clr/1976/1976_3_169.pdf

(3)(a) and of provisotoparagraph 3of thesixth Scheduleto the SocialInsurance Law, 1964 (Law 2 of 1964)—Irreconcilable conflict between the two provisions—Provisions of the section prevail—That part of the proviso which refers to the right of "election" treated as re­ pugnant or inoperative—Word "election" eliminated from the proviso as being inconflict with the enactingpart of the Law. Social Insurance Law, 1964 (Law 2 of 1964)—Construction of s' 13

(3)(a)andofproviso toparagraph 3 of the sixth Scheduleto the law—Irreconcilable conflict between the two provisions—Pro­ visionsof section prevail—Proviso cannotbe treated as aprovision restricting the generality or the application of the said s. I3

(3)(a). Election—Statutory election. Social Insurance—Pensioner—Old age pensioner—Reduced old age pension—Section 13

(3)(a) of the Social Insurance Law, 1964 -(Law2σ/1964) andparagraph 3of thesixth Scheduleto the Law. The respondents in this appeal were insured under the pro­ visions of the Social Insurance Law,Cap. 354which was repealed by theSocial Insurance Law, 1964(Law No. 2 of 1964). Under the latter law they were all "existing contributors" in the sense of the proviso* toparagraph 3 of the sixth Schedule tothis Law. * Quoted in full at pp. 175-176post. 169 AND ANOTHER) v.1 PANAVIOTTS KATSARAS AND OTHERS 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER O F LABOUR AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS AND OTHERS When they applied for old age pension they were granted reducedold agepensions,instead of fullones,on theground that the yearly average of the contributions paid by or credited to them were less thanfiftyi.e. lessthan the minimum required by paragraph 3(b)*ofthe sixth Schedule to Law 2of 1964. 5 The validity of the decision refusing full old agepension was challenged by the respondents by means of a recourse and the Court annulled the decision complained of having held that the appellants have wrongly resolved an ambiguity resulting from the conflict between the text of section 13

(3)(a)** of Law 2 of 10 1964 and the text of paragraph 3*** of the Sixth Schedule to this Law. Hence the present appeal. Counsel for the appellants contended: (a) That the trial Judge wrongly found that if the right of 15 election provided in the proviso to paragraph 3 of the sixth Schedule to Law 2 of 1964is treated as inoperative,beinginconflict with theenactingpart inthe body ofthestatute in question,then therest oftheprovisions of the sameproviso should also be treated as inopera- 20 tive, because in accordance with the principles of construction only those provisions which are in direct conflict with the provisions of section 13

(3)(

1. a)and section 24 should be treated as inoperative. (
2. b)That the trial Judge wrongly found that the said pro- 25 viso can be treated as a provision restricting the generality of theapplication of section 13

(3)(a) of Law 2of 1964, in the sense that it enables a contributor to elect not to accept the benefit conferred on him by that section if that section would entail adverse conse- 30 quences for him by way of a reduced pension. Held,allowing the appeal,

(1)that the remaining provisions of the said proviso should be treated as operative because in accordance with the rules of construction where there is a conflictbetween a leadingsection and a schedule, one hastotry and 35 reconcile them as best as he may; that having tried to reconcile * Quoted in full at p. 175 post. ** Quoted at p. 174 post. · » · Quoted at p. 175 post. 170 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 themit appears that theycannot bereconciled; that that part of the proviso which refers to the right of election of an existing contributor in the Schedule should be treated as repugnant or inoperative only once the rest of the provisions are reconcilable with section 13

(3)(a); that this is just the case in which when there is a conflict between a leading section and a Schedule, the leading section should prevail (see Instituteof PatentAgentsv. Lockwood[1894] A.C. 347 at p. 360); and that, accordingly, having failed to reconcile the provisions of section 13

(3)(a) with paragraph 3of theproviso to thesixth Schedule,the subordinate provision, that istosaytheproviso,shouldgivewaytothe leading provision, which is section 13

(3)(a) bytreating the provision intheprovisoreferring toelection asbeinginoperative (see,also, Stonev. The Mayor,Aldermen andBurgesses of Yeovil, 45 L.J. Q.B. 657 at p. 660).

