ANDREA PASPARI ν. MARITSOU HJ. PANAYIOTI (V2) 1 CLR 130 ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ CyLaw | Αναφορικά μ'εμάς | " target="_top">Επικοινωνία | Όροι χρήσης Έρευνα - Κατάλογος Αποφάσεων - Εμφάνιση Αναφορών (Noteup on) - Αρχείο σε μορφή PDF - Αφαίρεση Υπογραμμίσεων (V2) 1 CLR 130 1893 March 17 [SMITH, C.J. AND MIDDLETON, J.] ANDREA PASPARI Plaintiff, v. MARITSOU HADJI PANAYIOTI Defendant. MINOR-RESPONSIBILITY OF-CONTRACT OF DEPOSIT-THE INFANTS ESTATES LAW, 1884-MEJELLE, ARTICLE
- The Infants Estates Law of 1884 does not effect any alteration in the Ottoman Law regulating the age at which persons become competent to enter into contracts its object being merely to protect and preserve the property of persons under the age of 21 years. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF FAMAGUSTA. Economides for the appellant. Diran Augustin for the respondent. The facts and arguments sufficiently appear from the judgment. Judgment: This was an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Famagusta. The plaintiff in this action claimed the return of £20 which he alleged he had deposited with the defendant, to whom he was betrothed on the understanding that if he declined to carry out his engagement to marry her, the £20 should be forfeited. He averred that he was willing to marry her, but that she refused to marry him, and he, therefore, sought to recover the £
- The defence raised by the defendant was simply a denial that the plaintiff had deposited the money with her. There appears to have been a divergence of opinion amongst the Judges of the District Court. Atta Bey was of opinion that the plaintiff had not deposited the £20, whilst Mr. Macridi thought that the plaintiff had deposited it and was entitled to recover it. The President of the Court, without expressing any opinion as to whether the money had in fact been deposited, held that as the defendant was under the age of 21 years the time at which, under the Infants Estates Law, 1884, she would come of age, the action could not be maintained against her, It appeared to us on a perusal of the notes of evidence, that the balance of evidence was strongly on the side of the plaintiff; and we, therefore, communicated with the President of the District Court, and asked him to be good enough to favour us with his views as to the facts. He informs us that he was inclined to believe that the money was in fact deposited, and we, therefore, come to the conclusion that as a matter of fact the sum of £20 was deposited by the plaintiff with the defendant. With regard to the legal point raised that this action cannot be maintained against the defendant, inasmuch as she is under the age of 21 years, it appears to us that it is not well founded. The evidence before the Court was to the effect that the defendant is about 17 years of age. According to the Ottoman Law young persons of both sexes attain the age of puberty, and are competent to enter into contracts at the age of 15 years. Between the ages of 12 and 15 in the case of a male, or 9 and 15 in the case of a female, unless the signs of puberty mentioned in the Mejelle are present, they are regarded as "merahik" or approaching puberty, and with regard to the contract of deposit, Section 776 says distinctly, that it is not necessary that both parties should be of full age (i.e. have completed their fifteenth year) but that if they are "merahik" the contract is still good. The Infants Estates Law of 1884, provides that in that law the expression "under disability" includes every person who has not completed the age of 21 years. The scope and object of the law are to regulate the administration of the estates of such persons, and it was not intended in our opinion to effect any alteration in the Ottoman Law regulating the age at which persons become competent to enter into contracts. The Infants Estates Law was passed solely for the purpose of preserving and protecting the property of persons under the age of 21 years, and for no other purpose. With regard to the opinion expressed by the President of the Court, that, owing to the plaintiff's conduct, the defendant was justified in refusing to marry him; it appears that a criminal charge was brought by the defendant against the plaintiff of which he was acquitted. He still maintains his willingness to marry the defendant, and the Court by which he was tried on the charge brought against him, having found him not guilty, we are of opinion that he is not disentitled to recover on this account. For these reasons we are of opinion that the plaintiff has made out his case, and the judgment of the District Court must be reversed and judgment entered for the plaintiff for £20 and costs. Appeal allowed. cylaw.org: Από το ΚΙΝOΠ/CyLii για τον Παγκύπριο Δικηγορικό Σύλλογο