State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate

State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate Ordinance of the Head of State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) of the Republic of Lithuania No. 17, June 21, 1999 VILNIUS On THE Approval of THE General Requirements for Dry Type Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, VD-B-03-99 Pursuant to Clause 7.1 of Article 7 of the Regulations of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (State Bulletin, 1992, No. 32-1004) I ORDER: 1. To approve of the General Requirements For Dry Type Storage Of Spent Nuclear Fuel, VD-B-03-99. 2. To establish that the General Requirements For Dry Type Storage Of Spent Nuclear Fuel, VD-B-03-99 shall come into force on the date of their declaration. S. KUTAS The Head Approved by Ordinance No. 17 of The Head of State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate, Dated June 21, 1999 The General Requirements for Dry Type Storage for Spent Nuclear Fuel, VD-B-03-99 1. The ADMINISTRATION AUTHORITY shall be defined as the leading staff with the attributed rights and duties and responsibilities for the operation of the specified storage facilities. 2. The SITE shall be defined as the territory with the defined boundaries whereon the storage facilities will be under construction, or has been built, or the possibility to construct a storage facility is being investigated. 3. The SELECTION of the site shall be defined as the process of selecting the proper site location including the determination and the evaluation of the main criteria of the proposed storage facilities. 4. The term ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) shall be defined as the lowest amount reasonably and safely possible to be achieved – the principle of optimisation based on which a storage facility shall be designed, constructed and maintained in such way that the radiation exposure to the staff and the public and the impact on the environment are minimised as low as reasonably possible, taking into consideration the economical and social conditions. 5. The COMMISSIONING shall be defined as the process during which the systems and the elements of the constructed storage facilities shall be prepared for the intended safe operation, inspected and monitored for the conformity of the desired work parameters and applicable national and international standards, and approved by the proper authorities to that regard. 6. An ACCIDENT shall be defined as the failure of a storage facility facilities operation or functioning during which radioactive elements and (

1. or)ionising dispersion are radiated outside the normal operation boundaries provided for in the original specifications of the storage facilities, and which exceed the established safe exploitation and contamination limits. 7. An EMERGENCY SITUATION shall be defined as the state of storage facilities characterised by the violation of the operational conditions and (
2. or)the limits that did not cause a nuclear accident. 8. The GREATEST PERMISSIBLE AMOUNTS shall be defined as the greatest permitted amounts of radioactive substance release and effluent as prescribed by the proper State authorities and supervision institutions. 9. The OPERATION shall be defined as the various performed activities aimed at realising the purposes set and targeted for the storage facilities, including supervision, storage (and return, in case of necessity) of the spent nuclear fuel, technical maintenance services of all storage systems and elements, continuous operational control, and inspection and testing during operation and other operations related to its activity. 10. The DECOMMISSIONING of a storage facility shall be defined as the implementation of legal, organisational, and technical measures with the aim of managing the storage facility after such a decision has been adopted that the storage facility shall be permanently removed from operation. 11. The OPERATION LIMITS shall be defined as the whole complex of normal operation parameters and characteristics indicated in the original project for the systems and the elements of a storage facility facility, as well as the storage facility as a whole. 12. The OPERATING ORGANISATION shall be defined as the economic or official entity possessing the proper licence, required equipment, and adequate financial resources for the operation of a storage facility facility, including the responsibility for its safety. 13. The ELEMENTS shall be defined as the outfit, devices, pipelines networks, cabling structures, building constructions, and other products ensuring an independent (or systemic) fulfilment of the specified function. In a project for the construction of a storage facility facility, and during the reliability and safety analysis, the ELEMENTS are considered to be structural units. 14. The PHYSICAL PROTECTION shall be defined as the aggregate of the organisational, legal, and technical measures aimed at protecting nuclear equipment and nuclear as well as radioactive material from their illegal possession or seizure, and from the unauthorised entry of persons into the territory of a storage facility. 15. The “HOT TRIALS” shall be defined as the trials during which the spent nuclear fuel is placed into the container and the container is brought to a storage facility. 16. The QUALITY ASSURANCE shall be defined as the whole complex of systematic actions planned and carried out with the help of a specific quality system and shown in a proper way in which trust in the fact that a storage facility meets the quality requirements should be created. 17. PERMISSION shall be defined as an official document from a state or state delegated authority and/or the supervising institution issued to an operating organisation for the construction of a storage facility or performance of “HOT TRIALS”. 18. The LICENCE shall be defined as an official document issued by a state or a state delegated authority and/or the supervising institution authorising the design, construction, commissioning, and operation (and if necessary, the decommissioning or dismantling) of a storage facility in conformity with the prescribed conditions, technical standards, and other requirements. 19. The LICENSEE shall be defined as the legal entity possessing a LICENCE issued by a state or state delegated authority and/or the supervising institution authorising the design, construction, commissioning, and operation (and if necessary, the decommissioning or dismantling) of a storage facility in conformity with the prescribed conditions, technical standards, and other requirements, including the responsibility for the safety of the storage facility. 20. A SEVERE ACCIDENT shall be defined as the accident having happened due to the initial circumstances not foreseen as design-basis accidents, with the occurrence of more than a single failure accompanied by the erroneous performance of the staff, or predetermined by other failures not foreseen in the design-basis accident protection systems and elements, which may cause heavy violations of the construction of the spent nuclear fuel storage facility, heavy violations of the spent nuclear fuel itself and eruption of disintegrated products into the environment. 21. A NORMAL OPERATION shall be defined as the operation of a storage facility within the limits and conditions provided for in the project and the licence. 22. The SYSTEMS AND ELEMENTS OF NORMAL OPERATION shall be defined as the systems and the elements intended for operation of a storage facility. 23. The NORMS AND RULES shall be defined as the norms, rules, regulations, manuals, and other standard technical documents of which application in the nuclear energy sector is approved by the state or state delegated authority and/or the supervising institutions. 24. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL shall be defined as the nuclear fuel irradiated in the active zone of a reactor if the organisation operating the reactor officially registers following the procedures set by the state or state delegated authority and/or the supervising institutions that the fuel will no longer be used in reactors. 25. The STORAGE OF THE SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL shall be defined as the complex designed and constructed for the temporary storage of the spent nuclear fuel, removed from the reactor pool, in the dry type containers until their final disposal. 26. The APPLICANT shall be defined as an operating organisation submitting an application for the receipt of a LICENCE for the operation and the decommissioning of the storage, or for the receipt of a permission for the construction of a storage facility or the performance of “HOT TRIALS”. 27. A DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENT shall be defined as an accident for which precautions for the initial occurrence and subsequent chain of events are provided for in the project scope, and the safety systems limit the consequences of such accidents within the limits set in the project, taking into consideration the principle of the single failure of the outfit, or the single fault of the staff, irrespective of the initial event. 28. The SAFETY shall be defined as the whole complex of legal norms, rules, as well as the technical, scientific, and organisational standards and procedures intended for the in avoidance of uncontrolled and undesirable influence to people and the environment during the normal operation (and in all other circumstances) of a storage facility. 29. The SAFE OPERATION CONDITIONS shall be defined as the minimal conditions set in the project for the amounts, characteristics, efficiency status, and technical maintenance services of systems and elements significantly required for the safety of a storage facility, ensuring that the safe operation limits and (
3. or)safety criteria are not violated. 30. The STORAGE – see “STORAGE OF THE SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL”. 31. The SAFETY CRITERIA shall be defined as the sense and (
4. or)the characteristics of the parameters of the emergency consequences established in the norms, rules, and (
5. or)standards and provided by the state authority, state delegated authority and/or the supervising institution. The STORAGE SAFETY shall be dependant on the proper identification, documentation, publication, and implementation of the SAFETY CRITERIA. 32. The SAFETY SYSTEMS AND ELEMENTS shall be defined as the processes and the elements that are needed for the integral performance of the all functions and operations in a storage facilities. 33. The CONSTRUCTION shall be defined as the process of assembling, installing, erecting, and building complete or partial storage facility systems and elements, including the conductance of procuring, assembling, storing, and utilising all required materials and auxiliary equipment, as well as light and heavy transports and other requirements not mentioned here, but specified in the scope of the project of a storage facility. 34. The SYSTEMS AND ELEMENTS IMPORTANT FOR THE SAFETY shall be defined as the minimum set of safety systems and elements, including the normal operational systems and elements that are required to prevent (or predict) any structural damage to the storage facility or any personal injury to the operating staff or the neighbouring population, which shall disrupt the normal operation or performance of the storage facility, and may cause PROJECT and/or SEVERE ACCIDENTS. 35. The TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE SERVICES shall be defined as the complex of actions during normal operation, which are required for controlling and maintaining a workable and accurate state of a storage facility. I. GENERAL REGULATIONS 1.1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT 1.1.1. The present “General Requirements for Dry Type Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel” (hereinafter referred to as the General Requirements) are the supreme level standard document regulating all technical, operational, and safety issues concerning Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Type Storages (hereinafter referred to as Storages), in order to prevent or minimise any possible release of ionising radiation affecting employees, public, and environment, as well regulating the parameters of nuclear and radiation safety (hereinafter referred to as Safety) and establishing the terms for the issue of the licence for the operation or decommissioning of a storage facility and VATESI permission to construct a storage facility and to carry out “HOT TRIALS”, as well as setting the requirements made to the documents and the procedure of their submission. 1.1.2. The present General Requirements shall set the aims of the safety assurance and the main safety criteria, as well as the main principles and the nature of technical and organisational measures. Those principles and measures shall be realised by observing the requirements of standard documents, norms and rules regulating the Safety of storage facility, the list of which is presented in Appendix 1. 