LSTAVR1NIDHS, Λ. 1.01Z0U AND MALACHTOS, JJ.J ANTONISMOUZOURISANDANOTHER, 1977 July 27 — ANTON1S Appellants-Defendants, v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD., Respondents-Plain tiffs. {Civil Appeal No. 5731). 5 Contempt of Court—Committal—Breach of injunction—Order re straining defendants from interfering in any way with an area of land—Disobedience to—Standard of proof—Beyond rea sonable doubt—No reason to interfere with findings of fact by trial Court, and conclusions drawn therefrom, that defendants interfered with the land subject-matter of the order—Non-ser vice of the map referred to in the order is not, in the circum stances, such an irregularity as to invalidate the proceedings— Proper measure of punishment. ]0 Contempt of Court—Breach of order prohibiting doing of an act— Committal proceedings—Before procedure therefor is invoked the person to whom the order is directed shall, unless other wise directed by the Court, be served personally with the order —Order 42A rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 15 Sentence—Contempt of Court—Proper measure of sentence. Decided cases—Decisions of English Courts—They are of great persuasive authority—Reference thereto is useful in construing our legislative provisions whose origin is to be found in the English legal system. 20 25 ΟΏ May 15, 1976, the trial Court made an order* restrain ing theappellants-defendants from "interfering in any way with an area of land of an extent of 97 donums shown in exhibit \, coloured yellow". A duly endorsed copy of this order was served on appellant 1 on the 29th May, 1977 and service upon appellant 2 was effected through appellant 1, who is her husband. *Quoted at pp. 291- 292 post. 287 MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. The biggest part of the lands, subject matter of the prohibitory order were planted with potatoes, barley and cereals.Appellant 2 and some of her children were repeatedly seen irrigating the potato plantations and moving about freely in the land. 5 There was no direct evidence that appellant 1 entered the land but he applied for compensation to the British Authorities for damage caused, in the course of military exercises, to the potato crop, situate within the lands subject-matter of the order. \Q The respondents-plaintiffs applied for a committal order on the ground that the appellants have disobeyed thesaid order. The trial Court found that appellant 1,personally or through his agents, cultivated the lands subject-matter of the prohibitory order of the Court, interfering thereby with such lands 15 in contravention of the terms of the order and thus he was liable to be committed for contempt; and that the conduct of appellant 2 was wilful and contrary to the terms of the order of the Court and in defiance of it. It then sentenced appellant 1 to 45 days' imprisonment and ordered appellant 2 to pay the 20 costs of the application. Upon appeal Counsel for the appellants contended: (a) That theproceedings against appellant 2 were doomed to failure because personal service was a prerequisite to the invocation of the jurisdiction of the 25 Court underOrder 42A of the Civil Procedure Rules for thecommittalof a person incontempt; (b) that the trial Court wrongly decided that the appellants interfered with the plots in respect of which they were ordered not to interfere and there was no 30 evidencejustifying such aconclusion; (c) that the non-service of the map (exhibit 1) referred to in the order was such an irregularity as to invalidate theproceedings; (d) that the trialCourt wrongly assumed that the English cases 'decided after independence cannot affect the common law applicable in this Country and/or amend express statutory or other provisions of Cyprus Law; 288 35 (ej that thesentence imposed wasexcessive. Order 42A of the Civil Procedure Rules provides as follows: ,; 5 ]0 15 20 25 30 35 1. Where any order isissued by any Court directing any act to be done or prohibiting the doing of any act there shall be endorsed by the Registrar on the copy of it, to be served on the persons required to obev it, a memorandum in the words or to the effect following: 'If you, the within-named A.B., neglect to obey this order, by the time therein limited, you will be liable to be arrested and to have your property sequestered'. 2. An office copy of the order shall be served on the person to whom the order is directed. The service shall, unless otherwise directed by the Court or a Judge, be personal". Held,
(1)that under rule 2 of Order 42A the order shall beserved on the person to whom the order isdirected and the service shall be personal, unless otherwise directed by the Court; and that as appellant 2 was not served personally with the order the appeal willbe allowed as far asshe is concerned. (Cf. theEnglish rules).
(2)That on the totality of the evidence adduced there is no reason tointerfere with the findings of fact and the conclusions drawn thereon by the trial Court; that they were duly warranted by the circumstantial evidence adduced, which conclusively established the interference of the appellant himself • and through his servants and agents, members of his family, with the property in question; and that, moreover, the trial court properly directed itself on the standard of proof necessary to substantiate a complaint for contempt which has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the disobedience complained of being wilful in the sense of voluntary as opposed to accidental conduct.
(3)That the prohibitory order in question was issued after a long discussion on many points, including the point of the accurate determination of the area affected by the application for the interim order; that the reference to the map exhibit 1 at that hearing was made for the purpose of the identification 289 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHEF v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. of the properties in dispute and as appellant 1 attended that hearing he cannot be heard to say that he did not know the boundaries of the land to which the interim order related, quite apart from the fact that the interference was in respect of all 97 donums of land the subject of the proceedings; that 5 the order itself was duly served on him in accordance with the Rules and the fact that an exhibit was not served on him is not, in the circumstances, such an irregularity as to invalidate the proceedings (Reginav. Jones, 169 E.R. 68 distinguished).
(4)That the trial Court never assumed that the decisions ] Q of the English Courts are binding on our Courts; that they are of great persuasive authority as illustrating the common law, which in theory isnot changed by particular decisions; thatthe trial Court simply made a comparative analysis of the situation in England, in view of the fact that the English Rules of ]5 Court were the Rules on which our Rules were modelled, though with occasionalchanges and variousmodifications; and that, therefore, reference to the English authorities is useful in construing ourlegislativeprovisions whoseorigin is tobe found in the English Legalsystem. 20
(5)That this was the second disobedience by appellant 1 and that on the first occasion he was fined £25 and, apparently, he was not impressed by the leniency exhibited by the Court on that occasion; that disobedience to an order of the Court is a very serious behaviour which should entail strict 25 sanctions, as it undermines the very administration of justice and ultimately may render it nugatory; and that, therefore, there is no difficulty in dismissing the appellant's contention that the sentence imposed on him was excessive. Appeal of appellant1 dismissed. 30 Appeal of appellant2 allowed. Cases referred to: Mavrommatis and Others v. Cyprus Hotels Co. Ltd.
(1967)1 C.L-R. 266; Hadkinson v.Hadkinson[19521P. 285; Bettinson v.Bettinson[1965] 1 AllE.R. 102; Comet Products U.K. Ltd., v. Hawkex PlasticsLtd. [1971] 2 Q.B.67;[1971] 1AllE.R. 1141; Christodoulides v. ChristodouUdes, 11 C.L.R. 15; 290 35 Sheriffof Limassot v. Theodoros, 12C.L.R. 67; Churchmanv. Shop Steward's Committee[1972] 3 All E.R. 603; Hussonv.Husson[1962] 3AllE.R. 1056; 5 WestminsterC.C. v. Chapman [1975] 2 All E.R. 1103; Selousv. CroydonLocalBoard[1885] 53 L.T. 209; Hudsonv. Walker [1891] 64LJ. Ch.204; Reginav.Jones,169E.R. 68. 10 Appeal. Appeal by defendants against the order of the District Court of Larnaca (Pikis, P.D.C.and Artemis,D.J.) dated the 30th June, 1977,,(in an application for contempt of Court inAction No.27/76) wherebydefendant No. 1 was 15 sentenced to 45 days' imprisonment and defendant No. 3 was ordered to pay the costs of the application, for disobeying the order of the Court dated 15thMay, 1976. 20 G.Ladas, for theappellants. L. Papaphilippou with F. Valiandis, for the respondents. Cur.adv.vult. STAVRINIDES,J.:Thejudgment of theCourtwillbedeliveredbyJusticeA.Loizou. A.LOIZOU, J.: This is an appeal from thejudgment of 25 the Full District Court of Larnaca, whereby on the application of the plaintiffs-applicants (hereinafter to be called the respondent Company) the defendant-respondent No. 1 in that application (hereinafter to be called "appellant No. 1") was sentenced to 45 days' imprisonment for dis30 obedience of an order of the Court dated the 15th May, 1976 and his wife, defendant-respondent No. 3 (hereinafter tobe called appellant No.2),wasordered topaythe costs of the application, which was withdrawn and dismissed in the course of the trial against defendant-respon35 dent2,theirson. The order which was disobeyed was as follows: "(
- a)The defendants-respondents to be restrained 291 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. 1977 July 27 ANTON1S MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. and theyare hereby restrained from interfering in anyway withanarea of land of an extentof 97 donums shown in exhibit 1. coloured yellow. (
- b)The plaintiffs-applicants to furnish a guaran- 5 tee for damages in the sum of £200 in order to compensate the defendants-respondents for any loss they may suffer on account of theissueof the interim order in case the plaintiffsapplicants fail intheir action. 10 (
- c)The costs of the present application will be costs in cause but in any event not against the plaintiffs-applicants". The application for thecommittal of the appellantswas accompanied byanaffidavit sworn byoneof theDirectors 15 of the respondent Company, wherein thefacts relied upon were set out. The appellants opposed the application andan affidavit was sworn by appellant No. 1—personally and on behalf of the other appellant, being, as he stated therein, duly 20 authorised to swear that affidavit—denying the charges brought against them and maintaining that allegations madeinsupport of theapplication didnot makeout acase of violation by them of the order of the Court, and, further, that the said allegations were baseless and untrue. 25 It wasfurther contended in paragraph 2 of the said affidavit that the order of the 15th May was made "after a long discussion on various points, including also thepoint of the accurate determination of the area affected bythe application". As further stated in the affidavit, an appeal 30 was filed against the interim order, but its hearing was adjourned so that the litigants would take steps for the speedy determination of the substance of their differences andso avoid multiplicity of proceedings. On the insistence of the respondent Company that the Court should not 35 proceed to the hearing of the case before the appellants complied with the interim order, the trial Court directed that the complaint for contempt should first be examined before going into the substanceof the case, for aparty in contempt forfeits his right of audience before the Court 40 and does not recover it until the contempt is purged. In 292 support of this proposition the trial Court referred to oui own case of Theofylactos Mavrommatis and 2 Others v. Cyprus Hotels Co. Ltd.
