REPUBLIC (PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION) ν. LEFKOS GEORGHIADES (1972) 3 CLR 594

(1972)3 CLR 594 ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ CyLaw | Αναφορικά μ'εμάς | " target="_top">Επικοινωνία | Όροι χρήσης Έρευνα - Κατάλογος Αποφάσεων - Εμφάνιση Αναφορών (Noteup on) - Αρχείο σε μορφή PDF - Αφαίρεση Υπογραμμίσεων

(1972)3 CLR 594 1972 November 20 [STAVRINIDES, L. LOIZOU, HADJIANASTASSIOU, A. LOIZOU, MALACHTOS, JJ.] THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Appellant, and LEFKOS GEORGHIADES, Respondent. (Revisional Jurisdiction Appeal No. 77). Public Service and Public Officers-Disciplinary proceedings under section 82

(3)of the Public Service Law,1967-(Law No. 33 of 1967)-Accusatorial character of the proceedings as distinct from the inquisitorial system-Implications of-Natural justice-The rule audi alteram partem-Non-communication to the officer concerned of the reports of the investigating officers forwarded to the Public Service Commission under section 82

(1)of the statute, as well as of documents forwarded before the enactment in June 1967 of the said statute (viz. Law No. 33 of 1967, supra)-Such non-communication does not violate the said rule of natural justice-Because neither. the officer nor his counsel requested at any stage, prior to the sub judice decision of the Public Service Commission, to see, inspector take copies of the reports in question-Though they were fully aware of their existence-And any documents they asked to be produced were in fact produced at the hearing of the disciplinary case in question-Moreover, the officer was afforded every opportunity to cross-examine witnesses; and produced in evidence every document that was thought useful for the presentation of his case-And the Commission never considered or even read the documents in question, except in so far as they were made exhibits. Disciplinary proceedings-Disciplinary punishment-Accusatorial character of such proceedings-Implication of-Cf. inquisitorial system-Rule of natural justice audi alteram partem-Scope and effect-See supra; see further infra passim. Disciplinary proceedings-The non-communication to the officer charged with a disciplinary offence of the reports of the investigating officer, forwarded under section 82

(1)of the said Law, does not violate the provisions of said section or any other statutory provision-Cf. supra Disciplinary proceedings-Disciplinary proceedings before the Public Service Commission under section 82

(3)of the said Law-Accusatorial system as distinct from the inquisitorial system-Due inquiry by the Commission-Non-studying or non-considering by the Commission of the aforesaid reports of the investigating officer (supra)-Does not render the inquiry conducted by the Commission a deficient one-Because it is of the essence of the accusatorial system that the Judge should confine himself to the facts and circumstances that the parties elect to present-Nor does the non-making available to the officer of all the material render the inquiry a non-due one-Provided that all the material that was available to the Commission was equally available to the officer. Accusatorial character of the disciplinary proceedings-Implications of-Cf. inquisitorial system-See supra passim; see also infra. Investigation into disciplinary of fences-Reports prepared under Regulation 5 of Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Public Service Law, 1967 (Law No. 33 of 1967)-No specific statutory provision as to what to do with such reports-The Court cannot read and imply into the said Law an obligation to serve, without being asked, copies of the reports. Accusatorial system of disciplinary proceedings-Investigating officer-Reports of such officer sent to the Commission under section 82

(1)of the statute-They need not he made part of the record by the Commission-For if they were to be so made, the whole character of the accusatorial system would be altered. Demotion as a disciplinary punishment-Section 79

(1)of the said Public Service Law, 1967-Demotion of two grades at one and the same time is possible in law. Disciplinary decision-Due reasoning required-How such need is satisfied-Regulation 7 of Part III of the Second Schedule to the Public Service Law, 1967-Disciplinary decision in the instant case duly reasoned in accordance with the requirements of the said statute and the general principles of administrative law. Reasoning of administrative decisions-Due reasoning required-Principles applicable. Facts-Misconception of fact-Assessment or determination of facts by the administration-Judicial control of such assessment or determination-Principles governing approach of the Administrative Court to such assessment, determination or findings of fact-When the Court will interfere. Findings of fact by the administration-Judicial control of-See immediately hereabove. Recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution-Course of non considering and determining all issues raised by a recourse when the determination of certain of the issues raised leads to the annulment of the decision subject matter of the recourse-Is a right course-Trial Judge having properly in his discretion refrained from determining all the remaining issues-Position on appeal-But the successful party is at liberty, in the case of an appeal by the other party, to ask by way of cross-appeal the Supreme Court to deal with and determine the issues so left undetermined by the Judge of the first instance (Markou's case (infra) (distinguished)). Revisional appeal-Cross-appeal-Right of the successful party to claim by cross-appeal the determination of the issues left undetermined in the first instance-Cf. supra. Statutes-Interpretation-Principles applicable. This case turns on the disciplinary punishment (demotion from the rank of Ambassador to the rank of Counsellor A) imposed on the public officer (now respondent) by the Public Service Commission (now the appellants) sitting as a disciplinary tribunal under the relevant provisions of the Public Service Law, 1967 (Law No. 33 of 1967). On a recourse filed by the officer against his demotion, the learned Judge of the Supreme Court (Triantafyllides J. as he then was) who tried the case in the first instance annulled the aforesaid decision of the Public Service Commission on certain grounds, leaving undetermined a number of other grounds set forth by the officer in support of hi recourse. It is against this judgment (infra) that the Republic through the Public Service Commission now appealed. The officer cross-appealed (infra). Allowing the appeal and dismissing the cross-appeal, the Supreme Court held: (a) that the non-communication to the officer of the reports of the investigating officer forwarded to the Public Service Commission under section 82

(1)of the said Law (No. 33 of 1967) doe; not contravene the provisions of the said section (infra) or any other statutory provision; (

1. b)that such non-communication does not contravene either the rule of natural justice audi alteram partem, regard being had to the circumstances of this case; and (
2. c)that the aforesaid non-communication, in view of the accusatorial character of the disciplinary proceedings, does not render the enquiry held by the Commission into the matter a deficient one. Dealing with the cross-appeal taken by the respondent officer, the Supreme Court held that the Judge, trying in the first instance a recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution may, in his discretion, once he has annulled the decision subject matter of the recourse on one or more grounds, refrain from determining the remaining grounds of annulment, if any, as he has done in this case. Moreover, distinguishing the Markou's case (infra) the Supreme Court held that the successful party in a recourse is entitled, when he is faced with an appeal lodged by the other party, to ask the Court of Appeal (viz. the Supreme Court) by way of a cross-appeal to deal with, and determine, all the points raised in the first instance and left undetermined by the trial Judge as aforesaid. Dealing with the argument regarding the existence or no of facts or the reasonableness of the inferences drawn therefrom by the appellant Disciplinary Tribunal, the Supreme Court stated the reasons why it did not find necessary to go into the details of the evidence laid before the Tribunal, being content to state that there was. ample material before the Commission on which it was entitled to arrive at the conclusion it did; the Supreme Court insisting that it will not interfere and substitute its own view for that of the Commission, having itself (the Commission) weighed the probative effect of the evidence and having correctly arrived at the conclusion that the facts and circumstances, which it was its duty to consider, amounted to the disciplinary offences of which the officer (applicant, now respondent) was found guilty. The facts of this case very briefly stated are as follows: The respondent public officer was demoted from the rank of Ambassador to the rank of Counsellor A by a decision taken by the appellant Public Service Commission as a result of disciplinary proceedings instituted against the appellant for certain disciplinary offences. The appellant made in due course a recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution whereby he successfully challenged the validity of his aforesaid demotion, the learned Judge in the first instance, Mr. Justice Triantafyllides as he then was, annulling it on the grounds hereinafter, set out (see Lefcos Georghiades v. The Republic

(1970)3 C.L.R. 380). Against this decision of the learned Judge the Republic through the Public Service Commission took the present appeal. The then applicant (now respondent) cross-appealed (infra). The trial Judge annulled the aforesaid demotion of the (then) applicant on two main grounds, that is to say:- A. The respondents (now appellants) failed to communicate to the applicant (now respondent) the reports of the investigating officers and the attached thereto documents as well as certain other documents forwarded to the Public Service Commission (now the appellants) in relation to the procedure of examining the case against the applicant officer (now respondent) before the enactment of the relevant Public Service Law, 1967 (Law No.33 of 1967). The said failure of communication of the reports and other documents just referred to contravenes- (i) The audi alteram partem rule of natural justice, and (ii) The provisions of section 82

(1)and Regulation 3 of Part III of the Second Schedule to the aforesaid Public Service Law, 1967, and- B. The Public Service Commission (now appellants) did not carry out a due inquiry into the case- (

1. i)because of the aforesaid non communication to the applicant officer (now respondent) of the aforesaid reports and other documents, and (
2. ii)because it did not study the said reports and documents. Section 82

(1)of the said Public Service Law, 1967 (Law No. 33 of 1967) reads as follows: "

(1)When an investigation carried out tinder paragraph (

1. b)of section 80 is completed and the commission of a disciplinary offence is disclosed, the appropriate authority shall forthwith refer the matter to the Commission and shall forward to it:- (
2. a)the report of the investigation; (
3. b)the charge to be brought signed by the appropriate authority concerned; and (
4. c)the evidence in support thereof." Regulation 3 of Part III of the Second Schedule to the said Law No. 33 of 1967 provides: "3. The hearing of the case shall proceed as nearly as may be, in the same manner as the hearing of a criminal case in a summary trial." Allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the learned Judge of the first instance whereby the sub judice demotion of the applicant officer (now respondent) was annulled, the Court:- Held, I: Allowing the appeal:

(1)Documents sent to the Public Service Commission under section 82

(1)of the Public Service Law, 1967 (Law No. 33 of 1967) need not be made part of the record by the Commission; for if they were to be so made the whole character of the accusatorial system regarding disciplinary proceedings would be altered; and disciplinary proceedings under the said Law follow the accusatorial system as distinct from the inquisitorial one.

(2)On the other hand, it cannot be said in the circumstances of this case that there has been any violation of the rule of natural justice audi alteram partem by reason of the non-communication to the applicant officer (now respondent) of the documents forwarded to (he appellant (then respondent) Public Service Commission under section 82

(1)of the said Law (supra). Because neither the officer himself nor his counsel requested at any stage prior o the sub judice decision of the Commission, to see, inspect or take copies of the reports and documents in question, though they were fully aware of their existence; and any documents they asked to be produced were in fact produced at the hearing. Moreover, the officer and his counsel were afforded every opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and produced in evidence every document that was thought useful for the presentation of his (the officer's) case; and the Commission never considered or even read the documents in question, except in so far as they were made exhibits in Court.

(3)Moreover, the non-communication to the applicant officer (now respondent) of the aforesaid documents does not in any way violate the provisions of section 82

(1)of the Law and Regulation 3 of Part III of the Second Schedule to the said Law (supra). This is consonant with the accusatorial (as distinct from the inquisitorial) character of the disciplinary proceedings under the aforesaid Law No. 33 of 1967 (supra); and indeed we are unable to find that there is any provision in the said Law that has been violated by the manner in which the Commission's decision was reached, as found by the learned trial Judge.

