the Cnminal Code, Cap. 154—Causing death within section 210—What amounts to "causing" in section death within section 210 is laid down 211
the Code—Providing that a person deemed to have caused the death
another, is although his act is not the immediate or the sole cause
death—And even if his act or omission would not have caused the death unless it had been accompanied by an act or omission.
killed or
other persons—Careless stantial" the person act or omission a " sub cause
the death (see R.v. Gould [1964] 1 W.L.R. 145)—See also herehelow. Road traffic—Causing death by careless driving—Section 210
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154—",ee above and below. Causing death—-By careless act not an otmling to culpable negli 210 and 211
gence—Sections <he Criminal Code, Cap. 154—See above. Criminal Procedure—Constitutional Law—Charge—Framing charge—Sufficient details should he given
the nature and grounds
the charge preferred .against the person charged— Test to be applied—Article 12.5 (a) and (b)
the Constitu tion—Article 6
the .European Convention on Human Rights
1950, forming part
the law
Cyprus by virtue
.3
the Constitution, the Convention having been ratified by the European Convention on Human Rights {Ratification) Law, 1962 (Law No. 39
]962)—See, also, below. Human Rights—Article Corresponding 12.5 (a) and (b)
the Constitution — to Article 6
the European Convention on Human Rights,
1950—The European Con vention on Human Rights (Ratification) Law 1962 (Law No. 39
1962)—Article 169.3
the Constitution—See 29 above.
T H E POLICE^ I%8 \pnl S PANAYIOTIS I O K * KANVAS alιοί POMBAS υ 1 HF P O L I O Charge—Framing oj—Particulais to be gnen—Causing death by careless act (ontrar\ to section 210 oj Cap 154 (supra)— Particulars oj the careless act gnen in the present case were simply " careless dm mg —But in the circumstances
this case it is obvious that the accused knew from the start all necessary details—Therefore, he was not prejudiced in his defence—Furthermore his counsel did not apply, as he M«¥ entitled, for further particulars—See, also, above. Constitutional Law above -Articles 12 5 (a) and (b) and 169 3—See Paitttulars—Charge—See abo\e The appellant was convicted by the District Couit
Famagusta for causing the death
two persons by careless driving on the 25th April, 1967 The charge sheet contained two counts which both charged the appellant with causing death unintentionally " by a careless act, not amounting to culpable negligence, to wit, by careless driving'
his lorry, contrary to section 210
the Cnminal Code, Cap 154 The case for the prosecution was that the appellant was dnving al the time his fully loaded lorry dangeiously fast lound a blind curve, without keeping to his propel side on a lather narrow road, with the result that a collision occurred between the loiry and a motor-cai coming from the opposite direction and driven by one
the victims, the other victim being a passenger in the motor-car Both, driver and passcngei
the motor-car, icceived in the afoicsa-d loadcollision the latal injuries The learned trial Judge convn -d the appellant on both counts and sentenced him to 12 months imprisonment on each count the sentences to run concuirently I he appeal, as originally liled, was dnecled both against convturon and sentence but at the hearing ot the appeal the appeal against sentence was abandoned The appeal was lought on two main giouiids - (I) It was submitted that the convictions weic bad in law bci.auSt. the counts on the charge-sheet were not framed in accordance with Article 12 5 fa)
the Constitution which provides that every person chaiged with an
ience has the right " to be informed promptfv and in a language which he understands and in detail ot the natuic and grounds
the charge pieferred against him . It was subnvttcd m this respect that it was not sufiiuent to state in the 31» particulars
the counts merely that the appellant had driven carelessly, but that it was necessary to give, also. details
the careless driving, a thing which was not done in this case. I'M* A p 3 PANAMOUS FOK* KANMS ij/ι'ηϊ
driving
the driver
the motor-car with which the appellant collided ; and that, had the Judge done so, he might have not convicted the appellant because he might have found then that the collision was caused by the manner in which the motor-car was being driven. In dismissing the appeal and affirming the conviction, the Court :— Held, (/) as to ground (I) supra:
the European Convention on Human Rights,
1950 which provides that everyone charged with a criminal
fence has the right " to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail,
the nature and cause
the accusations against him ". On the other hand the convention forms part
the law
Cyprus, in the sense envisaged by Article 169.3
the Constitution, since its ratification by the European Convention on Huir in Rights (Ratification) Law, 1962 (Law No. 39
1962).
