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1964 May 21, 23 [WILSON, P., VASSIUADES AND JOSEPHIDES, JJ. AND MUNIR, A G . J.] VEDAT A H M E T H A sir VEDAT AHMET HASIP, T H E POLICE v. Appellant, THE POLICE, Respondents. (Criminal Appeal No. 271

Article 159

, the framers of the Constitution used the expression " person arrested" in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article 11, no doubt to distinguish persons against whom a charge or a case has actually been filed in Court and persons against whom an investigation into the commission of an offence is being carried out but has not been completed. Finally, Article 155, paragraph 3 of the Constitution which empowers the High Court to determine the composition of the Court in " mixed" cases provides that " The High Court shall determine the composition of the Court which is to try a criminal case in which the accused and the injured party belong to different communities ". There again, reference is made to the trial of a criminal case. One has to look at the whole context and not divorce certain expressions from paragraph 2, Article

  1. And this paragraph has to be read together with paragraph 4, of the same Article (" in a criminal case") and Article 62 155, paragraph 3 (" to try a criminal case"), and point 17of the Zurich and London Agreements (" in criminalcases "). Finally, as the provision requiring the administration of justice to be based on communal criteria was introduced for the first time in Cyprus on the establishment of the Republic in 1960, and as this provision is an inroad in the universally accepted concept of justice and the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, such provision should be strictly interpreted. For all these reasons I am of the view that paragraph 2 of Article 159 becomes operative only in criminal cases where there is an accused charged with an offence in a criminal case before a court, and that, consequently, an application for a remand order does not come within the provisions of Article 159, paragraph
  2. It, therefore, follows that Judge Demetriades was empowered to make the remand order appealed against. A question which exercised my mind, and on which I asked counsel to make their submissions, was whether the question as raised before us, regarding the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 159 of the Constitution, did not amount to an ambiguity, in which case the Supreme Constitutional Court would have exclusive jurisdiction to make an interpretation of the Constitution under the provisions of Article 149 (b). I also invited counsel's attention to the case of The Cyprus Grain Commission and The New Vatili Cooperative Credit Society, 4 R.S.C.C. page 91 ; and Osman Saffet and The Cyprus Palestine Plantations Co., 4 R.S.C.C.
  3. But both counsel were agreed (as were my brother Judges) that this was not a case of ambiguity and they invited this Court to interpret and apply Article 159, paragraph
  4. To quote the words of Lord Parker, C.J. in a recent case (Bowersv. Gloucester Corporation

