clr/1966/1966_1_106.pdf

(2)Ihi Coin ι hefon affixing guilt must in satisfied that then Mas something man thai' oppor­ tunity fin athdien Sinh tis tndeiue of intfiliation to (oinmii nthilfen or wil/niKiiess to indulge m amounts dalhaiut fallow. shoit of adultery In tin pn sail tase time is no stith t \ideim Mtitnmomal (anses On on·. Mtitnmomal Offeint s Ulidter\ I \tdeiue (orrohoiatm < in/ente as a rule utpmed Rule of prudue only not of law Need joi totrohoration is m\cssa~ ul\ greattr in uihkltiidtd asts -Confessions οι in/missions of aduftei \ h\ a nspomltui >'hev are iealousl\ stiutmred espefialli if made h\ a spoust who desires to he dnorad Ihe (ami uill ιίlust to ail on tonfessnms οι admissions alone unli s\ stioug siinoiuuhii·· < ininnsfantes induate that tin tonfissiim is tun I i' winη made h\ a spouse who has tierxίΐιιιΐίζ !ι lost h\ sin li tonft ssnui, οι h\ a spouse who is tuiMous Un f'ltrtteiuss In so·h i,i\ts tin ί <uiit nia\ tut upon a tonIt ssi m althoin;h mu οι lohorated \ Mnmntom I ( oust s Matiunomal Offemes Dnom I'ttilum pn anon e an tin \·ΐοΐιιιιΙ of tidufliti' Ctdfusion ami tonnnana Man ι·· and tlfttf of Huitltii of pioof Standout <>l pioof II /"hl'oiiti Ιυ satnt ·! bus I" \att\f\ tin ί mil ι nilci .lbι //;/./ iht p< liliou ι inn pn s.nltd or piosauted m (allusion wuh the nsp uuUni fin Iuv/is'i Matiwio/ual •06 Canst s itf, 1950 1966 |-cb. 14, 16, 2<l Collusion i.son agreement between the paitie.s in a suit whereby the initiation of the .suit is p'rottired 01 its eonduel provided ftn An essential element in a collusive bargain is an atlempt to pervert the course of justice—It applies particularly to an agreement not to defend—The fact above that both spouses desire a divorce does not make them guilty of a collusion ANTONIOS Nicoi; v. GUNDAA. Nicou (OTHERWISE BOKRILL) AND Collusion—Burden and standard oj proof—The burden is on the petitioner to disprove collusion—// is initially discharged by the provisional presumption of innocence—But if some matters arouse suspicion, then the burden shifts hack to the petitioner — The standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. Matrimonial Causes— Attorney-General—The the Republic is the State's Tractor. Attorney-General Matrimonial Causes • Marriage of convenience—To evade Immigration Laws as regards emloyment in Cyprus. This ih a husband's undefended petition for divorce on the ground of the wife's adultery with the co-respondent. The latter although duly served, did not enter an appearance nor did he defend the proceedings. The respondent wife was represented by counsel who had instructions not lo oppose the petition and admit the facts. The marriage was solemnized at the District Officer's Office in Larnaca on the 22nd September. 1962, under the provisions of the Marriage Law, Cap. 279. The learned Justice, in dismissing the petition: Held, (I) (a) under the provisions of the English Matrimonial Causes Act. 1950, which is the law applicable to matrimonial causes in Cyprus, the Court has to be "satisfied on the evidence" that "the case for the petition has been proved and, inter alia, that the petition is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent or either of the respondents, and if the Court is not satisfied with respect to any of the aforesaid matters it shall dismiss the petition" (section 4 of the said English Act, 1950). Needless to say that a fact may be inferred from circumstances which lead to it, by fair inference, as a necessary conclusion. But the Court must be satisfied that there was something more than opportunity before il will affix guilt ; evidence of a guilty passion or inclination is needed in addition (see Rayden on Divorce 9th edition, page 151, paragraph 106, and the cases quoted in support of the statements in that paragraph). 107 MICHAEL JAMIS WOOD of the 1966 Feb. 14, 16, 24 ANTONIOS Νιοου η. GLENDAA.NICOU (OTHERWISE BORRILL) AND MICHAEL JAMES WOOD (b) In the present case however, there is no evidence of inclination to commit adultery or willingness to indulge in amorous dalliance falling short of adultery ; and there is no presumption of adultery simply because opportunity is there.

