Αστυνομικός Διευθυντής Λεμεσού ν. Μαρθάρη, Αρ. Υπόθεσης: 10718/16, 22/7/2019 ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ CyLaw | Αναφορικά μ'εμάς | " target="_top">Επικοινωνία | Όροι χρήσης Έρευνα - Κατάλογος Απο

tended) χρήσης παράνομης βίας σε κάποιο άλλο πρόσωπο χωρίς την συγκατάθεση του. Επίθεση μπορεί να διαπραχθεί χωρίς ο κατηγορούμενος να αγγίξει το θύμα (R v. Rophe

the light of the circumstances as they reaonably appeared to the accused ...", όπως το διατύπωσε o Edmund Davies, L.J. (ως ήτο τότε), στην Mclnnes [1969] 55 Cr. App. R. 551, o. 562, στην οποία ακολουθήθηκε από το Court of Appeal η Julien [1969] 53 Cr. App ,R. 407 και υιοθετήθηκε η κλασσική διατύπωση της αρχής της αυτοάμυνας από τον Lord Morris στην Palmer ν. R. [1971] A.C. 814 (P.C.), στις σελίδες 831-832: «

their Lordships' view the defence of self-defence is one which can be and will be readily understood by any jury. It is a straightforward conception. It

volves no abstruse legal thought. It requires no set words by way of explanation. No formula need be employed

reference to it. Only common sense is needed for its understanding. It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do, what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances. Of these a jury can decide. It may

some cases be only sensible and clearly possible to take some simple avoiding action. Some attacks may be serious and dangerous. Others may not be. If there is some relatively minor attack it would not be common sense to permit some action of retaliation which was wholly out of proportion to the necessities of the situation. If an attack is serious so that it puts someone

immediate peril then immediate defensive action may be necessary. If the moment is one of crisis for someone

imminent danger he may have to avert the danger by some

stant reaction. If the attack is all over and no sort of peril remains then the employment of force may be by way of revenge or punishment or by way of paying off an old score or may be pure aggression. There may no longer be any link with a necessity of defence. Of all these matters the good sense of a jury will be the arbiter. There are no prescribed words which must be employed

or adopted

a summing up. All that is needed is a clear exposition,

relation to the particular facts of the case, of the conception of necessary self-defence. If there has been no attack then clearly there will have been no need for defence. If there has been attack so that defence is reasonably necessary it will be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessaiy defensive action. If a juiy thought that

a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and

stinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken. A jury will be told that the defence of self-defence, where the evidence makes its raising possible, will only fail if the prosecution show beyond doubt that what the accused did was not by way of self-defence. But their Lordships consider,

agreement with the approach

the De Freitas case [1960] 2 W.I.R. 523, that if the prosecution have shown that what was done was not done

self-defence then that issue is eliminated from the case. If the jury consider that an accused acted

self-defence or if the jury are

doubt as to this then they will acquit. The defence of self-defence either succeeds so as to result

an acquittal or it is disproved

which case as a defence it is rejected.

a homicide case the circumstances may be such that it will become an issue as to whether there was provocation so that the verdict might be one of manslaughter. Any other possible issues will remain. If

any case the view is possible that the

tent necessary to constitute the crime of murder was lacking then that matter would be left to the jury.» Ο συσχετισμός του αντικειμενικού κριτηρίου προς τις περιστάσεις συνοψίζεται και από τον Lord Diplock στην Reference under s 48A of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1968 (No 1 of 1975) [1976] 2 All E.R. 937 στη σ. 947, σε συνάρτηση προς την ανάλογη υπεράσπιση της χρήσης εύλογα αναγκαίας βίας για την αποτροπή εγκλήματος: «The form

which the jury would have to ask themselves the question

a trial for an offence against the person

which this defence was raised by the accused, would be: are we satisfied that no reasonable man (a) with knowledge of such facts as were known to the accused or reasonably believed by him to exist (b)

the circumstances and time available to him for reflection (c) could be of opinion that the prevention of the risk of harm to which others might be exposed if the suspect were allowed to escape, justified exposing the suspect to the risk of harm to him that might result from the kind of force that the accused contemplated using?» H Shannon [1980] 71 Cr. App. R. 192, όχι μόνο δεν διαφοροποιεί τη θέση αυτή αλλά την ακολουθεί. Όπως παρατήρησε ο Ormrod, L.J. σχολιάζοντας το απόσπασμα από την απόφαση του Lord Morris στην Palmer ν. R στις σελίδες 195-196: «The whole tenor of this statement of the law is directed to the distinction which has to be drawn between acts which are essentially defensive

character and acts which are essentially offensive, punitive, or retaliatory

character. Attack may be the best form of defence, but not necessarily

law. Counter-attack within limits is permissible; but going over to the offensive when the real danger is over is another thing.» Και το κριτήριο για τη διαπίστωση εκείνη παραμένει, στο τέλος της ημέρας, αντικειμενικό, ως προς το εύλογο της βίας που χρησιμοποιήθηκε, λαμβανομένων υπ' όψη όλων των περιστάσεων. Η καταδίκη στη Shannon παραμερίσθηκε μόνο και μόνο διότι η καθοδήγηση του δικαστή προς τους ενόρκους κρίθηκε ελαττωματική αφού δεν περιείχε αναφορά στο σύνολο των περιστάσεων, όπως αναπτύχθησαν στην Palmer ν. R., περιλαμβανομένης της αντίληψης του κατηγορούμενου ως προς την, απεγνωσμένη, κατάσταση στην οποία θεώρησε ότι εβρίσκετο. Η R. ν Clegg [1995] 1 A.C. 482 δείχνει ακριβώς το κριτήριο και το όριο της αυτοάμυνας, έχει δε ισχυρή αναλογία προς την προκειμένη υπόθεση, αφού εκρίθη εκεί από το Court of Appeal

Northern Ireland (η έφεση στο House of Lords αφορούσε άλλο και ακόλουθο νομικό σημείο) ότι, αν και οι τρεις πρώτοι πυροβολισμοί κατά του αυτοκινήτου ερίφθησαν στα πλαίσια αυτοάμυνας, ο τέταρτος - και θανατηφόρος - πυροβολισμός ο οποίος ερίφθη στο πίσω μέρος του αυτοκινήτου ενώ αυτό απεμακρύνετο δεν ήταν στα πλαίσια αυτοάμυνας αφού συνιστούσε υπερβολική και δυσανάλογη χρήση βίας. Στην απόφαση της Επιτροπής του Συμβουλίου της Ευρώπης στην υπόθεση Kelly ν. United Kingdom, 17579/90, 13.1.1993, η Επιτροπή παρατήρησε κατ' αρχή την αυστηρότητα του ενιαίου κριτηρίου "absolutely necessary" που αναφέρεται στη χρήση επιτρεπτής βίας στα πλαίσια του άρθρου 2.2 της Ευρωπαϊκής Συνθήκης Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων, το οποίο αντιστοιχεί προς το άρθρο 7.3(β) και το οποίο προνοεί: «2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as

flicted

contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: a.

defence of any person from unlawful violence; b.

order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; c.

action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or

surrection." Όπως το έθεσε στις σελίδες 41-42: "As a preliminary remark, the Commission would emphasise that the situations where deprivation of life may be justified are exhaustive and must be narrowly

terpreted. The use of force which has resulted

a deprivation of life must have been shown to have been "absolutely necessary" for one of the purposes set out

the second paragraph. The Commission has held that the test of necessity

cludes an assessment as to whether the

terference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and that the qualification of the word "necessary" by the adverb "absolutely"

dicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be applied than

the context of other provisions of the Convention. More specifically, the Commission considered that: '... Article 2 para. 2 permits the use of force for the purposes enumerated

sub-paragraphs (a), (

1. b)and (
2. c)subject to the requirement that the force used is strictly proportionate to the achievement of the permitted purpose.

assessing whether the use of force is strictly proportionate, regard must be had to the nature of the aim pursued, the dangers to life and limb

herent

the situation and the degree of the risk that the force employed might result

loss of life. The Commission's examination must have due regard to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the deprivation of life» (No. 10044/82, Dec. 10.7.84, D.R. 39 pp. 162, 171).' Εφαρμόζοντας την αρχή αυτή στην ενώπιον της υπόθεση, επεσήμανε ότι (σ. 42): "... the Commission is satisfied that the shooting

this case was for the purpose of apprehending the occupants of the stolen car, who were reasonably believed to be terrorists,

order to prevent them carrying out terrorist activities. Accordingly, the action of the soldiers

this case was taken for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest within the meaning of Article 2 para. 2(b) of the Convention.................................. The Commission has therefore examined whether the force used

pursuit of the above aim was "absolutely necessary",

particular whether it was strictly proportionate, having regard to the situation confronting the soldiers, the degree of force employed

response and the risk that the use of force could result

the deprivation of life. " Παρατηρώντας δε ότι ο μόνος τρόπος να σταματήσουν το αυτοκίνητο ήταν πυροβολώντας εναντίον του όπως έκαναν, τόνισε ότι (σ. 43): "Their conduct must also be assessed against the background of the events

Northern Ireland, which is facing a situation

which terrorist killings have become a feature of life.

this context the Commission recalls the judge's comments that, although the risk of harm to the occupants of the car was high, the kind of harm to be averted (as the soldiers reasonably thought) by preventing their escape was even greater, namely the freedom of terrorists to resume their dealing

death and destruction.» Η υπόθεση Kelly δεν αποφασίζει ότι η οποιαδήποτε βία είναι επιτρεπτή αν μόνον έτσι μπορεί να επιτευχθεί η σύλληψη. Αυτό που αποφασίζει είναι ότι, δοθείσας της πολύ περιορισμένης έκτασης της υπεράσπισης του άρθρου 2.2, η χρήση της απολύτως αναγκαίας βίας είναι επιτρεπτή μόνον όπου είναι ανάλογη του συγκεκριμένου σκοπού τον οποίο επιδιώκει, ο οποίος στην περίπτωση εκείνη ήταν να συλληφθούν από τις δυνάμεις ασφαλείας, και όχι από οποιοδήποτε ιδιώτη, άτομα τα οποία λογικά εκρίθησαν ότι ήσαν απεγνωσμένοι τρομοκράτες ώστε vc εμποδισθούν να συνεχίσουν τις τρομοκρατικές ενέργειες τους λαμβάνοντας ιδιαίτερα υπ' όψη την επικρατούσα κατάσταση πραγμάτω1 στη Βόρειο Ιρλανδία. Ανάλογη αντίκρυση διακρίνεται και στην απόφαση της Επιτροπής στην υπόθεση Stewart ν. United Kingdom, 10044/82, 10.7.1984, η οποία, αν και δεν αφορούσε τη χρήση βίας για σκοπούς σύλληψης δυνάμει του άρθρου 2.2(b) όπως η Kelly αλλά τη χρήση βίας προς το σκοπό καταστολής εξέγερσης δυνάμει του άρθρου 2.2(c), τονίζει το ενιαίο και το περιορισμένο του κριτηρίου της απόλυτα αναγκαίας βίας του άρθρου 2.2. Όπως αναφέρεται στις σελίδες 134-136: «11. The Commission's approach to the

terpretation of Article 2 must be guided by a recognition that it constitutes one of the most important rights

the Convention, from which no derogation is permissible, even

times of public emergency (Article 15 par. 2). 12. Article 2 requires that the right to life 'shall be protected by law', and sets limits to the circumstances and conditions,

which the taking of life by a public authority may be permitted. Four different sets of situations are enumerated

which deprivation of life is not to be regarded as a violation of the right to life. The first is found

the second sentence of paragraph 1, and the remaining three are enumerated

paragraph

2. These situations, where deprivation of life may be justified, are • exhaustive and must be narrowly

terpreted, being exceptions to, or

dicating the limits of, a fundamental Convention right 16. As regards the

terpretation of the concept 'absolutely necessary', guidance can be sought

the Court's and Commission's jurisprudence.

the Handyside Case (judgment of 7.12.76, Eur. Court H.R. Series A No. 24, par. 48) the Court stated the following

the context of Article 10 par. 2: 'The Court notes at this juncture that, whilst the adjective 'necessary' within the meaning of Article 10 par. 2, is not synonymous with '

dispensable' (cf.

Article 2par.

2 and 6 par. 1, the words 'absolutely necessary' and 'strictly necessary' and,

Article 15par.

