clr/1963/1963_2_448.pdf

(2), 8 (I) and

(2)and 9

(1)—Therefore, no relief under the latter Law can be sought in respect of thesaid debt—Relief can onlybe granted in respect of Debts incurred before the appointed day (supra) and still owed by the debtor at the time of the filing of the application for relief. Statutes—Construction—Canons of construction—Matters to be considered in construing a statute—Aim, scope and object, of the whole statute—what was the law before the statute waspassed— What was the mischief or defectfor which the law had not provided—What remedy the legislature has appointed and the reason of the remedy—And the history of the statute. By section 62 of the Contract Law, Cap. 149 it is provided that if " the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed." By section 2 of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law, 1962 " Debt " includes all liabilities of a debtor of any nature whatsoever, secured or unsecured, , whether payable presently or in future." Section 8 of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law, 1962, reads as follows :—

(1)" A debtor m a y . . . . apply in the prescribed formclaiming relief. . . . in respect of any debt incurred before the appointed date and owed by him " . . . (Note : the appointed date is February 13, 1962). 448

(2)Anysuch application shall include al! the debts owed by the debtor and incurred before the appointed date and shall also contain a statement ofany debts owed by thedebtor and incurred after theappointed date andof any exempted debts " Section 9

(1)of the said Lawreads as follows:— " N o application shall be entertained bytheRelief Court and norelief shall begranted inrespect of any debt incurred after theappointed date." Section 6

(2)ofthe aforesaid Law gives theCourt power to grant leavetoadebtor toapply forthe reopening ofa " transaction " under certain circumstances. (Section 6

(2)isset out in full in thejudgment of the High Court). The appellant hasapplied totheAgricultural Debtors Relief Court, Kyrenia, requesting relief under theprovisions ofthe Agricultural |Debtors Relief Law, 1962, in respect of a debt of£1892 owed by himunder a bond in customary form dated the 29th July, 1962, to thecreditor (respondent). This bond was issued in consideration and satisfaction of two previous bonds dated the 24th September, 1957and 15thOctober,1961, respectively, andofa cash loan of £50 made after February, 1962, i.e. after the appointed day(13thof February, 1962). The Agricultural Debtors Relief Court, Kyrenia held that the applicant-debtor (appellant) wasnot entitled to relief in respect of this bond issued to therespondent-creditor onthe ground that it wasa debt incurred after the appointed day i.e. February 13,1962andthat therefore, this debt should be deleted from theapplication for relief. The debtor (applicant) appealed against this order and the High Court indismissing theappeal, ZEKIAand JOSEPHIDESJ.J., dissenting:Held,(\)itisquiteclear that therewasa new liability created when the newbond wasissued. Were it not for the provisions of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law, 1962,to be discussed herein, there would be agreement that this was the legal position.

(2)There isofcourse nodispute astothe general purpose, but the nature andextent of relief must be ascertained from the Law itself. Thedebtor must bring himself within theprovisions of the Act. In section 2 the definition is " debt includes all liabilities of a debtor of any nature whatsoever, 449 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOAVNOU KRASISMENOS V. lOANNIS IOSIF HjICHANNI 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS V. lOANNIS IOSIF HjICHANNI secured or unsecured, whether payable under a Judgment or Order ofa Court or under a hire purchase agreement or otherwise and whether payable presently or in the future ". This clearly includes the bond in question. From the definition there are excluded what are known as " exempted debts " with which we are not concerned in this proceeding, and the debts dealt with by section 9.

(3)The plain language of sub-section

(1)of section 8 says the debts in respect of which relief maybe given arethe debts incurred before the appointed date, February 13, 1962,and they must be debts owed by him, but it does not define the date upon which they must be owed. Nevertheless before the Relief Court can grant relief a debt must beone incurred before February 13, 1962and also be owing. Owing when ? At thedate when theapplication issworn toor filedas will be explained later. The sub-section does not say the debt must be owing, whatever that word may mean, on or before February 13, 1962. If that had been the intention it would have been easy tosayso.

(4)At what date, then must the debt be owing in order to give the Court jurisdiction over it ? Clearly there is notjurisdiction over a debt which wasincurred before the appointed dateandwhichhasbeen paid offbythedateonwhich the debtor makes his affidavit attached to his application for relief because such a debt cannot be said to be one " owed " at that time. Norfor thesame reason hastheCourt any jurisdiction in respect ofa debt which hasbeen incurred after the appointed dates but has also been paid off bythe date the debtor makes such an affidavit. The form does not even require it to be listed.

(5)Again sub-section

(2)of section 8 of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law, 1962, provides for the listing notonly of those debts for which relief maybegiven, but also other debts for which relief maynot be given, namely those incurred after the appointed date and owed by the debtor. It does notrequire a listing of any debts which have been incurred since the appointed date and have been paid. Wecanonly conclude the word " owed " relates to debts owed at thedate the application was sworn to by the debtor, namely August 8,1962.

