21999A0313(01)

21999A0313(01) 21999A0313(01) Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons (notified under document number COM(1998) 314) Official Journal L 067 , 13/03/1999 p. 0001 - 0044  Dates: OF DOCUMENT:   22/09/1998 OF EFFECT:   00/00/0000; ENTRY INTO FORCE SEE ART 17 ; OF SIGNATURE:   22/09/1998; VIENNA OF END OF VALIDITY:   99/99/9999 Authentic language: THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ; GERMAN ; DANISH ; SPANISH ; ENGLISH ; FRENCH ; FINNISH ; GREEK ; ITALIAN ; DUTCH ; PORTUGUESE ; SWEDISH Author: AUSTRIA ; BELGIUM ; DENMARK ; SPAIN ; FINLAND ; GREECE ; ITALY ; IRELAND ; LUXEMBOURG ; NETHERLANDS ; PORTUGAL ; SWEDEN ; FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ; EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY ; INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Subject matter: EXTERNAL RELATIONS ; NUCLEAR COMMON MARKET Directory code: 11304000 EUROVOC descriptor: arms limitation ; non-proliferation of arms ; nuclear weapon ; European arms policy ; EC agreement ; NEA Legal basis: 157A101................... ADOPTION Amendment to: 278A0222(01)......LINKAGE....... ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons (1*) (notified under document number COM(1998) 314) (1999/188/Euratom) PREAMBLE Whereas the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden (hereinafter referred to as 'the States`) and the European Atomic Energy Community (hereinafter referred to as 'the Community`) are parties to an Agreement between the States, the Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the 'the Agency`) in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the 'Safeguards Agreement`), which entered into force on 21 February 1997; Aware of the desire of the international community to further enhance nuclear non-proliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system; Recalling that the Agency must take into account in the implementation of safeguards the need to avoid hampering the economic and technological development in the Community or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, to respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals, and to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge; Whereas the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Protocol shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards; Now therefore the Community, the States and the Agency have agreed as follows: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THE PROTOCOL AND THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT Article 1 The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to the extent that they are relevant to and compatible with the provisions of this Protocol. In case of conflict between the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and those of this Protocol, the provisions of this Protocol shall apply. PROVISION OF INFORMATION Article 2 (a) Each State shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iv), (ix) and (x). The Community shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (v), (vi) and (vii). Each State and the Community shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (iii) and (viii). (i) A general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material carried out anywhere that are funded, specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, the State concerned. (ii) Information identified by the Agency on the basis of expected gains in effectiveness or efficiency, and agreed to by the State concerned, on operational activities of safeguards relevance at facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used. (iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use and, if not apparent from that description, its contents. The description shall include a map of the site. (iv) A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in the activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol. (v) Information specifying the location, operational status and the estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines and concentration plants and thorium concentration plants in each State, and the current annual production of such mines and concentration plants. The Community shall provide, on request by the Agency, the current annual production of an individual mine or concentration plant. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy. (vi) Information regarding source material which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, as follows: (a) the quantities, the chemical composition, the use or intended use of such material, whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use, for each location in the States at which the material is present in quantities exceeding 10 tonnes of uranium and/or 20 tonnes of thorium, and for other locations with quantities of more than 1 tonne, the aggregate for the States as a whole if the aggregate exceeds 10 tonnes of uranium or 20 tonnes of thorium. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy; (b) The quantities, the chemical composition and the destination of each export from the States to a State outside the Community, of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding: (1) 10 tonnes of uranium, or for successive exports of uranium to the same state, each of less than 10 tonnes, but exceeding a total of 10 tonnes for the year; (2) 20 tonnes of thorium, or for successive exports of thorium to the same State, each of less than 20 tonnes, but exceeding a total 20 tonnes for the year; (c) the quantities, chemical composition, current location and use or intended use of each import into the Sates from outside the Community of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding: (1) 10 tonnes of uranium, or for successive imports of uranium each of less than 10 tonnes, but exceeding a total of 10 tonnes for the year; (2) 20 tonnes of thorium, or for successive imports of thorium each of less than 20 tonnes, but exceeding a total of 20 tonnes for the year; it being understood that there is no requirement to provide information on such material intended for a non-nuclear use once it is in its non-nuclear end-use form. (vii) (a) Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement; (b) information regarding the quantities (which may be in the form of estimates) and uses at each location, of nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 36(b) of the Safeguards Agreement but not yet in a non-nuclear end-use form, in quantities exceeding those set out in Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy. (viii) Information regarding the location