(1963)1 All E.R. 437 at p. 439), " I think that this is a typical case where, in argument before the Court, a confusion has arisen between a provision which is ambiguous and a provision which is difficult to interpret. It may well be that many sections of Acts are difficult to interpret, but can be interpreted by the proper canons of constniction." As Lord Parker says in the same case (in relation to a penal section) a provision can only be said to be ambiguous where, having applied all the proper canons of interpretation, the matter is still left in doubt (at page 439). (See Petrides v. The Greek Communal Chamber, and another
(1963)2 C. L. R. 417). 63 1964 May 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET H A S I P v. T H E POLICE Josephides, J. 1964 M a y 2 1 , 23 VEDAT AHMET HA«IP ν T H E PoLicr Josephides, J It may well be that this is not a case of ambiguity but a case where a provision of the Constitution is difficult to interpret, but can be interpreted by the proper canons of construction. As the matter was not fully argued be­ fore us I would like to leave it open, and I have decided the question raised in this appeal on the assumption that it is not a case of ambiguity. The secondground of appeal was that the remand order was unjustified as the police had obtained remand orders against the appellant on three previous occasions, each for 8 days, and that they had had sufficient time to com­ plete their investigation. The power conferred on a Judge to remand a person in custody is undoubtedly discretionary, and this is a com­ plaint that the Judge has not exercised his discretion in a judicial manner Suffice it to say that no material was put on behalf of the appellant before this Court to show that the Judge's discretion was not exercised judicially. For the guidance of Judges in future we express the Mew that it is desirable that a judge dealing with an ap­ plication for a remand order should keep a record of the appearances made before him and a summary of the state­ ments made, and, at the same time, if the application is contested, give grounds—albeit brief—of his decision, to help this Court on appeal m determining the matter Furthermore, where the application for remand is con­ tested, evidence should be heard on behalf of the police to satisfy the judge as to the use of the time made, prior to the application by the police, in investigating the com­ mission of the offence, and as to the exact stage reached in the investigation, and the time required for its com­ pletion. In the result, I would dismiss the appeal. MUNIR, ACTING J. : This is an appeal against an order made on the 16th May, 1964, by a District Judge of the District Court of Nicosia remanding the appellant in police custody for a period of eight days from the said date The form, Criminal Form No. 5 (Form J. 13), by which the police officer in question has made the application for remand, states that the offence in respect of which such application for remand was being made is that of " Endeavouring to procure an alteration in the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, by the show of armed force ." It is common ground that the appellant belongs to the 64 Turkish Community, as defined in Article 2 of the Constitution, and that the District Judge who granted the remand in question belongs to the Greek Community, as defined in the said article
  1. The appellant's notice of appeal contains the following three grounds : "
  2. The learned judge who was exercising criminal jurisdiction was wrong in law when he made the order of remand because the appellant being a member of the Turkish Community and there being no person injured, the Court giving such an order ought to have been composed of a Turkish Judge and not of a Greek Judge as was the case.
  3. In any event the learned Judge was wrong in law to have given the order of remand without having the appellant brought before the Court and thus depriving him of his right to challenge the grounds of the application made against him.
  4. The order of remand was unjustifiable because the Police had already obtained remand orders against the appellant on three previous occasions each for 8 days, and the police had already had sufficient time to complete their investigation." In the light of facts disclosed in the affidavit made by Police Inspector George Papageorgiou on the 21st May, 1964, which was filed in support of the notice given on behalf of the Attorney-General of his intention to oppose the appeal and from which it appears that thejudge granting the remand was taken to the Central Prison, Nicosia, where the appellant was being held in custody, counsel for the appellant decided not to press the issue raised in ground No. 2 and counsel of the Republic was accordingly not called upon to address the Court on this ground. The only two grounds of appeal which are left for consideration by this Court are, therefore, grounds Nos. 1 and
  5. Ground No. 1 : The gist of the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant in support of this ground of appeal is to the effect that by virtue of paragraph 2 of Article 159 of the Constitution a Greek Judge has no jurisdiction to make the remand order in question because the granting of such a remand, being the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in a case in which there was no injured person, was, by virtue of paragraph 2of Article 159, within the jurisdiction 65 1964 May 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET HASIP V. T H E POLICE Munir, Acting J. 1964 May 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET HASIP t;. T H E POLICE Munir, Acting J. of a judge belonging to the same Community as that to which the person in respect of whom an application for such a remand order was being made belonged, namely, the Turkish Community. He submitted that the word " case " inthe first lineof paragraph 2 of Article 159 should not be interpreted in the restricted sense of meaning a criminal trial, that is to say, he submitted that it should not be confined to that part of the exerciseof criminal jurisdiction which took place after a charge is formally preferred against an accused person before the Court. In support of this submission he gave as an example the use of the word " case " in section 17 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155) in which the word " case " is likewise used in a wider sense as meaning " the case " which is still the subjectmatter of police investigation before the preferment of a formal charge. Counsel for the appellant also submitted that the expression " the accused", which also occurs in the first line of paragraph 2 of Article 159, means any person who is accused of an offence at any stage and includes, as in this case, a person such as the appellant who is accused by the police, as appears from the relevant Form J. 13, of the specific offence stated in the said Form and referred to earlier in this judgment. In the submission of counsel for the appellant the expression " accused" is not, and should not be, restricted only to persons who are accused of an offence after a charge has formally been preferred against them. Counsel for the appellant finally submitted that it would be contrary to the spirit, and defeat the purpose, of Article 159 if the Court were to give an unnecessarily restricted interpretation to the words " case" and " accused"

Article 159

which would result in a judge, not belonging to the same Community as the person who is accused of committing a criminal offence, being empowered to deprive such person of his liberty for a total period of three months, by periods not exceeding eight days at any one time, when, by virtue of the said Article 159, such a judge would not be empowered to sentence such person even to a fine of 50 mils. Counsel of the Republic largely based his submission concerning this Ground on the word " a c c u s e d "

