CYPRUS THROUGHTHE COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX JOSEPHIDES, JJ.] ' D E M E T R I S PETROU CHRISTOU, Applicant, and T H E REPUBLIC
CYPRUS, T H R O U G H T H E COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX, Responden t. (Case No. 212/63). Administrative Law—Income Tax—The Taxes (Quantifying and Recovery) Law, 1963, (Law 53
1963J and the Constitution
Cyprus, Article 24.3—Provisions
Law 53
1963 do not amount to retrospective taxation nor is law contrary to Article 24.3
the Constitution—Income Tax Assessment made on Applicant under such Law in October, 1963, in respectofyear
assessment1958, validly made. Income Tax—The Income Tax Law Cap. 323, and the Coustitution
the Republic, Article 188.2—Law ceased to be in force by virtue
.2—Liability to pay income tax already accrued under the Law not extinguished when such Law ceased to be in force, Constitutional Law—Constitution
The Republic, Articles, 24.3 and 188.2—Provisions
the Taxes (Quantifying and Recovery) Law, 1963 (Law 53
1963J do not amount to retrospective taxation—Income tax liability accrued under Cap. 323 not extinguished when such Law ceased to be in force. Construction
Statutes—Temporary Statutes—The Duties and Taxes (Continuation
Provisions) Law, i960, (Law 23
i960) and the Constitution
Cyprus, Article 188.2— Duration
the provisions
temporary statutes a matter
construction regard being had to the particular statute and the intention
legislature The Applicant was assessed by a notice
assessment dated the 7th October, 1963, to pay the sum
£591.750 as income tax in respect
the year
assessment 1958, 214 being the year
income 1957. The Income Tax Law (Cap. 323) which was in force in 1957 and 1958, having ceased to be in force by October, 1963, the assessment in question was made under the provisions
the Taxes (Quantifying and Recovery) Law, 1963, No. 53
1963 which came into operation on the 18th July, 1963. The three principal issues dealt with in this case are:
the Applicant-to pay income tax in respect
the year
assessment 1958 had accrued and was in existence at the time when the assessment, which is the subject-matter
this recourse, was made upon him on the 7th October, 1963; and
Law 53/63 authorizes the making
the assessment the subject-matter
this recourse; and
the said Law. Held, I. With regard to issue
Vasos Constantinou Kyriakides and The Republic, 4 R.S.C.C. p. 109, the Supreme Constitutional Court held (at p. 115), inter alia, "that a proper interpretation and application
paragraph
can only lead to the result that whatever liability to pay income tax may have accrued under Cap. 323 until the prescribed relevant date has not been extinguished". The Court has given careful consideration to the reasons for which the Supreme Constitutional Court came to that conclusion and to the submissions made by learned counsel on this point, and has come to the conclusion that it sees no reason for differing from the conclusions reached on this issue by the Supreme Constitutional Court in the Kyriakides Case. Vasos Constantinou Kyriakides and The Republic, 4 R.S. C.C. p. 109, followed: II. With regard to issue
INCOME TAX 1965 Jan.12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and THE REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH THE COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX which had already been imposed on the Applicant in re spect
the year
assessment 1958 by the relevant pro visions
Cap. 323, and in particular Part II thereof, and with which too the Applicant had already been charged under the said relevant provisions
Cap. 323 and which liability had already accrued upon the ceasing to be in force
Cap. 323. III. With regard to issue (τ,): The assessment in question was validly made in accor dance with the relevant provisions
Law 53/1963 and the Court sees no grounds for holding otherwise. / V. As regards costs : We award part
the Respondent's costs against the Ap plicant, which we fix at £10.Order: The assessment made on the Applicant in respect
the year 1958 has been validly made under the provisions
Law 53/63 and that this application cannot therefore succeed and is dismissed accordingly. Per JOSUPHIDES, J.: (In giving additional reasons for Judgment) I. The duration
the provisions
a temporary sta tute is a matter
construction, having regard to the parti cular statute and the intention
the legislature. //. The liability to pay tax under Cap. 323 accrued in the year when the income was earned irrespective
whe ther the Commissioner
Income Tax has served a notice
assessment on the tax-payer or not. III. T h e liability for the payment
income tax in res pect
the applicant accrued in the year when the income was earned, which was prior to the date when Cap. 323 ceased to be in force; and once the liability accrued, it was not extinguished when Cap. 323 ceased to be in force, by virtue
the provisions
the Constitu tion, as I hold that, as a matter
construction, it was not the intention
the legislature to extinguish such liabilities as had already accrued in the past; but sim ply to clear the legislative field in those respects in whiqh the provisions
the majority vote required in the passing
216 taxation and other laws by the House
Representatives. IV. The Income Tax Law, Cap. 323, having ceased to be in force as a whole on the 31st March, 1961, there was no legislation in force after that date authorizing the making