or further processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 on which safeguards have been terminated pursuant to Article 11 of the Safeguards Agreement. For the purpose of this paragraph, 'further processing` does not include repackaging of the waste or its further conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal. (ix) The following information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II: (a) for each export out of the Community of such equipment and material: the identity, quantity, location of intended use in the receiving State and date or, as appropriate, expected date, of export; (b) on specific request by the Agency, confirmation by the importing State of information provided to the Agency by a State outside of the Community concerning the export of such equipment and material to the importing State. (x) General plans for the succeeding 10-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities) when approved by the appropriate authorities in the State. (b) Each State shall make every reasonable effort to provide the Agency with the following information: (i) a general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material which are specifically related to enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel or the processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 that are carried out anywhere in the State concerned but which are not funded, specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, that State. For the purpose of this paragraph 'processing` of intermediate or high-level waste does not include repackaging of the waste or its conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal. (ii) A general description of activities and the identity of the person or entity carrying out such activities, at locations identified by the Agency outside a site which the Agency considers might be functionally related to the activities of that site. The provision of this information is subject to a specific request by the Agency. It shall be provided in consultation with the Agency and in a timely fashion. (c) On request by any or all of the Agency, a State or the Community, as appropriate, shall provide amplifications or clarifications of any information provided under this Article, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards. Article 3 (a) Each State or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2(a)(i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)(a), (vii), and (x) and Article 2(b)(i) within 180 days of the entry into force of this Protocol. (b) Each State or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, updates of the information referred to in paragraph (a) for the period covering the previous calendar year. If there has been no change to the information previously provided, each State or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall so indicate. (c) The Community shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, the information identified in Article 2(a)(vi)(b) and (c) for the period covering the previous calendar year. (d) Each State shall provide to the Agency on a quarterly basis the information identified in Article 2(a)(ix)(a). This information shall be provided within 60 days of the end of each quarter. (e) The Community and each State shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2(a)(viii) 180 days before further processing is carried out and, by 15 May of each year, information on changes in location for the period covering the previous calendar year. (f) Each State and the Agency shall agree on the timing and frequency of the provision of the information identified in Article 2(a)(ii). (g) Each State shall provide to the Agency the information in Article 2(a)(ix)(b) within 60 days of the Agency's request. COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS Article 4 The following shall apply in connection with the implementation of complementary access under Article 5 of this Protocol: (a) The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the information referred to in Article 2; however, the Agency shall have access to: (i) any location referred to in Article 5(a)(i) or (ii) on a selective basis in order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities; (ii) any location referred to in Article 5(b) or (c) to resolve a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information provided pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information; (iii) any location referred to in Article 5(a)(iii) to the extent necessary for the Agency to confirm, for safeguards purposes, the Community's, or, as appropriate, a State's declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used. (b) (i) Except as provided in paragraph (ii), the Agency shall give the State concerned, or for access under Article 5(a) or under Article 5(c) where nuclear material is involved, the State concerned and the Community, advance notice of access of at least 24 hours. (ii) For access to any place on a site that is sought in conjunction with design information verification visits or ad hoc or routine inspections on that site, the period of advance notice shall, if the Agency so requests, be at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it may be less than two hours. (c) Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and the activities to be carried out during such access. (d) In the case of a question or inconsistency, the Agency shall provide the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of the question or inconsistency. Such an opportunity will be provided before a request for access, unless the Agency considers that delay in access would prejudice the purpose for which the access is sought. In any event, the Agency shall not draw any conclusions about the question or inconsistency until the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community have been provided with such an opportunity. (e) Unless otherwise agreed to by the State concerned, access shall only take place during regular working hours. (f) The State concerned, or for access under Article 5(a) or under Article 5(c) where nuclear material is involved, the State concerned and the Community, shall have the right to have agency inspectors accompanied during their access by its representatives and, as appropriate, by Community inspectors provided that Agency inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions. Article 5 Each State shall provide the Agency with access to: (a) (i) any place on a site; (ii) any location identified under Article 2(a)(v) to (viii); (iii) any decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used. (b) Any location identified by the State concerned under Article 2(a)(i), Article 2(a)(iv), Article 2(a)(ix)(b) or Article 2(b), other than those referred to in paragraph (a)(i), provided that if the State concerned is unable to provide such access, that State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, through other means. (c) Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b), to carry out location-specific environmental sampling, provided that if the State concerned is unable to provide such access, that State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, at adjacent locations or through other means. Article 6 When implementing Article 5, the Agency may carry out the following activities: (a) for access in accordance with Article 5(a)(i) or (iii): visual observation; collection of environmental samples; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; application of seals and other identifying and tamper indicating devices specified in Subsidiary Arrangements; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board of Governors (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board`) and following consultations between the Agency, the Community and the State concerned. (b) For access in accordance with Article 5(a)(ii): visual observation; item counting of nuclear material; non-destructive measurements and sampling; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of records relevant to the quantities, origin and disposition of the material; collection of environmental samples; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency, the Community and the State concerned. (c) For access in accordance with Article 5(b): visual observation; collection of environmental samples; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of safeguards relevant production and shipping records; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and the State concerned. (d) For access in accordance with Article 5(c), collection of environmental samples and, in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location specified by the Agency pursuant to Article 5(c), utilisation at that location of visual observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by the State concerned and, where nuclear material is involved, the Community, and the Agency, other objective measures. Article 7 (a) On request by a State, the Agency and that State shall make arrangements for managed access under this Protocol in order to prevent the dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. Such arrangements shall not preclude the Agency from conducting activities necessary to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities at the location in question, including the resolution of a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 or of an inconsistency relating to that information. (b) A State may, when providing the information referred to in Article 2, inform the Agency of the places at a site or location at which managed access may be applicable. (c) Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, a State may have recourse to managed access consistent with the provisions of paragraph (a). Article 8 Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude a State from offering the Agency access to locations in addition to those referred to in Articles 5 and 9 or from requesting the Agency to conduct verification activities at a particular location. The Agency shall, without delay, make every reasonable effort to act on such a request. Article 9 Each State shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified by the Agency to carry out wide-area environmental sampling, provided that if a State is unable to provide such access that State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements at alternative locations. The Agency shall not seek such access until the use of wide-area environmental sampling and the procedural arrangements therefor have been approved by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and the State concerned. Article 10 (a) The Agency shall inform the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community of: (i) the activities carried out under this Protocol, including those in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community within 60 days of the activities being carried out by the Agency. (ii) The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community as soon as possible but in any case within 30 days of the results being established by the Agency. (b) The Agency shall inform the State concerned and the Community of the conclusions it has drawn from its activities under this Protocol. The conclusions shall be provided annually. DESIGNATION OF AGENCY INSPECTORS Article 11 (a) (i) The Director-General shall notify the Community and the States of the Board's approval of any Agency official as a safeguards inspector. Unless the Community advises the Director-General of the rejection of such an official as an inspector for the States within three months of receipt of notification of the Board's approval, the inspector so notified to the Community and the States shall be considered designated to the States. (ii) The Director-General, acting in response to a request by the Community or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the Community and the States of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for the States. (b) A notification referred to in paragraph (a) shall be deemed to be received by the Community and the States seven days after the date of the transmission by registered post of the notification by the Agency to the Community and the States. VISAS Article 12 Each State shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and remain on the territory of the State concerned for the purpose of carrying out his/her functions. Any visas required shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as required, to cover the duration of the inspector's designation to the States. SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS Article 13 (a) Where a State or the Community, as appropriate, or the Agency indicate that it is necessary to specify in subsidiary Arrangements how measures laid down in this Protocol are to be applied, that State, or that State and the Community and the Agency shall agree on such Subsidiary Arrangements within 90 days of the entry into force of this Protocol or, where the indication of the need for such Subsidiary Arrangements is made after the entry into force of this Protocol, within 90 days of the date of such indication. (b) Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency shall be entitled to apply the measures laid down in this Protocol. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS Article 14 (a) Each State shall permit and protect free communications by the Agency for official purposes between Agency inspectors in that State and Agency Headquarters and/or Regional Offices, including attended and unattended transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices. The Agency shall have, in consultation with the State concerned, the right to make use of internationally established systems of direct communications, including satellite systems and other forms of telecommunication, not in use in that State. At the request of a State, or the Agency, details of the implementation of this paragraph in that State with respect to the attended or unattended transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. (b) Communication and transmission of information as provided for in paragraph (a) shall take due account of the need to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information or design information which the State concerned regards as being of particular sensitivity. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Article 15 (a) The Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge, including such information coming to the Agency's knowledge in the implementation of this Protocol. (b) The regime referred to in paragraph (a) shall include, among others, provisions relating to: (i) general principles and associated measures for the handling of confidential information; (ii) conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential information; (iii) procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality. (c) The regime referred to in paragraph (a) above shall be approved and periodically reviewed by the Board. ANNEXES Article 16 (a) The Annexes to this Protocol shall be an integral part thereof. Except for the purposes of amendment of Annexes I and II, the term 'Protocol` as used in this instrument means this Protocol and the Annexes together. (b) The list of activities specified in Annex I, and the list of equipment and material specified in Annex II, may be amended by the Board on the advice of an open-ended working group of experts established by the Board. any such amendment shall take effect four months after its adoption by the Board. (c) Annex III to this Protocol specifies how measures in this Protocol shall be implemented by the Community and the States. ENTRY INTO FORCE Article 17 (a) This Protocol shall enter into force on the day on which the Agency receives from the Community and the States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met. (b) The States and the Community may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force, declare that they will apply this Protocol provisionally. (c) The Director-General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force of, this Protocol. DEFINITIONS Article 18 For the purpose of this Protocol: (a) 'nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities` means those activities which are specifically related to any process or system development aspect of any of the following: - conversion of nuclear material, - enrichment of nuclear material, - nuclear fuel fabrication, - reactors, - critical facilities, - reprocessing of nuclear fuel, - processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233, but do not include activities related to theoretical or basic scientific research or to research and development on industrial radioisotope applications, medical, hydrological and agricultural applications, health and environmental effects and improved maintenance. (b) 'Site` means that area delimited by the Community and a State in the relevant design information for a facility, including a closed-down facility, and in the relevant information on a location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, including a closed-down location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used (this is limited to locations with hot cells or where activities related to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing were carried out). 'Site` shall also include all installations, colocated with the facility or location, for the provision or use of essential services, including: hot cells for processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear material; installations for the treatment, storage and disposal of waste; and buildings associated with specified activities identified by the State concerned under Article 2(a)(iv). (c) 'Decommissioned facility` or 'decommissioned location outside facilities` means an installation or location at which residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used to store and can no longer be used to handle, process or utilise nuclear material. (d) 'Closed-down facility` or 'closed-down location outside facilities` means an installation or location where operations have been stopped and the nuclear material removed but which has not been decommissioned. (e) 'High enriched uranium` means uranium containing 20 % or more of the isotope uranium-235. (f) 'Location-specific environmental sampling` means the collection of environmental samples (e. g. air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at, and in the immediate vicinity of, a location specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities at the specified location. (g) 'Wide-area environmental sampling` means the collection of environmental samples (e. g. air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at a set of locations specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities over a wide area. (h) 'Nuclear material` means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute of the Agency after the entry into force of this Protocol which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Protocol only on acceptance by the Community and the States. (i) 'Facility` means: (i) a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation, or (ii) any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used. (j) 'Location outside facilities` means any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less. Hecho en Viena, por duplicado, el veintidės de septiembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, en las lenguas alemana, danesa, espaęola, finesa, francesa, griega, inglesa, italiana, neerlandesa, portuguesa y sueca siendo cada uno de estos textos igualmente autłntico, si bien, en caso de discrepancia, harńn fe los textos