(1). It is plain to me, that in view of the wording of paragraph 3 of Article 146 (supra), once the decision or act of the acquiring authority for the compulsory acquisition of the property was published, time was set in motion and the commencement of the running of the period for the making of the recourse by the owner began to run as from the date of such publication in computing the period of 75 days; and irrespective of when the act or decision came to the knowledge of the person concerned.

(2)The mere fact that the acquiring authority failed to reply to the letter of the Applicant dated the 30th June, 1966, (supra) does not in my view change the position of theApplicant, because the acquiring authority has acted under the provisions of Law 15 of 1962 (supra).

(3)The view that time begins to run as from such publication is further supported by the decisions of the then Supreme Constitutional Court (See John Moron and The Republic, 1 R.S.C.C-io, at p. 13; Joyce Marcoullides and The Greek Communal Chamber, 4 R.S.C.C. 7, at p. 10; Charalambos Pissas (No. 1) and The Electricity Authority, ( i 9 6 6 ) 3 C . L . R . 634).

(4)It should be further observed that the Applicant, under the provisions of the aforesaid Law'No. 15 of 1962, was deemed to have had constructive notice as from the date of the publication in the Official Gazette of the intended compulsory acquisition of her property. (S)(

1. a)Counsel further contended that the failure of the Respondent to reply to the Applicant's aforesaid letter of the 30th June, 1966 (supra) contravened Article 29 of the Constitution; and submitted that there could not be a reply by publication. (
2. b)There is no doubt that Article 29 covers all those cases where a person applies in writing to any competent authority (see Phedias Kyriakides and The Republic, 1 R.S. C.C. 66). But in the present case, the Applicant has not put forward a collateral claim under Article 29 for failure of the Respondent to reply to her letter; and it is equally 205 1968 April 27 MELPOMENI CONSTANTI ANTONI BAKKALIAOU, V. THE MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA 1968 April27 MELPOMENI CONSTANTI ANTONI BAKKALIAOU, V. THE MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA clear that the Applicant did not apply first to the acquiring authority, but only as a result of the said letter of the respondent dated the 19th June, 1966 (supra) informing her of the intended acquisition and calling on her to submit any objection which she may wish to raise. In my view, the failure of the acquiring authority to reply personally to the Applicant's letter does not offend against Article 29, because, as a matter of fact, the decision of such authority and its due reasons were published in the Official Gazette as required under the provisions of the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law No. 15 of 1962) for her information and of any other person interested to such property. (
3. c)I would like further to observe, that once the Applicant had ample notice of the intended acquisition of her property, it was her duty to show more interest and watch out for such publication in the Official Gazette.

(6)With regard to counsel's submission that "there cannot be a reply by publication" on the authority of Nicos Pelides and The Republic, 3 R.S.C.C. 13 at p. 17, I think that the reasoning behind this passage does not in any way support counsel's view, because it is evident that in that part of its Judgment the Supreme Constitutional Court was dealing with the question of review on an appeal.

(7)In the circumstances, and for the reasons I have advanced, this application cannot proceed and is dismissed as being filed out of time. Application dismissed. No order as to costs. Cases referred to: John Moran and The Republic, 1 R.S.C.C. 10, at p. 13; Joyce Marcoullides and the Greek Communal Chamber, 4 R.S.C.C. 7 at p. 10; Nicos Pelides and The Republic and Another, 3 R.S.C.C. 13, at pp. 17 and 20; Phedias Kyriakides and The Republic, 1 R.S.C.C. 66; Charalambos Pissas (No. 1) and The Electricity Authority,

(1966)3 C.L.R. 634; 206 Maria Venglis and The Electricity Authority ofCyprus,

(1965). 3 C.L.R.

1. 1968 April 27 MELPOMENI CONSTANTI ANTONI BAKKALIAOU, Recourse. Recourse against the decision of theRespondent to acquire compulsorily Applicant's property. A. Triantafyllides, for the Applicant. S. Marathovouniotis, for the Respondent. Cur. adv. vult. The following Judgment* was delivered by:HADJIANASTASSIOU, J.: In this preliminary point of law, the short question between the parties is whether this appli­ cation has been filed in Court within time, that is to say, before the lapse of the period of 75 days, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 146 of our Constitution. The undisputed facts are in brief as follows: The Applicant is the owner of a corner building site Plot No. 181, sheet-plan No. ΧΧΧΙΙΪ/12.6.ΙΙ, Block B, situated at Ayios Nicolaos in Famagusta. On the 28th April, 1966, the acquiring authority, themuni­ cipal corporation of Famagusta, published in the official Gazette of the Republic a "notice of acquisition" (Not. No. 49 in Supplement No. 3), containing a description of the property intended to be acquired, the name of the Applicant, the purpose for which it was required and the reasons for the acquisition in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law,
2. The municipal council acting, no doubt, on sound adminis­ trative policy, and in order to inform personally the owner of the intended acquisition of her property wrote a letter to the Applicant dated 19th June, 1966, in which it says: «Φέρεται εις γνώσιν υμών, ότι ή Δημοτική Επιτροπή 'Αμμοχώστου, έν TTJ ενασκήσει των δικαιωμάτων άτινα της παρέχονται δυνάμει τοΰ Νόμου 15 του 1962, Περί •For final decision on appeal see

