{"html": "<div class=\"lf-doc\"><p class=\"lf-p\">Dutch employment rules limiting applicants for international protection to working for a maximum of 24 weeks within a 52-week period was incompatible with Article 15(2) of the 2013 Directive.30 That restriction affected all protection applicants and, as well as limiting how much work they could undertake in the event that they succeeded in finding employment, operated as a significant barrier to obtaining employment in the first place. The evidence was that the 24-week limit was the major obstacle to protection applicants entering the labour market and that in fact only some 4% of eligible 30 Rulings 202303122/1/V6 ECLI:NL:RVS:2023:4341 and 202305065/1/V6 ECLI:NL:RVS:2023:4418, both given on 29 November 2023.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Page 69 of 86 applicants had obtained a work permit (which had to be applied for by the prospective employer). On the basis of such evidence, it is unsurprising that the court concluded that the effect of the 24-week limit was that protection applicants did not have a fair opportunity to participate in the labour market and that such limit was a measure that undermined the purpose and effectiveness of the 2013 Directive. The relevant provisions of Dutch law therefore prevented “effective access” to the labour market for international protection applicants. In light of the evidence as to the very small proportion of international protection applicants that succeeded in obtaining a work permit, and as to the role of the 24-week limit as the “major obstacle” to access, that conclusion appears to have been inevitable.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">116.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The impugned provisions of the 2018 Regulations do not impose any comparable restriction, nor is there any comparable evidence of the impact of those provisions on labour market access here (or, indeed, any evidence whatever, save for the evidence of the limited impact on AM). On their face, the 2018 Regulations appear to provide for “effective access” to the labour market, access that, in the language of the Judge, is “real and not illusory” (§69). Furthermore, the access provided for by the 2018 Regulations appears to be clearly capable of fulfilling the underlying objectives of granting labour market access in the first place, as identified in the travaux préparatoires of the 2003 and 2013 Directives and discussed in KS. Such access is, as the Judge found, “capable of bringing about a level of self-sufficiency and a dignified standard of living” for protection applicants as well as preventing exclusion and facilitating integration.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Page 70 of 86 117.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Here, in contrast to the Dutch actions, there is no evidence that the exclusion of employment in the public sector effectively prevents access to employment in the State or deprives protection applicants of a “fair opportunity” to access employment in practice. AM’s own experience belies any such suggestion. His complaint is not that he was excluded from seeking or obtaining employment but that he was precluded from seeking or getting a job in his particular (and highly specific) preferred area of employment (public sector pharmacy). Nothing in the language, structure, legislative history or purpose of the 2013 Directive suggests that it was intended to confer on protection applicants a right to access their preferred employment, or any right to access employment that precisely matches their individual qualifications, experience and career aspirations and/or maximises their earning capacity. Such a right would go much beyond what was necessary to give effect to the objectives of the 2013 Directive, as reflected in its legislative history and as explained in KS and the other CJEU decisions discussed above.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">118.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In my view it is clear that, for the purposes of Article 15(2) of the 2013 Directive, the issue of “effective access” falls to be assessed objectively, not by reference to the subjective preferences of individual protection applicants. And whether or not access is “effective” is the critical issue in this context. Member States are entitled to impose conditions on access and Article 15 neither prescribes nor proscribes any particular condition: the essential question is whether, in any given case, the effect of the conditions imposed is to deny or frustrate “effective access” to the labour market.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Page 71 of 86 119.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Here, there is no evidence that the labour market access provided for by the 2018 Regulations does not constitute “effective access” and the available evidence is in fact the other way. There may be cases where it might be difficult to assess whether access is “effective”: however, on the evidence here, this is not a marginal or closely-balanced case. In my view, that is sufficient to dispose of this aspect of AM’s appeal.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">120.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I am not persuaded that in assessing whether the 2018 Regulations comply with the State’s obligation to ensure “effective access” to the labour market, the Court is required to undertake any separate proportionality analysis of the public sector employment exclusion in Regulation 11(9)(a). The obligation to provide labour market access in Article 15 is expressly qualified by the recognition of the general competence of Member States to impose conditions on such access. Article 15 contains its own express limitation on that competence — the requirement that access must be “effective”.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Effectiveness is therefore the litmus test. In my view, a condition that does not impair or undermine “effective access” is not subject to challenge on the basis of a further, free-standing, proportionality analysis. No basis for such an approach is apparent from the terms of Article 15 itself, from KS or, indeed, the background material to the 2003 and 2013 Directives (none of which make any reference to proportionality in the context of labour market access).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">121.