the Consti tution and by Article 6
the Convention, it is quite pertinent to bear in mind the relevant jurisprudence
the European Commission
Human Rights, set up and functioning under the Convention
the relevant cases (quoted infra) that, in deciding if a charge is sufficiently detailed. what has to be examined is whether or not an accused person has been deprived, through the omission from the charge
any element,
the possibility
adequately preparing his defence ; and in this connection regard must be had to any circumstances showing that such accused person had in fact knowledge
the essential elements
the
fence with which he was charged. 31 POMHA^ i>. ^ΗΖ 1>ul - 1Ch 1968 April 5 PANAYIOTIS FOKA KANNAS alias POMBAS V. T H E POLICE
the particulars
the two counts on which he has been convicted, that his " careless act " was " care less driving" and he was not given in the said counts any details regarding his " careless driving", nevertheless, the appellant, having been present when the police took relevant measurements on the spot, after the accident, and having seen the real evidence discovered there, such as length and direction
the marks on the asphalt left by the tyres
his lorry, must have known—and been in a position to instruct his counsel accordingly—
the essential elements constituting his "careless driving"; thus, the appellant was not deprived
the possibility
adequately preparing his defence because
lack
any details in the charges. (b) Moreover, the appellant, at the commencement
the trial, did notapply, as hewas fully entitled to do, for further particulars
the charges ; apparently, such a course was not deemed necessary bycounsel defending him. Held, (Π) as to ground
driving
the appellant on this occasion was such as to render him liable to be convicted under section 210
the Criminal Code.
the victims ; he may not have devoted a specific part
his judgment to this aspect, but he more than once refers to this matter in analysing the explanation given by the appellant for the collision.
the motor-car were tobe blamed to a certain extent for the collision, the appellant was still properly convicted for causing the death
such driver andhis passenger. What amounts to "caus i n g " death within section 210
the Criminal Code is laid down in the following section 211, which provides that a person is deemed to have caused the death
another person, although his act is not the immediate 32 or the sole cause
death, and even if his act or omission would not have caused the death unless it had been accompanied by an act or omission
the person killed or
other persons ; and on the basis
the facts in this case it cannot be seriously argued that the death
the two occupants
the motor-car in question were not "caused", in the sense
section 211, through the careless driving
the appellant.
the accused should be the " substantial" cause
"the death
the deceased but need not be the sole cause
such death. Even if we were to apply such a test in the case before us we would unhesitatingly say that the careless driving
the appellant was a substantial cause
the fatal accident in question. Appeal dismissed. Sentence to run from the date
conviction. Cases referred'to : Kouma v.The Police
fner against Austria, Yearbook No. 3
the European Convention on Human Rights at p. 344 ; Nielsen against Denmark, Yearbook No. 4
the Convention , at p. 490 ; Note: The immediately preceding two cases are cases '.considered by the European Commission
Human * Rights. Appeal against c o n v i c t i o n a n d s e n t e n c e . Appeal against conviction and sentence by Panayiotis Foka Kannas alias Pombas who was convicted on the 11th November, 1967, at the District Court
Famagusta (Criminal Case No. 5450/67) on two counts
the
fence
causing'the death
two persons by careless driving contrary to section 210
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154, and was sentenced by Pikis, D.J., to 12 months' imprisonment on each count the sentences to run concurrently. L. Clerides, with G. Tornaritis, for the appellant. S. Georghiades, Counsel
the Republic, for the r e s p o n dents. 33 1968 April 5 PANAYIOTIS FOKA KANNAS alias POMBAS v. T H E POLICE 1968 April 5 VASSILIADES, P.: The judgment
the Court will be delivered by TriantafyHides, J. PANAYIOTIS FOKA KANNAS alias POMBAS n, v · T H E POLICE TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.: T h e appellant was convicted by the District Court
Famagusta, on the 11th November, 1967, for causing the death
two persons by careless driving on the 25th April, 1967. & r ' The charge-sheet contained two counts, both under section 210
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154 : each count in respect
the death
the person named therein, who died from injuries received in a road collision between a fullyloaded lorry, driven by the appellant, and a motor-car, driven by one
the two victims, who had the other victim as a passenger sitting next to him. Both counts charged the appellant with causing death unintentionally " by a careless act, not amounting to culpable negligence, to wit, by careless driving "
the lorry. The case for the prosecution was that the appellant caused the collision by driving dangerously fast round a blind curve, without keeping to his proper side on a rather narrow road ; the main Famagusta-Karpass road, outside Tavrou village. The appellant's case was that he was driving his lorry round the bend in question, keeping to the middle
the road, and at a speed
25-30 m.p.h., when he suddenly saw, very close to and in front
him, at a distance
about twenty feet, the motor-car coming, fast, from the opposite direction. He tried to take avoiding action, by applying his brakes and swerving to his left, but the distance between the two vehicles was so close that there was no time for either
them to avoid the collision, which occurred almost head-on, causing heavv damage to the smaller vehicle, and fatal injuries to its two passengers. Appellant's version