1.1.3. The proposed specific technical solutions shall be substantiated by the operating organisation and shall be co-ordinated with the state, or state delegated authority and/or the supervising institutions. The justification shall be prepared at the modern scientific-technical level. Before submitting the justification, it shall be co-ordinated with the state authority and supervision institutions, its independent expertise shall be performed and it shall be approved by an operating organisation. 1.1.4. The General Requirements shall be replenished and amended only upon the decision of VATESI. 1.2. THE Licensing of AN activity 1.2.1. The notions “selection of the site”, “designing”, “construction”, “commissioning”, “operation” and “decommissioning” shall be used for the purpose of distinguishing an individual activity types during all stages of storage development and existence. General licensing procedure for the activity in the nuclear energy sector is set in the document approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, which is named the Licensing Regulations of the Activity in the Nuclear Energy Sector [1]. The present General Requirements shall not analyse the issue procedure of the first type licenses (permissions) granting the right to design or construct Spent Nuclear Fuel Storages, but shall only set the requirements for the operating organisation wishing to receive the license to safely operate a storage facility or to adequately decommission it and the permission of VATESI to construct a storage facility and to carry out “HOT TRIALS”. 1.2.2. Operation of a storage facility may not be started without the VATESI license in accordance with Article 25, Paragraph 2 of the Law on Nuclear Energy (No. I-1613, 14/11/1996) and Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Law on Radioactive Waste Management (No. VIII-1190, 20/05/1999). Decommissioning of a storage facility may not be started without another license issued by VATESI (Article 25, Paragraph 4 of the Law on Nuclear Energy and Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Law on Radioactive Waste Management). 1.2.3. A storage facility site shall be selected in accordance with Article 29, Paragraph 3 of the Law on Nuclear Energy, the Law on Territorial Planning (No. I-1120, 12/12/1995, amendments in No. VIII-323, 26/06/1997), and Article 17 of the Law on Radioactive Waste Management. The procedure of a storage facility project co-ordination is set in Articles 30 and 31 of the Law on Nuclear Energy and Article 18 of the Law on Radioactive Waste Management. 1.2.4. The terms of the issue of the VATESI permission to an operating organisation and the lists of the documents needed for such an issue shall be given in Clause 2.2 of the present General Requirements. The permission to construct a storage facility shall be issued by the Regional Governor’s Administration in accordance with Article 31, Paragraph 1 of the Law on Nuclear Energy. 1.3. the main principles of safety assurance 1.3.1. A Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Type Storage shall be considered as satisfying the safety requirements if: 1.3.1.1 The radiation exposure of employees and the public and impact upon the environment during operation of a storage facility are as low as reasonably possible, taking into consideration the economical and social conditions; 1.3.1.2. Under normal operation conditions and in case of design-basis accidents, the doses of the highest permitted radiation exposure of employees and the public from all controlled sources of ionising radiation are not to be exceeded; 1.3.1.3. Under normal operation conditions and in case of design-basis accidents, the radioactive substances are not emitted from a storage facility to the outside in unplanned and uncontrolled manner; 1.3.1.4. During planned and controlled release of liquefied and gaseous radioactive substances, accumulated during normal operation of a storage facility to the outside, the highest permitted amounts of radioactive release and effluent are not to be exceeded; 1.3.1.5. During a severe accident (in case of unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive substances to the outside) certain corrective measures for controlling the release and mitigating its after-effects shall be foreseen and implemented. 1.3.2. The storage safety shall be ensured by consistent realisation of the principle of “deep down protection” based on the barrier system preventing or hindering migration of radionuclides or other substances in a storage facility and their spreading to the environment and by using a system of technical and organisational measures protecting those barriers and maintaining their efficiency during the operation and directly protecting employees and the public from harmful impact of ionising radiation. 2. application for a licence or vatesi permission 2.1. THe submission of an application 2.1. In order to receive a license (VATESI permission) for storage construction or a permission for carrying out of “HOT TRIALS” and a license to operate a storage facility or decommission it, an applicant shall submit VATESI with an application consisting of a formal statement and an application document package [1]. 2.1.2. An application shall be submitted using the official stationary (or letterhead) of the company and shall be signed by the head of the company, or a substituting person with the power-of-attorney confirmed in the written form, and sealed. The content of the application is indicated in Clause 2.1.6. Each application for an activity related to individual stages of storage development and existence (including an application to amend the terms of the issued license) shall be executed anew. 2.1.3. The application document package, consisting of technical safety documents of a storage facility, administrational documents, and documents proving the preparedness of an applicant for an activity related to a specific stage of storage development or existence are indicated in Clause 2.2. 2.1.4. Technical safety documents of a storage facility submitted alongside with the application shall be worked out and shaped following the requirements of the standard documents regulating the safety of nuclear energy sector as well as they shall be approved of by the head of an operating organisation or a person substituting the head and having the power-of-attorney confirmed in the written form. 2.1.5. The application documents shall be worked out clearly and with quality ensuring their monosemantic understanding by both the applicant and VATESI and other institutions and organisations taking part in the review and (
6. or)the analysis of the application documents. 2.1.6. The application shall provide the following: 2.1.6.1. Full legal name and requisites of the applicant; 2.1.6.2. The activity, for which the issue of a license or a permission is requested; 2.1.6.3. The location, in which the intended activity will be performed or carried out; 2.1.6.4. The general plan of activity performance; 2.1.6.5. The duration, for which a license is requested; 2.1.6.6. Information sufficient to prove that an applicant will have the funds necessary for decommissioning of a storage facility; 2.1.6.7. Details of the persons representing the applicant; 2.1.6.8. The list of application documents. 2.1.7. An applicant shall present respective institutions and organisations taking part in the licensing procedure with a copy of the application and the associated application documents within their sphere of competence for their review, analysis and preparation of conclusions. 2.2. application documents for individual stages 2.2.1. The followings should be enclosed to the application for receipt of a storage construction permission (VATESI permission) [1]: 2.2.1.1. Report of safety analysis prepared based on the requirements of Clause 2,3 of the General Requirements; 2.2.1.2. The technical project for the storage facility in accordance with the requirements of Clause 2.4 of the General Requirements; 2.2.1.3. The physical safety plan in accordance with the requirements of Clause 7.2 of the General Requirements; 2.2.1.4. Confirmation that a storage facility site has been selected in accordance with special scheme and a detailed plan of the territory is made available in accordance with Article 23, Paragraph 3, Clauses 1 and 2 of the Law on Nuclear Energy; 2.2.1.5. The statement of legalisation of the occupation of the specified storage land for the public needs in accordance with Article 29, Paragraph 3, Clause 3 of the Law on Nuclear Energy; 2.2.2. The followings shall be enclosed to the application for the receipt of VATESI permission for “HOT TRIALS’: 2.2.2.1. The final safety analysis of the operation in accordance with the requirements of Clause 4.1.1 of the General Requirements; 2.2.2.2. Resolution of the Government concerning the approval of the storage facility project in accordance with Article 31, Paragraph 3 of the Law on Nuclear Energy; 2.2.2.3. The conclusions of the State technical expertise on the suitability of the storage project in accordance with Article 31, Paragraph 1 of the Law on Nuclear Energy (if such expertise is fulfilled separately from the work of an acceptance commission appointed by the Government); 2.2.2.4. A permission to construct a storage facility issued by the Regional Governor’s Administration in accordance with Article 32, Paragraph 1 of the Law on Nuclear Energy; 2.2.2.5. A statement signed by a special commission appointed by the Government concerning the acceptance of a storage facility in accordance with Article 34 of the Law on Nuclear Energy; 2.2.2.6. The plan of commissioning in accordance with the requirements of Clause 11.1 of the General Requirements; 2.2.2.7. A statement of a commission consisting of VATESI, the Ministry of Environment, and the Ministry of Health concerning the preparation of a radiation control system and a report on investigation of the radiation status within the surroundings of a storage facility (measuring of zero background); 2.2.2.8. A program of the preparedness for accidents in accordance with the requirements of Paragraph 8; 2.2.2.9. A general program of quality assurance in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 8; 2.2.2.10. A recruitment plan for the storage facility employees, who shall be recruited by the commencement of “HOT TRIALS” in accordance with the requirements of Clause 10.1; 2.2.2.11. A program of training of the employees needed for the storage facility operation in accordance with the requirements of Clause 10.1; 2.2.2.12. Positional instructions in accordance with the requirements of Clause 10.2; 2.2.2.13. A report on the commissioning of the storage facility (co-ordination work and “COLD TRIALS”) in accordance with the requirements of Clause 11.2; 2.2.2.14. Technical manual of the storage facility in accordance with the requirements of Clause 12.1; 2.2.2.15. The storage operational instructions prepared in accordance with the requirements of Clause 12.2; 2.2.2.16. A program of technical service, trials and periodical inspections during the operation in accordance with the requirements of Clause 12.3.2. 2.2.3. In order to receive a license for a storage operation the following shall be submitted additionally: 2.2.3.1. A report of the “HOT TRIALS” in accordance with the requirements of Clause 11.2; 2.2.3.2. Conclusions of the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Health in accordance with Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Law on Nuclear Energy; 2.2.3.3. Documents proving that a storage facility has been insured or in some other way assuring funds for compensation of future damage in accordance with Article 61 of the Law on Nuclear Energy; 2.3. THE safety analysis report 2.3.1. The aim of the safety analysis report is to show that a storage facility may be constructed and operated safely, i.e. that it will satisfy the requirements of the laws and regulated documents of the Republic of Lithuania. That would be achievable after it has been proven to the concerned authorities that the proposed storage facility and its components have been properly technically evaluated. 