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I should note in this context that in its decisions on the validity of the Dutch law limiting asylum applicants to 24 weeks of work in a 52 week period, the Raad van State went on to suggest that access to the labour market was a right that asylum seekers had in principle and was therefore the general rule and that it followed that any limitation to Page 72 of 86 such a general rule had to be interpreted strictly. The starting point for that aspect of the Raad van State’s analysis was §68 of KS (which is set out in full above and which, in relevant part, states that access to the labour market is a reception condition within the meaning of the 2013 Directive and, as such, one of “the rights and benefits conferred by that directive on any applicant for international protection whose application has not been finally determined”). The Raad van State then referred to two CJEU decisions, neither of which was concerned with the 2013 Directive (one was the familiar decision of the Grand Chamber in Case C-140/20 GD v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána ECLI:EU:C:2022:258), as authority for the proposition that any exception to such a “general rule” must be interpreted strictly.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">122.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Raad van State went on to say that the 24-week restriction could not be justified precisely because it did not provide “effective access” to the labour market.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">123.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as the Raad van State intended to identify a further or different threshold for judicially reviewing the validity of conditions on labour market access that may be imposed by a Member State, one differing from, or in addition to, the threshold of “effective access” provided for in Article 15(2) of the 2013 Directive – and that is not entirely clear – I do not, with respect, find this aspect of its rulings persuasive. That the right to access the labour market provided for in Article 15 of the 2013 Directive is a “reception condition” (though not a “material reception condition”) within the meaning of the Directive is clear. It follows that it is indeed one of “the rights and benefits conferred by [the] [D]irective on [asylum applicants]”. In my opinion, that is all that the CJEU was saying in §68 of KS. Nowhere in the CJEU’s judgment in KS (or in the Page 73 of 86 Opinion of the Advocate General) is there any indication that labour market access is a general right and/or that the entitlement of Member States to attach conditions to such access is subject to strict scrutiny or to judicial review on any basis other than the express requirement in Article 15(2) that such access must be “effective access” and, as I have said, such an argument does not find any support in the language, structure, purpose or legislative history of the 2013 Directive (or its 2003 predecessor). Any right of access to the labour market is qualified by the competence of Member States to impose conditions on access, subject always to ensuring that the access granted is “effective”. The test of “effective access” ensures that the level of access permitted by Member States is such as to promote and support the objectives of providing for labour market access in the first place, while respecting the competence of Member States to impose conditions on such access.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">124.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In any event, the application of a proportionality/justification test would make no material difference on the facts here. Even if Article 15 is regarded as conferring a right of access to the labour market, that right is inherently qualified and Members States are given a broad discretion to “decide the conditions for granting access to the labour market for the applicant, in accordance with their national law” (subject always to ensuring “effective access”). Thus, we are not here concerned with limitations on the exercise of a Treaty right, such as the right of nationals of other Member States to access employment in the State. As a matter of basic principle, conditions on the exercise of the Article 15 “right” should not be subject to the same intensity of review as would national limitations on the exercise of a fundamental EU Treaty right. Furthermore, Article 15(2) clearly leaves a significant area of policy choice with Member States and Page 74 of 86 that also affects the intensity of review: see generally Craig and de Búrca, EU Law:</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Text, Cases, and Materials (8th ed; 2024) (“Craig and de Búrca”), pages 581-588.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">125.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In fact, even as regards the free movement of workers guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU, Article 45(4) provides for an exception for employment in the public service. That exception is undoubtedly narrower in scope than that in Regulation 11(9) of the 2018 Regulations, extending only to positions in the public service that involve the exercise of public law powers: Craig and de Búrca, pages 788-791. That strict approach is justified by the fact that Article 45(4) derogates from fundamental principles of free movement and non-discrimination which are cornerstones of the EU legal order. It simply does not follow that the competence of Member States to impose conditions restricting or excluding access to public sector employment under Article 15 of the 2013 Directive is to be read as subject to an equivalent limitation.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">126.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Article 45(4) TFEU is nonetheless relevant as recognising a distinction between public service employment and other areas of employment. In the circumstances here, the State was, in principle, entitled to draw that distinction when giving effect to the 2013 Directive, based not only on the fact that many of the public service positions excluded by Regulation 11(9) do, in fact, involve the exercise of public law powers such as would bring them within the scope of Article 45(4) TFEU but also on the fact that, in general, public sector employment is based on permanent – or at least long-term – employment.