{"html": "<div class=\"lf-doc\"><p class=\"lf-p\">Party’s application for permission. The Applicant now purports to impugn the Commission’s Decision, the subject matter of the within proceedings, on the basis of same, by reference to Core Ground No. 5, and the Applicant is not entitled to do so (see at §57 of the Statement of Opposition).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Applicant’s Position: (c) This contention is rejected by the Applicant. The Applicant specifically refers on pages 5, 6 and 7 of his appeal to the Commission to the developer’s disregard of the planning laws, and indeed non-compliance with the planning laws to include unauthorised development.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">5.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Points contended to have been both made in the process and also pleaded:Respondent’s Position: (a) Without prejudice to the foregoing objections, the Commission’s position in respect of the Applicant’s pleaded case has been set out in the Commission’s Statement of Opposition and its legal submissions.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Applicant’s Position: (a) The Applicant’s position in respect of the pleaded case is set out in sufficient detail in the Statement Required to Ground Application for Judicial Review setting out the Core Grounds, the particularization of same and the Factual Background, together with the grounding Affidavit of the Applicant supported by exhibits attached thereto, and also in the Legal Submissions as filed.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">65.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regard pleadings the overall context is as follows. As now put in O. 103 r. 14(3) RSC (but O. 84 r. 20(3) RSC is similar) (emphasis added): “(3) It shall not be sufficient for an applicant to give as any of his or her grounds for the purposes of paragraphs (II) or (III) of sub-rule (1)(a)(ii) an assertion in general terms of the ground concerned, but the applicant should state precisely each such ground, giving particulars where appropriate, and identify in respect of each ground the facts or matters relied upon as supporting that ground.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">66.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">These issues can be disposed of as follows: (i) The submission under core ground 1 that the commission failed in their obligation to properly and/or meaningfully engage with the inspector’s report, the submissions made in respect of the application and the application documentation (at §18 of the applicant’s submissions) is not adequately pleaded under core ground 1. (ii) The submission under core ground 1 that the commission failed to meaningfully engage with the application made to it and its decision to grant permission without the condition in respect of the temporary duration of the permission is fundamentally an error of law and of fact (at §18 of the applicant’s submissions) is not adequately pleaded under core ground 1. This is in substance pleaded under core ground 3.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">27 (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv) The plea at sub-ground 15 of the statement of grounds that condition 3 of the commission’s order “significantly expands potentially the impact of the airport” is acceptably clear in its context in that it implies an unlawfully wide discretion being conferred on the council via condition 3.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regards sub-grounds 22 and 23, I agree that the placing of these under the heading of core ground 3 is misconceived and that, as the commission contends, have “no nexus” to that ground. If they are placed in the context of core grounds 7 to 11 they make somewhat more sense and can be considered in that context subject to the following.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I agree with the commission that the complaint that the commission “failed to formulate a test which complied with its obligations under Schedule 7 of the Planning an [sic] Development Regulations” is too vague to comply with pleading requirements especially in an EU law context. What test and what process of formulation are we talking about? The tests for EIA are set out in EU law and are not up for formulation or reformulation by the commission in any given case.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The claim in sub-ground 23 that “In failing to consider how the preliminary examination was required to be conducted and in failing to consider what information was required in respect of the receiving environment the Respondent failed to conduct the preliminary examination in respect of Council Directive 92/43EEC and in accordance with its mandatory obligations” is misconceived and can be rejected in limine by reason of a failure to plead how such a non-existent procedure arises.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">There is no preliminary examination procedure under the directive referred to.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as certain core grounds particularly core ground 4 do not have significant or any particulars, that just has the effect that the applicant is limited to what is acceptably clear from the core ground itself. There is no absolute rule that all core grounds must have sub-grounds if they are acceptably clear in themselves.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regards the complaint that it has not been particularised how the planning authority allegedly has “been afforded unrestricted rights in respect of the airport by virtue of condition 3” as per core ground 4, this can be read in the context of the other pleas as being a reformulated complaint about the alleged unlawfully wide discretion afforded to the council pursuant to condition 3.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The unparticularised complaint under core ground 5 that the commission approved “an application that failed to comply with the Planning and Development Act 2000 and the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, and in particular the public notice fails to comply with Articles 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 (Amended),” fails to comply with pleading requirements. Only the specific provisions cited and explained on the pleadings could be the basis for relief.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as core ground 6 and/or sub-ground 28 contain generalised complaints of mis-description, those are inadequately particularised (such complaints need to be a lot more specific) except in relation to the particular matters mentioned regarding the two allegedly incorrect locations for houses, what the applicant refers to as “the misrepresentation of the location and number of dwellinghouses adjacent to the runway”.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I agree with the commission that the alleged obligation on the commission to address unauthorised development at sub-ground 29 is not sufficiently pleaded.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">What is missing is the basis of this obligation – is it meant to be statute (if so what statute) or administrative law, or public policy, and what is the extent of the obligation – is it an obligation to ensure that all unauthorised development in the redlined area is addressed, or something more or less than that? This is insufficiently clear on the pleadings. I will nonetheless consider the merits of the argument below but formally it fails as inadequately pleaded.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It is not clear to me that sub-ground 31 bears any real nexus to core ground 7. But core ground 7 is fundamentally misconceived in any event for reasons outlined below. There is no stateable EIA argument in this case.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In themselves core ground 8 and sub-ground 32 do contain a discernible point, but it is wholly misconceived in any event as EIA does not apply here.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I agree that core ground 11, repeated at sub-ground 35, is very light on particulars.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The AA issue can however be given some meaning if pieced together in tandem with statements elsewhere in the pleadings and I will deal further below with that complaint. Core ground 11 in its generalised form adds little however.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It is correct that the applicant when appealing did not argue for a five-year limitation.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">However given that there was no first-party appeal, one would be inclined to the 28 view that it would be too onerous to rule out the applicant’s point merely on the basis that he did not anticipate the outcome that the five-year limit would be dropped. However no final decision on that is necessary as will become apparent below given how the issue is disposed of on the merits. (xvi) As regards the applicant’s failure to contend that what is now condition 3 conferred “unrestricted rights”, the condition still has to be interpreted. That interpretation does not change depending on the extent of the applicant’s submissions. It is not necessary in the light of the interpretation adopted in the judgment below to consider whether relief should be refused since no relief arises on foot of that interpretation. (xvii) Insofar as there are generalised references to non-compliance with planning law in the process, these relate to the alleged unauthorised development, not breaches of the planning regulations. In the absence of any point as to the planning regulations having been raised and/or of this making any demonstrable difference to the applicant or compromising the process overall it would be inappropriate to grant relief on such a basis in any event.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">67.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">We can turn now to the specific grounds.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Domestic law issues Core ground 1 – limited time of the previous permission 68.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 1 is: “1.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent planning appeals board erred in law in deciding to grant planning permission in respect of an airstrip in circumstances where the proposed development represented and sought a continuation of the development permitted under register reference no. 17/1784 which permission was granted in respect of the airstrip/airport for a temporary period of five years, and the application was lodged and proceeded with on that basis.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">69.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “Applicant:The application before the Respondent, who appointed an Inspector to advise, describes the proposed development the sub-matter of application ABP-319221-24 as for the ‘continued use of the field as an air strip. The proposed development relates to formerly approved planning application no. 17/1784 which received a temporary permission for 5 years for the use of the field as an airstrip.’ The proposed development as submitted was specifically referenced to the previous permission granted. The proposed development was first granted permission under register reference 10/1103 where the permission granted by the Respondent Planning Appeals Board under reference no. 07/238257 granted the permission for a temporary period of 5 years. There was no change in circumstances that would warrant the departure from this decision and the principles of res judicata apply relative to that decision in the absence of any change of circumstances.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Subsequent to that decision, planning permission 17/1784 was applied for and the planning authority granted planning permission on the same basis. The said application the submatter of these proceedings expressly references in the documentation lodged both of these decisions and represented on that basis that the application was made on a similar basis to these previous decisions in respect of which the Second Notice Party made no objection.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Applicant in the appeal made to the Board made on his behalf by Dolan &amp; Associates proceeded on the basis that the application is for a temporary period and both the submission of the Applicant in these proceedings and the assessment by the Inspector is conducted on the basis and determined both in respect of the Planning and Development Act, the Habitats Directive and the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive that the permission is granted on a temporary basis. Accordingly, the proposed decision to grant full permission in accordance with the plans and permissions lodged and particularly condition 3 which significantly expands potentially the impact of the airport is ultra vires the Respondent, invalid and void.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent Planning Appeals Commission has failed in their obligation to properly and/or meaningfully engage with the Inspectors Report, the submissions made in respect of the application and the planning application documentation. The decision of the Respondent Planning Appeals Commission to grant permission for a development, which is in effect a totally different development than what was applied for in the application for permission, and in effect by virtue of the decision made, as opposed to what was applied for, established a use as a permanent airstrip/airport on the lands as opposed to the personal use of the lands to the applicant for planning permission for a temporary period, and was a fundamentally different development to that in respect of which the submissions and/or observations lodged by the Applicant and affected parties, and is a totally different 29 development than was considered by the Inspector. The Respondent Commission failed to meaningfully engage with the application made to it and its decision to grant permission without the recommendation condition in respect of the temporary duration of the permission is fundamentally an error of law and of fact.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Respondent:The Commission repeats its objections as outlined in Section H above in respect of (i) §18 of the Applicant’s submissions, (ii) the plea at E15 of the Statement of Grounds and (iii) the Applicant’s failure to assert before the Commission that it was limited to granting permission for a period of five years on the basis that the principle of res judicata applied. As regards, the substance of Core Ground 1, the Commission makes three points.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First, the Applicant’s complaints are premised on the contention that the application for permission was made on the basis that any grant of permission authorising the proposed development would be subject to a five year limitation. The application documentation nor the Inspector’s analysis of the proposed development do not support this contention. The application for permission was not made on qualified temporal terms. Rather, the Applicant’s contentions here offend against the well-settled principle that the Commission’s Decision should be read holistically and in a way that makes sense and renders it valid rather than invalid as opposed to reading it in the most erroneous way possible so that the Applicant can obtain certiorari.