2.3.2. The followings shall be analysed and presented in the safety analysis report: 2.3.2.1. The essential assumptions where the proposed storage project is based on paying special attention to the amount and characteristics of the spent fuel; 2.3.2.2. The foreseen conditions under which a storage facility may be operated and the risk factors potentially affecting the storage facility; 2.3.2.3. A documentation of the typical storage operational limits such as the kef factor, the maximum fuel element temperature, and the ionising radiation levels inside the storage facility and outside its boundaries; 2.3.3. The Safety Analysis Report shall be of such extent and content that could fully describe the following: 2.3.3.1. The storage buildings, systems and elements; such description shall: 2.3.3.1.1. identify the purpose of the whole storage, its buildings, systems and elements, and outfits being used, 2.3.3.1.2. investigate and properly substantiate those project circumstances which could affect the safety; 2.3.3.2. The applicable operational limits, which shall: 2.3.3.2.1. reflect the main safety related technical aspects, 2.3.3.2.2. be co-ordinated with VATESI and other state or state delegated authority and/or the supervising institutions; 2.3.3.3. The designing process of the storage facility; the description of which shall be detailed enough so that: 2.3.3.3.1. the designing methods and factors, which have been taken into consideration, are properly presented and documented; 2.3.3.3.2. the safety analysis report proving that the design of the storage facility has been completed, reviewed, and approved by the appropriate authorities, and that the project has been divided into parts which are properly investigated and described and all significant factors have been properly accounted for, evaluated, and accepted; 2.3.3.3.3. it is clear that the proper technical investigations have been applied both for the individual parts of the storage facility, as well as the storage facility itself, and that the complete analyses and calculations have been successfully performed, reviewed, and approved by the appropriate authorities; 2.3.3.4. The engineering aspects of the storage facility shall include the followings: 2.3.3.4.1. The spent nuclear fuel shall be fully characterised by giving its physical, chemical, radiological, and engineering properties, its enrichment, history of burn up, and the specifications for the storing of the radiation exposed fuel in the pools. It is necessary to describe the expected alterations in the fuel characteristics during the lifetime of the fuel. It is also necessary to indicate the minimum duration of fuel storing in the pools after which the fuel may be placed into a storage facility. 2.3.3.4.2. The safe operational conditions showing that sufficient number of reliable elements and systems has been designed and that those systems are of different construction, or if they are alike, their number is sufficient so that in case of failure of one the other would ensure functioning of the desired function of the storage facility, 2.3.3.4.3. It should be clear for an expert evaluating the safety analysis report that functioning and conformity of all elements have been ensured, and the elements will supplement each other ensuring functioning of the system as a whole, 2.3.3.4.4. It should be indicated how the principle of “the deep down protection” has been realised in the project; 2.3.3.4.5. It should be demonstrated that the project is technically reliable and may be realised with the available technologies and after the fulfilment of well-grounded acceptable improvements; 2.3.3.5. The storage administration aspects (procedures, controls, monitorings, etc.) 2.3.3.6. The storage operation parameters; 2.3.3.7. The anticipated storage operational conditions, including descriptions of the methods with the help of which they have been determined, keeping in mind the followings; 2.3.3.7.1. it is necessary to describe the impact of the outside conditions (site conditions, process, events; nature’s and outside influence predetermined by a man) upon the storage facility, evaluation of such impact and expected alterations in the course of time. Also, it is necessary to indicate the extent of impact for which a storage facility has been designed, 2.3.3.7.2. with the help of structural analysis method, the integrity of the storage facility elements during normal operations and during accidents shall be determined. This structural analysis shall evaluate the future structural loads and alterations of substance properties in the course of time, etc., 2.3.3.7.3. it is necessary to evaluate the size and the nature of the impact of the storage facility (radiological impact: radiation exposure, release, doses, and if needed, the non-radiological impact as well) upon the environment and people and to compare it with the operational criteria. The circumstances and alteration subsequent to the impact shall be described and evaluated in the course of time, including the expected changes of the number of surrounding population, 2.3.3.7.4. the completed analysis and the documented evidences shall be clear and exact, i.e. it shall be completely clear which models have been used, what parameters have been chosen, and what limiting conditions and assumptions have been applied. The reasons why exactly those methods, parameters, limiting conditions, or assumptions have been chosen shall be also documented, 2.3.3.7.5. it shall be evident that the chosen models are proper, that they are related to the concerned problem, that they properly reflect the concerned processes, and that they have been united into a fluent and consistent systematic model, 2.3.3.7.6. the circumstances and methods used during validation, verification, and sensitivity analysis shall be documented, 2.3.3.7.7. the evaluations and calculations shall be presented in such way that an expert analysing the safety analysis reports would have the possibility to draw a conclusion that they have been properly performed and completed, 2.3.3.7.8. it should be clearly shown that the whole design process, including data collection, evaluation and project preparation, has been carried out in accordance with quality assurance procedures and that a proper general quality assurance program will be prepared during project realisation and storage operation; also, a quality assurance program applied in carrying out the analysis itself and preparing the safety analysis report shall be clearly described and documented. 2.3.4. A Typical Safety Analysis Report contents is presented in Appendix 3. If any part of the presented contents is omitted, a justification for that omission shall be given, proving that this part is not required for the proposed storage facility, and that it will not influence the storage facility structural integrity or operational safety. If the presented contents of the Safety Analysis Report fail to correspond to the typical one, it shall be co-ordinated with VATESI. In any case, the Safety Analysis Report has to satisfy the requirements of Clause 2.3 of these General Requirements. 2.4. THE storage FACILITY project 2.4.1. This part shall not give any detailed requirements made for the storage facility project and its volume as they are regulated by the laws and other legislation of the Republic of Lithuania. However, the project shall be detailed enough to describe and illustrate the storage facility and the operations associated with the spent nuclear fuel so that an expertise performing expert investigations and evaluations of the storage facility project could understand and determine that the proposed storage facility meets the present General Requirements and other legal acts and regulations. 2.4.2. The storage facility project presented for co-ordination shall include: 2.4.2.1. limits for the safe operation of the storage facility, and the devices and equipment for their control. The limits values of functional possibilities of the storage systems and elements and of the work characteristics under the conditions of spent nuclear fuel supervision and storing, acknowledged to be indispensable in maintaining the integrity of container keeping, protecting the service staff against radiation exposure to staff and environment, and avoiding unplanned and uncontrolled releases of radioactive substances to the outside shall also be indicated. Devices and equipment for the safe operation limit control shall be attributed to the systems and elements indispensable for the safety; 2.4.2.2. the safe operational conditions for the storage facility. Organisational measures for the avoidance of violations to the safe operational conditions shall be accounted for; 2.4.2.3. requirements for the technical maintenance services, including: 2.4.2.3.1. inspection and periodical check-ups of the storing conditions of the spent nuclear fuel, 2.4.2.3.2. technical services on the control measures, their trials and check-ups aiming at the assurance of efficiency and good state of systems and elements indispensable for the safe operation of the storage facility, 2.4.2.3.3. procedures enabling to confirm that a storage facility is being operated within the safe operational limits, 2.4.2.3.4. procedures enabling to confirm that the safe operational conditions are satisfied; 2.4.2.4. project peculiarities, i.e. those project circumstances which may influence the safety in case any systems or elements are replaced or modified (e.g., construction materials and geometrical dimensions); 2.4.2.5. administration control covering the organisational and management measures, documentation management, technical maintenance services, and enabling the possibility to guarantee that the storage facility is operated within the safe operational limits provided for in the project scope and under the conditions of normal operation; 2.4.2.6. technical solutions ensuring anti-fire protection of a storage facility; 2.4.2.7. communication means, including the dubbing ones, intended for the control of the storage facility systems, as well as hazard warning apparatus during normal operation, design-basis accidents, and severe accidents. 2.4.3. The project shall meet the project criteria set forth in Chapter 6. In the cases when the project proposals do not meet these criteria, a proposed solution shall be properly substantiated and presented. 3. terms of license issue and terms of A license 3.1. terms of license issue 3.1.1. VATESI shall issue a license for operation of a storage facility after it is convinced that the application documents indicated in Clause 2.2 satisfy the regulations of the present General Requirements and that the application does not violate the laws and other legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania. 3.2. validity period of A license 3.2.1. A license shall be issued for a fixed duration of time indicated in VATESI licence. The validity period of a storage facility operation license may not exceed 20 years after the date of its issue. VATESI may extend the validity period of a license when a licensee submits an application with new application documents evaluating the experience of operation and the soundness of the previous assumptions and operational conditions. 3.2.2. The application for the extension of the validity period of a license shall be executed in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 2 at least one year prior to the expiration of the license validity period. 3.2.3. In case if a licensee shall submit an application for the extension of the license validity period at least one year prior to the expiration of the license validity period, the issued license shall be valid till VATESI passes their final decision concerning the extension or non-extension of the license validity period. 3.3. terms of license validity 3.3.1. The terms of a license – technical and organisational norms regulating the validity and possession of a license [1, 25] shall be registered into the issued license. The terms of a license shall set forth the requirements for the assurance of the safety requirements during the operation or the decommissioning of the storage facility. In addition, the terms of a license shall determine the possibilities for a state or state delegated authority and/or a supervising institution to effectively control the licensed activity. 3.3.2. Each term of a license shall be co-ordinated with the other terms so that carrying out of one term would not violate the requirements of the other terms. The terms of a license may be indicated based on the analysis and evaluations given in the safety analysis report. If needed, a state or state delegated authority and/or a supervising institution may also enter supplementary terms into a license. 3.4. alterations, trials, and experiments 3.4.1. A licensee shall have the right: 3.4.1.1. to fulfil such alterations of a storage facility and the technical manual of storage operation which are substantiated in the Safety Analysis Report; 3.4.1.2. to carry out trials and experiments not described in the safety analysis report without prior co-ordination of such trials and experiments with VATESI, except those trials and experiments which alter the terms of a license, raise questionable concerns about the safety of a storage facility, increase the radiation exposure of employees and the public, and threaten the surrounding environment. 3.4.2. The proposed alterations, trials, and experiments shall be considered as raising questionable concerns of a storage facility safety if: 3.4.2.1. the probability of an accident may increase and the functioning of systems and elements significant for the safety of the storage facility, and set forth in the safety analysis report may worsen; 3.4.2.2. the limits for the safe operation of the storage facility, set forth in the Safety Analysis Report, narrow; 3.4.3. A licensee shall document any alterations of a storage facility or technical manual, and shall manage the trials and experiment documentation as well. Such documentation shall have a written safety evaluation allowing the determination that the alterations, trials, and experiments do not raise any questionable concerns. The documentation showing the alterations on a storage facility and the technical manual as well as the documentation of trials and experiments shall be kept in possession at the site of the storage facility for the duration of the license validity. 