[HADJIANASTASSIOU, J.]

THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 146OF THE CONSTITUTION PHOTINI M. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS, Applicants, and THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS» THROUGH 1. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, 2. THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND

DUSTRY, Respondents. {Cases Nos. 51/71, 52/71, 54/71, 55/71, 60/71, 62/71 & 63/71). Provisional Order—Suspending effect of an act or decisionysubject matter of a recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution— Principles upon which it may be granted—Rule 13 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules, 1962 and section 17 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law, 1964(Law No. 33 of 1964)—Recourse against acquisition and requisition orders—Application for a provisional order restraining respondents from taking any steps

furtherance of such orders—mainly that of requisition—Until final'determination of the recourse—No irreparable damage would result for the applicants from the refusal of such order— Applicants not residing themselves

the dwelling, the subject matter of the requisition, are not going to suffer any hardship— Considering, on the other hand, that the recourse against the acquisition order is obviously out of time and that, therefore, the said dwelling will be

due course compulsorily acquired— The applicants will, thus, have to give up the premises and, consequently, they would suffer no irreparable damage even if the respondents proceed to demolish the said premises acting under the said requisition order—Applicants' only desire appears to be to secure better terms of compensation—Finally, on the evidence, it is absolutely necessary for the respondents to proceed with theproject (building hotels, bungalows etc.)— Therefore the granting of the provisional order would cause serious obstacles to the proper functioning of the administration—Provisional order refused—Principles laid down

Pavlou and Another v. The Republic, reported

this Part at p. 120 ante, applied. 317 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI M . PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS V. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OP MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) Requisition of immovable property (land with a dwelling house thereon)—Said property affected by an earlier acquisition order—Purpose of requisition being the construction of build­

gs on the said property—Whether such requisition is a valid one and compatible with the notion of requisition being of a temporaty nature—Whether such requisition frustrates applicants' rights of property safeguarded under Article 23.4(c) of the Constitution—Cf The Requisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law No. 21of 1962) sections 3

relation to Article 23 of the Constitution—Not contrary, either, to Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ratified by theEuropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (Ratification) Law, 1962 and,thus,forming part of our

ternal law under Article 169.3 of the Constitution). Compulsory Acquisition—Compensation-—Time of payment— Article 23.4(c) of the Constitution—"Just and equitable com­ pensation "

Article 23.4(c)—It means the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken.

Words and Phrases—" Just and equitable compensation "

Article 23

.4(c) of the Constitution—" On payment

cash and

advance of a just and equitable compensation"—ibid.— " Promptly "

Article 23.8(rf) of the Constitution.

The applicants

case No. 62/71, hereinafter referred .. to as " theapplicants " (

asmuch as all theother sixrecourses (supra) have been withdrawn before judgment), seek by their recourse to challenge the validity of,

ter alia, a requisition order affecting their property part of which is occupied by a dwelling house consisting of 4 rooms and all amenities. This requisistion order dated February 6, 1971 was made for a period of twelve months under the provisions of section 4 318 of the Requisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law No. 21 of 1962)for apurpose of public benefit viz. for the promotion or development oftourism of anarea known as" Golden Sands "

Famagusta, which purpose is specially provided for

section 3

allsevencases(supra) thepropertiesinvolved werealso affected byan earlier order of compulsory acquisition dated March28, 1969, Simultaneously withthefilingoftheirrecoursethe applicants applied under Rule 13 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules, 1962, for a provisional order suspending the effect of,

ter alia, the said requisition order. It was contended on behalf of the applicants that unless the stay was granted they would suffer irreparable damage—"by the demolition of the said house and/or the construction of newbuilding on thesite, which is the presumed or declared

tention of the respondents—, whilst the respondents willsuffer no substantial harm by Us granting with the consequential delay as all the facts and history of the case clearly point to i.e. the fact that the order of acquisition was made on March 28, 1969 and the order of requisition on February 6, 1971". It is common ground that although no compensation has been paid either

respect of the acquisition or of the subsequent requisition, a notice

writing dated February 9, 1971 was served on the applicants calling upon them to evacuate and deliver vacant possession of their property because the requisitioning authority

tended to start work for the accomplishment of the said project as from March 1, 1971. Regarding the validity of the order of requisition it was argued on behalf of the applicants that it is illegal because it

tends to serve not a case of urgency and of a temporary nature, but to serve a permanent purpose viz.the erection of buildings which is

compatible with the notion of requisition (see Article 23.8(c) of the Constitution and Kyriacopoulos, on Greek Administrative Law, 4th ed. Vol. Ill, at pp. 395-396). Article 23.8 of the Constitution reads as follows : " 8. Any movable or immovable property may be requisitioned by the Republic or by a Communal Chamber for the purposes of the educational, religious, charitable or sporting

stitutions, bodies or establishments within its319 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI M. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS V. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS \ND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) competence and only where the owner and the person entitled to possession of such property belongtothe respecti­ ve Community, and only— (a) for a purpose which is to the public benefit and shall be specially provided by a general law for requisitioning which shall be enacted within a year from the date of the coming

to operation of this Constitution ; and (

1. b)when such purpose is established by a decision of the requisitioning authority and made under the provisions of such law stating clearly the reasons for such requisitioning ; and (
2. c)for a period not exceeding three years ; and (
3. d)upon the prompt payment

cash of a just and equitable compensation to be determined

case of disagreement by a civil court". The Court refused the provisional order applied for ; and going

to the merits of the case, took the view that the sub­ missions made by counsel on behalf of the applicants could not be sustained ; and, consequently, it dismissed the recourse. Held : As to theprovisional order appliedfor underRule13 of the SupremeConstitutional CourtRules, 1962 :

the light of the principles governing the matter,and which I have reiterated

my decision

the caseManolis Pavlou and Anotherv. The Republic (reported

this Part at p. 120, ante), I have reached the conclusion that the justice of this case does not require the making of a provi­ sional order for the following reasons :— (a) Because the aplicants

my view will not suffer irre­ parable damage, that is to say, harm which cannot be estimated adequately later on

terms of money, even if their house would be demolished

due course as a result of the order of requisition, particularly so, because their expert Mr. M. has already completed the assessment of compensation regarding the house

question ; and

deed the civil Court

assessing the compensation will find no difficulty

proceeding without viewing it. 320 (b) Since the applicants are not residing themselves

the said house but their licensees (the gardener etc.), they are not going to suffer any kind of hardship. Regrettable as this may be, since the gardener and his family have not been joined as parties, it is now too late for this Court