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">That is certainly the predominant model of employment in the public sector. No doubt, there may be parts of the public sector where shorter term employment is available but certainty and clarity were also important considerations in this context. Furthermore, Page 75 of 86 the State was entitled to take the view that the prospect of access to employment in any capacity in the public sector might operate as a “pull factor” – an entirely legitimate and reasonable reason for such provisions – (as indeed the Judge found) and that past employment in the public sector might, in the event of international protection ultimately being refused, provide a basis for the applicant to seek to resist removal from the State.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">127.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">These were matters for the State to weigh. Proportionality review does not, either as a matter of EU law or Irish law, involve courts making policy judgements. The question for the court is whether the policy judgement made by the State was within permissible parameters. In my view, it is clear that the policy judgement made here, to which effect is given in Regulation 11(9) of the 2018 Regulations, pursues legitimate and important State interests and the means adopted by the State to protect those interests do not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose and do not impose an excessive burden on eligible applicants for international protection, who under the Regulations have “effective access” to the labour market for the reasons already set out. Regulation 11(9) is therefore a justified and proportionate limitation of applicants’ rights to access the labour market here.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">128.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">That conclusion is not called into question by Article 15 of the Charter. I agree with Hogan J’s analysis of Article 15 in NHV. Article 15 does not confer on applicants for international protection a free-standing right to choose an occupation or engage in work.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as applicants have such a right, it derives from, and is subject to the limitations in, Article 15 of the 2013 Directive. The principles underpinning Article 15 of the Page 76 of 86 Charter may in a general way inform the interpretation of the Directive but Article 15 does not have the effect of giving what, as a matter of law, is a conditional right arising from a measure of EU secondary law, the status of a Charter right nor does it alter the fundamental question arising under Article 15 of the Directive, namely whether the State here has complied with its obligation to ensure “effective access” to the labour market.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Is a Reference to the CJEU necessary?</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">129.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Finally, it is necessary to consider the question of a reference.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">130.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The proper approach to that question was explained by the CJEU (Grand Chamber) in Case C-561/19 Consorzio Italian Management ECLI:EU:C:2021:799 as follows: “66 … Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law must comply with its obligation to bring before the Court [of Justice] a question concerning the interpretation of EU law that has been raised before it, unless it finds that that question is irrelevant or that the provision of EU law in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Page 77 of 86 131.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">This is, of course, a court “against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law”. The question of interpretation of EU law which AM suggests requires to be referred relates to the interpretation of Article 15 and, specifically, whether conditions on access to the labour market imposed by Member States under Article 15(2) are subject to a proportionality test or (as it was also put) whether such a proportionality test is an element of the concept of “effective access” in Article 15(2).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">132.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I have reached a clear view on that question, based on the text and purpose of Article 15, its legislative history and the approach taken by the Advocate General and the CJEU in KS. I understand the other members of the Court to agree with that view. In deciding whether to make a reference in any given case, a national court of final appeal (as this Court is) must of course faithfully apply the test articulated by the CJEU in Consorzio Italian Management but the actual application of that test is a matter for the national court. In my view, there is no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the correct interpretation of the 2013 Directive in terms of the test that should be applied where it is said that a Member State has failed to comply with the requirements of the Directive in relation to labour market access. That is the test expressly prescribed by the Directive — whether that Member State has ensured “effective access”. The application of that test here is, on the evidence, equally clear.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">133.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Furthermore, and in any event, the question as to whether conditions imposed by Member States in respect of access to the labour market are subject to a distinct and/or additional proportionality review is not ultimately relevant to the resolution of this appeal, as the answer to that question is not, in the circumstances here, capable of Page 78 of 86 affecting the determination of the appeal. Even if a proportionality test applies, AM’s challenge to Regulation 11(9) would fail for the reasons already set out above. The concrete application of such a test on the facts here is, of course, a matter for the national court, not the CJEU, and therefore it is not on any view necessary or appropriate to make a reference.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Page 79 of 86 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 134.