(4)Having in mind that the disciplinary proceedings under our Law (supra) come within the accusatorial system, the non-studying by the Commission of the reports sent to it under section 82

(1)of the Law (supra) does not indicate that there has been an undue inquiry into the matter; because it is of the essence of the accusatorial system that the judge should confine himself to the facts and circumstances that the parties elect to present; nor does the non-making available to the officer concerned of all the material which was before the Commission render the inquiry a non due one; because all the material that was available in this case to the Commission was equally available to the officer. Held, II: Dismissing the cross-appeal:

(1)The Judge of this Court trying in the first instance a recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution may, in his discretion, once he has annulled the decision subject matter of the recourse on one or more grounds, refrain from determining the remaining grounds of annulment, if any, as the learned Justice has done in the present case.

(2)The successful party in a recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution is entitled, whenever he is faced with an appeal by the other party, to ask the Court of Appeal by way of a cross-appeal to deal with, and determine, all the points raised in the first instance and left undetermined by the trial Judge as aforesaid; and the Court has to so act, at least in case where the appeal succeeds (Markou's case (infra) distinguished).

(3)(

1. a)As to the argument set forth by the respondent regarding the existence or not of facts or the reasonableness of the inferences drawn therefrom by the appellant Public Service Commission-sitting as a disciplinary tribunal-we do not find it necessary in the circumstances of this case to go into the details of the evidence laid before the Commission. (
2. b)It is enough to state that there was ample material before the Commission on which it was entitled to arrive at the conclusion it did; and we shall not interfere and substitute our own view for that of the Commission which has duly weighed the probative effect of the evidence and has correctly arrived at the conclusion that the facts and circumstances, which it was its duty to consider, amounted to the disciple nary offences of which the officer (now respondent) was found guilty.

(4)Regarding the respondent's argument that a demotion of two grades at one and the same time-as it was done in the instant case-is in law impossible, we hold that there is nothing in the relevant statutory provisions warranting such view (see section 79

(1)of the said Public Service Law,1967 (Law No. 33 of 1967). Appeal and Cross-appeal dismissed. Cases referred to: B. Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] A.C. 322, at pp. 337, 338, 369; Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All E.R. 109, at pp. 115, 118; General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943] 2 All E.R. 337, Vat p. 341; Board of Education v. Rice [1911] A.C. 179, at p. 182; Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A.C. 120, at pp. 132-3; Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society, Ltd. [1958] 2 All E.R. 579, at p. 599; Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66, Vat pp. 80-81; [1964] A.C. 40; Hadjigeorghiou v. The Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 326; Durayappah v. Fernando [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, at p. 156; Wiseman v. Borneman [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1372; Wiseman v. Borneman [1969] 3 All E.R. 275, at pp. 277-278; H.L. In re Pergamon Press Ltd. [1970] 3 All E.R. 535, at pp. 539, 540, 542; Ex Parte Efrosyni Michaelidou

(1969)1 C.L.R. 118, at pp. 133-134; R. v. Birmingham City Justice, ex parte Chris Foreign Foods (Wholesalers) Ltd. [1970] 3 All E.R. 945, at p. 949; R. v. Cornwall Quarter Sessions Appeal Committee, Ex parte Kerley, [1956] 2 All E.R. 872, at p. 875; R. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex parte Benaim and Another [1970] 2 All ER 528, at pp. 533-534; [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1009, at p. 1016; A-G v. Briant [1846] 15 M. and W. 169; Marks v. Beyfus [1890] 25 Q.B.D. 494; Nicolaou v. The Republic

(1970)3 C.L.R. 250; Fox v. General Medical Council [1960] 3 All E.R. 225; Constantinou v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 190, at pp. 203, and 207-208; Georghios Markou v. The Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 166, at p. 171; Constantinides v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.LR. 523, at p. 530; Papazachariou v. The Republic (reported in this Part at p. 486 ante); HadjiSavva v. The Republic (reported in this Part at p. 174 ante, at pp. 202-205); Pierides v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 274, at p. 290; Lefkos Georghiades v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 396, at p. 404 and 408; University of Ceylon v. Fernando [1960] 1 All E.R. 631; In re K. (Infants) [1965] A.C. 201; Haros and the Republic, 4 R.S.C.C. 39, at p. 44; Morsis and The Republic, 4 R.S.C.C. 133, at p. 137; McNabb v. United States, .87 Law; ed. 819, at p. 827; R. v. Architects' Registration Tribunal, Ex parte Jaggar [1945] 2 All E.R. 131; Stafford v. Minister of Health [1946] K.B. 621, at p. 625; Regina v. Deduty Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex parte Jones [1962] 2 Q.B. 677; Sloan v. General. Medical Council [1970] 2 All E.R. 686; Pearlberg v. Varty (Inspector of Taxes) [1972] 2 All E.R. 6, at p. 11; H.L.; Shareef v. The Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents [1966] A.C. 47 P.C.; The Board for Registration of Architects etc. v. Kyriakides

(1966)3 C.L.R. 640; Iordanou v. The Republic

(1967)3 C.L.R. 245; P.E.O. v. The Board of Cinematograph Films Censors and Another

(1965)3 C.L.R. 27; Sofocleous (No.1) v. The Republic (reported in this Part. at p. 56 ante, at p. 60); Platritis v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 366, at pp. 374375; Sentonaris v. The Greek Communal Chamber, 1964 C.LR. 300; Decisions of the Greek Council of Stale Nos: 80/1961, 81/1961, 362/1961, 339/1962, 930/1962, .953/1962, 1412/1962, 1720/1962, 1721/1962, 1722/1962, 1778/1962, 7/1963, 1.65/1963, 443/1963, 1659/1963, 1861/1963, 1480/1961, 2157/1961, 1112/1962, 1664/1962, 1778/1962, 1659/1963, 2206/1963, 894/1962, 1112/1962, 1412/1962, 2168/1962, 1861/1963, 16/1961, 2157/1961, 899/1961, 900/ 1961, 2044/1962, 1777/1961, 1417/1 962, 2134/ 1952, 1474/1956, 1508/1956. Appeal and Cross-appeal. Appeal and cross-appeal from the judgment of a Judge of the Supreme Court of Cyprus (Triantafyllides, J.) given on the 11th November, 1970, (Case No.179/69) where-by the decision of the respondent to demote the applicant from the rank of Ambassador to the rank of Counsellor A was declared null and void. L. Loucaides, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the appellant. Respondent appearing in person. Cur. adv. vult. The following judgments were read: STAVRINIDES, J.: Mr. Justice Hadjianastassiou, who was to have delivered the first judgment, is unavoidably prevented from sitting with us this morning. His judgment is to the effect that he would allow the appeal and dismiss the cross-appeal without costs. It reads as follows:- HADJIANASTASSIOU, J.: On August 11, 1968, the Public Service Commission, following the summary procedure, stated to the defendant, Mr. L. Georghiades, the substance of the complaint in the presence of his counsel. Having pleaded not guilty to those charges, the hearing of the case proceeded, and after a long trial lasting for a period of over 18 days, the Commission, on April 30, 1969, delivered its judgment and found the defendant guilty in respect of the charges against him relating to disciplinary offences viz., that while he was the Ambassador of the Cyprus Republic in Moscow, U.S.S.R., he acted in his official capacity m connection with certain financial transactions involving foreign exchange as well as in the course of buying and selling cine cameras arid cars, in a manner inconsistent with his duties, responsibilities and status as a public officer and diplomatic representative of Cyprus. The Commission, exercising its powers under s. 79

(1)of the Public Service Law, 1,967, (Law No. 33/67), imposed upon him the disciplinary punishment of reduction from the rank of Ambassador to Counsellor A, as from June 1, 1969. On June 16, 1969, the applicant, feeling aggrieved because of the decision of the Commission, filed a recourse No. 179/69 in the Supreme Court under Articles 12, 29 and 146 of the Constitution, claiming "a declaration of the Court that respondent's decision to demote applicant from the rank of Ambassador to the rank of Counsellor A communicated to applicant by letter dated May 5, 1969, and received by applicant on or about May 12, 1969, is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. This application was based, jilter alia, on these grounds:- "That respondent's decision should be declared null and void in that:- (

1. a)The disciplinary offences laid against applicant conflict with the provisions of Article 12 of the Constitution and/or the accepted principles of Administrative Law relating to disciplinary offences in that they relate to alleged omissions and/or conduct prior to the enactment of Law 33/67 i.e. the years 1965, 1966 and 1967 and Law 33/67 has no retrospective effect. (
2. b)The respondents as a collective organ and/or each one of them separately and/or anyone of them were disqualified from trying the case against applicant and adjudicating upon it in that because of the existence of a serious friction between applicant and the Commission the latter were biased against applicant and thus they were not possessed of the element of impartiality of judgment which is an accepted prerequisite for any organ exercising disciplinary powers. (
3. c)The decision of the respondents is not duly reasoned within the meaning of Article 29 of the Constitution and the accepted principles of Administrative Law pertaining to the reasoning of judgments of disciplinary tribunals. (
4. d)The disciplinary offences initiated against applicant are null and void as conflicting with sections 80(
5. b)and 82 of Law 33/67 and Appendix B, Part I of the said Law in that the procedure laid down in Rule 1 of the said Appendix has not been followed." The opposition was filed giving notice that the decision complained of was taken in the proper exercise of respondent's discretion and on the basis of all relevant material before them. The facts are these:- The applicant, before he was appointed in the Foreign Service of the Republic, was serving with the United Nations Organization in Lybia as a statistics expert from 1953-60 when he was asked by the Cyprus Government to join its service, having been offered the post of: Officer in Charge, Economic Development. In the meantime, and pending the establishment of the Economic Planning Commission, he was offered the post of Development Officer in the Ministry of Finance. He also served as a Chairman of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus from 1960-63. In September, 1963, he was appointed as Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus in Finland, Czechoslovakia and Sweden. On April 24, 1968, whilst he was serving as Ambassador in Moscow, the respondent initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. In the meantime, on September 7, 1967, the Council of Ministers, exercising its powers under the provisions of the Second Schedule in Part I of Law 33/67, appointed Mr. P. N. Paschalis as an investigating officer to conduct the investigation regarding the question whether the applicant has committed disciplinary offences. Because the investigation failed to take place within the period of 30 days provided in paragraph 2 of the aforesaid Second Schedule, due to various reasons, the Council of Ministers on December 21, 1967, reappointed Mr. Paschalis to carry out the said investigation. Strangely enough, due to inadvertence, the relevant decision of the Council of Ministers did not come to the knowledge of Mr. Paschalis until after the expiration of the period of 30 days. When this was communicated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Mr. Paschalis, by a letter dated February 1, 1968, a new decision of the Council was issued re-appointing once again Mr. Paschalis to carry out an enquiry. The powers of an investigating officer are laid down in paragraph 3 of the Regulations, and it provides that in carrying out an investigation, the investigating Officer "shall have power to hear any witnesses or to obtain written statements from any person who may have knowledge of any of the facts of the case, and any such person shall give all information within his knowledge and shall sign any statement so given after its having been read out: to him". Then, paragraph 4 is to this effect:-"The officer concerned shall be entitled to know the case against him and shall be given an opportunity of being heard". Paragraph 5 deals with the duties of the investigating officer after the completion of the investigation, and "shall forthwith report his conclusion to the appropriate authority giving full reasons in support thereto and submitting all relevant documents". On receiving the said report of the investigating officer, the appropriate authority, in accordance with paragraph 6 "shall forthwith refer it, with all documents submitted, to the Attorney-General of the Republic, together with its views thereon for his advice". The Attorney-General, on his part, shall, with all reasonable speed, consider the matter, and as paragraph 7 provides, "advise the appropriate authority whether a charge may be brought against the officer and, if so, shall draft the charge. Finally, on receiving the charge drafted by the Attorney-General, the appropriate authority (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in accordance with paragraph 8, shall "sign it and transmit it to the Chairman of the. Commission with all documents submitted to the Attorney General of the Republic". Reverting once again to Mr. Paschalis, it appears that the decision of the Council was communicated to him on April 16, 1968, and he started immediately the investigation regarding the disciplinary offences of the applicant by taking written statements from various persons. On April 24, 1968, he addressed a letter to the applicant in compliance with paragraph 4 of the Regulations, informing him of the accusations against him, and requested him to furnish a, reply not later than April, 1968. On May 28, 1968, the applicant delivered to the investigating officer a long written statement concerning' the case against him. No doubt document (No. 5 attached to exhibit A) contained a very comprehensive description of the case against the applicant, though it is true that Mr. Paschalis did not mention the sources of his information. Then on June 3 and 4 Mr. Paschalis interviewed the applicant, who gave such explanations again at great length orally and in writing. See document No. 8 attached to exhibit A. Whilst on this point, I find myself in agreement with the learned judge who said that he did not think that there has been in this connection a contravention, in a material respect, of Regulation 4 by not giving to the applicant copies of the statements obtained by Mr. Paschalis. On June 18, the report of the investigating officer, with all relevant documents, were sent to the Ministry of Foreign In the meantime, on June 13, 1968, the Council of Ministers, exercising its powers under the same legislative provisions appointed also the then Accountant-General of the Republic, Mr. A. Ioannides as an additional investigating officer, in order to investigate, another disciplinary offence, reported as being committed by applicant whilst he was an Ambassador in Moscow, relating to the operation of the bank account of the Embassy. The investigation of that case was carried out, and the report of the second investigating officer was submitted to the same Ministry on July 26, 1968. On September 11, 1968, the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to the Commission referring to the case against the applicant for the alleged disciplinary offences contrary to ss. 58

