(2)—Consequently, the negative decision of the Board cannot be said to form a composite administrative action with the negative decisionof the Council of Ministers, complained of by this recourse, which was taken under the aforesaid second proviso. Executory act or decision—See above. Composite administrative action—See above. Petition—Right to petition—Duty of the public authorities concerned—Reasoned reply—Article 29 of the Constitution— See above under Constitutional Law. Abuse and excess of powers—See above under Buildings. By this recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution the Applicant complains against a decision of the Respondent Council of Ministers dated the 26th January, 1967 (Exhibit 4^ whereby the Council, turning down Applicant's ' application of the 5th January, 1966 (Exhibit 2), refused to grant him a building permit by virtue of its powers under the second proviso to sub-section

(2)of section 14 of the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96, as amended, in this respect, by the Streets and Buildings 310 Regulation (Amendment) Law, 1959 (Law No. 14of 1959). The said section (as amended) is quoted in full in the Judgment of the Court, post. The decision complained of was communicated to the Applicant by a letter dated the 13th April, 1967, Exhibit 1. In the year 1955, the Applicant erected at Kaimakli a mosaics factory. Subsequent to this, on November 10, 1955, a Notice was published in the Official Gazette (Supplement No. 3 under Not. 700) by virtue of which the area in which the said factory was erected was declared, under the provisions of section 14

(1)of the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96 (then Cap. 165 in the 1949 edition), to be a zone within which industrial buildings, such as the Applicant's factory, could no longer be erected; there was, however, a provision in the said Notice for the possibility of granting building permits for additions or alterations to already existing such industrial buildings subject to certain conditions and restrictions. In 1964 the Applicant proceeded, without first obtaining the necessary building permit, to build the parts of his factory which are coloured red on the map produced in Court (Exhibit 3). In view of their extent such parts could not possibly come within the provisions in the aforesaid Notice enabling additions to a building such as the factory of the Applicant. Obviously the appropriate authority (the Improvement Board of Kaimakli) could not have granted him a building permit by virtue of the provisions of the said Notice and such a permit could only have been granted to the Applicant under either of the two provisos to sub-section

(2)of section 14 of Cap. 96 (see post). The Applicant was prosecuted in 1965 by the Improvement Board of Kaimakli in relation to these unauthorised structures and on the 5th January 1966, while the criminal proceedings were still pending, the Applicant applied to the Council of Ministers by Exhibit 2 requesting, in effect, the Council to exercise its powers under the second proviso to sub-section

(2)of section 14 of Cap. 96. The Applicant, as stated above, was informed by Exhibit 1, the letter of the 13th April, 1967 addressed to him by the District Officer, Nicosia, as Chairman of the Kaimakli Improvement Board, that his request has been turned down on the 26th January, 1967, by decision No. 6273 of the Council of Ministers. This decision 311 1968 June 18 PELOPIDAS SEVASTIDES v. REPUBLIC (COUNCILOF MINISTERS) 1968 June 18 PELOPIDAS SEVASTTDES v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) (which was later produced in Court together with the relevant submission by the Minister of Interior, as Exhibit 4 supra) is the subject of the present recourse. It was argued, inter alia, by counsel for the Applicant firstthat the subject decision isnot duly reasoned and that in any event it offends against Article 29 of the Constitution.* Counsel has, next, submitted that this decision was reached in abuse and excess of powers, in that material factors—set out inthe particulars delivered for the purpose —were not taken into consideration by the Respondent. Dismissing the recourse, the Court:Held,

(1). It is correct that such decision, as communicated to the Applicant by the letter of the 13th April,1967 (Exhibit 1) does not appear to be reasoned; but the decision itself (see Exhibit4.)has to be treated as being, indeed, duly reasoned, because it has to be read together with the submission on the basisof which it hasbeen taken (and which has been produced as part of the said Exhibit 4); and it is quite clear that it was taken for the sum total ofthe reasonsset out in paragraph 3of the said submission. (See in this respect Papaleontiou and the Republic,

(1967)3 C.L.R. 624).