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Second, the Applicant contends that because the Planning Authority had previously granted permission for the use of part of the agricultural field as an airstrip for a period of five years under permission (Reg Ref: 17/1784—13th February 2018), the Commission was bound to only granting permission for a period of five years for the proposed development as there was ‘no change in circumstances that would warrant the departure from this decision and the principles of res judicata apply relative to that decision in the absence of any change of circumstances’. This proposition is untenable and does not accord with the Commission’s obligations under s.37 and s.34(2)(a) of the 2000 Act to consider applications/appeals de novo and on the basis of an informed and objective assessment of the planning and environmental merits of any given proposal. The Commission was required to consider the application which was before it. It is not bound by previous decisions in the manner suggested by the Applicant.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Third and without prejudice to the Commission’s objections in respect of §18 of the Applicant’s submissions, the Applicant’s reliance on the Court’s decisions in Konisberry -vAn Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 194 and Walsh -v- An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 533 in aid of impugning the Commission’s Decision is misconceived. Those cases concerned situations where the relevant Inspector recommended that a grant of permission be made but the Commission ultimately decided to refuse permission. With respect, it is in that context that the respective Courts in Konisberry and Walsh outline that there was a requirement on the Commission to engage with the Inspector’s Report in a meaningful way so as to ensure compliance with the Commission’s duty under s.34(10)(b) of the 2000 Act.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In contradistinction, in this case, the Commission decided to grant permission for the proposed development generally in accordance with the Inspector's recommendation.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Commission Direction explained that the Commission was satisfied to grant the application for the full permission applied for by the Notice Party and that it did not note any justification to limit the grant of permission to five years.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">70.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">If this suggests that the application could only be treated as a five-year application that is not correct.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">71.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">If this suggests that the commission could not grant a five-year permission in view of the limited duration of the previous permission(s), this point is misconceived and, as the commission says, “untenable”. Many permissions are granted for a specified time period. That does not operate as a bar on a future application for permission for an additional time period or indefinitely.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Administrative bodies do not operate on some kind of res judicata, Henderson v. Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100-basis that one bite of the cherry is all you get. That is logic-free and authority-free argument that would quickly lead to gridlock and that would undermine the entitlement of planning decision-takers to make whatever decision is best in accordance with proper planning and sustainable development.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">72.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Allowing further development for a specified period or an open period when similar development has previously been allowed for an earlier specified period is not a situation that calls for a heightened reasons duty that would arise when an institutional actor is disagreeing with another institutional actor. That is because the second permission is not in itself a disagreement with anything. It is just a further permission. The law on reasons for disagreement relied on by the applicant is simply irrelevant to this ground.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">30 73.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Overall the applicant has not discharged the onus of proof to show any illegality under this heading.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 2 – alleged excess of jurisdiction 74.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 2 is: “2.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Board of the Respondent in deciding to grant planning permission for the airstrip contrary to the recommendation of its own Inspector, who acknowledged the application was made on that basis and accordingly limited its use, acted in excess of its jurisdiction, granted a permission for a development which had not been sought in the first instance, and granted planning permission in excess of their powers and jurisdiction, and accordingly the determination of the Respondent is ultra vires, invalid and void.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">75.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “Applicant:The Board of the Respondent in deciding to grant planning permission for the airstrip contrary to the recommendation of its own Inspector, who acknowledged the application was made on that basis and accordingly limited its use, acted in excess of its jurisdiction, granted a permission for a development which had not been sought in the first instance, and granted planning permission in excess of their powers and jurisdiction, and accordingly the determination of the Respondent is ultra vires, invalid and void.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent failed to properly consider or have regard to the submission of the Applicant in circumstances where the Board could not have concluded that there was ‘no justification’ for limiting the airport on a temporary basis notwithstanding that the airport was permitted initially on the basis that it would only operate for a period of 5 years and that decision was continued in the subsequent permission, and the application made specifically sought to incorporate these decisions as the basis of this application. The Applicant had identified a range of impacts both on the Applicant’s dwelling house, the farm buildings, on his farmlands, in terms of noise, visibility, invasion of privacy, health impacts, pollution, stress and human health and had set out a detailed planning history by reference to the previous planning considerations and decisions. He set out the history of unauthorised development in respect of archaeological protection and the concerns in respect of the planning authority who have been afforded unrestricted rights in respect of the use of the airport by virtue of condition 3. Accordingly, the Respondent failed to properly consider the Applicant’s submission, failed to have any or any appropriate regard to the said submission and the said decision is contrary to fair procedures, to natural and/or constitutional justice, and to the principles of audi alteram partum [sic] and is accordingly invalid and void.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Inspector at condition 4 limited the use of the lands to 5 years from the date of the Order for the reason that such a limitation was in the interest of proper planning and sustainable development. The said limitation period formed part of the consideration in respect of Council Directive 92/43EEC and 2011/92EU. The Board failed to address the Inspector’s recommendation under the reasons and considerations which is the appropriate location for any consideration in respect of Section 34(10)(b) and accordingly failed to direct their minds to their obligations on the aforesaid permission.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">There was and is no legally permissible procedure available to the Respondent Planning Appeals Commission to modify the application for permission in the way that it has. The Respondent pursuant to Section 142 of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended may grant permission for a modified development however this procedure was never activated. The application made by the applicant for permission sought a temporary duration of five years and it was in respect of that application submissions and observations were made and subsequently the application considered by the Respondent Inspector.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The decision of the Respondent to omit the condition recommended by the Respondent Inspector is unreasonable and irrational and contrary to O’Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanala [1993] 1 IR 39 especially in circumstances where there was nothing before the Respondent Commission to justify and/or ground the decision to omit the condition regarding the temporary duration of the permission. Similarly, the decision to omit said temporary duration of the permission is contrary to the decision in Meadows v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Respondent:The essence of the Applicant’s claim under Core Ground 2 and 4 is that (i) the Commission, in granting permission for the proposed development, failed to address why it had not adopted Condition No. 4 as recommended by the Inspector and thereby failed to comply with its obligations under s.34(10)(b) of the 2000 Act and (ii) the Commission failed to properly consider or have proper regard to the Applicant’s submission in circumstances where the Commission could not have concluded that there was no justification for attaching Condition No.4.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Each of these contentions are premised on a 31 misreading/mischaracterisation of the application documentation, the Applicant’s appeal and the Inspector’s report to the effect that these documents were compiled on the presupposition that the application for permission was one which was sought on qualified temporal terms.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In respect of the Applicant’s first contention, the obligation to give reasons under s.34(10)(b) of the 2000 Act does not extend to situations where the Inspector recommends, and the Commission decides, to grant permission for the proposed development but the Commission decides not to attach a recommended condition. Condition No. 4 was not an environmental condition which arises from the consideration of an EIAR within the meaning of s.34(10)(c) of the 2000 Act. In any event, there was a note to the Commission’s Direction which explained that the Commission was satisfied to grant the application for the full permission applied for by the Notice Party and that it did not note any justification to limit the grant of permission to five years.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In respect of the Applicant’s second contention, two points arise.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First, the Commission’s Decision clearly reflects that the Applicant’s submissions were considered. This is evident from the Commission Direction and the Inspector’s Report. The Applicant’s complaint in this regard offends against the well settled principle that lack of narrative discussion does not equate to a lack of consideration and there is no obligation on the Commission to engage with submissions in a discursive ‘hand-to-hand combat sense’.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Rather, the Applicant’s complaint is that the Commission did not agree with their submission which is an impermissible merits based complaint.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Second, the Applicant’s complaint that the Commission’s Decision to omit Condition No.4 was unreasonable and irrational is a de-facto merits based disagreement with the conclusion reached by the Commission in the exercise of its expert evaluative judgement that it did not note any justification to limit the grant of permission to five years. The Commission’s Decision not to attach Condition No. 4 to the grant of permission must be understood in the context of the material which was before it and on that material, the Commission was entitled, in the exercise of its evaluative judgement, to refrain from imposing Condition No.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">4 on the basis that there was no justification to limit the grant of permission for five years.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In this regard, it is well settled that reasons may be implicit from the context and relatedly, reasons need be explicitly stated for the obvious or self-evident. Accordingly, certiorari ought not be granted as the Applicant could not be in any real doubt as to why the Commission did not attach Condition No. 4 to the grant of permission”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">76.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Condition 4 as proposed by the inspector states: “The use of the subject lands as an airstrip shall cease on or before the expiration of five years from the date of this order.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Reason: In the interest of proper planning and sustainable development.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">77.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The commission’s direction includes the following: “Note: The Board was satisfied to grant the application for the full permission applied for by the applicant subject to the conditions set out above and did not note any justification to limit the grant of permission to five years.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">78.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The applicant makes the following essential points under this heading: (i) irrationality leading to excess of jurisdiction; (ii) lack of reasons for disagreeing with the inspector; (iii) grant of something not applied for by the developer; (iv) consequential breach of EU law; (v) lack of regard to submissions; and (vi) treatment of unauthorised development.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">79.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The first point is just a merits complaint. It was not unreasonable in the legal sense to grant an indefinite permission.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">80.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regards lack of reasons, there are reasons in the direction – essentially a negative rationale – a lack of justification as seen by the commission for a time-limit. The fact that others might argue that there was a justification doesn’t render this unlawful.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">81.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The law on reasons requires, in effect, main reasons on the main issues. This was complied with.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">82.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">That said I don’t accept what I understood as the commission’s blanket defence that they never have to give reasons for disagreeing with the inspector about conditions. In some cases, a condition can be objectively a main issue rather than just detail. But there is no breach of a reasons duty here. I don’t in any event see the duration in this context (five years on top of a previous five years versus a non-time limited permission) as an inherently main issue requiring reasons but if I am wrong about that there are reasons.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">83.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The argument that the permission granted was not that sought is understandable but not accurate. An ongoing permission was sought but was time-limited by the council. The fact that the 32 applicant launched a third-party appeal did not deprive the commission of the jurisdiction to revert to the non-time-limited permission originally sought. Admittedly the outcome is therefore a bit of an own goal in the sense that it was brought about by the applicant’s own third-party appeal, but that doesn’t make it unlawful. The loose analogy is the person who appeals the severity of a sentence and ends up with a heavier one. That isn’t a breach of rights.