{"html": "<div class=\"lf-doc\"><p class=\"lf-p\">common law system, an accused person must have not just access to, but the assurance of the presence of, a lawyer during any detention. This is particularly so because, until now, the Convention jurisprudence has not adopted any absolute rule that evidence obtained in breach of a Convention right must be inadmissible, but rather has applied a test of considering the overall fairness of the proceedings.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">104.</span>Whilst these observations were made in the context of whether or not a suspect subject to the compulsion of the State in custody was entitled to have a solicitor present as of right, in effect, the Chief Justice expresses caution about drawing a bright-line rule in respect of the right to a solicitor because of the fact that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and to date of the Court of Justice of the European Union, is derived from civil law concepts. We think that it is far from clear that at the early investigative stage of a detention for the purpose of investigation including interviews and, as here, invocation of the so-called inference provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 the point of “notification” has been reached and that the obligation to tell the suspect of the garda case (it remains that) so far as they can has been arrived at. In our view, it has not been so arrived at since the process at that stage is far from a decision of the DPP to charge or the actual charging.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Furthermore, the gardaí can at most be expected (even if we were wrong) to afford information of a concrete kind which they actually have. In any event, any derogation under Article 7(4) “… that does not prejudice the right to a fair trial, access to certain materials may be refused if such access may lead to a serious threat to the life or the fundamental rights of another person or if such refusal is strictly necessary to safeguard an important public interest, such as in cases where access could prejudice an ongoing investigation …”.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The necessity for a derogation does not arise in any event. The position is quite different, say, after a person has been charged although we do not reach any conclusion in this case as to the point where, prima facie, rights under the Article are triggered. We should also say that we do not reach any view as to the limits of any derogation. In any event there was no such refusal in practice in this case: as we say the investigation was at any early stage. It was plain that further evidence of importance might be obtained (e.g. the results of DNA testing).</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">105.</span>The judge provided his ruling on the overarching submission that the responses should be excluded in light of the legal advice purportedly received by Mr Carlyle, inter alia, in the following terms: “The next issue relates to the use of inference provisions during the first arrest of Mr Carlyle. During the course of the accused's first detention at Tallaght Garda Station on the 8th of September 2019, gardaí invoked inference provisions under sections 18 and 19 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 as amended by sections 28 and 29 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007. Objection is taken to the admissibility of those interviews.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">When the inference provisions were invoked, the accused's solicitor read a statement to the effect that the information available in respect of the matters to which the inference related was insufficient to allow Mr Carlyle to be properly advised and, therefore, Mr Carlyle could not meaningfully engage with the process.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The prosecution intend to rely on that statement as a response to the questions put during the course of the inference interview.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Section 18 and section 19 of the Act do not fully deprive a suspect of the right to silence but do impair it by permitting a jury to draw inferences from the decision of a suspect to exercise the right to silence if they decline to answer questions in certain circumstances set out in the legislation. It is a matter for a jury to adjudicate upon whether or not any inference can be drawn at what the evidential value of such an inference is.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Trial judges are obliged to take a rigorous approach where the prosecution seeks to rely on the provisions. In DPP v. Sheehan, the Supreme Court held that these sections are not to be construed as penal provisions.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">An overarching objection is raised in respect of the interviews on the basis that in light of the statement read by Mr Carlyle's solicitor, no jury properly charged could draw any inference other than that Mr Carlyle's refusal to answer each of the individual questions was because he was acting on legal advice. That argument is advanced on the basis that there was an information gap at the time of the detention on the 8th of September 2019 because, for example, various forensic tests had not yet been carried out on items that had been recovered during the investigation, or the results of which were not available. It is, therefore, contended that the inference interview should be excluded in its entirety because no jury could properly draw an inference adverse to the accused in the circumstances. I do not agree with that submission.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It is clear from the evidence that the accused benefited from legal advice throughout his detentions as he is entitled to. The solicitor was present before and after the inference provisions were invoked. Moreover, on the contents of the statement read by the accused's solicitor, but signed by the accused himself and clearly read on his instructions, it is apparent that the accused had been fully advised about the inference procedure and that he had a good understanding of what was involved. In that regard, I note that nowhere in his statement read on his behalf does he suggest that he did not understand the procedure, the nature of an inference or what the potential effect of his decision not to directly answer any of the inference questions might be.