acordados en las lenguas oficiales de la Junta de gobernadores del OIEA. Udfördiget i Wien den toogtyvende september nittenhundrede og otteoghalvfems i to eksemplarer põ dansk, engelsk, finsk, fransk, grösk, italiensk, nederlandsk, portugisisk, spansk, svensk og tysk med samme gyldighed for alle versioner, idet teksterne põ de officielle IAEA-sprog dog har fortrinsstilling i tilfölde af uoverensstemmelser. Geschehen zu Wien am 22. September 1998 in zwei Urschriften in dōnischer, deutscher, englischer, finnischer, franzŠsischer, griechischer, italienischer, niederlōndischer, portugiesischer, schwedischer und spanischer Sprache, wobei jeder Wortlaut gleichermačen verbindlich, im Fall von unterschiedlichen Auslegungen jedoch der Wortlaut in den Amtssprachen des Gouverneursrats der Internationalen Atomenergie-Organisation mačgebend ist. øółżõ ėĮ÷ Āłążż÷ õłĖ ōłĘū˙žż, Į÷ż 22÷ ÷üąęń Į˙į ÓõĘĮõüņęč˙į 1998, ėĮ÷ ōńżłśČ, ˙ūūńżōłśČ, ńóóūłśČ, ŠłżūńżōłśČ, óńūūłśČ, óõęüńżłśČ, õūū÷żłśČ, łĮńūłśČ, Ę˙ęĮ˙óńūłśČ, łėĘńżłśČ śńł ė˙į÷ōłśČ óūžėėń 7 Įń śõčüõżń ėõ ŽūõĖ ĮłĖ ńżųĮąęų óūžėėõĖ õčżńł õžčė˙į ńįųõżĮłśĄ, õśĮŽĖ ńĘŽ ĘõęčĘĮųė÷ ńĘŽśūłė÷Ė, ˙ĘŽĮõ įĘõęłėšž˙įż Įń śõčüõżń Ę˙į ąš˙įż ėįżĮńšųõč ėĮłĖ õĘčė÷üõĖ óūžėėõĖ Į˙į Äł˙łś÷Įłś˙ž Óįüņ˙įūč˙į Į˙į Äłõųż˙žĖ Ļęóńżłėü˙ž ĮĮ˙üłśČĖ ÅżąęóõłńĖ. Done at Vienna in duplicate, on the twenty second day of September 1998 in the Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts of which are equally authentic except that, in case of divergence, those texts concluded in the official languages of the IAEA Board of Governors shall prevail. Fait š Vienne, en deux exemplaires le 22 septembre 1998 en langues allemande, anglaise, danoise, espagnole, finnoise, fran÷aise, grecque, italienne, nłerlandaise, portugaise et sułdoise; tous ces textes font łgalement foi sauf que, en cas de divergence, les versions conclues dans les langues officielles du Conseil des gouverneurs de l'AIEA prłvalent. Fatto a Vienna in duplice copia, il giorno 22 del mese di settembre 1998 nelle lingue danese, finnico, francese, greco, inglese, italiano, olandese, portoghese, spagnolo, svedese e tedesco, ognuna delle quali facente ugualmente fede, ad eccezione dei testi conclusi nelle lingue ufficiali del Consiglio dei governatori dell'AIEA che prevalgono in caso di divergenza tra i testi. Gedaan te Wenen op 22 september 1998, in tweevoud, in de Deense, de Duitse, de Engelse, de Finse, de Franse, de Griekse, de Italiaanse, de Nederlandse, de Portugese, de Spaanse en de Zweedse taal, zijnde alle teksten gelijkelijk authentiek, met dien verstande dat in geval van tegenstrijdigheid de teksten die zijn gesloten in de officiūle talen van de IOAE bindend zijn. Feito em Viena em duplo exemplar, aos vinte e dois de Setembro de 1998 em lżngua alemó, dinamarquesa, espanhola, finlandesa, francesa, grega, inglesa, italiana, neerlandesa, portuguesa e sueca; todos os textos fazem igualmente fł mas, em caso de divergśncia, prevalecem aqueles textos que tenham sido estabelecidos em lżnguas oficiais do Conselho dos Governadores da AIEA. Tehty Wienissō kahtena kappaleena 22 pōivōnō syyskuuta 1998 tanskan, hollannin, englannin, suomen, ranskan, saksan, kreikan, italian, portugalin, espanjan ja ruotsin kielellō; kaikki kieliversiot ovat yhtō todistusvoimaisia, mutta eroavuuden ilmetessō on noudatettava niitō tekstejō, jotka on tehty Kansainvōlisen atomienergiajōrjestŠn hallintoneuvoston virallisilla kielillō. Utfōrdat i Wien i tvõ exemplar den 22 september 1998 põ danska, engelska, finska, franska, grekiska, italienska, nederlōndska, portugisiska, spanska, svenska och tyska sprõken, varvid varje sprõkversion skall ōga lika giltighet, utom ifall de skulle skilja sig õt dõ de texter som ingõtts põ IAEA:s styrelses officiella sprõk skall ha fŠretrōde. Por el Gobierno del Reino de Błlgica For Kongeriget Belgiens regering FŽr die Regierung des KŠnigreichs Belgien Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į˙į Āńėłūõč˙į Į˙į Āõūóč˙į For the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium Pour le gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique Per il governo del Regno del Belgio Voor de regering van het Koninkrijk Belgiū Pelo Governo do Reino da Błlgica Belgian kuningaskunnan hallituksen puolesta FŠr Konungariket Belgiens regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Mireille CLAEYS Por el Gobierno del Reino de Dinamarca For Kongeriget Danmarks regering FŽr die Regierung des KŠnigreichs Dōnemark Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į˙į Āńėłūõč˙į Į˙į ÄńżčńĖ For the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Pour le gouvernement du Royaume de Danemark Per il governo del Regno di Danimarca Voor de regering van het Koninkrijk Denemarken Pelo Governo do Reino da Dinamarca Tanskan kuningaskunnan hallituksen puolesta FŠr Konungariket Danmarks regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Henrik WŲHLK Por el Gobierno de la RepŪblica Federal de Alemania For Forbundsrepublikken Tysklands regering FŽr die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į÷Ė Ļü˙ėĘ˙żōłńśČĖ Ä÷ü˙śęńĮčńĖ Į÷Ė ĆõęüńżčńĖ For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Pour le gouvernement de la Rłpublique fłdłrale d'Allemagne Per il governo della Repubblica federale di Germania Voor de regering van de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland Pelo Governo da RepŪblica Federal da Alemanha Saksan liittotasavallan hallituksen puolesta FŠr FŠrbundsrepubliken Tysklands regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Karl BORCHARD Helmut STAHL Por el Gobierno de la RepŪblica Helłnica For Den Hellenske Republiks regering FŽr die Regierung der Griechischen Republik Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į÷Ė Åūū÷żłśČĖ Ä÷ü˙śęńĮčńĖ For the Government of the Hellenic Republic Pour le gouvernement de la Rłpublique hellłnique Per il governo della Repubblica ellenica Voor de regering van de Helleense Republiek Pelo Governo da RepŪblica Helłnica Helleenien tasavallan hallituksen puolesta FŠr Republiken Greklands regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Emmanuel FRAGOULIS Por el Gobierno del Reino de Espaęa For Kongeriget Spaniens regering FŽr die Regierung des KŠnigreichs Spanien Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į˙į Āńėłūõč˙į Į÷Ė ÉėĘńżčńĖ For the Government of the Kingdom of Spain Pour le gouvernement du Royaume d'Espagne Per il governo del Regno di Spagna Voor de regering van het Koninkrijk Spanje Pelo Governo do Reino de Espanha Espanjan kuningaskunnan hallituksen puolesta FŠr Konungariket Spaniens regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> ad referendum