their absence to grant them a relief. (

1. c)The applicants gave me the impression that all along their only desire was to secure better terms of compensation from the respondents for their property. (
2. d)Because this recourse so far as the relevant order of acquisition challenged thereby is concerned is bound to fail because it is out of time under the provisions of Article 146.3 (cf. The principle laid down

the case Cleanthis Georghiades (No. I) v. The Republic

view of the foregoing, I would dismiss the application for a provisional order. Held : Regarding the validity of the aforesaid requisition order dated February 6, 1971 : After disposing of the first and second propositions advanced by counselfor the applicants (see post

thejudgment). The learnedJudge went on to deal with the third proposition, which was to the effect that the order of requisition

question is illegal because it

tends to serve not a case of urgency and of 321 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI M. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS V. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) a temporary nature, but a case of apermanent object or purpose viz. the erecting of buildings, which is

compatible with the notion of requisition. The Court disposed of this proposition as follows :

paragraph 8 of Article 23 (supra), Under this paragraph (supra) a requisition may be made for the same reasons and under the same conditions as a com­ pulsory acquisition, except that the requisition cannot exceed three years, and the compensation to be paid need not be paid

advance, but " prompty". (As to the meaning of " promptly " see Thymopoulos and Others v. The Municipal Committee of Nicosia

the owners, whilst under an acquisition order the ownership is transferred. On the other hand under section 6

relation to the same property anything which any person having an

terest therein would be entitled to do by virtue of such

terest. (b)

my view, these concluding words are strong words, and could only be construed as meaning that the requisition­

g authority could step

to the shoes of the owner and carry out or do anything

connection with the public benefit utility,

cluding any kind of building or other erection on the requisitioned land. (c) I think I am fortified

this view from the wording of section 8(l)(c) of the said Law No. 21 of 1962 (see the text post

the judgment).

any way conflict, nor it is

compatible with the notion of requisition, because it is not

tended to be of a permanent nature, but only of a limited period

order to serve the needs of the requisitioning authority for such period which is specified

the order of requisition and,

any event, not exceeding a period of three years.

the case of Aspri and The Republic, 4 R.S.C.C. 57

which case it was stated that the mere fact that the purpose for which the compulsory acquisition has been decided upon is being pursued pro tempore by means of a requisition upon payment of compensation, cannot reasonably be said to frustrate the said rights of the applicant under Article 23.4(c) of the Constitution, because the ownership continues to vest

the applicant

the meantime.

excess or abuse of powers vested

the requisitioning authority.

view however of the nature of these cases, particularly regarding the delay of the acquiring authority, there will be no order as to costs. Recourse dismissed. as to costs. No order Cases referred to : Cleanthis Georghiades(No. 1) v. The Republic

this Part at p. 120 ante) ; Vassiliades v. The Republic

volve the same factual and legal issues) I entertain some doubts whether I ought to have dealt

this decision with the question of the provisional order

Case No. 62/71. The application for a provisional order proceeded and was heard by me because the respondents refused (after a lot of negotiations) to agree to pay to the applicants the same amount of compensation on the terms reached

a similar case, No. 55/71, after the delivery of my decision* on April 6, 1971, regarding the value of a house and the part of land on which it stands. 1. The application for a provisional order : On March 2, 1971, the applicants

recourse No. 62/71 simultaneously with the filing of this case, applied under Rule 13 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules, 1962, and section 17 of theAdministration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law 1964, for a provisional order restraining the respondents from taking any steps

furtherance of the acquisition of their property situate at Ayios Memnon or of the requisition order affecting the same property until the final determination of the case. The facts relied upon

support of the application for the provisional order appear

the sworn affidavit dated February 26, of Mr. Koumis J. Hadjimichael of Famagusta. " 1. I am one of the registered owners

undivided shares (1/3 share) of property Reg. 2138, plot 284, plan/sheet XXXIII. 21.5.IV. 6.III. 29.2.II 3.1, Ayios Memnon, Famagusta, of an extent of 1 donum 3 evleks and 184 sq. feet. * Reported

this Part at p. 120 ante. ** For final judgment on appeal see

due course

the names of the other applicants

undivided shaies.

2. A small part of the property mentioned

para. 1 above is occupied by a house consisting of 4 rooms and alt amenities.

1. I am advised that the hearing of this case will not be concluded by the 9.3.71 the time limit set by a letter sent to me and/or the other applicant" that I should vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the propeity.
2. I am advised and verily believe that I have a good case on the merits.
3. Unless a provisional order is made restraining the respondent/s from taking any steps m furtheran­ ce of the acquisition of the property

question or of the requisition order affecting the same property the applicants shall suffer irreparable damage—by the demolition of the said house and/or construction of new buildings which is the presumed and/or declared

tention of the respondent/s—whilst respondent/s will suffer no substantial harm by its granting with the consequential delay as all the facts and history of the case clearly point to, i.e. the fact that the order of acquisition was made on the 28.3.69 and the order of requisition 23 months later on the 6.2.71. 8. It is to be observed that

all seven cases

paragraphs 1 & 2 of the relief sought by all applicants, the said properties are affected by an order of acquisition and an order of re­ quisition. The first order was published

supplement No. 3 to the Official Gazette on March 28, 1969, under notification No. 202, and the second on February 6, 1971, under notification 94. See exhibits 2 & 3 respectively. The said order of requisition was made for a period of twelve months under the provisions of section 4 of the Requisition of Property Law 1962 (No. 21 of 1962) for a purpose of public benefit viz., for the promotionor develop­ ment of tourism of an area known as Golden Sands

Fama­ gusta, which purpose is specially provided by section 3

respect of the acquisition or of the requisition, on February 9, 1971, a notice

writing was 325 1971 Aug. 20 ΡΗΟΤΙΝΙ Μ PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS V REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS V. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) served on the applicants to evacuate and deliver vacant possession of their property because the requisitioning authority

tended to start work for the accomplishment of the said project as from March 1,

2. The motion for relief : By the motion for relief

these proceedings, all the applicants mainly seek a declaration that both the orders of acquisition and requisition are null and void and of no effect whatsoever. On April 28, 1971, the oposition of the respondents was filed, and the giounds of substance are

accordance with the law aftei all circumstances of sub­ stance have been taken

to consideration ;

any event, an offer of compensation has been made to the appli­ cants

accordance with the provisions of section 10 of Law 15 of 1962, which are not contrary to the Constitution or Law 39 of 1962.