any assessment until the 18th July, 1963, when the Taxes (Quantifying and Recovery) Law, 1963 (Law 53
1963), came into operation. Reading that Law as a whole I am
the view that, once it is held that under the legislation then in force, the tax was imposed and the liability accrued prior to i960, as in the applicant's case, and that the liability has not been extinguished, the provisions
Law 53
1963 do not amount to retrospective taxation nor is that Law contrary to the provisions
, paragraph 3,
the Constitution and I agree with the reasons given in the judgment
the Court delivered by my brother Munir J. V. The provisions
Law 53
1963 were a sufficient authority for the Commissioner to make the assessment complained
, and I would dismiss the application. Application dismissed. Cases referred to: Vasos Constantinou Kyriakides and The Republic, (4 R.S.C. C , p. 109 and p. 115). R.v. Wicks [1946] 2 All E.R. 529, at p. 532, per Lord Goddard, C.J. Steavenson v. Oliver
£591.750 mils income tax for the year
assessment 1958. 217 1965 Jan.12 April20 DEMETRIS PETROUCHRISTOU and THE REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGHTHE COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX 1965 Jan. 12 April 20 A. Triantafyllides for the applicant. M. Spanos, Counsel
the Republic, for the respondent. DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU Cur. adv. vult. and T H E REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH T H E COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX ZEKIA, P.: Thejudgment
the Court will be delivered by Mr. Justice Munir, and Mr. Justice Josephides will give additional reasons for judgment. MUNIR, J.: By this recourse, made under Article 146
the Constitution, the Applicant seeks a declaration "that assessment No. 96/AD/63 and/or the decision
Respondent to impose on Applicant the amount
£591.750 as income tax for the year
assessment 1958 is null and voidand
no effect whatsoever". It is common ground that the Applicant was assessed, by a notice
assessment dated the 7th October, 1963, to pay the sum
£591.750 as income tax in respect
the year
assessment 1958,being the year
income 1957. The Income Tax Law (Cap. 323) which was in force in 1957 and 1958, having ceased to bein force by October, 1963,the assessment in question was made under the provisions
the Taxes (Quantifying and Recovery) Law, 1963, Law No. 53
1963 (hereinafter referred to as "Law 53/63"), which came into operation on the 18th July, 1963. The three principal issues which call for a decision in this case are—
the Applicant to pay income tax in respect
the year
assessment 1958 had accrued and was in existence at the time when the assessment, which is the subject-matter
this recourse, was made upon him on the 7th October, 1963; and
Law 53/63 authorize the making
the assessment which is the subject-matter
this recourse; and
the said Law. 218 With regard to issue
the Applicant to pay income tax in respect
the year
assessment 1958 had accrued after Cap. 323had ceased to be in force by virtue
the provisions
paragraph
the Constitution. He invited the Court to reconsider the Interim Decision
the Supreme Constitutional Court
the 8th February, 1963, in the case
VasosConstantinou Kyriakidesandthe Republic, 4 R.S.C.C, p. 109 (hereinafter referred to as "the Kyriakides Case"). In the Kyriakides Case the Supreme Constitutional Court held (at p. 115), inter alia, "that a proper interpretation and application
paragraph
can only lead to the result that whatever liability to pay income-tax may have accrued under Cap. 323 until the prescribed relevant date has not been extinguished". The Court has given careful consideration to the reasons for which the Supreme Constitutional Court came to that conclusion and to the submissions made by learned counsel on this point, and has come to the conclusion that it sees no reason for differing from the conclusions reached on this issue by the Supreme Constitutional Court in the Kyriakides Case. With regard to issue
Law 53/1963 and the corresponding section 37
Cap. 323. He pointed out that whereas section 37
Cap. 323 states that the "Commissioner shall proceed to assess every person chargeable with the tax ", section 13
Law 53/1963 states that the "Director shall proceed to assess every person on whose object
the tax has been imposed ". Counsel for Applicant submitted that the omission
any charging provision in Law 53/1963, chargingthe Applicant with the tax in question has resulted in a lacuna with the consequence that the assessment in question on the Applicant is invalid. The Court is
the opinion that once the liability to pay the tax in question has already accrued in accordance with the principle laid down in Kyriakides Case, then it must follow, for the very reason why such liability has accrued (namely, the existence in force at the time
such accruing 219 1965 Jan. 12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and THE REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH THE COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX Munir, J. 1965 Jan. 12 April 20 DtMETRlS PETROU CHRISTOU and T H E REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH THF. COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX Munir, J.
