Pierides Zenon D ν. Gavriel Maratheftis (V19) 1 CLR 263

(2)Where a statement can have two meanings, one defamatory and the other not; the libellous meaning should not be seized on. A Court should examine with care claims alleging libel which reflect on the plaintiff in the way of his business ; for a man who is merely seeking to defend his contractual or proprietory rights and does not intend to reflect on the character of his rival ought not to be condemned in damages unless either he makes a statement which is false, malicious and injurious, or his statement clearly reflects on the character of the plaintiff ; it is only in the latter event that an action for libel or slander should lie. Appeal allowed. Appeal by defendant from the judgment of the District Court of Limassol (Action No. 108/51). Sir Panayiotis Cacoyannis, G. N. Rossides and A. Loizou for the appellant. Chr. Mitsides and G. J. Pelaghias for the respondent. The judgment of the Court was delivered by:- HALLINAN, C.J.: The appellant among other business interests is the General Agent in Cyprus for Messrs. Fratelli Cosulich of Genoa, who, at all material times, were the operating managers of s.s. Protea. The appellant on the -'9th January, 1951, informed Messrs. Cosulich that on his principal's behalf he had appointed the Louis Tourist Agency as the sole booking agents in Cyprus for this voyage of the s.s. Protea to Australia. Between that date and the 8th February, notices appeared in several newspapers by other tourist agencies including that of the respondent offering berths to intended emigrants from Cyprus on the s.s. Protea. On the 8th February the appellant sent the following letter to the editor of the newspaper "Phos" (Exhibit 4). The Editor of the Newspaper "Phos", Nicosia. Sir, We have observed that various agents publish in your newspaper advertisements in connection with the departure of s.s. PROTEA from Port Said or Limassol for Australia towards the end of February. We wish by our present letter to notify you as general agents in Cyprus of the said steamer that we have exclusively and solely authorized the Louis Tourist Offices to advertise and book passengers for the said departure. We have in our hands cables of the owners of, s.s. PROTEA assuring that it will not be permitted to any passenger from Cyprus to embark either at Limassol or at Port Said without the written consent of the Louis Tourist Offices. Consequently, we desire to draw your attention to publications which have been made or are going to be made in your newspaper regarding the said departure. (Sd.) Z. D. PIERIDES. Larnaca, 7.2.51." In the same issue of the same paper as well as in several other newspapers published in Cyprus the appellant also published an advertisement. It is only necessary here to set out that part of this advertisement which, it is alleged, is libellous ; this portion of the advertisement is set out in paragraph 10 of the statement of claim and is as follows : " FOE PASSENGERS TO AUSTRALIA S/S PROTEA In view of the publications of various Shipping Tourist and Immigration Offices in Cyprus, in connection with the sailing of s.a. PROTEA from Limassol or Port Said for Australia we wish to draw your attention to the following:

(1)On behalf of the owners of the above mentioned steamer we declare most categorically that we have not given authority (and we reserve our rights in connection with the publications of other Agencies) to any office in Cyprus to refer to or publish or book berths on board the s.s. Protea either directly from Cyprus or through Port Said for Australia." In order to establish their claim, the respondents had to prove two things. First, that either the letter to the editor or the advertisement or both amounted to an allegation that the respondent and other travel agents were selling passages for the voyage of the s.s. Protea to Australia -without authority; and, secondly, that such allegation amounted to a reflection on the character of the respondent in the way of their business. It is not denied that the reference to the Tourist Agents in both the letter and the advertisement includes reference to the respondent. Let us examine first the advertisement and then the letter to see whether either can be said to allege that the respondent as travel agent was selling passages without authority. That the passage complained of in the advertisement amounts to this: First that {by reference' to notices published by the respondent and other tourist agents) the reader would know that the appellant was referring in the advertisement to the respondent, who had published notices offering passages on the s.s. Protea from Limassol or Port Said for Austraha; and, secondly, that the appellant on behalf of the owners Messrs. Cosulich had not authorised any agent to book berths on the s.s. Protea. If one reads the advertisement as a whole, however, it is clear that the appellant had given authority to book such berths to the Louis Tourist Agency exclusively. Counsel for the respondent has argued that in this advertisement the appellant in substance states that the owners, Messrs. Cosulich, had not given authority to any office in Cyprus to book for the s.s, Protea and had not given such authority even through Messrs. Cosulich's agents in Egypt or elsewhere, outside Cyprus. Counsel submitted that this amounted to an allegation that the respondent was booking passages without authority. In my view the plain meaning of the passage complained of in the advertisement is not as respondent's counsel suggests. When the appellant used the word "We" he is referring to acts done by him in Cyprus on behalf of the owners; he is not referring to acts done elsewhere by the owners without his mediation as agent. I do not consider that the passage in the advertisement complained of by the respondent can fairly be said to contain an allegation that the respondent was selling passages on the s.s. Protea without authority; I conclude therefore that this passage is not capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. The letter to the editor contained three paragraphs. The first contain» an assertion that various agents including the respondent had published notices advertising their authority to book passages on the s.s. Protea ; the second paragraph states that the appellant as general agent in Cyprus for the s.s. Protea has given Louis Tourist Agency the sole right to book such passages ; and the third paragraph asserts that the appellant has received cables from the owners Messrs. Cosulich containing an assurance that passengers from Cyprus will not be allowed to embark at Limassol or Port ®a ^ without the consent of the Louis Agency. It is most important when considering whether this letter is capable of a defamatory meaning