{"html": "<div class=\"lf-doc\"><div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">150.</span>In Joe Moroney Coach Hire Limited, Butler identified the standard of proof as the ordinary civil standard.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">151.</span>As the plaintiff is relying on article 7(2), he must establish to that standard that the “harmful event” occurred in Ireland.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">152.</span>The CJEU has considered in a number of cases what the phrase “place where the harmful event occurred or may occur” means for the purpose of article 7(2). These include Kronhofer v Maier (Case C-168/02), Bier v Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA (C21/76), Marinani v Lloyd’s Bank (Case C-364/93). These have been very helpfully reviewed by Butler J in Crotty and Joe Moroney Coach Hire Limited. In Crotty, Butler J said: “25. The case made under Article 7(2) is somewhat different and focuses on identifying “the place where the harmful event occurred”. The argument made is that although the accident occurred in Sweden, the plaintiff travelled back to Ireland and her claim for personal injuries, which relates to an on-going injury, continues in this jurisdiction. In argument, the plaintiff's counsel relied on the decision of the CJEU in Case C-21/76 Bier. This case was taken by a horticultural producer based in the Netherlands which was dependent on water from the River Rhine. An upstream pollution event in France in which an industrial installation discharged waste into the river caused damage to the horticultural produce and the producer was required to put expensive treatment in place in order to deal with the 48 consequent pollution. An issue arose as to whether the French or the Dutch Courts had jurisdiction in respect of the subsequent claim. The CJEU held that where the place of the happening of an event and the place where that event results in damage are not identical, then the expression “the place where the harmful event occurred” covers both and the defendant can be sued at the plaintiff's option in either place.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">26.</span>However, subsequent case law makes it clear that this does not allow a plaintiff simply to elect to sue in the place of the plaintiff's domicile on the basis that he is suffering an on-going loss or injury as this would be inconsistent with the fundamental principle under Article 4(1) that a defendant should be sued in the place of the defendant's domicile. In Case C-364/93 Marinari, the CJEU held, at para. 14 of the judgment:“Whilst it has thus been recognized that the term ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ within the meaning of [Article 8(2)] may cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, that term cannot be construed so extensively as to encompass any place where the adverse consequences can be felt of an event which has already caused damage actually arising elsewhere.”</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">153.</span>Following a discussion of Case C-51/97 Réunion Européene, Butler J went on to say: “28. Thus, it is clear from this line of authority that the ongoing consequences of a harmful event which may be either ascertained or suffered on a continuing basis by a plaintiff in the jurisdiction of his or her domicile do not themselves constitute a harmful event giving the plaintiff an entitlement to sue in that jurisdiction. The damage referred to in the Bier judgment was direct damage sustained by the plaintiff albeit at a location physically removed from the place where the tortious act had taken place. This reasoning is consistent with the legal basis for the tort of negligence in this jurisdiction. The tort comprises a negligent or careless action (or omission) in circumstances where a duty of care is owed and which causes damage. Until damage has been caused, the tort is not complete and no proceedings can be brought: once damage has been caused, the tort is complete and the plaintiff can sue. The tortfeasor is not guilty of a continuing tort merely because the plaintiff continues to suffer the consequences of his tortious action. In this case, assuming the plaintiff's allegations against the second defendant were to be borne out, then the second defendant committed the tort of negligence by allowing ice to be present on its premises which, in turn, caused the plaintiff to fall 49 and injure herself. The tort was complete at that point and did not continue even though the plaintiff continued to suffer its adverse consequences. Limitation periods will, by and large, run from the date of the defendant's actions giving rise to the injury or harm. To suggest, as the plaintiff's solicitor does, that there is a continuing tort or “harmful event” merely because the plaintiff remained under the care of her orthopaedic team until June, 2018 shows the absurdity of the proposition. On this analysis, the defendant would be continuously committing the tort of negligence arising out of the presence of ice at its airport long after the summer sun had melted any ice even as far north as Ostersund. The limitation period would not run from the date of the accident but from whenever the plaintiff's doctors signed her off as being fully recovered, which in the case of a permanent injury would mean the limitation period would run indefinitely.”</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">154.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In Joe Moroney Coach Hire Limited, Butler J considered when a tort, such as negligence, has occurred under domestic law. It is only complete when the plaintiff has suffered damage. She noted that this begged the question as a matter of EU law whether the “harmful event” refers to the defendant’s action or the plaintiff’s injury and noted that the answer from the CJEU is that it may encompass both (as discussed in Crotty). She went on to refer to Bier v Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA and noted that the CJEU considered the special jurisdiction rules under article 7 to be based on a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the court called upon to hear it. The CJEU pointed out that “the place of the event giving rise to the damage no less than the place where the damage occurred can, depending on the case, constitute a significant connecting factor from the point of view of jurisdiction.” The Court then concluded that:</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">19.