LOUCAS MARANGOS ν. COUNCIL FOR REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS AND CIVIL ENGINEERS
(1967)3 CLR 649 ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ CyLaw | Αναφορικά μ'εμάς | " target="_top">Επικοινωνία | Όροι χρήσης Έρευνα - Κατάλογος Αποφάσεων - Εμφάνιση Αναφορών (Noteup on) - Αρχείο σε μορφή PDF - Αφαίρεση Υπογραμμίσεων
(1967)3 CLR 649 1967 November 29 [TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.] IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 146 OF THE CONSTITUTION LOUCAS MARANGOS, Applicant, and THE COUNCIL FOR REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS AND CIVIL ENGINEERS, Respondent. (Case No. 209/65). Architects and Civil Engineers-Registration-Licence-The Architect and Civil Engineers Law, 1962 (Law No. 41 of 1962) (as amended)-Licence as an "Architect by profession", under section 9
(1)(A) of the Law-Applicant not satisfying the requirements either in (ii) or in (iii) of the said section 9
(1)(A). Architect by profession-See above. In this Case the Applicant complains against the decision of the Respondent Council not to grant him a Iicence as a "architect by profession" under section 9
(1)(A) pf the Architects and Civil Engineers Law, 1962, (Law No. 41 of 1962). The reasons for refusing the licence appIied for were that he had not, for the period of seven years immediately preceding the 30th May, 1962 (when Law 41 of 1962 came into operation), been bona fide engaged as a principal in the practice of the profession of an architect nor had he been employed for the said period in a responsible capacity under a person entitled under the Law, to be requirements an architect in other words that he did not satisfy the requirements set out in (ii) and (iii) of section 9
(1)(A) of the said Law. This case turns entirely on questions of fact. In dismissing the recourse, the Court: Held,
(1). According to the relevant application of the Applicant to the Respondent Council for Registration of Architects and Civil Engineers dated the 23rd June 1964 he (the Applicant) was being employed since 1954 by the firm of Messrs Th. Ph. and Son But it is common ground that Mr. A Ph the sole person in charge at all material times of the said firm, is not a person registered or entitled to be registered as an architect or civil engineer under the provisions of the said Law No. 41 of 1962; so, to that extent, there can be no dispute that the Applicant does not satisfy the requirements in (iii) of section 9
(1)(A) of the Law.
(2)It is clear from the evidence that the Applicant does not satisfy, either, the requirements in (ii) of section 9
(1)(A), in that he cannot be held to have bona fide practised the profession of an architect on his own for the period of seven years required by the Law (supra). Application dismissed with £15 costs in favour of the Respondent. Recourse. Recourse against the decision of the Respondent not to grant Applicant a licence as an "architect by profession" under section 9
(1)(A) of the Architects and Civil Engineers Law, 1962 (Law 41/62). A. Triantafyllides, for the Applicant. L. Demetriades, for the Respondent. Cur. adv. vult. The following Judgment was delivered by: TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.: In this Case the Applicant complains against the decision of the Respondent not to grant him a licence as an "architect by profession", under section 9
(1)(A) of the Architects and Civil Engineers Law, 1962 (Law 41/62)-there have been some amendments made to Law 41/62 but they are not material for the purposes of this Case. The said decision was communicated to the Applicant by letter dated the 25th October, 1965, (see exhibit 1) and it was taken by the Respondent on the 22nd September, 1965, (see its minutes, exhibit 2). The reasons for refusing to the Applicant the licence applied for were, as they appear from exhibits 1 and 2, that on the 30th May, 1962, when there came into operation Law 41/62, he had not, for the past seven years, been bona fide engaged as a principal in the practice of the profession of an architect, nor had he been employed, for the said period, in a responsible capacity under a person entitled, under the Law, to be registered as an architect; in other words that he did not satisfy requirements (ii) and (iii) of section 9
(1)(A) of Law 41/
- According to the relevant application of the Applicant to Respondent, dated the 23rd June, 1964 (see exhibit 3) he was being employed by Messrs. Th. Photiades & Son since
- It is common ground that Mr. Andreas Photiades, the sole person in charge at all material times of the said firm, is not a person registered or entitled to be registered as an architect or civil engineer under the provisions of Law 41/62; so, to that extent, there can be no dispute about the relevant reason behind the sub judice decision being a correct one. I pass on, next, to the second part of the Respondent's reasons, namely, that the Applicant had not practised, bona fide, on his own as an architect during the seven years' period before the 30th May, 1962, i.e. from the 31st May, 1955, onwards. It is the Applicant's case that while working at the office of Messrs. Th. Photiades & Son he was, also, undertaking architectural work of his own. As it appears, however, from his application to Respondent (exhibit 3) the Applicant was born on the 10th February, 1938, i.e. on the 31st May, 1955, at the beginning of the seven years' statutory period, he had only completed his seventeenth year a few months previously. It appears, also, from such application that from 1950 to 1956 he was studying at a secondary school in Nicosia; according to the evidence of the Applicant before the Court-which I find most unreliable-during the last school year 1955-1956 he was mainly working at the office of Messrs. Th. Photiades & Sons and, at the same time, he was studying his school lessons; but even if this were so, the fact remains that during the previous school-year, 1954-1955, which ended at the end of June 1955, the Applicant, was still a student at school-even if he attended at the office of Mr. Photiades during his spare time-and, thus, during part of the relevant statutory period he was, in essence, a mere teenager at school and could not be deemed as being engaged, bona fide, in the practice of architecture of his own. In this respect it is quite significant to note that the drawings of the Applicant which he submitted in support of his application to Respondent relate only to the years 1956 to 1962, and not to the year 1955 as well. Applicant has stated that, for the purpose of doing the work Undertaken on his own, he had an office at home, since 1956; he admitted, however, that he had never put his name-plate outside his home, or at the office of Messrs. Th. Photiades & Son, to indicate that he was a practising architect, in his own right It is material to note that when the Applicant originally applied by letter, on the 28th May, 1963, to the Respondent, for a licence as an architect by profession (see red 4 in exhibit 4), he did not rely expressly on having practised on his own as an architect, but he relied only on having been employed by Messrs. Th. Photiades & Son for the material seven years' period; and this letter of the 28th May, 1963, has to be read together with the later formal application of the Applicant (exhibit 3), as requested by the Applicant in a covering letter for his said formal application (see red 7 in exhibit 4). The Applicant started relying on the contention that, while he was working in the office of Messrs. Th. Photiades & Son he had practised on his own as an architect, when he addressed to Respondent a letter dated the 25th July, 1964 (see red 9 in exhibit 4). It is most significant that this letter of the Applicant was written after the Respondent had decided, on the 21st July, 1964 (see exhibit 2), that the Applicant must produce evidence that his eiii1dyer was a person who could be registered as an architect or civil engineer. In view of all the aforementioned circumstances I am of the opinion that the Respondent on the material before it was properly entitled to find that the Applicant had not been bona fide engaged during the material period from the 31st May 1955 on wards as a principal, in, the profession of an architect; nor am l of the vied that the evidence adduced by the Applicant has established in the least that the Respondent has in any way acted under any misconception of fact in reaching its sub judice decision. For all the foregoing reasons this recourse fails and it is dismissed accordingly. I, also, direct that the Applicant should pay £15.-towards costs to Respondent. Application dismissed. Order for costs as aforesaid. cylaw.org: Από το ΚΙΝOΠ/CyLii για τον Παγκύπριο Δικηγορικό Σύλλογο