(2)(

1. a)In an adultery case the evidence of the petitioner alone is seldom accepted without corroboration, either by a witness or, at least, by strong surrounding circumstances. On the question of corroboration the recent case of Alii v. Alii [1965] 3 All E.R. 480, restates the rule as to corrobora­ tive evidence, which is a rule of practice only and not of law. As Lord Merrivalc P. said in Williams v. Williams [1932] All E.R. Rep. 907, at p. 908 : " I t is obvious that in matters of the greatest consequence between man and wife it would be a dangerous thing to act upon theevidence of one party unsup­ ported by a body of facts ". (
2. b)On the other hand the need for corroboration is neces­ sarily greater in an undefended than in a defended case, where the evidence of the petitioner, though uncorroborated, is tested by cross-examination and can be measured against the evidence given on the other side. (Principle laid down in Kafton v. Kafton [1948] I All E.R. 435, at p. 438, per Cohen L.J. adopted). (
3. c)It will be seen that all these rules of practice spring from the gravity of the consequences of proof in a matrimonial offence, and from the fact that experience had shown the risk of a miscarriage of justice in acting upon the uncorroborated testimony of a spouse in this class of cases.

(3)Confessions or admissions of adultery by a respondent arc jealously scrutinized, especially if made by a spouse who desires to be divorced. Hie Court will refuse to act upon con­ fessions alone unless the surrounding circumstances indicate that the confession is true, e.g. where the confession is made by a spouse who is anxious for forgiveness, or by a wife who has everything to.lose by such confession, and in such cases the Court may act upon a confession, although uncorrobo­ rated.

(4)In the present case I find the evidence of the petitioner and his witnesses unreliable. But even if I believed their evi­ dence, that does not prove adultery, but only opportunity for adultery. On ihc whole, I am not satisfied that on the evidence the case for the petition has been proved and the petition fails (v. section 4

(2)of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, supra). 108

(5)(a) Even if adultery had been proved to my satisfaction under the provisions of section 4

(2)(

1. c)of the said English Act the petitioner would still have to satisfy the Court on the evidence that the petition is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent. 1966 Feb. 14, 16, 24 ANTONIOS NICOU n. CLENDAA.NICOU (OTHERWISE (
2. b)The burden of disproving collusion and connivance lies on the petitioner and it is initially discharged by the provisional presumption of innocence ; and it is only after there arises some matter which arouses the suspicion of the Court thai the burden shifts back to the petitioner. At the end of the case the Court must be satisfied that there has been no collusion on the part of the petitioner, but the standard of proof is on the balance o\' probabilities. (
3. c)Collusion means an agreement or bargain entered into· by parlies lo a suit whereby Ihc initiation of the suit is procured or its conduct provided for. but not every bargain entered into by the parties lo a pending divorce suit is collusive! An essential .element in a collusive bargain is an attempt to pervert the course of justice. It applies particularly to an agreement not to defend: Karnes v. Barnes and Grinwade (the Queen's Proctor intervening) [1X67] 'L.R. 1 P. and D. 505 : Bacon v. Bacon and Ashhy

(1877)25 W.R. 560 ; and the cases in the notes to paragraph II. al p. 241. of Rayden op. cit. The fact thai both spouses desire a divorce does not make them guiliy of a collusion provided they have nol entered into any agreement obnoxious to the Court. (

