{"html": "<div class=\"lf-doc\"><p class=\"lf-p\">The only limitation provided for in this statutory exemption is that where the works materially affect the external appearance of the structure they are exempted development so long as they do not render the appearance of that structure inconsistent with its own character or the character of neighbouring structures.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">53.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The appearance of the said structures are consistent with the character of the original structures being of the same size height, and design constructed as it has been on the original footprint of the existing structure. It has similar lightweight materials, fenestration, design and has exhibited a drawing of the design of the original structure and a drawing of the design of the new structure to demonstrate the non-material nature of the alteration.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">54.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Appellant/Respondents submit that exempted development is specifically excluded from the definition of unauthorised development/ unauthorised works that the works being carried out by the Respondent constitute exempted development and accordingly they cannot amount to an unauthorised development for the purposes of Section 2 of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Analysis of exempted development defence 144.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Section 4(1)(h) provides that the following is exempted development: “development consisting of the carrying out of works for the maintenance, improvement or other alteration of any structure, being works which affect only the interior of the structure or which do not materially affect the external appearance of the structure so as to render the appearance inconsistent with the character of the structure or of neighbouring structures;”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">145.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The exempted development categories are to be construed strictly: Dillon v. Irish Cement Limited 2004 WJSC-SC 2866, [1986] 11 JIC 2602 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Finlay C.J., 26 November 1986); Corajio Unlimited v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 373 (Unreported, High Court, Phelan J., 29 June 2023) (§70); Leitrim County Council v. Dromaprop Ltd [2024] IEHC 233 (Unreported, High Court, 29 April 2024) (§44).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">146.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The respondents bear the onus to show that the exemption applies, an onus they have not only not discharged but which they never had any hope of discharging. There are two independent but mutually reinforcing and insuperable problems: (i) Total or near-total replacement of a structure is not maintenance, improvement or alteration of the structure: this is clear from an overview of the consistent caselaw touching on this, including Cairnduff v. O’Connell 1986 WJSC-SC 209, [1986] I.R. 73, [1986] I.L.R.M. 465; Dublin Corporation v. Arnold Lowe and Signway Holdings Limited [2000] IEHC 161 (Unreported, High Court, Morris J., 4 February 2000) at p. 9; Fingal County Council v. Crean [2001] IEHC 148 (Unreported, High Court, Ó Caoimh J., 19 October 2001); Dublin City Council v.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Lowe [2004] IESC 106, [2004] 4 I.R. 259 (McCracken J.; Murray C.J. and Kearns J. concurring); McCabe v. Coras Iompair Éireann and Iarnród Éireann [2006] IEHC 356, [2007] 2 IR 392 (Herbert J.) (§28); Sligo County Council v. Martin [2007] IEHC 178 (Unreported, High Court, O’Neill J., 24 May 2007) (§21 et seq.); Cronin (Readymix) Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IESC 36, [2017] 2 I.R. 658 (O’Malley J.;</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">MacMenamin and Laffoy JJ. concurring); Morgan v. Slaneygio Limited [2017] IEHC 284 (Unreported, High Court, Baker J., 4 May 2017), at 39-41. (ii) Furthermore, the works did materially affect the external appearance of each structure (see photographs illustrated above) so as to render it inconsistent with the character of the structure. The works here go so far beyond anything accepted in Cairnduff v. O’Connell 1986 WJSC-SC 209, [1986] I.R. 73, [1986] I.L.R.M. 465 or any other case as to make reliance on s. 4(1)(h) simply unstateable and irrelevant.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The averment to the contrary by Mr Donoghue is not reality-based as set out above.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">147.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">So the elaborate legal arguments based on s. 4(1)(h) just don’t get off the ground on these facts.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">148.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It doesn’t help that there are clearly areas of the site which had no pre-existing structures, so there was nothing to improve in any event. This illustrates I suppose that it is possible for an argument to be totally without merit for more than one reason.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">149.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regards the argument that the foundations are improvements to the pre-existing foundations, I endorse the council’s reply bearing in mind the onus of proof: “The Appellants have adduced no evidence to establish existing foundations on the Lands – noting that the photographs depict mobile homes on blocks. Moreover, even if foundations did previously exist on the Lands, the Council’s photographs depict the development of new 28 larger and materially different foundations with new services to same. Again, none of the Appellants’ deponents attempt to engage with this evidence.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Noting the restrictive interpretation to s.4(1)(h) of the PDA, it is simply not credible to argue, as the Appellants enthusiastically attempt to, that these comprise repairs to the alleged existing foundations.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The evidence demonstrates that the new structures are considerably larger and different from those previously located on the Lands – which is consistent with the need for new larger foundations.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">150.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The respondents implausibly claim that they have discharged the onus via Mr Donoghue: “These structures were the subject matter of a survey conducted by the Respondents [sic] architect [sic] (who’s [sic] qualifications and expertise are not disputed) and who confirms that the foundations of these structures were retained and improved and that the alteration/improvement works are carried out on or within the footprint of those foundations.