3.4.4. In an annual report presented to VATESI, based on the requirements of Clause 4.1.2, a licensee shall submit a short description of the alterations, trials, and experiments carried out in accordance with Clauses 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. Such descriptions shall give conclusions on the evaluation of every alteration, trial, or experiment. 3.4.5. A licensee planning to alter the construction of a storage facility or the procedures of technical manual of operation defined in the Safety Analysis Report or to carry out trials and experiments not defined in the Safety Analysis Report, which might raise questionable concerns on the safety of the storage facility, increase the radiation exposure of employees and the public or the impact upon the environment, or if a licensee is planning to alter the terms of a license, an application for the alterations of the terms of the license shall be submitted in accordance with the requirements of Clause 3.5. 3.5. alteration of the license terms 3.5.1. A licensee wishing to alter the terms of a license shall present VATESI with an application fully describing the planned alterations and the reasons for such alterations. The documents of such an application shall meet the same requirements as those documents required for an initial application. If the desired alterations to the license terms do not change any parts of the previously submitted documents, the list of the application documents shall be co-ordinated with VATESI in each specific case. 3.5.2. Any state or state delegated authority and/or supervising institutions which took part in the original licensing procedure may present proposals for VATESI to change the terms of an existing license ([1] p. 61). 3.6. supervision of EXECUTION of license terms; sanctions 3.6.1. A state or state delegated authority and/or a supervising institution taking part in the licensing process shall have the right to obligate a licensee to eliminate the observed deficiencies in the activity and (
7. or)any violations to the license terms. 3.6.2. VATESI shall have the right to suspend or cancel the validity of a license before the expiration of the validity period if a licensee fails in any form or manner to carry out the license validity terms, norms, rules, and (
8. or)requirements established by the state or a state delegated authority and/or any supervising institutions, or if the licensee roughly violates any of these requirements, or submit incomplete or misleading information. 3.6.3. Suspension of the license validity and (
9. or)cancellation of a license do not relieve a former licensee from the responsibility for safe status of a spent nuclear fuel storage facility. When liquidating the organisation or company that is operating a storage facility, registering a new company (organisation) and the issues of transfer of the responsibility for the safety of a storage facility shall be settled following the procedure set by the laws. 4. documentation, reports, and inspections 4.1. reports 4.1.1. An applicant shall renew the project documentation, the descriptions of planned operations, and other information and pass it over to VATESI at least once every six months during the period between a permission to construct a storage facility is granted and “HOT TRIALS” are started. The final Safety Analysis Report shall be presented to VATESI at least 90 days prior to the planned receipt of the spent nuclear fuel. The final Safety Analysis Report shall give the final analysis and evaluation of operational properties of the project systems and elements as well as the systems and the elements significant for the safety of the storage facility, taking into consideration the changes having occurred after the issue of a permission to construct a storage facility. 4.1.2. During the storage operation, by March 1 of every year, a licensee shall present VATESI, the Ministry of Environment, and the Ministry of Health with an annual report. The report shall contain: 4.1.2.1. the review of the storage operations within the previous year, summarising how the main operational goals (radiation safety of the staff and the public, the impact upon the environment, the assurance of subcriticality, cooling, etc.) have been realised; 4.1.2.2. the information on functioning of storage systems and elements, and equipment, operations with the spent nuclear fuel, giving details of the cases of failures (in accordance with Clause 12.3.4.), or inside or outside conditions, predetermined by natural or human errors, which have disrupted or could have disrupted the normal operation of the fuel return cases and other cases when the operational limits and conditions as well as other parameters, have been violated. Also, any additional information indicated in Clause 3.4.4. 4.1.2.3. the amount of the fuel placed into a storage facility and its characteristics (initial enrichment, burnouts, duration of keeping in a pool, remaining heat, measurements of integrity, size of ionising radiation); 4.1.2.4. information on containers (location in the storage facility, number of a container, measurements of tightness properties, surface temperature, ionising radiation, surface contamination); 4.1.2.5. emergency preparedness, IAEA safeguards, physical protection; 4.1.2.6. storage facility administration, quality assurance, documentation of storage facility work; 4.1.2.7. review of monitoring (contact ionising radiation, ionising radiation inside and outside the storage facility, radioactive pollution, data on every important radionuclide getting into the outside with radioactive releases and effluent during the last 12 months, statistic data on radiation state inside a storage facility and in the environment, individual doses, collective dose, methods, application of ALARA principle, etc.); 4.1.2.8. technical service and supervision (results of inspections (in accordance with Clause 12.1.2.) carried out trials and their results); 4.1.2.9. information on decommissioning (planning, changes in a storage facility related to change of radiological situation which may have influence decommissioning, etc.). 4.1.3. basing on annual report and other supplementary information, state authority and supervision institutions obligate a licensee, in case of necessity, to perform correcting actions, taking into consideration economic and social conditions. 4.2. accounting of nuclear and radioactive substances 4.2.1. A licensee shall manage the accounting documentation of nuclear materials in accordance with Regulations Of Accounting And Control Of Nuclear materials In Nuclear And Non-Nuclear Objects [15], Clause 7.1. of Safety Regulations In Storing And Transportation Of Nuclear Fuel In Nuclear Energy Objects [4], and Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [23]. An applicant shall present a program (instruction) of account and control of nuclear and radioactive substances for co-ordination of VATESI. 4.2.2. A licensee shall keep the accounting documentation of nuclear and radioactive substances as long as the spent nuclear fuel is stored in a storage facility and five years more after disposal of the fuel or its removal from a storage facility. Present accounting documents shall be dubbed. The second set of documents shall be kept in a separate place rather remote from the place of the first copy in order to avoid destruction of both sets during an accident. 4.2.3. Information about nuclear materials stored in a storage facility shall be accumulated in state nuclear substance information system, located at VATESI, according to the agreement with IAEA concerning guarantee application. 4.2.4. Besides the information accumulated in a storage facility in accordance with [15] requirements, an operating organisation shall make a database of the spent nuclear fuel loaded to a container. The database shall contain the following: 4.2.4.1. date and time of fuel loading into the reactor and removal from the reactor, indicating the number of technological channel; 4.2.4.2. chroniology of alteration of reactor’s power (loading); 4.2.4.3. date and time of fuel placing into maintenance waterpool and its removal from the pool, by indicating a place in a pool; 4.2.4.4. results of analysis of water chemical composition in a case and of measuring and analyses performed during of container draining and vacuuming; 4.2.4.5. the scheme of assemblers’ layout in a container; 4.2.4.6. alteration of chemical composition of the fuel; 4.2.4.7. dissipation of residual heat; 4.2.4.8. experiment results of ionising radiation and measuring; 4.2.4.9. periodical measuring of container state; 4.2.4.10. other significant information. 4.3. informing state authority and supervision institutions 4.3.1. A licensee shall immediately inform state authority and supervision institutions about events significant with regards to safety and extraordinary events following the procedure set by state authority and supervision institutions. 4.3.2. A licensee shall present VATESI with a written report on the events mentioned in Clause 4.3.1. Following the established procedure, reasons and consequences of the event and the foreseen measures to be taken in order to avoid similar events in future or to reduce the probability of their occurrence shall be given in the report. 4.4. inspections and trials 4.4.1. A licensee shall assist state authority and supervision institutions in inspection of urgent and accident documentation containing the data both on normal operation and violations, a storage facility itself, premises and activity related to operation of a storage facility. 4.4.2. VATESI and its representatives shall be presented without hindrance with operative documentation on receipt, storing, accounting, control, and passing over of the spent nuclear fuel. 4.4.3. A licensee shall provide free of rental charge the premises for periodical work of the representatives of state authority and supervision institutions. A licensee shall provide heating, lighting, sockets, and cleaning of the premises. The premises shall be comfortable, isolated, and with easy access to a storage facility. 4.4.4. A licensee shall immediately provide free of charge any representative of state authority and supervision institutions with radiation protection and personal hygiene means equal to the ones provided to a qualified staff of a storage facility. The representatives of state authority and supervision institutions shall observe a valid control procedure of permissions and permissions to work. 4.4.5. A licensee shall itself perform trials and inspections which shall be considered indispensable for satisfaction of license terms or shall allow state authority and supervision institutions to perform such trials and inspections. 5. criteria of site evaluation 5.1.1. The site shall be selected for a storage following Clause 1.2.3. of present General Requirements and other legal acts. This part gives only general principles and the main safety criteria. When evaluating both usual and unusual characteristics of a region and a site, the impact upon the environment during normal operation, emergency situations, or decommissioning shall be evaluated, taking into consideration release of radioactive waste and effluent to the environment and other factors. The impact upon the environment shall be carried out in accordance with the requirements of Law on Environmental Protection (No. I-2223, 21/01/21, amendments No. I-1352, 28/05/1996, and No. VIII-310, 26/06/1997) and the Law on The Impact Of Planned Economic Activity Upon The Environment (No. I-1495, 15/08/1996, amendments No. VIII-329, 26/06/1997 and No. VIII-436, 07/10/1997). 5.1.2. Characteristics of the site, which may have a direct impact upon the storage facility safety, shall be examined and evaluated. The site proposed for a storage facility shall be examined taking into consideration the frequency of the natural factors and the gravity of the consequences as well as factors generated by people and able to impact safe operation of a storage facility. The structure of the storage facility site evaluation shall be given in Appendix 3. 5.2. projected outside natural factors 5.2.1 Taking into consideration potential impact upon safe operation of a storage facility, it is necessary to determine and evaluate the natural phenomena which may occur in the region of the site. The main natural phenomena which may have an impact upon a storage facility shall be determined. 5.2.2. The documents on the cases of significant natural phenomena in this region and the gravity of their consequences shall be collected; the reliability, exactness, and exhaustiveness of such documents shall be evaluated. 5.3. projected outside factors predetermined by human activity 5.3.1. The region of the site shall be examined evaluating human activity and buildings which made put in danger the proposed storage facility. Significant factors generated by humans and able to make impact upon a storage facility shall be determined. 