clr/1966/1966_3_671.pdf

(2)of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law, 1964, (No. 33 of 1964), from the decision* of one of •Reported in

(1965)3 C.L.R.

1. 671 DEMETRIOS PAPADEMETRIOU Tut BOARD FOR REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS & CIVIL ENGINEERS 1966 April 19,
2. June 30 DEMETRIOS PAPADEMETRIOU the Judges of this Court, on certain legal issues raised in a recourse which was being heard before the learned Judge in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of the Court. under Article 146 of the Constitution. V, T H E BOARD FOR REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS & CIVIL ENGINEERS The recourse (Case No.92/64) was against the decision of a statutory body, the Board for Registration of Architects and Civil Engineers, who exercising their powers under the relative statute (The Architects and Civil Engineers Law
3. No.41 of 1962) refused, on the 20th July, 1964, a request to register the Applicant as architect or civil engineer, under the provisions of section 7

(1)or

(2)of the statute. Byhis recourse,filedon July 28, 1964,the Applicant sought relief in the form of a judicial declaration, that the decision of the Board in question is null and void and of no effect whatsoever, for a number of reasons, including the contention that the restrictions imposed by section 7, under which the Applicant was refused registration, are unconstitutional, as offending against the Constitution. In effect the constitutionality of the whole statute was challenged under Article 6. providing against discrimination; under Article 28, providing for equality before the law; and Article 25 protecting the right to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business. The facts alleged by the Applicant in support of his claim for registration, as set out in his application, are that he "graduated the Bennet College, Athens in 1936, and has also obtained by correspondence diplomas from the British Institute Civil Engineering Chambers School, London; Associate Membership National Institute of Engineers, London; American School of Architecture. He contributed articles to the press, and was several times entrusted with important government jobs. He had been practising the profession of an architect since 1936". The recourse was opposed by the Board mainly on the ground that the Applicant did not qualify for registration under section 7 of the statute, the validity of which, under the Constitution, was positively asserted. For the sake of convenience and to avoid costs, the recourse was being heard together with eleven other cases of similar nature. One of them was No. 218/63 (Kyriakides v. The Boardfor the Registration of Architects and Civil Engineers) 672 where extensive argument was heard on the legal issues; and two decisions* were,in due course, reached and pronounced by the trial Judge clearing the ground on the legal aspect of all these recourses. The first, was an interim decision, pronounced on April 14, 1965, which disposed of several points of law raised in all these cases. It decided that "the setting up of the Board after the period laid down in section 3

(2)was not an invalid act" as contended on behalf of the applicant. (Vide Record at p. 30, I-J; and p. 33, D). The same interim decision also disposed of the objections taken on rules of natural justice. For the reasons elaborately stated by the learned Judge in his decision "the rule of natural justice relied on. could not be said to be either involved or to have been infringed'*. (At p. 33, J-K). After dealing with these preliminary points, the Judge went on to consider in hissaid interim decision, "the constitutionality of the provisions in question of "Law 41/62 which are sections 7 and 9, as amended by Law 7/64". (Record at p. 35, A). By a most careful and convincing reasoning, if we may say so with all respect, the learned Judge cleared the objections based on different other parts of the Constitution,and concluded that the "examination, therefore, concerning the constitutionality of sections 7 and 9 of the Law. must be limited, in these proceedings, within the context of Article 25". (Record at p. 38. I-J). Argument was then heard from learned counsel representing all parties concerned, on the main issue of the constitutionality of the statutory provision in question, rested on Article 25. By a decision in the proceedings affecting all the cases in question, pronounced on 11.12.1965** (embodying also the interim decision of the 14.4.1965*** described above) the learned Judge dealt with equal thoroughness, we would unhesitatingly say, with the main legal issue as set out above. I do not propose discussing here the reasons which led our brother Judge to his conclusion regarding the constitu*Decisions reported in

(1965)3 C.L.R. at pp. 151 and 617. respectively, under the name "Kyrtakt'desand theCouncil for Registration of Architects and Civil Engineers". «•Reported in

(1965)3 C.L.R. 617. ^••Reported in

(1965)3 C.L.R.