(1)(d) and 73

(1)(b), and requested that the necessary action be taken. The said letter, in accordance with s. 82 of Law 33/67, was accompanied (

1. a)by the reports of the investigation; (
2. b)the charge to be brought signed by the appropriate authority concerned; and (
3. c)the evidence in support thereof. I think I should have added that before the promulgation of Law 33 of 1967 on June 30, 1967, the case regarding disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, was referred to the Commission earlier, but after the new law came into force the whole process was set in motion once again under the said law. Pausing here for a moment, I would like to observe that the Commission, after receiving the necessary documents, had to deal with the question referred to it by the appropriate authority without bias, and it must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting his own case. The decision of the Commission must be reached in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a body or organ whose duty is to mete out Justice, but it does not follow that the procedure of every tribunal must be the same, unless it is prescribed by the legislative provisions. On July 14, 1969, the hearing or the recourse started and was heard by a judge of this Court exercising jurisdiction under the provisions of s. 11

(2)of Law 33/64. Subsequently, the reserved ruling of the Court was delivered dealing with a number of preliminary points. The learned trial judge, dealing with ground of law (a) raised on behalf of the applicant, said in Georghiades v. The Republic,

(1969)3 C.L.R. 396, at p. 404:- "In the light of the foregoing I cannot accept that the first part of paragraph

(1)of Article 12 of the Constitution-with which, only, we are concerned at this stage-can, or should, be construed so as to render applicable to disciplinary matters concerning public officers the principle of nullum delictum sine lege (or, nullum crimen sine lege). Thus, even on the assumption that the applicant has been charged with, or found guilty of, disciplinary offences contrary to Law 33/67-and I am leaving this issue entirely open for the time being-I cannot find that Article 12.1 has been contravened." Later on, dealing with the question of bias by the Commission (raised in ground of Law(b)), the learned Justice said at p. 408 :- "This allegation has been based on the contents of certain correspondence exchanged between the Chairman of the respondent and the applicant, in his then capacity as Development Officer in the service of the Planning Commission (see exhibit AG). I can find nothing therein to satisfy me that the applicant has discharged the burden of establishing bias by the respondent, or its Chairman or any of its members, against him." Finally, the Court dealing with the question of disqualification of Mr. Paschalis, answered it in this way :- "But even when Mr. Paschalis was acting as an Investigating Officer he was not acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, because he was not called upon, or entitled, to decide the guilt Or. innocence of the applicant from the disciplinary point of view; he was merely investigating into acts of the, applicant in order to prepare a report on the basis of which the Attorney-General would advise the appropriate authority whether the applicant might be charged disciplinarily (see the relevant regulations. in Part I of the Second Schedule to Law 33/67). Bearing all the above in mind I cannot see how in the circumstances of this case the rules of natural justice can be said to have been in any way contravened through Mr. Paschalis having been appointed, and acted, as an Investigating Officer after he had given legal advice in relation to one of the matters into which he later investigated." Then because the remaining issues which have been raised in argument by counsel were connected with the merits of this case, the Court decided not to go into them and to leave them entirely open for determination at the proper stage. I think that I should have added that the applicant did not challenge on appeal the decision of the learned judge on the above points. The learned trial judge delivered his reserved judgment annulling the decision of the Commission, mainly for the following reasons:- (a) That because the procedure followed by the Commission violated the principle of audi alteram partem, once the applicant in making his defence, was not aware of either the reports of the investigating officers, or the contents of the evidence given against him; (b) that documents relevant to the charges against the applicant (exhibits a-f) were sent to the Commission prior to the promulgation of Law 33/67, and were not brought to the knowledge of the applicant when he was defending himself; (c) that irrespective of any non-compliance with the said principle of audi alteram partem, the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant were conducted by the Commission contrary to the object and combined effect of s. 82

(1)of Law 33/67, and Regulation 3 in Part III of the said law; and that the Commission was bound under the said law to make available to the applicant and/or his counsel, the reports and the other evidence before it; and (

1. d)that the Commission failed to carry out in the! exercise of its powers, a due enquiry for the purposes of the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, and because by not making available to the applicant all the material which was before it, it was deprived of the opportunity of having before it a complete explanation by the applicant in trying to exculpate himself once he was aware of all the material against him. On January 22, 1971, counsel on behalf of the appellant-respondent raised in his notice of appeal a number of points with which I shall be dealing in due course. On January 30, 1971, the applicant raised in his cross-appeal (
2. a)that the trial Court "misdirected itself as to its obligation to decide on issues raised by the applicant and discussed during the hearing; (
3. b)that there was no violation of the Rules of Natural Justice and abuse of power by the administration; and (
4. c)not to make an order for costs in favour of the applicant". Regarding the complaint of counsel on appeal that the learned trial judge was wrong in law in holding that the Commission was bound under the conception of natural justice to disclose to the applicant the reports of the two investigating officers, as well as the statements obtained by them (exhibits A and B) in the case of the investigation, I think it is necessary to see what are the principles of natural justice; what is the philosophy Of the law, and to what extent the principles of natural justice ought to be followed by the Commission in the case in hand. I propose, therefore, to approach the present case by considering whether in all the circumstances, the Commission acted unfairly. The learned trial judge at least thought so, because in his judgment, relying mainly on the authority of B. Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya [19621 A.C. 322, had this to say at pp. 403-404 :- "In the present instance the applicant, when he made his defence before the respondent Commission, did not know of the written statements on the basis of which the reports of the two investigating officers had been prepared; and without knowledge of this material, which had been forwarded, under the aforementioned provisions of Law 33/67, to the Commission, his right to be heard in his own defence was not really worth much". Then he goes on: "... at any rate, . it was required by the relevant principle of natural justice, that the applicant when defending himself before the Commission should have known the actual contents of the reports of the two investigating officers. This is so in view of the nature of such reports: The report of Mr. Paschalis-whose good faith in this matter is not to be doubted in the least-appears to me to have overshot the limits of the requirements prescribed by regulation 5 in Part I of the Second Schedule to Law 33/67 (viz. that it should have contained his conclusion with full reasons in support thereof) and to be an exposition of elaborate and careful argumentation forcefully establishing the guilt of the applicant and destroying his credibility. On the other hand the report of Mr. Ioannides-who was at the time the Accountant-General of the Republic and, therefore, in a position to express a view as an expert regarding the financial matters under investigation-appears to be, to a certain limited extent, favourable for the applicant. Thus, I have found no difficulty in concluding that ignorance by the applicant, at the material time, of the full contents of these reports did severely handicap the exercise by him of his right to be heard in his own defence." Regarding other documents relevant to the charges against the applicant (see exhibit AF)-which were sent to the Commission prior to the promulgation of Law 33/67 and to the commencement ab initio of disciplinary proceedings against him under such Law, he says:- "I am, again, of the view that ignorance of their contents by the applicant, when he was defending himself before the Commission, affected adversely his said right to be heard." Finally, he concluded in these terms:- "In the light, therefore, of the fact that one of the two basic rules of natural justice, and of audi alteram partem, has not been effectively applied in the course of the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, I have been led to the conclusion that the sub judice decision of the respondent Commission has to be annulled, as having been reached in a manner contrary to law." With the greatest respect to the view of the learned trial judge, and because the present appeal revolves itself into the question whether the enquiry was conducted with due regard to the rights accorded by the principles of natural justice to the applicant as the person against whom it was directed, I intend to review some of the authorities, since these rights have been defined in varying language in a large number of cases covering a wide field. But, at the same time, I must point out that the question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted, in any given case, must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case. As Tucker, L.J., said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All E.R. 109 at p. 118: "There are, in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of, domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules tinder which the Tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with, and so forth." Lord Atkin expressed a similar view in these words in General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943] 2 All E.R. 337 at p. 341: "Some analogy exists no doubt between the various procedures of this and other not strictly judicial bodies. But I cannot think that the procedure, which may be very just in deciding whether to close a school or an insanitary house is necessarily right in deciding a charge of infamous conduct against a professional man. I would, therefore, demur to any suggestion that the words of Lord Loreburn L.C., in Board of Education v. Rice ( [1911] A.C. 179 at p. 182) affords a complete guide to the General Medical Council in the exercise of their duties". With this in mind regarding the reservations as to the of general definition in this branch of the law, it appears to me that Lord Loreburn's much quoted statement in Board of Education v. Rice, affords as good a general definition as any of the nature and limits on the requirements of natural justice to hear both sides in this present case. Its effect is stated in this passage 'from the speech of Viscount Haldane, L.C. in Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A.C. 120 at pp. 132 and 133, where he cites with approval the following words :- "I agree with the view expressed in an analogous case by my noble and learned friend Lord Loreburn. In Board of Education v. Rice, he laid down that, in disposing of a question which was the subject of an appeal to it, the Board of Education was under a duty to act in good faith, and to listen fairly to both sides, inasmuch as that was a duty which lay on every one who decided anything. But he went on to say that he did not think it was bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. The Board had no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. It could he thought, obtain information in any way it thought best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who were parties in the ,controversy to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view." Then he goes on: ".I concur in this view of the position of an administrative body to which the decision of a question in dispute between parties has been entrusted. The result of its inquiry must, as I have said, be taken, in the absence of directions in the statute to the contrary, to be intended to be reached by its ordinary procedure." Later on, dealing with the complaint that the report of an inspector should have been disclosed, Viscount Haldane went on in these words "It might or might not have been useful to disclose this report, but I do not think that the Board was bound to do so, any more than it would have been bound to disclose all the minutes made on the papers in the office before a decision was come to. It is plain from Sir Horace Monro's affidavit that the order made was the order of the Board, and so long as the Board followed a procedure which was usual, and not calculated to violate the tests to which I have already referred, I think that the Board was discharging the duty imposed on it in the fashion Parliament must be taken to have contemplated when it deliberately transferred the jurisdiction, first, from a Court of summary jurisdiction to the local authority, and then, for the purposes of all appeals, from quarter sessions to an administrative department of the State. What appears to me to have been the fallacy of the judgment of the majority in the Court of Appeal is that it begs the question at the beginning by setting up the test of the procedure of a Court of justice, instead of the other standard which was laid down for such cases in Board of Education v. Rice. I do not think the Board was bound to hear the respondent orally, provided it gave him the opportunities he actually had." Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, delivering a separate speech in the same case, said at p. 138:- "The words 'natural justice' occur in arguments and sometimes in judicial pronouncements in such cases. My Lords, when a central administrative board deals with an appeal from a local authority it must do its best to act justly, and to reach just ends by just means. If a statute prescribes the means it must employ them. If it is left without express guidance it must still act honestly and by honest means." Then I turn to the judgment of Harman, J. (as he then was) in Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society, Ltd., [1958] 2 All E.R. 579 at p. 599. The learned judge said this:- "What, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind? First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and, thirdly, of course, that the Tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really is anything more." In Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66, Lord Reid made a lengthy and thorough survey of the principles of natural justice applicable in this connection. I consider it useful to quote this passage at pp. 80-81:- "The respondents' contention is that, even where there was a doubtful question whether a constable was guilty of a particular act of misconduct, the watch committee were under no obligation to hear his defence before dismissing him. In my judgment it is abundantly clear from the authorities that. I have quoted that at that time the Courts would have rejected any such contention. In later cases dealing with different subject-matter opinions have been expressed in wide terms so as to appear to conflict with those earlier authorities. But learned judges who expressed those opinions generally had no power to overrule those authorities, and in any event it is a salutary rule that a judge is not to be assumed to have intended to overrule or disapprove of an authority which has not been cited to him and which he does not even mention. So I would hold that the power of dismissal in the Act of 1882 could not then have been exercised and cannot now be exercised until the watch committee have informed the constable of the grounds on which they propose to proceed and have given him a proper opportunity to present his case in defence. Next comes the question whether the respondents' failure to follow the rules of natural justice on March 7 was made good by the meeting on March 18. I do not doubt that if an officer or body realises that it has acted hastily and reconsiders the :whole matter afresh after affording to the person affected a proper opportunity to present his case then its later decision will be valid. An example is De Verteuil v. Knaggs [1918] A.C. 557. But here the appellant's solicitor was not fully informed of the charges against the appellant and the watch committee did not annul the decision which they had already, published and proceed to make a new decision In my judgment what was done on that day was a very inadequate substitute for a full re-hearing. Even so three members of the committee changed their minds, and it is impossible to say what the decision of the committee would have been if there had been a full hearing after disclosure to the appellant of the whole case against him. I agree, with those of your lordships who hold that this meeting of March 18 cannot affect the result of this appeal." See Hadjigeorghiou v. Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 326, in which some of the English and Cyprus authorities are reviewed. Lord Upjohn in Durayappah v Fernando [1967] 2 All E R 152, dealing with the principle of audi alteram partem, had this to say at p. 156:- "Their lordships were, of course, referred to the recent case of Ridge v. Baldwin where this principle was very closely and carefully examined. In that case no attempt was made to give an exhaustive classification of the cases where the principle audi alteram partem should be applied. In their lordships opinion it would be wrong to do so. Outside well known cases such as dismissal from office, deprivation of property and expulsion from clubs, there is a vast area where the principle can be applied only on most general considerations. For example, as Lord Reid when examining R. v. Electricity Comrs. Ex p. London Electricity Joint Committee Co.