Article 159

and, in dealing with the contention of counsel for the appellant on this ground, did not base his argument on the meaning to be given to the word " c a s e " . He submitted that a person did not become an " accused " in a criminal case until a charge had been formally preferred against him before a Court and he drew 66 a distinction between the expression " accused ", as used

Article 159

, and the expression " person arrested ", which is used in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 11 and similar expressions which are used in sections 13, 17 and 24 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155). It might be convenient at this stage to set out in full the relevant provision of Article 159 of the Constitution, which is paragraph 2 thereof and which reads as follows : " 2. A court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a case where the accused and the person injured belong to the same Community, or where there is no person injured, shall be composed of a judge or judges belonging to that Community." Having given careful consideration to the able arguments put before the Court by learned counsel I have come to the conclusion that when a Judge makes an order, as in the present case, remanding a person in police custody under Article 11 and section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155) (which has continued in force after the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution by virtue, and subject to the provisions, of Article 188 thereof) he is, in so doing— (

  1. a)"exercising criminal jurisdiction"; and (
  2. b)in so " exercising criminal jurisdiction" he is doing so " i n a case ... where there is no person injured ", in the sense of paragraph 2 of Article 159, and it follows, therefore, in my opinion that a Judge making such a remand order must, by virtue of paragraph 2 of Article 159, belong to the same Community as that to which the person in respect of whom the remand order is made belongs. I have come to the above conclusion for the following reasons : (
  3. i)there can be no doubt, to my mind, that when a Judge makes a remand order under Article 11 and section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155) he is in so doing " exercising criminal jurisdiction " i.e. jurisdiction conferred upon him by the machinery of the Criminal Procedure Law. He is performing the exercise of a judicial function, exercising a judicial discretion and making a judicial decision in the course of criminal procedure, which decision is expressly made subject to appeal by paragraph 6 of Article 11 of the Constitution. This exercise of a judicial 67 1964 May 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET H A S I P v. T H E POLICB Munir, Acting J. function must be distinguished from nonjudicial functions of a Judge, such as the taking of a dying deposition, etc. ; -- — it is true that paragraph 2 of Article 159 speaks of a " court" exercising criminal jurisdiction. It should be observed, however, that of the very few expressions which are singled out for definition in Article 186 of the Constitution, the expression " court" is one of them and that " c o u r t " is defined therein as including " any judge thereof "; a court, or anyjudge thereof, in " exercising criminal jurisdiction" cannot do so in vacuo but must, of necessity, do so in respect of a certain criminal " m a t t e r " , "proceeding", " c a u s e " , " c a s e " or by whatever name such matter or thing, in respect of which such criminal jurisdiction is being exercised, might be called ; in examining the grammatical construction of paragraph 2 of Article 159 the expression " in a case " should not, in my opinion, be so linked with the expression which precedes it, namely, the expression " exercising criminal jurisdiction ", so as to limit or qualify the latter expression. In other words, when paragraph 2 of Article 159 speaks of a court (or a judge thereof) exercising criminal jurisdiction it covers, to my mind, all exercise of "criminal jurisdiction" by such court or judge thereof and the words which follow the expression " criminal jurisdiction ", namely, " in a case ", should be linked with the ensuing words and be read as describing the two alternative cases described in the paragraph, i.e. where the accused and the person injured belong to the same Community and where there is no person injured. In my opinion the grammatical structure of the paragraph and its ordinary logical construction should be analyzed and broken up to read as follows : " 2. A court exercising criminal jurisdiction—in a case— (
  4. i)where the accused and the person injured belong to the same Community, or (
  5. ii)where there is no person injured, shall be composed of a judge or judges belonging to that Community." 6S (ν) even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the expression " in a case " grammatically quali­ fies and restricts the preceding expression " exer­ cising criminal jurisdiction ", i.e. that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction is restricted to such exercise " in a case ", then, in my opinion, there is no reason whatsoever, in the absence of any express or implied provision

Article 159

to the contrary, to give a restricted meaning to the word " case" and to limit to that part of the judicial criminal process which commences after a formal charge has been pre­ ferred before a court. Had it been the intention of the drafters of the Constitution to make such a restriction or limitation they could easily have used the expression " in a trial " or " in a cri­ minal trial ", etc. (c.f. paragraph 3 of Article 155 where the expression "try a criminal case" is used) instead of the expression " i n a c a s e " ; (