1. 673 1966 April 19,
2. June 30 DtMETRlOS PAPADEMETRIOU
3. THE BOARD TOR REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS & CIVIL ENGINEERS 1966 April 19, 20, J u n e 30 DEMETRIOS PAPADrMETRIOU V. T H E BOARD FOR REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS & CIVIL ENGINEERS tional validity of section 7, with which the Court agree. Especially when this matter is dealt with in more detail in the Judgment just delivered in the Kyriakides case (Rev. App. No.9)*. Itis sufficient to state the result in the Judge's own words which read: "On the basis of the material before me, Ido find thattheacademicqualifications specified therein are qualifications of the standard usually required for the professions inquestion,and,therefore, section 7, isa provision within the ambit of paragraph 2of Article 25, in this respect". (Record at p. 68, H-l). "Viewed in that light—the learned Judge proceeds further down in his judgment (at p. 70, A-D)—I am of opinion, that the provisions concerned can properly be regarded as being within both Article 25

(2)and Article 28, because they do ensure that any academic qualification actually of the standard usually required for the professions in question will, without discrimination,be eventually declared equivalent to the qualifications expressly specified in section 7, which as I have held already are of the said usually required stand­ ard". The Court, as Ihavealready said, agree with thisconclusion. The learned Judge proceeded to deal, very carefully and extensively, with the constitutionality of section 9; "or rather—as he puts it—(p. 71, A) the constitutionality of such parts of paragraphs (A) and (B) (a) of sub-section (Π of such section, which are involved in the proceedings". His conclusion in this connection, appears further down in his decision (at p. 79, I) where he declared sub-paragraph (iii) of section 9

(1)(A) of Law 41/62 to be unconstitutional and of no effect for the purposes of the proceedings before him. And likewise, and for the same reasons, he found and declared as unconstitutional sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph Β (a) of sub-section

(1)of section

1. (Vide p. 80, 1-K). Against this decision, which, it must be remembered only disposes of certain legal issues raised in these recourses, (and does not finally purport to deal with or dispose of the recourses on their respective merits) both sides concerned. have taken the present appeal. •Reported ante, at page
2. 674 The Applicant imthe recourse seeks to attack the decision in its full extent contending that both sections 7 and 9 of the Law, are unconstitutional. The statutory body whose decision is challenged by the recourse (the Board in question) attacks in the appeal the part of the decision which declared as unconstitutional the provisions of section 9 set out above. In addition to elaborate and able argument from learned counsel on both sides, theCourt had the advantage of hearing the learned Attorney-General of the Republic whom we invited to address the Court on the issues of constitutionality of the statute in question raised in theappeal and cross-appeal before us. Besides expressing the Court's full appreciation for the assistance received from all learned and able counsel who addressed us. 1do not propose dealing here with any part of their submissions which havebeen considered and discussed by Mr. Justice Josephides in the judgment just delivered in Kyriakides' case (Rev. Appeal No. 9).* Following aswedo, in thiscase,thejudgment in Kyriakides' case for the same reasons as those stated therein, we arrive at the same result. We allow the cross-appeal of the Board; and we dismiss the appeal. The attack on the validity under the Constitution, of section 7 and 9 of the Architects and Civil Engineers Law in their form at the material time, fails for the purposes of this recourse. The record shall now be returned to the learned Judge who has been dealing with the matter so far, for further consideration and decision on the merits, if the Applicant still thinks that his remedy lies in these proceedings; and not in establishing, in due course, that his numerous and various qualifications as described in his application are "of a standard equivalent to those" provided in the statute, or those declared as such, by the appropriate authority. There will be Judgment in this appeal (Revisional Appeal. No. 8)and orders accordingly. With no order as to costs in the appeal. Appealdismissed. Cross-appeal allowed. No order as to costs in the appeal. 'Reported ante, at page
3. 675 1966 April 19,
4. June 30 DEMETRIOS PAPADFMFTRIOU V. THE BOARD FOR REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS & CIVIL ENGINEERS