{"html": "<div class=\"pre\">\n3      Legge n. 14 – Ratifica ed esecuzione del Protocollo tra il Governo della Repubblica italiana e il Consiglio dei ministri della Repubblica di Albania per il rafforzamento della collaborazione in materia migratoria nonché norme di coordinamento con l’ordinamento interno (law ratifying the protocol between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on the strengthening of cooperation in the field of migration and provisions for coordination with domestic legislation; ‘Law No 14/2024’) (GURI No 44 of 22 February 2024).\n\n4      These are the areas referred to in Annex 1 of the Protocol.\n\n5      Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).\n\n6      See, inter alia, Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (OJ L 2024/1351), and other instruments of the pact.\n\n7      Although some of the provisions of that pact are already partially in force, the date of entry into force of the abovementioned regulations is either 12 June or 1 July 2026.\n\n8      Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).\n\n9      Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96).\n\n10      Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31).\n\n11      Decreto legislativo No 142 – Attuazione della direttiva 2013/33/UE recante norme relative all’accoglienza dei richiedenti protezione internazionale, nonché della direttiva 2013/32/UE, recante procedure comuni ai fini del riconoscimento e della revoca dello status di protezione internazionale (Legislative Decree No 142 implementing Directive 2013/33/EU laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection as well as Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection), of 18 August 2015, (GURI No 214 of 15 September 2015, p. 1), in the version applicable to the facts in the main proceedings (‘Legislative Decree No 142/2015’) provides:\n\n12      The referring court notes that ‘the validation of detention orders must be requested by the Police Commissioner before the Court of Appeal of the place where he or she is based within 48 hours of the commencement of detention; the Court of Appeal is to take a decision within the following 48 hours’.\n\n13      Judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny (C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraphs 45 to 48and the case-law cited).\n\n14      Judgments of 15 June 1995, Zabala Erasun and Others (C‑422/93 to C‑424/93, EU:C:1995:183, paragraph 29), and of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others (C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).\n\n15      See, by analogy, judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others (C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraphs 24 to 26).\n\n16      In his Opinion in Sedrata (C‑414/25, EU:C:2026:334), Advocate General Emiliou examined the compatibility, in the light of Directive 2008/115, of the transfer, to the areas concerned, of third-country nationals who were the subject of return procedures.\n\n17      According to the information provided by the referring court, the subject matter of the main proceedings is the request to detain SG and AJ. The referring court notes that it is called upon to ‘validate the decision ordering [the detention of those persons], as detained person[s] seeking asylum’.\n\n18      See, to that effect, judgments of 15 February 2016, J.N. (C‑601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 75), and of 19 June 2018, Gnandi (C‑181/16, EU:C:2018:465, paragraphs 61 to 63).\n\n19      It should be clarified that, in the context of the first questions referred for a preliminary ruling, Article 46 of Directive 2013/32, on the right to an effective remedy against decisions on applications for international protection, is not relevant, since it is Article 9 of Directive 2013/33, which specifically governs the procedural guarantees offered to applicants for international protection who have been detained, which is the most relevant provision for determining the existence of any exclusive competence of the Union. Furthermore, the right to health care of applicants for international protection who have been detained, guaranteed by Articles 17 and 19 of Directive 2013/33, will not be examined in the context of the first questions referred for a preliminary ruling, since that question does not have a sufficiently direct link with the determination of exclusive competence of the Union within the meaning of Article 3(2) TFEU; instead, it will be analysed in the context of the second questions referred for a preliminary ruling, which must be answered in the alternative.\n\n20      Chamon, M., Implied Exclusive Powers in the ECJ’s Post-Lisbon Jurisprudence: The Continued Development of the ERTA Doctrine, in Common Market Law Review, vol. 55, No 4, 2018, pp. 1101–1141; Rosas, A., Exclusive, Shared and National Competence in the Context of EU External Relations: Do Such Distinctions Matter?, in I. Govaere, I., Lannon, E.,Van Elsuwege P, and Adams, S (ed.), The European Union in the World : Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau, Brill, Leyde, 2024, p. 17 to 43. \n\n21      See, by analogy, Opinion 1/13 (Accession of third States to the Hague Convention) of 14 October 2014 (EU:C:2014:2303, paragraph 70).