</span>Thus the meaning of the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ in article 5(3) must be established in such a way as to acknowledge that the plaintiff has an option to commence proceedings either at the place where the damage occurred or the place of the event giving rise to it.”</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">155.</span>However, Butler J went on to say: “60. To a certain extent, Bier represents the high point in the jurisdiction as regards a plaintiff's right to rely on the place where damage occurred as the basis for invoking the special jurisdiction rule under Article 7(2). In the subsequent case of Marinaria v. Lloyd's Bank Plc Case C-364/93 the CJEU had to consider a claim taken in Italy by a plaintiff domiciled in Italy against a UK bank. The plaintiff had deposited valuable promissory notes in a UK branch of that bank which its staff 50 regarded as suspicious and reported to the police. This led to the arrest of the plaintiff and the appointment of a receiver over the promissory notes. The plaintiff was subsequently acquitted by the UK courts and then sought damages from the bank, both in respect of the value of the promissory notes, the fact of his detention, and the damage to his reputation. The CJEU did not accept that the damage could correctly be characterised as having occurred in Italy. The court was also concerned that to allow plaintiff to sue in any location at which it claims to have suffered consequential loss would convert a general rule of jurisdiction based on the defendant's domicile into one in which the plaintiff could elect to sue in the place of its domicile. The court stated:“13. The option thus open to the plaintiff cannot however be extended beyond the particular circumstances which justify it, otherwise the general principle, enshrined in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention, of the jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting State in the territory of which the defendant is domiciled and to end up recognising, apart from the cases expressly provided for, the jurisdiction of the courts of the domicile of the plaintiff in respect of which the Convention expressed its disfavour in ruling out, in the second paragraph of Article 3, the application of national provisions providing for such courts of jurisdiction in respect of defendants domiciled in the territory of a Contracting State.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">14.</span>While it thus accepted that the concept of “place where the harmful event occurred” within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Convention, may cover both the place where the damage occurred and that of the causal event, that concept cannot, however, be interpreted so expansively as to encompass any place where the harmful consequences of an event which has already caused damage which has actually occurred in another place may be felt.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">15.</span>Consequently, that concept cannot be interpreted as including the place where the victim, as is the case in the main proceedings, claims to have suffered financial damage following initial damage occurring and suffered by him in another Contracting State.”</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As Whelan J. observed in Castlelyons Enterprises Ltd v. EUROK [2018] IECA 98, Marinari represents “the current authoritative interpretation of ‘where the harmful event occurred’ in EU law”.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">156.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Having considered these authorities, Butler J said at paragraph 67 and 68 of Joe Moroney Coach Hire Limited:</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">51 “67. Based on the jurisprudence discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the following would appear to be the principles relevant to determining whether a plaintiff has established a basis for relying on the special jurisdiction rule contained in Article 7(2) thus entitling the plaintiff to sue in a place other than that of the defendant's domicile:• The basis for the exception is the close connection between the action and the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff seeks to litigate such that it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that it might be sued there;</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>The plaintiff must establish that the harmful event occurred in Ireland;</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>The harmful event may be taken as having occurred either at the place of the event giving rise to the damage or at the place where the damage occurred. If these are different, the plaintiff has the right to choose to sue in either of these locations;</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>In the case of defective products, the place of the event giving rise to the damage will always be the place where the product was manufactured;</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>The place where damage occurs can encompass the place where initial damage occurred as a result of the normal use of the defective product. This is sometimes described as the manifestation of the damage;</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>The place where the damage occurred cannot be interpreted so broadly as to encompass any place where the harmful consequences of an event may be felt. Thus, a plaintiff cannot seek to recover consequential financial loss in the place of its domicile in respect of an event which has already caused initial damage which has occurred and been suffered by him in another Member State;</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">•</span>However, where a defect in a product causes the product to be worth significantly less than the purchaser paid for it, the resulting loss may constitute direct damage arising from the purchase rather than indirect damage consequent on the initial defect. It is unclear the extent to which this will depend on moral culpability going beyond the normal criteria for the liability of a defendant in tort.”