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">My principal conclusions may be summarised as follows:</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(1)</span>The essential issue presented in this appeal is whether, by effectively excluding employment in the public sector, the 2018 Regulations impermissibly restrict the entitlement of applicants for international protection in the State to seek employment in the State while waiting for a decision on their applications.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(2)</span>In some circumstances, applicants for international protection enjoy a constitutional right to seek employment (NHV v Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESC 35, [2018] 1 IR 246 (“NHV”)). Separately, as a matter of EU law – specifically Article 15 of the Reception Conditions Directive, to which Ireland “opted in” in the aftermath of the decision in NHV – Member States have a duty to ensure that applicants for international protection “have access to the labour market” while waiting for their applications to be determined.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(3)</span>In each case the right is qualified. NHV makes it clear that the constitutionallyderived right of protection applicants to seek employment in the State differs significantly from the right enjoyed by citizens and that the State is entitled to impose significant restrictions on it. The EU right is also qualified. In the first place, it applies only if “no later than 9 months from the date [of] the application … a first instance decision … has not been [made]” (and subject to the proviso that “the delay cannot be attributed to the applicant”): Article 15(1) of the 2013 Directive. Secondly, and more Page 80 of 86 significantly, Member States are competent to “decide the conditions for granting access to the labour market”, subject to “ensuring that applicants have effective access to the labour market”: Article 15(2). What constitutes “effective access” for this purpose, how that question is properly to be assessed and whether or not the 2018 Regulations ensure “effective access” are central questions in this appeal.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(4)</span>The evidence put before the High Court by AM was in a number of important respects very limited. Beyond the limited evidence of his particular experience as an applicant for international protection, AM did not present any evidence of how the LMAP regime actually functions in practice for applicants for international protection in the State or as to the concrete effect of Regulation 11(9)(a) and Schedule 6 of the 2018 Regulations (the provisions impugned by AM) on labour market access in the State.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(5)</span>What is clear from the evidence, however, is that AM was issued with an LMAP in a timely way, that he was as a matter of fact able to access employment without any significant delay (and in the pharmacy sector, though not in a position commensurate with his particular expertise and experience), at a rate of pay well in excess of the statutory minimum wage, and that his application for international protection was determined reasonably quickly (within a period of 9½ months). AM’s only specific complaint about his employment is essentially financial, namely that he would have expected to earn considerably more than he did if he had been able to obtain employment at an “appropriate level.”</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Page 81 of 86</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(6)</span>In the absence of such evidence, there is inevitably a somewhat abstract quality to AM’s case, effectively involving a claim that the exclusion of employment in the public sector – an exclusion that affected AM only for a very short period of time – is per se an infringement of the Constitution and/or a breach of the Article 15 right of “effective access” to the labour market. On any view, however, the 2018 Regulations appear to provide for broad access to the labour market given that, as a matter of fact, most employment in the State (including in the pharmacy sector) is in the private sector.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(7)</span>For the purposes of employment, both Irish and EU law (and the Refugee Convention itself) draw a clear distinction between the position of applicants for asylum/international protection and those whose claims to asylum/international protection have been recognised. Applicants for international protection in the host country are permitted to enter and remain in the host country solely by reason of making a claim to such protection and for the purposes of having such claim appropriately assessed. Their presence while that claim is assessed is conditional, contingent and provisional. As the Judge here found, many such claims turn out, on assessment, to be unfounded (though that was clearly not the case in respect of AM’s claim). In the employment context, the position of such applicants cannot be equated with those who have been granted international protection and who as a result have an entitlement to reside long-term in the host country. Allowing unqualified access to the labour market to beneficiaries of international protection reflects their particular status and that longterm entitlement to remain.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Page 82 of 86</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(8)</span>This Court in NHV found that the absolute and indefinite exclusion of asylum applicants from seeking employment in the State was constitutionally impermissible.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">However, the Court also made it clear that the Executive and the Oireachtas are permitted to impose significant restrictions on the employment of asylum seekers and, as the branches of government to which such matters are assigned, the courts should give “considerable latitude” to their judgement.