the events was given in a statement to the Police, made on the date
the collision, and from the witness-box at the trial. The learned trial Judge, in acarefully considered judgment, dealt first with the legal aspect
the case, and then, having analysed the evidence before him, he found that " the prosecution discharged the onus cast on them
proving their case beyond anv reasonable doubt ". He convicted the accused on both counts, and sentenced him to 12 months' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrentlv. Earlier on in his judgment the Judge described the curve
the road as a sharp bend ; he had inspected the locus in 34 the course
the trial, as provided in section 87
the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, and he had before him a set
photographs
the locus taken by the Police for the purposes
the case. The Judge found that the appellant showed considerable carelessness by driving his heavilyloaded lorry at a speed
25-30 m.p.h. when about to negotiate such a sharpbend, whilst occupying the wrong side
the road, from where the visibility round the bend was less than from his proper side
the road ; the Judge further found that the fact that the appellant had sounded his horn just before approaching the bend did not help him in the circumstances. The appeal, as originally filed, was directed both against conviction and sentence. At the hearing before us, however, the appeal against sentence was abandoned ; and was withdrawn by leave
the Court. We think that counsel for the appellant took a prudent course in doing so because the sentence imposed could scarcely be deemed to be too severe in a case
such seriousness. Learned counsel for the appellant have submitted that the conviction
their client on both counts was bad in law in view
-the fact that such counts were not framed in accordance with Article 12.5(a)
the Constitution, which provides that every person charged with an
fence has the right "to be informed promptly and in a language which he understands and in detail
the nature and grounds
the charge preferred against him '-'. It was submitted that it was not sufficient to state in the particulars
the counts that the appellant had driven carelessly, but that it was necessary, to give, also, details
the careless driving. Our Article 12.5(a) is in every material respect similar to Article 6.3(a)
the European Convention on Human Rights,
1950, which provides that everyone charged with a criminal-
fence has the right " to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail,
the nature and cause
the accusations against him ". The Convention forms part
_the law
Cyprus, in the sense envisaged by Article 169.3
the Constitution, since its ratification by the European Convention on Human Rights (Ratification) Law, 1962 (Law 39/62). In examining whether the charges on which the appellant has been convicted were sufficiently detailed,-as required by Article 12.5(a)
our Constitution—as well as by 35 1968 April 5 PANAYIOTIS FOKA KANNAS alias POMBAS D. T H E POLICE 1968 April 5 PANAYIOTIS FOKA KANNAS alias POMBAS υ. T H E POLICE Article 6.3 (a)
the Convention—it is quite useful to bear in mind the relevant jurisprudence
the European Com mission
H u m a n Rights, set up and functioning under the Convention : In the case
ner against Austria (Appl. 524/59) the Commission, when deciding on the admissibility
the application, has stated, inter alia, the following (see Yearbook N o . 3
the Convention at p. 344) : — " Whereas this information on the nature
and grounds for the accusation seems all the more necessary as under paragraph 3 (b)
, any accused person has the right ' to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation
his defence ' ; whereas, in fact, there is a logical connection between paragraphs 3 (a) and 3 (b)
; whereas, consequently, t h e in formation on the nature
and grounds for the accusa tion should contain such particulars as will enable the accused to prepare his defence accordingly." — a n d paragraphs 3 (a) and 3 (b)
the Conven tion correspond to paragraphs 5 (a) and 5 (b)
our Constitution. In t h e case
Nielsen against Denmark (Appl. 343/57) (see Yearbook No. 4
the Convention at p. 490) the appli cant had been charged with robbery before a Danish Criminal Court ; in the particulars
the indictment it was stated that he was being charged with robber\ " in that he had instigated and planned the robbery committed by the accused H a r d r u p " , a co-accused
the applicant. It was contended before the Commission that the text
the indictment was not sufficiently detailed, as required bv Article 6.3 (a)
the Convention, as it was not staled therein that Nielsen " instigated " Hardrup to commit the robbery by means
" hypnotic influence " —that being the prosecution's case against him. In dealing with this point the Commission had this to say, inter alia, in its Report : 11 It is for the Commission to state whether it considers that the information concerning the accusation against an Applicant, and, in particular the indictment, com plies with the requirement in Article f> that a person charged with a criminal
fence has the right to be informed in detail
the nature and cause
the charge against him. It considers in the first place that the 36 *' object
an indictment is to serve as a framework
the trial. The Commission will be obliged to examine the question whether the omission in the indictment
any element alleged by the applicant to be essential deprived him
the possibilities
adequately preparing his defence." 1968 April 5 PANAYIOTIS FOKA KANNAS alias POMBAS v. -The Commission proceeded, then, to find that the term " instigation.." was sufficient in the circumstances
that qase to cover the concept
hypnotic influence; the circumstances
the case being that counsel for the applicant • knew in advance