</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">157.</span>The CJEU considered the question of jurisdiction in relation to alleged libel in Shevill v Presse Alliance SA (Case C-68/93). It reiterated (at paragraphs 19 – 22) 52 many of the principles set out above and confirmed that they applied to defamation.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The court set out the applicable principles at paragraphs 24-32 and summarised at paragraph 33 as follows:: “33. In light of the foregoing, the answer to the first, second, third and sixth questions referred by the House of Lords must be that, on a proper construction of the expression \"place where the harmful event occurred\" in Article 5(3) of the Convention, the victim of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in several Contracting States may bring an action for damages against the publisher either before the courts of the Contracting State of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publication is established, which have jurisdiction to award damages for all the harm caused by the defamation, or before the courts of each Contracting State in which the publication was distributed and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation, which have jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm caused in the State of the court seised.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">158.</span>A fundamental difference between these proceedings and the Maybourne proceedings is, of course, that there is no specific claim in these proceedings that the relevant letter was actually read in Ireland. This brings the issue of where the “harmful event” occurred into sharp focus. The basis on which the plaintiff claims that the harmful event occurred in Ireland in those circumstances is not clear from his pleadings or his Replies to Particulars. The plaintiff largely asserts that this is a matter for evidence or submission. For example, at paragraph 6.1 of his Replies to Particulars he states, inter alia, “...The ultimate question in relation to the jurisdiction in which the wrongs of the Defendants were committed is ultimately a matter for legal submission.”</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">159.</span>It can, however, be deduced that his claim is that the harmful event occurred in Ireland because it was foreseeable that there would be republication of the defamation in Ireland, and because the plaintiff suffered significant reputational harm in Ireland.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">160.</span>For example, in relation to the first, the plaintiff avers at paragraph 19 of his affidavit that “the relevant publications have been extensively republished, including to individuals and entities with an Irish base.” At paragraph 14 of his second replying affidavit, he says that “it is trite but necessary to point out that it was eminently foreseeable that publication of a barring or “blackballing” diktat against me and against Mr. Sinton, separately or jointly, would be republished to third parties and 53 essentially the entirety of HSMC Limited [Hume Street Management Consultancy](the Irish registered project management company through which services were provided by me and Mr. Sinton for the Maybourne Riviera hotel). I further say that this republication was a necessary and logical (not to mention, foreseeable) corollary of the original publication if the intent truly was to prevent me accessing the relevant sites.”</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">161.</span>In relation to the second, it is pleaded that “The wrongs of the Defendants have caused damage to the Plaintiff in Ireland; the United Kingdom and France and elsewhere internationally amongst contractors and sub-contractors; experts; professionals; consultants; suppliers and banks generally and in particular amongst those who have known of his work with the Maybourne Hotel Group and the interests of the Al Thanis.” Furthermore, Senior Counsel for the plaintiff said in submissions that while there is no evidence of publication in Ireland, the plaintiff is nonetheless entitled to say that his reputation is in Ireland and the letter had the effect of damaging his reputation in Ireland, which means that he has the option of suing in this jurisdiction (relying on Ewins v Carlton [1997] IEHC 44, Hunter v Duckworth &amp; anor [2000] 1 IR 510, Crotty, and Joe Moroney Coach Hire Limited.) 162. In his replying affidavit to the defendants’ application, the plaintiff also relies on a letter which was sent to Mr. Frank Sinton and which was cc’d to Mr. Socker, Mr.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Cunningham, and another individual, Mr. Jim Byrne. He says that due to the level of interaction between the plaintiff and Mr. Sinton, these three individuals would have “reasonably understood that I was also involved in the same circumstances and developments particularly when coupled with my actual barring/eviction from the various hotel properties.” However, this is a separate claim and it is not the subject of the proceedings.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">163.</span>There is considerable overlap between the plaintiff’s reliance on damage being suffered in this jurisdiction and the alleged republication in the plaintiff’s submissions.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">164.