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">84.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The reference to EU law is makeweight. The whole point of EU law is that assessments can inform decision-taking on a project and the project can change as a result. An ongoing permission was on the table from the outset before the council and thus open to public participation if and to the extent that rights to participate applied. Public participation does not involve an ongoing entitlement to re-start the discussion and generate new effective remedies as soon as there is any change in the proposed decision, or to comment on other participants’ comments: C-461/24, Asociación Petón do Lobo, Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 1 August 2025. Even the ECHR allows an apex criminal court to impose a first instance and unappealable conviction, including following an appeal against an acquittal in jurisdictions where that procedure is allowed (Article 2(2) of Protocol No. 7).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">85.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The claim of lack of regard to submissions needs to be established evidentially which hasn’t been done. If the decision states that submissions have been considered, the applicant has to show otherwise. The applicant carries the onus of proof in that regard.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">86.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regards the monuments, the position is as follows. At para. 3.3 the inspector notes: “Department of Housing Local Government and Heritage It is noted that the proposed development site (PDS) is located at Recorded Monument GA017-048---- (Ringfort – rath). This monument is subject to statutory protection in the Record of Monuments and Places (RMP), established under Section 12 of the National Monuments (Amendment) Act 1994. Given the scale, extent and location of the PDS, it is possible that the Recorded Monument and previously unrecorded archaeological remains may be disturbed by the proposed development. The National Monuments Service of the Department advises that an updated Archaeological Impact Assessment, to include a programme of Archaeological Geophysical Survey in the first instance and Archaeological Test Excavation where deemed appropriate, be requested as Further Information.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">87.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The inspector goes on: “6.1.4. Archaeological Impact/ Unauthorised Development</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>An unauthorised concrete base has been erected within the recorded Monument. The exemptions under Article 9 (1) (a) (vi) and (vii) of the Planning and Development Regulation 2001 disapplies. The planning authority cannot consider any Planning Application on these lands until this is regularised.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>The applicant has removed the east west ditch running through the site approximately 500m from the applicants house- this is contrary to condition 2 of Grant of Permission by the Board.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>The applicant has extended airstrip without grant of permission</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>The applicant has raised grounds levels in excess of that stipulated under condition no 5 of the decision to grant permission”</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">88.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">And: “7.2. Archaeological Impact - The applicant has submitted an Archaeological Impact Assessment, prepared by Sherlock Archaeology, in response to further information request.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The purpose of this assessment was to evaluate the potential impact of the proposed development on Recorded Monument GA 017-048, in accordance with Policy Objective ARC 4 and Policy Objective ARC 5 of the Galway County Development Plan. These policies seeks to protect archaeological sites, monuments, their settings, and visual amenities. It requires that planning applications within areas of archaeological potential or near Recorded Monuments incorporate appropriate archaeological mitigation measures.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.2.1. The assessment identified several archaeological sites within 500 meters of the proposed development:</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>A ringfort (SMR No. GA017-048), located approximately 21 meters from the existing grass airstrip.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>An enclosure (SMR No. GA017-049), located around 180 meters from the airstrip in the townland of Carrowntryla.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>A ringfort and associated children’s burial ground (SMR Nos. GA017-050---- and GA017050001), approximately 317 meters from the airstrip.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>The nearest archaeological site, the ringfort GA017-048, is described in the Archaeological Inventory of Ireland as a poorly preserved circular rath situated on a rise in open grassland, with a diameter of approximately 33 meters. The monument is partially obscured by modern features such as a silage pit and a mound of rubble, with a field wall intersecting it at certain 33 points. On the day of the site inspection there was no silage pit or any other feature obscuring the ringfort, it was represented as a small grass mound outside of the airstrip.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.2.2. The Archaeological Impact Assessment concludes that the proposed development will not directly affect the ringfort or any other archaeological site, as no construction or excavation is involved. The use of the airstrip, limited to around 10 times per year, does not threaten the integrity of the archaeological sites. While the maintenance of the airstrip involves cutting grass, there will be no disposal of clippings within the ringfort. This is recommended to be controlled by way of condition. I agree with the findings of the Archaeological Impact Assessment in this regard, as there is no construction or excavation involved with the proposed use, there is no real likelihood of a direct [effect] on the ringfort.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.2.3. I consider that the visual impact of the development on the nearby ringfort as negligible. Since the proposal is for the continued use of an existing grass runway for private aviation, the visual character of the site remains unchanged. The existing landscape and visual context will not be altered by the development. A geophysical survey conducted in October 2023, covered both the runway and apron areas, identifying a single feature of interest—a ‘mass dipolar anomaly’ near the northeastern end of the runway. This anomaly may represent archaeological or modern activity, such as burning, or it could be due to buried ferrous materials. Regardless, it poses no immediate concern since no excavation or ground reduction is proposed.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.2.4. The Archaeological Impact Assessment meets the requirements of Policy Objectives ARC 4 and ARC 5 of the Galway County Development Plan. Given that no construction or excavation is planned, and the use of the site will remain limited and non-intrusive, the proposal will not have any physical or visual impact on known archaeological sites. The identified potential archaeological feature does not warrant further excavation, as unnecessary ground disturbance would be inappropriate for this type of development.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Consequently, I do not consider that there is a substantive archaeological reason to refuse the planning permission in this instance.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">89.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">So it hasn’t been shown that the impacts on monuments have not been considered. Again this comes down to the applicant’s failure to discharge the onus of proof.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">90.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The only pleaded references to monuments are in relation to the concrete apron which is addressed below.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">91.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as relatedly the applicant complains that visits to the house by plane from London don’t capture the full impacts due to recreational flying when the developer is on site, insofar as the applicant made submissions on this, the decision says they were considered. The onus to show that submissions were not considered lies on the applicant and has not been discharged here.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">92.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regards unauthorised development the inspector stated: “7.3.5. Unauthorised Development The appellant asserts that the removal of a hedgerow located to the south of the site constituted a breach of Condition 2 attached to the original planning permission granted under file 10/1003 (An Bord Pleanála reference 07.238257). Condition 2 specified that the use of the lands as an airstrip, including any associated works or maintenance, was to be confined to the area northeast of the existing east-west ditch located approximately 500m southwest of the applicant's house, with no works permitted southwest of the ditch.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.3.6. The applicant has clarified that the ditch was removed in 2017 by the applicant's brother for land drainage and improvement purposes. A letter from the Department of Agriculture confirms that a hedgerow of equivalent length has since been planted in another part of the applicant’s landholding, thereby compensating for the original hedgerow removal.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.3.7. In assessing the matter of unauthorised works, I note that the planning permission granted by An Bord Pleanála was valid for a period of 5 years, and the ditch removal occurred after this period had lapsed. Consequently, the removal did not constitute a breach of planning permission. Additionally, the planning authority has since granted permission (17/184) for a similar development on the site, with the ditch having already been removed at the time of the application.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.3.8. The applicant has also provided clarification regarding the accidental cutting of an extended area resembling the airstrip in the past. This was an error, as the airstrip's required length does not exceed 500m for take-off and landing. Furthermore, the existing concrete base on the site, which dates to the 1970s, has not been used for approximately 45 years.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.3.9. Based on the information provided, I do not consider there to be an issue of unauthorised works on the site. The applicant has addressed the concerns regarding the hedgerow removal, and there is no proposed intensification of use associated with the current application. The scale and nature of the development can be appropriately managed through suitable planning conditions. Therefore, I am satisfied that the issue of unauthorised 34 development has been adequately addressed and does not warrant a reason for refusal in this instance.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">93.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as concerns ditches and hedgerows, the applicant hasn’t shown that the grant of permission is meaningfully related to these issues.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">94.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as concerns the vague term “concrete base” this is referred to in the archaeology report as part of the further information response as a “concrete apron”. Given the size of the apron it looks like a parking stand for aircraft. The inspector states this is not being used – that hasn’t been shown to be an invalid conclusion although one has to wonder why would it not be used.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">However in view of the failure to dislodge the inspector’s view, it may be an unauthorised structure but it does not impact on the permission granted and does not render the permission invalid as an indirect facilitation of unauthorised development. If the developer wants to park his plane on this stand he needs to apply for permission in that regard. Maybe there is a case for relocating the apron away from the monument or maybe not but that is not a problem that renders this permission invalid because the permission did not depend on any assumed or likely use of that structure.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">95.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Overall the applicant has not discharged the onus of proof to show any illegality under this heading.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 3 – lack of reasons 96.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 3 is: “3.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent erred in law in failing to apply Section 34(10)(b) of the Planning and Development Act in failing to engage with or give any appropriate reasons for disagreeing with their Inspector to impose, in their recommendation, a limitation of five years in respect of the proposed development and concluded that they did not consider that there was ‘any justification to limit the grant of the permission for five years’, notwithstanding the submission of the Applicant, the planning history of the site and the nature of the application made, all of which provided an appropriate and proper basis for the imposition of the said condition. The said determination amounts to an error of law on the face of the record.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">97.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “Applicant:A person effect by a decision is generally entitled to a statement of reasons. One of the seminal decisions in respect of the duty to give reasons is Connelly v. An Bord Pleanala [2018] IESC 31. In that case Clarke C.J. identified the justification behind the duty to state reasons as follows. First, it enables a person affected by the decision to understand why a particular decision was reached. Secondly, it enables a person to ascertain whether or not they have grounds upon which to appeal the decisions (where an appeal lies ) or seek judicial review.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Having identified the purpose behind the duty to gives reasons, the Court then identified the legal requirements against which the adequacy of reasons may be tested. First, any person affected by a decision is entitled to know in general terms why the decision was made. This requirement derives from the obligation to be fair to individuals affected by binding decisions, and also contributes to transparency. Secondly, a person is entitled to have enough information to consider whether they can or should seek to avail of any appeal or to apply for judicial review of a decision. The reasons provided must also be such as to allow a court hearing and appeal or reviewing a decision to engage properly in such an appeal or review and should not be merely a perfunctory or a box ticking exercise.