is an act or decision in the domain only of public law and not an act or decision of a public officer in the domain of private law. The various orders, notices or decisions referred to in section 80 of CAP. 224 comprise acts or decisions in the domains of both public and private law. Before the coming into force of the Constitution a differentiation between matters in the domain of public law and matters in the domain of private law, such as was introduced by Article 146, was not made. It is not within the ambit of this reference to deal in general with the whole question of the distinction between the domains of public and private law. Nor is it material, in the case under reference, to decide in general upon the constitutionality of section 80 of CAP. 224, in relation to all orders, notices or decisions of the Director (as he is defined in section 2 of CAP. 224) because only an appeal against a decision of the Director under section 58 of CAP. 224 is the subject-matter of civil application No. 4/61. Section 58 of CAP.224 provides for the determination by the Director of disputes as to boundaries of immovable property. The determination of disputes as to boundaries of immovable property is a matter in the domain of private law. In so far as a public officer, i.e. the Director in a case of this nature, is vested with competence to take action in connection with the determination of such disputes as to boundaries, with the primary purpose of regulating private rights, then such action is a matter in the domain of private law and not in the domain of public law; consequently this is not a matter within the ambit of Article l46." This case was approved and followed in the Valanas case (supra). The head note reads:- "The Applicant was the registered owner of a house and yard situated at Platanistassa By a letter dated the 22nd May, 1961, the Respondent informed the Applicant that it was proposed to correct an error in the description of the boundaries of the Applicant's said property by which an area which was formerly part of his property would henceforth form part of a public road. The Applicant sought a declaration of the Court that the decision of the Respondent was null and void and of no effect whatsoever. Held: (a) the word 'act' or 'decision' in Art. 146.1 meant an act or decision falling in the domain of public law only, and not of private law (Achilleas HadjiKyriacou and Theologia HadjiApostolou, 3 R.S.C.C. letter F. p. 89); (b) where the primary object of an act or decision of a public officer was not the promotion of a public purpose but the regulation of civil law rights in property, such act or decision would be a matter of private law and would not amount to an 'act' or 'decision' in the sense of Art. 146.1." Fortsthoff, P., in dismissing the application of the Applicant said at pp. 93-94:- "What falls to be decided is whether the action of Respondent complained of by Applicant amounts to an 'act' or 'decision'
23/62, an 'act' or 'decision'
is an act or decision in the domain only of public law and not an act or decision of a public officer in the domain of private law. Civil law rights in immovable property are, as a rule, matters in the domain of private law. In so far as a public officer, in this case the Director, is vested with competence to take action in connection with civil law rights in immovable property, and the primary object of such action is not the promotion of a public purpose, but the regulation of the aforesaid civil law rights, then such action is a matter within the domain of private law and does not amount to an 'act' or 'decision'
. In the present case the Director acting under his powers under section 61 of CAP. 224 has purported to proceed to correct an error concerning the boundaries of the immovable property in question of Applicant and in doing so it is clear, from the contents of the said notice of the 22nd May, 1961, that the Director has acted with the primary purpose of regulating the relevant civil law rights of Applicant. The mere fact that as a result of the decision in question of the Director an area which Applicant alleges to be part of his yard would constitute part of a road does not affect the true character of the said decision because the primary object thereof still appears to be the regulation of Applicant's civil law proprietary rights i.e. the exact boundaries of his property and not the promotion of a public purpose, i.e. the widening of a road. In the circumstances of this Case the Court has no competence to entertain this, recourse under Article 146 and it is dismissed accordingly." Finally in Theocharis Charaiambides and The Republic (District Lands officer and Another), reported in 4 R.S.C.C. 24, the Court in dismissing the application .for a provisional order, to restrain the sale of immovable property, had this to say at p. 25:- "In the light of the judgment of this Court in the Case of Savvas Yianni Valana and The Republic (Director of Lands and Surveys), 3 R.S.C.C. p. 91 at p. 93, the Court is of the opinion that it has no competence to entertain this recourse because the said refusal of the Director involves the exercise of a power which does not have as its primary object 'the promotion of any public purpose' but it only concerns civil law rights inasmuch as it is designed to ensure that the sale of mortgaged property takes place in a proper manner for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the parties concerned. The said refusal, therefore, does not amount to an 'act' or 'decision'
." In my view, in view of the facts of this case, it is clear to me that since the year 1963 the Applicant's only complaint was that the road boundary has been omitted from the boundaries of his property; and was asking the Director of the Lands office to exercise his powers under section 61 of Cap.224, to correct such error or omission in the certificate of registration. Be that as it may, in the light of the authorities, the correction of errors and/or omissions in any certificate of registration with regard to immovable property is a matter falling within the domain of private law. As regards, however, the powers of the Director to take action with regard to the correction of such errors or omissions in the certificate of registration, the primary object of his act or decision, in my view, was not the promotion of a public purpose, but the regulation of civil rights in property. Having reviewed the authorities, I have decided to follow and adopt the principle in the Valanas case (supra), and have reached the view that the decision or act of the Director is a matter within the domain of private law and not in the realm of public law. I would agree with counsel for the Republic that this is not a matter within the provisions of Article 146 of the Constitution, and therefore, I would dismiss the application because this Court has no competence to entertain this recourse. Application dismissed. cylaw.org: Από το ΚΙΝOΠ/CyLii για τον Παγκύπριο Δικηγορικό Σύλλογο
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