</span>The plaintiff relied on Hunter v Duckworth to submit that evidence of direct publication in the jurisdiction is not necessary and that it is sufficient if it can be shown that the natural and foreseeable consequence of the original direct publication is republication in the jurisdiction. I do not accept that Hunter is authority for that proposition. In Hunter, there was publication in the United Kingdom and also in this jurisdiction, and what was at issue was whether the original publisher in the United 54 Kingdom was liable for the republication in Ireland where he had asked that the material not be published in Ireland but where such republication was the natural and foreseeable consequence of the original publication. The case concerned a booklet in relation to the Birmingham Six. The original publication occurred when the author of the booklet handed it to the publisher. The author asked his publisher that the booklet not be published in Ireland (but did not insist on that as part of the contract). The published distributed the booklet in Ireland. That publication in Ireland was held to be the natural and probable consequence of the original publication given the subject matter, and the question for the court was whether the author could be liable for that republication. Thus, the court was concerned with a different issue. Kelly J said: “Put in a nutshell, it is said that the second defendant published the matter complained of when he handed the manuscript to the first defendant in London.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">That was the only publication by him and it did not occur within the jurisdiction of this court. The first defendant then decided to publish in this jurisdiction but did so in circumstances where such publication was not the natural and probable result of the original publication of the material to them by the second defendant. It is contended that the second defendant could only have a liability in this jurisdiction in circumstances where the publication was either approved of by him or was the natural and probable result of the original publication which he made to the first defendant by handing them the manuscript in London. It is therefore said that he neither intended to nor was it the natural and probable result of this publication that the booklet should be published in Ireland. He says that this case is quite different on its facts from Ewins v. Carlton [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 223, where the natural and probable consequence of providing the television programme to Ulster Television for broadcast on its network was that it would reach a significant number of viewers in this State.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The position at common law In Speight v. Gosnay (1891) 60 L.J. Q.B. 231, it was held by the Court of Appeal that the original publisher of a defamatory statement is liable for its republication by another person where, inter alia, the repetition or republication of the words to a third party was the natural and probable result of the original publication. That rule has been accepted as part of the law of Northern Ireland and of this State (see Turkington v. Baron St. Oswald (Unreported, High Court, Northern Ireland, 2nd May, 1996) and Ewins v. Carlton [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 223 at page 231).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">55 Whilst it is accepted that this is the position at common law, it is said that I must look at the issue before me not by reference to this common law concept but rather by reference to the Convention. Looked at in this light, it is submitted that the second defendant has no sufficient nexus with the publication in this State to entitle the plaintiffs to sue him here.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I cannot believe that the Convention seeks to depart from the notion that the original publisher of defamatory matter will be liable for republications which are the natural and probable consequences of such publication. No authorities have been cited to support such a view. Indeed, the very way in which the issue has been formulated as a matter of Convention law by counsel for the second defendant bears a remarkable resemblance to the common law position. The question which I must address is, therefore, whether the publication in Ireland of the booklet is a natural and probable consequence of the second defendant's first publication in all the circumstances. If it is then this application fails.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Natural and probable result There can be no doubt but that the only act of direct publication which was effected by the second defendant was the handing of the manuscript of the booklet to his publishers in London. However, it is quite clear that the purpose of that publication was to bring about the production of the booklet in question. That was the subject of a written contract entered into between the second defendant and the first defendant. There is no evidence that that contract contained an express term prohibiting the publication or distribution of the work in question in this jurisdiction.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">On the contrary, the terms of the written contract expressly authorised the first defendant to publish the work throughout the world and indeed to licence any other publisher so to do. In the written contract, therefore, the second defendant gave the widest possible publication rights to the first defendant. Had he wished to exclude publication in this jurisdiction, he could have insisted on an express term to that effect being inserted into the written contract but did not do so.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">165.</span>Ewins v Carlton, upon which the plaintiff also relied, was also concerned with liability for republication rather than whether the republication had in fact occurred.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Carlton published an allegedly defamatory television programme in England. However, it also sold the programme to Ulster Television and it was found as a fact that publication took place in this jurisdiction when Ulster Television aired the programme.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The question was whether Carlton could be liable for that republication.