the relevant provisions
Cap. 323) that such tax had already been imposed and charged under the relevant provisions
Cap.323 at the time such liability accrued. It seems to the Court that the reason why provisions corresponding to sections 5 and 6
Cap.323 and indeed to the whole
part II
Cap. 323(which isentitled "IMPOSITION
TAX" and which also includes the said sections 5 and 6) have been omitted from Law 53/1963 is no doubt because Law 53/1963 does not purport to impose or charge a person with the liability to pay any tax but is merely intended and designed, as its title clearly indicates, to quantify an existing liability, already imposed and charged by some other law, by proceeding to assess the amount
the tax in question and to take steps for its recovery. The Court is, therefore,
the opinion that Law 53/1963 contained valid statutory provision for assessing and recovering the income tax in question, which had already been imposed on the Applicant in respect
the year
assessment 1958 by the relevant provisions
Cap. 323,and in particular Part II thereof, and with which too the Applicant had already been charged under the said relevant provisions
Cap. 323 and which liability had already accrued upon the ceasing to be in force
Cap. 323. With regard to issue
Law 53/1963 and sees no grounds for holding otherwise. For all the reasons given above the Court is
the opinion that the assessment in question made on the Applicant in respect
the year 1958 has been validly made under the provisions
Law 53/63 and that this application cannot therefore succeed and is dismissed accordingly. The Court has not considered it necessary to deal with the merits
the assessment in question in view
the declaration made by counsel for Applicant on the 15th September, 1964, that the merits
the assessment are not disputed. Taking into account the circumstances
this Case, including the fact that one
the grounds on which the Application was based had already been decided, we award part
the Respondent's costs against the AppUcant, which we fix at £10.— 220 JOSEPHIDES, J.: This is a recourse against the income tax assessment made on the applicant on the 7th October, 1963 in respect
the year
assessment 1958 (year
income 1957) under the Taxes (Quantifying and Recovery) Law, 1963(No. 53
1963). The amount
income tax assessed on the applicant is £591.750 mils, and it is not in dispute. The applicant had in the past submitted completed returns for the year
assessment 1955, 1956 and 1957 but he failed to do so for the year 1958. The Commissioner
Income Tax proceeded to assess the applicant's chargeable income for the year
assessment 1958 on the 28th September, 1960, but that was subsequently discharged and eventually the assessment complained
was made on the 7th October, 1963. The main grounds on which the case was argued before us on behalf
the applicant were:
the Income Tax Law, Cap. 323, on the 31st December, 1960, all existing income tax liabilities under that Law were extinguished; and
. On the first ground two questions fall for determination— (a) whether prior to the expiry
the Income Tax Law, Cap. 323, the liability for the payment
the income tax had accrued without service
notice
assessment; and ~(/r)~if-yes, was such liability extinguished with the expiry
that Law? These points were considered by the Supreme Constitutional Court in the case
Kyriakides and The Republic (Minister
Finance and Interior), 4 R.S:GG^109, in which it was held that by virtue
the provisions
the Income Tax Law, Cap. 323, which was in force at the material time, income tax must be deemed to have been imposed then, that the liability accrued and that it was not extinguished with the expiry
that Law. Applicant's counsel submitted that as the Income Tax 221 1965 Jan. 12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and THE REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH THE COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX 1965 Jan.12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and T H E REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH THE COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX Josephides, J. Law, Cap. 323, ceased to be in force on the 31st December, 1960, by virtue
the provisions
, paragraph 2
the Constitution, all accrued liabilities have been extinguished, and that this is in accordance with the established principles governing the expiration
statutes as distinguished from the repeal
statutes. He accordingly submitted that the Supreme Constitutional Court in the Kyriakides'' case wrongly applied the principle
equality and equal contribution towards the public burdens safeguarded by Articles 24 and 28
the Constitution and that the Court erred in drawing a distinction between "expiration" and "not continue to be in force" appearing in Article 188
the Constitution. Article 188, paragraph 2
the Constitution, with which we are concerned reads as follows: "2. Save where otherwise provided in the Transitional Provisions
this Constitution no provision in any such law which is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any provision
this Constitution and no law which under Article 78 requires a separate majority shall so continue to be in force: "Provided that the laws relating to the municipalities may continue to be in force for a period
