the Constitution-Purpose of acquisition attained by the construction of the port-Fact that acquired property has not been used for the actual construction of the port basin and its quays and wharfs and no buildings have been erected thereon does not make it unnecessary for the purposes for which it was acquired-As "port development" and "port" should be taken to include not only the part covered with water, but also the adjacent land which will be necessary for the construction of, inter alia, administration buildings and warehouses. By means of an order of acquisition dated February 20, 1969 the Council of Ministers compulsorily acquired a piece of land belonging to the applicant company for the purpose of construction of a port at Larnaca. Three years later the applicant company, acting under Article 23.
the Constitution applied to the respondent Minister for the return of the said property on the ground that more than three years have elapsed since the acquisition and the purpose for which it was acquired has not been attained. The respondent Minister turned down this application and hence the present recourse. Counsel for the applicant company contended that the said property has not been used for the construction of the port or its functioning and that the refusal or omission of the administration to comply with the provisions of Article 23.
the Constitution and sections 7, 14 and 15 of the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law 15/62) constitute a violation of the Constitution and the Law. The property in question has not been used for the actual construction of the port basin and its quays and wharfs and no buildings have been erected thereon. A senior Engineer of the Ministry of Communications and Works who is a qualified :Coastal and Harbour Engineer, and who has been concerned with the project in question testified that a port is a living entity and when plans are made for its construction its future needs are always taken into consideration; that such needs include not only the area to be used for the quays and water basin but also that required for administration buildings, warehouses, parking space, open stacking areas and transit sheds; and that this was followed in the present case and from the outset the property of the applicant was found to be and still is required for the purposes of the port. Held, that the provisions of Article 23.5 take effect if within three years of the acquisition the purpose for which the land in question had been acquired has not become attainable (see Kaniklides v. The Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. 49 at p. 58); that in this case no such situation has arisen because the purpose for which the property in question together with other properties has been acquired has been attained by the construction of the port of Larnaca and the land in question is being used and is needed for the purposes for which it has been acquired; that the fact that the acquired property has not been used for the actual construction of the port basin and its quays and wharfs, or that no buildings have been erected thereon, does not make the property unnecessary for the purposes for which it was acquired, namely, the port development of the district of Larnaca and the construction of a port; that "port development" and "port" should he taken to include not only the part covered with water in which a ship would be afloat but also the adjacent land which will be necessary for the construction thereon of warehouses, offices or is to be left as an open space for storage or parking or any other use incidental to the construction of a port and in general the port development of an area; and that, accordingly, the recourse must fail. Application dismissed. Cases referred to: Kaniklides and Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. 49 at p.
of the Constitution, calling upon them to exclude within 45 days from the acquisition and requisition, their property known as The Cyprus Tannery, Plot 334 at Larnaca reserving their rights to claim also reasonable compensation for the occupation and use of the said property by or on behalf of the Government and for any damage caused thereto from the, date of the acquisition up to the date of requisition of such property and delivery to their clients. On the 15th January, 1974 by letter (exh.1
of the Constitution and you do not specify for which reason you allege that the aforesaid Plot No. 334 must be excluded from the acquisition and requisition. (b) Under these circumstances, you realise that it is not possible to examine the subject in the light of any reasons unknown to us on which you base your allegation, and in our opinion, there do not and does not exist any violation of the Law with regard to the said acquisition and requisition. On the 14th October, 1974 by letter (exh.1
of the Constitution, speaks for itself and applies only in cases as the present one. Consequently, your allegations in paras. (
the Constitution and of the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962, (Law 15/62), sections 7, 14 and 15 constitute a violation of the Constitution and the Law and an abuse or excess of the powers entrusted to the Minister of Communications and Works, from which the applicant Company is directly affected and consequently has a legitimate interest to exercise a right of recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution. According to learned counsel for the applicant Company, Article 23.4 (c) and 23.
the Constitution and sections 7, 14 and 15 of Law 15/62, make it obligatory on the Acquiring Authority to release the immovable property of the applicants from the acquisition order as no longer required. It was further argued that the fact that the Oil Refinery Factory which was originally included in the acquisition was excluded later by the revocation of the notice of acquisition published in Supplement No. 3 to the official Gazette dated the 14 February, 1966 under Not. No.114 and which is nearer to the entrance to the docks, proves that the immovable property of the applicant Company is not necessary for the achievement of the purpose for which it was acquired and this omission of the Acquiring Authority constitutes an abuse of power. Article 23.
the Constitution, was judicially considered and interpreted in the case of Kaniklides and The Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. p. 49 at p. 58, where it is stated as follows: "The Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of paragraph
take effect if within three years of the acquisition the purpose for which the land in question had been acquired has not become 'attainable'. Any other interpretation would lead to absurdity in that there are bound to be many purposes for which land has been acquired in the sense of paragraph
, which, by their very nature, cannot be fulfilled within the said period of three years". In the present case no such situation has arisen because the purpose for which the property in question together with other properties has been acquired, has been attained by the construction of the port of Larnaca, and the land in question is being used and is needed for the purpose for which it has been acquired. The fact that the acquired property has not been used for the actual construction of the port basin and its quays and wharfs, or that no buildings have been erected thereon, does not make the property unnecessary for the purposes for which it was acquired, namely, the port development of the district of Larnaca and the construction of a port. "Port development" and "port" should be taken to include not only the 'part covered with water in which a ship would be afloat but also the adjacent land which will be necessary for the construction thereon of warehouses, offices or is to be left as an open space for storage or parking or any other use incidental to the construction of a port and in general the port development of an area. This is apparent from the evidence adduced upon the reopening of the case. Mr. Mikis Christodoulides, a Senior Engineer of the Ministry of Communications and Works, a qualified Coastal and Harbour Engineer, who has been concerned with the project in question all along, testified that a port is a living entity and when plans are made for its construction, its future needs are always taken into consideration. Such needs, include, not only the area to be used for the quays and water basin, but also that required for administration buildings, warehouses, parking space, open stacking areas, transit sheds, etc. This was followed in the present case, and from the outset the property of the applicant Company was found to be and is still required, for the purposes of the port. With regard to the issue raised in relation to the Oil Refinery Factory, it may be stated that with the exception of a strip of land along its boundary, as indicated on the plan (exh.5), same was never the subject of an acquisition, and what was released, following the objection lodged by its owners, was part of this strip of land. According to the evidence, there were valid reasons for its non acquisition, being an industry in operation, useful to the economy of the Island, and the costs of its acquisition would be tremendous. In such circumstances, no claims for discrimination could validly stand, which, if at all, should have been raised within the prescribed period after the determination of the objections. For all the above reasons, the present recourse is dismissed, but in the circumstances, I make no order as to costs. Application dismissed. No order as to costs. cylaw.org: Από το ΚΙΝOΠ/CyLii για τον Παγκύπριο Δικηγορικό Σύλλογο
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