1, the phrase 'to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation'), neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as 'admissible', 'ordinary' (cf. Article 4 par. 3), useful' (cf. the French text of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1), 'reasonable' (cf. Article 5 par. 3 and 6 par. 1) or 'desirable'.1 17. The Court has reaffirmed that 'necessary' implies a 'pressing social need'

the Sunday Times Case (judgment of 26.4.79, Series A No. 30, par. 59) - also

the context of Article 10 par. 2 - and

the Dudgeon Case (judgment of 22.10.81, Series A No. 45, par. 51)

the context of Article 8 par.

2. Above all, the test of'necessity'

cludes an assessment as to whether the

terference with the Convention right was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (Sunday Times Case, loc. cit., par. 62, p. 38). Finally, the qualification of the word 'necessary'

Article 2par.

2 by the adverb 'absolutely'

dicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be applied. 19. Having regard to the above, the Commission thus considers that Article 2 par. 2 permits the use of force for the purposes enumerated

sub-paragraphs (a), (

1. b)and (
2. c)subject to the requirement that the force used is strictly proportionate to the achievement of the permitted purpose.

assessing whether the use of force is strictly proportionate, regard must be had to the nature of the aim pursued, the dangers to life and limb

herent

the situation and the degree of the risk that the force employed might result

loss of life. The Commission's examination must have due regard to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the deprivation of life." Εγκρίνοντας τη χρησιμοποιηθείσα στην ενώπιον της υπόθεση βία ως απόλυτα αναγκαία υπό τις περιστάσεις, η Επιτροπή τόνισε ότι (σ. 137): "27.

assessing this question, the Commission must also bear

mind that the events took place

Northern Ireland which is facing a situation of continuous public disturbance that has given rise to much loss of life (see e.g. Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, Series A, Vol. 25). Moreover, rioting of the kind which occurred

the present case is a frequent occurrence and gives rise to the apprehension, as adverted to by Lord Justice Jones, that the disturbance will be used as a cover for sniper attack, although no claim has been made

the present case that the patrol actually came under such attack.

1. It recalls that the group of soldiers were confronted with a hostile and violent crowd of 150 persons who were attacking them with stones and other missiles, and, further, that the soldier's aim was disturbed at the moment of discharge when he was struck by several missiles.» Αντίθετα, στην υπόθεση Farrell, 9023/80, 11.12.1982, η οποία μάλιστα αφορούσε, όπως και η Kelly, τη χρήση βίας για σκοπούς σύλληψης δυνάμει του άρθρου 2.2(β), η υπόθεση εκρίθη παραδεκτή (δεν εκδικάσθηκε τελικά αφού διευθετήθηκε) και δεν έγινε αποδεκτή η θέση ότι η χρησιμοποιηθείσα βία ήταν αποδεδειγμένα απόλυτα αναγκαία υπό τις περιστάσεις. Η υπόθεση αφορούσε θάνατο προερχόμενο από πυροβολισμούς που ερίφθησαν από στρατιώτες στη Βόρειο Ιρλανδία εναντίον τριών ανδρών τους οποίους εύλογα εξέλαβαν ότι αποπειράθησαν να τοποθετήσουν βόμβα. Το ίδιο το Ευρωπαϊκό Δικαστήριο Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων πραγματεύεται τις παραμέτρους του άρθρου 2.2 στην απόφαση του στην υπόθεση McCann and others ν. United Kingdom, 27.9.1995, series A, volume
2. Στις σελίδες 45-46 αναφέρει: «
3. The Court's approach to the

terpretation of Article 2 must be guided by the fact that the object and purpose of the Convention as an

strument for the protection of

dividual human beings requires that its provisions be

terpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective (see,

ter alia, the Soering v. the United Kingdom judgment of 7 July 1989, Series Ano. 161, p. 34, § 87, and the Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections) judgment of 23 March 1995, Series Ano. 310, p. 27, §72). 147. It must also be borne

mind that, as a provision which not only safeguards the right to life but sets out the circumstances when the deprivation of life may be justified, Article 2 ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions

the Convention -

deed one which,

peacetime, admits of no derogation under Article

1. Together with Article 3 of the Convention, it also enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe (see the above-mentioned Soering judgment, p. 34, §88). As such, its provisions must be strictly construed.
2. The Court considers that the exceptions delineated

paragraph 2

dicate that this provision extends to, but is not concerned exclusively with,

tentional killing. As the Commission has pointed out, the text of Article 2, read as a whole, demonstrates that paragraph 2 does not primarily define

stances where it is permitted

tentionally to kill an

dividual, but describes the situations where it is permitted to "use force" which may result, as an unintended outcome,

the deprivation of life. The use of force, however, must be no more than "absolutely necessary" for the achievement of one of the purposes set out

sub-paragraphs (a), (

1. b)or (
2. c)(see application no. 10044/82, Stewart v. the United Kingdom, 10 July 1984, Decisions and Reports 39, pp. 169-71). 149.