(1969)1J.S.C. 74 to be reported in due course in

(1969)3 C.L.R. 207 v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA 1968 April 27 MELPOMENI C O N S TANTI ANTONI BAKKALIAOU, V. THE MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA 'Αναγκαστικής 'Απαλλοτριώσεως κτημάτων, δια σκοπούς δημοσίας όφελείας, ήτοι δια τήν δημιουργίαν, συντήρησιν και άνάπτυξιν δημοσίων οδών, προέβη είς τήν δημοσίευσιν Γνωστοποιήσεως 'Απαλλοτριώσεως τοϋ υμετέρου κτήματος τεμ. 181, Φ/Σχέδιον ΧΧΧΙΠ/12.6.ΙΙ Μπλοκ Β, 'Αγιος Νικόλαος, τοϋ οποίου ή άπόκτησις είναι απα­ ραίτητος δια τήν διεύρυνσιν, εΰθυγράμμισιν καΐ βελτίωσιν μέρους της Λεωφόρου Εύαγόρου καΐ της όδοΟ 'Ηλεκ­ τρικής. Ή δημοσίευσις της Γνωστοποιήσεως ταύτης, έγένετο είς τήν έπίσημον εφημερίδα της Δημοκρατίας, ΰ π ' άρ. 490 (Παράρτημα Τρίτον), ήμερ. 28.4-66 ('Αρ. Γνωστοποιήσεως 203). "Εάν ένίστασθε είς τήν σκοπουμένην ταύτην όπταλλοτρίωσιν, δύνασθε νά υποβάλετε προς τήν Άπαλλοτριοΰσαν 'Αρχήν, ήτοι τήν Δημοτικήν Ε π ι τ ρ ο π ήν 'Αμμοχώ­ στου, πλήρη καΐ δεόντως ήτιολογημένην εκθεσιν περί τ ω ν λόγων της ενστάσεως σας, εντός 15 ήμερων ά π ό της λήψεως της παρούσης είδοποιήσεώς μου». It would be observed, that the municipal council in their letter was calling upon the owner of the property to submit to the acquiring authority — the municipal corporation — within 15 days any objection which she may wish to raise to such acquisition. On the 30th June, 1966, the Applicant replied objecting to the intended acquisition of her property and, in a letter she says:«'Αναφερομένη είς τήν έπιστολήν τοΰ Εντίμου Κυρίου Δημάρχου 'Αμμοχώστου υ π ' αριθ. 41/65 ήμερ. 19ης 'Ιουνίου, 1966 επιθυμώ νά φέρω είς γνώσιν σας ότι ένίσταμαι είς τήν σκοπουμένην άπαλλοτρίωσιν τοΰ κτήμα­ τος μουΤεμάχιον 181, Φύλλον/Σχέδιον 33/12.6.2, Μπλοκ «Β» ευρισκομένου είς Άμμόχωστον, ένορίαν 'Αγίου Νικολάου διά τόν λόγον ότι τό κτήμα τοϋτο είναι ή μοναδική μου περιουσία και έσκόπευα νά κτίσω κατα­ στήματα έπ! τοϋ κτήματος τούτου σύμφωνα μέ τήν αΐτησίν μου και τ α σχέδια τ ά άποΐα είχα ύποβάλη προς ϋμας δι' άδειαν οίκοδομής ίνα τ ά τέκνα μου έχουν ένα είσάδημα έκ τοϋ οποίου νά δύνανται νά ζήσουν. «Έκ της έν λ ό γ ω επιστολής τοϋ 'Εντίμου Κυρίου Δημάρχου αντιλαμβάνομαι ότι ύμεϊς χρειάζεσθε μέρος τοϋ κτήματος μου διά τήν διεύρυνσιν, εΰθυγράμμισιν 208 καΐ βελτίωσιν μέρους της Λεωφόρου Εύαγόρου και της όδοϋ 'Ηλεκτρικής. 'Εάν πράγματιτοϋτος είναι ό σκοπός της αναγκαστικής άπολλοτριώσεως, προτείνω δπως, εάν δοθήάδεια οίκοδομήςτριών καταστημάτων σύμφωνα μέτήν αϊτησίν μουκαΐ τά σχέδιατά όποιαυπέβαλαπρος υμδς ή ώς ήθέλατε ΰποδείξη, παραχωρήσω μέρος τοϋ κτήματος μου δωρεάν διά τους σκοπούς της διευρύνσεως καΐ εύθυγραμμίσεως της Λεωφόρου Εύαγόρου καΐ της όδοΰ 'Ηλεκτρικής. Μέτήν πεποίθησιν δτι θά μελετηθή ή υπ*έμοΰ γενο­ μένη πρότασις καΐ θά τύχω απαντήσεως σας». It appears that no reply was.given to the letter of the Ap­ plicant, but the acquiring authority, no doubt, acting under the provisions of section 6 of Law 15/62, and after examining the objections to the acquisition made by the Applicant as well as after considering all circumstances of her case, it was considered expedient .to acquire the property of the Appli­ cant; and on the 13th October, 1966, an "order of acquisi­ tion" was published in the official Gazette of the Republic Not. No. 726 in Supplement No. 3). The Applicant, in her application for relief, dated the 17th August, 1967, seeks a declaration that the decision of the Respondent to acquire compulsorily her property is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. On the 19th