5.3.2. Modern and proper methods shall be employed for evaluation of the projected factors predetermined by human activity. 5.4. observation zone around a storage facility 5.4.1. The size of the storage facility region shall be established taking into consideration both natural factors and projected outside factors generated by humans used in designing of a storage facility. 5.4.2. A potential influence of storage facility construction, operation, and decommissioning shall be determined. Basing on potential measurable impact of the operation of a storage facility upon the public and environment an observation zone shall be established. The limits of the observation zone shall be registered in the projected documents of a storage facility. 5.4.3. It is necessary to examine the observation zone in accordance with Clause 3.1. of [4] taking into consideration the following: 5.4.2.1. current and future nature of population distribution; 5.4.3.2. current and projected future utilisation of land and water resources of the region; 5.4.3.3. all specific characteristics which may influence the impact of radioactive waste and effluent upon the environment and migration of radionuclides in the environment during the whole duration of storage facility operation. 5.5. sanitary protection zone around a storage facility 5.5.1. The distance between the fence and the nearest limit of the sanitary protection zone shall be determined by evaluation of radiation state. The limits of the sanitary protection zone shall be registered in the projected documents of a storage facility. 5.5.2. before the commencement of storage facility operation, the whole population shall be evicted from the sanitary protection zone following the set procedure. Sanitary protection zone may be crossed by a road and a railway. 5.5.3. before commencement of storage facility operation, the radiation status in the sanitary protection zone shall be examined. The control of radiation status in the sanitary protection zone shall be started before “hot trial”. 6. general DeSIGN criteria 6.1. general regulations 6.1. In accordance with the requirements made to the safety analysis report, the application documents shall present the projected criteria of the storage facility complex. Those projected criteria set the requirements for classification, designing, production, construction, trial, technical service, and operation properties of systems and elements significant for the safety. General projected criteria formulated in this part set only the minimal requirements made for projected criteria of a storage facility. Any omissions in those general projected criteria do not release a licensee of the responsibility to ensure necessary safety conditions in the storage facility project. 6.1.2. Neither liquid nor solid radioactive waste may be stored in a storage facility, except the spent nuclear fuel in containers and low activity secondary waste before their disposal in the way approved by state authority and supervision institutions and in the place co-ordinated with the above mentioned institutions. 6.2. general criteria 6.2.1. The requirements made for assurance of storage facility safety are set in Clauses 6.4 – 6.6. of [4] and in other norms and regulations of the Republic of Lithuania as far as they do not contradict present document and other legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania. 6.2.2. Systems and elements of a storage facility are classified in accordance with Chapter 2 of General Regulations Of Safety Assurance Of Atomic Plants [2]. Requirements set in Chapter 2 of [2] shall be applied for them. 6.2.3. The systems and the elements significant for the safety shall be designed taking into consideration their inter-compatibility with site characteristics and the impact upon the environment as well as they have to satisfy certain requirements of Chapter 4 of [2]. 6.2.4. The possibility to set the intensity of possible natural phenomena shall be foreseen in order to compare them with the projected solutions of the systems and the elements significant for the safety. 6.2.5. The systems and the elements significant for the safety shall be designed and laid out in such way as to efficiently fulfil the safety functions under the conditions of fire and explosion. Incombustible and heatproof substances shall be used everywhere and especially in the systems of paramount importance intended for storing of radioactive substances and control of safety functions. 6.2.6. The systems of explosion or fire detection, alarm announcement and suppression shall be designed in such way as to be powerful enough and to allow maximum reduction of the impact of fire and explosion upon the systems and the elements significant for the safety. The storage facility project shall provide protection measures against possible harmful impact both after exhaustion of fire extinguishing systems and after their break up. 6.2.7. The storing territory of a storage facility shall be designed in such way as not to include the routes of transportation or technical operations. 6.2.8. The routes of transportation and technical operations of placing the spent nuclear fuel into the storing territory or unloading from it shall be as straight and as short as possible and the number of storing and supervision operations shall be as low as possible in order to avoid unnecessary transportation operations with fuel and getting of the unnecessary staff into the storing territory. 6.2.9. Transportation of heavy objects above the storing territory and the systems significant for the safety shall be minimised in the project. 6.2.10. It is necessary to provide in a storage facility a possibility to carry out decontamination and maintenance of transportation containers and devices of the spent fuel and, in case of need, inspections of the fuel. 6.2.11. A sufficient space shall be left for unrestricted transportation of the spent fuel and the containers inside the storage facility, as well as of the equipment and the devices needed supervision, storing and utilisation of storage facility elements. 6.2.12. In case of damage of a container, the possibility to return the fuel to the initial position (if a storage facility is on the territory of an nuclear plant) or to the special place in which the fuel could be retrieved and reloaded in the way acceptable to VATESI that shall be foreseen. 6.2.13. The systems and the tanks for untight and damaged fuel storing shall be designed, and if storing of such fuel is not foreseen in a storage facility it is necessary to ensure that it does not get into a storage facility. Measuring of fuel tightness carried out before its loading into the containers may be used as an assurance. 6.2.14. A storage facility shall be designed in such way that the employees could easily get out of it in the case of an accident. 6.2.15. A storage facility shall maintain the conditions of safe operation in case of design-basis accidents. 6.2.16. Those parts of a storage facility in which no barriers of biological protection have been installed (e.g., openings related to cooling or loading-unloading of the spent fuel) shall be designed in such way as to prevent getting of water, non-organic solutions, organic substances, etc. into them which could weaken subcriticality, cooling, be the reason for corrosion, interfere with inspection and supervision. 6.2.17. If the containers have metal walls, getting of water between the walls and the outside shell shall be prevented. Vaults shall have water draining. 6.2.18. The systems and the elements important for the safety shall be designed in such way as to have a possibility to technically service, inspect and try them and that in case of an accidents they could be accessed in order to eliminate the consequences. 6.2.19. The foundation of a storage facility shall be strong enough and constructed in such way as to hold out the weight of all systems and elements and fully loaded fuel; the containers shall remain stable. 6.2.20. Water draining, collection, monitoring and treatment systems shall be installed in open storage facilities. 6.2.21. If a storage facility is built on the site of a nuclear power plant, the storage facility and the plant shall not have common systems and elements significant for the safety unless it is proved that that will not interfere with fulfilment of safety functions, including the ability to restore the conditions of safe operation during an accident. 6.2.22. Common utilities, services and physical inter-connection of a storage facility and a nuclear power plant are allowed, however that shall not increase the probability of an accident or the scale of its consequences and shall not worsen the functioning of the systems and elements significant for the safety due to reduced reliability of any equipment. 6.2.23. The containment systems of the stored fuel shall ensure constant monitoring or periodical inspection so that a licensee would be able to determine when corrective acts are needed in order to maintain safe operation conditions, except the cases when VATESI permits to refuse such measuring. 6.2.24. The storage facility project shall foresee a control room or a control site allowing constant monitoring of the storage facility safety during normal operation and assuring control under the conditions of emergency situations. 6.2.25. All utility service systems (water supply system, draining system, etc.) shall be projected taking into consideration the conditions of emergency situations. The project of utility systems significant for the safety shall provide the systems of sufficient dubbing systems which would be able to fulfil the safety functions in case of breaking of the main systems. 6.2.26. Emergency utility systems shall be designed so that it would be possible to check their functional preparation for work, efficiency and the whole operation course when each system switch from normal feeding sources to the emergency ones. 6.2.27. A reliable emergency electricity feeding sufficient to maintain safe operation conditions shall be provided for all equipment and devices, utilities, central danger announcement systems and operation systems in case of breakage of the main electricity source or in case of interruption of a circuit. 6.3. safety criteria of criticality 6.3.1. The projects of treatment, packing, transportation, and storing systems of the nuclear fuel shall provide the reserve of criticality safety parameters of the nuclear fuel, proportional to the data indefiniteness and applied calculation methods and shall guarantee the safety both under conditions of normal operation and an accident. 6.3.2. In calculating of infinite multiplication factor which may be used as a conservative kef value, the below listed assumptions shall be accepted: 6.3.2.1. if enrichment of the spent fuel alters in the fuel assembler, an exact model or conservatively accepted higher enrichment shall be used; 6.3.2.2. if enrichment of the spent fuel is different in individual assemblies, the subcriticality of a storage facility shall be based on higher enrichment of the fuel; 6.3.2.3. if there are any data on fuel indefiniteness, conservative data shall be used for the pre-critical calculations; 6.3.2.4. the reflection of neutrons shall be evaluated; 6.3.2.5. it shall be assumed that a storage facility is maximally filled in according to the project; 6.3.2.6. the absorption of neutrons in the storage facility elements shall not be taken into consideration, except the cases when they are fixed, their absorption properties may be evaluated and their alteration is hardly expected; 6.3.2.7. the absorption of neutrons in the fuel assembler shall be taken into consideration; 6.3.2.8. when calculating criticality, it is not allowed to reduce the absorption of the spent fuel taking into consideration burnable absorbers, except the cases when that is performed in accordance with the justification acceptable for VATESI. 6.3.2.9. it is necessary to take into consideration deformations having occurred in the spent fuel and the elements of a storage facility because of initial events; 6.3.2.10. neutron moderation shall be conservatively evaluated in the case of all states of normal operation; 6.3.2.11. all spent fuel shall be assumed to be of such burning out and such enrichment which would meet maximum reactivity, except the cases when that is assumed on the justification acceptable to VATESI. Measuring carried out before submission of the fuel for storing which directly or indirectly confirms the amount of splitting substances or the rate of their splitting may serve as such justification; 6.3.2.12. when calculating the criticality of individual storage facility parts, the influence of the neutrons diffused by its other parts shall be compensated by respective calculations; 6.3.2.13. with alteration of the temperature during normal operation and in case of accidents, it is necessary to accept the state in which the multiplication factor is maximum. 6.4. cooling criteria 6.4.1. A storage facility shall be designed in such way as to ensure the cooling of both the spent nuclear fuel and the elements of a storage facility itself so that the permitted temperature of the spent fuel, fuel shells and other elements significant for the safety shall not be exceeded even under the most unfavourable environmental conditions and accidents. 