  1. vi)counsel for the appellant has drawn our jttention to two instances in paragraphs (
  2. a)and (ly of sec­ tion 17 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155), where the legislature has used the word " case " as meaning the case which is still the subject-matter of police investigation in the course of the criminal process and before a charge is preferred under section 37 of that La*. Both paragraphs (
  3. a)and (
  4. b)of section 17 speak of " investigation of the case ". In sub­ section

(2)of section 19 of Cap. 155, which deals with warrants of arrest, again before the pre­ ferment of a charge under section 37, reference is also made to the court " having jurisdiction in the case ". If further authority were to be required in support of the view that in English criminal law, on which the criminal law of this country is based, the expression " case " is used as meaning, and including, that part of a case which is still the subject of police investigation, then one cannot do better than refer to sub­ sections
(1)and
(2)of section 38 of the Magis­ trates' Courts Act, 1952 (15 and 16 Geo. 6 and 1 Eliz. 2 c. 55) of the United Kingdom, which read as follows : " 38
(1)On a person's being taken into cus­ tody for an offence without a warrant, a police officer not below the rank of inspector, 69 1964 May 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET H A S I P v. T H E POLICE Munir, Acting J. 1964 M a y 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET HASH· v. THE POUCE Munir, Acting J. or the police officer in charge of the police station to which the person is brought, may, and, if it will not be practicable to bring him before a magistrates' court within twentyfour hours after his being taken into custody, shall, inquire into the case and, unless the offence appears to the officer to be a serious one, release him on his entering into a recognizance, with or without sureties, for a reasonable amount, conditioned for his appearance before a magistrates* court at the time and place named in the recognizance.
(2)Where, on a person's being taken into custody for an offence without a warrant, it appears to any such officer as aforesaid that the inquiry into the case cannot be completed forthwith, he may release that person on his entering into a recognizance, with or without sureties, for a reasonable amount, conditioned for his appearance at such a police station and at such a time as is named in the recognizance unless he previously receives a notice in writing from the officer in charge of that police station that his attendance is not required ; and any such recognizance may be enforced as if it were conditioned for the appearance of that person before a magistrates' court for the petty sessions area in which the police station named in the recognizance is situated." (See Halsbury's " Laws of England", 3rd edition, Vol. 10, para. 646, page 353) ;, (vii) in my opinion the moment a citizen is arrested under due process of criminal law and the machinery of criminal justice is put into motion in respect of such person, particularly after the police have decided to hold such person for a specific offence (as specifically ^averred in this case in Form J. 13) and, a fortiori the moment a court or a judge thereof commences to exercise criminal jurisdiction in such process, then those steps in the administration of criminal justice are so closely linked with the proceedings which follow after the preferment of the formal charge as to form part and parcel of " the case " con70 cerning such person, in the ordinary and accepted senseofthat termandcertainly,inmyopinion,in the sense inwhichsuch term is used

Article 159

; (viii) it is significant that in paragraph 4 of Article 159, which deals with the case where the accused and the person injured belong to different Communities, the expression used is not " i n a case " (as

Article 159) but " in a criminal case".

It may well be that in such a " mixed case", where it might have been the intention to empower a judge of either Community to grant a remand in a " mixed case ", the drafters of the Constitution wished to restrict the application of paragraph 4 to that part of the case which commenced after the preferment of the charge, and, therefore, on this occasion used the expression " criminal case", whereas

the very-same Article, where no such restriction was intended, the unqualified and unrestricted term " a case" is deliberately used in contradistinction to " criminal case"; (

  1. ix)I would here observe that learned Counsel of the Republic does not appear to have taken the view that the expression " i n a case" should be given a restricted meaning and be interpreted as being confined only to that part of a case after the preferment of a charge and has not thought it necessary, and rightly so in my opinion, to address the Court specifically on this point ; (
  2. x)with regard to the meaning to be given to the expression " the accused "

Article 159

, I agree with the submission made by counsel for the appellant that the expression, in the context in which it is used