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Supreme Court indicated that, in principle, the reasons for a decision may be derived either from a range of documents or from the context of the decision, or in some other fashion. Clarke C.J. Indicated that the reasons can be found in the decision or in other documents expressly referred to in the decision or indeed anywhere provided that it is sufficiently clear to a reasonable observer carrying out a reasonable inquiry that the matters conducted actually formed part of the reasoning. In other words, any materials can be relied on as being a source for relevant reasons subject to the important caveat that it must be reasonably clear to any interested party that the materials sought to be relied on actually provide the reasons which led to the decision concerned.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent Commission failed to give any and/or any appropriate and/or adequate reasons to justify and/or ground their decision in the first instance to decline to follow the recommendation of the Inspector and in the second instance to fundamentally alter the nature of the permission by virtue of its decision to not impose a condition limiting the duration of the permission. The Applicant is entitled to know the basis for the decision of the Respondent and the information grounding such a decision but the Respondent Planning Appeals Commission, in omitting the said condition without any basis, without any information and/or documentation grounding it, without any adequate and/or any adequate reasoning for its decision acted contrary to its obligations and contrary to law.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">35 Respondent:The nub of the Applicant’s complaint under Core Ground 3 is that the Commission erred in law in failing to apply s.34(10)(b) of the 2000 Act by failing to give appropriate reasons for disagreeing with its Inspector to impose Condition No. 4 and in concluding that they did not consider that there was any justification to limit the grant of permission for five years. Much of this Ground repeats the issues already addressed in Core Grounds 2 and 4. The Commission makes three points in reply.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First, the Applicant’s complaints are premised on a misreading and/or mischaracterisation of the documentation underlying the Commission’s Decision. Contrary to the Applicant’s contention, the application for permission was not sought on qualified temporal terms.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Second, s.34(10)(b) of the 2000 Act does not apply where the Inspector recommends, and the Commission decides to grant permission for the proposed development but the only disagreement between them relates to the imposition of a condition to the grant of permission (subject to the exception under s.34(10)(c) of the 2000 Act which does not apply in this case).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Third, and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Commission did give a reason why Condition No. 4 was not included in the grant of permission and the complaints made by the Applicant are ones that go to the merits of the decision. In this respect, the Applicant’s use of the term ‘appropriate reasons’ is revealing.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Commission clearly provided adequate reasons as to why it decided not to attach Condition No. 4 to the grant of permission and had material before it in support of that conclusion.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">98.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">This point has already been dealt with above.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 4 – lack of regard to submissions 99.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 4 is: “4.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent failed to properly consider or have regard to the submission of the Applicant in circumstances where the Board could not have concluded that there was ‘no justification’ for limiting the airport on a temporary basis notwithstanding that the airport was permitted initially on the basis that it would only operate for a period of 5 years and that decision was continued in the subsequent permission, and the application made specifically sought to incorporate these decisions as the basis of this application. The Applicant had identified a range of impacts both on the Applicant’s dwelling house, the farm buildings, on his farm lands, in terms of noise, visibility, invasion of privacy, health impacts, pollution, stress and human health and had set out a detailed planning history by reference to the previous planning considerations and decisions. He set out the history of unauthorised development in respect of archaeological protection and the concerns in respect of the planning authority who have been afforded unrestricted rights in respect of the use of the airport by virtue of condition 3. Accordingly, the Respondent failed to properly consider the Applicant’s submission, failed to have any or any appropriate regard to the said submission and the said decision is contrary to fair procedures, to natural and/or constitutional justice, and to the principles of audi alteram partum and is accordingly invalid and void.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">100.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised at core ground 2 above.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">101.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">This point has already been dealt with above.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 5 – invalid application 102.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 5 is: “5.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent erred in law in determining an application that failed to comply with the Planning and Development Act 2000 and the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, and in particular the public notice fails to comply with Articles 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 (Amended), fails to comply with Article 22 of the Planning and Development Regulations in respect of the maps and drawings that were submitted identifying the land of the structure to which the application relates and the boundaries thereof, and in particular all of the structures that adjoin and/or is adjacent to the land to be developed in accordance with the obligations of Article 22(2)(b) of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">103.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “Applicant:Particularly in respect of Core Ground No. 5, the obligations under Chapter 1 Part 4 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 are mandatory in nature. Article 19 requires a site notice to be fixed on the land or structure in accordance with Article 17 (1)(b) and requires that the notice be fixed in a conspicuous location on or near the entrance to the main entrance to the land or structure so as to ‘be easily visible and legible by persons using the public road.’ The said notice was not easily visible and certainly not legible from the 36 public road as submitted by the Applicant in the submission to Galway County Council and therefore failed to comply with the mandatory obligations of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The application fails to comply with the obligations under Article 23(1)(a) of the Planning and Development Regulations and/or Article 22 in respect of the location of structures in the immediate vicinity of the site. Specifically, a number of houses which are located immediately adjoining the airstrip and which objectively must be affected by it are shown at a distance of over 250m further away from the airstrip and accordingly the plans and particulars lodged failed to comply with the obligations under the said provisions. The said omission failed to comply with the mandatory obligation which is critical for any consideration of likely effects and where was likely to lead to a misleading understanding of the proximity of the airstrip relative to these houses. Accordingly, the decision based on the inaccurate plans and particulars lodged is ultra vires the Respondent, contrary to the mandatory requirements of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, invalid and void.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent failed to consider the Applicant’s submission in respect of the unauthorised development including the concrete stand and structure recorded within recorded monument GA017-048, failed to address the implication of that unauthorised development as well as the submission that the runway had been extended without any or any appropriate planning permission. In circumstances where the extension of this runway without any planning permission and is a class of development specified for the purposes of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive under Schedule 5 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, the said procedure adopted by the Board is inconsistent with and contrary to its obligations under the Planning and Development Act 2000, contrary to its obligations under the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, and contrary to its obligations under the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The said provisions of the Regulations are mandatory in nature and strict compliance is required in order to comply with the said Regulations, and as has been established by the Supreme Court in Monaghan U.D.C. v Alf-a-Bet Promotions Ltd [1980 WJSC-SC 1341] and related cases, and it has been identified in the Statement of Grounds, the verifying affidavits and the exhibits thereto that the said mandatory provisions have not been complied with Respondent:The Commission repeats its pleading and ‘gaslighting’ objections outlined in Section H above.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In respect of the Applicant’s complaint that the site notice did not comply with the requirements of Article 17 and/or 19 of the 2001 Regulations, the Planning Authority conducted a site visit on 25th June 2023 and concluded that the site notice was erected and legible. Similarly, the Inspector reviewed the location of the site notice and found it to be clearly visible and legible form the public road. The Applicant has failed to discharge the onus of proof that the application for permission for the proposed development failed to comply with Article 17 and/or 19 of the 2001 Regulations.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">If the Court determines that there was non-compliance with Article 17 and/or 19 of the 2001 Regulations then the Court should exercise its discretion to refuse certiorari as the Applicant has not sustained any prejudice given that he was not deprived from making a submission to the Planning Authority in respect of the application for permission or from making an appeal to the Commission.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regards the Applicant’s contention that the application for permission for the proposed development failed to comply with Article 22 and/or 23(1)(a) of the 2001 Regulations in respect of the location of structures, namely a number of houses (unidentified by the Applicant) in the immediate vicinity of the site, the Commission makes three points.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First, the Applicant’s Statement of Grounds (or his submissions) does not identify the structures or the houses which are purportedly 250m further away from the airstrip and in this regard, the Applicant has failed to discharge the onus of proof in respect of his complaints.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Second and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Applicant’s complaints are an impermissible merits based disagreement with the Commission’s expert evaluative judgement that, in respect of the drawings submitted with the application, same provided sufficient detail for a comprehensive assessment of the proposed development and that there were no procedural deficiencies that warrant invalidation of the application. The Commission had material before it in support of its conclusion in this regard including the site layout map dated 19th May 2023 (revised), the updated flight path map and the analysis of the Inspector (with which the Commission agreed) who, having conducted a site visit, concluded that the drawings submitted by the Notice Party were in compliance with the 2001 Regulations.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">37 Third, if the Court concludes that the application did not comply with Article 22 and/or Article 23(1)(a) of the 2001 Regulations, the Court should exercise its discretion and refuse certiorari as the Applicant has not established that he sustained any prejudice given that none of the unidentified structures allegedly mislocated on the aforementioned drawings were in the ownership of the Applicant. Rather, the application for permission was accompanied by a number of letters from adjoining landowners which outlined that they did not object to the proposed development. Moreover, the Notice Party’s appeal response document provided a map showing the residential houses and farms in support of the proposed development with accompanying letters therefrom.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Applicant complains that the Commission failed to consider his submission in relation to alleged unauthorised development. That is incorrect. The Commission did consider those submissions and this is evident from the Inspector’s Report and the Commission Direction.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Again the Applicant’s complaints here offend against the principle that lack of narrative discussion does not equate to a lack of consideration and there is no obligation on the Commission to engage with submissions in a discursive ‘hand-to-hand combat sense’.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Further, the Applicant’s allegations of unauthorised development were not established as a matter of fact and/or law before the Commission. The Inspector (with whom the Commission agreed) decided that the allegations of unauthorised development did not warrant a refusal for the grant of permission sought by the Notice Party and the Commission was entitled to proceed in this matter.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">104.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The basic reason why this point fails is that the applicant has not discharged the onus of proof to show that the application was in breach of the regulations, in the context where the planning decision-takers considered that the notices and application documents were adequate.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">105.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Even if there was some inadequacy, this was not so severe as to compromise the process, especially bearing in mind that the applicant himself was in no way inhibited from participation. His failure to make any such complaints in the process is relevant to discretion so I would refuse relief in the circumstances even if counterfactually a problem had been established. Monaghan U.D.C. v Alf-a-Bet Promotions Ltd 1980 WJSC-SC 1341, [1980] I.L.R.M. 64 does not require mandatory quashing in all circumstances and allows for substantial compliance.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">106.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as the complaint is that houses across the road from the development are not shown on plans, they are shown on at least one of the plans lodged as part of the application for the purposes of complying with art. 22 of the 2001 regulations.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 6 – alleged inaccurate information provided 107.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 6 is: “6.