6.4.2. The systems of compulsory or natural cooling shall be designed so that they would be capable to cool the maximum determined amount of the spent fuel. When determining the capacity of the cooling systems, the minimal fuel storing duration in the pool shall be assumed, however it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that in course of time the capacity of the cooling systems may become weaker because of different outside processes. 6.4.3. Cooling systems shall be designed in such way as to maintain functioning in case of design-basis accidents. 6.4.4. During transportation operations of the spent fuel its cooling shall be ensured. 6.4.5. If the spent nuclear fuel is kept in gaseous medium, the parameters of this media shall be maintained in accordance with the conditions set in the project. The project shall provide a possibility to measure the parameters of the gaseous medium and, in case of need, to restore them, except the cases when VATESI permits to renounce such measuring. 6.5. criteria of radiation safety 6.5.1. A storage facility shall be designed following the principles and requirements of radiation safety given in [3] and [7]. 6.5.2. The vaults and metal containers of the spent nuclear fuel shall contain a sufficient amount of barriers preventing ionising radiation and diffusion of radionuclides to the environment. 6.5.3. When calculating the protection against ionising radiation, it shall be assumed that a storage facility is filled in with the fuel, which is maximally burnt out and stored in the pool for minimally indispensable duration, according to the project. 6.5.4. Those parts of a storage facility which have no biological shielding installed (e.g., openings related to cooling or loading-unloading of the spent fuel) shall be designed in such way that high gamma and neutron radiation would be avoided. 6.5.5. Designing of the spent fuel transportation equipment it shall be assumed that the transported fuel amount in them is maximum and the equipment is designed in such way as to make it impossible to place the spent fuel in the places having no biological shielding. 6.5.6. The storage facility project shall provide that ionising radiation related to reflection and diffusion, and especially the impact of such radiation upon the control areas are minimised during loading-unloading, storing, and supervision of the spent fuel. 6.5.7. The places of vaults in which great amounts of radionuclides may accumulate shall be designed in such way as to maintain the pressure lower than the atmosphere pressure and to prevent diffusion of nuclides from such parts. In case of need, concentrations of radionuclides shall be reduced by filtering and ventilating. 6.5.8. Storage facilities shall be designed so that when carrying out operations with the spent nuclear fuel, the permitted level of radioactive pollution shall not be exceeded. 6.5.9. The storage facility project shall foresee the automated control system of the public radiation protection (hereinafter referred to as radiation control system) which shall function in the territory of a storage facility and in the zone of possibly harmful radioactive pollution during severe accidents, and if a storage facility is an individual object of nuclear energy, then it shall function both in the sanitary protection zone and in the observation zone. 6.5.10. radiation control system shall ensure measuring of controlled parameters characterising the state of a storage facility and the environment at the set extent in all working modes of a storage facility, including severe accidents also during decommissioning of a storage facility. The stationary and movable measuring equipment, whereof technical and metrological characteristics would enable to detect alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation, shall be used in this system. 6.5.11. The system of radiation control shall be developed during designing of a storage facility. The project of radiation control shall be a component part of the storage facility project. The extent of radiation control of a storage facility shall be set in it, including: 6.5.11.1. options of radiation control; 6.5.11.2. objects of radiation control; 6.5.11.3. controlled parameters; 6.5.11.4. permitted and controlled levels of controlled parameters; 6.5.11.5. network points of radiation control; 6.5.11.6. periodicity of radiation control; 6.5.11.7. the number of individually controlled persons; 6.5.11.8. technical measures of radiation control and methodical provision. The project of radiation control system shall provide the utilisation of automated systems containing calculation techniques and metrological devices. Technical measures, control methods, and methods of sampling shall be unified. 6.5.12. During normal operation the radiation control system shall ensure urgent receipt and processing of information on the correspondence of the radiation status of a storage facility and its surroundings to the projected one. In case if the sizes of the measured values exceed the projected ones or in case of alteration of the radiation status in the observation zone, the radiation control system shall automatically report respective information to the storage facility management post and the administration authority of a storage facility. 6.5.13. Under the conditions of emergency situations, the radiation control system shall ensure urgent receipt and processing of the information on the radiation status of a storage facility and its surroundings, on the activity and composition of the radioactive substances getting outside the limits of a storage facility, also information necessary for prognosis of radiation status alteration in time and preparation of the recommendations on liquidation of radiation consequences. 6.5.14. The system of radiation control system shall foresee indicating and alarming devices installed in the premises and in the territory of a storage facility where radiation status may rapidly and significantly alter during technological operations. 6.5.15. The devices of radiation control, ensuring the receipt of information given in Clauses 6.5.12. – 6.5.14 shall be constantly switched on and shall have a reserve and (
10. or)dubbing of information transfer channels. 6.5.16. Measuring of γ-radiation background shall be a component part of radiation control system of the storage facility environment. Gamma radiation control shall be carried out in the location using dosimetric assemblies installed in the controlled points. 6.5.17. The storage facility project shall foresee the measures: 6.5.17.1. preventing accumulation of radioactive substances in those systems which indispensably need technical service or allowing decontamination of those systems; 6.5.17.2. preventing the employees from uncontrolled access to the storage facility zones which may be contaminated or which may cause a great radiation exposure of employees; 6.5.17.3. allowing to measure and control the contamination level in the zones to which an access is necessary; 6.5.17.4. allowing to minimise the time needed for performance of the work close to the systems and elements diffusing ionising radiation, for example, by providing sufficient space for convenient technical service and by designing special equipment for convenient repairs or replacement.; 6.5.17.5. enabling to shield the staff against ionising radiation. 6.5.18. In order to ensure the safety, the territory of a storage facility and the premises shall be divided into the areas, the regime of sanitary letting in of the operation staff and their dosimetric control in accordance with the requirements of sanitary regulations [7] shall be provided. 6.6. accident evaluation criteria 6.6.1. Carrying out the analysis of accidents and emergency situations occurring in a storage facility, it is necessary to follow the list of initial events and instructions given in Chapter 4 of [4]. 6.6.2. Additionally, it is necessary to analyse the accidents and emergency situations predetermined by the following events: 6.6.2.1. placing of untight or damaged assemblies to a storage facility; 6.6.2.2. faults in the fuel baskets, thin-walled fuel canister, etc; 6.6.2.3. incorrect placing of the fuel; 6.6.2.3. disorder of cooling; 6.6.2.5. containers’ loss of tightness properties; 6.6.2.6. alterations in the medium in which the fuel is stored. 6.7. decommissioning criteria 6.7.1. A storage facility of spent nuclear fuel shall be designed in the way making it possible to decommission it. The measures enabling easier decontamination of the systems and devices, minimising the amount of radioactive waste and contaminated devices to the lowest possible level and helping elimination of the radioactive waste and contaminated substances during final decommissioning of a storage facility shall be provided. 6.7.2. The project shall give a preliminary program of decommissioning of a storage facility and provide its periodical renewal during operation. 7. PHYSICAL protection 7.1. The aim of the physical protection is to protect nuclear equipment as well as nuclear and radioactive substances against their illegal seizure or stealing and unapproved access of outsiders to the territory of the spent nuclear fuel storage by using organisational and technical measures. The physical protection shall not permit the disturbance of the normal operation of the storage facility and it shall prevent the seizure of the spent nuclear fuel or radioactive substances with the aim of possible blackmailing, sabotage, terror, stealing, etc. [10]. 7.2. the plan of the physical protection 7.2.1. The licensee shall work out the plan of the physical protection which shall meet the Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear materials, IAEA recommendations and Regulations of Special Protection of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania [10] and Regulations of Physical Protection of Nuclear Object [11]. 7.2.2. The physical protection plan, which is confidential, shall give information reasonably guaranteeing that: 7.2.2.1. necessary technical and administrational measures preventing the unapproved actions – both intentional and unintentional – that could have an impact on the safety of the storage facility; 7.2.2.2. the measures safeguarding that only the persons authorised for that in accordance with the written instructions will have an access to the storage facility shall be implemented; 7.2.2.3. efficient ways for the detection of the violation of physical protection shall be provided and a certain system connecting with state authority and supervision institutions shall be installed in order to receive timely help. 7.2.3. The plan of the physical protection shall consist of two parts. The first part shall consist of the project of technical devices of the physical protection, the plan of the protection of the storage facility under normal and emergency conditions, and the plan of the guarding staff training. The second part shall consist of the plan of examinations, inspections and other measures used when checking whether the physical protection of the storage facility meets the requirements. 8. the program of emergency preparedness 8.1. The applicant shall prepare the internal plan of emergency preparedness of the storage facility; the plan shall indicate the criteria of alarming in the storage facility, the actions of local bodies in rendering assistance in case of emergency situation, the technical equipment of the emergency service, the accepted actions, also rendering of the first aid to the employees. 8.2. The plan of the public safety in the case of an accident in the storage facility, defining the actions of local organisations and state bodies in the case of the radioactive substance release outside the boundaries of the storage site, shall be presented alongside with the internal plan of the emergency preparedness of the storage facility. 8.3. The requirements made for the emergency preparedness are also presented in Article 24 of the Law On Management of Radioactive Waste and in [2]. 9. quality assurance program 9.1. The organisation operating the storage facility shall prepare and install a quality assurance system which would cover the whole activity influencing a safe operation of the storage facility, as well as designing, site selection, commissioning and decommissioning. 9.2. In realisation of the quality assurance system, the operating organisation shall prepare the quality assurance program providing specific quality assurance measures, the distribution of responsibility and resources, the procedure of carrying out of the actions related to some specific production, service, contract, or the project. 9.3. The requirements made to the quality assurance system are set in the Requirements For Quality Assurance System of Atomic Power Plants and Other Nuclear Energy Objects [12], EN ISO 9000 Quality Assurance Standard [26], and IAEA guidelines [26]. 