1. d)In the present case, certain mailers .regarding the conduct of the wife have aroused strong suspicion in the mind of the Court and the burden shifts back lo the petitioner to dispro\e collusion. But on the evidence 1 am not prepared to say thai I am nol satisfied that ihc petition is not presented or prosecuted in collusion. Petition dismissed. No order as to costs. Per curiam : (
2. a)Had the case for the petition been proved, then this would certainly b e , a proper case for the Attorney-General of the Republic as the State's Proctor, lo look into it and consider whether to intervene or not. (
3. b)This was a marriage of convenience lo evade the Immigration Law as regards employment in Cyprus. as the respondent wife had no permit to work as a 109 BORRILL) AND MICHAEL JANUS WOOD I960 Feb 14, 16, 24 waitress in tht petitioner's bar and the police had been making enquiries It was after those enquiries that the parties were married ANTONIOS NICOU GLTNDAA NKOU (OlHFRWISF BORRllX) AND MitHAn JAMIS ® Woo» Cases rejerred to Allt v. Alh [1965] 3 All L R 480, lestatement of the lule as to corroborative evidence of matiimonial ι Williams Williams J1932] Ml Ε R Rep 907 offences at p. 90S, per Lord Mcrnvale V followed . Kajton ι Kajton |I9481 Ι ΛΙΙ Ε R 435, at p. 4 3 * per Cohen L J . followed Barnes ι Barms and Gnnwade (the Queen's PIOCIOI miei- vcmng)

(1867)L Κ I Ρ and D 505 , Baton ι Baton and Ashln (1S77) 2^ W R 560 And the tases m tin notes to paragraph 11, at ρ 241 of Rank η on Dnorte l)ih edition , and also the cases auoted m support to the staitnnufs in paragiaph 106 on ρ 151 of tin same hook Matrimonial Petition. Petition !oi dissolution <>l matnage because ot the wile> adulleiy S Oemetiuni lor ιhi peritonei Vf Cnimns loi tin. uspoiulcnl Co-respondent nol appeal ιlg Duly served ( in ad\ ι uft The following ludgmcni was dclivcicd by Josi iMiim s, J 1 Ins is a h u s b a n d s p e t i t i o n loi d i v o i c e o n t h e g r o u n d ot t h e w i l e s a d u l t e r y with the c o - i c s p o n d c n t in this ease T h e l a t l u , a h h o u g h duly served, did n o l entei an a p p e a l a IKC noi did he delend the p i o c e e d m g - T h e lesp o n d c n l was i c p t c s e n i c d by counsel w h o had m l r u c t i o n s not to o p p o s e the petition a n d a d m i t t h e f a d s , but I shall revert to that m a t t e r at a later stage of this j u d g m e n t T h e pclitionci-husband, w ιο is aged 29, is a G i e c k p n o t a n d a iiKinbeM of .ι Cncck O i i h o d o x C h u r c h b o r n in A> C\- He was I h c o d o r o s \jllag., L a i n a e a Distiicl, l i o m w h e i c his m o t h e r c o m e s His fa diet w h o was a G r e e k , e a m e from 110 Smyrna πι l(>22 and settled in Cyprus and maincd (he peti­ tioner's mother. lie lived and woikcd in Larnaca until he died some 11 years ago. The petitioner, while still in his teens, went to England where he was employed as a waiter for 7 years and returned to Larnaca in April 1962, where he has been running a bar since May