six months after the date
the coming into operation
this Constitution and any law imposing duties or taxes may continue to be in force until the 31st day
December, 1960". On the 31st December, 1960, the Duties or Taxes (Continuation
Provisions) Law, 1960 (No. 23
1960) was enacted, whereby the Income Tax Law, Cap. 323, continued to be in force until the 31st March, 1961. Applicant's counsel further submitted that as the Law was not repealed, the provisions
section 10
the Interpretation Law, did not apply to save any liability already accrued prior to the repeal
the Law. He conceded that the duration
the provisions
a law which has expired was a matter
construction and that the Court had to look to the intention
the legislature having regard to the enactment. As Law 23
1960was
a temporary nature, he said, it was a temporary statute and being a temporary statute the whole
the provisions
the Income Tax Law Cap. 323, expired 222 on the 31st March, 1961, at the latest. In support
his ^submissions counsel cited the case
R. v. Wicks 11946] 2 All E.R. 529. \ In the course
hisjudgment in that case Lord Goddard, C.J. said (at page 532): "This section, however, has no application to statutes which have expired, and the question must, therefore, remain one
construction whether the provisions as to expiry are such as to makeit impossible for a prosecution or other proceeding to be either instituted or brought to conviction, or whether, on a true construction
the Act, Parliament has provided that legal proceedings, whether
a civil or criminal character, can be prosecuted in relation to matters connected with the Act after it has expired". Lord Goddard in his judgment, inter alia, referred with approval to the leading authority
Steavenson v. Oliver
the restrictions imposed, and the duration
the provisions, are matters
construction". "Temporary statutes" according to Craies on Statute Law (5th edition, page 61), "are those on the duration
which some limit is put by Parliament"; and (at page 376
the same book) "If an Act contains a proviso so that it is to continue in force only for a certain specified time, it is called a temporary act". What we have here to consider is the construction
the provisions
, paragraph 2,
the Constitution and Law 23
1960. It is the duty
the Court to ascertain what was the intention
the framers
the Constitution and the legislature in enacting Law 23
1960. Was it the intention that income tax in respect
the years prior to 31st March, 1961, even if due, should not be collected from the persons concerned; or was it the intention
12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and THE REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH THE COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX Josephides, J. 1965 Jan. 12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and T H E REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH T H E COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX Josephides. J. paragraph 2, to clear the legislative field in those respects in whichtheprovisions
In considering this matter I think it would be useful to refer to English cases which may help us in reaching a conclusion one way or the other, though this would not necessarily mean that we are bound by such decisions. As we said in another case: "Undoubtedly decisions
the English, Scottish, and Irish Courts are not binding upon the Courts
the Republic
Cyprus, though entitled to the highest respect. 1am
the view that, as a general rule, our Court should as a matter
judicial comity follow decisions
the English Courts
Appeal on the construction
a statute, unless we are convinced that those decisions are wrong". (Stylianou v. Police 1962 C.L.R. 152). At Common Law and prior to the enactment
the Interpretation Act, 1889,section 38
fences committed against a statute while in force could not have been punished without a special clause to allow it: Miller's case
Rex v. Elizabeth WKenzie and another
fence committed before the passing
a new Act but not tried till after, was not liable to be punished under either the former or the newAct. The prisoners in that case were tried in the year 1820 on an indictment charging them with feloniously stealing on the 11thJuly, 1820, twenty-three yards
lace, valued at £1.3.0., from a shop. The evidence in support
the indictment was clear, but the statute I Geo. IV c.117 which received the royal assent on the 25th July, 1820, having repealed the provisions
the Act which deprived persons convicted
stealing goods privately in a shop to the amount
five shillings in value,
the benefit
clergy, the learned Common Sergeant respited the judgment in order to take the opinion
the Judges, whether sentence
death could be passed on the prisoners by virtue
the previous statute which was in force at the date
the commission
the felony, or whether the prisoners should receive judgment as in cases
grand larceny, by virtue
the new Act. All Judges agreed that judgment could not be passed on the new Act which was prospective only, and that the prisoners must receive judgment as for a common larceny, 224 without reference to either statute. Next in chronological order comes the leading case