10. training of the operation staff 10.1. the program of the staff training 10.1.1. The operating organisation is responsible for recruiting and training of the storage facility staff. The main regulations of the staff selection, training, permission to work independently, and control during the operation of the storage facility are set in the standard documents [2, 9]. 10.1.2. The applicant shall prepare the schedule of the recruiting of the storage facility staff and the program of the staff training. The staff training program shall set the requirements for the qualification of the staff, including the staff of technical service of the storage facility. The schedule of the staff recruiting and the training program shall be co-ordinated with VATESI. 10.2.1. Before the commencement of the operation of the storage facility, the staff of the storage facility shall be recruited and trained for the independent work 10.2.2. Before the staff of the storage facility, including the staff of technical service, starts working independently, it shall be properly trained and its abilities shall be checked following the valid norms and regulations. Periodical training of the staff is compulsory. 10.2.3. Both during the first time training of the staff and the repeated one, a special attention shall be paid to the actions of the staff (taking into consideration inter-actions of individual employees) in the case of accidents and to the development of practical skills of storage facility operation. When training the staff of the storage facility operation, it is necessary to explain the consequences of possible mistakes with regards to the safety of the storage facility, the staff, the public, and the environment. 10.2.4. Positional instructions for the whole staff of the storage facility operation shall be prepared. 11. commissioning of the storage facility 11.1. the plan of the commissioning 11.1.1. The project of the storage facility shall set the sequence and the volume of the co-ordination work being carried out, the requirements of “cold” and “hot” trials, also the criteria of the acceptance of the commissioned equipment and systems. The commissioning shall be carried out following the requirements of Chapter 8 of [4]. 11.1.2. The applicant shall prepare the commissioning plan which shall consist of the operations following each other in a logical way and prove that the systems and the elements of the storage facility provided for in the project and guaranteeing a safe storing of the spent nuclear fuel function normally and their properties correspond to the projected criteria. Moreover, the operation procedures and preparedness of the staff to operate the storage facility shall be confirmed. This plan shall be co-ordinated with VATESI. 11.2. the stages of commissioning 11.2.1. The commissioning shall be carried out in the following stages: 11.2.1.1. Termination of the construction. In the stage of the termination of construction work, the state authority and supervision institutions shall, within their competence, shall thoroughly inspect the storage facility and confirm that its’ all parameters correspond to the project co-ordinated with them. Such parameters shall be confirmed as physical measures and the initial construction terms. The final stage of the construction work the correspondence of the storage facility to all project drawings and documents shall be systematically inspected in order to determine the suitability of the storage facility for the functioning. 11.2.1.2. Trial of the equipment. During the trial of the equipment and the systems of the storage facility, the electricity feeding shall be switched on, different control levers, the torsion direction, the flow direction, the connections, etc. shall be tested. Besides, the loading of the imitation of the spent nuclear fuel into the container and the lifting mechanisms and devices shall be tested. The safety of the control of devices shall also be demonstrated during such testing. 11.2.1.3. Demonstration of operation properties. After the elements of the equipment are tested, the trials demonstrating the safe interaction of all equipment and the general possibilities of the operation and the power of the storage facility shall be carried out. In this stage, it is necessary to show the safety and the efficiency of the whole instructions and procedures. Besides, the preparation of the operation staff for the work both under the conditions of normal operation and emergency situations shall be showed. 11.2.1.4. “Cold trials”. In this stage it shall be formally confirmed that the systems and the elements of the storage facility and the whole facility correspond to the project and the faults found in the previous stages have been eliminated. At the termination of “cold trials”, it is necessary to prepare a report indicating their successful conclusion. The report shall show the shortcomings and propose the liquidation measures which shall indispensably be carried out before the commencement of the “hot trials”. 11.2.1.5. “Hot trials”. This stage starts at the moment when the spent nuclear fuel is loaded into the container, the operations related to such loading are being carried out, and the first container bearing the spent nuclear fuel gets into the storage facility. During the “hot trials” the correspondence of the whole operational properties of the storage facility to the projected criteria are showed; the chronometry of individual operations, the specification of working characteristics of the equipment and the systems, the specification of the limits and the conditions of the safe operation, the correction of the operational procedures in order to make them accurately reflect the actual characteristics of the systems and the equipment may be performed. 11.2.2. At the termination of “hot trials”, the report shall be prepared. The report shall comprehensively describe all the trials performed and shall confirm their successful conclusion. This report shall serve as the grounds foe the issue of the storage facility operation license. It is necessary to emphasise in the report what alterations have been fulfilled in the technical manual and operational and positional instructions. 12. assurance of the safety of the storage facility during its operation 12.1. organising of the storage facility operation 12.1.1. The licensee shall be responsible for the development of the organisational structures indispensable for the safe operation of the storage facility, the provision of the storage facility with necessary financial and material-technical resources, the scientific-technological support, the carrying out of the requirements of norms and rules, the quality assurance during all stages of the existence of the storage facility, the organisation of physical and fire protection of the storage facility, the selection of the operational staff and its training, the safety habits in the storage facility and the sustainable control of the storage facility operation. 12.1.2. The licensee shall constantly control and inspect the activity significant for the safety of the storage facility. The licensee shall furnish VATESI and the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Health – within their competence – with the results of the control and inspections of the safety of the storage facility and the periodical reports bout the safety state of the storage facility. 12.1.3. The main document defining the safety of the storage facility operation is technical manual setting forth the main methods and functions ensuring the safe operation of the storage facility, the general procedure of the performance of the operations related to the storage facility safety, and the limits and the conditions of safe operation. 12.1.4. The licensee, for the operational purpose, may make the requirements of the norms and the rules more strict in order to avoid any violations of safe operation limits and (
11. or)conditions. 12.1.5. The license of the storage facility operation may be issued after the operating organisation approves of the technical manual and co-ordinates them with VATESI. 12.1.6. The changes made in the technical manual shall be co-ordinated with VATESI. 12.2. instructions of the storage facility operation 12.2.1. The administration authorities of the storage facility, basing on the norms and the rules, the technical manual and the manufacturers’ documentation of equipment, shall prepare the operational instructions before the commencement of the “hot trials”. 12.2.2. The main operational instructions shall be prepared. They shall cover the following: 12.2.2.1. the supervision of the unused (new) containers and the procedures until loading of the spent nuclear fuel during which all the necessary documents proving the quality and the completeness of the container are checked; 12.2.2.2. the evaluation and description of the spent nuclear fuel kept in the reactor pools, in order to receive the data on the existing conditions which may influence the management and the storage of the spent nuclear fuel (e.g., injuries of fuel shells or structural violations); 12.2.2.3. the loading of the fuel into the container, the drying of the container’s inside cavity and its tight shutting, checking up of the helium leakage, the measuring of the ionising radiation, the contamination and the temperature, and the radiation safety of the operational staff.; 12.2.2.4. the accounting of the spent nuclear fuel existing in the storage facility, including its characteristics and the storing location; 12.2.2.5. the control and the registration of the transfer of the spent nuclear fuel from one place of the storage facility to the other one; 12.2.2.6. the constant monitoring of gamma radiation and the spatial distribution of the intensity of the neutron flows in the environment; 12.2.2.7. the constant monitoring of the heat dissipation by the containers and its dispersion in the atmosphere (in case of necessity); 12.2.2.8. the supervision and the constant monitoring of the medium (e.g., helium) available in the containers (in case of need); 12.2.2.9. the operation under the conditions of all emergency situations provided for in the safety analysis report and the elimination of the consequences after the design-basis accidents; 12.2.2.10. the service, the testing, and the inspection of the lifting mechanisms (lifting cranes, rope loops, beams, hooks); 12.2.2.11. the corrosion control, the maintenance and the repairs of the primed and painted surfaces; 12.2.2.12. the physical safety of the storage facility; 12.2.2.13. the application of IAEA guarantees; 12.2.2.14. the documenting of the storage facility work and the control of documents. 12.2.3. The operation instructions of the equipment and the systems shall provide very specific instructions for the operational staff about the methods of work fulfilment under the normal operation and the emergency situations; they also have to include the chapters indicated by [18]: 12.2.3.1. the title, the instruction number, the date of its approval, the name and the position of the approving person; 12.2.3.2. the purpose of the instruction; 12.2.3.3. the indispensable initial conditions under which the instruction may be used; 12.2.3.4. the caution measures and restrictions which shall be observed; 12.2.3.5. the restrictions and the limits of the controlled parameters violation of which demand the measures to be taken in order to return the parameters to the normal diapason; 12.2.3.6. the evaluation criteria of right or faulty actions; 12.2.3.7. the control lists of complex procedures included into the instruction or mentioned in it; 12.2.3.8. the checking procedures of the radiation exposure doses; 12.2.4. The operational instructions shall be corrected taking into consideration the results of the “hot trials” as well as in the course of operation; 12.2.5. The applicant shall present VATESI with the copies of all operational instruction of the storage facility. If the operational instruction should be corrected, the licensee shall inform VATESI about that at least within 14 days after the correction is carried out. 12.3. technical service and trials 12.3.1. In order that the systems and the elements significant for the safety could perform their functions and meet the project requirements, it is necessary to perform a regular technically service and testing. The indicated work shall be performed in accordance with the instructions, programs, and schedules prepared by the administration authorities of the storage facility, basing on the requirements and the technical manual of the project. Thorough documenting of the work is indispensable. 12.3.2. The applicant wishing to receive a license for the storage facility operation, shall present the program of technical service and testing of the systems and the elements significant for the safety, including the lifting mechanisms and the systems of the outside fences and gate alarm systems of the storage facility, for the approval by VATESI. The applicant shall prepare a universal system of planned and periodical inspections, permitting to confirm that the storage facility is operated observing the requirements of quality assurance program as well as determine the efficiency of the program. The applicant, taking into consideration the results of the reliability analysis of the elements and the systems, shall set the frequency and the volume of the technical service, the testing, and the periodical inspections. 