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">56 166. The fundamental difference between these cases and the instant case is that the plaintiff has adduced no evidence of publication or republication in Ireland. Part of the plaintiff’s case is that I can infer from the fact that a natural and foreseeable or probable result of the original publication of the letter outside of this jurisdiction is republication in the jurisdiction. I do not believe that I can do so in the circumstances of this case. The plaintiff claims that it was eminently foreseeable that republication would occur to the “entirety of HSMC Ltd”. It seems to me that it would have been straightforward for the plaintiff to adduce some evidence from personnel in HSMC Ltd, but he did not do so, and does not explain why there is no such evidence. Of course, the plaintiff does not have to prove his case at this stage. Nonetheless, where some evidence could be adduced and was not, it is not open to me to make a finding on the basis of an inference. I am not, therefore, satisfied that the plaintiff has established publication in this jurisdiction.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">167.</span>The plaintiff also relied on Ewins and Hunter to submit that where a statement is published outside of Ireland but reputational damage occurs within the country, a plaintiff is entitled to advance a claim in the Irish courts on the basis of the damage that has been suffered in Ireland. In my view, Ewins and Hunter did not establish such a principle.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">168.</span>In Ewins, Barr J found as a fact that that there was publication in this jurisdiction. He said: “...The documentary \"Confessions\" was duly supplied by Carlton to Ulster Television which, simultaneously with Carlton, transmitted the programme on its network to viewers in Northern Ireland and in this State. It was received in the latter Jurisdiction in one of three ways:(i) by unavoidable spillage of signal in border areas; (ii) by extension in other areas by deliberate tuning of aerials to intercept signals broadcast in Northern Ireland or Wales; and (iii) by lawful distribution by cable companies and deflector systems.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The number of viewers in this jurisdiction who watched the programme is estimated by Radio Teilifís Éireann to have been 111,000 as calculated by its television measurement system. Ulster Television also derive advertising revenue from this State. It is reasonable to assume that the prices charged for such advertising are 57 based upon the total extent of I.T.N. viewing in this jurisdiction whether transmissions are received through regular authorised sources or otherwise. It follows that Ulster Television, as a constituent part of I.T.N., has an interest in broadcasting to as many people as possible in this State whether \"official\" or \"unofficial\" viewers.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">169.</span>As already discussed, in Hunter, it was also found that there was publication in this jurisdiction.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">170.</span>Thus, Ewins and Hunter are not authority for the proposition that a claim for reputational damage in this jurisdiction may be maintained even where there is no publication in this jurisdiction. The authorities are in fact to the contrary. In Coleman v MGN [2012] IESC 20, Denham J held that the absence of evidence of any “hits on any such site in this jurisdiction” was a “fatal flaw” in the plaintiff’s case. In Grovit v Jan Jansen [2020] IEHC 501, Hyland J (at paragraph 58) said: “Shevill makes it clear that the test a national court must apply in deciding whether jurisdiction under 5(3) exists is simply whether the publication was distributed in their jurisdiction and whether the victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation.”</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">171.</span>In Ryanair v Fleming [2016] 2 IR 254 (it is important to note that this case was not a case under Brussels Recast), Hogan J said at paragraphs 23 – 26: “[23] These principles may be said to form the basis of the entire Brussels Regulation (and, indeed, the wider Lugano Convention) system which has been the mainstay of the European Union's jurisdiction allocating rules for the best part of 50 years. It is true, of course, that the present jurisdictional dispute falls completely outside the scope of the Brussels/Lugano system and is governed by our own national conflict of law rules. The point, however, is that conflict of laws rules reflecting the principal allocation of jurisdiction as between competing fora must, in general, at least, in order to be fair, reflect these considerations of foreseeability and the orderly administration of international justice. [24] These considerations apply with particular force in the case of internet defamation where traditional rules in relation to jurisdiction have, to some extent at least, been overtaken by technological developments. As the European Court of Justice observed in eDate Advertising GmbH v. X. (Joined Cases C-509/09 and C161/10)[2011] E.C.R. I-10269 at paras. 45 and 46:- 58 “45 … [T]he placing online of content on a website is to be distinguished from the regional distribution of media such as printed matter in that it is intended, in principle, to ensure the ubiquity of that content. That content may be consulted instantly by an unlimited number of internet users throughout the world, irrespective of any intention on the part of the person who placed it in regard to its consultation beyond that person's Member State of establishment and outside of that person's control.