the meantime, (after taking the list of all the cases which originally were dealt with by Mr. Justice Triantafyllides as he then was) on May 12, 1971, (a date fixed for hearing regarding the provisional order) counsel on behalf of the applicants withdrew all other applications except those

cases Nos. 55/71 and 62/71 but regarding the latter, he limited the effect of the withdrawal to the land only. Moreover, counsel made this statement :— "

view of the fact that I have all my clients today

Court, and we have agreed with my learned friend to renew our efforts for an out of Court settlement, and because today the Court has been dealing with the question of

terim orders only and we have suc­ ceeded with most of them being withdrawn, and as the Court is sitting at 11.30 at a meeting of Judges, I would apply for an adjournment sometime

June,

order to explore all the possibilities of an out of Court settlement." The cases then were fixed for hearing on the merits on May 26, and the applications for a provisional order on May 28. On May 26,during the hearing of these seven cases, counsel stated that the application for a provisional order regarding case No. 55/71 was abandoned because a settle­ ment as to compensation was reached between the parties 326 regarding the house of the applicants and a piece of land of an area of 12,576 sq. ft. After concluding the hearing of those cases, judgment was reserved. On May 28, the hearing of the application

case No. 62/71 regarding the provisional order was also concluded and counsel for the respondents, after adopting his previous argument

case No. 55/71, further argued (

1. a)that because the order of acquisition has not been challenged before this Court within the proper time provided by Article 146-3 of the Constitution, the provisional order was not justified ; and (
2. b)that the persons now residing

the said house of the applicants have not been joined

this case

any capacity and were not entitled to the protection of this Court. Having had the advantage of hearing full argument by both counsel, and

the light of all documentary and other material, as well as the evidence of Mr. Philippou which is before me, I would state that

deciding whether to grant or refuse a provisional order, I have

mind the principles governing this question which I have reiterated

my decision* of April 6, 1971, and which I would adopt and apply

this judgment. It is perhaps convenient, however, to add that

Greece a provisional order is considered' as a very exceptional measure to grant, because it prevents the administration from carrying out effectively its admini­ strative functions under the law. See the well-known textbook by Kyriacopoullos on the Greek Administrative Law, 4th edn., Volume ' Γ', at pp. 146-148. 3. Conclusion on the provisional order:

the light of these principles, I have reached the view that the justice of this case does not require the making of a provisional order for the following reasons : — (a) Because the applicants

my view will not suffer irreparable damage, that is to say, harm which cannot be estimated adequately later on

terms of money, even if their house would be demolished

due course because of the order of requisition, particularly so, because their expert Mr. Mavroudis has already completed the assessment of compensation regarding the house

question ; and

deed the trial Court

assessing the compensation would not find any difficulty without viewing it. (b) Since the applicants are not residing themselves

the said house and they are not going to suffer any kind * Reported

this Part at p. 120, ante. 327 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI M. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) of hardship. I would

deed at this stage express my surprise, because nothing was mentioned

the affidavit about this particular fact. I would, further add that, the way paragraph 5 of the affidavit was drafted, one would be

clined to think that the affiant was

possession of the said house and that he had difficulty to vacate it and deliver the possession of the said house to the respondents ; see also paragraph VII of the grounds of law referring to the said house as a " family house". (c) That all along during the negotiations between the parties regarding compensation, the applicants

Court gave me the impression that their only desire was to secure better terms of compensation from the respondents for their property, particularly so on the terms agreed upon

Case No. 55/71.

deed, nothing was said or disclosed that the said house was occupied by a gardener and his family, either as a tenant or by the leave or licence of their deceased relative (from whom they have

herited the said property), until the last moment, because, apparently, they knew or were convinced that if they did agree to a satisfac­ tory amount of compensation they would have seen that the gardener would have moved away from the said house. Moreover, regrettable as it is, since the gardener and his family have not been joined as parties, it is too late now for this Court (I repeat

their absence) to grant them a relief. (d) Because this recourse No. 62/71, (as well as the rest of the recourses) regarding the acquisition of the property is not bound to succeed

accordance with the principle formulated

Cleanthis Georghiades (No. 1) v. The Republic

view of the provisions of Article 146.3 of the Constitution ; (e)

view of the evidence (given it becomes absolutely necessary for proceed with the building of a hotel, b pools etc.,

compliance with the needs project, and therefore, the making of would have caused serious obstacles to

g of the administration.

«ι Case No. 55/71) the respondents to •ungalows, swimming of the public benefit a provisional order the proper function- (/) Finally, as I said earlier (because the applicants have not challenged the validity of the order of compulsory acquisition) when the compensation for the compulsory acquisition will be paid by the respondents to them, they would have to give up their premises and that they would 323 not suffer irreparable harm even if the decision of the respondents is to demolish their premises. I would, therefore, reiterate clearly that I cannot accept the argument of counsel that they will suffer irreparable harm even if the decision to demolish their premises taken consequent upon the requisition is not prevented from taking effect before the final determination of the present proceedings. Cf. Kouppas v. The Republic (Council of Ministers)

view of all these reasons, I would dismiss the application for a provisional order. 4. The decision on the merits of these recourses :— Regarding the property rights of the applicants, I take the view that, the property guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, represents the

dividualistic concept of property and the right of property is an

dividual prerogative and not a social function imposing obligations towards society. Moreover, it has to be stressed that the right of property is secure, and no deprivation of this right can be effected except by the constitutional machinery of the compulsory acquisition of property, provided it is done

compliance with the conditions and guarantees laid down

the Constitution. Our Constitution, though

other respects adopted the now prevailing views of the socialization of the

dividual rights,

this respect lagged behind following the provisions of the then Constitution of Greece which was based on that of 1864, probably because of the realities existing also

Cyprus regarding the property rights. Article 23.4 provides that any immovable property may be compulsorily acquired by the. Republic upon the payment

cash and

advance of a " just and equitable compensation to be determined

case of disagreement by a civil Court ". Section 10

Moti and Another v. The Republic

the light of the provisions of Article 23.4 of our Constitution, which provides for the payment of 'just and equitable 329 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI M. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 ΡΗΟΤΙΝΙ Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) compensation' we are of the view that the owner of land is entitled to the payment of compensation for the loss arising directly out of the delay

the sanction­

g of the acquisition, such as the delay which occurred

the present case. As usual, the enunciation of such a principle is easy enough, but its application to varying facts is apt to be difficult." There is no doubt that some of these provisions, and especially the requirements of payment of compensation

advance and

cash (excluding payment by bonds or by exchange for other property) appears to be a handicap to many development programmes.