12.3.3. After the technical service has been performed, it is necessary to check the efficiency of the systems and the equipment, as well as the characteristics of the project conformity when documenting the inspection results. The projected and operational documentation shall be managed, kept, and reviewed in accordance with the requirements of the norms and rules. 12.3.4. During the operation, the information on the breakage of the storage facility equipment and the faulty actions of the operational staff shall be collected, processed, analysed, and kept. The operating organisation shall be responsible for the collection, high quality analysis, systemisation of the information and its urgent transfer to the state authority and supervision institutions. APPENDIX 1 the list of the most important standard documents, norms, and rules 1. Res. No. 103 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, dated 27/01/1998 Licensing Regulations of The Activity in the Nuclear Energy Sector 2. VD-B-001-0-97 General Regulations of Safety Assurance At Atomic Energy Plants 3. HN-73-1997 The Main Rules Of Radiation Safety 4. PNAE G-14-029-91 Safety Rules When Storing Or Transporting Nuclear Fuel In the Nuclear Energy Objects 5. VD-T-001-0-97 Nuclear safety Rules of the Reactor Equipment of Atomic Power Plants 6. PNAE G-5-006-87 Norms of Designing Earthquakeproof Atomic Power Plants 7. SPAS-88 Sanitary Norms of Designing And Operation of Atomic Power Plants 8. VATESI-95 Requirements For the Organisation Operating an Atomic Power Plant 9. OPKP Regulations of Selection And Training Of the Staff of Atomic Power Plants and Permission to Work Independently and of Control During Operation 10. Res. No. 1074-14 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania Regulations of Special Protection Methods of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant 11. VATESI-97, Ordinance No. 6 Regulations of Physical Protection of Nuclear Object 12. VD-KS-02-99 Requirements of Quality Assurance System of Atomic Power Plants and Other Nuclear Energy Objects 13. PBJa-06-00-88 The Main Rules Of Nuclear Safety When Processing, Storing, And Transporting Nuclear materials 14. PRB AS-89 Radiation Safety Rules When Operating Atomic Power Plants 15. VD-VP-01-97 VATESI, 1997 Regulations of Nuclear Substance Accounting and Control in Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Objects APPENDIX 2 the list of The MOST important IAEA AND ICRP guidelines 17. IAEA, SS No. 116 Design of Spent Fuel Storage Facilities. Safety Guides. Safety Series No. 116. IAEA, Vienna, 1994 18. IAEA, SS NO. 117 Operation of Spent Fuel Storage Facilities. Safety Guides. Safety Series No. 117. IAEA, Vienna, 1994 19. IAEA, SS NO. 118 Safety Assessment for Spent Fuel Storage Facilities. Safety Practices. Safety Series No. 118, IAEA, Vienna, 1994 20. IAEA, SS NO. 6 Regulations for the safe Transport of Radioactive Material. Safety Series No. 6, IAEA, Vienna, 1995 (As amended 1990) 21. 50-C-D (Rev. 1) Code on the safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1) IAEA, Vienna, 1988 22. 50-SG-D10 Fuel Handling and Storage Systems in Nuclear Power Plants. A Safety Guide. Safety Series No. 50-SG-D10. IAEA, Vienna, 1984 23. IAEA/ SG/INF-12 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Wepons 24. Guidelines of the International Commission of Radiation Safety. Publ. 60, Part I, Clauses C22, C25, C40 25. 50-SG-G8 Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants: Content, Format and Legal Considerations. A Safety Guide. Safety Series No. 50-SG-G8. IAEA, Vienna, 1982 26. 50-C/SG-Q Quality Assurance for Safety in Nuclear Power Plants and Other Nuclear Installations. Safety Guides. Safety Series, Q1-Q14. IAEA, Vienna, 1998 APPENDIX 3 the typical content of safety analysis report 1. Introduction 1.1. The purpose of the spent nuclear fuel storage facility (hereinafter referred as the storage facility) 1.1.1. The rationale of the spent nuclear fuel (hereinafter referred as the fuel) storing; 1.1.2. The foreseen period of the storage facility operation; 1.1.3. Long-term objectives 1.2. The review of the storage facility 1.2.1. The main elements of the storage facility 1.2.2. The location and the layout of the storage facility 1.2.3. The summary of the fuel handling operations 1.3. The performance objectives goals 1.3.1. The radiation safety 1.3.1.1. Workers 1.3.1.2. The public 1.3.2. The impact upon the environment 1.3.3. The maintaining criticality 1.3.4. Cooling 1.3.5. Other 2. Description of the element construction of the storage facility 2.1. Fuel assembly, fuel basket 2.2. The equipment of the operations with the fuel 2.3. Internal construction of the container 2.4. Handling system of the container 2.5. Transport containers 2.6. Transport means 2.7. Fuel storing structures 2.8. Supplementary structures 2.8.1. Buildings 2.8.2. Berns, ramparts 2.8.3. Cranes, lifting equipment 3. The characteristics of the natural site 3.1. The region and the site geology 3.1.1. Lithology and stratigraphy 3.1.2. The geotechnical characteristics of the substances of site 3.1.3. Seismicity 3.1.3.1. Faults, zones of weakness 3.1.3.2. The history of earthquakes 3.2. Geomorphology and topography of the site 3.2.1. The stability of the site 3.2.1.1. The stability of the slope 3.2.1.2. The surface erosion 3.2.2. The impact of the surrounding territory 3.3. Meteorology and climatology of the region 3.3.1. Precipitation 3.3.1.1. Normal amount (rain, hail, snow, snow cover, ice, ice cover) 3.3.1.2. Registered extreme cases 3.3.2. Wind 3.3.2.1. Prevailing directions, intensity 3.3.2.2. Extreme events (whirlwind, hurricanes) 3.3.3. Insolation 3.3.3.1. Normal distribution of the temperature 3.3.3.2. Registered extreme temperatures 3.3.4. Normal distribution of the barometric pressure 3.3.5. Normal distribution of the humidity 3.3.6. Important chemical characteristics of the atmosphere 3.3.7. Lightning 3.3.7.1. The frequency of the storms with lightning 3.3.7.2. Lighting to the earth (per year, per sq. meter) 3.4. Hydrology and hydrogeology of the region and the site 3.4.1. Normal conditions of the surface water run off 3.4.2. Inundation: frequency, intensity 3.4.3. Ground water 3.4.3.1. Normal conditions 3.4.3.2. The highest recorded ground water table 3.5. The probability of natural explosions and fires (forest fire, oil leakage, gas accumulation, etc.) 3.6. Land flora and fauna of the site 3.7. Aquatic fauna and flora in the neighbourhood of the site 4. Human activity in the region of the site 4.1. Distribution of population 4.2. Agriculture 4.3. Neighbourhood settlements and commercial activity 4.4. Industry 4.5. Transport lines in the neighbourhood of the site 4.5.1. Water roads 4.5.2. Surface roads 4.5.3. Railway 4.5.4. Air corridors 4.6. Mines and excavation 4.7. Nuclear installations 4.8. Electricity plants 4.9. Potentially dangerous structures (e.g. dams on the riverhead) 5. Design basis 5.1. Fuel characteristics 5.1.1. Physical description of the fuel assembler, the fuel basket 5.1.2. Surface deposits on the fuel assembler and the fuel basket 5.1.3. Initial enrichment 5.1.4. Burn up, history of operation 5.1.5. Minimal cooling time in the pools 5.1.6. Isotopic composition during storage 5.1.7. Ionising radiation during the storage 5.1.8. Reactivity during storage 5.1.9. Decay heat production formation during the storing 5.2. The amount of the fuel kept in the storage facility 5.2.1. Fuel amount in one storage element 5.2.2. Fuel amount in the storage facility 5.3. The duration intended for the storing of the fuel 5.4. Fuel handling operation 5.4.1. Operations in the pool: equipment and procedures 5.4.2. Transportation operations: equipment and procedures 5.4.3. Operations of fuel placing into the storage facility: equipment and procedures 5.5. Selection and justification of the materials for production of the elements 5.5.1. Physical and chemical characteristics 5.5.2. Thermal properties 5.5.3. Strength properties 5.5.4. Limiting parameters 5.5.4.1. The highest temperature of a material 5.5.4.2. The maximum stresses of the materials 5.5.5. Time influenced processes in the material 5.5.5.1. Corrosion 5.5.5.2. Creep 5.5.5.3. Fatigue 5.5.5.4. Shrinkage 5.5.5.5. Radiation induced alterations in materials 5.5.6. The foreseen serving duration of the storage facility 5.6. The determining conditions of the site: selection and justification 5.6.1. The values of parameters for design basis 5.6.2. The values of external parameters for the analysis of severe accidents 5.7. Fault analysis 5.7.1. Initial events: selection and justification 5.7.1.1. External natural 5.7.1.2. External, predetermined by human activity 5.7.1.3. Inside, predetermined by human activity 5.7.1.4. Breakage in equipment or elements 5.7.2. Coupled and synergetic effects 5.7.3. Normal operation: definitions and justification 5.7.4. Design-basis accidents: selection and justification 5.7.5. Severe accidents: selection and justification 5.8. Design basis loads 5.8.1. Static 5.8.2. Dynamic 5.8.2.1. Cyclic 5.8.2.2. Impact 5.8.3. Thermally induced stresses 5.8.4. Internal pressure 5.9. Operation limits 5.9.1. The summary of operation objectives 5.9.2. Values of criteria 5.9.2.1. Radiation fields 5.9.2.2. Levels of radioactive contamination 5.9.2.3. Zones of radioactive contamination and radiation control 5.9.2.4. Sanitary protection and monitoring zone 5.9.2.5. Release (radionuclides and other substances) 5.9.2.6. The maximal fuel colliding temperature 5.9.2.7. Other 5.9.3. The confirmation of surrogate estimates 5.9.4. The justification of the criteria values 6. The design justification 6.1. The states of the facility 6.1.1. Normal operation (reference to 5.7.3. and 5.8.) 6.1.2. Design-basis accidents (reference to 5.7.4. and 5.8.) 6.1.3. Severe accidents (reference to 5.7.5. and 5.8.) 6.2. Analysis results 6.2.1. The analysis of the foundation (buildings) 6.2.2. Structural analysis of the storage facility elements (reference to 2) 6.2.3. Heat transfer 6.2.4. Dose estimation and ALARA principles 6.2.4.1. Worker dose estimates: maximum individual, average group and collective 6.2.4.2. Dosing for the public: critical group and collective 6.2.5. Safety factors 6.3. Analytical conclusions 6.3.1. Protection against radiation 6.3.2. Containment 6.3.3. Fuel geometry 6.3.4. Change of moderation 6.3.5. Dissipation of decay heat 6.4. Preparedness for the accidents 6.4.1. Available measures 6.4.1.1. Equipment, materials 6.4.1.2. Staff 6.4.2. Plans of emergency preparedness 6.4.3. Administrational body of emergency organisation 6.4.4. Mitigation of emergency consequences 6.5. Impact 6.5.1. Radiological 6.5.2. Environmental 6.5.3. Other 7. The system of the spent fuel managing 7.1. IAEA guarantees 7.2. Physical protection 7.3. Fuel acceptance control, setting of acceptability criteria: equipment and procedures 7.4. Defected fuel 7.4.1. Determining 7.4.2. Managing: equipment, elements, procedures 7.5. Fuel return to the initial position in case of breakage 7.6. Minimisation of the impact of container loading upon the pool operations 8. Monitoring 8.1. What is monitored 8.1.1. The staff 8.1.2. Radiation fields 8.1.2.1. In case of contact 8.1.2.2. Inside the storage facility 8.1.2.3. Outside the storage facility 8.1.3. Control of radioactive contamination 8.1.4. Permitted releases 8.1.4.1. To the atmosphere 8.1.4.2. To the water bodies 8.1.5. Accepting (surrounding) environment 8.1.6. Specific parameters of the systems: selection and justification 8.2. How is the measuring carried out 9. Inspection and maintaining program 10. Conceptual decommissioning plan of the storage facility 10.1. Options of decommissioning 10.1.1. Estimation of the price 10.1.2. Impact 10.1.3. Benefits 10.2. Peculiarities of decommissioning 10.2.1. Possibility to retrieve the spent fuel after a long duration of storing 10.2.2. Dismantlement, decontamination, disposal of equipment 10.2.3. Disassembling, decontamination, and burying of the containers 10.2.4. Restoration of the site 10.3. Periodical review of the preliminary decommissioning program and its renewal 11. Quality assurance program 11.1. Designing and analysis 11.2. Construction of the storage facility, production of the elements 11.3. Operation 11.3.1. Operations with fuel 11.3.2. Fuel management system 11.3.3. Monitoring 11.3.4. Inspection and maintenance 11.4. Decommissioning of the storage facility 10/08/2000 Translation from Lithuanian into English is made by Daiva Gridziuškaitė, the translator of Translation Bureau of D. Gridziuškaitė Personal Company. I, translator Daiva Gridziuškaitė, hereby certify this to be a true translation from Lithuanian, made being aware of the content of Art. 293 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. In case of any discrepancies the Lithuanian text shall prevail. 10/08/2000 I, D. Blauzdžiuvienė, Notary Public of Vilnius Notary Bureau No. 11, hereby certify the genuineness of the signature of Daiva Gridziuškaitė. Register No. Dues: paid Notary: