GEORGHIOS IKOSIS ν. ANASTASSIA THOMA (V21) 1 CLR 125

(1)(g)-Business premises required as landlord's residence. The plaintiff, the landlord of certain premises, sued the tenant for possession under section 18

(1)(g) of the Rent Control Law, 1954, alleging that she required the premises as a residence. The trial Court made an order for possession. Upon appeal, Held: The order of the trial Court set aside.

(1)On the facts, the plaintiff did not reasonably require the premises as a residence; and

(2)Under section 18

(1)(g) a landlord cannot obtain an order for the possession of business premises on the ground that he needs them as a residence. Appeal allowed. Appeal by defendant from the judgment of the District Court of Nicosia (Action No. 3176/54). M. A. Triantafyllides with A. Emilianides for the appellant. C. Colocassides for the respondent. The facts sufficiently appear in the judgment of the Court which was delivered by: ZEKIA, J: In this case the appeal was allowed at the conclusion of the hearing, and the order given by the trial Court for the recovery of possession of the business premises under consideration in favour of the plaintiff landlord was set aside. We now proceed to give the reasons: The plaintiff, an elderly Woman suffering from Parkinson's disease, found it difficult to climb to her bedroom on the top of the shop, the premises under consideration, which is occupied by the appellant as a statutory tenant. Dr. Mikellides, who has been treating the respondent for a considerable time, gave his opinion that climbing stairs by the respondent would be a good exercise for her, at least for some time to come. The trial Court, chiefly on account of the fact that the landlady experienced difficulty in climbing upstairs, found that she reasonably required the shop in question for her residence, and having satisfied itself that it was a reasonable order to make as per section 18

(1)(

1. g)of the Rent Control Law, 1954, made the ejectment order against the present appellant. Before an order for the recovery of possession of any premises covered by the Rent Control Law, 1954, can be made the Court should satisfy itself on the following three points: (
2. a)That the landlord intends genuinely to occupy the premises in question; (
3. b)That he reasonably required the premises; and (
4. c)That the Court considers it reasonable to give such order. In addition, the proviso to the sub-section should be borne in mind. By the first proviso, if the tenant satisfied the Court that having regard to all the circumstances of the case greater hardship would be caused by granting the order or Judgment than by refusing to grant it, no order of ejectment shall be issued. The trial Court appears to have felt on this point that another shop already occupied by the wife of the tenant some twenty yards away on the same street, Ledra Street, and which might accommodate the tenant, was Some ground for tipping the scales in favour of the landlady, although there was no evidence that the premises occupied by the wife were controlled premises. Taking the first point, it is doubtful whether she genuinely intended to occupy the shop for residence. The shop consists of one room on the ground floor, abutting on Ledra Street, a very busy street, and according to the evidence, it is damp and has only one glass door as its entrance door. This appears to be altogether unsuitable for a bedroom. Even if it is assumed that she was genuine in her intention to occupy this shop as sleeping quarters, I should find it extremely difficult to say that she reasonably required this place for residence. She cannot be the sole arbiter of her requirements once that requirement is qualified by law with reasonableness. A substantial rent was offered to her by the appellant for this shop and the upstairs rooms which, as she alleges, she does not need to occupy them as living rooms. She refused to accept it. She could no doubt, with the rent offered, secure ground floor house accommodation elsewhere in a much quieter neighbourhood, but apparently she was not interested in the offer. It is obvious that she does not reasonably require the shop in question. On the other hand I am inclined to the view that premises held separately as business premises cannot be recovered under section 18

(1)(g) as a residence by the landlord. The landlord or any member of his family wholly dependent upon him may claim the occupation of a dwelling house for residence whereas in business premises the landlord may claim occupation for himself or for his spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law or daughter-in-law over eighteen years of age. If the legislature intended the recovery of the possession of business premises for occupation as residence there appears to be no reason why members of his family wholly dependent upon him and under the age of eighteen would not have a claim for occupation of the business premises for residence, like son, daughter, son-in-law and daughter-in-law who are over eighteen years of age; and also it strikes me as a bit odd why a son-in-law and a daughter-in-law would be entitled to occupy business premises for residence but enjoy no such right in the case of a dwelling-house. Business premises held not as part and together with a dwelling-house but solely for business purposes normally are not suitable for residence as a bed-room. I am of the opinion that it was not within the contemplation of the legislature for the purpose of section 18

(1)(g) that business premises might be occupied as residence by the landlord. The naming of a certain class of persons of over a certain age in addition to the landlord, entitled to claim occupation of business premises, suggests that that part of the section was intended to enable the landlord to assist in installing in trade his close relations. The rule of construction followed by Denning L. J. in Henry v. Taylor

(1954)(1 Q. B. p. 513) may properly be adopted: "Where there is a fair choice between a literal interpretation and a reasonable interpretation, we should always choose the reasonable interpretation". This does not mean, however, that a landlord is precluded from putting forward a genuine claim for converting into residence business premises under any other sub-section of the same law; in a proper case he might do so under section 18

(1)or 18

(1)(m) of the law. HALLINAN, C. J.: I concur. cylaw.org: Από το ΚΙΝOΠ/CyLii για τον Παγκύπριο Δικηγορικό Σύλλογο