(6)Can it be said debts are owing under the two earlier bonds as of either the date of making theaffidavit or filingthe application for relief ? We think not. It was stated and agreed during argument before us that the debtor's liability 450 under them had been extinguished when the new bond was taken. This is confirmed by their return by the creditor to the debtor. The fact that the new bond represented a re­ arrangement of the legal liabilities between these two persons does not affect the creditor's position. The rights and liabi­ lities of the parties are not governed by the earlier bonds, they arise out of and are governed by the new legal contract entered into on July 19, 1962. The debtor must have known about the Law when he gave the new bond and must be held to think he gained some advantage in doing so.

(7)When thedebtorfiled his application (sworn on August 8, 1962) on August 8, 1962, he knew he owed nothing on the two earlier bonds, he only owed money on the last one. He had therefore no right to.apply for relief in respect of those earlier debts. And if he had no right to apply for relief the Court could not hava power to grant him something for which he was not entitled to ask. Section 9

(1)confirms this view because it prohibits the Court from granting relief in respect of any debt incurred after the appointed date.

(8)We have not overlooked section 6

(2)of the Law which gives the Relief Court power to grant leave to a debtor to apply for the re-opening of a "transaction " under certain circum­ stances. It was argued in this Court that the debtor could invoke it here. There are two insurmountable difficulties in his way. The first is that no application was made to the Relief Court for such leave. The second is that no material was placed before either the Relief Court or this Court which would allow such leave to be given. We should also add that section 6

(2)supports the conclusion which we have reached. In it the legislature has clearly said, in effect, that the transactions therein designated and which apart from this provision would clearly not come within the Law, may be re-opened and a new account may be taken bet­ ween the debtor and the creditor and that the relief therein provided for may he given. Held, per JOSEPHIDES, J., in his dissenting judgment :—

(1)There is no doubt that under our Contract Law, Cap. 149, if the " parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed " (section 62). If A owes to Β £1,000 by virtue of a customary bond dated 1961 and A enters into an agree451 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. IOANNIS I O S I F HjICHANNI 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOO KRASISMENOS «. IOANNIS IOSIF HjICHANNI ment with Βand gives Β a mortgage of his (A's) property for £1,000 in March, 1962, in place of the bond of £1,000, this is a new contract and extinguishes the old. But, can it be said that this is a " debt incurred after the appointed date"(13th February, 1962) for the purposes of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law ? In fact the consideration ^stated in the bond for £1,892 of July, 1962, is the two old bonds of 1961 plus a small " admitted account" (£50).

(2)We are here concerned with the construction of an Act of Parliamentand I thinkwe ought togivetheAct its ordinary meaning, and carry out to its full extent that which thelegisla­ ture intended. In accordance with the canons of construction applicable tosuchcases toarrive atthereal meaning,itisalways necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act ; to consider (a) what was the law before the Act was passed ; (b)what was themischief or defect for which the law had not provided ; (c) what remedy Parlia­ ment has appointed ; and (d) the reason of the remedy(Heydon'scase

(1584)Rep. lb).

(3)The long title of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law, 1962, states that it is " a Law to provide for the relief of Agri­ cultural Debtors in the Republic ". The expression " debt " in section 2 is defined as including " all liabilities of a debtor of any nature whatsoever, secured or unsecured, whether payable under ajudgment or order of a Court or under a hirepurchase agreement or otherwise and whether payable pre­ sently or in the future ". Certain debts are exempted from the definition of a " debt " e.g., taxes and duties,loans madeby Co-operative Societies and Banks, etc.

(4)A special Court, styledas " theRelief Court " was consti­ tuted under the provisions of section 3 of the Law and em­ powered to consider and determine any application made by any debtor under the provisions of the Law and, when the " circumstances of the case " so require, by its decision to order— (

1. a)that any debt included in the debtor's application may be paid by instalments during such period, not exceeding twelve years, as the Court may determine (subject to spe­ cial provisions for hire-purchase agreements) ; (
2. b)that theagreed rate of theinterest chargeable for such debt may be reduced up to not less than five per centum per annum (section 6

(1)). 452 The expression " circumstances of the case " includes inter alia " questions relating to the circumstances under which and the purposes for which such indebtedness was incurred " (section 6

(3)'(Z>)).

(5)The Relief Court was further empowered to reopen transactions regarding interest paid, arrears of interest, rate of interest, or theamountscharged for expenses, bonus, premiums, renewals, etc., proved to be excessive, notwithstanding any bond or agreement purporting to create an obligation, and relieve the debtor of any sum so found to be charged or paid in excess. (Section 6

(2)). This reproduces substantially the provisions of the Usury (Farmers) Law, Cap. 101 (section 4) and the Dealings between Merchants and Farmers Law, Cap. 132 (section 6), which have been on the statute book since 1919. Under the provisions of section 8a debtor is entitled to apply to the Relief Court for relief in respect of " any debt incurred before the appointed d a t e " ; and under section 9

(1)it is provided that no application shall be entertained by the Re­ lief Court and no relief shall be granted in respect of " any debt incurred after the appointed date " (see the Greek and Turkish texts of section 9

(1)quoted in this judgment). A " debt " is a liability of a debtor of any nature whatsoever " . . . . whether payable presently or in thefuture " , (section2). " The appointed date " is defined in section 2 of the Law to be the 13th day of February, 1962. In the Bill published in the Official gazette of the Republic on the 3rd March, 1962, the expression " appointed date " in clause 2 of the Bill, was defined as meaning " the date in which the present Law was introduced as a Bill by the competent Ministers in the House of Representatives".

(6)From theabove brief outline it will be seen that the object of the legislature was to provide for the relief of farmers in the Republic by extending the time for the payment of their debts, reducing the rate of interest, etc.,in respect of debts which had been " incurred " before the date on which the Bill was intro­ duced in the House of Representatives. The expression used in the Greek text is " χρέη συναφθέντα " and the expression used in the Turkish text is " aktedilen her hangi bir bore ", before the appointed date (section 8

(1)).

(7)I now approach the construction of this Act bearing in mind that in thewords of Lord Lindley (in Thomson v.Clanmorris

(1900)1 Ch. 718, 725) " regard must be had not only to 453 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS u. lOANNIS IOSIF HjICHANNI 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. lOANNIS IOSIF HjICHAlJNI the words used, but to the history of the Act and the reasons which led to this being passed ". (Pratt v. Cook

(1939)1K.B. 364, 382 C.A., per Goddard L.J.).

(8)As I read the Greek and Turkish texts of section 8

(1)and section 9

(1)it was the intention of the legislature to give relief in respect of debts actually created for the first time prior to the introduction of the Bill in the House of Representatives (and payable either " presently or in the future "), and not to exclude such debts from relief in cases where an old bond or liability was renewed after the introduction of the Bill in the House. That is to say, I take the object of the legislature to be to look to the substance of the transaction to ascertain whether it is a completely new liability incurred for the first time after the appointed date or a bond or contract renewing an older bond or contract made prior to the appointed date. For the purposes of this special Law one has to look to the substance and the origin of the liability and not to the ultimate form ; one should look to the creation and nature of the indebtedness itself as such and not to the date of the document evidencing such debt or to the documentary evidence of the debt founding the enforceable right.

(9)In the present case the bond in dispute (for £1,892) signed in July, 1962, itself states that the consideration is the old bonds (of 1961) plus a new account (of £50). That is to say, the sum of £1,892 consists of two old debts incurred prior to the 13th February, 1962, amounting to £1,842 and of a new debt of £50 incurred after February, 1962.

(10)In the circumstances, applying the above construction I consider that the debtor is entitled to relief in respect of his indebtedness of £1,842 incurred prior to the appointed date, but not in respect of the new debt of £50 incurred after that date. I would allow the appeal in those terms. Appeal dismissed with costs. Cases referred to :— Thomson v. Clanmorris

(1900)1 Ch. 718, 725 ; Pratt v. Cook

(1939)1 K.B. 364, 382, C.A.; Heydoris case

(1584)Rep. lb. Appeal. Appeal against the judgment of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Court of Kyrenia (Attalides Ag. D.J.) dated the 30.5.63 (Application No. 100/62) whereby it was held that 454 applicant is not entitled to relief in respect of a debt due on a bond issued to the respondent on 29.7.62 and that the debt be deleted from the application for relief. IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS E. Efstathiou for the appellant. A. Liatsos for the respondent. v. Cur. adv. vult. The facts sufficiently appear in the judgments which follow. WILSON, P. : This is an appeal from the order of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Court, Kyrenia, made on May 30th 1963, in which it was ordered that the applicant debtor was not entitled to relief in respect of a debt due on a bond issued to the respondent on 29.7.1962 and that the debt be deleted from the application for relief. The only question for consideration in this appeal is whether for purposes of the said Law, the indebtedness to the creditor was incurred by two earlier bonds given before the effective date or incurred by a single bond given after the effective date. The learned trial Judge ruled that the debtor, was not entitled to relief for this debt because the debtor freely issued the newbond after the Law had been put into operation and it was accordingly excluded by the provisions of section 9

(1)which reads : " No application shall be entertained by the relief Court and no relief shall be granted in respect of any debt incurred after the appointed date." The appointed date was February 13, 1962. . Upon the appeal it was contended that the debtor was entitled to relief because the indebtedness to the creditor was, for purposes of the Law, incurred under the earlier bonds, and, in any event, section 6

(2)applied. It provides :— " Subject to any Rules of Court the relief Court may grant leave to a debtor to apply for the re-opening of a transaction if there is evidence satisfying such court that the interest paid or the arrears of interest on the debt or both exceed the amount of such debt, or that the rate of interest in excess of the legal rate of interest, or that the amounts charged for expenses, inquiries, fines, bonus, premius renewals or any other charges are excessive, and in such a case the relief court may re-open the transaction and take an account 455 1963 Nov. 3, Dec. 17 lOANNIS IOSIF HjICHANNI 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS IOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. IOANNIS IOSIF HjICHANNI Wilson, P. between the creditor and the debtor, notwithstanding any account stated, bond, mortgage or any agreement purporting to create an obligation, and relieve the debtor of any sum so found to be charged or paid in excess." The following are the relevant facts. It is admitted that the appellant is a debtor within the meaning of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law

1. It is admitted that this bond was given in satisfaction of two earlier bonds made between the debtor and the creditor dated 24.9.61 and 15.10.61 and some small debts incurred after the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law came into effect. It is also admitted that the earlier two bonds and the small debts referred to were satisfied by the issue of the new bond on July 29,
2. The two older bonds were surrendered by the creditor to the debtor when the new bond wasgiven. It wasfurther admitted that if the creditor had brought action on the old bonds—assuming that were permitted—against the debtor, after the new bond had been given, the latter would have contended that he was not under any liability to pay them, because they had been satisfied by the giving of the new bond. It is quite clear, therefore, that there was a new liability created when the new bond was issued. Were it not for the provisions of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law to be discussed herein, there would be agreement that this was the legal position. It was contended, however, that for the purposes of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Lawthat the old debt continued because the new bond contained the following provision :— "Derived from old bonds and by virtue of an admitted account." and that the general purpose of the law was to give relief to agricultural debtors. There is of course no dispute as to the general purpose, but the nature and extent of relief must be ascertained from the Law itself. The debtor must bring himself within the provisions of the Act. In section 2 the definition is : " ' debt' includes all liabilities of a debtor of any nature whatsoever, secured or unsecured, whether payable under a Judgment or Order of a Court or under ahire purchase agreement orotherwise and whether payable presently or in the future." This'clearly includes the bond in question. From the definition there are excluded what are known as " exempted debts " with which we are not concerned in this proceeding, and the debts dealt with by section
3. 456 Now what does the Law require. The relevant words of section 8

(1)and

(2)are—"A debtor may. . .apply in the prescribed form . ..claiming relief . . .in respect of any debt incurredbefore the appointed date and owedby him . . . " "

(2)Any such application shall include all the debts owed by the debtor and incurred before the appointed date and shall also contain a statement of any debts owed by the debtor and incurred after the appointed date and of any exempted debts . . .. " The plain language of sub-section

(1)says the debts in respect of which relief may be given are the debts incurred .before the appointed date, February 13, 1962, and they must be debts owed by him, but it does not define the date upon which they must be owed. Nevertheless before the Relief Court can grant relief a debt must be one incurred before February 13, 1962 and also be owing. Owing when? At the date when the application is sworn to or filed as will be explained later. The sub-section does not say the debt must be owing, whatever that word may mean, on or before February 13, 1962. If that had been the intention it would have been easy to say so. At what date, then, must the debt be owing in order to give the Court jurisdiction over it? Clearly there is no jurisdiction over a debt which was incurred before the appointed date and which has been paid off by the date on which the debtor makes his affidavit attached to his application for relief because such a debt cannot be said to be one " owed " at that time. Nor for the same reason has the Court any jurisdiction in respect of a debt which has been incurred after the appointed dates but has also been paid off by the date the debtor makes such an affidavit. The form does not even require it to be listed. Again, sub-section

(2)provides for the listing not only of those debts for which relief may be given, but also other debts for which relief may not be given, namelythose incurred after the appointed date and owed by the debtor. It does not require a listing of any debts which have been incurred since the appointed date and have been paid. I can only conclude the word " owed " relates to debts owed at the date the application was sworn to by the debtor, namely August 8,

1. Can it be said debts are owing under the two earlier bonds as of either the date of making the affidavit or filing the application for relief? I think not. · It was stated and agreed during argument before us that the debtor's liability under them had been extinguished when the new bond was taken. This is confirmed by their return by the cre457 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. lOANNIS I O S I F HjICHANNI Wilson, P. 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. IOANNIS I O S I F HjICHANNI Wilson, P. ditor to the debtor. The fact that the new bond represented a re-arrangement of the legal liabilities between these two persons does not affect the 'creditor's position. The rights and liabilities of the parties are not governed by the earlier bonds, they arise out of and are governed by the new legal contract entered into on July 29,
2. The debtor must have known about the Law when he gave the new bond and must be held to think he gained some advantage in doing so. When the debtor filed his application (sworn on August 8, 1962) on August 8, 1962,he knew he owed nothing on the two earlier bonds, he only owed money on the last one. He had therefore no right to apply for relief in respect of those earlier debts. And if he had no right to apply for relief the Court could not have power to grant him something for which he was not entitled to ask. Section 9

(1)confirms this view because it prohibits the Court from granting relief in respect of any debt incurred after the appointed date. I have not overlooked section 6

(2)of the Law which gives the Relief Court power to grant leave to a debtor to apply for the reopening of a " transaction " under certain circumstances. It was argued in this Court that the debtor could invoke it here. There are two insurmountable difficulties in his way. The first is that no application was made to the Relief Court for such leave. The second is that no material was placed before either the Relief Court or this Court which would allow such leave to be given. I should also add that section 6

(2)supports the conclusion which I have reached. In it the legislature has clearly said, in effect, that the transactions therein designated and which apart from this provision would clearly not come within the Law, may be reopened and a new account may be taken between the debtor and the creditor and that the relief therein provided for may be given. For these reasons the appeal should be dismissed with costs. ZEKIA, J. : The point which falls for decision in this appeal is the construction to be laid on the words " debts incurred " which occur in section 9

(1)of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law, 1962. Section 9

(1)reads : " No application shall be entertained by the Relief Court and no relief shall be granted in respect of anv debt incurred after the appointed date," the appointed date being the 13th day of February,1962. 458 In this case, admittedly, the consideration of the bond (£1,892 of July 1962) included in the appellant's application made to the Agricultural Debtors Relief Court, consists mainly of two earlier bonds for debts incurred prior to the appointed date. Is it permissible for the appellant-debtor, for the purposes of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law, 1962, to include in his application debts embodied in two earlier bonds notwithstanding the fact that both bonds merged in a new bond of July 1962? The primary object of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law is to grant relief to the Agricultural Debtors by arranging the payment of their debts by annual instalments, not exceeding 12 years and also by reducing,the rate of interest to be paid by such debtors, and, if need be, by re-opening accounts and transactions between such debtors arid their creditors (see section 6 of the Law). Under section 8(a) of the Law a debtor was entitled to apply within the prescribed period to the Relief Court in respect of debts incurred before the appointed date. There is no doubt that the old debts merged in the new bond, executed in July, 1962, but the fact remains that they were still unpaid and were originally incurred prior to the appointed date. I am inclined to the view that it would be more consistent with the object of the law in question if the actual date originally a debt was incurred is accepted for the purposes of sections 6

(1)and 9

(1)of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law,

1. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the appeal should be allowed. VASSILIADES, J. : I am clearly of opinion that the ap- peal must fail. The word " debt " in a legal proceeding and in a statutory provision concerning indebtedness, must carry its ordinary legal meaning unless otherwise required. It must mean a legally binding obligation for the payment of money, enforceable by legal process. Moral debts, prescribed debts, extinguished or paid up debts, and other such obligations, past or still existing, cannot be described as legal debts, in the absence of express provision to that effect in the relevant law. We arehere concerned with a debt under the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law,
2. The claim of the creditor, or 459 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. IOANNIS I O S I F HjICHANNI Zekia, J. 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS V. IOANNIS I O S I F HjICHANNI Vassiliades, J . the obligation ofthe debtor, cannot be dealt with under the provisions ofthis special statute, unless they can be brought within the definition of thestatute, which reads : «'Χρέος' περιλαμβάνει πάσης φύσεως υποχρεώσεις οφει­ λέτου τινός,ήσφαλισμέναςή μή,είτε αύται οφείλονται δυνάμει δικαστικής αποφάσεως ή διατάγματος, είτε δυνάμει συμ­ βάσεως ένοικιαγορας είτε άλλως πως, καιείτε αύταικατέστη­ σαν ήδη απαιτητά! είτε θά καταστώσιν απαιτητοί εν τω μέλλοντι.» (In the official English translation prepared atthe Ministry of Justice, the definition reads : " debt includes allliabilities ofa debtor of any nature whatsoever, secured or unsecured, whether payable under a judgment ororder ofaCourt orunder ahirepurchase agreement orotherwise and whether payable presently or in future.".) It is common ground that the " d e b t " of the appellantdebtor to the respondent-creditor herein, could not be dealt with by the Relief Court unless it could be brought within the provisions of the statute. It is moreover commonground that the"debt" in question consists ofa legal obligation of the appellant-debtor topay to the respondent-creditor £1,862 with 9% p.a.interest from 1.8.62 under abond incustomary form dated 29.7.62, and issued to the creditor accordingly, payable on1.8.
3. This bond was signed and issued in considerationand satisfaction of a small cash-loan andtwoprevious bonds dated 24.9.61 and 15.10.61 respectively, both of which were returned, as usual, to thedebtor upon theissuing of the bond in question on 29.7.
4. Surely the only legal debt which now, (and as from is­ suing of the new bond) the appellant-debtor owes to the respondent-creditor is the debt payable under the bondin question. He has no debt under the previous bonds ; or in respect ofthe small cash loan. And equally surely, the debt under the present bond is a " debt " within the defi­ nition ; while theindebtedness which existed underthe previous bonds ceased to be debts within the definition as from the 29.7.
5. To my mind, the legal position under these bonds cannot be other than this. Now the appellant-debtor in making his application for relief under section 8 of the Agricultural Debtors Re­ lief Law, onthe 8th August 1962, included inhisstate460 ment of payable debts, the debt due, or " o w i n g " to the respondent-creditor under the bond issued on the 29.7.
6. Had he not included it, the debt could not be made sub­ ject to any order made by the Relief Court under section 6, as expressly provided in section
7. And the creditor would be free to pursue his ordinary legal remedy under the bond in his hands. But having included the debt in his application under section 8, the appellant-debtor is faced with the unavoid­ able position that the Relief Court, by express provision in the same section 8, can only give him relief under the statute " in respect of any debt incurred before ' the ap­ pointed date ' ", that is to say before the 13th February, 1962, as provided in section
8. Debts incurred after that date, are expressly exempted from the statute, notwith­ standing the fact that they are " debts " within the defi­ nition in section
9. Now " debt incurred" or " χρέος συναφθέν" (as worded in the Greek text of the section 8 of the Statute) before the appointed date can only mean, in my view, debt contracted, before the date fixed by the legislator for the purposes of this law. Συνάπτω χρέος in Greek means : I contract a debt. In my view, the appellant-debtor contracted his present legal debt to the respondent-creditor when he negotiated, agreed signed and issued to him, the bond for £1,862 on the 29.7.62 ; presumably knowing the legal consequences of the transaction. The ruling of the Relief Court Judge, to exclude the debt in question from appellant's appli­ cation, was, therefore, in my opinion, clearly right. And I agree with the conclusion reached by the President of the Court that for the reasons stated in his judgment, this appeal must be dismissed, with costs. JOSEPHIDES, J. : In this case we have to construe the expression " χρέη συναφθέντα μετά την καθωρισμένην ήμερομηνίαν" in Turkish " T a y i n edilen tarihten sonra akdedilen her hangi bir bore ", which occurs in section 9