Antonio Ortiz GARCĶA Por el Gobierno de Irlanda For Irlands regering FŽr die Regierung Irlands Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į÷Ė ÉęūńżōčńĖ For the Government of Ireland Pour le gouvernement de l'Irlande Per il governo dell'Irlanda Voor de regering van Ierland Pelo Governo da Irlanda Irlannin hallituksen puolesta FŠr Irlands regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Thelma M. DORAN Por el Gobierno de la RepŪblica Italiana For Den Italienske Republiks regering FŽr die Regierung der Italienischen Republik Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į÷Ė ÉĮńūłśČĖ Ä÷ü˙śęńĮčńĖ For the Government of the Italian Republic Pour le gouvernement de la Rłpublique italienne Per il governo della Repubblica italiana Voor de regering van de Italiaanse Republiek Pelo Governo da RepŪblica Italiana Italian tasavallan hallituksen puolesta FŠr Republiken Italiens regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Vincenzo MANNO Por el Gobierno del Gran Ducado de Luxemburgo For StorhertugdŲmmet Luxembourgs regering FŽr die Regierung des Gročherzogtums Luxemburg Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į˙į ĢõóĄū˙į Ä˙įśĄĮ˙į Į˙į Ė˙įžõüņ˙žęó˙į For the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Pour le gouvernement du Grand-Duchł de Luxembourg Per il governo del Granducato di Lussemburgo Voor de regering van het Groothertogdom Luxemburg Pelo Governo do Gróo-Ducado do Luxemburgo Luxemburgin suurherttuakunnan hallituksen puolesta FŠr StorhertigdŠmet Luxemburgs regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Georges SANTER Por el Gobierno del Reino de los Pażses Bajos For Kongeriget Nederlandenes regering FŽr die Regierung des KŠnigreichs der Niederlande Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į˙į Āńėłūõč˙į Įųż ŹĄĮų ×ųęžż For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Pour le gouvernement du Royaume des Pays-Bas Per il governo del Regno dei Paesi Bassi Voor de regering van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden Pelo Governo do Reino dos Pażses Baixos Alankomaiden kuningaskunnan hallituksen puolesta FŠr Konungariket Nederlōndernas regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Hans A.F.M. FÖRSTER Por el Gobierno de la RepŪblica de Austria For Republikken Ųstrigs regering FŽr die Regierung der Republik Österreich Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į÷Ė Ä÷ü˙śęńĮčńĖ Į÷Ė ĮįėĮęčńĖ For the Government of the Republic of Austria Pour le gouvernement de la Rłpublique d'Autriche Per il governo della Repubblica d'Austria Voor de regering van de Republiek Oostenrijk Pelo Governo da RepŪblica da Įustria Itōvallan tasavallan hallituksen puolesta FŠr Republiken Österrikes regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Irene FREUDENSCHUSS-REICHL Por el Gobierno de la RepŪblica Portuguesa For Den Portugisiske Republiks regering FŽr die Regierung der Portugiesischen Republik Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į÷Ė Š˙ęĮ˙óńūłśČĖ Ä÷ü˙śęńĮčńĖ For the Government of the Portuguese Republic Pour le gouvernement de la Rłpublique portugaise Per il governo della Repubblica portoghese Voor de regering van de Portugese Republiek Pelo Governo da RepŪblica Portuguesa Portugalin tasavallan hallituksen puolesta FŠr Republiken Portugals regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Įlvaro Josł Costa DE MENDONĒA E MOURA Por el Gobierno de la RepŪblica de Finlandia For Republikken Finlands regering FŽr die Regierung der Republik Finnland Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į÷Ė ÖłżūńżōłśČĖ Ä÷ü˙śęńĮčńĖ For the Government of the Republic of Finland Pour le gouvernement de la Rłpublique de Finlande Per il governo della Repubblica di Finlandia Voor de regering van de Republiek Finland Pelo Governo da RepŪblica da Finlņndia Suomen tasavallan hallituksen puolesta FŠr Republiken Finlands regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Eva-Christina MÄKELÄINEN Por el Gobierno del Reino de Suecia For Kongeriget Sveriges regering FŽr die Regierung des KŠnigreichs Schweden Ćłń Į÷ż śįņąęż÷ė÷ Į˙į Āńėłūõč˙į Į÷Ė Ó˙į÷ōčńĖ For the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden Pour le gouvernement du Royaume de Suųde Per il governo del Regno di Svezia Voor de regering van het Koninkrijk Zweden Pelo Governo do Reino da Sułcia Ruotsin kuningaskunnan hallituksen puolesta FŠr Konungariket Sveriges regering >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> BjŠrn SKALA Por la Comunidad Europea de la Energża Atėmica For Det Europöiske Atomenergiföllesskab FŽr die Europōische Atomgemeinschaft Ćłń Į÷ż ÅįęųĘńŪśČ Ź˙łżŽĮ÷Įń ĮĮ˙üłśČĖ ÅżąęóõłńĖ For the European Atomic Energy Community Pour la Communautł europłenne de l'łnergie atomique Per la Comunitš europea dell'energia atomica Voor de Europese Gemeenschap voor Atoomenergie Pela Comunidade Europeia da Energia Atėmica Euroopan atomienergiayhteisŠn puolesta FŠr Europeiska atomenergigemenskapen >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Lars-Erik LUNDIN Por el Organismo Internacional de Energża Atėmica For Den Internationale Atomenergiorganisation FŽr die Internationale Atomenergie-Organisation Ćłń Į˙ż ÄłõųżČ ĻęóńżłėüŽ ĮĮ˙üłśČĖ ÅżąęóõłńĖ For the International Atomic Energy Agency Pour l'Agence internationale de l'łnergie atomique Per l'Agenzia internazionale dell'energia atomica Voor de Internationale Organisatie voor Atoomenergie Pela Agśncia Internacional da Energia Atėmica Kansainvōlisen atomienergiajōrjestŠn puolesta FŠr Internationella atomenergiorganet >REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC> Mohamed ELBARADEI (1*) On 8 June 1998, the Council approved the conclusion by the Commission on behalf of the European Atomic Energy Community (the Community) not only of this Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the 13 non-nuclear-weapon Member States of the Community, the Community and the IAEA (published in OJ L 51 Volume 21, dated 22 February 1978 and as IAEA document INFCIRC/193, dated 14 September 1973) but also Additional Protocols to the Agreements between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Community and the IAEA (published as IAEA document INFCIRC/263, dated October 1978) and between France, the Community and the IAEA (published as IAEA document INFCIRC/290, dated December 1981). All three Additional Protocols were signed by the relevant Parties in Vienna on 22 September 1998. The texts of each Additional Protocol can be accessed at the following internet address: http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg17/nuclear/nuchome.htm ANNEX I List of activities referred to in Article 2(a)(iv) of