(2)That oncetheword "election" isof itself insensible,when oneconsiders the rest of the legislation, it should be eliminated; that this Courtfindsitself unable to agree with the learned trial Judge that the proviso can be treated as a provision restricting thegeneralityortheapplication ofsection 13

(3)(a),becausewhen a law grants a right of election, that is done by an express provisioninwhichit shouldprovide that theperson whohas aright of election has to elect between two disjunctive ways which specifically or expressly are mentioned in the said Law; and that election takes place when a man is left to his own free will to take or do one thing or another which would please him; that the viewtaken bythe trial Judge iscontrary to the provisionsof our Law; and that, accordingly, the appeal will be allowed and the decision of the Chief Insurance Officer that the respondents wereentitled toareduced oldagepension onlywillbe confirmed. Appeal allowed. Cases referred to: Institute ofPatent Agents v.Lockwood[1894]A.C.347atp.360; Stone v. TheMayor,Aldermen andBurgesses of Yeovil, 45 L.J. Q.B. 657 at p. 660; Re Baines, 41 E.R. 400 at p. 406; Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co.Ltd. [1946] A.C. 163at p.

1. Appeals. Appeals against thejudgment of the President of the Supreme 40 Court of Cyprus (Triaatafyllides, P.) given on the 13th March, 1973 (Cases Nos. 168/169, 201/69, 202/69, 205/69, 206/69, 171 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS AND OTHERS 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER O F LABOUR A N D SOCIAL INSURANCE A N D ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS A N D OTHERS 210/69 and 237/69) whereby the decision of the respondents that the applicants, as old age pensioners, were entitled to reduced, and not to full, old age pensions was annulled. L. Loucaidesy Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic, for the appellants. 5 L. Papaphilippou, for the respondents (in appeals Nos. 115-120). D. Demetriades, for the respondents (in appeal Nos. 116 and 121). E. Emilianides, for the respondents (in appeals Nos. 118 10 and 119). Chr. Demetriades, for the respondent (in appeal No. 117). Cur. adv. vult. STAVRINIDES, J.: The judgment of the Court will be delivered by Mr. Justice Hadjianastassiou. 15 HADJIANASTASSIOU, J.: The present consolidated appeals are made under the provisions of s. 11 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law, 1964 (Law 33/64), against the decision*of a Judge of the SupremeCourt, by which all the subjudice decisions of the Chief Insurance Officer of the 20 Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance granting to the applicants reduced old age pension, were declared to be null and void and of no effect whatsoever as being contrary to law. The facts as shortly as possible are these:The applicants were considered as "insured persons" under 25 s. 2 of the Social Insurance Law, Cap.
2. On April 19, 1964, the House of Representatives enacted the Social Insurance Law, 1974(No. 2/64), and itslong title shows that it isa law to amend and consolidate the laws of social insurance and workmen's compensation law establishing a scheme providing cash benefits 30 for marriage, maternity, sickness, unemployment, widowhood, orphanhood, old age, accidents and death. This new law which repealed the earlier law became operative on October 5, 1964, and all the applicants who were insured persons under the previous law, came within the ambit of the 35 relevant provisions of thenew law; and whenfinallythey became entitled, they applied to the Chief Insurance Officer to grant * Reported in

(1973)3 C.L.R.