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">This is the only evidence of actual survey which is averred to at paragraph 7 of the affidavit of Adrian Donoghue and therefore as a matter of evidence has not been put in dispute and must be accepted.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">151.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As noted above Mr Donoghue is not an architect. The assertion that the lack of foundations is not in dispute is incorrect given the photographic evidence put forward by the council. The respondents’ failure to invoke cross-examination means this issue must be decided against the party carrying the onus of proof – in relation to an exemption that is the respondents.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">152.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Furthermore Mr Donoghue’s affidavit generally is manifestly not reality-based, to a very concerning degree. Little or no weight should be attached to his averments in any event, even if the council bore the onus of proof. There is no explanation of how pouring new foundations on top of 50-year-old foundations could ever have worked, even if counterfactually all of the previous homes had foundations.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">153.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Even if rudimentary fragments of old foundations survive, they have been subsumed into the new unauthorised development and thus fall to be removed in their entirety.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">154.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regard what the respondents clearly think is a winning point that they have kept the same footprint and dimensions, that is not a winning point. The 2000 Act does not create a defence that you can have a new development as long as you keep the old footprint and dimensions. This is a new and different development, irrespective of those matters.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">155.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As regards the ancillary matters – the extensive site clearance works, the development of new roads within the lands, the installation of new services such as pipes – the defence is that these are ancillary to exempted development and are thus themselves exempted in consequence (relying on Rehabilitation Institute v. Dublin Corporation 1988 WJSC-HC 626, [1988] 1 JIC 1401 (Unreported, High Court, Barron J., 14 January 1988)). Unfortunately, the notion of acceptable ancillary development does not arise when the substantive development is not exempted. So this argument never gets out of the traps.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">156.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The immense ingenuity deployed on behalf of the respondents knew few bounds (and in case I had overlooked any of the numerous elaborate fall-back arguments, I invited the respondents to let me know during the draft judgment process, but no such notification was received), in that a further argument was made that the road works were covered by para. (h) as improvements to the existing roads. Again however the respondents have not discharged the onus of proof on this including by way of showing that the original roads were authorised or exempt in the first place. If the original roads were unauthorised structures (and the respondents have not proved the contrary), it would be contrary to public policy to interpret s. 4 as having the effect that improvements to such roads, even if proved, could also be exempt.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Tree-cutting issue as alleged exempted development 157.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In fairness to the respondents I have considered s. 4(1)(i) even though it didn’t particularly feature in their submissions.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">158.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">First of all that doesn’t cover any damage to hedges and the like, only to trees.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">159.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Secondly and more generally, the tree-cutting was in the service of an unauthorised development. That which might otherwise be non-exempted may be permissible if it is ancillary to exempted development: by analogy with Rehabilitation Institute v. Dublin Corporation (Unreported, High Court, Barron J., 14 January 1988) whereby a use ancillary to the main use was deemed not to be a different use. But this cuts both ways – by necessary logical reciprocation and as a matter of legal policy, that which might otherwise be exempted ceases to be so if it is for the purposes of an unauthorised development.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">160.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In any event, s. 4 goes on to provide: “(1B) Development referred to in paragraph (a), (d), (e) or (g) of subsection (1A) shall not be exempted development if an environmental impact assessment of the development is required. (1C) Development referred to in paragraph (a), (d), (e) or (g) of subsection (1A) shall not be exempted development if an appropriate assessment of the development is required.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">29 161.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The respondents here, who carry the onus of proof to demonstrate that an exemption applies, have not shown that no environmental impact assessment (EIA) or appropriate assessment (AA) would have been required. So the defence is not made out in any event.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Issue 6 – discretion 162.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The council submitted, with all due respect, that “you can hardly come across a less deserving case of discretion”. Unfortunately that is fair comment.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">163.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Discretion has two dimensions, an objective element (regarding planning considerations independently of the particular occupier/developer etc.) and a subjective element. Of these, the objective element is notably more compelling.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">164.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">There are multiple reasons why that should be so. The primary context is separation of powers – it is for statutory decision-takers to decide whether to allow any development. If a court refuses to require remediation of an unauthorised development, it in effect grants a form of retention permission contrary to the statute and contrary to the separation of powers.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">165.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Secondly, it is central in planning law that development is objective, and that taking into account in a material way the identity or personal characteristics or conduct of the owner or occupier renders a decision unlawful – see Killegland Estates Ltd v. Meath County Council [2023] IESC 39, [2023] 12 JIC 2109 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Hogan J., 21 December 2023) at 83-85, applied in daa v. Fingal County Council [2024] IEHC 589 (Unreported, High Court, 17 October 2024). So it would be illogical and unprincipled to quash planning decisions if regard was had to particular occupiers or developers, and yet grant a de facto retention permission by reference to those very types of subjective considerations.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">166.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The third and most poignant reason why objective factors are notably more weighty is that development by a particular person is a transitory thing. Yes, a court might be understandably tempted to hold off on enforcement against a sympathetic respondent, perhaps an aged and infirm individual and so on, but once that particular respondent goes the way of all flesh, we are left in perpetuity with a blot on the landscape and violence having been done objectively to the environment and the separation of powers, to the detriment of the public interest for as long as the development lasts, perhaps indefinitely, and to the detriment in particular a whole cohort of present and future people who must suffer the illegality and who are rendered invisible in a subjective analysis that renders the wrongdoer’s ill-gotten interests as somehow weighty or decisive.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">167.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">For this reason, the fact that a property is used as a dwelling does not give rise to an exemption from planning law, any more than the existence of housing shortages renders the law unenforceable against dwellings constructed without permission. To put it another way, rights are not boot-strapping – you can’t confer on yourself a right to live in structure X merely by erecting the structure, if you do not otherwise enjoy such a right, any more than you can confer on yourself a right to live in a particular State by entering it, or a right to private property in something just by taking possession of it that you are not otherwise entitled to. To go down that road does a severe injury to the objective nature of planning law and renders the law overall incoherent and in significant part unenforceable. And when the sympathetic resident waving their copy of the Constitution has disappeared over the horizon, the structure remains potentially for all time. Such an argument inflates a distortedly individualised notion of constitutional rights to eclipse the rights and interests of others and society generally, as well as the bedrock notion of the rule of law and the separation of powers. What Hogan J. said for a unanimous seven-judge Supreme Court in Killegland at 84, “[p]lanning and zoning decisions should, generally speaking, at least, be blind as to issues of ownership”, is doubly true of discretion in planning enforcement, because a court has no legitimacy to impose its own subjective planning outcomes by refraining from applying the law based on some kind of romanticised sympathetic consideration of the individual owner/occupier at a given time.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">This misconception of self-starting “rights” takes an even more extreme form when we are dealing with people who simply walk onto land and set up residence. To block enforcement of planning law based on the “rights” of people, however otherwise unfortunate, who trespass onto lands is to incentivise trespass and to undermine equality before the law. To reward wrongdoers with courtimposed rights in such situations is to in effect exempt trespassers, or even worse particular judicially favoured categories of trespassers, from laws that apply to other citizens. This is, I emphasise, simply comment for completeness. And also for completeness we must acknowledge the growing relevance of EU law in the planning area – failure by the courts to uphold the integrity of the planning system and provide an effective remedy for unauthorised developments would in many cases constitute a breach of European law, including as to assessments and public participation.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Objective factors 168.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The primary objective factor is the integrity of the planning system (Morris v. Garvey 1982 WJSC-SC 1253, [1983] I.R. 319, [1982] I.L.R.M. 177 (Henchy J.; Griffin and Hederman JJ. concurring); Meath County Council v. Murray [2017] IESC 25, [2018] 1 I.R. 189 (McKechnie J.;</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Denham C.J, O’Donnell, Laffoy and Dunne JJ. concurring) at 221-225). That militates in favour of full remediation.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">30 169.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Relief will only be refused in exceptional circumstances. As put in Krikke v. Barranafaddock Sustainability Electricity [2020] IESC 42 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 17 July 2020) by O’Malley J. (Clarke C.J., Charleton and Baker JJ. concurring) at §110: “The orderly operation of the planning code is, in my view of high public importance. As McKechnie J. emphasised in Murray, the starting point is that, subject to certain exemptions, no development can lawfully be commenced without planning permission. As well as rendering the developer liable to very far-reaching orders under s. 160, unauthorised development is a serious breach of the criminal law. The penalties are, McKechnie J. stated, ‘a significant expression of the high level of public concern there is in regulating orderly and sustainable development’.”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">170.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">That primary consideration of the integrity of the system, the principle of legality, the need for equal justice and the rule of law, militating in favour of an order being made, is reinforced here by: (i) the high amenity zoning; (ii) the related protection objective; (iii) the traffic hazard, as explained by John Joe Hegarty, senior engineer, traffic and transportation division – noting the unsuitable nature of the roads serving the area around the lands; (iv) the water and wastewater arrangements and impacts on local water courses, as per the affidavit of Lorcan Brennan, senior engineer with the council; and (v) the impacts on the local heritage and sensitive environment – as per the affidavit of Rosaleen Dwyer, heritage officer with the council and the affidavit of Laurence Colleran, senior executive parks superintendent.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">171.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It is also reinforced by the impact on local residents. Mr O’Neill lives 200m from the unauthorised development – to translate that into terms some readers may relate to, it is the distance as the crow flies from Chancery Place to the Bar’s Church Street building. The need to consider residents illustrates the general problem with subjective approaches that render innocent parties legally invisible – wrongdoers are not the only people whose interests or rights need to be considered.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">172.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Finally, this is not a technical breach or one that can be readily remedied.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">173.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The objective factors overwhelmingly favour full remediation.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Subjective factors 174.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Subjective factors, even if established to be in any way favourable (which they are not in this case), are generally of limited weight when placed against objective factors, particularly the need to enforce planning law.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">175.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The claim for the exercise of discretion is unsustainable having regard to the following: (i) Some of the development – particularly in the area with no previous structures – is not covered by any claimed exemption, however threadbare (unless passing reference to a septic tank on the virgin field is a claim that the building of houses is “improvement” of that, although I didn’t understand that to be the argument). (ii) The response to pre-litigation letters was either lacking (in Mr O’Neill’s case) or wholly unsustainable (in the council’s case – e.g., raising a frivolous and evidencefree pre-1964 point that was never substantiated). (iii) Works continued and accelerated despite the council’s intervention and while the matter was before the court. As the council submits, the appellants ignored the warning letters and correspondence from the council seeking an undertaking to cease the works and continued to proceed with the completion of the work. If the appellants had stopped when the council requested, they would not be facing the extent of removal required – they are therefore entirely the authors of their own misfortune.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As the council submits, “any consequences, including financial consequences, for the Appellants are entirely of their own making and were entirely foreseeable.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The Appellants’ action of proceeding with the unauthorised development, driven by their own commercial motivations (noting the averments indicating an intention to rent out the unauthorised structures), does not provide any basis for withholding the relief and would in fact set an extremely dangerous precedent by rewarding the Appellants for continuous unauthorised development (a criminal offence under s. 151 of the PDA). Nobody made the Appellants proceed with the unauthorised development. Nobody stopped the Appellants applying for planning permission before commencing the unauthorised development. Nobody stopped the Appellants applying for a s. 5 Declaration before commencing the works.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Nobody made them expedite the unauthorised development whilst the s. 160 proceedings were before the Circuit Court. The financial consequences of an Order on the Appellants provides no basis for withholding relief”.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">31 (iv) (v) There was removal of significant mature trees without a felling licence.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">This was likely to have been during prohibited season contrary to the Wildlife Act 1976. (vi) The respondents’ litigation conduct does not improve their position. There was an unexplained failure to comply with the Circuit Court’s directions as to the exchange of affidavits. (vii) There was also the issuing and then withdrawing (without any explanation ever having been provided on affidavit) of a motion to transfer the case to the High Court on the basis that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction (for which costs were ordered against them). (viii) There was also the issuing and withdrawing judicial review proceedings (High Court Record No. 2025 1024 JR)which sought to stay these proceedings. These judicial review proceedings sought, inter alia, a stay on any enforcement steps being taken, including the issuing of s. 160 proceedings (§D6, statement of grounds), but did not refer to the fact that, as of 10 November 2025 (the first listing date before the High Court), s. 160 proceedings had already issued in the Circuit Court and directions had been fixed for the hearing of an urgent interlocutory application (with the case having been listed before the Circuit Court on 30 October 2025 and 6 November 2025 in this regard). (ix) While this isn’t of course criticism, it is nonetheless a fact that this is a commercial exercise by the respondents who clearly seek to make a gain from the unauthorised structures by renting same out. (x) There has been no delay in the council acting to address the unauthorised development, not that delay within the quasi-limitation period is particularly weighty or even relevant in any event (there is developed EU law on that subject). (xi) Housing shortages are not a weighty consideration. The fact that the structures would be used as dwellings is not a weighty consideration. The respondents don’t in any event have standing to assert dwelling-based interests in that regard. There is no such argument anyway because these houses are not occupied. The former occupants are not parties and there is no evidence that they have any rights of reoccupation.