(1)of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law, 1962. The same expression occurs in section"8 of the same Law. In the English translation of the Law this is rendered as " any debt incurred after the appointed date." The GreekandTurkish texts of section 9

(1)read as follows: «9

(1)To δικαστήριον άνακουφίσεωςαγροτών οφειλετών δέν κέκτηται δικαιοδοσίαν εκδικάσεως αιτήσεων ουδέ παροχής άνακουφίσεως άναφορικώς προς χρέη συναφθέντα μετά τήν καθωρισμένην ήμερομηνίαν.» 461 1963 Nov 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS ν IOANNIS I O S I F HjICHANNI Vassihades, J. 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. IOANNIS I O S I F " 9

(1)Tayin edilen tarihten sonra aktedilen her hangi bir bore, ile ilgili olarak, Bore Duzenlome Mahkemesince hie; bir muracaata bakilmaz ve Ιιΐς bir hal c^aresine hiikmedilmez." The "appointed d a t e " is the13thdayof February, 1962 (section 2of the Law). HjICHANNI Josephides, J. The facts arebriefly as follows : The appellant, who is a debtor within the meaning of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law,filed his application for relief to the Relief Court on the8th August, 1962, in theprescribed form, under theprovisions of section 8

(1)of theLaw. In the second schedule to his application he showed the respondent as his creditor No.1and stated that he owed to him " about £1,892 plus interest ", by virtue of a " bond renewed in July, 1962," adding the following : " my original debt was incurred in 1949 and since then the bonds were renewed every year." The respondent-creditor filed a notice of opposition supported by anaffidavit in which, inter alia, it was stated that by virtue ofa bond issued onthe 29th July, 1962, and expiring on the 1st August, 1962,the appellant-debtor owed to himthesumof £1,892 plus interest at 9% per annum, and he, the respondent, asked the Court to exempt this debt from the debtor's application having regard to the date of the issue of the bond. The application came on for hearing before the Relief Court Judge onthe30th May, 1963, andit was common ground that the consideration stated inthe bond for £1,892 issued on the 29th July, 1962, was twoold bonds dated 24th September, 1961 and15th October, 1961 (for £1,699 and £58, respectively), and an" admitted account" of £50 in respect of money advanced for the first time after the 13th February,

1. The appellant's counsel submitted to the Relief Court that the bond signed in July, 1962was a renewal ofan old debt existing prior to 13th February, 1962and not a " debt incurred " after that date. The respondent's counsel submitted that the debtor by signing the bond for £1,892 onthe 29th July, 1962, that is to say,after the" appointed d a t e " (13th February, 1962), waived hisright toaskfor relief and that the bond was in respect of a " debt incurred after the appointed date." 462 Furthermore, respondent's counsel submitted that the bond for £1,892 included not only two old bonds but also a new loan of £
2. The Relief Court Judge ruled that the appellant was not entitled to relief for this debt " having freely issued the bond after the date fixed and after the Law has been put into operation. The debt 1, therefore, is deleted from the application ". On appeal both counsel reiterated their submissions, appellant's argument being that the bond of £1,892 signed in July, 1962, was a renewal of a " d e b t incurred" prior to the 13th February, 1962, and that the renewal of a bond did not constitute the " incurring of a debt " under the Law. Counsel for the respondent submitted that by the signing of the new bond in July, 1962, the liability under the old bonds of 1961 was extinguished and that the debtor "incurred a d e b t " in July, 1962, i.e. after the appointed date. There is no doubt that under our Contract Law, Cap. 149, if the " parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed " (section 62). If A owes to Β £1,000 by virtue of a customary bond dated 1961 and A enters into an agreement with Β and gives Β a mortgage of his (A's) property for £1,000 in March, 1962, in place of the bond of £1,000, this is a new contractand extinguishes the old. .But, can it be said that this is a " debt incurred after the appointed date " (13th February, 1962) for the purposes of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Law ? In fact the consideration stated in the bond for £1,892 of July, 1962, is the two old bonds of 1961 plus a small " admitted account " (£50). We are here concerned with the construction of an Act of Parliament and I think we ought to give the Act its ordinary meaning, and carry out to its full extent that which the legislature intended. In accordance with the canons of construction applicable to such cases to arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act ; to-consider (a) what was the law before the Act was passed ; (b) what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not pro­ vided ; (c) what remedy Parliament has appointed ; and (d) the reason of the remedy (Heydon's case