(1920), Ltd. pointed out, Bankes, L.J. inferred the Judicial element from the nature of the power and Atkin L.J. did ,the same Pausing there, how-ever, it should not be assumed that their lordships necessarily agree with Lord Reid's analysis of that case or with his criticism of Nakkuda All v. M.F. de S. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66. Outside the well-known classes of cases, no general rule can be laid down as to the application of the general principle in addition to the language of the provision." In Wiseman v. Borneman [1969] 3 All E.R. 275, Lord Reid said at pp. 277-278:- "Every public officer who has to decide whether to prosecute or raise proceedings ought first to decide whether there is a prima fade case but no one supposes that justice requires that he should first seek the comments of the accused or the defendant on the material before him. So there is nothing inherently unjust in reaching such a decision in the absence of the other party." In re Pergamon Press Ltd. [1970] 3 All E.R. 535, Sachs, L.J. in delivering a separate judgment in this case, and dealing with the reports of inspectors, had this to say at p. 542 :- "The reports of such officers are, of course, neither intended to be nor in fact are, made public. To conclude that there must be an appropriate measure of natural justice, or as it is often nowadays styled 'fair play in action', in the present case is thus easy. That was indeed something which was well recognised by the inspectors, who expressly so stated more than once in the course of the proceedings. The real issue, however, is whether that measure should in relation to s. 165 investigations generally, or, alternatively, as regards this particular investigation, be reduced by the Courts to some set of rules, or whether it should be left to the inspectors, who are men of high professional qualifications, in their discretion to proceed with that fairness of procedure that is appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case as it may develop. In the application of the concept of fair play, there must be real flexibility, so that very different situations may be met without producing procedures unsuitable to the object in hand. That need for flexibility has been emphasised in a number of authoritative passages in the judgments cited to this Court. In the forefront was that of Tucker L. J. in Russell v Duke of Norfolk and the general effect of his views has been once again echoed recently by Lord Guest, Lord Donovan and Lord Wilberforce in Wiseman v. Borneman. It is only too easy to frame a precise set of rules which may appear impeccable on paper and which may yet unduly hamper, lengthen and, indeed, perhaps even frustrate (see per Lord Reid in Wiseman v. Borneman) the activities of those engaged in investigating or otherwise dealing with matters that fall within their proper sphere. In each case careful regard must be had to the scope of the proceedings, the source of its jurisdiction (statutory in the present case) the way in which it normally falls to be conducted and its objective." No doubt, the right to a hearing is equally fundamental to a just "judicial decision that each party should have the opportunity of knowing the case against him and of stating his own case. Each party must have the chance to present his version "of the facts and to make his submission on the relevant rules: of law. It is too well known that the rules of Court procedure, both in England and in Cyprus are founded on these general principles of natural justice. But not, all that is done even by the Courts of Law themselves, accords at all times with the extended meaning of the Rules of Natural Justice. Many an ex parte injunction is granted against a person who has no, notice of the charge and no opportunity of being heard. Furthermore, the principle of audi alteram partem (hear both sides) is not always complied with by the Courts exercising criminal or civil jurisdiction, and the case against an accused person or a defendant in a civil action, who is given notice of the proceedings, but failed to attend, can be punished in his absence or have judgment given against him in, a civil case. This, in my view, shows that the need for flexibility is required. That this is so has been emphasised in a number of cases already quoted in this judgment. Cf., Ex parte Efrosyni Michaelidou

(1969)1 C.L.R.118, at pp. 133-134. In R. v. Birmingham City Justice, parte Chris Foreign Foods (Wholesalers) Ltd., [19701 3 All ER. 945, Lord Parker, C.J., dealing with, the Riles of Natural Justice, after adopting a statement made by Donovan J. in R. v. Cornwall Quarter Sessions Appeal Committee, Ex parte Kerley, [1956] 2 All E.R. 872, 875, that a justice had to bring qualities of impartiality and fairness to bear on the problem, had this to say at p. 949:- "Complaint has been made that the justice in this case had a meeting with the chief veterinary officer, the public analyst and public officials on 19th March, when the matter was first referred to him, and that they never gave any evidence at the hearing on 2nd April. For my part I do not think that the justice was prevented under this procedure from hearing the evidence of those officials; having a sample taken, inspecting the sample before and in the absence of the applicants. Nor do I think it necessarily any unfairness if those officials, do not give evidence at the hearing, provided always that the objectors, the applicants, are told what the point is that they have to meet, and of course at this hearing they clearly knew and had evidence to deal with it. But the point where I feel that the rules of natural justice in their limited application to such a case as this, limited to openness, impartiality and fairness, have been broken, is when the justice retired with the two officials in order, as he puts it, to take advice, and the three of them then came back into Court and he announced his decision It seems to me that in a case such as this a justice must be very careful not to take any fresh advice or hear any fresh evidence in the absence of the objectors, unless he returns and enables the objectors to know what the advice is that he has received thus enabling them to deal with it." Later on he said:- "It seems to me that in the present case the rules of natural justice in their limited, and very limited, application to a case such as this have been broken in the present case, and I would let the writ issue." In R. v Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex parte Benaim and Another [1970] 2 All E.R. 528, counsel for the applicants criticised the procedure followed by the board, especially the way in which the board proposed to keep. that confidential information regarding the applicants. He relied on some words used by Lord Denning in Kanda v. Government of Malaya [19621 A.C. 322 at p. 337, when he said "... that the judge or whoever has to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive representations from one side behind the back of the other." On the other hand, counsel for the board submitted that the board are free to grant or refuse a certificate as they please, they are not bound, he says, to obey the rules of natural justice any more than any other executive body. Lord Denning, M.R. delivering the unanimous judgment in the Court of Appeal, said at pp. 533 and 534:- "I cannot accept this view, I think that the board are bound to observe the rules of natural justice. The question is:- What are those rules? It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply; nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject-matter; see what Tucker L.J. said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk and Lord Upjohn in Durayappah v. Fernando. At one time it was said that the principles only apply to judicial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings. That heresy was scotched in Ridge v. Baldwin. At another time it was said that the principles do not apply to the grant or revocation of licences. That, too, is wrong. R. v. Metropolitan Police Comr., ex parte Parker and Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. de S. Jayaratne are no longer of authority for any such proposition. See what Lord Reid and Lord Hodson said about them in Ridge v. Baldwin. So let us sheer away from these distinctions and consider the task of the board and what they should do. The best guidance is, I think, to be found by reference to the cases of immigrants. They have no right to come in, but they have a right to be heard. The principle that regard was well laid down by Lord Parker C.J. in Re K. (H) (an infant) [1967] 1 All E.R. 226 at 231, when he said:- '...even if an immigration officer is not acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, he must at any rate give the immigrant an opportunity satisfying him of the matters in the subsection, and for that purpose let the immigrant know what, his immediate impression is so that the immigrant can disabuse him. That is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to act judicially, but of required to act fairly'. Those words seem to me to apply to the board." Later on he says:- "They can, and should, receive information from the police in this country or abroad, who know something of them. They can, and. should, receive 'information from any other reliable source. Much of it will be confidential. But that does mean that the applicants are not to be given a chance of answering it. They must be given the chance, subject to this qualification: I do not think that they need tell the applicants the source of their information, if that would put their informant in peril, or otherwise be contrary to the public interest. Even in a criminal trial, a witness cannot be asked who is his informer. The reason was well given by Eyre C.J. in R. v. Hardy,

(1794)24 State Tr 199 at 808. '...there is a rule which has universally obtained on account of its importance to the public for the detection of crimes, that those persons who are the channel by means of which that detection is made, should not be unnecessarily disclosed...' And Buller J. added: '...if you call for the name of the informer in such cases, no man will make a discovery, and public justice will be defeated' That rule was emphatically re-affirmed in A-G. v. Briant, [1846] 15 M & W 169, and Marks v. Beyfus, [1890] 25 QBD 494. That reasoning applies with equal force to the enquiries made by the board." Finally, he says:- "If the board were bound to disclose every detail that might itself give the informer away and put him in peril. But without disclosing every detail, I should have thought that the board ought in every case to be able to give to the applicant sufficient indication of the objections raised against him such as to enable him to answer them. That is only fair. And the board must at all costs be fair. If they are not, these courts will not hesitate to interfere." In Re Pergamon Press Ltd., (supra), a case in which the Board of Trade ordered an investigation under s. 165(

1. b)of the Companies Act, 1968, two inspectors were appointed; one of them was an eminent counsel and the other a distinguished accountant. The directors appealed to the Court of Appeal because during the investigation of the affairs of the company, the directors did not agree to allow them a right to peruse the transcripts. One counsel before the Appeal Court claimed that they had a right to see the transcripts of the evidence of the witnesses adverse to them; the other counsel claimed that they ought to see any proposed finding against them before it was included finally in the report. The third counsel claimed a right to cross-examine the witnesses. In short, the directors claimed that the inspectors should conduct the inquiry much as if it were a judicial inquiry in a Court of Law in which the directors were being charged with an offence. On the other hand, counsel for the inspectors suggested that in point of law they were not bound by the rules of natural justice, because they were carrying out an investigation of inquiry; and that such rules applied in all cases where the tribunal was under a duty to come to a determination or decision of some kind or other. Lord Denning, M.R. after rejecting the submission of counsel for the inspectors, said at pp. 539-540:- "They may, if they think fit, make findings of fact which are very damaging to those whom they name. They may accuse some; they may condemn others; they may ruin reputations or careers. Their report may lead to judicial proceedings. It may expose persons to criminal prosecutions or to civil actions. It may bring about the winding-up of the company and be used itself as material for the winding up: See Re SBA Properties Ltd. [1967] 2 All E.R. 615. Even before the inspectors make their report, they may inform the Board of Trade of facts which tend to show that an offence has been committed-see s. 41 of the Companies Act 1967. When they do make their report the board are bound to send a copy of it to the company; and the board may, in their discretion, publish it, if they think fit, to the public at large. Seeing that their work and their report may lead to such consequences, I am, clearly of opinion that the inspectors must act fairly. This is a duty which rests on them, as on many other bodies, although they are not judicial nor quasi-judicial, but only administrative: See R. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain ex parte Benaim. The inspectors can obtain information in any way which they think best, but before they condemn or criticize a man, they must give him a fair opportunity for correcting or contradicting what is said against him. They need not quote chapter and verse. An outline of the charge will usually suffice. That is what the inspectors here propose to do, but the directors want more. They want to see the transcripts of the witnesses who speak adversely to them, and to see any documents which may be used against them. They or some of them, even claim to cross-examine the witnesses. In all this the directors go too far. This investigation is ordered in the public interest. It should not be impeded by measures of this kind. Witnesses should be encouraged to come forward and not hold back. Remember, this not being a judicial proceeding, the witnesses are not protected by an absolute privilege, but only by a qualified privilege: See O'Connor v. Waldron, [1935] A.C. 76. It is easy to imagine a situation in which, if the name of a witness were disclosed, he might have an action brought against him, and this might deter him from telling all that he knew. No one likes to have an action brought against him, however unfounded. Every witness must, therefore, be protected. He must be encouraged to be frank. This is done by giving every witness an assurance that his evidence will be regarded as confidential and will not be used except for the purpose of the report." Later on he says:- "For I take it to be axiomatic that the inspectors must not use the evidence of a witness so as to make it on the basis of an adverse finding unless they give the party affected sufficient information to enable him to deal with it. It was suggested before us that whenever the inspectors thought of deciding a conflict of evidence or of making adverse criticism of someone, they should draft the proposed passage of their report, and put it before the party for his comments before including it. But I think that this also is going too far. This sort of thing should be left to the discretion of the inspectors. They must 'be masters, of their own procedure. They should be subject to no rules save this: They must be fair. This being done, they should make their report with courage and frankness, keeping nothing back. The public interest demands it. They need have no fear because their report so far as I can judge is protected by an absolute privilege: See Home v. Bentinck [1820] 2 Brod & Bing 130 at 162, per Dallas C.J. and Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India in Council [1895] QB 189 at 191, per Lord Esher M.R." I think, in the light of what has been said by Lord Denning in the last two cases, I would state, that from the material before me, Mr. Paschalis has used the evidence of the witnesses to make, them the basis of a finding against the applicant, but after he has given to the party affected sufficient information to enable' him to deal with it. Reading through the report of Mr. Paschalis I think that he acted very fairly and one can hardly call it a harsh report. I would, therefore, dissociate myself from the criticism made that he has "over-shot the limits of the requirements prescribed by regulation 5 in Part I of the Second Schedule to Law 33/67 (viz. that it should have contained his conclusion with full reasons in support thereof) and to be an exposition of elaborate and careful argumentation forcefully establishing the guilt of the applicant and destroying his In fact, paragraph 8 of the report shows how carefully and fairly this investigating officer was acting:- "Mr. Georghiades disputes some of the facts mentioned in paragraph 4 of exhibit 5, and surely the question as to who must be believed will be decided by the Public Service Commission if the case is finally referred to before it-but if an evaluation of the facts is made as alleged by Mr. Georghiades, it will be shown that irrespective of some insignificant points, the versions relating to the facts by both' sides in substance are not really different, or they present a small difference. Mainly, it is the inference which can be drawn which is disputed by the applicant." Finally, in paragraph 11, he says:- "My conclusion, in the light of the, related facts and the conclusions reached, is that Mr. Georghiades has committed, or in any case, prima facie has committed, disciplinary offences in accordance with paragraph 7 of Part I of the Second Schedule of the Law, it is for the Attorney-General to advise whether it is possible to frame a charge against him, and in case of a confirmative advice, to proceed to formulate the charges against him." Though it is said that the report "appears to be to a certain limited extent favourable to the applicant" I propose examining it to see whether Mr. Ioannides (the investigating officer) has acted in accordance with the concept of fair play. On July 19, 1968, he wrote to the applicant, seeking information regarding the listed remittances in his letter, which were made from the Embassy bank account during the years 1965-166. With regard to each remittance, he said :-"I would like to have explanations (
2. a)as to the purpose of the payments; (
3. b)how the payments are connected with the obligations, of the Cyprus Embassy in Moscow; if any of the above payments are not obligations' of the Cyprus Embassy. I would like to be given the authority for such payments made out of public funds. The payments for which the above explanations are required are as follows...." Then the dates are given, the amount, as well as the name of the recipient 'of those remittances. (See appendix 'B'). On July 22, the applicant in reply, I think, tries to give some explanations regarding the Embassy bank account in Moscow and concludes as follows :- "Had I a personal Bank Account in Moscow, the Embassy obligations would have been met by either withdrawing money in cash or by making a transfer from the Embassy Account to my personal account. It should be a matter of indifference to the Government how I spent my money. A fact in point is the transfer of £400.-(four hundred pounds) from the Embassy Account to Mr. Vakis' account in April 1965 for the one thousand roubles, spent already by him on behalf of the Embassy, to meet Embassy obligations and one should not care less where he later remitted his £400. (
4. a)The purposes,-therefore, of these payments to meet the obligations of the Cyprus Embassy, Moscow, to myself and certain members of the staff." On July 26, 1968, the investigating officer, Mr. Ioannides, wrote to the Minister 'of Foreign Affairs in these words:- "I have been unable by my investigation to find evidence which can be-used in support of any proceedings for serious disciplinary action. However, the position regarding the management of the Bank Account and other related financial matters by Mr. L. Georghiades, leaves a lot to be desired as it appears that no financial discipline was exercised during the two years which I have investigated i.e. 1965 and 1966. The Embassy's rouble and foreign exchange requirements were to a large extent provided by the Ambassador who in return took it upon himself to be reimbursed by either foreign exchange withdrawals or foreign exchange remittances to private destinations. The question of how and where the roubles required to meet the expenses of the Embassy in the first instance came from is not satisfactorily answered and it is upon this matter that my investigation is inconclusive. One can-either believe or give the benefit of doubt to the officer under investigation or may allow oneself to make a number of assumptions as to the real sources of this rouble revenue. Any departure from proved facts will be to the detriment of the officer under investigation. Therefore, I have refrained from making any such assumptions." Then, the report attached to this letter' refers to the procedure regarding payments, and after interviewing Mr. A. Vakis and Mr. Georghiades, they both agreed, regarding the mode of the procedure. He goes on:- "This procedure is a rather peculiar one and a departure from procedures followed by other Embassies whereby the Ambassador draws from the Bank by cheque the required sum of money to meet the expenses of the Embassies and normally that sum of money is handled by the Paying Officer. In the case of the Moscow Embassy, Mr. Georghiades was providing the requirements in roubles by withdrawals in foreign exchange and subsequent conversion at unknown rates of exchange and with unauthorised dealers or alternatively (in the majority of cases) by lending in the first instance the Government his own personal roubles which were acquired as submitted by him by the sale of private property or by transfers from Cyprus." Regarding the transfers relating to $ 2,000 (in currency notes) on 25.2.1965, £180 (in convertible starting cheque) on 30.8.1965 and £850 (in convertible starting cheque) on 23.8.1966, the investigating officer was of the view that these transfers did not amount to very much compared with the amounts remitted from the Embassy bank account to private destinations and the withdrawals in foreign exchange. He said, however, that one would have to accept the explanations of the Ambassador regarding the sale of private property if one is to understand how the difference was eventually made up. In this connection, he goes on, a number of assumptions can be made as to the ways and means of acquiring the extra roubles, but, as he put it, he could not himself venture into assumptions but he was restricted by the facts made available to him. Regarding the reply given by Mr. Georghiades, he said:- "You will note that the reply is rather evasive and no explanation has been offered for each specific transfer as requested in my letter of 19 July, 1968 (Appendix 2). The reply given by the Ambassador that all remittances were obligations of the Cyprus Embassy to himself is not a satisfactory one in the sense that as there were sufficient money in the Embassy Bank Account there was no necessity for the Ambassador to advance his own private funds to meet the requirements of the Embassy." Then dealing with the duties of an imprested officer, he says:- "It is not permissible for any public servant who is an imprested officer to take it upon himself to make private use of a Government account because he happens to have the authority to operate that account. It submitted here that the Ambassador in this connection used the facility extended to the Government of Cyprus by the Government of the U.S.S.R. in the operation of a foreign exchange account as a convenient channel to convert and transfer private rouble funds to private destinations outside the U.S.S.R. The Embassy Bank Account was never meant to become a channel for such foreign payments." Having shown that both investigating officers have not used unfairly the evidence of witnesses, so as to make it the basis of an adverse finding, and that they have given ample information to the applicant affected to enable him to know and to deal with the case against him, I find it convenient to deal also with the report of the Board of Inquiry in Kanda case (supra). I think, however, that before doing so, I should have added that after reading both reports, and particularly that of Mr. Paschalis, it appears that although he has presented the taken from Mr. Antonakis Vakis, Stelios Hjirakleous and Mr. Fizentzides, (no statement could be made available from Miss Avraamidou), nevertheless, he expressed neither his views as to the credibility of each witness, nor the weight to be attached to the statements. As for the applicant himself, he simply drew certain conclusions relying on the statements, but without in any way attacking the credibility of the applicant or using a strong adverse language against him. I would reiterate once again that both reports have been made and presented in a very fair way. See exhibit A at p. 2 et seq. Reverting now to the report in Kanda case, certainly no one could have put it in better language than Rigby, J. He called that report "a most damning indictment against Inspector Kanda as an unscrupulous scoundrel who had suborned witnesses, both police and civilian, to commit perjury." The report said:- "The Board are unanimously of the opinion that Inspector Kanda is the villain of the piece.... The Board were forced to the conclusion that Inspector Kanda is a very ambitious and thoroughly unscrupulous officer who is prepared to go to any lengths, including the fabrication of false evidence, to add to his reputation as a successful investigator. The Board could not help considering how many of his previous successful cases attained were achieved by similar methods." I think that this report, as compared to the reports in the present case, needs no more comments on my part. The next question which arises is: Whether the statutory procedure followed by the Commission in the present case is insufficient to achieve justice. In my view, the Commission, in hearing the case against the applicant, had to proceed in accordance with the regulations which are set out in Part III of the Second Schedule of the said law. Paragraph 3 reads as follows:- "The hearing of the case shall proceed as nearly as may be, in the same manner as the hearing of a criminal case in a summary trial." Further, the Commission has power under the provisions of paragraph 4: "(
5. a)to summon witnesses and require their attendance and that of the officer as in summary trials; (
6. b)to require production of any document relevant to the charge; (
7. c)to admit any evidence whether written or oral even if inadmissible in civil or criminal proceedings." And in paragraph 7 it is clearly stated that "Any judgment of the Commission shall give reasons for the decision taken and shall be signed by the Chairman." I think that I must add that the legislature was intended for the protection, of the officer concerned to introduce in effect with these regulations, the accusatorial system of our Criminal Procedure Law, Cap.155, which is based upon the presumption of innocence as well as the principle of audi aiterarn partem (hear both sides). There is no doubt that an accused person under this system has the further advantage to be represented by a counsel of his own choice and to cross-examine the witnesses called on behalf of the complainant, whilst prosecuting counsel are restrained by strict convention from acting oppressively or unfairly. I should have also added that under s. 62, an accused person may "before pleading, apply to be supplied with a copy of the charge or information, and the Court shall cause him to be supplied with such copy or he may apply for further time to plead, and the Court may allow such further time on such terms as it may think fit." In the present case, I would recall that the Commission was exonerated by the trial judge from the charge of being biased, and in hearing the case of the applicant, it has employed the procedure prescribed by the aforesaid regulations treating the matter as if it was a trial; Going through the voluminous minutes of the trial, it is clear that the prosecuting counsel on behalf of the appropriate authority opened its case in the usual way it is done before an Assize Court. In order to see, therefore, whether a fair opportunity has been given to the applicant to meet the case against him before the Commission, must depend mainly on the evidence of Mr. Paschalis carried out the investigation and obtained statements both from the witnesses who have given evidence, as well as from the applicant himself. Having read the whole evidence including the cross-examination to which Mr. Paschalis was subjected to by the experienced counsel of the applicant, it is abundantly clear to me that the applicant was adequately informed of the case he had to meet, and given every opportunity of meeting it. I am also of the view that the Commission has conducted the proceedings with all fairness, and in turning the pages regarding the examination-in-chief as well as the cross-examination, one would find that counsel on behalf of the appropriate authority was not allowed to produce any statement or notes obtained by Mr. Paschalis from the applicant which were not signed by him. Although it is true, and it has been conceded by the other side, that no copies of the reports were given. to the applicant in advance, nevertheless, it appears to me that during the examination of Mr. Paschalis and the other witnesses, various documents were produced both at the instance of counsel for the appropriate authority, and made use of by the two counsel appearing for the applicant. No doubt, both the applicant and his counsel were aware of the existence of the reports of both investigating officers, once the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was bound under the provisions of paragraph 8 of the Regulations to transmit the charge drafted by the Attorney-General to the Chairman of the Commission with all written statements attached thereto. I am sure that the complaint of the applicant viz. that he has not been given copies of the reports of the investigating officers, might have been a more powerful objection once the Commission had power to require production of any documents relevant to the charge, if his counsel had asked to be given the opportunity, to peruse both the reports before the opening of the case and/or during, the hearing, and his request has been refused. But he never made such request, although regarding the report of Mr. Ioannides, he appeared to have knowledge of its contents; and reference was made regarding certain extracts by both counsel appearing before the Commission. In my view, therefore, there is no ground for supposing that, if counsel made such a request, it would not have been granted, once other documents were produced at his request. That this is so, finds also support from the statement made by Mr. Loucaides before this court that, had the applicant asked for such documents, his request would have been met and no privilege would have been claimed regarding their production. Mr. Hjioannou, appearing on behalf of .the applicant before the learned trial judge, tried to excuse his client (unsuccessfully in my view) for his failure to request the production of the reports of the investigating officers-once other documents were produced without objection-by making a statement that the applicant had asked his then counsel Mr. Clerides to request the production of the reports, but, his counsel did not adopt such a course, adding that apparently his former counsel was under the impression that in law the applicant was not entitled to use or have copies of such reports. In view of the fact that the requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of each case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject matter, and so forth, I think, after having considered everything which has been said by counsel on behalf of the appellant and the applicant himself, I regret that I find myself unable to agree with the learned trial judge that the failure of the Commission to, provide the applicant with copies of the reports and other relevant documents, was sufficient to nullify the proceedings of the Commission as failing to comply with the requirements of natural justice in the circumstances of the, present case, and the rules under which the Commission has acted. Furthermore, in my opinion, the decision of Kanda, relied upon by the learned trial judge, must be con strued and applied not in the circumstances of the case of the applicant, but in the context of that decision in which it was given. I, therefore, believe that that case is distinguishable from the present case, particularly so, because of the damning report against Inspector Kanda. No doubt, the report in that case which dealt in detail with the evidence of each witness heard by the Board of Inquiry and expressed views as to the credibility of each witness, and the weight to be attached to his statement needs no comment on my part, because. Rigby J., as I said earlier, called it a most damning indictment. The question in that case was whether the hearing by the adjudicating officer was vitiated by his being furnished with that report by the Board of Inquiry,, but unknown to Inspector Kanda, who had no knowledge of its contents until about the fourth day of the trial, of the action; and without being given an opportunity of correcting or contradicting it. It is perhaps significant to quote what was said between the trial judge and the legal adviser to the Government, in order to show that all along counsel claimed privilege in respect of the Board of Inquiry file:- "The Court to legal adviser: Am of the opinion that in the interests of justice the findings of the board of inquiry ought to be made available to the Court and to the plaintiff and privilege waived thereon..." "Legal adviser: Must be some misunderstanding-they have always been available-and no privilege claimed thereon." "Court: It is my clear impression that both in Court and throughout earlier proceedings in chambers, privilege has been consistently claimed in respect of the board of inquiry file and the findings thereon." I am sure that those proceedings could not have 'been made with an impartial and fair mind, and this was the reason why Lord Denning came to the conclusion that the dismissal of Inspector Kanda was made contrary to the principles of natural justice, because he was not given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Lord Denning said at p. 338:- "Applying these principles, their Lordships are of opinion that inspector Kanda was not in this case given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. They find themselves in agreement with the view expressed by Rigby J. in these .words 'In my view, the furnishing of a copy of the findings of the board of inquiry to the adjudicating officer appointed to hear the disciplinary charges, coupled with the fact that no such copy was furnished to the plaintiff, amounted to such a denial of natural justice as to entitle this Court to set aside those proceedings on this ground. It amounted, in. my view, to a failure to afford the plaintiff a reason-able opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge preferred against him which resulted in his dismissal'. The mistake of the police authorities was no doubt made entirely in good faith. It was quite proper to let the adjudicating officer have the statements of the witnesses. The Regulations show that it is necessary for him to have them. He will then read those out in the presence of the accused. But their Lordships do not think it was correct to let him have the report of the board of inquiry unless the accused also had it so as to be able to correct or contradict the statements in it to his prejudice." Pausing here for a moment, it would be observed in contrast to what appeared in Kanda case, that although in this case the applicant did not know of the actual contents of the documents complained of, nevertheless, whatever came to be used against him which was contained in the said documents was established, by evidence during the trial. I do not think, therefore, that once the accusatorial system has been followed, that because the reports were in the hands of the Commission (under the provisions of the law) that by itself amounts to hearing evidence or receiving representations from one side behind the back of the other, because at the hearing evidence was given by all, witnesses, who made written statements to both investigating officers, and the applicant was told what were the points he had to meet; and, of course, at this hearing he actually knew and had evidence which dealt with those points. In my view, going through the procedure followed, the commission has brought during the whole of the trial qualities of impartiality and fairness. In the light of all those judicial pronouncements and in the circumstances of the present case, I find myself in agreement with counsel for the appellant on this point. Regarding the question about the documents which sent to the Commission, prior to the promulgation of Law 33/67, I think I can dispose of this point shortly by saying that I do not agree that ignorance of their contents by the applicant affected adversely his right to be heard once those documents, as it appears from the correspondence of the Commission, were never used or made use of during the trial of the applicant. Now, what is the combined effect of s. 82