this respect the use of the term "absolutely necessary"

Article 2

§ 2

dicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally applicable when determining whether State action is "necessary

a democratic society" under paragraph 2 of Article 8 to 11 of the Convention.

particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out

sub-paragraphs 2 (a), (

1. b)and (
2. c)of Article 2. 150.

keeping with the importance of this provision

a democratic society, the Court must,

making its assessment, subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, taking

to consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances

cluding such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination.» Η υπόθεση αφορούσε το θάνατο τριών ατόμων από πυροβολισμούς στρατιωτών οι οποίοι εύλογα (αν και λανθασμένα), θεώρησαν ότι οι τρεις, που ήσαν μέλη του IRA, επρόκειτο άμεσα να προκαλέσουν την έκρηξη αυτοκινήτου-βόμβας στο κέντρο του Γιβραλτάρ. Η Επιτροπή είχε κρίνει ότι η χρησιμοποιηθείσα βία ήταν τέτοια και τόση ώστε να καθίστατο απόλυτα αναγκαία για την προστασία της ζωής των πολλών ανθρώπων που θα κινδύνευαν να σκοτωθούν αν δεν απετρέπετο η δράση την οποία ανέμεναν στα πλαίσια του άρθρου 2.2(a). Το Δικαστήριο (αν και ουσιαστικά διχασμένο, με πλειοψηφία 10 προς 9) ήχθη σε διαφορετική απόφαση επί των γεγονότων, αποφαινόμενο ότι (σ. 62): «... having regard to the decision not to prevent the suspects from travelling

to Gibraltar, to the failure of the authorities to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that their

telligence assessments might,

some respects at least, be erroneous and to the automatic recourse to lethal force when the soldiers opened fire, the Court is not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the use of force which was no more than absolutely necessary

defence of persons from unlawful violence within the meaning of Article 2 § 2(a) of the Convention.» Η κατάληξη αυτή τονίζει την αυστηρότητα με την οποία, ακόμα και σε ακραίες περιπτώσεις όπου τα ίδια τα εντεταλμένα ειδικά όργανα του νόμου προβαίνουν σε ενέργειες που αποσκοπούν στον μέγιστο σκοπό της προστασίας της ζωής, πολλών μάλιστα ανθρώπων, το κριτήριο της απόλυτης αναγκαιότητας της χρησιμοποιηθείσας βίας σε συνάρτηση προς κάθε παράμετρο παραμένει ισχυρό». ΑΞΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΗ ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑΣ - ΕΥΡΗΜΑΤΑ - ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑΤΑ Το Δικαστήριο είχε την ευκαιρία μέσα από την ζωντανή ατμόσφαιρα της δίκης να παρακολουθήσει με ιδιαίτερη προσοχή τους μάρτυρες που κατέθεσαν ενώπιον του Δικαστηρίου και το Δικαστήριο είναι σε θέση να αξιολογήσει όλη την εν γένει συμπεριφορά τους στο εδώλιο του μάρτυρα. Το Δικαστήριο αξιολογεί τη μαρτυρία τους με δείκτη μεταξύ άλλων την ύπαρξη προσωπικού συμφέροντος στην υπόθεση, της ευκαιρίας που είχαν να παρακολουθήσουν τα διαδραματισθέντα, την ακεραιότητα και ειλικρίνεια τους, τη μνήμη και τους λόγους που είχαν για να θυμούνται ή να πιστεύουν αυτά για τα οποία κατέθεταν, τη φυσικότητα, ευθύτητα και την αμεσότητα των απαντήσεων τους ( βλ. Ζεβρού v. Χαραλάμπους

surance Co Ltd ν. Κατωμονιάτη κ.α.

