ANDREAS ECONOMIDES ν. IOANNIS L. ZODHIATIS
(1961)1 CLR 306 ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ CyLaw | Αναφορικά μ'εμάς | " target="_top">Επικοινωνία | Όροι χρήσης Έρευνα - Κατάλογος Αποφάσεων - Εμφάνιση Αναφορών (Noteup on) - Αρχείο σε μορφή PDF - Αφαίρεση Υπογραμμίσεων
(1961)1 CLR 306 1961 November 28 [O' BRIAIN, P., ZEKIA, VASSILIADES and JOSEPHIDES, JJ.] ANDREAS ECONOMIDES, Appellant (Defendant), v. IOANNIS L. ZODHIATIS, Respondent (Plaintiff). (Civil Appeal No. 4347). Appeal-Powers of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction to review findings of fact and rehear witnesses-The Courts of Justice Law, 1960, section 25
(3)-Trial Judges should normally give reasons for believing the version of one party and rejecting that of the other. Held:
(1)Since the enactment of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960, under section 25
(3)this Court is not bound by any determination on questions of fact made by the trial court and has power to rehear any witness already heard by the trial court, if the circumstances of the case justify such a course.
(2)But this provision has to be applied in the light of the general principle that a Court of Appeal ought not to take the responsibility of reversing the findings of fact by the trial court merely on the result of their own comparisons and criticism of the witnesses, and of their own view of the probabilities of the case. Appeal dismissed. Per curiam: it is desirable that trial judges, in deciding to believe the version of one party and reject that of the other, should normally give reasons for doing so. Appeal. Appeal against the judgment of the District Court of Famagusta (Kourris D.J.), dated the 31.5.61 (Action No. 2168/60) whereby judgment was given in favour of the plaintiff in an action for £14, being balance due from the sale of big baskets. N. Antoniou for the appellant P. Eleftheriou for the respondent. The judgment of the Court was delivered by: JOSEPHIDES, J.: in this case the plaintiff's claim was for £14, balance of value of 400 big baskets (kofines) which were alleged to have been sold and delivered to the defendant. The plaintiff gave evidence himself and called three other witnesses who gave evidence in the case. The defendant denied that any baskets were ever sold or delivered to him. He gave evidence before the trial Court in support of his case and called one witness. The trial judge, after hearing the evidence adduced and the addresses of counsel, found for the plaintiff and gave judgment accordingly. The defendant now appeals against that judgment. The main complaint of the appellant is that the trial judge said baldly that he believed the plaintiff and his witnesses and discarded the evidence of the defendant and his witness without giving any reasons for doing so. In support of his argument, Mr. Antoniou for the appellant has pointed out one or two apparent contradictions in the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses. Undoubtedly a Court of Appeal has the power to set aside the findings of fact of a trial Court where the trial judge has failed to take into account circumstances material to an estimate of the evidence, or where he has believed testimony which is inconsistent with itself, or with indisputable fact. And since the enactment of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960, under section 25
(3)this Court is not bound by any determinations on questions of fact made by the trial Court and has power to re-hear any witness already heard by the trial Court, if the circumstances of the case justify such a course. But this provision has to be applied in the light of the general principle that a Court of Appeal ought not to take the responsibility of reversing the findings of fact by the trial Court merely on the result of their own comparisons and criticism of the witnesses, and of their own view of the probabilities of the case. Having read the evidence adduced in this case, we are satisfied that there was ample evidence on which the trial Court could make its finding preferring the version of the plaintiff and his witnesses to that of the defendant and his witness. We are not, therefore, prepared to reject the finding of the trial judge on the facts deposed to by the witnesses, especially when the finding, as in this case, is based on the credibility of the witnesses. For these reasons the appeal fails. We must observe, however, that it is desirable that trial judges, in deciding to believe the version of one party and reject that of the other, should normally give reasons for doing so; otherwise the Court of Appeal would find difficulty in deciding whether the trial judge has properly estimated the witnesses. Appeal dismissed with costs. cylaw.org: Από το ΚΙΝOΠ/CyLii για τον Παγκύπριο Δικηγορικό Σύλλογο