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Even if there was occupation of unauthorised structures, constitutional rights don’t provide protection against demolition of such structures save in the most exceptional circumstances that are hard to envisage. Even in such circumstances, a stay or adjournment would be more proportional than objectively despoiling the environment in perpetuity by refusing relief without any policy mandate to do so and on the insubstantial basis of the transitory fact of occupation by a particular person. (xii) Characterising what happened here as “genuine mistake” (Morris v. Garvey 1982 WJSC-SC 1253, [1983] I.R. 319, [1982] I.L.R.M. 177 per Henchy J. (Griffin J. and Hederman JJ. concurring)) is a ludicrous defence to offer when works pressed ahead and intensified after enforcement letter, an enforcement order and proceedings. To do that isn’t engaging in a genuine mistake – it is defiance and a voluntary assumption of risk. (xiii) There is no acquiescence over a long period as referred to by Henchy J. We are not talking about the old caravan/ mobile home park anymore. We are talking about the new works since August 2025. The triviality or the mere technicality of an infraction could be relevant in a given case (which is an objective factor as noted above) but this is not a trivial or technical infraction. Gross or disproportionate hardship or such like extenuating or excusing factors are subjective but the hardship here is not disproportionate. It cannot be the law that some illegal developments are too big to remediate. A developer cannot create a defence of gross or disproportionate hardship merely by engaging in gross or disproportionate illegality.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">To put it another way, full remediation is not disproportionate merely because it is full, or merely because the illegality is large and therefore the full remediation is going to be expensive. Even if legally recognised gross hardship did arise, the objective factors are still of compelling weight.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">176.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Insofar as any of the factors are contested, the respondents bear the onus to establish facts necessary to show that discretion should be exercised in their favour, which they have not discharged.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">177.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Overall, even if counterfactually, there were subjective reasons against immediate enforcement, it would normally be disproportionate to refuse relief altogether and certainly would be here. Relief with a stay or an adjournment pending some engagement with the planning system would be far more proportionate in one of the exceptionally rare situations where the subjective 32 elements were of such immense moment as to outweigh the separation of powers and the integrity of the planning system.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">178.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Ultimately the core reasons why objective factors are compelling were identified in Sligo County Council v. Martin [2007] IEHC 178 (Unreported, High Court, O’Neill J., 24 May 2007) (§2829): “If the court were to not grant relief that would have the effect of granting planning permission for this structure in circumstances where the various procedures set out in the Act of 2000 for the purposes of protecting the public in regard to development would be ignored with the inevitable defeat of a variety of public interests. Firstly there is the interest of the public in general to participate in the planning process by making objection or observation in relation to any particular proposed development. Secondly the expert supervisory role of the local authority as planning authority would be set at nought as it would be entirely excluded.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">It was at all times open to the respondent prior to taking the precipitous action of replacing this mobile home in August of 2005 to seek, in the ordinary way, planning permission for this development. He choose not to do so and in my view he cannot now call in aid the discretion of this court, when it is clear that what he has done is a breach of the statutory obligation to obtain planning permission prior to the carrying out of a development ...”</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Issue 7 – form of the order 179.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">There are three basic questions about the form of the order: (i) what should happen; (ii) who should do it; and (iii) when should it happen.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Sub-issue I – what should happen 180.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The logic of the position successfully put forward by the applicants is that the removal of the original caravans/ mobile homes terminated any defences that would have applied to those structures. The modular homes are a new development which is unauthorised. Remediation of the unauthorised development therefore involves removing the new structures including new foundations without re-erecting the old ones which would be unauthorised development.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">181.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The respondents made extensive submissions on the shortcomings of the reliefs as originally drafted by the applicants in the notices of motion before the Circuit Court. That’s all as may be, but the court has to be able to grant the appropriate relief under s. 160. Since the respondents also made much of the right to have ancillary matters included in the substantive matter, the appropriate order under s. 160 is going to involve some ancillary matters to make it effective.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">182.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In any event, in fairness to the applicants, the claim for further and other relief has to be wide enough to allow the court to make the order under the section they invoke that most appropriately gives effect to the findings of the court. Indeed the respondents submitted that the court “can make any order that the court considers appropriate”, and while that was a concept they invoked in favour of allowing them to continue to have unauthorised structures, it applies equally to an order requiring removal and remediation.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">183.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Relying on Lawlor v. Dundalk Town Council [2005] IEHC 73, [2005] 2 I.L.R.M. 106 (O’Neill J.), the respondents claim lack of clarity as to what is demanded. But there is no analogy between a self-executing enforcement notice, at issue in that case, and a motion invoking an equitable jurisdiction of the court. It is the order, and not the motion, that provides the necessary clarity. If the respondents think there is any lack of clarity in the order I invited them to raise their issues in the draft judgment process (which they did not do) or to invoke the liberty to apply post-perfection.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">184.