1. On this evidence I am satisfied that the petitioner-husband is domiciled in Cyprus and that this Court has jurisdiction lo hear and determine Ihc present petition As regards the facts of the case : The husband gave evi­ dence himself and called a witness in support of his case. It is the* husbands version that he met his wife, the respondent, in a dance hall in London while he was working there a short lime before he returned to Cyprus. They came together to Cyprus in April 1962 and until September 1962 she lived in his house. After he set up his bar business in May 1962 she went to-work with him at the counter and, in fact, she worked in the bar from May 1962 until the 12th October,
2. The marriage was solemnized al the District Officer's Office in Larnaca on the 22nd September, 1962, under the provisions of the M.arriage Law, Cap.
3. The certificate οΐ marriage produced in evidence shows that the husband was then 25 years of age and a bar manager of Larnaca, and that the wife was then 21 years o\' age and a waitress of Larnaca. As already staled, the husband is a member of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the wife a member of the Melhodist Church, but there was no religious ceremony of marriage in any church. There is no issue of the marriage It should, I think, be observed that ihis was a marriage o\' convenience lo evade the Immigration Laws as regards employment in Cypius, as the respondent had no pcimit lo work as a waitress in the petitioner's bar and the police had been making enquiries. It was after those enquiries that the parties were married. After their marriage the parties lived together at the house of the husband in Larnaca, and his mother lived with them. According to the husband, three or four months after the marriage the wife wanted to go to England to visit her pa­ rents and he sent her there about 9 or 10 months after the marriage. She spent some 7 months in England and then returned to Cyprus. Their relations became worse, according to the husband, though he did not state in what respect. 1966 l-cb. 14, 16, 24 A M O N I O S NICOU P. GLENDAA.NICOU (OTHERWISF BORRILL) AND MICHAEL JAMFS WOOD 1ί>66 The wife made the acqainlancc of the co-respondeni, some three months before October, 1965, while she was working ANIONICS NICOU in the husband's bar. The co-respondent used to frequent the bar regularly as a customer and he became friendly with GLENOAA.Nicou the wife, and the husband slated that he suspected them. The (OTHERWISE co-respondent, who is a bachelor and an Englishman, is BORRILL) employed at the Sovereign Base Area at Dhekelia and lives AND in Larnaca. M I C H A E L JAMFS Feb. 1^ WOOD , The husband further slated that in the evening of the 12th October, 1965, he missed the.wife and that he reported the matter to the police at about 8 p.m. At about 11 p.m. he went, logether with Takis Koumis (witness 2) and Petros Christou to the house of the co-respondent in Larnaca and he knocked at the door. The co-respondent opened the door and the husband, together with his two friends, went into the house where he saw his wife sitting on an armchair in the sitting room in her night-dress. He then asked her to go home with him, she refused and he left. On the following day he met her in the street al about 3 or 3.30 p.m. accompanied by the co-respondent and he asked her again to return to him but she replied : " I have deserted you, 1 am not coming back ". On another occasion he saw her in the cinema accom­ panied by the co-respondent. They were holding hands when he saw them. This is the husband's version as given in evidence by him. The petition was filed 11 days after the 12th October, that is, on the 23rd October,
4. It was served on the wife and the co-respondent on Ihc 26th October. On the following day the wife signed a retainer to her advocate, Mr. M. Cramvis, and she left Cyprus two days after service, that is, on the 28th October, 1965, never to return. Her instructions to her lawyer, as given in the form of retainer, were " 1 instruct him nol to oppose the application and admit facts as per appli­ cation ". Mr. Cramvis staled on the date of the hearing that his client left Cyprus on the day following the signing of the retainer, that she left no address with him and that he has not communicated with her since that date. Respondent's counsel did not enter appear.ancc at the proper time, nor did he file a reply or any other document on respondent's behalf. On the day of the hearing of this petition he was granted leave to enter an appearance on that day. The husband's witness, Takis Koumis, did not attend Court on the day fixed for the hearing of the petition owing, 112 as he explained, lo some nusundcistanding between the pe­ titioner and thewitness , butit should be stated that he was not subpoenaed lo attend Couil. On counsel's application the case was adjourned for two days to enable this witness to attend andgive evidence in support of the husband's ver­ sion This witness, who comes from Larnaca, is a partner in a "flippeis" amusement business Heslated that he had known the parties before and that the husband methim at the " Acropolis " cafe on the 12thOctober, 1965, at about 7 or 730 ρm Thehusband appeared to be upset and, aftei some conversation, this witness together with a eeilam Petros Chnstou and thehusband went tothepolice slatton at about 8 ρm and then they lelurned lo the"Acropolis" cafe Atabout 11 p m on thesame night all three of them went lo an En­ glishman's house in Larnaca According to this witness, the husband knocked at the dooi, the Englishman opened and all thiee o\~ them went in. Theie this witness stated that he saw the wile lying ona sofa in the silting room, holding a dunk , that shewas wearing a night-dress, that when shesaw them she got up fiom the sofa and went tosit inan armchair, and that thehusband became excited andsaid lo Ihewife in I nghsh (the conversation is quoted veibatim) "Why you left me ? You did nottell meanything What you doing in this house ' " The wile replied " I cannot live with youanymoie I had enough fiom you I know what Iwant Ifound it 1 am happv here" The witness then offered to reconcile them but, according to him, she replied " 1 cannot live with him any more I cannot stand this kind of life with himand I never go back with him" Thereupon the husband, with his two filends, left theEnglishman's house Twoor three days later the witness saw thewife together with thesame Englishman at thecinema Thewitness, whodid not know the English­ man befoie the 12thOctober, 1965, has notseen himsince Pausing there, 1think that this witness hasgiven evidence as lo a conversation alleged to have taken place in the co­ respondent's house, which the husband himself never alleged in his evidence before the Court The only thing which the husband said was that he asked the wife to follow him and she refused and he then left Amaterialcontradiction inthe evidence of these twowitnesses is that thehusband, who en­ tered the room fust, stated lhat his wife was sitting inan armchair while his witness Koumis stated thatwhen theyentered she was lying ona sofa and when shesaw themshe got up and vvcnl and sat on an aimchair Another discrepancy inthe ΙΠ 1966 Feb 14, 16, 24 AsnoMOS N K O I o. OJLISDAA Nieou (OTHFRUISE BORRIL!) AM) M K H A F I JAMIS WOOD 1966 l-eh. 14, 16, 24 A N I O N I O S NICOU v. Cii I'NOA A. NICOU (Οι in KWISI KCKKII.I.) AND Mil ΉΛΙ i. JAMI s Wool» evidence o f these two witnesses is that Koumis staled that the wife was holding a drink when they entered while the hus­ band said nothing about a drink. Under the provisions o f the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, which is the law applicable to matrimonial causes in Cyprus, the Court has l o be " satisfied on the evidence " that " t h e case for the petition has been proved " and, inter tifitt, that the petition is not presented or prosecuted in col­ lusion with the respondent or either of the respondents, and if the Court is not satisfied with respect to any o f the afore­ said matters il shall dismiss the petition (section 4 o\' the En­ glish Act o f 1950). Needless to say that a fact may be inferred f r o m circumstances which lead to i l , by fair inference, as a necessary conclusion. But the Court must be satisfied that there was something more than opportunity before it will affix guilt; evidence o f a guilty inclination or passion is need­ ed in addition (sec Ruydcn on Divorce, 9th edition, page 151, paragraph 106, and the cases quoted in support o f the statements in thai paragraph). I n ' t h e present case., however, there is no evidence o f inclinalion lo commit adultery or willingness lo indulge in amo­ rous dalliance falling short o f adultery ; and there is no pre­ sumption o f adultery simply because opportunity is there. In an adultery case (lie evidence o f the petitioner alone is seldom accepted without corroboration, either by a witness or, at least, by strong surrounding circumstances. In this case there is no direct evidence o f eye-witnesses as to the aclual act o f adultery. Certain evidence is given l o the Court and f r o m that evidence the C'ouri is invited to infer that adultery has actually taken place between the wife and the co-rcspondgnt. On the question of corroboration the recent case o f Alii v. Alii [1965] 3 A l l l-.R. 480 restates the rule as to corro­ borative evidence. The following is taken from the headnotc: " In regard to corroborative evidence o f alleged ma­ trimonial offences the authorities justify the following rules, applicable in proceedings in Courts o f summary jurisdiction and in the High Court—(i) that where a ma­ trimonial offence is alleged, the Court will look for corro­ boration o f the complainant's evidence; and (ii) that the Court w i l l normally, before f i n d i n g a matrimonial offence proved, require such corroboration if, on the complai­ nant's own evidence, il is available. These arc rules o f practice only, not o f law. They spring from the gravity 114 o f the consequences o f proof in a matrimonial offence ; and from