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">46 It thus appears that the internet reduces the usefulness of the criterion relating to distribution, in so far as the scope of the distribution of content placed online is in principle universal. Moreover, it is not always possible, on a technical level, to quantify that distribution with certainty and accuracy in relation to a particular Member State or, therefore, to assess the damage caused exclusively within that Member State.” [25] All of these difficulties identified by the European Court of Justice in eDate Advertising GmbH v. X. (Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10)[2011] E.C.R. I10269 apply to the present case. The internet forum itself was hosted in California and, so far as can be ascertained, the participants themselves (all of whom used pseudonyms) came from a variety of (mainly) European jurisdictions. The plaintiff's affidavit evidence indicates that 12 participants identified themselves by reference to an Irish location. This, however, does not in and of itself necessarily mean that any of them actually accessed or downloaded the defendant's post when they were in Ireland. It is, nevertheless, hard to say that a participant posting from Australia on an international website based in California in relation to incidents which took place in Spain could reasonably foresee that he would thereby expose himself to litigation in this jurisdiction simply by reason of comments made about an Irish based airline in the course of that posting where that poster had no other connections with this jurisdiction and where the forum itself was not hosted in Ireland.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The jurisdiction of the Irish courts [26] It is against this general background that the question of jurisdiction may now be considered. Quite apart from any other consideration, the plaintiff must, of course, establish publication in this State in order to establish jurisdiction. There is, however, no evidence before the court to establish that this post has been seen, accessed or downloaded by any third party within this jurisdiction. Proof of publication to a third party is, of course, an essential ingredient of the tort: see s.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">59 6(2) of the 2009 Act. There could, of course, be many circumstances where the fact of publication in an online version – such as the website of a major newspaper</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">–</span>would, as a matter of common sense, lead to the inference that it was so published to a third party. This cannot, however, obscure the fact that the plaintiff is still required to prove that the material was accessed or downloaded by a third party in this jurisdiction.”</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">172.</span>At paragraphs 30 to 32 he said: “[30] It is true that the website could have been accessed by anyone with access to the internet anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, the plaintiff has not identified any third party who has come forward to say that they have accessed or downloaded this particular post in this jurisdiction. [31] The Supreme Court's decision in Coleman v. MGN Limited [2012] IESC 20, [2012] 2 I.L.R.M 81 is also of some importance in this context. Here the question was whether the publication in the online edition of the well-known British newspaper, The Daily Mirror, was sufficient to ground the defamation proceedings in this jurisdiction for the purposes of article 5(3) of the Brussels Regulation.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Denham C.J. held at p. 87 that the fact of such publication had not been made out, as there was no evidence of “any hits on any such site in this jurisdiction”. In the absence of such proof, the Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction in the absence of evidence that a tort had been committed here. [32] It follows, therefore, that independently of any other consideration, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Irish courts have jurisdiction in the matter since, to repeat, there is no actual evidence that a third party located in this jurisdiction has accessed or downloaded the offending post.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">173.</span>The plaintiff in fact accepted that the absence of publication in Ireland presented a difficulty in respect of his defamation claim. He submitted, however, that he is entitled to sue for conspiracy in this jurisdiction because the tort of conspiracy was only completed in this jurisdiction when it caused harm to him. I have previously considered the relevant principles in relation to conspiracy.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">174.</span>In addition to the difficulties discussed earlier, it seems to me that it is not open to the plaintiff to seek to separate the conspiracy and the defamation in this manner in circumstances where the means by which it is alleged effect was given to the alleged 60 agreement was to defame the plaintiff and I have found that defamation in Ireland has not been established.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Failure to specify jurisdictional basis 175. The defendants submit that the incorrect indorsement under Brussels Recast is fatal to the proceedings. At the hearing, they also raised the point that the Statement of Claim contains no indorsement at all.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">However, this point was not originally advanced as a basis for relief. I therefore do not consider it.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">176.</span>In relation to the first, it is accepted by the plaintiff that they indorsed the Summons incorrectly. The indorsement asserts that the courts of Ireland have jurisdiction pursuant to article 4, 8 and/or 25 of Brussels Recast whereas in fact, as discussed, jurisdiction is asserted on the basis that the harmful event occurred in this jurisdiction. The indorsement should, therefore, have referred to article 7(2). It seems that the articles referred to were the relevant ones under Brussels Recast’s predecessor. It is to address this that the amendment application has been brought.