(1)of Law 33/67 and paragraph 3 of 'the Regulations set down in part 3 of the Second Schedule to the said law? The answer, according to the learned trial judge, who found that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in a manner which was inconsistent with the aforesaid provisions of the law is this:- "I have not known of any summary trial of a criminal case at which there was anything placed before the judge trying such case without it being, too, within the knowledge of the accused person and his counsel; and yet this is what has happened on this occasion, in the sense that the evidence in support of the charges brought against the applicant, which was forwarded to the respondent Commission in compliance with section 82

(1)of Law 33/67, as well as the reports of the two investigating officers, which were likewise forwarded to the Commission, were before the Commission but not within the knowledge of the applicant and his counsel. In my view the proper course for the Commission was to make such evidence, which consisted of the written statements of various persons and of documentary exhibits, part of the record of the hearing before it, because it was forwarded to it in that connection (and under regulation 4(c) in Part III of the Second Schedule to Law 33/67 it could admit evidence which would be 'inadmissible in civil or criminal proceedings'); it being understood, of course, that, it was open to the Commission to decide, either of its own motion or at the request of a party before it, that any of the said persons should, be, called to give oral evidence, too, during the hearing before the Commission. Moreover, the reports of the two investigating officers ought to have been made available to applicant and his counsel (not only, as stated earlier in this judgment, as a matter of natural justice, in the circumstances of this case) but, also, as a matter of law-the said section 82