the fact that experience has shown the risk o f a miscaniage o f justice in acting on the u n c o n o h o i a led testimony o f a spouse in this class o f case. It is, nevertheless, open l o a C o u i l to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a spouse if the Court is not m doubt where the i f u l h lies (see p. 484, lellers Ε to G, post). Dictuni of SIR B O Y D M E R R I M A N , P, in Β. v. B. ([1935) A l l li.K. at ρ 429) applied ". As Lord Merrivale P. said in Williams v. Williams |1932J All Ε R. Rep. 907, -at page 908 : " It is obvious that in malteis οϊ Ihc greates. consequence between man and wifeit would be a dangerous thing lo act upon the evidence o f one paity unsupported by a body o\' f a c t s " . O n the other hand, in Kafton v. Ktifton [19481 1 A l l E.R. 435, at page
5. Cohen, I J , was <>\' the view that the need for corroboration is neecss.iiilv giealci in an undefended than in a defended case, where the evidence of the petitioner, though unconobolaled, is tested by cross exammation and can be measuied against the evidence given on the other side. Il wilt be >ecn that all these niles of practice spnng t i o m Ihc giavit) o\' the consequence·» of proof in a mahimoniai offence, and I om the fact that experience has shown the risk ol a miscarriage o f justice in acting upon the uneonoboraied testimony o\' a spouse in this class of eases. Confessions or admissions o f adultery by a respondent are jealously seiuiim/.cd, especially if made by a spouse who desires to be di\o:ceil. The Court will lefuse to act upon confessions alone unlc··» lhe surrounding circumstances indicate that the confession is iruc, e.g. wheic the confession is made by a spouse who is anxious for foigiveness, or by a wife who has c\ciνthing: lo lose by such confession, and i n such cases the Court may act upon a confession, although uncorroborated (sec Raydcn on Divorce, page 153, paragraph 109 and the cases in support). In the present case il is the version of the husband and his witness that the wife was seen at 11 p.m. in the co-respon­ dent's house wearing a night diess. One o f the question t o be considered is : Are these two witnesses telling the t r u t h ? In weighing their evidence it should be borne in mind that the wife left the matrimonial home on that very evening, and \vc have no evidence whether she moved her personal clothing II 1 · 1065 Teb. 14, !ΐ-, \SI0M0S N|t /> CiLTNDA Λ Nil (OTHERWISH BORRILI ) AND MlCHAtL J\M WOOD 1966 Feb. 14^ 1 , and belongings from the house and, if she did, at what time. | _ [ o w j j ^ s h ec o m e l 0 b ej n a night-dress inthe sitting room ANTONIOS NKOU "• of theco-respondent ? I entertain considerable doubts whether she was actually in her night-dress. The petitioner's (;..LNOAA.NKO.J S (OlHIKWINIi . ι,ΠΗΙ{||[) AND Mu iiAii. JAMIS W,M,I> w o u | d J h a v e .· b c c n . | n o r c b a b L ,e i. j f t · h i. e w j f c w •ι a s J f o u n d • in some stale ol undress, rather than in her night-dress in Ihe silting room, considering that il was her first evening there. On the other hand, why should she be wearing her night-dress and sitting in Ihe sitting room and not taking any precaution when there was a knock at the door, bymo­ ving into another room. Further more, there is no evidence as lo the state ofdress o\' ihe co-respondent. 1think that it can be reasonably assumed that hewasproperly dressed, and not undressed orinpyjamas, otherwise the husband and his witness would have staled so. Another factor tobe con­ sidered in weighing (he evidence is that there was no scene between the husband and Ihe wife and/or the co-respondent when itisalleged that Ihc husband caught his wife in a night­ dress inihe co-respondent's house. Would that beprobable, considering the type of the husband, that is lo say, thathe is a young bar manager and not a sophisticated University don lolake matters lying down with a cool head. . Following that, the husband goes to hislawyer andthe petition is filed and served on the wife. She very conveniently instructs her advocate not lo oppose the petition and to admit the facts and she leaves Cyprus on Ihc following day leaving no address and not returning to Cyprus. Having watched the demeanour of the husband andhis witness in ihe w mess box, and considering the discrepancies in their evidence, I have formed the impression that they are nol witnesses of truth. I find their evidence unreliable and I am nol prepared toaccept it. But, even if 1 believed their evidence, that does not prove adultery. I d onot have any evidence that the wife spent the night with the co-respondent and on the other evidence Iam not prepared to draw the in­ ference that adultery took place on lhat night. To sum up, having regard to the nature and quality ofthe evidence before me Iam nol prepared todraw the inference lhat in Ihe circumstances of this case the wife committed adultery with the co-respondent. On the whole, I amnot satisfied lhat on ihc evidence the case has been proved and the petition should accordingly fail (section 4