Cyprus, save for the consent of the owner, no compensation otherwise than

cash can be paid, although regarding this project some owners agreed to accept part payment by receiving government land.

dia, it seems to be settled that under Article 31

bonds or

kind. See Basu at p. 223. Under the provisions of section 7

section 8 has been reached, the acquiring authority or any person

terested may apply to the Court for the determination of the compensation payable for the acquisition of the property .... ".

my view, therefore, under the provisions of our law, it was also open to the applicants on April 27, 1969, to apply to a civil Court to determine the compensation payable to them. The mere fact that they have not exercised their rights under the law means that they have themselves also to blame besides the Republic for such a delay. Be that as it may, I am

formed by counsel for the respondents that the acquiring authority has applied to the District Court of Famagusta on May 6, 1971, for the determination of the compensation of the properties of the applicants. Regarding the question of payment, I am of the view that from the way paragraph 4 of Article 23 of our Con­ stitution is worded, viz., " any movable or immovable property or any right over or

terest

such property " it follows that such payment should be made not only before the acquisition of the ownership, but also before taking possession of the properties. I, therefore, find myself

330 agreement with counsel that the respondents were not entitled to take possession of the properties (if that was the case) under the acquisition order unless the compensation was paid to the owners

advance. Cf. Saripolos on the Greek Constitutional Law, 2nd edn., vol. II at p. 488 et seq. regarding Article 17. Regarding the further complaint of counsel for the applicants (which is the crux of the whole matter) that the provisions of section 10 (a) of the Compulsory Acquisition Law, 1962, are unconstitutional because they contravene both the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution and of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, I find myself with due respect to counsel, unable to agree, because the Constitution leaves the determination of compensation to the judicial authority to the exclusion of legislative and administrative authorities, which according to Saripolos, op. cit. at pp. 491-494, is a bigger guarantee for the protection of the right of property. Cp. Basu on Commentary of the Constitution of

dia, 5th edn., vol. II at p.

1. But, of course, there is nothing preventing the legislature to provide for the general principles according to which compensation is to be assessed. Cf. Saripoloson the System of Constitutional Law of Greece, 4th edn., vol. I l l at p. 216 under note
2. See also Sgouritsa on the Constitutional Law, 1964, Vol. II at p. 176, under note 2 ; also cp. the Constitution of

dia, Article 31

section 10 of our law, under which the Republic apparently was negotiating with the applicants to pay them compensation, but it was rejected by them. Regarding the further argument, I am

agreement with counsel for the applicants that, the right to property

the Republic of Cyprus is also guaranteed by Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. But, with respect, I disagree that the provisions of section 10 (a) of Law 15 of 1962, which deal with the general principles of assessment of compensation that the value of the property shall be the market value of such property on the date of the publication of the relevant notice of acquisition, are contrary to the said convention, because there is nothing

that convention which

any way prevents the legislature to provide for the general principles according to which compensation is to be assessed by a civil Court. Article 1 of the Protocol of the said Convention is

these terms :— " Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No-one shall be 331 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI M . PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 deprived of his possessions except

t h e public

terest and subject to the provisions provided for by law and by the general principles of

ternational law. ΡΗΟΤΙΝΙ Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU T h e preceding provisions shall not, however,

any way impair t h e right of t h e State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property

accordance with the general

terest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penal­ ties." AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANCnUER) T h i s protocol was acceded to by the Republic under ζ decision of t h e Council of Ministers, and was ratified by the European Convention for the Protection of H u m a n Rights (Ratification) Law, 1962, and having been published

the Official Gazette constitutes a part of our law, and under Article 169.3 of our Constitution it has superior force to any municipal law.

the light of these reasons, I have reached t h e view that paragraph (a) of section 10 of Law 15 of 1962 is not unconstitutional. Moreover, as I am of the opinion that t h e order of acquisition is not contrary to our law, and for the reasons I have explained earlier at length, I would dismiss this contention of counsel. 5. Requisition : — T h e next question which is posed is whether the order of requisition is valid or not. T h e order of requisition was published on February 6, 1971, and was made by the Council of Ministers, the Republic being the requisitioning autho­ rity. T h e submission made appears

a document (exhi­ bit 5) and so far as relevant, is

these terms

Greek : — *«2. Ώρισμέναι ακίνητοι ίδιωτικαΙ ίδιοκτησίαι έχουν άπαλλοτριωθή δυνάμει Διοικητικής Πράξεως ΰττ' άρ. 202 τοΰ 1969 δια τήν τουριστικήν άξιοποίησιντης Χρυσής 'Αμμουδιάς (Golden Sands) παρά τήν Άμμόχωστον. 'Επειδήοί Ιδιόκτητοι των έν λόγω Ιδιοκτησιών δεν άπεδέχθησαντήν προς αυτούς προσφερθεΐσαν άποζημίωσιν ΰπό τοΰ Κτηματολογίου και επειδή αϊ διαδικασίαι συμφώνως προς τήν κειμένηννομοθεσίαν θα απαιτήσουν άρκετόν χρόνον μέχρις δτου εγγραφούν τά κτήματα έπ' ονόματι τής Κυβερνήσεως παρίσταται ανάγκη δπως έκδοθή Διάταγμα Έπιτάξεως δυνάμει τοΰ άρθρου 4 τοϋ περί "ΕπιτάξεωςΙδιοκτησίας Νόμου Άρ. 21 τοΰ 1962, ίνα * An English translation of this text appears at pp. 340-341 post. 332 οΟτω δυνηθή ή Δημοκρατία νά έπέμβη έπι των έν λόγω κτη­ μάτων, τό ταχύτερονπρος έπίτευξιν τοΰ σκοποϋ δι* δν άπαλλοτριεΐ. Σημειωτέον δτι δυνάμει σχετικής συμφωνίας οί Εργολάβοι οί όποιοι άνέλαβον τήν άνέγερσιν τοΟ £ργου ωφείλουν νά αρχίσουν έργασίαν άπότης Ιης Μαρτίου,1971.» Counsel for the applicants put forward this proposition : That the order of requisition was illegal because the Mini­ ster of Commerce and

dustry acted under a misconcep­ tion respecting the factual position, viz., particularly with regard to a passage referred to

exhibit 5 at p. 2 of the said submission. With due respect to counsel, after reading the said submission, that proposition is not right because negotiations were going on between the Government and the applicants regarding the amount of compensation, but it is clear

my mind that the applicants were not willing to accept the amount of compensation offered to them orally based on the value of their lands as

1968. However, I would go further and say, even if that statement is not entirely or substantially correct, (see paragraph 10 of the opposition)

the absence of any evidence before me, I have no doubt as to the true meaning of that document, and I am not prepared to

terfere by annulling the order of requisi­ tion ; because the real issue

these cases is that all nego­ tiations on the question of compensation failed because the applicants are demanding to be paid the value of their lands with much bigger prices, because as they claim

their applications, the value of their lands has

creased by many thousands of pounds since the notice of acquisition

the year 1968. The second proposition was that, the order of requisition was contrary to the provisions of section 4

dustry and not by the Council of Ministers. That proposition is right (if that was the case) because when the requisitioning authority is the Republic, the Council of Ministers is the appropriate organ to make such an order. However, it appears that under the provisions of section 3

such decision prescribe.