Steavenson v. Oliver (quoted above), decided in
jhis right, and Lord Abinger, C.B. in givingjudgment said: \ '•'It is by no means a consequence
an Act
Parliament expiring that rights acquired under it should likewise expire. The Act provides that persons who hold such commissions should be entitled to practise as apothecaries, and we cannot engraft on the statute a new qualification limiting that enactment". Parke, B.in the course
hisjudgment said: "Then comes the question, whether the privilege given by the statute 6 Geo. 4, is one which continues, notwithstanding the expiration
the statute: that depends on the construction
the temporary enactment. There is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed ; but with respect to the former, the extent
the restrictions imposed, and the duration
the provisions, are matters
construction". This is the passage referred to in the judgment
Lord Goddard, C.J. in the Wicks case
Spencer v. Hooton
the Act giving him jurisdiction having expired in September, 1920, before the appeals came on for hearing. Roche, J. referred to thejudgment
Baron Parke, in Steavenson v. Oliver(supra)where he says that if an Act expires the duration
its provisions is a matter
construction.In Bennett v. Tatton
Statutes, 225 1965 Jan. 12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and THE REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH T H E COMMISSIONER
INOCME TAX Josephides, J. 1965 Jan.12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and THE REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH THE COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX Josephides, J. 5th edition, at page 671 to the following effect was approved: "where an Act expired or was repealed, it was formerly considered, in the absence
provision to the contrary, as if it had never existed, except as to matters and transactions past and closed. Where, therefore, a penal law was broken, the
fender could not be punished under it, if it expired before he was convicted, although the prosecution was begun while the Act was still in force". The cases
Steavenson
R. v. Wicks
these authorities is that the duration
the provisions
a temporary statute is a matter
construction, having regard to the particular statute and the intention
the legislature. One thing is clear, that apart from statute, no
fence can be prosecuted or punished under a statute which has expired without any saving clause. But short
that, the authorities show that rights acquired under a statute are not lost or extinguished with the expiry
that statute. In the same way, considering the particular provisions
the Income Tax Law, Cap. 323, and the intention
the legislature having regard to Article 188, paragraph 2,
the Constitution, and the Income Tax Law itself, I take the view that—(a) it was not intended that liabilities already accrued would be extinguished at the end
December, 1960, or at the end
March, 1961,when laws imposing taxes ceased to "continue to be in force", if such liabilities had already accrued; and (b) that the intention was to clear the legislative field in respect
the majority vote required under Article 78, paragraph 2, in the passing
taxation and other laws by the House
Representatives. The next question which I have to consider is whether the income tax liability
the applicant had accrued prior to the time when the Income Tax Law, Cap. 323 ceased to be in force. Could such a liability accrue without any notice
assessment having been served on him prior to the expiration
the Law? Having given the matter my best consideration I have come to the conclusion that the income tax liability
applicant accrued before the expiry
the Law. I am confirmed in that opinion having regard to— 226 (ι) the express provisions
the Income Tax Law, Cap. 323; and * (ii) the language
another taxation law, that is to say, the Immovable Property Tax Law, Cap.322. As regards (/), in section 2
the Income Tax Law, Cap. 323 the expression "tax" is defined as "the income tax im posed by this Law". Part II
the Law is headed "Imposi tion
Tax", and section 5
this Law, be payable at the rate or rates specified hereafter for the year
assessment commencing on the first day
Janu ary, 1941, and for each subsequent year
assessment upon the income
any person accruing in, derived from, or received in the Colony ". Section 6 pro vides that tax shall be "charged, levied and collected for each year
assessment upon the chargeable income
any person for the year immediately preceding the year
assessment.. ..., 1 " . Section 23 provides: "There shall be levied and paid upon chargeable incomes tax at the rates and in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Second Schedule to this Law". Section 37 empowers the Commis sioner
Income Tax to assess every person chargeable with the tax as soon as may be after the expiration
the time allowed to such person for the delivery
his return; and subsection
section 37 provides that where a person has not delivered a return and the Commissioner is
the opi nion that such person is liable to pay tax, he may, "according to the best
his judgment, determine the amount