1. 172 them cash benefits for old age pension which they claimed they were entitled to. On February 27, 1968, the Chief Insurance Officer in reply told the applicants that they would begranted reduced old age 5 pensions because theyearly average of their contributions were less than the yearly average offiftywhich was required for full pensions. The applicants, feeling aggrieved because of the reply of the Chief Insurance Officer,filedseparate recourses in Court which 10 finally werewithdrawn ontheundertakingbytheadministration to reconsider their claims and to inform them if it was found that theyhad arightofelection undertheprovisionsoftheSixth Schedule of Law 2/
2. On May 6, 1969, the Chief Insurance Officer having reviewed the matter, informed each applicant 15 separately that he had reached the conclusion that his original decision which was communicated to them on April 30, 1968, regarding the reduced old age pension could not be altered. Theapplicantsfeeling aggrieved onceagain,filedtheserecourses whichfinallywere consolidated before the learned trial Judge. 20 Thegrounds oflawput forward in respect ofeach application " weremore or lessidentical, and are these:" (a)Applicants having paid the required contributions under thelaw,wereentitled tofull oldagepensionand not to a reduced one; and 25 30 (b) respondents oreither ofthem,indecidingto reducethe old age pension of applicants, by taking into consideration the average yearly contributions under the previous SocialInsurance Law, Cap. 354,or otherwise, acted contrary to ss. 13,24 and to the proviso of the Sixth Schedule of the Social Insurance Law No. 2/64 (as amended). OnJuly26, 1969,theopposition wasfiled,and counselfor the respondents raised these two grounds:- 35 "

(1)that thedecisionscomplained ofwerereached lawfully in accordance with the Social Insurance Law, 1964 (No. 2/64) after taking into consideration all the material elements of the case;

(2)that no question arises regarding the subject of election by the applicants by calculating the old contributions 173 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS AND OTHERS 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER O F LABOUR AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS AND OTHERS under the proviso to the Sixth Schedule of the aforementioned law. The relevant provision regarding election of the said proviso contradicts expressly paragraph (a) of subsection 3 of s. 13of the same law and, therefore, it should be ignored in accordance with the well-accepted 5 legal principles of interpretation of laws. MAXWELL; ON INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, 10th edn. at p. 163". Thus, it appears that the stand taken by the respondents was that the applicants were not entitled to a right of election under 10 the proviso to paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule of the law, in order to get a full pension, and I propose quoting some of the sections of our law: It appears that in the definition of s. 2 of the Social Insurance Law, 1964, an "insured person" means a person insured under this law; and that "appointed day" means such date as the Council of Ministers may by order appoint for the coming of this law into operation and which date was fixed, the 5th October, 1964. 15 Section 13of the same law deals with all kinds of benefit, rate 20 or amount of benefit, contribution conditions and also as to the persons who are entitled to benefit, and is in these terms: "13

(1)Benefit shall be of the following kinds:- (g) old age pension;

(2)Subject to the provisions of this Law 25 (b) the contribution conditions for the several kinds of benefit shall be as set out in the Sixth Schedule to this Law;

(3)For the purpose of determining whether a person is entitled to benefit of any kind - 30 (

1. a)any contributions paid by or credited to an insured person under the repealed law, prior to the appointed day, shall be considered as having been paid after the appointed day". Subsection 4 which isa provision intended to benefit a person 53 although the relevant contribution conditions are not satisfied, provides as follows :" Where a person would be entitled to benefit of any kind 174 5 10 but for the fact that the relevant contribution conditions are not satisfied as respects the number of contributions paid or credited in the last contribution year, the yearly average of contributions paid or credited or in the case of a maternity allowance the number of contributions paid or credited in respect of the fifty-two weeks immediately preceding the period from which the allowance is payable, that person shall nevertheless be entitled, if the said number or yearly average is not less than twenty, to benefit of that kind at the reduced rate or of the reduced amount specified for benefit of that kind in the column of the Seventh Schedule to this law which is appropriate to the said number or yearly average'". The Sixth Schedule to this law, relating to the contribution 15 conditions for the several kinds of benefits provides in paragraph 3 : " The contribution conditions for a marriage grant, widow's pension or old age pension are 20 (
2. a)that not less than one hundred and fifty-six contributions have been paid by the insured person; and (
3. b)that the yearly average of the contributions paid by or credited to him over the period- 25 30 (
4. i)beginning on the first day of the contribution year which includes the appointed day or, if he reaches the age of sixteen years after the appointed day, on the first day of the contribution year in which he reaches that age; and (
5. ii)ending on the last day of the last complete contribution year before the beginning of the benefit year which includes the day on which the conditions are required to be satisfied is not less than fifty". 35 Then comes the proviso which admittedly because of its defective drafting has given a lot of headache to all concerned. This proviso is in these terms:" Provided that, where an existing contributor elects to have all or part of the contributions paid by or credited to him 175 1976 June28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER OF LABOUR ANDSOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS ANDOTHERS 1976 3ur> ^_ REPUBLIC (MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL NS RANCB " v PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS . under the repealed Law, Cap. 354, to be considered as having been paid by or credited to him after the appointed ^ay, the yearly average of contributions paid by or credited to him shall be for the period beginning on the first day of the contribution year, prior to the appointed day, which includes the first contribution considered as having been paid after the appointed day and ending on the last complete contribution year before the beginning of the benefit vear which includes the day on which the conditions are required to be satisfied". 5 10 AND OTHERS Now section 24