(2)(a). Of course, it might be argued that the reply given to the Applicant on the 13th April, 1967 (v. said Exhibit 1) offends against Article 29 of the Constitution because it is not, nevertheless, duly reasoned, too. But, in my opinion, theApplicant, in the circumstances of this case, as established before the Court, cannot pursue a claim complaining against a contravention of Article 29; he has, already, proceeded by means of this recourse in respect of the substance of the matter, to which the afore*Article 29 of the Constitution reads as follows: 1. "Every person has the right individually or jointly with others to address written requests or complaints to any competent public authority and to have them attended to and decided expeditiously; an immediate notice of any such decision taken duly reasoned shall be given to the person making the request or complaint and in any event within a period not exceeding thirty days. a,: Where any interested person is aggrieved by any such decision or where no such decision is notified to such person within the period specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, such person may have recourse to a competent court in the matter of such request or complaint". 312 said reply of the 13th April, 1967, (Exhibit 1) relates, and he has not established that he has suffered any material detriment through such reply not being duly reasoned; thus nolegitimate interest ofhis

(3)With regard to the submission that the material factors enumerated in the particulars were not taken into consideration by the Respondent, it is quite clear from the evidence before me, that all the factors in question were properly placed before the Council of Ministers for due consideration by them. ii)(a) Counsel for the Applicant has, also, submitted that the decision of the Kaimakli Improvement Board, dated the 12th July, 1966, (Exhibit 4AJ, refusing to recommend the grant of a building permit to the Applicant, (see the first proviso to sub-section

(2)of section 14 of Cap. 96, post), was taken without due inquiry and it is not duly reasoned. But it is quite clear that there has been a proper inquiry and cogent reasons for their refusal are given. (b) In any case, as it appears from the record of the criminal proceedings (see Exhibit 11) the Applicant had notice since January 13th, 1967, of the aforesaid decision of the Board, and he could have proceeded by recourse against such decision, if he had so wished as depriving him of the possibility of obtaining a permit under the first proviso to section 14

(2)of Cap. 96 (post); but he has not done so at all, not even by the motion of relief in this present recourse. •Paragraph 2 of Article 146 of the Constitution reads as follows: " 2 . Such a recourse may be made by a person whose any existing legitimate interest, which he has either as a person or by virtue of being a member of a Community, is adversely and directly affected by such decision or act or omission". 31? 1968 June 18 PELOPIDAS SEVASTTDES v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) 1968 June 18 PELOPIDAS SEVASTIDES v. REPUBLIC ( C O U N C I L or MINISTERS) (c) Moreover, it cannot be said that the decision of the Board forms with the subjudice decision of the Council of Ministers a composite administrative action because a favourable recommendation of the Board was not a prerequisite for a decision of the Council to grant a permit under the secondproviso to sub-section

(2)of section 14 of Cap. 96 (post). Recoursedismissed. No order as to costs. Cases referred to: Papaleontiou and the Republic,

(1967)3 C.L.R. 624; Kyriakides and the Republic, 1 R.S.C.C. 66, at p. 77. Recourse. Recourse against the decision of the Respondent Council of Ministers, refusing to grant to Applicant a building permit by virtue of its powers under the second proviso to sub-section

(2)of section 14 of the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96 (as amended). G. Tornaritis, for the Applicant. K. Talarides, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondent. Cur. adv. vult. The following Judgment was delivered by:TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.: By this recourse the Applicant complains, in effect, against a decision of the Respondent Council of Ministers, (No. 6273 of the 26th January, 1967, see exhibit 4) by means of which the Council refused to grant him a building permit by virtue of its powers under the second proviso to sub-section

(2)of section 14 of the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96, as amended, in this respect, by the Streets and Buildings Regulation (Amendment) Law 1959 (Law 14/59). The said section 14, as in force at the material time, reads as follows:"14.

(1)The appropriate authority may, with the approval of the Governor, by notice to be published in the Gazette, define zones314 (

1. a)within which buildings for special trades or industriesmay or may not be erected or which shall be reserved exclusively for residential or other purposes; (
2. b)within which buildings of a lesser value than that specified in the notice shall not be erected.

(2)Notwithstanding anything in this Law contained, from and after the publication of a notice under sub­ section

(1), no permit shall be issued by the appropriate authority save in accordance with such notice: Provided that if the appropriate authority declares itself to be satisfied that the public interest requires the issue of a permit, the Governor, after receiving and con­ sidering such declaration,may, in his absolute discretion, authorise the appropriate authority to issue a permit otherwise than in accordance with such notice. Provided further, and without prejudice to the ope­ ration of the first proviso to this sub-section, if theGovernor-in-Council is satisfied that the public interest requires the issue of a permit he may direct the Director of Planning and Housing to issue such a permit other­ wisethan in accordancewith such noticeand theDirector shall comply with such direction and in relation to such a permit shall be deemed to be and have thepowers of an appropriate authority under this Law and any permit so issued shall have effect for all the purposes of this Law as though issued by the appropriate authority". In view of Article 188.3 of the Constitution we have to read,in section 14above, "the Council of Ministers" wherever mention is being made therein of "the Governor" or "the Governor-in-Council". The circumstances in which the Applicant came to apply for the building permit in question are shortly as follows:In 1955 he erected at Kaimakli a mosaics factory. It consisted then of the buildings coloured blue and marked with the figure Τ on a plan which is exhibit 3 in these pro­ ceedings. Subsequent to this, on the 10th November, 1955, a Notice was published in Supplement No. 3 to the Official Gazette (see Not. 700) by virtue of which the area in which the said 315 1968 June 18 PELOPIDAS SEVASTIDES v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) 1968 June 18 PELOPIDAS SEVASTIDES V. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) factory is to be found was declared, under the provisions of section 14