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Overall, the respondents gave the impression of having the belief that they had a winning “gotcha” point that the exact reliefs in the notices of motion were insufficiently wide and/or that the applicants needed to be pinned down rigidly to the original wording. Unfortunately it is my painful rôle to explain that that is not a winning point.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">185.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Especially in the quasi-equitable context of a statutory injunction, the court needs to be able to fashion the relief that arises most appropriately from the evidence as the issues are shaped by the particular submissions made.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">186.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">By way of summary, the court is not shackled to the exact wording of the specific reliefs sought in the original notices of motion in the Circuit Court for any one or more of the following independent reasons and a fortiori for these reasons taken cumulatively: (i) the respondents submitted that the court “can make any order that the court considers appropriate”, and so it is improper to now make the opposite submission having lost; (ii) the precise order made has to take into account the evidence and the run of the case in terms of what issues were raised by way of defence and what issues were determined, something that cannot conceivably be anticipated on day one; (iii) the applicants in any event expressly sought further and other relief;</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">33 (iv) (v) this is in any event a quasi-equitable context; the order provisionally proposed remains squarely within the context of s. 160 of the 2000 Act; (vi) subsection (1) of s. 160 provides inter alia that the court can “by order require any person to do or not to do, or to cease to do, as the case may be, anything that the Court considers necessary and specifies in the order to ensure, as appropriate, the following: (a) that the unauthorised development is not carried out or continued; (b) in so far as is practicable, that any land is restored to its condition prior to the commencement of any unauthorised development; ...” (vii) subsection (3)(b) of s. 160 provides inter alia that the order “may contain such terms and conditions (if any) as to the payment of costs as the Court considers appropriate”; (viii) there will be an opportunity to make a submission on the form of the order; and/or (ix) there are in any event significant objective interests involved in terms of the integrity of planning law and EU law.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">187.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">As specified above, the exact form of the order will be open for submissions but not in a way that revisits the judgment.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">188.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">With a view to assisting the respondents, I can clarify that it would be improper to attempt to avail of the liberty to make submissions on the form of the order in a manner that impermissibly re-argues the case, including by reference to any of the following: (i) that the court has failed to have appropriate regard to the nature of the structure which was the subject matter of the works for alteration and improvement; (ii) that the Court has failed to have appropriate regard to the fact that the footprint of the structure has not been increased, nor the dimensions altered beyond what existed on the site which evidence was not contradicted; (iii) that the evidence from the unregistered person showing the before and after demonstrates that the extent of the alterations as was shown and was not a significant given the surveys carried out by him both before and after; (iv) that the court has failed to have appropriate regard to the application of the principle governing s. 4(1)(h) and in particular the judgement of Ryan J. in Micheal Cronin (ReadyMix) Limited v. An Bord Pleanála [2009] IEHC 553, [2009] 4 I.R. 736, and the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Cairnduff v. O’Connell 1986 WJSC-SC 209, [1986] I.R. 73, [1986] I.L.R.M. 465 which gives the effect that there is a greater margin of appreciation shown in a set of works which are exempted development as prescribed under that section and is not confined to insignificant works; (v) that the court erred in its interpretation of the defences available under s. 4(1)(h) as set out in Morris v. Garvey 1982 WJSC-SC 1253, [1983] I.R. 319, [1982] I.L.R.M.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">177 (Henchy J.; Griffin and Hederman JJ. concurring) the application of which defences apply to the facts of this case where it was a genuine belief based on a statutory exemption which related to no alteration of the character of the structure that would render the development inconsistent with the previous development or adjoining structures; (vi) that the court erred in its interpretation of the defence of disproportionate hardship in terms of how it has been applied to the facts of this case; (vii) that the finding of the court that this development commenced subsequent to the 1 October 1964 is not consistent with the purpose of the s. 160(6) (seven-year rule) of the 2000 Act; (viii) that the court erred in its interpretation of the reliefs sought by the applicants and in particular those reliefs relating to the restoration of the lands to their condition immediately prior to the commenced of the development in August 2025; (ix) that the court erred in its finding that both affidavits of Ann Mulcrone were inadmissible on the basis that they should have been before the court of first instance; (x) that the respondents should be (re-)heard in the question of inadmissibility of affidavits; (xi) that the court erred in its interpretation of the established use of the development site; (xii) that the proposed mandatory order is arbitrary and unfair having regard to the requirements of the 2000 Act and the provisions of s. 4(1)(h); and/or (xiii) that the proposed mandatory order is in error and does not take account of the reliefs sought by both respondents (or the applicants for that matter).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">34 189.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In short, to pay homage to Oscar Wilde, inappropriately trying to re-litigate the case once is unfortunate but twice would be careless – presumably that won’t arise. Liberty to make submissions on the form of the order is fine as long as we are clear it is within the tramlines of the judgment and not a procedure to reargue a case having lost it.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Sub-issue II – who should do it 190.