(1)(as amended) lays down that a person is entitled to old age pension if" (

1. a)he is over pensionable age; and in the case of an employed person he has retired from regular employment; and 15 (
2. b)he satisfies the relevant contribution conditions; or (
3. c)he does not satisfy those conditions on that day, as from the first day thereafter on which he satisfies those conditions: Provided that where a person was an existing con- 20 tributor under the repealed Social Insurance Law, was over the age of fifty-five on the 7th January, 1957, and the number of contributions paid by him for contribution weeks which begin before the day on which he reaches the age of sixty-five, excluding contributions paid by him as a volun- 25 tary contributor under the repealed Law is less than fifty, that person shall be deemed for the purposes of this section to reach pensionable age, if he is then alive, on the 7th January, 1967: Provided further that any contributions paid by or in 30 respect of an employed person under the repealed Social Insurance Law for any period after that person reached the age of sixty five shall be considered for the purposes of this section as having been paid before he reached the age of sixty-five". The learned trial Judge, having considered both sub-section 3(a)of s. 13and paragraph 3of the Sixth Schedule, and obviously facing difficulties as to the correct construction of those two provisions, had this to say:176 35 10 " There obviously arises great difficulty in .trying to apply together subsection

(3)(a) of section 13 and paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule; there appears to exist a conflict between them; and there does exist much ambiguity as to the combined effect of these two provisions; as a result the respondents treated the right of election in the proviso to paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule as being a provision which should be ignored, so as to giveeffect to the intention of the Legislature as allegedly otherwise expressed in Law 2/64, by subsection

(3)(

1. a)of section 13*in particular". Then the learned trial Judge, having addressed his mind (
2. a)to the principles regarding the construction of statutes and particularly having regard to the existence of ambiguity as to the effect of the two aforesaid provisions; and 15 (
3. b)to the question whether the right of election in the proviso to the Sixth Schedule should be ignored or disregarded in order to accord with the true intent of the makers of the law in question, particularly of subsection 3(
4. a)of s. 13. Having dealt also with a number of authorities and having 20 quoted other sections, including ss. 13

(4)and 24

(1)of Law 2/64, said: 25 30 35 " It is against the background of the foregoing that there should be examined the riddle that, though the already quoted proviso to paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule to Law 2/64 gives a right to an existing contributor—that is (see section 2 of Law 2/64) a person who had been contributing under Cap. 354— to elect to have the contributions under Cap. 354 treated as having been paid by or credited to, him after the coming into force of Law 2/64 (provided that in such a casethemethod ofcalculating theyearly average of his contributions is different than the one laid down in sub-paragraph (b) of the said paragraph 3), nevertheless what such existing contributor can bring about by exercising the said right of election, under the proviso in question, is something which is ordained, by section 3

(3)(a), to happen in any case by operation of law, without any right of election in this respect by the existing contributor concerned." 177 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS AND OTHERS 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER O F LABOUR AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS AND OTHERS Then the learned trial Judge goes on:" In the light of various principles of construction of statutes, which have been referred to in this judgment, the provision regarding the right of election of an existing contributor, in the proviso to paragraph 3 of the Sixth 5 Schedule, might be treated as inoperative in view of being in conflict with an enacting part in the body of the statute, namely section 13