(1)above of Cap.96—(Cap.96 being then Cap.165 of the at the time in force codification of the Cyprus Statutes) — to be a zone within which industrial buildings, such as the factory of the Applicant, could no longer be erected; there was made provision in such Notice for the possibility of granting building permits for additions or alterations to already existing non-conforming buildings, subject to certain conditions and restrictions. Pursuant to the provisions of such Notice the Applicant was allowed in 1957 to effect additions to his factory. In 1964 the Applicant proceeded, without obtaining first the necessary building permit, to build the parts of his factory which are coloured red on the map, exhibit 3\ it appears that in 1963 the Applicant had applied to the Improvement Board of Kaimakli for a building permit in respect of the said parts but having received no formal reply to his application for some time—due apparently to the anomalous situation in the Island — he proceeded to build without a permit. In view of their extent such parts could not possibly have come within the provisions in the aforesaid Notice enabling additions to a building such as the factory of the Applicant; so the Improvement Board of Kaimakli could not have granted him a building permit by virtue of the provisions of such Notice and such a permit could only have been granted to the Applicant under either of the two provisos to subsection

(2)of section 14 of Cap. 96. TheApplicant was prosecuted in 1965 by the Improvement Board of Kaimakli in relation to these unauthorised structures and the relevant criminal proceedings eventually culminated in Criminal Appeal No. 2885 which was determined on the 7th April, 1967;* he was ordered todemolish such structures (see exhibit 11). We are not, really, concerned in this Case with the criminal proceedings aspect of the matter. On the 5th January, 1966, while the criminal proceedings against him were pending, the Applicant petitioned, through his lawyer, the Council of Ministers; the relevant document is exhibit 2 in these proceedings, and though it was not stated •Nate: Vide

(1967)2 C.L.R. 117. 316 clearly therein what theApplicant was seeking thereby, he was, in effect, requesting the Council to exercise its powers under the second proviso to sub-section

(2)of section 14of Cap.96. Applicant could not have been seeking from the Council of Ministers a buildingpermit under thefirstproviso to subsection

(2), because he was not relying on a recommedation for the purpose of the appropriate authority, the Kaimakli Improvement Boaid; on the contrary—as stated also in his said petition—the said Board had instituted proceedings seeking the demolition of the structures concerned. TheApplicant wasinformed byletterdated the 13thApril, 1967, and addressed to him by the Nicosia District Officer, as Chairman of the Improvement Board of Kaimakli (see exhibit 1),that hisrequest has been turned down on the26th January, 1967, by decision No. 6273 of the Council of Ministers,i.e.thesubjudicedecision of the Council. This recourse wasfiledon the 10th May, 1967. The said decision of the Council of Ministers has been produced, together with the submission of the Ministry of Interior on the basis of which it was reached (see exhibit 4). 'Therehasalsobeen produced a decision of the Improvement Board of Kaimakli, taken on the 12th July, 1966,and which wasbefore the Council of Ministers at the material time(see exhibit4A);bymeansofsuchdecisiontheBoardhaddecided not to recommend to the Council of Ministers the issue of a building permit to the Applicant. There have also been produced the following documents which were before the Council at the time: A letter of the Nicosia District Officer addressed to the Director-General of the Ministry of Interior and dated the 5th February, 1966 (seeexhibit8);a letteroftheDirector-General oftheMinistry ofCommerceand Industryaddressed tothe Director-General of the Ministry of Interior and dated the 29th June, 1966 (see exhibit J); a letter of the Nicosia District Officer, as Chairman oftheImprovement Board of Kaimakli,addressed to the Director-General of the Ministry of Interior and datedthe 10thOctober, 1966(seeexhibit6);andaletter ofthe Director of the Department of Planning and Housing addressed to the Director-General of the Ministry of Interior and dated the 21st November, 1966 (see exhibit7). 317 1968 June 18 PELOPIDAS SEVASTTDES v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) 1968 June 18 PELOPIDAS SEVASTTDES V. REPUBLIC ( C O U N C I L OF MINISTERS) In the relevant submission to the Council of Ministers the history of the matter was set out, first; then, it was stated therein that —for reasons which were set out in extenso in such submission —the Director of the Department of Planning and Housing was against the grant tothe Applicant of a building permit in respect of the structures in question, and that of the same viewwere, too, the Improvement Board of Kaimakli and the Nicosia District Officer; on the other hand, it was stated in the submission that the DirectorGeneral of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was of the view that a permit should be granted to the Applicant, both for reasons of public interest in relation to the economy of the country and in order to avoid adverse financial consequences for the Applicant. The Council, as already stated, decided to turn down the application of the Applicant for a building permit. It is mainly complained of, first, by the Applicant that the relevant decision of the Council of Ministers is not duly reasoned. It is correct that such decision, as communicated to the Applicant by means of the letter of the 13th April, 1967 (exhibit 1) does not appear to be reasoned; but the decision itself (see exhibit 4) has to be treated as being, indeed, duly reasoned, because it has to be read together with the submission on the basis of which it has been taken; and it is quite clear that it was taken for the sum total of the reasons set out in paragraph 3of the submission. (See in this respect Papaleontiou and The Republic,