the Protocol (i) The manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas centrifuges. Centrifuge rotor tubes means thin-walled cylinders as described at point 5.1.1(b) of Annex II. Gas centrifuges means centrifuges as described in the introductory note to point 5.1 of Annex II. (ii) The manufacture of diffusion barriers. Diffusion barriers means thin, porous filters as described in point 5.3.1(a) of Annex II. (iii) The manufacture or assembly of laser-based systems. Laser-based systems means systems incorporating those items as described in point 5.7 of Annex II. (iv) The manufacture or assembly of electromagnetic isotope separators. Electromagnetic isotope separators means those items referred to in point 5.9.1 of Annex II containing ion sources as described in 5.9.1(a) of Annex II. (v) The manufacture or assembly of columns or extraction equipment.Columns or extraction equipment means those items as described in points 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, 5.6.5, 5.6.6, 5.6.7 and 5.6.8 of Annex II. (vi) The manufacture of aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes. Aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes means separation nozzles and vortex tubes as described respectively in points 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 of Annex II. (vii) The manufacture or assembly of uranium plasma generation systems. Uranium plasma generation systems means systems for the generation of uranium plasma as described in point 5.8.3 of Annex II. (viii) The manufacture of zirconium tubes. Zirconium tubes means tubes as described in point 1.6 of Annex II. (ix) The manufacture or upgrading of heavy water or deuterium. Heavy water or deuterium means deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5 000. (x) The manufacture of nuclear grade graphite. Nuclear grade graphite means graphite having a purity level better than five parts per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1,50 g/cm3. (xi) The manufacture of flasks for irradiated fuel. A flask or irradiated fuel means a vessel for the transportation and/or storage of irradiated fuel which provides chemical, thermal and radiological protection, and dissipated decay heat during handling, transportation and storage. (xii) The manufacture of reactor control rods. Reactor control rods means rods as described in point 1.4 of Annex II. (xiii) The manufacture of criticality safe tanks and vessels. Criticality safe tanks and vessels means those items as described in points 3.2 and 3.4 of Annex II. (xiv) The manufacture of irradiated fuel element chopping machines. Irradiated fuel element chopping machines means equipment as described in point 3.1 of Annex II. (xv) The construction of hot cells. Hot cells means a cell or interconnected cells totalling at least 6 m3 in volume with shielding equal to or greater than the equivalent of 0,5 m of concrete, with a density of 3,2 g/cm3 or greater, outfitted with equipment for remote operations. ANNEX II List of specified equipment and non-nuclear material for the reporting of exports and imports according to Article 2(a)(ix) 1. REACTORS AND EQUIPMENT THEREFOR 1.1. Complete nuclear reactors Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per year. Explanatory note A 'nuclear reactor` basically includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core. It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium production, are not considered as 'zero energy reactors`. 1.2. Reactor pressure vessels Metal vessels, as complete units or as major shop-fabricated parts therefor, which are especially designed or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 and are capable of withstanding the operating pressure of the primary coolant. Explanatory note A top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is covered by item 1.2 as a major shop-fabricated part of a pressure vessel. Reactor internals (e.g. support columns and plates for the core and other vessel internals, control rod guide tubes, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates, diffuser plates, etc.) are normally supplied by the reactor supplier. In some cases, certain internal support components are included in the fabrication of the pressure vessel. These items are sufficiently critical to the safety and reliability of the operation of the reactor (and, therefore, to the guarantees and liability of the reactor supplier), so that their supply, outside the basic supply arrangement for the reactor itself, would not be common practice. Therefore, although the separate supply of these unique, especially designed and prepared, critical, large and expensive items would not necessarily be considered as falling outside the area of concern, such a mode of supply is considered unlikely. 1.3. Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines Manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing fuel in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 capable of on-load operation or employing technically sophisticated positioning or alignment features to allow complex off-load fuelling operations such as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is not normally available. 1.4. Reactor control rods Rods especially designed or prepared for the control of the reaction rate in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. Explanatory note This item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing part, the support or suspension structures therefor is supplied separately. 1.5. Reactor pressure tubes Tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain fuel elements and the primary coolant in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 at an operating pressure in excess of 5,1 MPa (740 psi). 1.6. Zirconium tubes Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg in any period of 12 months, especially designed or prepared for use in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1, and in which the relation of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500 parts by weight. 1.7. Primary coolant pumps Pumps especially designed or prepared for circulating the primary coolant for nuclear reactors as defined in paragraph 1.1. Explanatory note Especially designed or prepared pumps may include elaborate sealed or multisealed systems to prevent leakage of primary coolant, canned-driven pumps, and pumps with inertial mass systems. This definition encompasses pumps certified to NC-1 or equivalent standards. 2. NON-NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR REACTORS 2.1. Deuterium and heavy water Deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months. 