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">A plan submitted in response to further information which identified the incoming and outgoing flight path misrepresents the location of a number of dwellinghouses immediately adjacent to the runway. There are two dwellinghouses which immediately adjoin the runway which are shown on the documentation received on the 23/01/2024 as being located approximately 250m further north from their actual location, and at a significantly further remove in planning terms. This misrepresentation, whether deliberate or negligent, is significant. Accordingly, the plans and particulars which formed the basis of assessment does not comply with mandatory obligations under the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, materially misdescribes the context of the development both in respect of noise, impacts, visual impacts and the effect on residential amenity and as such is to render the application invalid and the decision ultra vires the Respondent being contrary to the requirements of the regulations, invalid and void.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">108.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “Applicant:The application lodged fails to record unauthorised development and in particular the extension of the runway by the construction of a concrete base for the plane itself which was erected within recorded monument GA017-048. The application fails to include any proposal in respect of this unauthorised development which is required to be included as a structure and where the said structure requires planning permission. The application made must be formulated in a manner to be consistent with the requirements of the Planning and Development Regulations and Chapter 1 thereof. In failing to provide for this unauthorised development, pay the appropriate fee, show by way of drawings the structure to which it relates and formulate the application in a manner to be consistent with the requirements of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 the Respondent determined an application which is inconsistent with the mandatory requirements of the Planning and Development Regulations as well as failing to consider the Applicant’s submission in respect of this issue.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Respondent:In respect of the Applicant’s contention that the flight plan submitted by the Notice Party, as part of their response to the Planning Authority request for further information, allegedly 38 misrepresented the location of a number of dwelling houses and/or constituted a breach of the 2001 Regulations, the Commission makes two points.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First, the Applicant’s Statement of Grounds (or his submissions) do not identify the structures or the houses which are purportedly 250m further away from the airstrip and in this regard, the Applicant has failed to discharge the onus of proof in respect of his complaints.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Second and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Applicant’s complaints are an impermissible merits based disagreement with the Commission’s expert evaluative judgement that, in respect of the drawings submitted with the application, same provided sufficient detail for a comprehensive assessment of the proposed development and that there were no procedural deficiencies that warrant invalidation of the application. The Commission had material before it in support of its conclusion in this regard including the site layout map dated 19th May 2023 (revised), the updated flight path map and the analysis of the Inspector (with which the Commission agreed) who, having conducted a site visit, concluded that the drawings submitted by the Notice Party were in compliance with the 2001 Regulations Without prejudice to the Commission’s pleading objection above, insofar as the Applicant contends that the ‘plans and particulars’ materially mis-describe the context of the proposed development, the Inspector and the Commission were satisfied that the drawings provided as part of the application for permission provided sufficient detail for a comprehensive assessment of the development and same met the requirements of the 2001 Regulations.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">This is a matter within jurisdiction of the Commission.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regards the Applicant’s allegation of unauthorised development, the Commission repeats that no such allegation was proven as a matter of fact and/or law and there was no preclusion on the Commission from granting permission. Insofar as the Applicant claims that the application for permission ought to have included a proposal in respect of the alleged extension of the runway, the existence of such a legal obligation has not been demonstrated by the Applicant. Further, and contrary to the Applicant’s contention, the Commission did have regard to his submission on the issue of alleged unauthorised development. This is evident from the Inspector’s Report and the Commission Direction.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">109.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The basic reason why this point fails is that the houses complained of do appear on at least one site map before the commission. The applicant has not demonstrated any type of flaw going to certiorari rendering the decision invalid.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">110.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The unauthorised developments are dealt with elsewhere and do not legally preclude a grant of permission in circumstances where the permission granted is not dependent on or facilitative of such unauthorised development.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">EU law issues Core ground 7 – inadequate preliminary examination 111.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 7 is: “7.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent erred in law in determining a preliminary examination under Council Directive 2011/92EU without the requisite information required in Schedule 7A of Planning and Development Regulations 2001, and failing to consider the required information in accordance with their obligations as competent authority under Schedule 7 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001. Accordingly, the said application reference ABP319221-24 was not carried out in accordance with the Respondent’s obligations under the requirements of European Community law.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">112.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “Applicant:The Respondent acknowledges that the proposed development is a sub-threshold development and considers at paragraph 7.11.3 whether the development is likely to have significant effects on the environment. The grounds submitted in respect of Core Ground 2 are repeated in respect of the assessment conducted of the issue of likely significant effects on the environment. The assessment fails to consider any likely significant effects on the receiving environment and in particular the residential development in the immediate vicinity, has before it inaccurate and misleading documentation as to the location of a number of dwellinghouses in the immediate vicinity, fails to consider the Applicant’s submission in terms of the effects of any such development on the receiving environment, fails to comply with the obligation in respect of the information required as set out in Schedule 7 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, fails to conduct any assessment of a type required under Schedule 7, fails to consider anywhere the use of the airport/airstrip as is required for a class of development specified in Schedule 5 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 and fails to consider the significant of permitting in condition 3 the planning authority to regulate the use of the airport.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">39 The permission imposes no limitations in terms of what may be agreed in respect of any such use which is contrary to the public participation requirements of the said Directive, contrary to the obligation to participate in any such decision making process, and contrary to the requirement to be notified of the decision in that regard so as to bring any proceedings in respect of any such review as is entitled to be made under the requirements under Council Directive 2011/92EU.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Respondent:The Commission makes seven points in respect of the complaints under Core Ground 7.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First, given that part of the agricultural field has an established “use” as an airstrip and the proposed development is for the continued ‘use’ of the application site as an airstrip—which will continue to be for limited private use by the Notice Party— and the proposed development does not involve any works or interventions involving alteration to the physical aspects of the application site, the proposed development is not a project for the purpose of the EIA Directive. Therefore any need for EIA and/or screening for EIA did not arise and the Commission’s Decision cannot be impugned by reference to same.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Second and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Applicant’s complaints regarding the Commission’s preliminary examination for the purpose of the EIA Directive are premised on a fragmented misreading of the Commission’s Decision. On a holistic reading of the Commission’s Decision (including the Inspector’s Report) and in a manner which renders it valid, as opposed to invalid, it is evident that the Commission carried out a lawful preliminary examination of the proposed development for the purpose of Article 109(2) of the 2001 Regulations and the EIA Directive Third, the Applicant’s complaint that the Commission erred in law in determining a preliminary examination for the purpose of the EIA Directive without the requisite information required in Schedule 7A of the 2001 Regulation, is misconceived. Given preliminary examination of the proposed development for the purpose of the EIA Directive concluded that there was no real likelihood of significant effects on the environment arising from the proposed development, there was no requirement for the Notice Party to provide the information under Schedule 7A of the 2001 Regulations to the Commission in accordance with Article 109(2)(b)(ii) of the said Regulations. Relatedly, as regards the Applicant’s complaint that the Commission failed to comply with the obligations in respect of the information as required under Schedule 7 of the 2001 Regulations, the adequacy of the information for the purpose of conducting a preliminary examination is a matter within the competency and jurisdiction of the Commission and it had material before it in support of its conclusion that there is no real likelihood of significant effects on the environment arising from the proposed development. Further, the Applicant [is] not advancing or adverting to anything to impugn the rationality of the Commission’s conclusion in respect of its preliminary examination by reference to the material before the Commission nor has the Applicant adduced any expert evidence to show that the said preliminary examination was erroneous or inadequate nor has the Applicant established any error on the face of the material considered by the Commission in its preliminary examination. The onus of proof on the Applicant as to an alleged inadequacy in the decision cannot be discharged by mere assertion.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Fourth, the Inspector did not examine and/or assess the proposed development for the purpose of the Habitats Directive and/or the EIA Directive on the basis that the proposed development was for a limited period of five years. There is nothing in the Inspector’s report which supports that contention.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Fifth, the Applicant (i) has failed to discharge the onus of proof in respect of his contention that the Commission had inaccurate and misleading documents before it in relation to ‘the location of a number of dwelling houses in the immediate vicinity’ and (ii) ignores the expert evaluative judgement of the Inspector (with which the Commission agreed with), who having conducted a site visit, concluded that the drawings submitted by the Notice Party provided sufficient detail for a comprehensive assessment of the development and that same were compliant with the 2001 Regulations.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Sixth, the Commission did consider the Applicant’s submission in terms of the effect of the proposed development on the receiving environment. This is evident from the Inspector’s report and the Commission Direction. Again, the Applicant’s complaints here offend against the principle that lack of narrative discussion does not equate to a lack of consideration and there is no obligation on the Commission to engage with submissions in a discursive ‘handto-hand combat sense’. On a holistic reading of the Commission’s Decision, which is in context, and in a manner which renders same valid rather than invalid, it is clear that the Commission considered the Applicant’s submission regarding the alleged effect of the proposed development on the receiving environment.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">40 Seventh, the Applicant’s complaints in respect of Condition No. 3 are premised on a mischaracterisation of Condition No.3 and a failure to read the Commission’s Decision in a holistic manner and in a way that renders it valid. The use of the airstrip by the Notice Party’s particular aircraft formed part of the Notice Party’s application for permission for the proposed development and formed part of the Commission’s assessment of the proposed development for the purposes of the 2000 Act, the EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It is clear that Condition No.3, read in light of the reason for its imposition and Condition No. 1 and 2 to the Commission’s Order, provides (i) the airstrip will only be used by the Notice Party’s specific identified aircraft, (ii) the use of an alternative aircraft by the Notice Party on the proposed airstrip requires the written agreement of the Planning Authority prior to the commencement of the development and (iii) any prospective agreement reached as between the Planning Authority and the Notice Party under Condition No.3, prior to the commencement of the development, would be confined to the Notice Party using an alternative plane of identical model in accordance with its intended use which was the subject of the Notice Party’s application and the Commission’s assessment. This accords entirely with the principle that (i) Condition No.3 has to be read in context with the entirety of the Commission’s Decision and the other conditions imposed and (ii) any prospective agreement reached pursuant to Condition No.3 must be in accordance with the scope of the planning permission as a whole. Accordingly, the Applicant’s complaints that Condition No.3 is contrary to the EIA Directive are misconceived in light of the true meaning and effect of Condition No. 3.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">113.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The inspector’s EIA screening analysis is as follows: “5.3 EIA Screening See completed Form 2 on file. Having regard to the nature, size and location of the proposed development and to the criteria set out in Schedule 7 of the Regulations, I have concluded at preliminary examination that there is no real likelihood of significant effects on the environment arising from the proposed development. EIA, or an EIA determination therefore is not required.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">114.