Article 159

, and in the absence of any express or implied provision to the contrary, must be given its ordinary meaning, namely, as meaning a person who is accused of a criminal offence. When a person is arrested by the police, and particularly where, as in this case, as many as three remands have been applied for and granted in respect of a specific and categorical offence described and stated on the application for remand form (J. 13), to say that such a person is not " the accused " and is not " accused " of committing that offence would amount, in my opinion, to 71 1964 May 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET H A S I P v. T H E PoLiCB Munir, Acting J. 1964 May 21, 23 ~AT V AHMET HASHv. THI: POLICE ~. Λ f"'^! violating the ordinary meaning of that word. Lawyers in criminal practice generally, law officers, police and other officers concerned with the administration of criminal justice, have always, in my experience, referred to a person respect of whom police investigations are m pending as " the accused " . For example, when a P o u c e docket or case file has been opened the subject of that docket, in connection with whom the police are carrying out investigations, has always been referred to by the police and law officers in this country as " the a c c u s e d " . I can see no logical, grammatical or any other reason why, in the context in which the word " a c c u s e d " is used

Article 159

without any qualification, the word " accused " should be confined, in point of time, to those accused persons who continue to be accused persons after a formal charge has been preferred against them before a court. It is true that, as learned counsel for the Republic has pointed out, the expression " person arrested " is used in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 11 and in other parts of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155). I would point out, however, that expressions may be given different meanings in different parts and contexts of one and the same Consti­ tution (c.f. the j u d g m e n t s of the Supreme Con­ stitutional Court in the cases of Georghios S. Papaphilippou and The Republic, 1 R . S . C . C , p. 62, at pp. 64-65 and Lazaris Demetriou and Another and the Republic, 3 R . S . C . C , p. 121, at p. 127. Thus, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 12, even where a person has been charged with an offence he is not referred to as " the accused " or " an accused person " but is referred to, in the style of that Article, as the " person charged." If the submission of counsel of the Republic as to the restricted meaning to be given to the expression " the accused "

Article 159

were correct, then one would expect to see the same expression used in, for example, paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 12 instead of t h e expression a " p e r s o n charged with an o f f e n c e " ; (xi) even if there were any doubt as to the meaning of the expressions " in a case " and " the accused " as used

Article 159

and, there­ fore, any doubt as to the application of its pro- 72 visions to the granting of a remand order (as to which, in my opinion, for the reasons which I have stated above, there is no such doubt) then, in my view, any such doubt should have been resolved in favour of the application of the said paragraph 2 to the making of a remand order, such as the subject-matter of this appeal, for the following reasons : (