fact, on February 13, 1965, the Council of Ministers exercising their powers under the aforesaid law,

its decision No. 4401, conferred to the said Minister the making of an order of requisition under section 6 of Law No. 15 of 1962. (See exhibit 1 333 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI M. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 ΡΗΟΤΙΝΙ Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND O T H E R S v. REPUBLIC ( C O U N C I L OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) which is a circular No. 34).

the light of this exhibit, I have reached the view that the said order of requisition is not contrary to the provisions of section 4

tends to serve not a case of urgency and of a temporary nature, but of a permanent purpose, viz., the erecting of buildings, which is

compatible with the notion of acquisition. He relies on Kyriacopoulos on the Greek Administrative Law, 4th edn., Vol. I l l at pp. 395 and 396. Having had the advantage of perusing a number of Greek textbooks on the question of requisition, I shall proceed to examine first this question

the light of our own Article 23 and Law 21 of 1962 before referring to the position prevailing

Greece on this issue. There is no doubt that our Constitution differentiates between the compulsory acquisition of property and the requisition of property with which it deals

paragraph 8 of Article 23. Under this paragraph a requisition may be made for the same reasons and under the same conditions as a compulsory acquisition, except that the requisition cannot exceed three years, and the compensation to be paid need not be paid

advance, but promptly.

Thymopoulos and Others v. Municipal Committee of Nicosia

any case such scheme is unconstitutional, even if it only imposes restrictions or limitations under paragraph 3 of Article 23, because no compensation for such restrictions or limitations has been paid

advance of its taking effect ; it has been argued that this is what was required to be done by the terms ' promptly'

paragraph 3 of Article 23. I can find no merit

this argument ;

my opinion, the term ' promptly' has to be given its ordinary meaning and cannot be construed, especially if one compares the said paragraph 3 with paragraph 4 of the same Article, as meaning '

advance' of the taking of effect of the relevant restriction or limitation."

Hadjikyriakou and Others (No. 1) v. The Council of Ministers and Another

a case of requisition of premises, had this to say regarding the expression " prompt payment of compensa­ tion " : — "

this connection I have to comment, too, on the fact that respondents have not acted yet

a manner 334 commensurate with the constitutional obligation (under Article 23) to effect prompt payment of compensation

respect of the order of requisition. It is correct that by letters of the 16th November, 1967 (see exhibit 6) respondent No. 2 called upon all the five applicants to negotiate regarding the compensation payable to them ; but nothing has as yet been agreed upon, nor have any references been filed before the competent Court, either by the applicants or by respondents, for the assessment of such compensation. My understanding of the obligation for prompt payment of compensation is that when the exceptional measure of requisition is resorted to the authority concerned should be then

a position to make an offer, at once, to the person affected, and if such offer is not accepted then a reference to Court should be made without delay. Procrastination

the matter on the part of the person affected is no excuse for the authority concerned ; the duty to pay compensation is cast upon such authority and it hasto be discharged by it promptly.

all the present cases it does not appear that any formal offer of compensation has been made to the applicants till this day." Moreover, the distinction between a requisition and an acquisition is that undei a requisition order only possession of the property is taken, the ownership remaining

the owner, whilst under an acquisition order the ownership is transferred. Cf. section 6 of the Requisition of Property Law, 1962. Under sub-section 2, when possession of any property is taken by virtue of this law, such property may be used bythe requisitioning authority for which such possession is retained, or do ; n relation to the same property anything which any person having an

terest

such property would be entitled to do by virtue of that

terest.

my view, these concluding words are strong words, and could only be construed as meaning that the requisitioning authoiity could step

to the shoes of the owner and carry out or do anything

connection with the public benefit utility,

cluding any kind of building or other erection on the requisitioned land. Moreover, I think I am fortified

this view, from the wording of section 8, which deals with the question of compensation payable to the owner of the requisitioned property. Sub-section 1 (c) reads as follows :— _y " a sum equai to any diminution

the value of such property resulting either from the presence on or

or over such property of any building or other erection, structure or fixture erected, constructed or affixed 335 1971 Aug 20 PHOTINI M. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI Μ . PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS l'. by the requisitioning authority, or from any damage occasioned to such property during the period for which possession of the property is retained by virtue of the order of requisition, no account being taken of fair wear and tear or of any damage made good by t h e requisitioning authority." REPUBLIC ( C O U N C I L OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) T h e position, of course,

Greece is different

my view, and the question of requisitions created—to use the words of Prof. Kyriacopoulos—a lot of confusion regarding their legal nature not only among the Greek textbook writers, b u t also of foreign authors on this topic. T h e late Prof. N . Saripolos, who took the view that requisition of property is considered a compulsory acquisition for a public benefit purpose, within Article 17 of the then Constitution of Greece 1864/1911, thus described the position