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">While in theory a s. 160 order should require the respondent to carry out works themselves, the council seemed to appreciate that in practice this often doesn’t work and failure to comply with legal responsibilities tends to continue. The only practical method of upholding the integrity of the planning system is in some cases for the relevant council to carry out thew works itself and reclaim the cost via the obligations stemming from the enforcement notice, or on a quantum meruit basis, or by way of terms of an order of the court.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">191.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The respondents’ preference was to do any remediation themselves in the first instance. I am not inherently opposed to that, but it needs to be understood that this would be on a strict timetable and on strict conditions to ensure compliance, breach of which would mean that the council would be required to take exclusive possession for the purposes of enforcement of the order. The respondents would need to demonstrate a reality to compliance. On reflection I am not going to be absolutely prescriptive about what that would involve at this stage other than that there will inherently need to be a timetable and a plan to remediate the site, to be agreed or directed. There would be something to be said for nominating individual directors to take responsibility for receiving personal service of the order marked with the penal endorsement and/or for payment on account, but on reflection if the order is very prescriptive it could get in the way of a practical solution.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">192.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">If the respondents comply with the reasonable and modest conditions of the order, then they can be allowed to take the remediation in hand. If they do not then non-compliance with anything would mean that the council could either take the lead in carrying out the works, without prejudice to any legal consequences for the respondents in terms of recovering the costs of noncompliance (preferable, I would have thought), or else proceed exclusively by contempt (resourceheavy as far as the court is concerned so probably my second preference, if my views are of interest).</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">193.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I am providing for submissions on the form of the order but strictly within the contours of the judgment.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Sub-issue III – when should it happen 194.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">There is no obvious reason at the moment why the situation should not be rectified forthwith, so I have included a timeline in the proposed order below subject to submissions on the form of the order.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Costs 195.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Section 161 of the 2000 Act provides (emphasis added): “Costs of prosecutions and applications for injunctions.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">161.—(1) The court shall, unless it is satisfied that there are special and substantial reasons for not so doing, order the person to pay— (a) where a person is convicted of an offence under this Part, to the planning authority, or (b) where the person is the subject of an order under section 160, to the planning authority or to any other person as appropriate, the costs and expenses of the action, measured by the court.</p>\n<div class=\"lf-abs\"><span class=\"lf-abs-num\">(2)</span>Where costs or expenses are to be paid to the authority, they shall include any such costs or expenses reasonably incurred by the authority in relation to the investigation, detection and prosecution of the offence or order, as appropriate, including costs incurred in respect of the remuneration and other expenses of employees, consultants and advisers.”</div>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">196.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Presumptively therefore costs will follow the event.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">197.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">I am open to measuring the costs as specified in s. 161(1) but it may just be easier to allow for adjudication. If the parties wanted measuring I invited them to raise that in the draft judgment process but nobody did.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">198.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">The order will provisionally include the specific provision in sub-s. (2) insofar as relevant.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">Summary 199.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">In outline summary, without taking from the more specific terms of this judgment: (i) it is settled law that the onus of proof to show that development is exempted lies on the respondent; (ii) applying such law to the facts here, the respondents have failed to discharge that onus; (iii) it is settled law that exemptions should be construed narrowly and that an exemption for alteration does not include total removal and replacement; (iv) applying such law to the facts here, this is not exempted development; (v) it is settled law that removal of structures or a definite cessation of use means that any pre-1964 or seven-year rule defence ends and that new structures or a reestablished use requires permission unless exempted;</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">35 (vi) (vii) applying such law to the facts here, this is new and unauthorised development; it is settled law that the integrity of the planning system is a significant factor in the court’s discretion; and applying such law to the facts here, discretion weighs in favour of making an order. (viii) Order 200.