  1. a)I agree with the submission made by counsel for the appellant that in construing paragraph 2 of Article 159 due regard must be had not only to the letter but also to the spirit and intention of Article 159. Whatever may have been the political reasons for incorporating the substance of Article 159 in the Zurich Agreement, on which Article 159 is based, and whatever views may be held for or against such a provision (all of which I need hardly say is not the slightest concern of this Court), the Court must, in interpreting paragraph 2 of Article 159, give effect to what is to my mind the clear intention of the constitutional legislators, namely, that, inter alia, broadly speaking, criminal cases concerning Turks alone should be dealt with by Turkish Judges and those concerning Greeks alone by Greek Judges. When the effect of Article 159 is that a court or a judge thereof is not empowered to convict or to fine an accused person, in a case in which paragraph 2 of Article 159 applies, even to a fine of one mil or to sentence him to imprisonment for even one day, it surely goes against the spirit and clear intention of that Article to give an unnecessarily restricted interpretation to paragraph 2 of Article 159 the result of which would be to empower a court or a judge thereof, not empowered to impose the smallest fine or the shortest imprisonment in respect of a particular person, to deprive that same person of his liberty for periods not exceeding eight days and amounting in the total to a period not exceeding three months ; (
  2. b)in resolving any doubt which there might have been, due regard must also be had, 73 1964 May 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET HASIP v. T H E POLICE Munir, Acting J. 1964 May 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET HASH* v. T H E POLICE Munir, Acting J . in my opinion, to the ρractice which has been followed by the courts and judges thereof and all organs of the Republic con­ cerned, including the Office of the AttorneyGeneral, the Police, Gendarmerie, etc., since the coming into operation of the Con­ stitution. By saying this I do not mean if the practice which has been adopted hitherto •waswrong or unconstitutional that this Court would be bound by such practice ; what I mean is that in interpreting a provision such as paragraph 2 of Article 159 the Court, in case of doubt, could derive assistance from the manner in which responsible or­ gans of the Republic, such as those which I have mentioned, have been interpreting and applying the relevant provisions of that Article since the coming into operation of the Constitution. It appears that the invari­ able practice followed in this Republic up till now (with apparently certain isolated exceptions), and particularly in Nicosia (where Greek and Turkish Judges are sta­ tioned) lias been for accused persons to be taken before the judge of the Community to which such accused person belongs when an application for a remand order is made under Article 11 and section 24 of Cap. 155 ; (
  3. c)paragraph 6 of Article 11 provides, inter alia, that when a person is brought before a judge on an application for his remand, the judge shall proceed to inquire into the grounds of the arrest " in a language understand­ able by the person arrested." This pro­ vision does not, of course, in itself, and without the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 159, mean that such person shall be taken before a judge belonging to the same Community as that to which he belongs (and I am aware that it appears that in this case the appellant understood the language in which the judge granting the remand spoke, namely Greek), but when paragraph 6 of Article 11 is read in conjunction with Article 159 it would, to my mind, clearly indicate, (should there otherwise have been any doubt) that it was not the inten74 tion of the drafters of the Constitution that remand proceedings under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 11, which expressly require the judge concerned to inquire into the grounds of the arrest " i n a language understandable by the person arrested", should be excluded from the purview of paragraph 2 of Article 159 ; 1964 May 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET H A S I P v. T H E POLICE Mimir, Acting J. (
  4. d)in a country the criminal laws of which are based on the Common Law of England one of the fundamental principles of which under the Magna Carta is that a person should be judged by his " peers " or " equals", and furthermore, in a country where, in addition to that Common Law principle, there is a constitutional provision that criminal proceedings concerning a person should be dealt with by a. judge or judges belonging to his Community, I see nothing more reasonable and logical than to resolve any doubt, which there might have been as to whether or not remand proceedings are covered by paragraph 2 of Article 159, in favour of such remand proceedings being so covered ; / (
  5. e)likewise, in resolving a doubt of this nature, had it existed, I would also have had due regard to the principle applicable in all criminal proceedings, and particularly in all such proceedings where the liberty of the citizen is involved, that any such doubt should be resolved in favour of the accused person. I am, therefore, of the opinion, for the reasons given above, that as the appellant in this case belongs to the Turkish Community, the judge exercising the criminal jurisdiction of granting a remand order in this case must, by virtue of paragraph 2 of Article 159, belong to the same Community as that to which the appellant belongs and that the District Judge who granted the remand order in question in this case, not being a member of the same Community as that to which the appellant belongs, did not have jurisdiction to grant the said remand order which, in my opinion, must, therefore, be declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 75 1964 May 21, 23 VEDAT AHMET HASH· v. T H E POLICE Munir, Acting J. Ground No. 3 : Having come to the conclusion that the remand order in question is null and void it becomes unnecessary for me to deal with ground No. 3 of this appeal, which concerns the merits or grounds on which the said remand order was made. I would, therefore, confine myself to making the general observation that, whatever may have been the practice of the judges regarding the granting of remand orders prior to the coming into operation of the Constitution, I am of the opinion that in view of the express provision of paragraph 6 of Article 11, making any decision of the judge remanding a person in custody under that paragraph " subject to appeal ", it is certainly advisable, if not imperative, for the grounds for such an appealable decision to be recorded by the judge granting such a remand. I would have thought that the longer the period of remand is extended (in this case it has now been extended to 34 days) the weightier and more reasoned should the grounds for making such extension be on each successive extension. In this case even on the third occasion on which the remand order was made, bringing the total period of detention of the appellant to 34 davs, the learned District Judge does not appear to have made anv record of the investigation which he was required to conduct under paragraph 6 of Article 11 nor has be recorded anv reason for extending the remand but has merely made the formal order " Remand in police custody for eight days granted." Nor is there any light thrown on the matter in the affidavit of Police Inspector George Papageorghiou of the 21st May, 1964, which was filed by Counsel for the Republic in support of his notice of opposition to this appeal. The affidavit, in this connection, is simply confined to stating that " the appellant is being held in custody for a very serious offence " and that '' the investigation into the commission of the offence for which the appellant has been arrested has not been completed." This latter statement appears to be nothing more than a mere repetition of the formal printed wording of the application for remand form (Form J. 13) and adds very little to the matter. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this appeal should be allowed and that the remand order in question dated the 16th May, 1964, should be set aside. WILSON, P. : In the result the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. 76

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