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">This is then expanded as follows: “7.3.11. Environmental Impact Assessment The appellant sets out that the applicant should have been required to submit an EIAR under Schedule 7, Article 103 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001. I have assessed the requirement for EIAR under Section 5.3 of this report. A runway is considered a class of development under Part 1 Schedule 5 – ‘A line for a long-distance railway traffic, or an airport with a basic runway length of 2,100 meters or more’. I do not consider the proposal falls under this class of development as there is no physical runway on site, but a maintained grassed area for take off and landing of the aircraft. In any case the airstrip as proposed is 500m in length. There is no construction or excavation associated with the development and other environmental impacts have been addressed above, I therefore have concluded at preliminary examination that there is no real likelihood of significant effects on the environment arising from the proposed development. EIA, or an EIA determination therefore is not required.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">115.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Annex I of the EIA directive includes class 7(a): “Construction of lines for long-distance railway traffic and of airports (9) with a basic runway length of 2 100 m or more;”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">116.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Footnote 9 reads: “(9) For the purposes of this Directive, ‘airport’ means an airport which complies with the definition in the 1944 Chicago Convention setting up the International Civil Aviation Organisation (Annex 14).”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">117.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">A single grass runway may be an airstrip, possibly even an aerodrome (no definitive decision on that is necessary) but it is not an airport, a concept that requires additional and extended facilities. Even if counterfactually this is to be classed as an airport, the permission currently under challenge does not involve works.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">118.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Article 1(2)(a) of the EIA directive defines “project” as involving works, not uses: “‘project’ means: — the execution of construction works or of other installations or schemes, — other interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape including those involving the extraction of mineral resources;”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">119.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The false premise of the EIA argument is the assertion that EIA applies. But EIA relates only to works. The caselaw establishing this is, for good measure, in the aviation context – the European Commission’s summary is that “renewal of an existing permit (to operate an airport) cannot, in the absence of any works or interventions involving alterations to the site’s physical aspects, be classified as a ‘Project’ (Case C-275/09, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest and others, paragraph 24; Case C- 41 121/11, Pro-Braine and Others, paragraph 31)” (Environmental Impact Assessment of Projects Guidance on Screening (Directive 2011/92/EU as amended by 2014/52/EU) (European Union, 2017), p. 26).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">120.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">So the EIA arguments don’t arise.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 8 – defective EIA / screening 121.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 8 is: “8.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent erred in law in the determination that for the purposes of Council Directive 2011/92EU that there was no real likelihood of significant effects on the environment arising from the proposed development. As set out in Section 7.3.11 of the Inspector’s Report, in circumstances where the considerations applied namely that there was no runway on site and that there was no construction or excavation associated with the development is wrong as a matter of law and as a matter of fact, and where no consideration whatsoever was given to the second limb of the definition of development, namely use and where significant effects by virtue of the said use would arise both in relation to noise, impact on wildlife, impact on residential amenity, pollution and in particular emissions to air. The Respondent thus erred in this determination. The range of factors required to be identified in any consideration of likely effects on the environment was not addressed anywhere by the Respondent required by the requirements of Council Directive 2011/92 EU and are the obligations contained in the Planning and Development Regulations 2001.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">122.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “Applicant:The Respondent Planning Appeals Commission has failed to undertake a valid screening for appropriate assessment in accordance with the Habitats Directive and in accordance with the test set out in Kelly v. An Bord Pleanala. The purported screening for appropriate assessment that was undertaken contained gaps, lacuna and lacked complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions where, notwithstanding that the site is located approximately 1400m south of Lough Corrib SAC, no consideration is included of the said conservation objectives of the said European Site, no consideration is identified in respect of the use of the airstrip/airport by virtue of noise, disturbance or general impact, and accordingly the said assessment for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC failed to comply with the obligations in respect of a Stage 1 assessment and where the Board of the Respondent failed to address the limitation period of the Inspector and therefore the said Screening for Appropriate Assessment carried out by the Respondent was fundamentally flawed and does not comply with the test provided for in Kelly.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Decision of the Respondent to impose condition 3 is void for uncertainty in circumstances where the condition limits the use of the airport to a single aircraft unless otherwise agreed in writing with the planning authority, but in no way limits the matters that may be agreed with the planning authority relative to the numbers, type, frequency of planes. As a consequence it could not have assessed the impact of condition 3 for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC, 2011/92EU and/or the requirements of the Planning and Development Act 2000, and accordingly the condition is ultra vires the powers of the Respondent, contrary to the requirements of the said Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and Habitats Directive, is invalid and is void Respondent:The Commission makes three points in respect of the substance of the Applicant’s complaint under Core Ground 8.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First, the proposed development did not constitute a ‘project’ for the purpose of the EIA Directive and in turn, the need for EIA and/or screening for EIA does not arise (see Core Ground 7 above). Therefore, the Commission’s Decision cannot be impugned by reference to the EIA Directive.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Second, insofar as the Applicant’s asserts that the Commission erred in law and in fact in concluding that there was no runway on the site and that there was no construction or excavation associated with the development, this is incorrect. Rather, in considering whether EIA was required, the Commission considered, inter-alia, whether the proposed development was a project within the class described in Paragraph 7(a) of Annex 1 of EIA Directive/Paragraph 7 of Part 1 of Schedule 5 of the 2001 Regulations. In concluding that the proposed development did not fall within that class, the Commission determined (i) there was no physical runway on site but a maintained grassed area for take-off and landing of the aircraft, (ii) the airstrip as proposed is 500m in length and (iii)there is no construction or excavation associated with the development. The Commission was entitled to come to that conclusion on the material which was before it, including, the Notice Party’s application form dated 1st June 2023, the AIA Report dated November 2023, a letter from Sean Maloney 42 &amp; Associates dated 16th December 2023, the Notice Party’s appeal response document (see letter from Sean Maloney &amp; Associates which formed part thereof) and the Inspector’s report.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Third, the Applicant’s contention that the Commission erred in its determination that there was no real likelihood of significant effects on the environment arising from the proposed development as significant effects would arise by virtue of the use of the airstrip in relation to noise, impact on wildlife, impact on residential amenity, pollution and in particular emissions to air, amounts to an impermissible merits based appeal in respect of the Commission’s conclusion on the likelihood of significant effects. The Commission had sufficient information before it to reach the conclusion that it did. Without prejudice to the position that the proposed development was not a project for the purpose of the EIA Directive. the Commission carried out a lawful preliminary examination of the proposed development for the purposes of Article 109(2)(a) of the 2001 Regulation and the Applicant has not adduced any expert evidence to show that the Commission’s conclusion was erroneous or inadequate nor has the Applicant established any error on the face of the material which was considered by the Commission in its preliminary examination.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">123.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The premise of this argument is incorrect as above – EIA does not apply to a mere use permission with no physical intervention.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 9 – defective AA screening 124.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 9 is: “9.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent erred in law in the manner in which it carried out the Stage 1 screening for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC which screening is set out at paragraph 7.4 of the Inspectors Report and where, notwithstanding that the site is located approximately 1400m south of Lough Corrib SAC, no consideration is included of the said conservation objectives of the said European Site, no consideration is identified in respect of the use of the airstrip/airport by virtue of noise, disturbance or general impact, and accordingly the said assessment for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC failed to comply with the obligations in respect of a Stage 1 assessment and where the Board of the Respondent failed to address the limitation period of the Inspector and who determined the application without any reference to its obligations under the Habitats Directive/ Council Directive 92/43EEC.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">125.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “Applicant:The Respondent Planning Appeals Commission has failed to undertake a valid screening for appropriate assessment in accordance with the Habitats Directive and in accordance with the test set out in Kelly v. An Bord Pleanala. The purported screening for appropriate assessment that was undertaken contained gaps, lacuna and lacked complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions where, notwithstanding that the site is located approximately 1400m south of Lough Corrib SAC, no consideration is included of the said conservation objectives of the said European Site, no consideration is identified in respect of the use of the airstrip/airport by virtue of noise, disturbance or general impact, and accordingly the said assessment for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC failed to comply with the obligations in respect of a Stage 1 assessment and where the Board of the Respondent failed to address the limitation period of the Inspector and therefore the said Screening for Appropriate Assessment carried out by the Respondent was fundamentally flawed and does not comply with the test provided for in Kelly.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Decision of the Respondent to impose condition 3 is void for uncertainty in circumstances where the condition limits the use of the airport to a single aircraft unless otherwise agreed in writing with the planning authority, but in no way limits the matters that may be agreed with the planning authority relative to the numbers, type, frequency of planes. As a consequence it could not have assessed the impact of condition 3 for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC, 2011/92EU and/or the requirements of the Planning and Development Act 2000, and accordingly the condition is ultra vires the powers of the Respondent, contrary to the requirements of the said Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and Habitats Directive, is invalid and is void.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Respondent:The Commission makes three points as regards the Applicant’s complaints pertaining to the Commission’s screening for AA in respect of the proposed development.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First, the contention that the Inspector conducted its screening for AA on the premise that the proposed development was for a temporary period of five years is incorrect. The Inspector’s AA screening determination does not reflect that their analysis leading to that determination was on the basis that the proposed development was for a limited period of five years. The Applicant has not pointed to any specific part of the Inspector’s report which supports this contention and has failed to discharge the burden of proof.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">43 Second, it is incorrect to suggest that the Commission’s AA screening (i) failed to consider the conservation objectives of the Lough Corrib SAC and/or the use of the proposed development by virtue of noise, disturbance or general impact and (ii) failed to formulate the appropriate test and consider the proposed development in its appropriate form. The Inspector and the Commission carried out a screening for AA in respect of the proposed development and concluded that, on the basis of objective information, the proposed development would not have a likely significant effect on any European Site either alone or in combination with other plans or projects and therefore an Appropriate Assessment (Stage</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">2)</span>of the proposed development was not required. The Inspector concluded that the proposed development did not require a Stage 2 AA as there was no conceivable risk to any European Site. In this regard, the Inspector further explained that the reason for that conclusion was (a) the scale and nature of the development, (b) the absence of development works to facilitate the development and (c) the distance from the Lough Corrib SAC and lack of connections thereto.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Inspector was entitled to conclude that the proposed development would not have a likely significant effect on any European Site on the basis of the information which was before him, which included inter-alia, the Environmental Noise Survey dated 11th December 202 and the AA Screening Report dated October 2023 (which considered inter-alia, the conservation objectives of the Lough Corrib SAC and the potential direct and secondary impacts of the proposed development on the European site and its conservation objectives/qualifying interests).