(2)of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950). 116 Even il adultciy had been piovcd lo my satisfaction, undci the provisions ol section 4

(2)(e) of the 1950 Act the peti­ tioner would still have to satisfy ihe Court on the evidence that the petition is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent, and I think that I should deal shoitly with lhat point The burden of disproving collusion and connivance lies on the petitioner and il is milially discharged bv the piovisional piesumption of innocence , and it is only aftei there arises some mattci which arouses Ihe suspicion of the Couit that the buidcn shifts back to the petitioner (see Rayden on Divorce, page 231, paiagiaph 3, and the cases m support) At the end οΐ the ease the Cour must be satisfied that thcie has been no collusion on the pail ol ihe petitioner but the standard ol prt>of is on the balance of probabilities Col­ lusion means an agieement οι bargain between the paities to a suit whcieby the initiation ol the suit is piocuicd oi its conduct provieled loi, but nol evciy bargain entered into bv the p.ntics lo a pending divoiee suit is collusive An essential element in a collusive bargain is an attempt to perveit the course of |Usliee It applies paiiieularly to an agreement not lo defend Buiiiis ν Raines and (iimnade (the Queens Procloi intervening) [18671, I R 1 Ρ & D 505 , Baton ν Hat on and Aslibv

(1877), 25 W R 560 , and the cases in the notes to pauigraph 11, at page 241, of Rayden on Dtvoice The fact lhat both spouses desire a divorce does not make ιhem guilty ol a collusion provided they have nol entered into any agreement obnoxious to the Couit As alieady stated, the burden ol disproving collusion is on the pclitionci In the present case I have to considei the following lacls (

1. a)Ihe express instructions given by the respondent to her advocate not to defend the petition and to admit facts , (
2. b)her depailure from Cyprus on the day following the signing of the ιclaim,r lo her advocate ,(
3. c)that she lett no addiess with her advocate , and (
4. d)that she has not given furlhei instructions to her advocate or written to him at all since her deparluie fiom Cyprus All these matters have aroused stiong suspicion in the mihd of the Court and the burden shifts back to the petitioner but on the evidence before me 1 would nol be prcpaied to say that I am not satisfied lhat the petition is not presented or prosecuted in collusion Had the case for the petition been piovcd, then this would certainly be a proper case for the 117 heb 1966 14, 16 24 \siiAKi\ Nieoi ο G L I NDA A N I C O I (Omntwisi BORRIIJ ) ANLi M i l HAFl )K\MS W oon 1966 J_ ' ANIONIKS Attorney-General of the Republic, as the Stale's Proctor, look inlo it and consider whether lo inlervene 01 nol. N I < i»t' n. 0 In the result the petition is dismissed. Cil 1 ΝΙ>ΛA N l ( o n (OitihKwisr N 0or(jer as lo c o s t s ItOKRII ι ) ANI> Petition dismissed. No or M i l MAI ι J A M I S WIH.D lS < 118 t 0 C 0 S T S -