the trial that Hardrup had been subjected to a psychiatric examination, had been furnished with copy,
the report
such examination and appreciated the possible significance
this step with regard to the criminal proceedings against the applicant. Actually, at the commencement
the trial counsel for the applicant had asked the Public Prosecutor to state whether the term " instigation " covered the notion
" hypnotic influence ", but the Prosecutor refused to give further particulars
the indictment and "the Commission took the view that " the Public Prosecutor's refusal to give this explanation did not .justify the applicant in presuming that the concept
hypnotic influence was excluded by employment
the term ' instigation '. ,The Report
the Commission on'this point concludes " by stating :— " The Commission is thus
the opinion that the applicant was informed
the nature and cause
the accu·, satibn against him in sufficient detail and that in this respect .there was no violation on the part
the res' pondent Government
the Convention." It appears from the foregoing that, in deciding if a charge is sufficiently detailed, what has to be examined is whether or not an accused person has been deprived, through the omission from the charge
any element,
the possibility
adequately preparing his defence ; and in this connection regard must be had to any circumstances showing that such accused person had in fact knowledge
the essential elements
the
fence with which he was charged. • Applying the-above test to the present case we find that, though the appellant was only told, by means
the particulars
the two counts on which he has been convicted, that his- " careless a c t " was "careless driving", and he 37 T H E POLICE 1968 April 5 PANAYIOTIS FOKA KANNAS alias POMBAS v. T H E POLICE was not given in the said counts any details regarding his " careless driving", nevertheless, the appellant, having been present when the police took relevant measurements on the spot, after the accident, and having seen the real evidence discovered there, such as the length and direction
the marks on the asphalt left by the tyres
his lorry, must have known—and been in a position to instruct his counsel accordingly—
the essential elements constituting his " careless driving " ;thus, the appellant was not deprived
the possibility
adequately preparing his defence because
the lack
any details in the charges. Moreover, it is worth drawing, in this respect, attention to the fact that the appellant, at the commencement
the trial, did not apply, as he was entitled to do, for further particulars
the charges ; apparently, such a course was not deemed necessary by his counsel. We are
the opinion, therefore, that in the circumstances
the present case no contravention
.5 (a)
the Constitution has taken place. We pass on, next, to deal with the law applicable in this case :— The appellant has been convicted, under section 210
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154,
having caused death by a careless act, not amounting to culpable negligence. As pointed out by Josephides, J. in Nearchou v. ThePolice
each particular case. There can be no doubt at all, in our opinion, that the manner
driving
the appellant on this occasion was, as properly found by the trial Judge on the evidence before him, such as to render him liable to beconvicted under section 210. Counsel for theappellant havesubmitted that his conviction is bad because the trial Judge failed to address his mind to the manner
driving
the driver
the motor-car with which the appellant's lorry collided ; and that, had the Judge done so, he might have not convicted the appellant, having found that the collision was caused by the manner in which the motor-car was being driven. First, we cannot agree that the trial Judge failed to take duly into account the wav the motor-car was being driven ; 3S he may not have devoted a specific part
his judgment to this aspect, but he more than once refers to this matter in analysing the explanation given by the appellant for the collision. 1968 April 5 PANAYIOTIS FOKA KANNAS alius Secondly, even if the driver
the motor-car were to be blamed to a certain extent for such collision, the appellant was still properly convicted for causing the death
such driver arid his passenger. What amounts to " causing" death in the sense
section210istobefound laiddown insection211ofCap. 154, which provides that a person is deemed to have caused the death
another person, although his act is not the immediate or the sole cause
death, and even if his act or omission would not have caused the death unless it had been accompanied by an act or omission
the person killed or
other persons ; and on the basis
the facts
'this case it cannot be seriously argued that the deaths
the two occupants
the motor-car were not caused, in the sense
section 211, through the careless driving
the appellant. The trial Judge in his judgment referred, in this respect, to the test laid down in R. v. Gould(1964, 1W.L.R. p. 145) ; in that case it was decided that the driving
the accused should be " asubstantial " cause
the death
the deceased but need not be the sole cause
such death. Even if we were to apply such a test in the case before us we would unhesitatingly say that the careless driving
the appellant was a substantial cause
the fatal accident in question. In concluding we would point out that a useful precedent, where the negligence
the appellant caused death contrary to section 210, without being entirely the sole cause
death, but, where, nevertheless, the appellant was convicted, and properlv so,under section 210, isto be found in Kouma v. The Police'
the opinion that this appeal fails and has to be dismissed, but we direct that the sentence should run from the date
conviction. Appeal dismissed. Sentence torunfromdateofconviction. ?0 POMBAS t>. T H E POLICE
AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.