the chargeable incomeof such person and assess him accordingly" Finally, section 64 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Law (Cap. 323), tax "shall be assessed and chargedon all emoluments"
salaried persons for any year
assessment, and such tax shall, subject to Rules made under section 75, "be deducted by the person making the payment
the emoluments notwithstanding that when the payment is made no assessment has been made in respect
the emoluments ". The Rules made under section 75 provide, interalia, that in the case
an employee who is paid monthly the tax payable is deducted (by the employer) from his monthly emoluments in 12 equal monthly instalments, and in the case
an employee who is paid weekly the tax is deducted from his weekly emoluments in 227 1965 Jan.12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and THE REPUBUC
CYPRUS THROUGHTHE COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX Josephides, J. 1965 Jan.12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and T H E REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH T H E COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX Josephides, J. 52 equal weekly instalments, and paid by the employer to the Commissioner
Income Tax within 15days after theend
each month. Moreover, rule 11
the same Rules provides that "Income tax in respect
emoluments shall be assessed and charged by the Commissioner who shall serve a notice
assessment under section 41
the Law on every employee assessed by whom tax is payable or from whose emoluments any tax was deducted during the year
assess ment". If the tax payable under the assessment is less than the total tax deducted from the employee's emoluments in respect
the year the difference shall be repaid to (he employee; and if the tax payable under the assessment exceeds the total tax deducted from the employee's emolu ments in respect οΐ the year the Commissioner shall require the employee to pay the difference (rule 11
the aforesaid provi sions, including section 64, make it abundantly clear that the liability to pay tax under Cap. 323 accrued in the year when the income was earned irrespective
whether the Commis sioner
Income Tax has served a notice
assessment on the tax-payer or not. As regards (//"), a comparison
the provisions
the Income Tax Law, Cap. 323, with the provisions
the Im movable Property Tax Law, Cap. 322, likewise leads one to the conclusion, from the wording
the two statutes, that the income tax is deemed to have been imposed at the time when the income is earned and that the liability actually accrued. Section 3
the Immovable Property Tax Law provides that "on all immovable property there shall be raised, levied, collected and.paid annually a tax to be called the immovable property tax". Section 4 provides that immovable property tax shall be assessed upon the value
immovable property as registered or recorded in the books
the Land Registry, and that if such value is not so registered or recorded, the tax shall be assessed upon -the-value-
-such-property-as-determined-by-the Director-
Lands and Surveys. The provisions in this Law are almost identical with the provisions regarding the imposition, charging, levying, assessment and collection
income tax. In the result I come to the conclusion that the liability for the payment
income tax in respect
the applicant accrued in the year when the income was earned, v/hich was prior 228 to the date when Cap.323 ceased to be in force; and once the liability accrued, I am
the view that it was not extinguished when Cap. 323ceased to be in force, by virtue
the provisions
the Constitution, as I hold that, as a matter
construction, it was not the intention
the legislature to extinguish such liabilities as had already accrued in the past; but simply to clear the legislative field in those respects in which the provisions
the majority vote required in the passing
taxation and other laws by the House
Representatives. Needless to say that the provisions
Cap. 323 didlnot empower the imposition
income tax in respect
anylperiod after the 31st March, 1961. The Income Tax Law, Cap. 323, having ceased to be in force as a whole on the 31st March, 1961, there was no legislation in force after that date authorizing the making
any assessment until the 18th July, 1963, when the Taxes (Quantifying and Recovery) Law, 1963 (Law 53
1963), came into operation. Reading that Law as a whole I am
the view that, once it is held that under the legislation then in force, the tax was imposed and the liability accrued prior to 1960, as in the applicant's case, and that the liability has not been extinguished, the provisions
Law 53
1963 do not amount to retrospective taxation nor is that Law contrary to the provisions
, paragraph 3,
the Constitution and I agree with the reasons given in the judgment
the Court delivered by my brother Munir J. I am, therefore,
the view that the provisions
Law 53
1963 were a sufficient authority for the Commissioner to make the assessment complained
, and 1 would dismiss the application. Application dismissed. Applicant to pay part
Respondent's costs whichare fixed at £10.— 229 1965 Jan.12 April 20 DEMETRIS PETROU CHRISTOU and THE REPUBLIC
CYPRUS THROUGH T H E COMMISSIONER
INCOME TAX Josephides, J.
AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.