</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) by way of order to be perfected forthwith on the delivery of this judgment: in each case, the appeals be dismissed; in each case, the orders of the Circuit Court be affirmed, on the basis of being varied by way of prohibitory order as set out below and on the basis of being varied by way of mandatory and further order(s) in a manner to be determined by order(s) of the court following submissions on the form of the provisional orders; in each case, there be a prohibitory order under s. 160 of the 2000 Act, such order to be effective immediately, restraining the respondents, their directors or officers or any person having notice of the order from at any time: (a) carrying out any works on any of the lands on which the unauthorised development took place, save in accordance with an order of the court; (b) permitting any use of any of such lands (including occupation of any structures) save in accordance with an order of the court; and (c) re-erecting on such lands any of the caravans, mobile homes or other structures that have been removed save in accordance with an order of the court; in each case, that the respondents have liberty to make written legal submissions (without attempting revisit any findings in the judgment) on the form of the provisional further orders and as to on costs, by 09:30 on Wednesday 10 June 2026, with the applicants to reply by 09:30 on Wednesday 17 June 2026; in each case, that the respondents be required to submit a detailed draft remediation and landscaping plan by 09:30 on Wednesday 10 June 2026, specifying both (a) the steps the respondents intend to take to comply with the order if the provisional order is made as drafted and (b) any proposed variations within the scope of the judgment, specifying specific timelines in respect of all steps, with the applicants to reply by 09:30 on Wednesday 17 June 2026, specifying the extent to which (if at all) the proposals in the draft remediation and landscaping plan are agreed; in each case, it be directed that any unsuccessful application to vary the provisional order set out in the judgment may be the subject of an adverse costs order, inter alia pursuant to O. 103 r. 40(4) RSC, and that any improper attempt to revisit the findings of the judgment in the context of submissions on the form of the order or costs may be the subject of an adverse costs order; in each case, there be liberty to apply including in the event of non-compliance with any order of the court;</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">in each case, the matter be listed at 14:00 on Wednesday 3 June 2026; by way of order to be perfected 7 days following the judgment in the event of failure by the respondents to make contrary submissions by the specified time or failure by the respondents to prepare a draft remediation and landscaping plan within that time, or otherwise to comply with the order, or in the event of such submissions and compliance, 14 days following this judgment or at such other time as may be specified subject to contrary submissions within the scope of the judgment as set out above, provisionally as follows: in each case, there be a mandatory order under s. 160 of the 2000 Act requiring the respondents to take the following steps (such order to cease to have effect (without prejudice to the consequences of any breach that has already occurred) if vacant possession of the entire lands on which the unauthorised development occurred is surrendered to the council with the consent of the council in accordance with the order), namely within 6 weeks from the date on which the remediation and landscaping plan is agreed by the parties or directed by the court, to remove all structures erected since August 2025 including remnants of previous structures incorporated in the new structures, which includes removal of all foundations, and to restore the lands, in a manner to be agreed with the applicants or directed by the court in default of agreement, and in accordance with a remediation and landscaping plan to be so agreed or so directed by the court in default of agreement, to a 36 (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv) condition representing a landscaped finish to the status quo on each part of the lands as it stood: (a) in the case of trees, hedges or other vegetation, immediately prior to their removal (i.e., by replanting trees, hedges and vegetation as appropriate); (b) in the case of dwellings, following the removal of all caravans and mobile homes (or other dwellings however described) and prior to the erection of modular houses and foundations; and (c) in the case of other works, immediately prior to such works; and subject in each case to such consequential and ancillary landscaping as may be required by the remediation and landscaping plan; in each case, there be a mandatory order under s. 160 of the 2000 Act requiring the respondents to surrender to the council vacant possession of the entire lands within their possession or ownership within which the unauthorised development occurred for the purposes of remediation by the council, either in the event that the</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">respondents and the council agree such surrender or in the event that the respondents breach any provision of this order and the council thereafter requests such surrender, and that in the event of any dispute as to the extent of the lands required to be surrendered to the council, the matter be determined by the court, and that in the event of the council taking exclusive possession of the lands pursuant to this order, the council be required to carry out all necessary demolition and restoration works as set out above in this order, subject to any further directions of the court, within 6 weeks from taking such possession or such further period as may be allowed by the court, and that in that eventuality, the return of possession of the lands to the respondents will be determined by further order of the court subject to completion of remediation and landscaping and to s. 154(6) and (7) of the 2000 Act; in the O’Neill case, the order of the Circuit Court as to costs be affirmed on the basis that there be an order for costs in the Circuit Court (including reserved costs and the costs of written submissions and including a certificate for junior counsel as granted by that court) being awarded to the applicant against the respondents jointly and severally to be taxed in default of agreement; in the SDCC case, the order of the Circuit Court as to costs be affirmed on the basis that there be an order for costs in the Circuit Court (including reserved costs and the costs of written submissions and including a certificate for junior counsel and senior counsel as granted by that court) being awarded to the applicant against the respondents jointly and severally to be taxed in default of agreement; in each case, there be an order for costs in the High Court (including reserved costs and the costs of written submissions) being awarded to the applicants against the respondents jointly and severally and any issue as to the extent of such costs be determined, in default of agreement, by way of legal costs adjudication; in each case, the order for costs in the High Court shall include an order for the costs of legal costs adjudication; and in the SDCC case, pursuant to s. 161(2) of the 2000 Act, the order for costs in the High Court shall include all costs or expenses reasonably incurred by the applicant in relation to the investigation and detection of the unauthorised development as well as in the proceedings, including costs incurred in respect of the remuneration and other expenses of employees, consultants and advisers in respect of those</p>\n<p class=\"lf-p\">matters.</p></div>", "next": 0}