his text­ book on the System of Greek Constitutional Law, 1923, 4th edn. Vol. 3 at pp. 225-228 : — *«Al επιτάξεις άττοτελοΰσιν άπαλλοτρίωσιν δια δημοσίαν ώφέλειαν κατ' άκολουθίαν εφαρμόζονται και εΐς ταύτας αί διατάξεις τοΰ άρθρου 17 τοΰ συντάγματος, αί άφορώσαι ιδίως είς τόν καθορισμόν της αποζημιώσεως δια της δικα­ στικής όδοΰ και είς τήν προηγουμένην άποζημίωσιν. Ούδ' εΐνε αληθές οτι ή εφαρμογή των διατάξεων τούτων εϊνε αδύνατος έν τοις πράγμασι προκειμένου περί επιτάξεων διότι αυτά τό άρθρον 17 τοΰ συντάγματος ορίζει δτι * έν περι­ πτώσει έπειγούση ή άποζημίωσις δύναται και προσωρινώς νά όρισθή δικαστικώς', ΰπό δικαστικής τίνος αρχής, π.χ. ύπό τοΰ προέδρου των πρωτοδικών, ή ΰπό τοΰ ειρηνοδίκου. "Αλλως έν Γαλλία π.χ. και έν Βελγίω, έν περιπτώσει ώρισμένων στρατιωτικών ή ναυτικών επιτάξεων (requisitions militaires), ή άποζημίωσις, ήτις αληθώς δέν εΐνε 'προηγου­ μένη ', ορίζεται είτε ύπό τοΰ ειρηνοδίκου (juge de paix) είτε ύπό τοΰ πρωτοδικείου (tribunal civil), αναλόγως τοΰ ποσοϋ τής αποζημιώσεως. Αί επιτάξεις διά τάς άνάγκας τοΰ στρατού τής ξηράς ή τής θαλάσσης, αϊ στρατιωτικοί (έν τή γενική τής λέξεως σημασία) επιτάξεις, και ού μόνον αύται, άλλ* αϊ επιτάξεις έν γένει, υπάγονται είς τάς διατάξεις τοΰ άρθρου 17 τοΰ συντάγματος, ώς ούσαι 'απαλλοτριώσεις διά δημοσίαν ώφέλειαν *, καθόσον άποτελοϋσιν * άφαίρεσιν ιδιοκτησίας', έν τή έννοια τοΰ δρου τούτου έν τω άρθρω 17 τοΰ συντάγματος, δηλ. τής κυριότητος (π.χ. ίππων, ήμιόνων κ.λ.π.) ή τής χρήσεως και καρπώσεως (π.χ. πλοίων), διά ' δημοσίαν ώφέλειαν *, προς έξυπηρέτησιν αναγκών τοΰ στρατού τής ξηράς και τής θαλάσσης. Επειδή δ' αϊ επιτάξεις εΐνε ' άφαίρεσις ιδιοκτησίας ' κινητών ή ακινήτων πραγμάτων * An English translation of this text appears at pp. 341— 342 post. 336 διά 'δημοσίαν ώφέλειαν \ κατά τήν επικρατούσαν καΐ έν τή αλλοδαπή επιστήμη γνώμην, ην καΐ ήμεϊς έδιδάσκομεν έν ταΐς προηγουμέναις ήδη έκδόσεσι τοΰ άνά χείρας Εργου, δρθώς άπεφήνατο τό πρωτοδικεϊον 'Αθηνών, διά των ύπ" Δριθ. 785 καΐ 800 αποφάσεων αΰτοϋ τής 20 καΐ 21 Δεκεμβρίου, 1913, δτι δέον νά όρίζηται ή άποζημίωσις ' διά τής δικαστικής όδοϋ \ καΐ ουχί διά * διοικητικών δικαστηρίων', ώς ώρισε, προκειμένου περί ναυτικών επιτάξεων, παρά τό Αρθρον 17 τοΰ συντάγματος, ό ΔΡΟΒ' νόμος τοΰ 1913, δν δέν έφήρμοσεν αντισυνταγματικόν δντα, τό πρωτοδικεϊον, απόρριψαν τήν περί άναρμοδιότητος τοΰ δικαστηρίου ενοτασιν τοΰ εναγο­ μένου δημοσίου.» On t h e other hand, Prof. Kyriacopoulos t h u s described the same position on the same topic

his textbook op. cit. at pp. 394-396,

cluding notes 10 and 11 : — *«

1. "Οσον άφαρ$ είς τήν νομικήν φύσιν των επιτάξεων, κρατεί μάλλον σύγχυσις. Μεταξύ των συγγραφέων, δχι μόνον παρ" ήμΐν άλλα καΐ άλλαχοΰ, δέν επετεύχθη εΙσέτι Ομοφωνία. Ή έπίταξις, κατ' άλλους μέν, συνιστ^ θεσμόν Ιδίας φύσεως, ξένον προς τόν τής απαλλοτριώσεως. Έθεωρήθη δηλαδή ή δημόσιον βάρος ή αναγκαστική μίσθωσις ή γενικώτερον μέτρον, τό όποιον έπιβάλλουσιν Εκτακτοι άνάγκαι τοΰ κράτους, Ιδία έν καιρώ πολέμου. ΚαΙ αϊ τρεις αύται έκδοχαΐ εύρον άπήχησιν έν τη νομολογία. Κατ' άλλους, πάλιν, ή έπίταξις εϊτε εμφανίζει μεγάλην άναλογίαν προς τήν άπαλλοτρίωσιν καϊ δέν διαφέρει ταύτης ουσιωδώς, είτε είναι αυτόχρημα άπαλλοτρίωσις, υπαγόμενη, διά τοΰτο, είς τάς διατάξεις τοΰ αριθ. 17 τοΰ συντάγματος. Ή διαφωνία δέν έχει απλώς θεωρητικήν σημασίαν, άλλα, κατ* εξοχήν, πρακτικήν σπουδαιότητα. Διότι, αν μέν ή έπίταξις έν γένει είναι άπαλλοτρίωσις, υπάγεται είς τάς δια­ τάξεις τοΰ αριθ. 17 παρ. Ι τοΰ συντ. καί, κατ' άκολουθίαν, δέν χωρεί έπίταξις άνευ δημοσίας ωφελείας καϊ προηγουμένης αποζημιώσεως, οριζόμενης ύπό των τακτικών δικαστηρίων αντιθέτως 6έ, έάν ή έπίταξις δέν εϊναι άπαλλοτρίωσις, ουδα­ μώς τυγχάνουσιν αντισυνταγματικά τά κατά τόν νόμον περί επιτάξεων διοικητικά δικαστήρια, δπως καθορίζωσι τήν άφειλομένην άποζημίωσιν. Τήν λύσιν τοΰ ζητήματος έπεζήτησεν ά συνταγματικός νομοθέτης τοΰ 1927 διά τής προσθήκης έν 3ρθ. 19 παρ. 3 ειδικής διατάξεως, ήτις επέτρεπε παρέκκλισιν άπό τής αρχής τοΰ "απαραβίαστου τής 'ιδιοκτησίας \ 'Αλλ' ακριβώς ή προσθήκη εκείνη έπιμαρτυρεΐ πόσον, καϊ κατά τόν συνταγματικόν νομοθέτην, ή έπίταξις ταυτίζεται, πολλάκις, προς τήν * An English translation of this text appears at pp. 342344 post. 337 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI M. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS V. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) άπαλλοτρίωσιν, ώστε νά παρίσταται ανάγκη ρητής έν τω συντάγματι εξαιρέσεως έκ τής γενικής αρχής τοΰ " απαρα­ βίαστου τής Ιδιοκτησίας'. Ή περί ής ό λόγος διάταξις, ήτις δέν περιείχετο εϊς τό αρθ. 17 τοΰ συντ. 1864/1911, περι­ ελήφθη καϊ έν τώ Ισχύοντι. Ή παρ. 4 τοΰ αρθ. 17 ορίζει: Εϊδικοΐ νόμοι ρυθμίζουσι τά των επιτάξεων διά τάς άνάγκας των ένοπλων δυνάμεων είς περίπτωσιν πολέμου ή έπιστρατεύσεως, ή προς θεραπε'ιαν άμεσου κοινωνικής ανάγ­ κης, δυναμένης νά θέση εις κίνδυνον τήν δημοσίαν τάξιν ή υγείαν. 3.—Παρά τήν ελλειψιν αναλόγου διατάξεως έκ τοΰ προϊσχύσαντος συντάγματος, τά δικαστήρια παρεδέχοντο, δτι ή έπίταξις ακινήτου, ώς έπιβάλλουσα ύπό ' άπλοΰν περιορισμόν *, έπιτρεπτόν κατά τό σύνταγμα, τό επί τοΰ ακινήτου δικαίωμα κυριότητος έκ λόγω δημοσίου συμφέροντος, καϊ μή στερούσα 'τόν κύριον τών έκ τής κυριότητος ωφελειών εΙμή έν μέρει μόνον *, δέν συνιστά άπαλλοτρίωσιν οΰτε, επο­ μένως, αντίκειται εις αρθ. 17 τοΰ συντ. 'Αλλ* ή έπίταξις υπαγορευόμενη έκ λόγων εξαιρετικών δημοσίας ή κοινωνικής ανάγκης, δικαιολογείται μόνον έκ τοΰ προσωρινού αυτής χαρακτήρος· διό καϊ δέν δύναται νά διατηρήται πέραν ευλόγου χρόνου, περί οΰ αποφαίνεται τό δικαστήριον, κρίνον κατά τάς εκάστοτε συντρέχουσας περιστάσεις καϊ έν συναρτήσει προς τήν ανάγκην, ήτις ΰπηγόρευσε τήν έπιβολήν τής έπιτάξεως. Ή έπι μακρόν χρόνον δηλαδή διάρκεια τής έπιτάξεως ακινήτου συνιστά εμμέσον παραβίασιν τής περί προστασίας τής 'ιδιοκτησίας διατάξεως τοΰ συντάγματος. Έπίταξις ακινήτου δι* ανάγκην ουχί προσωρινήν καϊ ίίκτακτον τής δημοσίας υπηρεσίας άλλα μόνιμον, δυναμένην, διά τοΰτο, νά θεραπευθή διά μέτρου μονίμου χαρακτήρος, ώς είναι ή άπαλλοτρίωσις, δέν είναι συνταγματικώς επιτετραμμένη, έφ' δσον διαρκεί πέραν ευλόγου χρόνου. Κατ* άκολουθίαν, δημιουργείται διά τήν διοίκησιν ύποχρέωσις, δπως προβή είς τήν άρσιν τής έπιτάξεως. Τό θεωρητικόν τοΰτο επίτευγμα τής νομολογίας, συνιστών λογικήν και αναμφισβητήτως όρθήν έρμηνείαν τών θεσμών τής απαλλοτριώσεως καϊ έπιτάξεως, δέον νά γίνη άποδεκτόν καϊ ΰπό τό ίσχΰον σύνταγμα ώς προς τήν έφαρμογήν τών διατάξεων τών παρ. Ι καί 4 τοΰ αρθ.
2. Διότι, διάφορος εκδοχή ώς προς τήν εννοίαν τοΰ θεσμού τής έπιτάξεως, θά ώδήγει εϊς τό άτοπον συμπέρασμα, οτι ό συνταγματικός νομοθέτης διά τής παρ. 4 άπέβλεψεν εϊς τήν καταδολίευσιν τής διά τής παρ. Ι διασφαλισθείσης αρχής τοΰ 'απαραβίαστου τής ιδιοκτησίας *.» ' Regarding the distinction between a permanent and a temporary requisition, provided by Law 4442/1929, see Kyriacopoulos op. cit. at pp. 393-394, and under note 1 of the latter page. 338 As I have said earlier