(1)and regulation 3-once they had been forwarded to the Commission, by the complainant Ministry, in relation to the disciplinary proceedings before it, and they were available both to its members and to counsel appearing for such Ministry." I regret that I have the misfortune to find myself once again in disagreement with the learned trial judge on the question of construction of the aforesaid provisions of Law 33/67. In my view, the Commission, in hearing the case of the applicant, was bound to follow the accusatorial system of our Criminal Procedure, Law, which is in strong contrast with the inquisitorial system of Continental Europe. In France, a searching preliminary inquiry is, made by a Judge instruction, who investigates the circumstances of the crime and rigorously examines the accused in private, who may be represented by counsel. If the accused is sent to trial, he is again examined by the presiding judge, although there is a procurer-general to Conduct the prosecution. Our criminal procedure, in contrast, as I have said earlier, is based upon the presumption of innocence. The judge is usually dispassionate, and tends to assist the accused rather than the prosecution. With these considerations in mind, and once a senior counsel was appearing on behalf of the appropriate authority to conduct the prosecution against the applicant, I fail to understand how the Commission would be entitled under the law to follow the inquisitorial system and introduce during the trial of the applicant all written statements obtained by the witnesses and other documents, before counsel for the prosecution or the defence, decide that such documents were necessary in order to support the charge or, indeed, be considered as helping the applicant in his defence. I think, that the Commission, like any other judge exercising criminal jurisdiction, is entitled to call himself a witness, not called by either party to the proceedings, or require the production of any document relevant to the charge, in his endeavour to find out the truth, but, certainly, he cannot turn himself into a procurer-general. I think, with the utmost respect, the Commission in this case followed the correct summary procedure, and has left counsel for the prosecution to carry on his duties by calling witnesses and documentary evidence in exactly the same Way followed in a trial in a Court of Law. I, therefore, have no doubt, that this procedure accords with the notion of acting fairly and impartially, but allowing each counsel, if requested, to allow the production of any relevant document during the course of the trial. Regarding the further point that the reports of the two investigating officers ought to have been made available to the applicant and/or his counsel as a matter of law, I am afraid that I do not share such view (unless again a request is made) for the same reasons I have given earlier, and because, in the application of the concept of fair play, there must be real flexibility so that very different situations may be met without producing procedures unsuitable to the object in hand. What was, indeed, clear, was that the Commission should be at all costs fair, allowing a party to the proceedings to inspect the reports of the investigating officers, and not that they were entitled under the law to be given copies in advance. No doubt, in this case, it is clear, in my view, that all along the Commission was fair; it has given to the applicant sufficient indication of the matters raised against him, and has enabled him to answer them by oral or documentary evidence. Furthermore, I repeat, the applicant or his counsel have failed to request for the production of those reports, and it is too late now to claim that under the law the Commission was bound to produce them as part of the record at the trial of the applicant. Regarding the reports, I think one should see the criticism of Lord Denning in Pergamon Press Ltd. (supra), referred to in my judgment. Regarding the words used by the learned trial judge "I have not known of any summary trial or a criminal case at which there was anything placed before the judge trying such case without it being too within the knowledge of the accused person and his counsel", I think the answer is provided by the late Lord Parker C.J. in Rex v. Birmingham City Justice (supra), when he said at p. 949, already quoted in this judgment: "For my part, I do not think that the Justice was prevented under this procedure from hearing the evidence of those officials, having a sample taken, inspecting the sample before and in the absence of the applicants. Nor do I think it necessarily any unfairness if those officials do not give evidence at the hearing, provided always that the objectors, the applicants, are told what the point is that they have to meet, and, of course, at this hearing they clearly knew and had evidence to deal with it." Those words seem to me to apply to the Commission in this case. The last ground of annulment was that the decision of the Commission was reached without due inquiry. Although going through the application, no such relief is sought by the applicant, nevertheless, out of respect, I think I would venture to express my own point of view on this issue. Having gone through the authorities relied upon, and particularly Nicolaou v. The Republic

(1970)3 C.L.R. 250, the headnote reads, inter alia, as follows:- "Annulled for absence of due enquiry, through the failure of the respondent Council to give applicant a chance of being personally heard and calling witnessess." Stavrinides, J. in his judgment said at p. 254:- "...and without overlooking the material that the Council had before it, I think, on the whole, that under the latter principle it should have given the applicant a chance of being personally heard and calling witnesses and that its failure to do so is a ground of annulment. However, I need not labour this point, because in my opinion the subject decision must be annulled for lack of due reasoning." Regarding the next case relied upon, Fox v. General Medical Council [1960] 3 All E.R 225, in my view, having read this decision, the point in issue was that evidence was tendered but it was rejected and with respect, does not carry the case of the applicant any further, because, in the present case, as it has been shown, the prosecution called witnesses, they were cross-examined by counsel for the applicant, he gave evidence himself and called other witnesses. In Constantinou v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 190, dealing with the question of what is required of a tribunal in conducting an inquiry, I said at p. 203:- "In short, it is not required of a tribunal to conduct itself as a Court or to conduct a trial. Provided they act in good faith, they can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view (per Lord Loreburn, L.C. in Board of Education v. Rice [1911] A.C. 179 p. 182). However, the matter is now regulated by statutory provision laying down the procedure to be followed and as to how the council should conduct such inquiry in order to decide as to whether a person is an 'entitled officer'." Later on I concluded in these terms:- "In my view, it would be observed from the wording of this section, that the council was not bound in law to hear afresh the applicant and his witness Mr. Costas Efstathiou, or indeed, any other witness, in the absence of an application by the applicant that he intended to place new evidence before them." In the present case, as I have said earlier, the inquiry carried out by the Commission was based on the system of our Criminal Law, and, in my view, not only such procedure does not conflict with the notion of "due inquiry", but, on the contrary, our system is considered a land mark safeguarding mostly the interest of Jan accused person; and that such statutory procedure" is sufficient to achieve justice at all times. Needless to add, as it has been said (see General Medical Council v. Spackman), there can have been no due inquiry if the rules of natural justice have not been observed, and this is true in my view. For the reasons I have endeavoured to explain, and in the circumstances of this case, I would adopt and follow the principle so well laid down by Lord Reid in Wiseman v. Borneman (supra) at p. 277:- "Natural justice requires that the procedure before any tribunal which is acting judicially shall be fair in all the circumstances, and I would be sorry to see this fundamental general principle degenerate into a series of hard and fast rules. For a long time the Courts have, without objection from Parliament, supplemented procedure laid down in legislation where they have found that to be necessary for this purpose. But before this unusual kind of power is exercised it must be clear that the statutory procedure is insufficient to achieve justice and that to require additional steps would not frustrate the apparent purpose of the legislation." Directing myself with these judicial pronouncements, and in the circumstances of this case, I would, therefore, allow the appeal because I am convinced that our criminal procedure is sufficient to achieve justice at all times when the Commission acts fairly. Regarding the complaint of misdirection raised by the applicant, I am of the opinion that, once the decision of the Commission has been declared null and void on any one of the grounds of law claiming relief, the learned trial judge was not in any way bound to deal with the rest of the said grounds, because the administration had a duty to re-examine the whole matter afresh. However, because the said decision has been challenged by the appellant-respondent, I think that the applicant was certainly entitled to cross-appeal in order to protect his legitimate interest arising out of those issues, which, though argued, were not decided by the learned judge. Having reached this view, I am of the opinion that the majority decision in Markou v. The Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 166, should not be followed, because it is distinguishable in the present case. In Markou (supra) the appeal was lodged by the successful party in that re-course. The appellant (applicant) in that case, was asking the Court to declare that the decision of the respondent was null and void and of no effect whatsoever, under the provisions of Article 146 paragraph 4(b) of the Constitution. In fact, the learned judge who heard the case at first instance made the declaration sought in favour of the appellant. Although, once the decision has been declared null and void and it was the duty of the administration to reconsider the matter, counsel for the appellant argued that if he did not take the appeal the two points raised in his notice of appeal might be considered as res judicata. Josephides, J., delivering a separate judgment in that case, in dismissing the appeal, said at p. 171:- "I am of the view that, once the decision of the respondent has been declared null and void and it is his duty to re-examine the matter, the whole matter should be left open. If the party concerned i.e. the appellant, is aggrieved by any fresh decision of the Administration then he will have the right to file a fresh recourse under the provisions of Article 146, if he can bring himself within the ambit of that Article, which provides that, on a complaint against an administrative decision that it is contrary to any of the provisions of the Constitution or of any law or was made in excess or abuse of powers, this Court has power to examine the matter and, if satisfied that the complaint has been proved, declare such decision null and void." As I was also a member of the Full Bench of V the Supreme Court, I concurred with the view taken by both Vassiliades, P., and Josephides, J., in dismissing the appeal. I think that the applicant is entitled to cross-appeal in this case, and the answer is provided by Vassiliades, P., in Constantinides v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 523 when he said at p. 530:- "The. case was originally heard under section 11

(2)of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law, (No. 33 of 1964) by one of the judges of this Court, whose decision in the matter is the subject of the present appeal to the Court, taken under the proviso to the same sub section. The question to be determined in such an appeal, continues to be the validity of the administrative decision which is challenged by the recourse, as now seen in the light of the proceedings before the trial judge, including his judgment. (See Costas Pikis v. The Republic-Rev. App. 34

(1968)3 C.L.R. 303). The recourse under Article 146 is made to the Court; and its subject is 'all along the validity of the administrative act or decision challenged." Those words seem to me to apply to the applicant regarding the issues not already decided by the learned trial judge and I would, therefore, find myself unable to agree with the applicant that the learned judge misdirected himself on this issue. Regarding the next complaint of the applicant, viz., that the non-determination of all the points raised by him deprived him of the right of access to the Court, I think that this argument, with respect to the applicant, is untenable, not only 'for the reasons I have, given earlier, but because it is obvious, having perused the record of the trial Court, that he has been afforded by the learned judge a long hearing indeed, in the Supreme Court assigned to him by the Constitution of the Republic, and cannot now claim, under Article .146, that justice was not done in his case, since he still has access in the same Court. I would, therefore, dismiss this point also. The next complaint of the applicant was that the decision of the Commission was not duly reasoned in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 7 of the Regulations set out in Part III of the Second Schedule to Law 33/67. I think that I find myself in full agreement with the applicant, that the judgment of the Commission should give reasons for such decision, since the whole object of that Regulation specifically requires reasons to be given in order to enable the person concerned, viz., the applicant, as well as the Court, on a review of the case, to ascertain in his case whether the decision is well founded in fact and in law. The legislature having provided that reasons shall be given, in my view, that must clearly be read as meaning that proper, adequate, reasons must be given; the reasons that are set Out, whether they are right or wrong, must be reasons which not only will be intelligible, but also can reasonably be said that it deals with the substantial points which have been raised before it. Of course, I would make it quite clear, that failure to give reasons in relation to minor points, would not be sufficient to in-yoke the jurisdiction of this Court. There must be something wrong and inadequate in the reasons that are given in order to make this Court invalidate the administrative decision. In my view, therefore, having gone carefully through the decision of the Commission, the reasons so stated fairly comply with the legislative requirements of Regulation 7, that the applicant who is affected by such decision should know why the decision was against him and what the reasons for it were. I would, therefore, once again, dismiss also this point. See the recent case Papazachariou v. The Republic (reported in this Part at p. 486 ante). See also Hadjisavva v. The Republic (reported in this Part at p. 174 ante, at pp. 202-205). The further question posed is (a) whether the decision of the Commission should be invalidated because it was based on non-existing facts; and (b) whether the evaluation of the evidence was wrongly made by the said Commission. Regarding the findings of fact, there is a long line of cases which decide that there is a presumption in favour of the correctness of the findings of fact by the administration. This presumption is weakened, once the applicant succeeds in rendering possible the existence of misconception of fact on the part of the Commission, even by creating doubts in the mind of the Court about the correctness of such findings of fact. In Pierides v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 274, dealing with this point, I said at p. 290:- "In reaching this conclusion, to annul the decision of the Public Service Commission, I have adopted and. followed a passage from the well-known textbook on the Law of Administrative Acts by Stassinopoulos, 1951 edn. at p. 304. The effect of this passage is that the presumption in favour of the correctness of the finding of fact by the administration, is weakened, once the litigant succeeds in rendering the misconception possible, that is, simply to create doubts in the mind of the judge about the correctness of the findings of fact by the administration. In such cases, the judge, finding himself in doubt, is not inclined to follow the aforesaid presumption, but he resorts to the one of the two courses; that is, he either (