to the error or quasi-error of referring to such explanationsas defences, it is particularly important that he should use language which suffices to make it clear to the jury that they are not defences

respect of which any onus rests on the accused, but are matters which the prosecution must disprove as an essential part of the prosecution case before a verdict of guilty is justified.» Για το ίδιο ζήτημα μπορεί να γίνει χρήσιμη παραπομπή στην Lobell [1957] 1 Q.B.D. 547. Ο πρωτόδικος δικαστής, μετά τη διατύπωση των ευρημάτων του, συζήτησε σύντομα και το θέμα των ορίων της νόμιμης άμυνας. Συναφώς είπε, πως το ερώτημα πάντοτε είναι κατά πόσον η βία που χρησιμοποίησε υπό τις περιστάσεις ο κατηγορούμενος ήταν λογική. Μεταξύ αυτών είναι και η διανοητική κατάσταση (mental state) του κατηγορουμένου κατά τον ουσιώδη χρόνο. Η εκκαλούμενη απόφαση παραπέμπει στις υποθέσεις: Miliotis v. The Police

a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and

stinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken. A jury will be told that the defence of self-defence, where the evidence makes its raising possible, will only fail if the prosecution show beyond doubt that what the accused did was not by way of self-defence.» Επίσης σε κατοπινό στάδιο της απόφασης, αποφασίσθηκαν τα ακόλουθα: «Έχουμε υπόψη, καταλήγοντας στην αθωωτική απόφαση, ότι το αδίκημα της συμπλοκής είναι δυνατό να διαπραχθεί από ένα μόνο πρόσωπο. Το λόγο εξηγεί η Taylor v. D.P.P. [1973] A.C. 964: "... ... one person fighting unlawfully could properly be convicted of an affray, since of two persons fighting one might be participating lawfully and the other unlawfully, and if one was participating unlawfully it was not necessary to

quire whether other participants were acting lawfully or unlawfully.» Στο σύγγραμμα Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2003, αναφέρεται ότι κατηγορία για συμπλοκή πρέπει γίνεται μόνο στις περιπτώσεις όπου παραβιάζεται σοβαρά η δημόσια τάξη και ότι είναι κακή πρακτική να χρησιμοποιείται το αδίκημα της συμπλοκής σε καθαρές περιπτώσεις επίθεσης. Παραθέτω το πιο κάτω απόσπασμα από την παρ 11-38 του συγγράμματος στην σελ. 509: «Prosecutions for affray should be

stituted only where the

cident gives rise to serious disturbance to public order (Law Commission Report No. 123, para. 3.38, referred to

Davison [1992] Crim LR 31); it is thoroughly bad practice to charge what are straightforward assaults as public order offences (Connor (13 March 2000 unreported)).» Στην υπόθεση Taylor (ανωτέρω) λέχθηκε επίσης ότι δεν είναι αναγκαίο στην συμπλοκή να υπάρχει αμοιβαιότητα στα κτυπήματα. Η χρήση βίας μπορεί να προέρχεται μόνο από την μια πλευρά ενώ η άλλη μπορεί είτε να αμύνεται νόμιμα είτε να αποφεύγει απλά τα κτυπήματα. Όπως λέχθηκε από τον Lord Hailsham στις σελίδες 110 και 112 της απόφασης: «a person is not to be acquitted of affray simply because his victim acts lawfully, as for

stance by retreating, or simply warding off the blows aimed at him by the accused. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thus,

the first place, the word 'fight' needs to be

terpreted so as to show that it is not necessary to prove a reciprocity of blows. Without attempting an alternative definition, it must

clude at least any unlawful participation

a violent breach of the peace where the requisite element of terror is achieved. The typical affray is, of course, a mêlée between many participants

which many blows are given and received by the participants. But the violence can be all on one side, and the unlawful character of the violence can be limited to one participant

the mêlée.» Στην υπόθεση Smith

volves a group of people who may well be shouting, struggling, threatening, waving weapons, throwing objects, exchanging and threatening blows and so on. Again, typically it

volves a continuous course of conduct, the criminal character of which depends on the general nature and effect of the conduct as a whole and not on particular

cidents and events which may take place

the course of it. Where reliance is placed on such a continuous course of conduct, it is not necessary for the Crown to identify and prove particular

cidents. » Επίσης στην υπόθεση R. v. Davidson

the charge or

formation» μέσα στο κείμενο του άρθρου 85