this judgment, irrespective of the reasons given before me regarding the delay (admittedly a long delay) between the order of acquisition and the order of requisition, I am convinced that the latter order was made and is purported to serve a case of urgency,

view of the magnitude of the project, which no doubt would serve the economic goals of the

dustry of tourism to the benefit of this country as a whole.

view, however, of the difference of our own law regarding the question of requisition, I am of the opinion that the dispute

Greece regarding the payment of compensation and whether it ought to be made before the taking of the possession of the property, is of no practical importance

Cyprus. I feel, therefore, that

order to decide the third proposition of counsel I must dosointhe light of our own lawof requisition. Having had the occasion to go through the various sections of our law, I have reached the view that the construction of buildings on the requisitioned land of the applicants does not

any way conflict, nor is it

compatible with the notion of acquisition, because it is not

tended to be of a permanent nature, but only of a limited period

order to serve the needs of the requisitioning authority for such period which is specified

the order of requisition and,

any event, not exceeding a period of three years. That this view is correct and that the requisition order will not frustrate the rights of the applicants under Article 23.4 of the Constitution I find support from the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court

the case of Evridiki Aspri and The Republic, 4 R.S.C.C. 57,

which case it was stated that the mere fact that the purpose for which the compulsory acquisition has been decided upon is being pursued pro tempore by means of requisition upon payment of compensation, cannot reasonably be said to frustrate the said rights of applicant under sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 4, because the ownership continues to vest

the applicant

the meantime. Cp. Manolis Panteli Pavlou and Another (reported

this Part at p. 120 ante ; see also Vassiliades v. The Republic

any event, the net result

these cases is that the acquiring authority have not exhibited an urgency to determine the just and equitable amount of compensation payable to the applicants with regard to the acquisition of their lands before taking possession under the Requisition of Property Law, a fact for which I cannot but express my regret for such a delay to safeguard the

terest of a citizen. Regarding, however, the .question of 339 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI M. PAPADOPOULLOU AND .OTHERS V. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WD ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND O T H E R S v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) compensation, under the provisions of section 8 of Law 21 of 1962 for their requisitioned land, section 11 is

these terms : — " If, within three months of the date on which any compensation for requisition has accrued due, no agreement as

section 10 has been reached, or if, notwithstanding that the said period of three months has not elapsed, no such agreement can

the cir­ cumstances be foreseen, the requisitioning authoiity or any person

terested may apply to the Court for the determination of such compensation." For the reasons I have endeavoured to explain at length, I have reached the conclusion, that the third proposition of counsel is not right, and

view of all the material before me, I am of the opinion that the order of requisition made by the requisitioning authority is neither contrary to any of the provisions of the Constitution or of any law, nor was it made

excess or

abuse of powers vested

such organ.

view, however, of the nature of these cases, particularly regarding the delay of the acquiring authority, I would not make an order as to costs against the applicants. Applications dismissed. No order as to costs. TRANSLATION This is an English translation of the Greektext appearing at pp. 332-333 ante, as prepared by the Registry. " 2. Certain immovable private properties have been acquired by virtue of Administrative Act No.202/1969 for the tourist development of ' Golden Sands' near Famagusta. As the owners of the said immov­ able properties have not accepted the compensation which has been offered to them by the Lands Office and as the formalities for the registration of the lands

the name of the Government would, accord­

g to existing legislation, take considerable time to be completed it is considered necessary for an order of requisition to be made under s. 4 of the Requisition of Property Law No. 21 of 1962,

order to enable the Republic to

terfere with these lands at the earliest so as to achieve the purpose of the acquisition. It should be noted that by virtue of the relevant agreerflent the contractors 340 who have undertaken the erection of the project are bound to commence work with effect from the 1st March, 1971." 1971 Aug. 20 PHOTINI M. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS TRANSLATION V. This isan English translation of the Greek text appearing at pp. 336-337 ante, as prepared by the Registry. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) " Requisitions of property constitute acquisition for a public benefit purpose ; consequently the provisions of Article 17 of the Constitution, particularly those relating to the assessment of compensation by the Court and the payment

advance of compensation, apply to these as well. Nor is it true that the application of these provisions is practically impossible

the case of requisitions ; because this Article 17 of the Constitution provides that '

a case of an urgent nature compensation may even provisionally be assessed by the Court' by a Judicial Authority, e.g. by the President of the Court of First

stance or by a Justice of the Peace. Otherwise

France, for example, and

Belgium,

the case of certain military or naval requisitions (' requisitions militaires '), the compensation, which

reality is not an ' advance compensation ', is either assessed by a Justice of the Peace {juge depaix) or by the Court of First

stance (tribunal civil)

accordance with the amount of the Compensation. Requisitions for the needs of the Land or Sea Army, the militaiy (within the general meaning of the word) requisitions, and not only these, but requisitions

general, come within the provisions of Article 17 of the Constitution as being ' acquisitions for a public benefit purpose ' ; because they amount to ' deprivation of property ', within the meaning of this term as appears

Article 17of the Constitution, that is to say, of the ownership (e.g.

horses, mules etc.) or the use and enjoyment (e.g. ships) for ' a public benefit ',

order to serve the needs of the Land and Sea Army. And because requisitions amount to ' deprivation of property '

movable or immovable chattels for a ' public benefit ', according to the current opinion accepted

the jurisprudence

other countries, which theory we had been expounding

the already published editions of this text book, a Court of Athens of First

stance rightly decided

its judgments 341 1971 Aug. 20 ΡΗΟΤΤΝΙ Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS v. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) NOS. 785 and 800 dated the 20th and 21st December, 1913, that the Compensation ought to be assessed by a ' Civil Court', and not by ' Administrative Tribunals ', as was provided,

the case of naval requisitions, and contrary to Article 17 of the Con­ stitution, by a Law of 1913, which was not applied, as being unconstitutional, by the Court of First

stance which overruled the objection of the defen­ dant public authority regarding the competence of the Court." TRANSLATION This is an English translation of the Greek text appearing at pp. 337-338 ante, as prepared by the Registry. " 2. Regarding the legal nature of the requisitions it does rather exist a confusion. Text book writers were not of unanimous opinion, not only

this country, but elsewhere. The question of requisi­ tion according to other writers constitutes an

­ stitution of its own nature unconnected with the acquisition. It was,

other words, considered by them a public burden or compulsory lease or a measure of a general nature, which is imposed by urgent needs of the state, particularly at war times. All these three theories have been echoed

caselaw. According to other text book writers again, requisition either presents a great similarity with acquisition and does not materially differ therefrom, or it is entirely

substance an acquisition, falling, thus, within the provisions of Article 17 of the Con­ stitution. The disagreement is not simply of a theoretical meaning, but it is particularly of a practical import­ ance. Because, if requisition is generally considered as an acquisition, it falls within the provisions of Article 17 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, and, consequently an acquisition is not justified

the absence of a public benefit and advance payment of compensation, assessed by the ordinary Courts ; on the contrary, however, if requisition does not amount to acquisition, the Administrative Courts, set up under the Requisition Law, to assess the Compensation, should by no means be considered as being unconstitutional. The constitutional legislator of 1927 sought to solve the problem by the addition of a special pro­ vision to Article 19 permitting a deviation from the principle of '

violability of property \ But it is significant that this addition confirms how, accord­

g also to the constitutional legislator, requisition is

many respects identical with acquisition, so that an express provision exempting from the general principle of the *

violability of property ' was deem­ ed necessary to be

serted

the Constitution. The said provision which was not

cluded

Article 17

of the 1864/1911 Constitution was

cluded

the present Constitution. Paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides ' Special Laws govern matters relating to requisitions for the needs of the armed forces

case of war or mobilisation, or for the remedy of a social need of an urgent nature, which would endanger public order or health'. 3.

spite of the lack of a similar provision

the pre-existing Constitution Courts accepted that the requisition of immovable property by imposing under a ' simple restriction ', allowed by the Con­ stitution, the right of ownership to the immovable property on grounds of public

terest, and thus not depriving ' the owner from the benefits of own­ ership except

part only ' does not constitute an acquisition, nor does it, therefore, contravene Article 17 of the Constitution. But a requisition dictated by exceptional grounds of public or social necessity, is justified only by virtue of its temporary nature ; and it should not thus be kept

force beyond a reasonable time, which is determined by the Court, judging according to the circumstances prevailing from time to time and by taking

to consideration the needs which dictated the requisition.

other words the long duration of the requisition of im­ movable property constitutes an

direct contraven­ tion of the Constitutional provision concerning the protection of the right to property. Requisi­ tion of immovable property for the needs of the public service which are not temporary and extra­ ordinary, but permanent, being thus capable of being remedied by means of a permanent nature, such as the acquisition, is not constitutionally per­ mitted, so long as it lasts beyond a reasonable time. Consequently it creates an obligation on the admi­ nistration to abandon the requisition. 343 1971 Aug. 20 ΡΗΟΤΙΝΙ Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS V, REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) 1971 Aug. 20 ΡΗΟΤΙΝΙ Μ. PAPADOPOULLOU AND OTHERS V. REPUBLIC (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ANOTHER) This theoretical achievement of case law which commends a reasonable and no doubt a correct

terpretation of the rules relating to acquisition and requisition ought to be accepted by the existing constitution regarding the application of paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 17. Because a different construc­ tion of the meaning of the law of requisition would lead to the impertinent conclusion, that the Con­ stitutional Legislator, by paragraph 4,

tended to defraud the principle of *

violability of property ' which was safeguarded by paragraph 1." 344