(3)(a), but in such a case there must also be treated as inoperative the remaining provisions of the proviso, because it is clear from the proviso that such 10 provisions becomeoperative onlywhen the right ofelection in question is exercised; and thus we are left only with the other relevant provisions in the said paragraph 3, which are those in sub—paragraph (b) thereof. On the other hand, the said proviso can be treated as a 15 provision restricting the generality of the application of section 13

(3)(a)) not in the sense that the said section comes into operation only when an existing contributor elects that this should beso,but in the sensethat it enables such a contributor to elect not to accept the benefit con- 20 ferred on him by section 13

(3)(a), if this would entail adverseconsequences for him byway of a reduced pension, in view of the, by operation of the provisions of the proviso, increase of theyears taken into account and resulting reduction of his yearly average of contributions." 25 Finally, he concludes: " Neither of the above alternative courses was adopted by therespondent authorities inreaching thein theserecourses sub judice decisions; what they did was to treat the right of election in the proviso as non-existent and yet to apply 30 the other provisions in the proviso, which could only come into operation if a right of election existed and had been exercised; as it is to be derived from the foregoing such a course was not a correct application of the relevant law and it follows that the subjudice decisions have to be 35 declared to be nulland voidand of no effect whatsoever as being contrary to law." Then the learned Judge, for the sake of guidance, says: " Having annulled the subjudicedecisions as contrary to 178 5 10 law it is not really necessary to proceed further and decide, in these proceedings, which out of my two aforementioned alternative views as to the proviso in question is the correct one; but I might state for the sake of guidance of all concerned that I am inclined in favour of the latter because I think that in this way is better served the social insurance legislative policy which is expressly stated in section 12

(3)of Law 106/72 and which had, without doubt, been all along sought to be implemented bymeans of the provisions, under scrutiny in this judgment, of Law 2/64." The first complaint of counsel in this appeal, resisted by counsel on behalf of the respondents, is that the learned trial Judge wrongly found that if the right of election provided in the proviso to paragraph 3 of the Sixth Schedule to Law 2/64, is 15 treated as inoperative, being in conflict with the enacting part in the body of the statute in question, then the rest of the provisions of the same proviso should also betreated as inoperative, because in accordance with the principles of construction only those provisions which are in direct conflict with the provisions 20 of s. 13

(3)(a) and s. 24 should be treated as inoperative. 25 30 35 40 Having considered carefully this contention of counsel, with the greatest respect to thelearned trial Judge, we hold a different view because in our opinion the remaining provisions of the said proviso should be treated as operative as in accordance with the rules of construction where there is a conflict between a leading section and a schedule, one has to try and reconcile them as best he may. Having done so, it appears that they cannot be reconciled, and we think that that part of the proviso which refers to the right of election of an existing contributor in the Schedule should be treated as repugnant or inoperative only once the rest of the provisions are reconcilable with s. 13

(3)(a)which saysthat "for the purpose of determining whether a person is entitled to benefit of any kind—(a)any contributions paid by or credited toan insured person under therepealed law, prior to the appointed day, shall be considered as having been paid after the appointed day". It seems to us that this is just the case in which when there is a conflict between a leading section and a schedule, the first should prevail, and if authority is needed, we think the case of Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood, [1894]A.C. 347provides the solution to this problem. Lord Herschell, L.C., facing the same difficulty of having two 179 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS AND OTHERS 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER O F LABOUR AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS AND OTHERS conflicting sections in the same Act, in his speech in the House of Lords, said at p. 360:" No doubt there might be some conflict between a rule and a provision of the Act. Well, there is a conflict sometimes between two sections to be found in the same Act. 5 You have to try and reconcile them as best you may. If you cannot, you have to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other. That would be so with regard to the enactment and with regard to rules which are to be 10 treated as if within the enactment. In that case, probably the enactment itself would be treated as a governing consideration and the rule as subordinate to it." Applying that principle, we would reiterate that having failed to reconcile the provisions of s. 13

(3)(a) with paragraph 15 3 of the proviso, we think that the subordinate provision, that is to say, the proviso, should give way to the leading provision, which as we said earlier, is s. 13