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(9)</span>It cannot plausibly be suggested that the restrictions on the employment of international protection applicants in the 2018 Regulations, and in particular the exclusion of employment in the public sector, negate the “essence” or “core” of their constitutional right to seek employment or otherwise fail to satisfy the constitutional standard articulated in NHV. Notwithstanding the exclusion of the public sector, the 2018 Regulations provide for broad access to employment in the State, both generally and with specific reference to the pharmacy sector. There is no evidence on which this Court could properly conclude that the exclusion of employment in the public sector has the effect of frustrating the right of access recognised in NHV or undermining its objectives. All the (limited) evidence was the other way: AM was able to obtain employment, as a pharmacy technician in a community pharmacy, at a reasonable wage, in the period prior to the determination of his international protection application. That was a responsible and well-paid position that, on its face more than met the objectives of dignity, socialisation and social inclusion, financial independence and selfsufficiency and self-worth which the right to seek employment identified by this Court in NHV was intended to promote and secure.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Page 83 of 86</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(10)</span>As regards AM’s EU law challenge, there is no evidence that the exclusion of employment in the public sector effectively prevented access to employment in the State or deprived protection applicants of a “fair opportunity” to access employment in practice. AM’s own experience belies any such suggestion. Nothing in the language, structure, legislative history or purpose of the 2013 Directive suggests that it was intended to confer on protection applicants a right to access their preferred employment, or any right to access employment that precisely matches their individual qualifications, experience and career aspirations and/or maximises their earning capacity. Such a right would go much beyond what was necessary to give effect to the objectives of the Directive, as reflected in its legislative history and as explained in KS and the other CJEU decisions discussed above.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(11)</span>For the purposes of Article 15(2) of the 2013 Directive, the issue of “effective access” falls to be assessed objectively, not by reference to the subjective preferences of individual protection applicants. Whether or not access is “effective” is the critical issue in this context. Member States are entitled to impose conditions on access and Article 15 neither prescribes nor proscribes any particular condition: the essential question is whether, in any given case, the effect of the conditions imposed is to deny or frustrate “effective access” to the labour market.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(12)</span>Here, there is no evidence that the labour market access provided for by the 2018 Regulations does not constitute “effective access” and the available evidence is in fact the other way. There may be cases where it might be difficult to assess whether access Page 84 of 86 is “effective”: however, on the evidence here, this is not a marginal or closely-balanced case. That was sufficient to dispose of this aspect of AM’s appeal.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(13)</span>In assessing whether the 2018 Regulations comply with the State’s obligation to ensure “effective access” to the labour market, the Court was not required to undertake a separate proportionality analysis of the public sector employment exclusion in Regulation 11(9). The obligation to provide labour market access in Article 15 is expressly qualified by the recognition of the general competence of Member States to impose conditions on such access. Article 15 contains its own express limitation on that competence — the requirement that access must be “effective”. Effectiveness is therefore the litmus test. A condition that does not impair or undermine “effective access” is not subject to challenge on the basis of a further, free-standing, proportionality analysis. No basis for such an approach is apparent from the terms of Article 15 itself, from KS or, indeed, the background material to the 2003 and 2013 Directives (none of which make any reference to proportionality in this context).</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(14)</span>In any event, the application of a proportionality/justification test would make no material difference on the facts here. Even if Article 15 is regarded as conferring a right of access to the labour market, that right is inherently qualified and Article 15(2) gives Members States a broad discretion to “decide the conditions for granting access to the labour market for the applicant, in accordance with their national law” (subject always to ensuring “effective access”). In imposing conditions on access, the State was, in principle, entitled to draw a distinction between public and private sector employment.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It is clear that the policy judgement made by the State here, to which effect is given in Page 85 of 86 Regulation 11(9) of the 2018 Regulations, pursues legitimate and important State interests and the means adopted by the State to protect those interests do not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose and do not impose an excessive burden on eligible applicants for international protection, who under the Regulations have “effective access” to the labour market. Regulation 11(9) is therefore a justified and proportionate limitation of the applicant’s right to access the labour market here.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(15)</span>That conclusion is not called into question by Article 15 of the Charter. Article 15 does not confer on applicants for international protection a free-standing right to choose an occupation or engage in work. Insofar as applicants have such a right, it derives from, and is subject to the limitations in, Article 15 of the 2013 Directive. Article 15 does not have the effect of giving what, as a matter of law, is a conditional right arising from a measure of EU secondary law, the status of a Charter right nor does it alter the fundamental question arising under Article 15 of the Directive, namely whether the State here has complied with its obligation to ensure “effective access” to the labour market.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(16)</span>In the circumstances, it was not necessary to make a reference to the CJEU.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">135.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">AM’s appeal must therefore be dismissed.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Page 86 of 86</p></div>", "next": 0}