(1584)Rep. 7b). The Agricultural Debtors Relief Law was published in the Gazette of the Republic (and came into operation) on the 26th April, -1962, and under the provisions of section 463 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS IOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. IOANNIS I O S I F HJICHANNI Josephides, J . 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS V. IOANNIS IOSIF HJICHANNI Josephides, J. 8

(1)a debtor was given three months after the expiration of one month from the day of the coming into operation of the Law to apply to the Relief Court for relief. The long title of the Law states that it is " a Law to provide for the relief of agricultural debtors in the Republic ". The expression " d e b t " in section 2 is defined as including " all liabilities of a debtor of any nature whatsoever, secured or unsecured, whether payable under a judgment or order of a Coutt or under a hire-purchase agreement or otherwise and whether payable presently or in the future". Certain debts are exempted from the definition of a "debt", e.g. taxes and duties, loans made by Cooperative Societies and Banks, etc. A special Court, styled as " the Relief Court" was constituted under the provisions of section 3 of the Law and empowered to consider and determine any application made by any debtor under the provisions of the Law and, when the "circumstances of the case" so require, by its decision to order— (a) that any debt included in the debtor's application may be paid by instalments during such period, not exceeding twelve years, as the Court may determine (subject to special provisions for hirepurchase agreements) ; (b) that the agreed rate of the interest chargeable for such debt may be reduced up to not less than five per centum per annum (Section 6

(1)). The expression " circumstances of the case" includes inter alia " questions relating to the circumstances under which and the purposes for which such indebtedness was incurred " (Section 6

(3)(b) ) . The Relief Court was further empowered to reopen transactions regarding interest paid, arrears of interest, rate of interest, or the amounts charged for expenses, bonus, premiums, renewals etc. proved to be excessive, notwithstanding any bond or agreement purporting to create an obligation, and relieve the debtor of any sum so found to be charged or paid in excess. (Section 6

(2)). This reproduces substantially the provisions of the Usury (Farmers) Law, Cap. 101 (section 4) and the Dealings between Merchants and Farmers Law, Cap. 132 (section 6), which have been on the statute book since 1919. Under the provisions of section 8 a debtor is entitled to apply to the Relief Court for relief in respect of " any debt incurred before the appointed d a t e " ; and under 464 section 9

(1)it is provided that no application shall be enter­ tained by the Relief Court and no relief shall be granted in respect of " any debt incurred after the appointed date " (see the Greek and Turkish texts of section 9

(1)quoted earlier in this judgment). A " debt " is a liability of a debtor of any nature whatsoever " . . whether payable presently or in the f u t u r e " (section 2). 1963 Nov. 5, D e c 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. IOANNIS I O S I F HJICHANNI T h e " appointed d a t e " is (as already stated) defined in section 2 of the Law to be the " 13th day of February, 1962 " . In the Bill published in the official Gazette on the 3rd March, 1962, the expression " appointed date " , in clause 2 of the Bill, was defined as meaning " the date on which the present Law was introduced as a Bill by the competent Ministers in the House of Representatives". From the above brief outline it will be seen that the object of the legislature was to provide for the relief of farmers in the Republic by extending the time for the payment of their debts, reducing the rate of interest, etc. in respect of debts which had been " incurred " before the date on which the Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. T h e expression used in the Greek text is " χ ρ έ η σ υ ν α φ θ έ ν τ α " and the expression used in the Turkish text is " aktedilen her hangi bir bor£ " , before the appointed date (section 8