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">However, the defendants submit that even if an amendment is permitted in accordance with that application the indorsement will still be defective because the proposed amendment simply reads “The Court has power under Regulation (EU No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) to hear and determine the Plaintiffs’ claims and the Court should assume jurisdiction to hear the said claims under the provisions of Article 7 of the said Regulation.” The defendants submit that simply referring to article 7 is not sufficient because Order 4 Rule 1A(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts requires that where Brussels Recast, the Lugano Convention or the 1968 Convention is being relied upon the indorsement “shall specify the particular provision or provisions of the relevant instrument concerned under which the Court should assume jurisdiction.” Article 7 provides for seven different jurisdictional bases and the defendants submit that it is insufficient in those circumstances to only refer to “article 7”.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">177.</span>It is not in fact necessary to determine these issues in circumstances where I have concluded that the Court does not have jurisdiction under the correct article and, as will be seen shortly, I conclude that it should not assume jurisdiction in respect of the claim against the third-named defendant.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">61 Conclusion in relation to the first and second-named defendants 178. I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has established that the “harmful event” occurred in Ireland. In those circumstances, the first and second-named defendants are entitled to be sued in the country of their domicile, France.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">179.</span>In those circumstances, it is not necessary to determine whether or not the incorrect indorsement under Brussels Recast is fatal to the proceedings or to determine the plaintiff’s application to amend the indorsement.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Application in relation to the third-named defendant 180. The defendants seek an Order dismissing, striking out or staying the proceedings as against the third-named defendant on the basis that the plaintiff did not obtain the leave of the court to issue and serve the proceedings outside of the jurisdiction. They also claim that the plaintiff served the Plenary Summons on the third-named defendant rather than Notice of the Summons. They also seek Orders setting aside the service of the Plenary Summons and/or dismissing, striking out or staying the proceedings on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Failure to obtain leave to serve prior to issuing proceedings 181. Order 11 Rule 1 of the Rules provides that: “1. Provided that an originating summons is not a summons to which Order 11A applies, service out of the jurisdiction of an originating summons or notice of an originating summons may be allowed by the court whenever - ...”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">182.</span>Order 11 Rule 6 provides that the application for the permission of the court for service out of the jurisdiction is to be made before the Summons is issued. It states: “6. Such application shall be made before the issue of the summons, and the affidavit to ground the same shall, when no proceeding is pending, be entitled as between the parties to the intended proceeding...”</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">62 183. There does not appear to be any dispute about the timing of the application for leave to serve the proceedings against the third-named defendant out of the jurisdiction and that it was made after the proceedings were issued. Indeed, the plaintiff states in his written submissions that “The Defendants are incorrect in suggesting that the Plaintiff did not obtain leave from the High Court to issue proceedings against HKT. The Plaintiff did so shortly after issuing the within proceedings” [emphasis added].</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">184.</span>Thus, it is acknowledged by the plaintiff that the leave of the Court was only obtained after the proceedings had already been issued. This is not in compliance with the clear terms of Order 11 Rule 6. The plaintiff does not engage with this at all but rather seemed to proceed on the basis that leave can be sought after the proceedings have been issued. That is not the position. It seems to me that the Court’s discretion under Order 124 is in principle sufficient to excuse such non-compliance in some circumstances, though, in light of the clear terms of Rule 6, they would have to be unusual circumstances. However, there must be some basis for doing so, such as an explanation as to why the application was not made before the proceedings were issued. No such explanation is given in this case. Of concern also is the fact that the Plenary Summons stated the third-named defendant’s address to be in France. This entitled the issuance of the Summons without an application for leave under Order 11. However, when the Statement of Claim was delivered, the third-named defendant’s address was given as the London address. The fact of different addresses being given in the Plenary Summons and the Statement of Claim is not necessarily a fundamental issue because a plaintiff could believe that a defendant resides in a member state and therefore an application under Order 11 is not necessary before a Plenary Summons is issued and could then discover before the Statement of Claim is delivered that the defendant in fact is to be found in a non-member state. However, the significant issue here is that in the same period of time as the delivery of the Plenary Summons in this case bearing the French address the plaintiff also issued the Maybourne proceedings in which the London address was given for the third-named defendant. The plaintiff does not explain this. He does say that he did not realise that the third-named defendant was domiciled in Qatar but that misses the point. The issue is how an address in Paris was given in one set of proceedings (thereby rendering it unnecessary on its face to get an Order under Order 11) and an address in London given in the other. In all of those circumstances, there is no basis upon which I should 63 exercise my discretion and it is appropriate to stay or strike out the proceedings against the third-named defendant. As I go on now to conclude that the proceedings against the third-named defendant should be stayed on the grounds of forum non conveniens, it seems to me, on a preliminary basis, that the appropriate order in</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">relation to the failure to obtain leave before issuing the proceedings is to stay the proceedings on that basis also. As I indicate below, I will hear from the parties as to the appropriate orders.