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Third, the Applicant’s complaints amount to an attempt to impugn the Commission’s determination that the proposed development, either alone or in combination with other plans or projects, is not likely to have a significant effect on any European site. The Applicant produced no objective or scientific expert evidence to the Commission that the proposed development would have any impact on the conservation objectives of the Lough Corrib SAC and/or that the intended use of the airstrip in terms of noise, disturbance or general impact would be likely to have significant effects on the Lough Corrib SAC which runs contrary to the Commission’s determination. The Applicant, by way of mere assertions cannot discharge the onus of proof as to an alleged inadequacy in the decision”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">126.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The inspector stated: “7.4 AA Screening 7.5 I have considered the proposal to use part of existing agricultural field as an airstrip in light of the requirements S177U of the Planning and Development Act 2000 as amended.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.6 The subject site is located within a rural location 1.4km South of Lough Corrib SAC The development proposal consists of using part of existing agricultural field as part of an airstrip.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">There are no development works associated with the development.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.7 Having considered the nature, scale, and location of the project, I am satisfied that it can be eliminated from further assessment because there is no conceivable risk to any European Site. The reason for this conclusion is as follows:</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>scale and nature of the development</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>No development works to facilitate the development – the development is agricultural land, cutting of grass does not constitute development works</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>Location-distance from nearest European site and lack of connections 7.8 I conclude that on the basis of objective information, that the proposed development would not have a likely significant effect on any European Site either alone or in combination with other plans or projects. Likely significant effects are excluded and therefore Appropriate Assessment (stage 2) (under Section 177V of the Planning and Development Act 2000) is not required.”</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">127.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Lough Corrib SAC (https://www.npws.ie/protected-sites/sac/000297) was designated on 27 July 2022 by S.I. No. 384 of 2022, the European Union Habitats (Lough Corrib Special Area of Conservation 000297) Regulations 2022.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">128.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Conservation objectives had been adopted on 28 April 2017 (see link above).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">129.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The fact that the site is located approximately 1400 m south of Lough Corrib SAC does not give rise to effects or presumption of effects.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">130.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As to the complaint that no consideration is included of the said conservation objectives of the said European Site, this is factually inaccurate having regard to the AA screening report.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">131.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The assertion that no consideration is identified in respect of the use of the airstrip by virtue of noise, disturbance or general impact is insufficient to evidentially establish reasonable scientific doubt about the conclusion.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">132.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Given the commission had before it the AA screening report and the inspector’s report, it is incorrect to contend as a general proposition that it determined the application without any reference to its obligations under the habitats directive.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">44 133.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">That then leaves one final issue – the change in the proposed consent subsequent to the inspector’s AA.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">134.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I agree with the applicant that where the commission is varying the inspector’s proposed decision, they should conduct their own EIA/ EIA screening/ EIA preliminary examination if they are differing from the inspector’s reasoned conclusion, and should conduct their own AA/ AA screening if what is being assessed/screened is different from what the inspector assessed/screened. This follows by analogy from Ventaway v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 406 (Unreported, High Court, 16 July 2025).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">135.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">That said, the commission had two main bulwarks of objection to this point – firstly that it was not pleaded and secondly that the inspector’s analysis should be read as referable to the project for which permission was sought.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">136.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Starting with the pleadings, the relevant pleas are as follows.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">137.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In core ground 9 (and sub-ground 33) (emphasis added): “9.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Respondent erred in law in the manner in which it carried out the Stage 1 screening for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC ... where the Board of the Respondent failed to address the limitation period of the Inspector and who determined the application without any reference to its obligations under the Habitats Directive/ Council Directive 92/43EEC.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">138.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In sub-ground 18 (incorrectly pleaded under core ground 4 but relevant to core ground 9) (emphasis added): “18.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Inspector at condition 4 limited the use of the lands to 5 years from the date of the Order for the reason that such a limitation was in the interest of proper planning and sustainable development. The said limitation period formed part of the consideration in respect of Council Directive 92/43EEC ...”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">139.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Admittedly these two sentences would make more sense in the one paragraph but there is no point demanding absolute perfection in pleadings. The question rather is – is this acceptably clear? And on balance it is, even acknowledging that it could be significantly improved. The clear meaning and necessary implication of the foregoing two statements taken together is that the inspector’s AA screening was on the basis of a five-year limitation, the commission adopted that screening exercise but failed to address the change in the terms on which consent was proposed, namely the dropping of the five-year limit, and this gave rise to a breach of the habitats directive.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">140.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The real problem for the applicant is the second objection. What defeats this point is the judgment of 12 April 2018, People Over Wind and Peter Sweetman v Coillte Teoranta, C-323/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:244.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">141.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Since mitigation must be disregarded at the AA screening stage, it follows that the inspector’s report could not properly have been by reference to the project as proposed to be conditioned. It must be taken to have been by reference to the project for which consent was sought (i.e., not time-limited). Such a lawful construction is open here. Thus the project as screened is the same as the project as consented so no new AA exercise was necessary. The point, albeit of some potential relevance in some other case, just doesn’t arise on the facts. However the applicant has helped the law to take a modest step forward into further clarification, albeit obiter, by raising this issue.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 10 – alleged voidness for uncertainty 142.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 10 is: “10.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Decision of the Respondent the impose condition 3 is void for uncertainty in circumstances where the condition limits the use of the airport to a single aircraft unless otherwise agreed in writing with the planning authority, but in no way limits the matters that may be agreed with the planning authority relative to the numbers, type, frequency of planes. As a consequence it could not have assessed the impact of condition 3 for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC, 2011/92EU and/or the requirements of the Planning and Development Act 2000, and accordingly the condition is ultra vires the powers of the Respondent, contrary to the requirements of the said Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and Habitats Directive, is invalid and is void.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">143.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “Applicant:The Respondent Planning Appeals Commission has failed to undertake a valid screening for appropriate assessment in accordance with the Habitats Directive and in accordance with the test set out in Kelly v. An Bord Pleanala. The purported screening for appropriate assessment that was undertaken contained gaps, lacuna and lacked complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions where, notwithstanding that the site is located approximately 1400m south of Lough Corrib SAC, no consideration is included of the said conservation objectives of the said European Site, no consideration is identified in respect of the use of the airstrip/airport by virtue of noise, disturbance or general impact, and 45 accordingly the said assessment for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC failed to comply with the obligations in respect of a Stage 1 assessment and where the Board of the Respondent failed to address the limitation period of the Inspector and therefore the said Screening for Appropriate Assessment carried out by the Respondent was fundamentally flawed and does not comply with the test provided for in Kelly.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Decision of the Respondent to impose condition 3 is void for uncertainty in circumstances where the condition limits the use of the airport to a single aircraft unless otherwise agreed in writing with the planning authority, but in no way limits the matters that may be agreed with the planning authority relative to the numbers, type, frequency of planes. As a consequence it could not have assessed the impact of condition 3 for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC, 2011/92EU and/or the requirements of the Planning and Development Act 2000, and accordingly the condition is ultra vires the powers of the Respondent, contrary to the requirements of the said Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and Habitats Directive, is invalid and is void.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Respondent:The Commission makes two points in respect of Core Ground 10.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First, the complaint that Condition No.3 is void for uncertainty and/or contrary to the requirements of the EIA Directive and/or the Habitats Directive, is premised on a mischaracterisation of Condition No.3 and a failure to read the entire decision holistically.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The use of the airstrip by the Notice Party’s particular aircraft formed part of the Notice Party’s application for permission for the proposed development and formed part of the Commission’s assessment of the proposed development for the purposes of the 2000 Act, the EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive. It is clear that Condition No.3, read in light of the reason for its imposition and Condition No. 1 and 2 to the Commission’s Order, provides (i) the airstrip will only be used by the Notice Party’s specific identified aircraft, (ii) the use of an alternative aircraft by the Notice Party on the proposed airstrip requires the written agreement of the Planning Authority prior to the commencement of the development and (iii) any prospective agreement reached as between the Planning Authority and the Notice Party under Condition No.3, prior to the commencement of the development, would be confined to the Notice Party using an alternative plane of identical model in accordance with its intended use which was the subject of the Notice Party’s application and the Commission’s assessment. This accords entirely with the principle that (i) Condition No.3 has to be read in context with the entirety of the Commission’s Decision and the other conditions imposed and (ii) any prospective agreement reached pursuant to Condition No.3 must be in accordance with the scope of the planning permission as a whole. Accordingly, the Applicant’s complaints that Condition No.3 is contrary to the EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive are misconceived in light of the true meaning and effect of Condition No. 3.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Second and strictly without prejudice to the foregoing, if the Court holds that Condition No.3 is ultra vires and/or void and/or invalid as contended for by the Applicant, Condition No.3 is severable from the Commission’s Order. The Commission’s Decision is clearly predicated on the Notice Party’s specific model of aircraft using the proposed airstrip (i.e[.] see §7.1.10 of the Inspector’s Report and the terms of Condition No.3 of the Commission’s Order itself).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Condition No.1 of the Commission’s Order on its own terms, confines the use of the proposed airstrip to the Notice Party’s current specific aircraft. It cannot be said that the permission granted for the proposed development, which would remain shorn of Condition No.3, is a permission which had never been envisaged by the Commission.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">144.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The basic reason why this point fails is that radical expansion of the permission by purported agreement would be ultra vires. Use of a different aircraft that would have significantly different impacts (e.g., by reason of being significantly more noisy) is not envisaged on a reasonable reading of condition 3.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">145.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">A reading that allowed such a radical expansion (or for example by allowing multiple aircraft used by multiple people) is a case of reading the decision in as invalid a way as possible.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">146.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">For good measure the condition is analogous to that imposed in the 2018 permission. The condition is not invalid as alleged.