(1)). T h e words " σ υ ν ά π τ ω " and " σ υ ν ά π τ ω χ ρ έ ο ς " are defined in the Greek Dictionaries as follows : Συνάπτω ΑΚΔ (άόρ. συνήψα, πθτ. άόρ. συνήφθην, μτχ. παθτ. πρκ. συνημμένος). Συνδέω (μτφ. μέ άφηρημένον άντικείμενον) κάμνω (π.χ. συνάπτω γάμον, μάχην κ.λ.π.) ('Επιτροπής Φιλολόγων Σύγχρονον όρθογραφικόν έρμηνευτικόν λεξικόν "Ελληνικής γλώσσης Καθαρευούσης—Δημοτικής, Σελις 2027) Συνάπτω, άόρ. συνήψα,—συνήφθην, παθ. μετ. συνημμένος. Συνδέω, συναρμόζω, συνήθ. μεταφ. «συνάπτω φιλίαν—γνωριμίαν—σχέσεις» συνδέομαι δια φιλίας κ.λ.π. «συνάπτω μάχην» μάχομαι (συνάπτω γάμον) νυμφεύομαι, « σ υ ν ά π τ ω χ ρ έ η — δ ά ν ε ι ο ν » δ α ν ε ί ζ ο μ α ι «συνημμένος-η-ον προσηρτημένος». Προσκεκολλημένος «τά συνημμένα μετά τής αναφοράς έγγραφα». Έπίρ.—συνημμένως (Μεγάλη 'Ελληνική 'Εγκυκλοπαίδεια 465 Josephides, J. 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. IOANNIS I O S I F HJICHANNI Josephides, J. Τόμος KB "Εκδοσις Δευτέρα Ιδρυτής Ιδιοκτήτης—Παύλος Δρανδάκης 'Εκδοτικός 'Οργανισμός «Φοίνιξ» Ε.Π.Ε. Σελΐς 551) Συνάπτω (ρ. μετ. άορ. συνήψα, παθ. άόρ. συνήφθην, μτχ. παθ. πρκμ. συνημμένος). Συνενώ, συνδέω, συναρμόζω, συγκολλώ, συμφωνώ, συμβάλλομοι, επιχειρώ, κάμνω φρ. συνάπτω γάμον, νυμφεύομαι· συνάπτω μάχην, συγκρούομαι συνάπτω συμβόλαιον, συμβάλλομαι συνάπτω σχέσεις, σχετί­ ζομαι· σ υ ν ά π τ ω χ ρ έ η * χ ρ ε ώ ν ο μ α ι . (Ελευθερουδάκη "Εγκυκλοπαιδικόν Λεξικόν Τόμος 'Ενδέκατος, Σελίς893). Συνάπτω (ρ. μτβ.) άόρ. συνήψα, παθ. άόρ. συνήφθην,μετ. παθ. παρακ. συνημμένος . Συνδέω τιπρος άλλο, συναρμόζω τι ώς παρακολούθημα, ώς παράρτημα. «Το εγγραφόνσας μετά τοϋ συνημμένου πιστοποιητικού διεβιβάσθη κ.λ.π.» ('ιδία μεταφ.) «συνάπτω γάμον» νυμφεύομαι- συνάπτω μάχην, μάχομαι- συνάπτω σχέσεις, γνωριμίαν, σχετίζομαι* γνωρί­ ζομαι προς τίνα «συνάπτω συμβόλαιον—σύμβασιν, δάνειον» συνομολογώ. (Πρωίας λεξικόν νέας 'Ελληνικής γλώσσης, "Εκδοσις δευτέρα έπηυξημένη, Τόμος Δεύτερος, Σελις 2299). According to t h e Turkish English Dictionary by Honi, t h e T u r k i s h word " Aktetmek " means " t o bind, tie, con­ clude (bargain, treaty) ; contract (marriage) ; set u p , es­ tablish (council) ; organise (meeting) ; make (a contract, e t c . " A n d according t o t h e Concise Oxford Turkish Dictionary by Alderson and Fahir I z , t h e word " akid " (from which the verb " a k t e t m e k " drives) means " A tying ; tie, knot ; compact, treaty ; bargain ; marriage." I now approach t h e construction of this Act bearing in mind that in t h e words of Lord Lindley (in Thomson v. Clanmorris

(1900)1 C h .718,725)" regard must behad not only t o the words used, b u t t o t h e history of t h eAct and t h e reasons which led to this being passed " . (Pratt v. Cook

(1939)1 K.B. 364, 382 C.A., per Goddard L.J.). As I read the Greek and T u r k i s h texts of section 8

(1)and section 9

(1)it was t h e intention of t h e legislature to give relief in respect of debts actually created for t h e first time prior t o t h e introduction of t h e Bill in t h e House of Representatives (and payable either " presently or in t h e 466 future"), and not to exclude such debts from relief in cases where an old bond or liability was renewed after the introduction of the Bill in the House. That is to say, I take the object of the legislature to be to look to the substance of the transaction to ascertain whether it is a completely new liability incurred for the first time after the appointed date or a bond or contract renewing an older bond or contract made prior to the appointed date. For the purposes of this special law one has to look to the substance and the origin of the liability and not to the ultimate form ; one should look to the creation and nature of the indebtedness itself as such and not to the date of the document evidencing such debt or to the documentary evidence of the debt founding the enforceable right. In the present case the bond in dispute (for £1,892) signed in July, 1962, itself states that the consideration is the old bonds (of 1961) plus a new account (of £50). That is to say, the sum of £1,892 consists of two old debts incurred prior to the 13th February, 1962, amounting to £1,842, and of a new debt of £50 incurred after February, 1962. In the circumstances, applying the above construction, I consider that the debtor is entitled to relief in respect of his indebtedness of £1,842 incurred prior to the appointed date, but not in respect of the new debt of £50 incurred after that date. I would allow the appeal in those terms. WILSON, P. : In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed with costs. 467 1963 Nov. 5, Dec. 17 IACOVOS lOANNOU KRASISMENOS v. IOANNIS I O S I F HJICHANNI Josephides, J.