2.2. Nuclear grade graphite Graphite having a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1,50 g/cm3 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 in quantities exceeding 3 x 104 kg (30 tonnes) for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months. Note For the purpose of reporting, the government will determine whether or not the exports of graphite meeting the above specifications are for nuclear reactor use. 3. PLANTS FOR THE REPROCESSING OF IRRADIATED FUEL ELEMENTS, AND EQUIPMENT ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED THEREFOR Introductory note Reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel separates plutonium and uranium from intensely radioactive fission products and other transuranic elements. Different technical processes can accomplish this separation. However, over the years purex has become the most commonly used and accepted process. Purex involves the dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel in nitric acid, followed by separation of the uranium, plutonium, and fission products by solvent extraction using a mixture of tributyl phosphate in an organic diluent. Purex facilities have process functions similar to each other, including: irradiated fuel element chopping, fuel dissolution, solvent extraction, and process liquor storage. There may also be equipment for thermal denitration of uranium nitrate, conversion of plutonium nitrate to oxide or metal, and treatment of fission product waste liquor to a form suitable for long term storage or disposal. However, the specific type and configuration of the equipment performing these functions may differ between purex facilities for several reasons, including the type and quantity of irradiated nuclear fuel to be reprocessed and the intended disposition of the recovered materials, and the safety and maintenance philosophy incorporated into the design of the facility. A 'plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements` included the equipment and components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the irradiated fuel and the major nuclear material and fission product processing streams. These processes, including the complete systems for plutonium conversion and plutonium metal production, may be identified by the measures taken to avoid criticality (e.g. by geometry), radiation exposure (e.g. by shielding), and toxicity hazards (e.g. by containment). Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase 'and equipment especially designed or prepared` for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements include: 3.1. Irradiated fuel element chopping machines Introductory note This equipment breaches the cladding of the fuel to expose the irradiated nuclear material to dissolution. Especially designed metal cutting shears are the most commonly employed, although advanced equipment, such as lasers, may be used. Remotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods. 3.2. Dissolvers Introductory note Dissolvers normally receive the chopped-up spent fuel. In these critically safe vessels, the irradiated nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid and the remaining hulls removed from the process stream. Critically safe tanks (e.g. small diameter, annular or slab tanks) especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above, intended for dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel and which are capable of withstanding hot, highly corrosive liquid, and which can be remotely loaded and maintained. 3.3. Solvent extractors and solvent extraction equipment Introductory note Solvent extractors both receive the solution of irradiated fuel from the dissolvers and the organic solution which separates the uranium, plutonium, and fission products. Solvent extraction equipment is normally designed to meet strict operating parameters, such as long operating lifetimes with no maintenance requirements or adaptability to easy replacement, simplicity of operation and control, and flexibility for variations in process conditions. Especially designed or prepared solvent extractors such as packed or pulse columns, mixer settlers or centrifugal contactors for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. Solvent extractors must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. Solvent extractors are normally fabricated to extremely high standards (including special welding and inspection and quality assurance and quality control techniques) out of low carbon stainless steels, titanium, zirconium, or other high quality materials. 3.4. Chemical holding or storage vessels Introductory note Three main process liquor streams result from the solvent extraction step. Holding or storage vessels are used in the further processing of all three streams, as follows: (a) the pure uranium nitrate solution is concentrated by evaporation and passed to a denitration process where it is converted to uranium oxide. This oxide is reused in the nuclear fuel cycle; (b) the intensely radioactive fission products solution is normally concentrated by evaporation and stored as a liquor concentrate. This concentrate may be subsequently evaporated and converted to a form suitable for storage or disposal; (c) the pure plutonium nitrate solution is concentrated and stored pending its transfer to further process steps. In particular, holding or storage vessels for plutonium solutions are designed to avoid criticality problems resulting from changes in concentration and form of this stream. Especially designed or prepared holding or storage vessels for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The holding or storage vessels must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. The holding or storage vessels are normally fabricated of materials such as low carbon stainless steels, titanium or zirconium, or other high quality materials. Holding or storage vessels may be designed for remote operation and maintenance and may have the following features for control of nuclear criticality: (1) walls or internal structures with a boron equivalent of at least 2 %, or (2) a maximum diameter of 175 mm (7″ ) for cylindrical vessels, or (3) a maximum width of 75 mm (3″ ) for either a slab or annular vessel. 3.5. Plutonium nitrate to oxide conversion system Introductory note In most reprocessing facilities, this final process involves the conversion of the plutonium nitrate solution to plutonium dioxide. The main functions involved in this process are: process feed storage and adjustment, precipitation and solid/liquor separation, …