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Forum Non Conveniens 185. The defendants also submit that the court should decline jurisdiction in respect of the third-named defendant on the basis of forum non conveniens. This application is not made in respect of the first and second-named defendants.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">186.</span>I have already dealt with the general principles in respect of forum non conveniens.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">187.</span>The burden of proof is on the defendants to identify the alternate jurisdiction which is clearly and distinctly more appropriate. This is accepted by the defendants.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">They say that France is the natural forum, particularly having regard to the fact that the first and second-named defendants are domiciled in France and the default rule is that they should be sued in the jurisdiction of their domicile.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">188.</span>In my view, they have discharged their burden. The proceedings are clearly more closely connected with France than with Ireland, particularly in circumstances where there is no evidence of publication or republication in Ireland. This is a very significant element. Of course, the proceedings have a connection to Ireland in that the plaintiff is Irish and the works that were being provided were being provided through an Irish company, HSMC Ltd. The connecting factors with Ireland are more fully set out at paragraphs 95 above.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">189.</span>It seems to me that with some differences, the other factors weigh in favour of the proceedings being dealt with in France. The parties are an Irish individual, a French company, a French individual, and a Qatari individual. The issues in relation to travel of witnesses are largely the same as in the Maybourne proceedings. The use of French may be an additional difficulty that does not arise in the Maybourne proceedings.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">However, I have no evidence about the plaintiff’s competence in French. It is relevant 64 that the plaintiff was able to work in France and temporarily moved to Roquebrune.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Nor do I have any evidence about the French competence of any other witnesses the plaintiff might call. The second-named defendant says that he is proficient in English.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">190.</span>The likelihood is that the applicable law will be French. This is a relevant factor as it is a system of law with which the Irish plaintiff and some of his witnesses may well not be familiar.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">191.</span>Nonetheless, it seems to me when all of the factors, including the connecting factors, the absence of evidence of publication in Ireland, and issues of cost and convenience, the defendants have shown that Ireland is a forum non conveniens.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Service of the Summons rather than Notice 192. In light of my conclusions on these other points, it is not necessary to determine this point.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Conclusion in relation to the third-named defendant 193. I am satisfied that the third-named defendant has established that Ireland is forum non conveniens. I am also satisfied that the fact that the application for leave to serve the proceedings on the third-named defendant outside the jurisdiction was made after the proceedings had already been issued amounts to non-compliance with Order 11 Rule 6 and that there is no basis upon which I can exercise my discretion pursuant to Order 124 Rule.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">194.</span>In light of those findings, it is not necessary to determine the question in relation to service of the Summons itself rather than Notice of the Summons.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">SUMMARY 195. I have summarised my conclusions in respect of the various aspects of the applications as I have dealt with them. I do not propose to repeat them other than to restate the following.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">65 196. In relation to the SEDH proceedings, I am not satisfied that the Court has jurisdiction in the claim against the first and second-named defendant under article 7(1) of Brussels Recast on the basis that it was not established that the harmful event occurred in Ireland. I am satisfied that the provisions of Order 11 Rule 6 were not complied with in respect of the proceedings against the third-named defendant and that there is no basis upon which the court should exercise its discretion in respect of that non-compliance. However, even if I exercised my discretion in respect of that non-compliance, I am satisfied that Ireland is forum non conveniens in respect of the claim against the third-named defendant.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">197.</span>In the Maybourne proceedings, I am satisfied that the court would be entitled to assume jurisdiction in circumstances where the plaintiff has established a good arguable case in respect of the tort of defamation. However, I am not satisfied, having regard to all of the circumstances, that the case is a proper one for service out of the jurisdiction.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">198.</span>I will hear from the parties in respect of the form of the Orders which should be made in light of my conclusions.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">66</p></div>", "next": 0}