(1967)3 C.L.R. 624. Of course, it might be argued that the reply given to the Applicant on the 13th April, 1967(exhibit 1) offends against Article 29 of the Constitution because it is not, nevertheless, duly reasoned, too. But, in my opinion, the Applicant, in the circumstances of this Case, as established before the Court, cannot pursue a claim complaining of contravention of Article 29; he has, already, proceeded by means of this recourse in respect of the substance of the matter, to which the reply of the 13th April, 1967 (exhibit 1) relates, and he has not established that he has suffered any material detriment through such reply not being duly reasoned; thus, no legitimate interest of his

(2)of Cap. 96; as no such recommendation was made by the Board the Council of Ministers has had to consider whether or not, nevertheless, the public interest required the issue of the permit applied for, under the second proviso to section 14

(2)of Cap. 96; but it is clear, in my opinion, that the Council 319 1968 June 18 PELOPIDAS SEVASTTDES v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) 1968 June 18 PELOPIDAS SEVASTIDES v. REPUBLIC ( C O U N C I L OF MINISTERS) would have refused the permit, even if the Board had recommended the grant thereof, because it is quite obvious that the Council decided that it was against the public interest to grant the permit, in view of what had been stated in relation to this matter by the Director of the Department of Planning and Housing; and it was reasonably open to the Council so to decide. In any case, as it appears from the record of the relevant criminal proceedings (see exhibit 11)theApplicant had notice, since the 13th January, 1967, of the decision of the Improvement Board of Kaimakli not to recommend the issue to him of a building permit, and he could have proceeded by recourse against such decision, ifhe had so wished, as depriving him of the possibility of obtaining a permit under the first proviso to section 14

(2)of Cap. 96; but he has not done so at all, not even by themotion of relief in this present recourse. Moreover, it cannot be said that the decision of the Board forms with the subjudice decision of the Council of Ministers a composite administrative action because a favourable recommendation of the Board was not a prerequisite for a decision by the Council to grant a permit under the second proviso to section 14

(2)of Cap. 96. For all the foregoing reasons, I take the view that the Applicant cannot succeed in this recourse and it is dismissed accordingly. 1 do sympathize with the difficulties of the Applicant who, having applied for a permit in 1963 and having not been given any formal reply in due time, decided in 1964 that he had to proceed and build without a permit. But this is not a sufficient or proper ground for which he can succeed in this recourse. Applicant should and could have taken at the time, and before proceeding to build, all necessary steps in order to obtain a formal reply to his application for a building permit. I would conclude by observing that, though I did not have to decide this aspect of the matter in this Judgment, I would be inclined to doubt very much whether a building permit, of such an extraordinary nature as one granted under the second proviso to section 14

(2)of Cap. 96 by the Council of Ministers, is one which could ever be properly granted after a building has been erected unlawfully; I am inclined 320 1968 June 18 t o the view that such a permit would have, always, to be applied for, and be obtained, in advance. I am making no order as to costs, in view of the fact that, no doubt, the Applicant is bound to suffer a lot financially through the refusal to him of the building permit in question. Application dismissed. order as to costs. 321 No PELOPIDAS SEVASTIDES v. REPUBLIC (COUNCILOF MINISTERS)