to put aside the question of whether its contents are true or not for that only concerns the plea of justification. What we are now concerned to discover is whether from reading these three paragraphs it can fairly be said that they amount to an assertion that the respondent was selling passages on the s.s. Protea without authority; any assertion less than this could not possibly be considered as a reflection on the character of the respondent in the way of his business. It would have been much easier for the appellant to have said boldly that the respondent was selling passages without authority if that is what he meant to say. But it would appear from the contents of the letter that the appellant has been most careful not to say any such thing. It must be remembered that he wrote the letter because many tourist agencies in Cyprus were purporting to have received their authority via Messrs. Peltour (the general agents for Messrs. Cosulich in Egypt) and sub-agents of Messrs. Peltour. What the letter in effect seems to say is this: "We, as general agents for Cyprus, have only authorised Louis Agency and we have the assurance of the owners that to protect the rights we have given to Louis Agency from a competition that may or may not have a lawful origin, the passengers from Cyprus can only embark with the permission of that agency." Of course the criterion of whether the letter is defamatory or not does not depend on the intention of the writer but what meaning it had for an ordinary member of the public who read it. In my view an ordinary reader might well understand this document in a sense that was not defamatory. In the case of Capital and County Bank v. Henty and others, 52, Law Journal, Q.B.D. 232, Henty & Sons having quarrelled with the branch manager of the bank issued a circular that it would not accept in payment of their accounts cheques drawn on any branch of the bank. It was held "that there was no ease to go to the jury, that the words were innocent in their primary and natural sense and would not be read by a reasonable man as imputing insolvency." In the case of Nevill (Lord William) v. Fine Arts and General Insurance Co., 66 Law Journal, Q.B.D., 195 at p. 198, the Lord Chancellor cites with approval a passage from the judgment of Lord Justice Brett in Henty's case: "It seems to me unreasonable that when there are a number of good interpretations, the only bad one should be seized upon to give a defamatory sense to the document." On reading the letter in the present case it seems to me that there are at least two possible interpretations : One, that a dispute about the right to issue tickets for the s.s. Protea had arisen between various agencies, that the right of the Louis Tourist Agency would be enforced by a veto on embarkation and that in this conflict of authority, the Louis Agency held the trump-card. The other interpretation (the one alleged by the respondent) might be that the respondent and other agents had assumed authority which they have not got. To use the phrase of Lord Justice Brett 1 do not think it reasonable that only the bad interpretation should be seized upon to give a defamatory sense to the document. But in order that this letter should bear a defamatory meaning it is not enough merely to show that the letter intended to allege that the respondent was selling passages without authority ; the respondent must also satisfy the Court that to make such an allegation amounted to a reflection on the character of the respondent in the way of his business. Here again the principle laid down in Henty's case applies. If the letter alleged that the respondent habitually sold accommodation on ships without authority that would undoubtedly reflect on his character, but can it be said that, because the appellant challenges his authority in respect of a single voyage on s.s. Protea, this necessarily constitutes a reflection on the respondent ? A man might on one occasion under a mistaken belief of his own rights assume authority which he had not got, and yet be a man of honour in his business transactions. There is another important matter to be considered before any Court should conclude that a challenge to a business man's authority to transact certain business amounts to a reflection on his character. Apart from libel and slander, there are other and entirely separate causes of action for malicious and false statements which caused damage to another. In Ratcliffe v. Evans, 1982, 2 Q.B.D., 524, Bowen, L.J., at p. 257 states : "An action will lie for written or cral falsehoods, not actionable per se nor even defamatocy where they are maliciously published, where they are calculated in the ordinary course of things to produce, and where they do produce, actual damage." In these actions the plaintiff must prove that the statement was false, it was maliciously made and that he suffered damage ; the burden of proof on the plaintiff is therefore much heavier than in cases of libel and slander. Where a statement is published which affects a man in the way of his business or calling, there is naturally a tendency to allege that the statement reflects on his character as a business or professional person. The ad- vantages are obvious: the plaintiff is not obliged to show that the statement has exposed him to ridicule, hatred or contempt, and the burden of proving falsity, malice and damage is not on him. A court should examine with care claims alleging libel which reflect on the plaintiff in the way of his business; for a man who is merely seeking to defend his contractual or proprietory rights and does not intend to reflect on the character of his rival ought not to be condemned in damages unless either he makes a statement which is false, malicious and injurious, or his statement clearly reflects on the character of the plaintiff; it is only in the latter event that an action for libel or slander should lie. In the present case the defendant-appellant in publishing the letter was obviously trying to implement contractual obligations undertaken by himself and for Messrs. Cosulich. He should not be exposed to the penalties for libel unless what he published clearly reflected on the character of the respondent in the way of his business. In my view the respondent has failed to discharge the burden which lay on him to prove that this letter to the editor reflected on his character; the Court below erred in holding that this letter was defamatory. In view of this conclusion it is not necessary to consider the defence of justification or qualified privilege. The judgment for the respondent must be set aside and judgment entered for the appellant with costs here and below. Costs certified for two counsels. cylaw.org: Από το ΚΙΝOΠ/CyLii για τον Παγκύπριο Δικηγορικό Σύλλογο