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I accept the submission that an accused cannot negative the inference provisions by claiming he was declining to answer questions based on legal advice. Whether his decision not to answer the questions because he was acting on any legal advice or not is a matter of fact for the jury to adjudicate on. I, therefore, refuse to exclude the inference interview of 8th of September 2019 on the general basis that no jury could draw an adverse inference as to the accused in the circumstances sorry, an adverse inference in the circumstances.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">106.</span>We accordingly reject ground no. 2.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Ground 3: “The learned trial judge erred in his pre-trial ruling related to the identification of the accused and the identification process in general.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">107.</span>This ground of appeal relates to the identification of Mr Carlyle in CCTV footage by one Garda Damien Reilly.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">108.</span>Counsel for Mr Carlyle objected to the admission of this identification evidence at trial on the basis that no clear procedure for the identification had been followed by gardaí. He submitted that the process of identifying Mr Carlyle was defective for reasons including that Garda Reilly was involved in the investigation of the offence which Mr Carlyle was suspected of committing, that he had accordingly viewed the footage multiple times before formally identifying Mr Carlyle, and that no garda independent of the investigation provided separate identification.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">109.</span>On appeal, counsel for Mr Carlyle submitted that the admission of the identification evidence was unlawful because no procedure which would allow for the identification to be tested had been followed and that, in his submission, made the evidence “tantamount to confirmation bias”. We reject the proposition that there was any meaningful difficulty challenging the recognition evidence. There was no evidence which could have supported the proposition that there was confirmation bias. Such a thing can exist but unless there is some rational basis for concluding that it does in a given case, it cannot be relevant. The position is quite different with respect to, say, identification evidence where the long experience of the courts has shown that fatal errors can be made.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">110.</span>Counsel for Mr Carlyle submitted that the law regarding the admission of identification evidence was correctly stated in The People (DPP) v. Murphy [2023] IECA 330. He submitted that Murphy established the proposition that potentially contaminating factors were one of the many factors which could influence, and thus affect the reliability of, identification evidence. This may be true in principle. Counsel submitted that the extent of knowledge of an identifying garda witness of the investigation of the person he is purporting to identify is a “potentially contaminating factor” which, he postulated, is because of the risk that his identification will be “tainted by confirmation bias”. Counsel then sought to draw an analogy between potential confirmation bias in the context of identification evidence and the treatment of confirmation bias in the context of independent expert evidence by reference to Crumish v. HSE [2023] IEHC 194, and Glenman Corporation Ltd. v. Galway City Council [2023] IEHC 336, as well in the assessment of International Protection applications by reference to IX v. Chief International Protection Officer and Ors [2021] 2 IR 209. These decisions are of no relevance.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">111.</span>Quoting from the judgment of Ní Raifeartaigh J in Murphy, counsel for Mr Carlyle submitted that the test for admissibility of identification evidence based on CCTV is whether the procedures adopted, when taken in the round, “were sufficiently robust to ensure a fair process or whether they fell below a threshold such that the evidence could be considered more probative than prejudicial”. Counsel submitted that Garda Reilly was “effectively engaging in confirmation bias” and that the admission of his identification evidence was accordingly unlawful. The test in Murphy was one of whether or not the process was fair and that was the necessity for the approach adopted in the neighbouring jurisdiction.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Fairness is juxtaposed with evidence, which fell below a threshold such that the evidence might be more prejudicial than probative. What is or is not a sufficiently robust process and whether or not evidence is more prejudicial than probative must depend on the facts of each case.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">112.</span>This topic has been dealt with repeatedly. The first thing to be said is that if the quality of the footage is very good and the individual identifying the person shown knows him well, then there will be cases where it is bordering on irrationality to suggest that any elaboration of procedure either of the kind which exists in England and Wales or otherwise is necessary or, to put the matter another way, that a mere viewing was insufficiently robust. Secondly, the elaborate procedures which exist in that jurisdiction are not part of Irish law and the extent to which they are relevant is debateable. There is no reason for any distrust of a member of An Garda Síochána in this context, absent an evidential basis. Since whether or not the identification can be relied upon is dependent on the quality of the footage and the extent of the knowledge of the individual by the Garda who recognises him, there is no difficulty about testing these issues – one can see the footage for oneself. It is sometimes said that the more elaborate procedures contemplated abroad are necessary in order to afford the defence an opportunity to test the reliability of the evidence of the identifying officer, but we cannot see how this is so given what can be tested. The proposition is advanced that notwithstanding the integrity of an officer or his competence there might be some form of subjective confirmation bias. We do not know wherefrom this proposition emerges.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">113.</span>The situation which arises where a victim, even in a recognition case, who was had limited opportunity in circumstances of panic to see someone who, say, has assaulted or robbed him bear no meaningful comparison. The trier of fact is in a position to make a judgement as to the extent to which weight should be given to prior knowledge of an individual by, say, the identifying garda which goes to the weight of recognition; by looking at the footage, the trier of fact will be in a position to make judgement as to the extent to which reliance can be placed upon it. It is obvious that the starting point for any judgement in this regard by a trier of fact is the objective material constituted by the footage. Recognition evidence by a garda of someone who he knows on CCTV footage whether to confirm what he has previously been told or otherwise is perfectly acceptable, all else being equal. This is a matter of common sense. This will especially be the case if the footage is good. It is only in the event that the footage is poor that there will be any reality to some concern about reliability of identification. The trier of fact is perfectly capable of addressing issues about how well a garda knows the individual, and the extent to which he has considered the footage and whether or not he has been told who it is suspected can be seen in it. There is no reason why garda evidence as to the identity of an individual is inadmissible just because he has been told in advance of the suspected identity of the actual suspect. Any issue arising will go to weight. The adoption of the more elaborate procedures in England and Wales, whilst a failure to adhere thereto will not give rise to exclusion, is relevant only to weight in a debatable case. The fact that such processes were not been adopted here could not on any view give rise to a basis for their rejection.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">114.</span>We therefore reject ground no. 3.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Ground 4: “The learned trial judge erred in his trial ruling by dismissing the accused’s POC application and the grounds upon which it was based.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">115.</span>It is submitted by counsel for Mr Carlyle that there are nine discrete issues giving rise to an “incurable unfairness” in the trial of Mr Carlyle. A number of these issues were, if there was any significance to them, matters which ought to have properly been the subject of a discharge application rather than justifying the grant of an application under P O’C for a directed acquittal. A number of the grounds relied upon are common to both appellants. In his written submissions on appeal, counsel for Mr Carlyle has summarised those nine issues as follows:— 1.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">There were a vast number of notices of additional evidence, 28 in total, which were furnished up to and on the final day of evidence;</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">2.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">On 2 December 2022, a member of the jury handed a note into the Court which stated that they recognised the name of a member of the Gardaí, Detective Garda O’Mahoney (deceased), who was a friend of her husband’s brother. The name of this Garda had not been highlighted during jury selection as he had passed away, however on hearing the name during the course of the trial, this juror alerted the Court to her knowledge of the Garda in question. It was submitted by counsel for the defence that, in light of the circumstances of Garda O’Mahoney’s death and the link between his suicide and this case, it would be inappropriate for this juror to continue to act in case the juror may have such knowledge.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">3.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The inadvertent reference by counsel for the prosecution on two occasions to Mark Carlyle when referring to the Appellant, Seán Carlyle. Mark Carlyle is a person whose criminality is very much in the public domain.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">4.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">On 30 November 2022, Garda Reilly was cross-examined by counsel for Mr Disney in relation to his lack of previous convictions and the fact that he was on bail at the time of his trial. It was submitted that no such evidence was or could be adduced on behalf of the Appellant, thus allowing the jury to draw adverse inferences against the Appellant.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">5.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Garda Reilly also gave evidence that on 30th July 2019, some time prior to the commission of the offence the subject of these proceedings, he saw the Appellant driving his van. He made a note of same in his notebook, including the name of the Appellant, the registration number of his van and a note “not in a position to stop” .</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The evidence of this comment by the Garda was not contained in the Book of Evidence and was led from the Garda directly from his notebook. It was submitted that this evidence was highly prejudicial as it clearly implied that the Appellant was involved in some kind of criminal conduct as the Gardaí wanted to speak with him and were making notes of sightings of him and his vehicle.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">6.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Coupled with the evidence of Garda Reilly in relation to wanting to stop Mr Carlyle, Garda Murray also gave evidence in relation to wanting to stop the Appellant’s van.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Garda Murray gave evidence that prior to the altercation the subject of these proceedings, he was on the lookout for this van, giving rise to an adverse inference that there was some kind of illegality involving this van which falls outside the parameters of the offence for which the Appellant was charged in this Court.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">7.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">At various times during the trial, both the Appellant and Mr Disney were absent due to illness. When the Appellant was absent, Mr Disney was left unaccompanied in the dock and the trial was not permitted to proceed in his absence. However, when Mr Disney was absent, the trial continued without him and the Appellant was guarded by officers in the dock. It was submitted that clearly the jury could deduct from this that the Appellant was in custody while his co-accused was not, clearly creating adverse inferences in the mind of the jury.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">8.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Bad character evidence was adduced in relation to the Appellant.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">9.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Evidence was given by Garda Seán Lawlor that when he arrived onto the scene of the altercation, he spoke to the other three individuals who were there and concluded that they could not offer any probative evidence. This, it was submitted, was misleading and unfair.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The overall effect of the above, was that the jury were aware that the Appellant was in custody and was a man with previous convictions and engagement with the Gardaí.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Further, cumulatively, these various matters gave rise to an irremediable and prejudicial unfairness to the Appellant.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">116.</span>We will deal with each issue also but with some hesitation because all can really only be decided by reference to the procedural law about discharges due to supposedly illegitimate procedural events. That said, two points of general application must be made first. As indicated above, the judge told the jury that they were dealing with two separate trials being run together with all that that entails (we put the matter shortly). It is fundamental that professional judges respect the Constitution, which is not an empty or nominal thing.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It must be given real substance and must underlie the approach, inter alia, to issues of the present kind because jurors must be respected. Respect for juries is repeatedly emphasised. Supposed fears of prejudice as to how the jury might be thinking must be regarded with caution absent a real evidential basis – juries have repeatedly shown their robustness and capacity to exclude from their minds, when directed by the judge to do so, any event, statement, or evidence. In general, courts must reject applications to discharge juries save in wholly exceptional circumstances. There may be cases where evidence is available, or indeed the court is informed of some factor, which either indicated a level of prejudice warranting a discharge or, say, a breach by the jury or a particular juror of the judge’s explicit directions (potentially giving rise to the discharge of a single juror) – then the application might have some substance.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">117.</span>The core of the submission made by counsel for Mr Carlyle on appeal is that the key consideration for a court when assessing such an application is fairness (of course that is</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">so)</span>and that although none of the individual grounds outlined could, on their own, reach the level of unfairness required to discharge the jury, the cumulative effect of those factors “irrevocably prejudiced” Mr Carlyle such that the trial fell below the appropriate level of fairness in the proceedings.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Issues Nos. 1 &amp; 2 118. The issues which are common, at least on this appeal, are nos. 1 (additional evidence) and 2 (discharge of juror). We have dealt with both of these above so far as Mr Disney is concerned and no purpose is served by repetition, although it can be seen from the judge’s ruling on the grounds raised that he ruled upon them separately and correctly. On the first ground he had this to say: “The accused says that up to and including evidence served on the 12th of December 2022, that 28 notices of additional evidence have been served by the prosecution.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">He says that they have been difficult to deal with and that service of that number of notices of additional evidence is itself unfair.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The position in law is that the prosecution are entitled to serve additional evidence at any stage up to the close of the prosecution case without the leave of the Court. Many, if not most of the notices of additional evidence in this case were served before the trial commenced and a number were served during the course of a pre-trial hearing. At all stages, when additional evidence was served, the defence was given as much time as they needed to consider it. I do not, in fact, consider the number of notices served was excessive or particularly unusual in a trial of this kind. I am satisfied that at all times, the defence were afforded as much time as they needed to consider any evidence that was served on them. There was therefore no unfairness or prejudice to them by the service of the additional evidence. I therefore refuse to discharge the jury on this ground, and because I find there was no unfairness or prejudice to the accused, this argument does not add weight to the cumulative argument being advanced.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Again, the judge dealt with the second ground as follows: “The second issue is also one the Court has already dealt with; it relates to the deceased Garda O'Mahony. He had an involvement in the investigation, but his name was not read to the jury panel during the empanelling process. After evidence had commenced, as already dealt with at the stage that this application was already made, the Court received a note to the effect that one of the jurors recognised Garda O'Mahony's name as being a friend, I think, of her husband's brother. An application to discharge the jury was refused. The Court was and still is satisfied that there was no personal relationship between any juror and Garda O'Mahony.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In addition, although Garda O'Mahony was mentioned during the course of the evidence, no statement of his sought to be relied upon by the prosecution. The unidentified juror properly drew the fact they recognised the name to the attention of the Court, but did not suggest they had any difficulty continuing as a juror or knew anything about the case prior to being sworn. Out of an abundance of caution, having received the note and heard submissions from counsel in the application to discharge, the jury were told that if for any reason, any of them felt they could not continue to act impartially as a juror, they should draw that to the Court's attention. No member of the jury did so. I was and remain satisfied that the matter was properly brought to the Court's attention on the part of the relevant unidentified juror, and that if they felt they could no longer continue to act impartially, they would have brought that to my attention. As I pointed out in making the ruling, the fact that person might be excused as a juror prior to being sworn does not mean they must be excused or the jury discharged later in the trial, so long as all members of the jury can adjudicate impartially on the evidence. I was at the time of the making of the application to discharge satisfied there was no unfairness to the accused in allowing the trial to continue with all 12 jurors. I remain satisfied that there is no unfairness or prejudice to either accused by virtue of the very remote connection between one of the jurors and deceased Garda O'Mahony. This issue does not, therefore, add weight to the cumulative argument now being advanced.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">We therefore reject the proposition that there was any error in respect of either of these, still less that any issue arises under P O’C or otherwise.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Issue No. 3 119. Issue no. 3 concerns two inadvertent remarks made by counsel for the prosecution to one ‘Mark Carlyle’ instead of Seán Carlyle. Counsel for the appellant submitted that Mark Carlyle is a person whose criminality is “very much in the public domain” and that the appellant was accordingly prejudiced by these inadvertent mistakes. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the risk of the purported prejudice was remote and said that for such prejudice to actually accrue the jurors would have had to ignore the direction given not to conduct research on the internet during the course of the trial.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">120.</span>The judge ruled on this issue as follows: “The third issue relates to the fact that counsel for the prosecution and Mr Staines twice used the name Mark Carlyle when he meant Sean Carlyle before the jury. I'm told that Mark Carlyle has been before the Courts and that any association between them is prejudicial to Sean Carlyle. I'm satisfied it was a simple mistake by counsel for the prosecution, which he corrected. He can do so again in his closing speech if the defence want him to. The jury have been told repeatedly not to look up anything about the case on the internet and to avoid any reporting of it. I am sure they follow that direction and in any event, I am satisfied that they will decide the case on the evidence and not on the basis of an innocent mistake by counsel. I have already ruled on this basis and state the above for clarity and I find that there is no prejudice to the accused in that regard and this argument does not add weight to the cumulative argument now being advanced.”</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">121.</span>First, the idea that the mention of a name of a third party inadvertently on a few occasions could impinge upon the adjudication by the jury of the evidence against the accused is not stateable. In any event, if it is correct, it presupposes prejudice on the part of the jury, breach of the directions of the judge, and the sort of minor, perhaps one may even say trifling, error which can creep into a trial inadvertently without consequence.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Issue No. 4 122. It is contended also that Mr Caryle was to be distinguished from Mr Disney because, in effect, he was disabled from putting his character in issue or at least evidence could not have been adduced (presumably because of prior convictions) favourable to him in distinction to Mr Disney who had apparently one minor conviction. It is said that this gives rise to the necessity for a separate trial, but no such application was made.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">123.</span>The judge ruled on issue no. 4 as follows: “The fourth issue raised is said to feed into two other specific issues; it relates to cross-examination by counsel for Philip Disney of Garda Damien Reilly to establish Philip Disney's good character. It's a point that I do not believe was raised in isolation as a basis for discharging for the jury. During the course of the cross-examination on behalf of Mr Disney, it was established that Mr Disney had one minor previous conviction. It is contended on behalf of Sean Carlyle that that creates a distinction between the two accused in which the jury will draw the inference that Sean Carlyle had previous convictions. He says that that would have been a sufficient basis to justify a separate trial, but separately says that even if he was tried on his own, it would be unfair. As counsel for Sean Carlyle properly concedes, there are hazards in joint trials. The holding of a joint trial is a balancing exercise to some extent.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">There can be very significant unfairness to the prosecution if there are separate trials in which each accused can point the finger of blame at the other, and it's therefore desirable that the jury hear the entirety of the evidence against both accused at the same time. The jury will be told they must try the case on the evidence as it exists in respect of each accused individually. With one relatively minor exception that I will deal with shortly, there is no evidence of any prior criminal wrongdoing on the part of Sean Carlyle before the jury. The evidence that was led in cross-examination in respect of Mr Disney does not render the trial unfair in respect of Mr Carlyle. I am therefore satisfied that it does not justify discharging the jury, and that it adds no weight to the cumulative application.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Issue No. 5 124. Complaint was also made about garda evidence of sightings of Mr Carlyle in his van with the implication that he may have been guilty of some road traffic offence. The judge ruled on this issue as follows: “The fifth ground is related to ground four and was advanced on the basis of an earlier application to discharge, and relates to evidence from Garda Damien Reilly that he saw Sean Carlyle driving a black flowers.ie van in July 2019. The sighting took place in a petrol service station. Garda Reilly said he recognised Sean Carlyle. He also said he had made a note of the van's registration number in his garda notebook. No objection was taken to that evidence.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The basis for the earlier application to discharge was that Garda Reilly also said that he was not in a position to stop Sean Carlyle, or words to that effect, which it is contended on behalf of Sean Carlyle gives rise to a specific and particular prejudice to him. The basis upon which all of the identification was given was that the relevant garda knew Sean Carlyle, in fact both accused, by virtue of his work as a community guard for 10 years. At the time of the relevant sighting in July 2019, Garda Reilly was in an unmarked car. The fact that Garda Reilly said he did not stop Sean Carlyle is no more prejudicial than the rest of his evidence about that sighting which was not objected to.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">125.</span>Evidence of sightings was perfectly justified to prove Mr Carlyle’s connection with the vehicle. This evidence does not necessarily give rise to the implication of criminality or certainly of criminality of such significance as to impinge upon the discharge by the jury of their duty in accordance with the judge’s directions. As prosecuting counsel pointed out, the identity of Mr Carlyle was contested in the teeth of overwhelming evidence.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Issue No. 6 126. The judge ruled on issue no. 6 as follows: “The sixth ground is related to grounds four and, to some extent, five above; it concerns the evidence of Garda Thomas Murray. He said he observed Sean Carlyle loading a bicycle into the back of the flowers.ie van on the 1st of July 2019. He said he took an interest in it and that he took a note of the registration number. He said, as I understand it, that he knew Sean Carlyle by virtue also as having worked as a community garda. He made a second sighting of the van on the 24th of August 2019 outside the Killinarden Inn at I think 19:45 or thereabouts. That evidence was not objected to. As part of his evidence, he said words to the effect that following from that initial observation, he was cognisant to locate the van. It is submitted on behalf of Sean Carlyle that the jury will infer that Garda Murray wanted to stop the van because he suspected Sean Carlyle was involved in criminality. As with the earlier related points, the excerpt from Garda Murray's evidence to which objection is taken is no more prejudicial in my view than the rest of his evidence, in relation to which no objection was taken earlier in the trial hearing or before Garda Murray gave evidence. I, therefore, find this ground is insufficient to justify discharging the jury.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Considering the cumulative impact of the above grounds, in particular grounds five and six, it is to be noted in the first instance that the defence were on notice of the evidence in question and took no objection to the substance of any of it.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Either individually or in full knowledge that it was the intention of the prosecution to lead the substance of the evidence of both Garda Reilly and Garda Murray. The evidence to which no objection is taken was to the effect that on two separate occasions, gardaí had taken note of Sean Carlyle's whereabouts and of the vehicle he was associated with. The additional part of the evidence to which objection is taken does not render the evidence as a whole any more prejudicial such, in my view, as to warrant discharging the jury. I do not accept that those two pieces of evidence taken together and even considered with the other grounds being advanced and in particular ground four, are such that there is a real risk that they would cloud the jury's critical judgement to the point where the accused would not get a fair trial. Some material, although unrelated to an offence charged, can be so prejudicial that it could not be left in the mind of a jury. Evidence of involvement or allegations of involvement in violent crime, for example; that is not the position here. The material about which complaint is made is not evidence of wrongdoing at all. It is no more than evidence that gardaí who knew the accused for reasons unrelated to any criminal wrongdoing noted his presence on two occasions with the flowers.ie van. The association between the accused and the flowers.ie van is a central feature of the prosecution case and of significant probative value.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">That association is clearly an issue in the trial.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The substance of the evidence of Garda Reilly and Murray was not objected to.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Any additional prejudicial effect, if any, is outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. I am satisfied that whether looked at individually or taken together, those three grounds do not give rise to a real or any substantial risk of an unfair trial and are, therefore, not a basis for discharging the jury.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">127.</span>No objection was taken to this evidence. Apart from that the same conclusions must be reached in relation to its introduction as in the previous ground. The judge was right to reject this argument.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Issue No. 7 128. The judge ruled on issue no. 7 as follows: “The seventh ground relied on Mr Sean Carlyle's absence from court over the last few days due to ill health -- over a number of days due to ill health. It is an argument not previously advanced. It is submitted that on occasion, prison staff remained in court when Sean Carlyle was there alone, but while Philip Disney was in court on his own, no prison staff were present. The argument is that the jury could draw the inference that Sean Carlyle is in custody. In the first instance, it should be noted that this matter was not drawn to the Court's attention at the relevant time. The jury were only present in court for a few minutes at a time over the days when Sean Carlyle was absent. This is not an instance of an accused being seen in handcuffs or otherwise in the custody of prison staff. The Court was very careful to ensure that during those very short periods when Sean Carlyle appeared over a video link from custody, that the jury could not see him. It was made very clear to the jury at all times that the reason he wasn't in court was because he was not well. I can see no prejudice on the basis contended for that would justify discharging the jury and refuse to do so on that ground.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">129.</span>It is unthinkable that the fact that Mr Carlyle was not in court for a few days because of a health issue or that prison officers were present when Mr Carlyle was present but not when Mr Disney was there on his own that there is something in the nature of an inference of bad character. Apart from the brevity of the periods when those situations arose if there is to be the most rudimentary respect for a jury’s impartiality the fact of the presence or absence of prison officers in a given case could not possibly influence them. It ignores the fact that if anything juries would be surprised to see that there were no prison officers present.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Issue No. 8 130. The judge ruled on this issue as follows: “The eighth ground relates to evidence where Garda Brogan, when under crossexamination by Sean Carlyle's own counsel. He put it to her that Sean Carlyle had been disqualified from driving and the case is made that that is why he said he was not driving the flowers.ie van, there having been evidence of that earlier in the trial.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The submission is made that counsel had to adduce evidence sorry, had to adduce that evidence; I do not accept that submission. The evidence that Sean Carlyle told Garda Brogan he had not been driving a van is potentially probative evidence. The prosecution did not, quite properly, lead the evidence that Sean Carlyle had been disqualified from driving at the time. It was then for the defence to make a tactical decision whether or not they would introduce that fact through cross-examination.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">They made the decision to lead the evidence, and there is no basis to discharge the jury based on that decision.”</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">131.</span>It is also said that for whatever reason counsel for the defence was put in a position whereby they he had to elicit evidence from a garda to the effect that his client had been disqualified from driving with a view, it seems, to undermining the proposition that he could be seen driving the van in question. He was not put in that position. He made a free choice to introduce evidence which might or might not be regarded as prejudicial. It might be supposed as a matter of reason that a jury trying a man for murder would regard the idea of disqualification as trifling. In any event it is admissible on the issue.</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Issue No. 9 132. It is also suggested that because a garda indicated that other persons who had not made statements were found at the scene some prejudice arises. The judge ruled on that issue (no. 9) as follows: “The ninth ground relates to an issue already raised about evidence led from one of the first gardaí who arrived at the location where Vincent Parsons was found, that being Garda Sean Lawlor. His evidence was to the effect that the three individuals who were there were not in a position to give evidence, meaning they weren't in a position to make statements to give evidence at trial.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It is submitted that that evidence is misleading and adds to general unfairness. The fact is that none of the eyewitnesses did make statements to the gardaí.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">No actual prejudice is even contended for by the accused. I'm satisfied that there is no prejudice or unfairness and that this point adds no weight to the overall argument being advanced.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">We cannot begin to understand how this point could have any substance.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">133.</span>We think that the judge was right in all respects.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">134.</span>We cannot see why any of these factors could form a basis for a successful application for a directed acquittal under the P O’C jurisdiction. Some one or more of them might give rise to an application for a discharge of the jury but such was not made (we do not wish to be taken as indicating that any such application was well founded): we hardly need to say that this jurisprudence pertains to circumstances where a fair trial in accordance with constitutional justice cannot be obtained not primarily because of errors (if there are any) in the course of the trial but because of what we might call extrinsic factors such as delay or nonavailability of essential witnesses rather than issues of this kind. On that ground alone, we think that there is no basis for complaint about the refusal of the judge to direct an acquittal.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">135.</span>We therefore reject ground no. 4 of Mr Carlyle’s appeal.</div>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">136.</span>Given that none of his grounds of appeal have been upheld, we accordingly dismiss this appeal.</div></div>", "next": 0}