December, 1967, counsel for the Respondent raised a preliminary point of law, that the application is out of time; and on the 30th December, 1967, counsel agreed that the preliminary point of law be tried by the Court first. It is not in dispute that the order of acquisition to acquire the property of the Applicant was published on the 13th October, 1966, and, therefore, it becomes evident that when this recourse was made on the 17th August, 1967, it was long after the lapse of 75 days as provided by paragraph 3 of Article 146 of the Constitution. But counsel for the Appli­ cant argued, that in view of the fact that Respondent failed to reply to the letter of the owner of the property, and because she was informed of the order of acquisition for the first time on the 8th June, 1967, when the Applicant was served with the notice of the proceedings for determination of the compensation payable for the acquisition, under the provi­ sions of section 9 of Law 15 of 1962, he submitted that time 209 1968 April 27. MELPOMENI CONSTANT! ANTONI BAKKALIAOU, V. THE MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA 1968 April 27 MELPOMENI CONSTANTI ANTONI BAKKALIAOU, V. THE MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA began to run as from that particular date of the 8th June 1967, and not from the 13th October, 1966. Paragraph 3 of Article 146 provides:"Such a recourse shall be made within 75 days of the date when the decision or act was published or, if not published and in the case of an omission, when it came to the knowledge of the person making the recourse". It is plain to me, that in view of the wording of paragraph 3, once the decision or act of the acquiring authority for the compulsory acquisition of property was published, time was set in motion and the commencement of the running of the period for the recourse by the owner began to run as from the date of such publication in computing the period of 75 days; and irrespective of when the act or decision came to the knowledge of the person concerned. The mere fact that the acquiring authority failed to reply to the letter of the Applicant in which she put forward her objections to the intended acquisition, does not in my view, change the position of the Applicant, because the acquiring authority has acted under the provisions of Law 15 of 1962. The view that time begins to run from such publication is further supported by the decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus and I propose dealing first with the case of John Moran and The Republic (Attorney-General and Minister of Interior) 1R.S.C.C. 10. The Court had this to say at p. 13: "The Court is of the opinion that the period of time provided for in the said paragraph 3 is mandatory and has to be given effect to in the public interest in all cases. Such view is in accordance with the interpretation of analogous provisions given by administrative tribunals in a number of European countries and is also the view of authoritative writings on this subject. Exceptional circumstances recognized by the above authorities as affecting the running of such period do not arise on the facts of this case. As in the present case the acts complained of were not published, in order to find as from when the period of seventy-five days began to run, it is necessary to ascertain when such acts came to the knowledge of theApplicant". 210 1968 April 27 Later on the Court says: "In the opinion of the Court 'knowledge' means knowledge of the decision, act or omission giving rise to the right of