\n\n22      Judgment of 31 March 1971 (22/70, ‘the ERTA judgment’, EU:C:1971:32).\n\n23      See judgment of 4 September 2014, Commission v Council (C‑114/12, EU:C:2014:2151, paragraph 66).\n\n24      Under Article 2(2) TFEU, in areas of shared competence, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. However, the Member States may only exercise their competence to the extent that the European Union has not exercised its competence, it being specified that they regain it to the extent that the European Union decides to cease exercising its competence. In accordance with Protocol (No 25) on the exercise of shared competence, when the Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only covers those elements governed by the Union act in question and therefore does not cover the whole area.\n\n25      See Rosas, A., cited in the footnote 20 of the present Opinion, p.22.\n\n26      It should be noted that Regulation No 604/2013 was adopted on the basis of Article 78(2)(e) TFEU. Directive 2013/32 was adopted on the basis of Article 78(2)(d) TFEU, while the legal basis of Directive 2013/33 is Article 78(2)(f) TFEU. Those legal bases fall under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which is part of the common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection, which the Union is required to develop pursuant to Article 78(1) TFEU.\n\n27      See, to that effect, judgment of 5 December 2017 (C‑600/14, EU:C:2017:935, paragraphs 45 to 49 and the case-law cited).\n\n28      EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 16 May 2017 (EU:C:2017:376, paragraphs 239 to 242).\n\n29      See paragraph 21 of the ERTA judgment, which refers to Article 5 EC. See also, for example, Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention No 170) of 19 March 1993 (EU:C:1993:106, paragraphs 10) and Opinion 1/03  (New Lugano Convention) of 7 February 2006 (EU:C:2006:81, paragraph 119).\n\n30      See, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2016, Council v Front Polisario (C‑104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, paragraphs 95 and 98), and of 12 November 2019, Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot (C‑363/18, EU:C:2019:954, paragraph 29). \n\n31      Strauss, M.J., Territorial Leases, in Nollkaemper, A., Plakokefalos, I., The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 67–70. \n\n32      See Ronen, Y., ‘Territory, Lease’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, which defines the territorial lease as an arrangement whereby a State receives the right to exercise the territorial authority of another State over a given territory, with full sovereignty remaining residual with the ceding State (accessed 27 May 2026, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1120). The territorial lease is a specific subcategory of the territorial concession, characterised by three elements: a fixed or determinable term; a consideration (which is not necessarily monetary); and an exclusive right to exercise State prerogatives in the territory concerned during the term of the lease. According to State practice and the terminology of territorial leases, ultimate sovereignty remains with the ceding State, since the difference between cession and lease may be small in practice, particularly during the term of the lease (see the section ‘Cession’ of that entry in the encyclopaedia). \n\n33      In that respect, it should be noted that the Court has held, in the cases giving rise to the judgments of 21 December 2016, Council v Front Polisario (C‑104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973), and of 27 February 2018, Western Sahara Campaign UK (C‑266/16, EU:C:2018:118), that the international characterisation of the territory is relevant for delimiting the territorial scope of EU law, and in particular that territories over which a third country claims sovereignty which is not internationally recognised do not automatically fall within the scope of the agreements concluded by the Union with that State. \n\n34      In that regard, the Court has already held that even if the facts of the case in the main proceedings do not fall directly within the field of application of EU law, provisions of EU law may be rendered applicable by domestic law due to a renvoi made by that law to the content of those provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 November 2018, C and A (C‑257/17, EU:C:2018:876, paragraph 31).\n\n35      See points 69 and 70 of the present Opinion\n\n36      See, a contrario, judgment of 7 March 2017, X and X (C‑638/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:173, paragraphs 42 to 45).\n\n37      See Articles 3(1), 10(5), 11(6) and 18(1)(a) of Directive 2013/33, which reserve the application of certain derogations to detention at the border or in a transit zone. See, also, the background to the case that gave rise to the judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary (Reception of applicants for international protection) (C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029).\n\n38      Judgment of 7 March 2017 (C‑638/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:173).\n\n39      C‑91/20, EU:C:2021:898, paragraph 40.\n\n40      In accordance with the principle of the primacy of EU law, as established since the judgment of 15 July 1964, Costa (6/64, EU:C:1964:66), and consistently confirmed by subsequent case-law, in particular the judgment of 21 December 2021, Euro Box Promotion and Others (C-357/19, C-379/19, C-547/19, C-811/19 and C-840/19, EU:C:2021:1034, paragraphs 250 and 251), the law of the Member States may not undermine the effect accorded to EU rules, without domestic provisions, whatever they may be, being able to prevent that.\n\n41      The conclusion of a bilateral agreement with a third state cannot have the effect of releasing a Member State from its obligation of ensuring compliance with fundamental rights (see, by analogy, ECtHR, 23 February 2012, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (CE:ECHR:2012:0223JUD002776509, &amp;sect; 129)).\n\n42      In the present cases, the detention decisions concerned are based, in the case of both applicants, on the ground provided for in Article 8(3)(d) of Directive 2013/33, transposed in Article 6(3) of Legislative Decree No 142/2015, namely the existence of reasonable grounds to consider that the application for international protection was made merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of a return decision adopted under Directive 2008/115. In the SG case, the detention decision is also based on the ground provided for in Article 8(3)(e) of Directive 2013/33, transposed in Article 6(2)(c) of Legislative Decree No 142/2015, namely the danger posed by the person concerned to public order and public security in the light of his criminal convictions..\n\n43      See judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary (Reception of applicants for international protection) (C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 159). \n\n44      According to Annex I of the Italy-Albania Protocol, facility B corresponds to the area intended for examining the conditions required for the recognition of international protection and for the return of migrants who do not have the right to enter and remain on Italian territory.\n\n45      Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU (OJ L, 2024/1348).\n\n46      Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ L 2024/1346).\n\n47      See, to that effect, Klamert, M., ‘Article 2 TFEU’, in Kellerbauer M., Klamert M., Tomkin J., The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, p. 356. \n\n48      Schütze R., European Union Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford (4th ed.) 2025, pp. 229–234. Chamon, M., ‘Implied exclusive powers in the ECJ’s post-Lisbon jurisprudence: The continued development of the ERTA doctrine’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 55, Issue 4, 2018, pp. 1101–1141 . Arena, A., ‘The Twin Doctrines of Primacy and Pre-Emption’, in Schütze, R, and Tridimas, T (eds), Oxford Principles of European Union Law: The European Union Legal Order, Oxford University Press, Oxford,: Vol. I (2018;, Oxford Law Pro), accessed 27 May 2026, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199533770.003.0012.\n\n49      Schütze, R., European Union Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2025, (4th ed.) p. 234.\n\n50      Judgment of 4 September 2014, Commission v Council (C‑114/12, EU:C:2014:2151, paragraph 66).\n\n51      Judgment of 4 September 2014, Commission v Council (C‑114/12, EU:C:2014:2151, paragraph 67).\n\n52      See, to that effect, judgments of 31 March 1971, ERTA (paragraph 30), and of 4 September 2014, Commission v Council (C‑114/12, EU:C:2014:2151, paragraph 68).\n\n53      Opinion 1/03 (New Lugano Convention) of 7 February 2006 (,EU:C:2006:81, paragraph 126).\n\n54      Judgment of 20 November 2018, Commission v Council (Antarctic MPAs), (C‑626/15 and C‑659/16, EU:C:2018:925, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited).\n\n55      Judgment of 4 September 2014, Commission v Council (C‑114/12, EU:C:2014:2151, paragraphs 70 and 71).\n\n56      Judgment of 20 November 2018, Commission v Council (Antarctic MPAs), (C‑626/15 and C‑659/16, EU:C:2018:925, paragraph 114 and the case-law cited).\n\n57      See, to that effect, Opinion 1/13 (Accession of third States to the Hague Convention) of 14 October 2014 (EU:C:2014:2303, paragraph 74); judgment of 26 November 2014, Green Network (C‑66/13, EU:C:2014:2399, paragraph 33); and Opinion 3/15 (Marrakesh Treaty on access to published works) of 14 February 2017 (EU:C:2017:114, paragraph 108).\n\n58      See points 62 to 64 [63 to 69] of the present Opinion.\n\n59      See, to that effect, judgment of 16 April 2026, Danané and Others (C‑50/24 to C‑56/24, EU:C:2026:301, paragraphs 43 and 47). Furthermore, in paragraph 62 of that judgment, the Court states that the dual classification of the same place complies with Directive 2013/33 only on condition that the Member States ensure full respect for the guarantees provided for in Articles 8 and 9 of that directive.\n\n60      See, to that effect, judgment of 16 April 2026, Danané and Others (C‑50/24 to C‑56/24, EU:C:2026:301, paragraphs 42 to 54), and Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou in those joined cases (C‑50/24 to C‑56/24, EU:C:2025:493, point 40).\n\n61      See points 63 to 69 of the present Opinion.\n\n62      See judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary (Reception of applicants for international protection) (C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 159 and the case-law cited).\n\n63      See judgments of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság (C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraph 252 and the case-law cited), and of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary (Reception of applicants for international protection) (C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 168).\n\n64      Judgment of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság (C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraph 250 and the case-law cited.\n\n65      See the footnote 42 of the present Opinion.\n\n66      See  Article 13(2) of the Italy-Albania Protocol.\n\n67      See, to that effect, judgment of 25 June 2020, Ministerio Fiscal (Authority likely to receive an application for international protection) (C‑36/20 PPU, EU:C:2020:495, paragraph 112).\n\n68      See, to that effect, judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson (C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19), and of 1 August 2025, BAJI Trans (C‑544/23, EU:C:2025:614, paragraph 49). \n\n69      See, to that effect, judgment of 15 February 2016, N. (C‑601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 56).\n\n70      See, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2022, Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet (Detention – Risk of committing a criminal offence) (C‑241/21, EU:C:2022:753, paragraph 47). \n\n71      See judgment of the ECtHR of 22 December 2020, Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (CE:ECHR:2020:1222JUD001430517, &amp;sect; 311 and the case-law cited). \n\n72      See, to that effect, judgment of the ECtHR of 15 December 2016, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (Application No 16483/12, CE:ECHR:2016:1215JUD001648312, &amp;sect;&amp;sect; 64 to 72 and the case-law cited).\n\n73      See, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2022, Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet (Detention – Risk of committing a criminal offence) (C‑241/21, EU:C:2022:753, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). \n\n74      See, to that effect, judgment of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság (C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraph 257). In particular, when the detention of an applicant for international protection is not limited in time, the determining authority, within the meaning of Article 2(f) of Directive 2013/32, must act with appropriate due diligence (paragraphs 262 to 264 of that judgment).\n\n75      See footnote 42 of the present Opinion.\n\n76      See also recital 15 of Directive 2013/33.\n\n77      See, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Ex officio review of detention) (C‑704/20 and C‑39/21, EU:C:2022:858, paragraph 84). \n\n78      See, to that effect, judgment of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság (C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraph 261).\n\n79      See, to that effect, judgment of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli (C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 77).\n\n80      See also Article 4(3) and (5) of Law No 14/2024 which sets out the practical arrangements for that remote link between the location of the foreign national concerned and that of his or her lawyer or the judge.\n\n81      See, to that effect, judgment of the ECtHR of 9 October 1979, Airey v. Ireland (CE:ECHR:1979:1009JUD000628973, &amp;sect; 26) on legal aid in non-criminal proceedings, and judgment of the ECtHR of 9 April 1984, Goddi v. Italy (CE:ECHR:1984:0409JUD000896680, &amp;sect; 31) on legal aid in criminal proceedings. \n\n82      See, to that effect, judgments of 15 February 2016, N. (C‑601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 62), and of 14 September 2017, K. (C‑18/16, EU:C:2017:680, paragraph 45).\n\n83      The wording of Article 4(5) of Law No 14/2024 states that that reimbursement is restricted to a ‘court-appointed’ lawyer, which appears to exclude lawyers freely chosen by their client.\n\n84      In that regard, the ECtHR has held that participation in the proceedings by videoconference is not, as such, incompatible with the notion of a fair and public hearing, but it must be ensured that the applicant is able to follow the proceedings and to be heard without technical impediments, and that effective and confidential communication with a lawyer is provided for (ECtHR, 2 November 2010, Sakhnovskiy v. Russia, CE:ECHR:2010:1102JUD002127203, &amp;sect; 98).\n\n85      That observation is made for the sake of completeness and will not be included in the operative part, since the referring court has not referred that question to the Court of Justice and that point has not been raised before the Court.\n\n86      It should be recalled that the Republic of Albania is not a Member State of the European Union, and is not, for that reason, bound by the obligations under Directive 2013/33 or by the rights guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter. The limitations that Albanian law may impose on access of lawyers to the areas concerned cannot therefore be subject to the same requirements of compatibility with EU law as those which are imposed on Member States. \n\n87      When detaining applicants for international protection, Article 10(4) of Directive 2013/33, read in conjunction with Article 8(2) of Directive 2013/32, guarantees that certain organisations have the right of access to applicants for international protection located at the external borders of the Member States or who are detained in their territory (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 November 2021, Commission v Hungary (Criminalisation of assistance to asylum seekers) (C‑821/19, EU:C:2021:930, paragraph 87). \n\n88      See, by analogy, judgment of 15 September 2011, Gueye and Salmerón Sánchez (C‑483/09 and C‑1/10, EU:C:2011:583, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).\n\n89      See, to that effect, judgment of 3 June 2025, Kinsa (C‑460/23, EU:C:2025:392, paragraph 47). \n\n90      The Italian Government explained at the hearing that the formalities took around 30 minutes, departing from Albania at 22:00 and arriving in Bari at 08:00.\n\n91      ECtHR, 6 November 1980, Guzzardi v. Italy CE:ECHR:1980:1106JUD000736776, &amp;sect;&amp;sect; 92 to 95.\n\n92      As regards Article 5 ECHR, the case-law of the ECtHR has held that administrative formalities associated with release cannot justify a delay of more than a few hours (see ECtHR, 4 June 2015, Ruslan Yakovenko v. Ukraine (CE:ECHR:2015:0604JUD000542511, &amp;sect;&amp;sect; 68 and 69), (delay of 2 days), and of 22 March 1995, Quinn v. France (CE:ECHR:1995:0322JUD001858091, &amp;sect;&amp;sect; 39 to 43) (delay of 11 hours)). See also the judgment of 21 September 2021, Kerem Çiftçi v. Türkiye (CE:ECHR:2021:0921JUD003520509, &amp;sect;&amp;sect; 32 to 34), regarding deprivation of liberty of one and a half hours, where the arrest of a person lacked any legal basis.\n\n93      The wording of that question refers inter alia to Articles 8 to 10, 17, 19 and 26 of Directive 2013/33, as well as to Articles 26 and 46 of Directive 2013/32\n\n94      See, to that effect, judgment of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság (C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraphs 258 and 291), in which the Court held that detention could not result from the mere fact that the applicant was in a specific place because of circumstances created by the national authorities themselves.\n\n95      See footnote 42 of the present Opinion. \n\n96      See point 97 of the present Opinion.\n\n97      On the autonomous interpretation of those terms, see point 75 of the present Opinion\n\n98      See, to that effect, judgment of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság (C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraph 238).\n\n99      I note that Article 9(3) of Council Directive 2013/33/EC provides for the immediate release of the applicant concerned where the detention is ‘held to be unlawful’. A situation in which the measure restricting personal freedom ceases to have effect, due to the absence of validation within the prescribed time limits, appears to be comparable with the situation covered by that provision.\n\n100      See points 125 and 126 of the present Opinion.\n\n101      See points 109 and 112 of the present Opinion.\n\n102      The geographical separation between the lawyer and his or her client during the hearing, such as is arranged by Article 4(5) of Law No 14/2024, is likely to compromise the confidentiality of their exchanges during that hearing.\n\n103      At the hearing, JA’s lawyer indicated that his client’s mobile phone had been confiscated, and that he only had 15 minutes each day to interview his client, whereas the persons placed in other facilities in the Italian Republic had greater access to their lawyer. \n\n104      See points 109 and 112 of the present Opinion.\n\n      See point 115 of the present Opinion.\n\n105      Article 9(2) of the Italy-Albania Protocol provides for access only as regards the guarantee of the rights of the defence.\n\n106      See points 119 and 120 of the present Opinion.</div>", "next": 0}