(3)(a), which is a governing consideration, by treating the provision referring to election as being inoperative. With this in mind, I would uphold 20 this submission of counsel, bearing in mind also the words of Brett J., in Stone v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of Yeovil, 45 L.J. Q.B. 657at p. 660: " Now on reading the sentence in section 9, 'and the compensation to be paid for any permanent damage or injury 25 to such lands', the expression 'such' at first sight confuses that compensation—the compensation in respect of lands to be purchased or taken—but when one comes to consider it carefully it is seen that if it be read thus it is insensible, and there is no effect which can be given to it in any case. 30 What follows? As 1 have always understood, it is a canon of construction that you are to give effect to every word in an Act of Parliament or in an agreement, but if there be a word or phrase to which no effect can be given, which is of itself insensible, then that word must be elimi- 35 nated. In the construction of this section the word 'such', is, to my mind, insensible, and therefore it must be eliminated." We think that the case in hand is on all fours with the construction adopted in the Stone case (supra), and, therefore, the 40 180 word "election" must be .eliminated from the proviso of the Sixth Schedule of our law, as being in conflict with the enacting part of our law. The second complaint of counsel is that the learned trial 5 Judge wrongly found that the said proviso can be treated as a provision restricting the generality of the application of s. 13

(3)(a) of the law, in the sense that it enables a contributor to elect not to accept the benefit conferred on him by that section if that section would entail adverse consequences for 10 him by way of a reduced pension. We think in trying,to answer this question we would state that if the enacting part and the schedule cannot be made to correspond, the latter must yield to the former—(see Re Baines, 41 E.R. 400 at p. 406). In the case in hand once the word 15 "election" is of itself insensible when one considers the rest of the legislation, it should be eliminated. With this in mind, we find ourselves unable to agree with the learned Judge that the proviso can be treated as a provision restricting the generality or the application of s. I3

(3)(a), because in our view, when a 20 law grants a right of election, that is done by an express provision, in which it should provide that the person who has a right of election has to elect between two disjunctive ways which specifically or expressly are mentioned in the said law. It is said that election takes place when a man is left to his own 25 free will to take or do one thing or another which would please him. On the question of the exercise of a statutory option or election, Viscount Simon in Youngv. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [1946] A.C. 163, had this to say at p. 173:30 35 40 " Here we are dealing with a statutory 'option' in its setting in the section, and I am willing to adopt the view, which has constantly been expressed and enforced, that the workman does not lose his alternative remedy merely because he accepts some payments under the Act, when the option is unknown to him. But if the circumstances amount to this, that he persists in taking weekly compensation after knowing of the alternative course, he is debarred from changing the nature of his claim... In conclusion I would venture to express the hope that, if there is to be new statutory enactment on the subject of alternative remedies when workmen meet with industrial accident, the legislation will be so framed as to get rid of 181. 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC "(MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS AND OTHERS 1976 June 28 REPUBLIC (MINISTER O F LABOUR AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ANOTHER) v. PANAYIOTIS KATSARAS AND OTHERS the doubts and "difficulties which have led to so much controversy, and have given rise to such fine distinctions, in the interpretation and application of s. 29." We agree that it would have been better if the law was so framed as to avoid difficulties, but havingregard to thewording of the proviso, no doubt, it presupposes that there is in existence a substantial provision granting the right of election, and because of that presupposition, thefixingof the period by which the average contributions are clearly calculated and made. (See the wording "where an existing contributor elects to have all or part of the contributions paid by or credited to him under the repealed law Cap. 354..."). But regretfully, no other provision in the context of the law ismade for suchelection, and, moreover, no other conjunctive method isprovided from which a contributor has a right to elect. It is for the reasons wehave stated that we have reached the conclusion that the view taken by the trial Judge, in his otherwise elaborate judgment, is contrary to the provisions of our law, and we would, therefore, allow the appeal and confirm the decision of the Chief Insurance Officer that the respondents are entitled to a reduced pension only. In view, however, of the important issues of law argued in this appeal, we would not make an order for costs. 10 15 20 Appeal allowed. No order as to costs. Appeal allowed. 25 182