(1966)3 C.L.R.

1. It would be further observed, that theApplicant, under the provisions of Law 15of 1962, was deemed to have had constructive notice as from the date of the publication of the intended compulsory acquisition ofher property in the official Gazette, irrespective of whether or not the acquiring authority had decided to inform theApplicant bymeans of a letter. Therefore, as no question arises in this case, as to whether or not there has been proper publication of the notice and order of acquisition, I am of the view, that the submission of counsel for the Applicant fails on this point. Counsel further contended that the failure of the Respondent to reply to the letter of the Applicant contravened Article 29of the Constitution; and submitted that there could not be a reply by publication within the ambit of the case of Nicos Pelides and The Republic (Council of Ministers and Another), 3 R.S.C.C.
2. 211 MELPOMENI CONSTANTI ANTONI BAKKALIAOU, v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA 1968 April 27 MELPOMENI CONSTANTI ANTONI BAKKALIAOU, V. THF MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA There is no doubt, that Article 29 of the Constitution covers all those caseswhere a person applies in writing to any competent public authority under the provisions of any specific law or otherwise. Vide Phedias Kyriakides and The Republic of Cyprus, 1 R.S.C.C.
3. In the present case, the Applicant has not put forward a collateral claim under Article 29for failure of the Respondent to reply to the letter of the Applicant; and it is equally clear that the Applicant did not apply first to the acquiring authority, but only as a result of the letter of the municipal council, informing the owner of the intended acquisition of her property; and calling on her to submit to such authority any objection which she may wish to raise to such acquisition. In my view, the failure of the acquiring authority to reply personally to Applicant's letter does not offend against Article 29 of the Constitution, because, as a matter of fact, the decision of such authority and its due reasons were published in the Official Gazette, as required under the provisions of Law 15 of 1962 for her information and of any other person interested to such property. I would like further to observe, that once the Applicant had ample notice of the intended acquisition of her property, it was her duty to show more interest and watchout for such publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic. Vide Maria Ch. Venglisand The Electricity Authority ofCyprus,

(1965)3C.L.R. 252. Furthermore it is evident that even if the Applicant was aggrieved because of the failure of theRespondent toreply to her letter, such requirement, in my view, has been waived by her. Having reached the conclusion that by such publication in the Official Gazette, the acquiring authority had in fact replied to theApplicant, this submission of counsel also fails. With regard to the last submission of counsel for the Respondent, that "there cannot be a reply by publication" on the authority of Nicos Pelides (supra), with due respect to counsel, I think the reasoning behind this case does not in any way support counsel's view. In Pelides case, the Applicant was the registered owner of a building site situated at the junction of Markos Drakos and Charalambos Georghiou Mouskos Streets, Nicosia. By Not. No. 422, published in the Official Gazette No. 61 of the 12th May, 1961,the Respondent No. 2 published certain plans concerning the widening and/or straightening of the said two streets. It was expressly stated therein that any person objecting to the 212- scheme could appeal to the Council of Ministers within three months from the date of such publication. The Applicant having thus first appealed to the Council of Ministers and the appeal having been left in abeyance by the Council fileda recourse on the 14th July, 1961,seeking a declaration by the Court that the street-widening scheme was null and void and of no effect whatsoever. The part of the judgment of the Court on which counsel for the Applicant relies is to be found at p. 17. It reads: "The Court takes this opportunity of stressing that though Article 146 grants it exclusive jurisdiction in administrative law matters there is nothing in such Article to prevent procedures for administrative review of executive or administrative acts or decisions from being provided for in a Law. Such review may be either— (

1. a)by way of confirmation or completion of the act oi decision in question, in which case no recourse is possible to this Court until such confirmation or completion has taken place (e.g. under section 17 of Cap. 96); or (
2. b)by way of a review by higher authority or by specially set-up oigans or bodies of an administrative nature, in which casea provision for such a leview will not be a bar to a recourse before this Court but once the procedure for such a ieview has been set in motion bya person concerned no recourse is possible to this Court until the review has been completed". The Court had further this to say at p. 20: "Once the time within which and the organ before which the street-widening scheme may be challenged are included in such publication, then, in a case of this nature, they become essential ingredients thereof because they are inseparably interwoven with the very nature and object of such publication, viz. to enable any person affected thereby to make a recourse against the streetwidening scheme". With due respect to counsel's submission, in my view the part of the judgment on which he relies, does not in any way help his case, because it is evident that, that part of the 213 1968 April 2? MELPOMENI CONSTANT! ANTONI BAKKALIAOU, V. THE MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA 1968 April 27 MELPOMENI CONSTANTI ANTONI BAKKALIAOU, v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA judgment of the Supreme Constitutional Court, was dealing with the question of review on an appeal. In the present case, Law 15of 1962laysdown that in the case of an intended acquisition of property of a citizen notice must be published in theOfficial Gazette and,that the owner or any other person interested in such property, is called upon within a certain period to submit to such authority any objection which he may wish to raise to such acquisition. Once the order of acquisition was published the Applicant who was affected was entitled to make a recourse within the proper time. In the circumstances, and for the reasons I have advanced, this application cannot proceed and is dismissed, as being filed out of time. Mr. Ladas (Appearing for Mr. Marathovouniotis): 1do not claim costs. Court: In the circumstances 1 am not proposing to make an Order for costs. Applicationdismissed. No Orderfor costs. 214