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">147.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The commission suggested that under condition 1 any agreement would need to be pre the commencement of use, meaning that if the notice party changed his plane he would need a new permission.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">148.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">That is unduly literal and would defeat the purpose of condition 3 which is to allow a change of plane from time to time.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">149.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The applicant’s interpretation was that condition 1 (which in any event is in standard, boilerplate language) only applied to conditions that are required to be agreed prior to the commencement of development as opposed to all conditions. That reasonable interpretation is how it would be read by the reasonably intelligent well-informed non-expert addressee per Re XJS Investments Ltd. 1986 46 WJSC-SC 1935, [1986] I.R. 750, [1987] I.L.R.M. 659 (McCarthy J.; Finlay C.J., Henchy, Griffin and Hederman JJ. concurring) and subsequent caselaw. Condition 3 is phrased in ongoing terms – it makes no sense as a once off condition that can only be exercised pre-commencement of the use.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The applicant’s interpretation is preferable. But that doesn’t mean that the condition is as wide as submitted – given the reason for the condition which relates to impacts, it does not allow agreements that result in significantly more impacts.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">150.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I will address the issue by clarifying the interpretation of the condition in a recital to the order, which will set out the interpretation of condition 3 as it would be viewed by a reasonably intelligent, well-informed non-expert addressee of the permission.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">151.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I will however request the commission to draw the proposed recital to the attention of the council and notice party in case either of them wish to make submissions within the 7 day period proposed. In the interests of progressing matters and by way of exception from the norm, such notification of the text of the proposed recital can take place on the basis of the text of the recital as proposed in the draft judgment.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 11 – alleged breach of EIA/habitats directives 152.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Core ground 11 is: “Condition 3 which permits the airport to be used not only permanently, but for whatever use is agreed between the planning authority and the Board, and without any facility to refer the matter to the planning appeals board or for the Applicant to be aware of the nature of any submission made or agreement entered into and for no such agreement to be published is contrary to fair procedures, contrary to the scheme of the Planning and Development Act, the scheme of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and/or the Habitats Directive which does not permit any public participation in the said process, any procedure that would subject the said agreement to the mandatory obligations under the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive given the nature and class of the proposed development which is subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment, and assessment for the purposes of the Habitats Directive, and accordingly the said decision is ultra vires the Respondent, invalid and void.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">153.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The parties’ positions as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “Applicant:The Respondent Planning Appeals Commission has failed to undertake a valid screening for appropriate assessment in accordance with the Habitats Directive and in accordance with the test set out in Kelly v. An Bord Pleanala. The purported screening for appropriate assessment that was undertaken contained gaps, lacuna and lacked complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions where, notwithstanding that the site is located approximately 1400m south of Lough Corrib SAC, no consideration is included of the said conservation objectives of the said European Site, no consideration is identified in respect of the use of the airstrip/airport by virtue of noise, disturbance or general impact, and accordingly the said assessment for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC failed to comply with the obligations in respect of a Stage 1 assessment and where the Board of the Respondent failed to address the limitation period of the Inspector and therefore the said Screening for Appropriate Assessment carried out by the Respondent was fundamentally flawed and does not comply with the test provided for in Kelly.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Decision of the Respondent to impose condition 3 is void for uncertainty in circumstances where the condition limits the use of the airport to a single aircraft unless otherwise agreed in writing with the planning authority, but in no way limits the matters that may be agreed with the planning authority relative to the numbers, type, frequency of planes. As a consequence it could not have assessed the impact of condition 3 for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC, 2011/92EU and/or the requirements of the Planning and Development Act 2000, and accordingly the condition is ultra vires the powers of the Respondent, contrary to the requirements of the said Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and Habitats Directive, is invalid and is void.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Respondent:The Commission repeats its pleading objections in respect of Core Ground 11 and/or E35 of the Statement of Grounds as outlined in Section H above. The Commission makes three points in response to the substance of the Applicant’s complaints under Core Ground 11.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First, insofar as the Applicant contends that there is an invalidity as regards either the power of the Commission to attach conditions which allow for matters to be agreed with the Planning Authority and/or s.34(5) of the 2000 Act, that contention could only go to the validity of the 2000 Act which has not been impugned in these proceedings Second, the Applicant’s complaints are premised on a mischaracterisation of the terms and purported consequences of the prospective implementation of Condition No.3. The use of the airstrip by the Notice Party’s particular aircraft formed part of the Notice Party’s 47 application for permission for the proposed development and formed part of the Commission’s assessment of the proposed development for the purposes of the 2000 Act, the EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive. It is clear that Condition No.3, read in light of the reason for its imposition and Condition No. 1 and 2 to the Commission’s Order, provides (i) the airstrip will only be used by the Notice Party’s specific identified aircraft, (ii) the use of an alternative aircraft by the Notice Party on the proposed airstrip requires the written agreement of the Planning Authority prior to the commencement of the development and (iii) any prospective agreement reached as between the Planning Authority and the Notice Party under Condition No.3, prior to the commencement of the development, would be confined to the Notice Party using an alternative plane of identical model in accordance with its intended use which was the subject of the Notice Party’s application and the Commission’s assessment. This accords entirely with the principle that (i) Condition No.3 has to be read in context with the entirety of the Commission’s Decision and the other conditions imposed and (ii) any prospective agreement reached pursuant to Condition No.3 must be in accordance with the scope of the planning permission as a whole. Accordingly, the Applicant’s complaints that Condition No.3 is contrary to the EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive are misconceived in light of the true meaning and effect of Condition No. 3. The inclusion of Condition No.3 in the Commission Order was a lawful exercise of the Commission’s power under section 34(5) of the 2000 Act which permits a limited matter to be left over for agreement between the Notice Party and the Planning Authority Third, if the Court holds that Condition No.3 is ultra vires and/or void and/or invalid as contended for by the Applicant, Condition No.3 is severable from the Commission’s Order.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Commission’s Decision is clearly predicated on the Notice Party’s specific model of aircraft using the proposed airstrip. Condition No.1 of the Commission’s Order on its own terms, confines the use of the proposed airstrip to the Notice Party’s current specific aircraft.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It cannot be said that the permission granted for the proposed development, which would remain shorn of Condition No.3, is a permission which had never been envisaged by the Commission.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">154.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as concerns EIA, this is based on a false premise. The EIA directive does not apply as set out above.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">155.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as concerns AA, the application for permission and the permission granted relate to the applicant’s use of the airstrip. Radical expansion of that via purported agreement under condition 3 would fall outside the permission, so no inadequacy in the AA screening has been demonstrated by reason of not considering such contingencies.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Summary 156.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">For the avoidance of doubt, preambular matters prior to the first heading of this judgment, and the following summary, do not take from the operative parts of the judgment and must be read in a sense consistent with those. In outline summary, therefore: (i) it is settled law that applicants are confined to their pleadings; (ii) applying such law to the facts here, any arguments going beyond the pleadings do not fall for consideration; (iii) it is settled law that there is no obligation to provide a discursive, narrative consideration of submissions or to “engage with” submissions in such a sense, or to provide an issue-by-issue or submission-by-submission response; (iv) applying such law to the facts here, no breach of the duty to consider submissions has been demonstrated; (v) it is settled law that Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (the EIA directive) does not apply to projects that are not listed; (vi) applying such law to the facts here, this is not such a project; (vii) it is settled law that the EIA directive does not apply to development consisting of use without physical intervention; (viii) applying such law to the facts here, this is a use permission to which EIA does not apply; (ix) it is settled law that the details of the project can change during the process as a result, inter alia, of public participation and European assessments; (x) applying such law to the facts here, the change in the duration of the permission as between the council and commission is not in itself unlawful; (xi) it is settled law that the mitigation should not be considered for the purposes of AA screening; (xii) applying such law to the facts here, the inspector’s AA screening must therefore be taken to be referable to the project prior to being conditioned, in which case the AA 48 (xiii) (xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) (xviii) (xix) (xx) (xxi) (xxii) (xxiii) (xxiv) (xxv) (xxvi) screening covered the project as consented by the commission meaning that there was no necessity for a fresh screening exercise; it is settled law that evaluative judgements involving a significant degree of planning judgement and not tainted by other procedural, legal or factual errors are reviewable on an irrationality standard; applying such law to the facts here, it has not been demonstrated that the margin of evaluation was generally exceeded here; it is settled law that judicial review is concerned with the legality rather than the</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">merits of the decision; applying such law to the facts here, the thrust of the applicant’s complaints involve a merits-based disagreement; it is settled law that the standard as to reasons can be summarised as an obligation to provide the main reasons on the main issues; applying such law to the facts here, adequate reasons were given; it is settled law that there is a presumption (the onus to rebut which falls on a judicial review applicant) that material has been considered if the decision-taker says so applying such law to the facts here, the applicant has not overcome that onus; it is settled law that an applicant must have discharged the onus of proof to establish all facts necessary for relief; applying such law to the facts here, the applicant here has not generally done so; it is settled law that in the context of a challenge to an environmental assessment, the onus of proof to show a defect generally lies on the applicant; applying such law to the facts here, the applicant has not generally done so; it is settled law that judicial review is a discretionary remedy within established doctrinal boundaries; and applying such law to the facts here, discretion should be generally exercised against relief on points that were not made to the decision-taker.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Order 157.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that: (i) the proceedings be dismissed; (ii) subject to any contrary submissions by the council or notice party within the time specified below, it be recited in the order that condition 3 of the permission be interpreted as follows: (a) insofar as the condition involves provision for agreement with the planning authority for the use of a different aircraft, this may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires, and is not one of the conditions to which condition 1 applies insofar as that latter condition requires agreement to be reached prior to the commencement of the development; (b) condition 3 does not permit agreement for the use of more than one aircraft at any one time but only for the substitution of a different aircraft (from time to time in the future) for that used by the developer as of the date of the permission; and (c) condition 3 does not permit agreement for the use of an alternative aircraft that is significantly different in terms of its adverse effects on the receiving environment so as to create a genuine planning issue; (iii) unless any party applies otherwise by the time and in the manner set out below, the foregoing order be perfected forthwith thereafter on the basis of no order as to costs (including no order as to any reserved or adjourned costs or costs not otherwise dealt with); (iv) the foregoing proposed order be subject to contrary written legal submission or any consequential application supported by a written legal submission, such submission to be delivered within 7 days, with replies by other parties within a further 7 days; (v) for the avoidance of doubt, any unsuccessful application to vary any provisional order as to costs proposed in this judgment may be addressed pursuant to O. 103 r. 40(4) RSC; and (vi) the matter be listed at 09:30 on Monday 15 June 2026 to confirm the foregoing.</p></div>", "next": 0}