1. a)directs production of evidence, or (
2. b)he annuls the act so that the administration may ascertain the actual circumstances in a way not leaving doubts." See also Stavros Sentonaris v. The Greek Communal Chamber, 1964 C.L.R. 300. The former decision was adopted and followed by me in Hadjisavva v. The Republic (reported in this Part at p. 174, ante, at pp. 201-203). There is no doubt, therefore, that our Supreme Court, in exercising its competence under Article 146 of the Constitution, has to examine whether a certain administrative act can be annulled as contravening the provisions of the law. The mistaken valuation of the real facts and the mistaken subjection or non-subjection of those facts to the said legal provisions constitutes contravention of the law for the purposes of Article 146. See the well-known textbook of Tsatsos, 3rd edn., on "application for annulment before the Council of State", at p. 31 et seq. See also Waline Droit Administratif, at p. 438 et seq. In case 368 of 1937, the Greek Council of State, dealing with the question of misconception of the real facts, took the view that misconception of the facts by the administration is an indirect contravention of the law, and provides a reason for the annulment of such decision of the administration. For the reasons I have endeavoured to explain, and directing myself with these judicial pronouncements, I have decided, after going through the documentary and oral evidence, as well as the decision of the Commission that there was no misconseption as to the real facts, to dismiss this contention of the applicant. Regarding the second leg of the question I posed, I think that the answer is provided in Constantinou v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 190 at pp. 207 - 208:- "I would like to reiterate once again what has been said in a number of cases, that the evaluation of the evidence remains the province of the council, and that the Court, in reviewing the determination of the council, would not interfere if there was any evidence on which the council could reasonably have come to the conclusion which they did. If, on the other hand, there V was no evidence upon which they could reasonably have arrived at that conclusion or they have misconceived the effect of the facts before them, or they misdirected themselves on the question of the law, then their decision can be reviewed by this Court. Having had the advantage of perusing carefully all the material before me, and after having reviewed the determination of the council, I have reached the view that it was acting under a misconception of the real facts, that the activities of the applicant did not amount to a direct or indirect participation in the liberation struggle; and that there was no clear evidence that the then Government had neither formed such a view nor suspected the applicant; and that pressure was brought upon the applicant to retire." I think that I should reiterate once again that the decision of the Commission is a reasoned judgment; they put on record in a summary form their findings, from the evidence before them; they drew inferences from such facts, and they arrived, at their conclusions after they have formed their views as to the credibility or reliability of the witnesses they have heard; they also have indicated their opinion on the law and the conclusions which they have come to. With these considerations in mind, I turn to the first charge that the applicant was meddling in. exchange transactions by unorthodox procedures for purposes of personal gain. The facts regarding those transactions, particularly for the years 1965, 1966 and 1967, were placed before the Commission, and in effect it shows that the applicant had never withdrawn. any roubles from the official account of the Embassy with the bank in Moscow, for the expenses of the Embassy, but instead he was paying the expenses by roubles provided by his own money in roubles, in spite of the warning given to him by the Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in his letter of February 15, 1965, regarding payments made by him in respect of furniture purchased for the use of the Embassy. This letter reads, inter alia, as follows:- "On all three occasions expenditure was incurred by you without authority and without funds being available and your Ministry had the unpleasant task of seeking covering approval which was secured after your personal representations with my Minister. You are no doubt aware of the correct procedure that, under our existing financial regulations and budgetary legislation, no expenditure can be incurred unless there is sufficient provision for it in the Budget. The question of unauthorised expenditure by Embassies abroad in general has already had to be reported to the Council of Ministers on more than one occassion and the latest Decision on the matter (No. 4295 dated 12th November, 1964) is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should once again draw the attention of all Ambassadors to the previous instructions that in no case can they incur unauthorised expenditure and that in future they will be held personally and pecuniarily responsible for such irregularities'." From the evidence, it appears that after the applicant was paying the expenses of the Embassy, he was getting the equivalent of these roubles at the official rate, which was about 2.50 roubles per pound from the embassy's bank account, in sterling or in any other foreign exchange. There is no doubt that the applicant admitted. to Mr. Paschalis and to the Commission, that from 1965, 1966 and 1967, he never withdrew roubles from, the bank account of the Embassy, but he went on to add that the proceeds of the roubles came from the sale of his belongings, amounting to £11,000. Having had the advantage of forceful and able argument from both the counsel for the respondent and the applicant, and having reviewed all the material before me, including the judgment of the Commission, I have to the conclusion not to interfere with the findings of the Commission, because there was sufficient evidence on which they could have reasonably arrived at the conclusions which they did regarding all the disciplinary charges against the applicant. I would like to add, however, in fairness to the Foreign Service as a whole, that the question of entertainment expenses, selling of personal belongings with or without permission, and the handling of the bank account, are serious matters which I think ought to be gone into more carefully by the appropriate authority, with a view of giving clear and unambiguous instructions thus finally leaving no room for misunderstanding among the personnel of the Foreign Office. Finally, the last point argued by the applicant was that the Commission erred in law by demoting him by two ranks from the rank of Ambassador to that of Counsellor Grade A, because, under the provisions of the Foreign Service Law, 1960, (as amended), the hierarchy is Ambassador, Minister Plenipotentiary, Counsellor, or General Consul, grade A. The applicant relied on the Decision of the Greek Council of State, No. 233/ 31. I find myself unable to adhere to the view expressed, by the applicant, because it is clear, in my opinion, that it was reasonably open to the Commission to impose the disciplinary punishment on him in demoting him to the rank of Counsellor. The Commission was entitled, I repeat, to impose any one of the disciplinary punishments provided in s. 79

(1)of Law 33/67, because; according to the wording of this section, the intention of the legislature was to make it clear that it was giving the Commission a discretionary power to demote an officer who was found guilty of a disciplinary offence, to a lower post, without having to follow the Decision of the Greek Council of State which was based on the statutory provisions in Greece. As I said, I have no doubt that the section, as drafted, must be read to mean that it was giving power to the Commission to demote him to any rank, and not necessarily to the 'immediately lower rank. Cf. Platritis v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 366, at pp. 374-375. For the reasons I have endeavoured to explain at length, I have reached the view that it was reasonably open to the Commission, in view of the evidence before them, to find the applicant guilty of the four disciplinary offences, and I would, therefore, dismiss the cross-appeal of the applicant. STAVRINIDES, J.: I will now ask Mr. Justice A. Loizou to read his judgment. A. LOIZOU, J.: This is an appeal and cross-appeal under s. 11

(2)of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law, 1964 (No. 33/64) from the judgment of a judge of this Court who dealt with this recourse, made under Article 146 of the Constitution, in the first instance. The respondent in the appeal (who was the applicant in the original recourse and who, for the sake of convenience, will continue hereinafter in this judgment to be referred to as "the applicant") had, by an application, applied to the Court for a declaration that the decision, of the Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") to demote him from the rank of Ambassador to the rank of Counsellor A is null and void. The said decision was, in fact, so declared by the judgment of the learned trial judge under appeal on the grounds therein stated, and with which I shall be dealing in the" course of this judgment. The applicant was, serving in, the diplomatic service with the rank of Ambassador and was at, the time material to the present proceedings the, Ambassador of the, Republic in Moscow, U.S.S.R. On the 16th May, 1967, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed a letter to the Commission requesting them to take disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. A number of documents were attached thereto. The Commission dealt With the matter at its meeting of the 8th June, 1967, and decided to refer the matter to the Attorney-General of the Republic for framing the necessary charges: Before, however, any charges were preferred under the then prevailing practice, the Public Service Law, 1967 (No.33/67) was enacted, long overdue as it was, making specific provisions regarding the holding of enquiries into the commission of disciplinary offences by public officers and laying down the procedure to be followed by the Commission at the hearing of disciplinary offences and other relevant matters thereto, such as disciplinary punishment, etc. These provisions appear in Part: VII under the heading "Disciplinary Code" ss. 73-85 inclusive, as well as in the First and Second Schedules to the Law. Pursuant to the provisions of ss. 80-82 of Law 33/67, the Commission referred the matter back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for appropriate action. Mr. P. Paschalis, a counsel of the Republic, was nominated by the Council of Ministers to conduct the investigation into .these matters. This nomination was done in, accordance with the provisions of section 80(b) of the Law, which reads as follows:- ".in any other case, cause an investigation to be made in the prescribed manner and then proceed as provided in section 82: Provided that until Regulations are made prescribing the manner of investigation, the Regulations set out in Part I of the Second Schedule apply." Whilst on this point, it will be useful to quote also the said Second Schedule, Part I which sets out the Regulations at present governing the" investigation of offences- "

1. The appropriate authority concerned shall, as expeditiously as possible, nominate one or more officers of its Ministry or Office (in this Part referred to as the 'investigating officer') to conduct the investigation. The investigating officer shall be a senior officer, who shall be of a higher rank than the officer concerned: Provided that if in any case the appropriate authority considers that it would not be possible, practicable or advisable to nominate an investigating officer from its Ministry or Office, it shall refer the matter to the Council of Ministers which shall nominate a suitable officer to conduct the investigation.
2. The investigation shall be carried out as expeditiously as possible and shall in any case be completed not later than thirty days from the date of the direction for investigation.
3. In carrying out an investigation the investigating officer shall have power to hear, any witnesses or to obtain written statements from any person who may have knowledge of any of the facts of the case and any such person shall give all information within his knowledge and shall sign any statement so given after it shall have been read out to him.
4. The officer concerned shall be entitled to know the case against him and shall be given an opportunity of being heard.
5. After the completion, of the investigation the investigating officer shall forthwith report his conclusion to the appropriate authority giving full reasons in support, thereof and submitting all relevant documents.
6. On receiving the report of the investigating officer, the appropriate authority shall forthwith refer it, with all documents submitted, to the Attorney-General of the Republic together with its views thereon for his advice.
7. The, Attorney-General of the Republic shall, with all reasonable speed, consider the matter and advise the appropriate authority whether a charge may be brought against the officer and, if so, shall draft the charge.
8. On receiving the charge drafted by the Attorney-General the appropriate authority shall sign it and, transmit it to the Chairman of the Commission with all documents submitted to the Attorney-General of the Republic." Mr. Paschalis took all the relevant statements concerning the case against the applicant, and informed the latter by letter of the facts of such case and requested by the same letter certain, explanations. The applicant delivered to the investigating officer a written statement concerning the case against him. There followed f