(1967)1 C.L.R. 266, and to the English cases Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] P. 285 and 5 Bettinson v. Bettinson [1965] 1 All E.R.
- Though theissue does not arise before us, yet we would like to adopt and point out what was stated about the law of contempt by Borie and Lowe in their book on the subject, at p. 367, 10 "A person who has committed a civil contempt by disobeying a court order may be subject to the socalled rule that a party in contempt cannot be heard or take proceedings in the same cause until he has purged his contempt". 15 In Hadkinson v. Hadkinson (supra) Denning L.J., as he then was, traced the origin of the rule in the Canon law which was later adopted by the Chancery Court and the Ecclesiastical Courts. In Chancery its origin lay in the ordinance of Lord Bacon in the year 1618 which laid down 20 that "they that are in contempt are not to be heard neither in that suit, nor in any other, except the court of special grace suspend the contempt". This practice of the Courts however changed in the course of time and it came to be reconstructed in scope (see Bettinson v. Bettinson, supra 25 at p. 106). The better view seems to be that in those cases where the rule is on the face of it applicable, the courts nevertheless have a discretion whether or not to hear the party. And the rule should be considered in the terms explained 30 by Denning, L.J., in Hadkinson (supra) at page 298, as follows: 35 40 "I am of opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed an order of the court is not of itself a bar to his being heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the court.may in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment isremoved or good reason is shown why it should not be removed". 293 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. The rule does not bar applications made in other causes, although they may involve the same parties, and it is inapplicable to an application to purge the contempt or to the bringing of an_appeal with a view to setting aside the order upon which the alleged contempt is founded. It 5 may also be stated that a party will also be heard to support a submission that upon the true construction of the order alleged to be disobeyed his action did not constitute a contempt or that having regard to all the circumstances he ought not to be treated as beingin contempt. As stated 10 byBorrie and Lowe,op.cit. at p.368, "The reason that a party is allowed to be heard in these latter cases is that the object of the further application is to clear the very contempt complained of; on the other hand the rule does prima facie operate 15 where the party in contempt seeks to invoke the aid of the court in the same cause upon some other issue than theissueof thecontempt itself". Having referred to this question because of its significance in the administration of justice, we turn to the 20 facts in hand. Four witnesses testified for the respondent Company, including the deponent of theaffidavit sworn in support of the application, who adopted its contents and offered himself for cross-examination. The other three witnesses were 25 Zacharias Papanicodemou, who produced the drawn-up order of the Court and affidavits of service (exhibits 1, 2 and 3); Antonis Peratikos, a rural constable, who gaveevidence touching thebehaviour of the appellants in relation to the properties, the subject matter of the order, and An- 30 dreas Trisveys, a forester, who testified on the state of the lands on the 28th January, 1977, and whose evidence was intended to establish that the lands in question had been cultivated by persons other than the respondent Company during the period complained of. The last two witnesses. 35 apparently, were also the source of the information of respondent's affiant. The two appellants chose not to give evidence, asthey were inlaw entitled to do. not being compellable witnesses in contempt proceedings, whether they be criminal or civil in nature, though if such a defendant 40 chooses to give evidence voluntarily he cannot, as of right, refuse tobe cross-examined. (Comet Products U.K. Ltd. v. 294 Hawkex PlasticsLtd. [1971] 2 Q.B. 67, [1971] 1All E.R. 1141 C.A.). A duly endorsed order of the Court was served on appellant No. 1 on the 29th May,
- The service upon 5 appellant No. 2 was effected through appellant No. 1.This failure to serve appellant No. 2 personally was the subject of extensive argument, to the effect that the proceedings against her were doomed to failure, personal service being a prerequisite to the invocation of the jurisdiction of the 10 Court under Order 42A of the Civil Procedure Rules for the committal of a person in contempt. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent company that personal service was not indispensable in the face of evidence that the terms of the order had come in some 15 other way to the notice of the person concerned. As pointed out by the trial Court, they did not find the problem easy to solve, nor did clear answers offer themselves. They appreciated the need for personal service, considering the basically criminal nature of the proceedings that may be20 fall a contemner, possibly resulting in imprisonment and they referred to the two Cyprus cases, Christodoulides v. Christodoulides, 11 C.L.R. 15, and the Sheriff of Limassol v. Theodoros, 12 C.L.R. 67, to the effect that regularity in procedure is essential in proceedings which are in25 stituted with a view to punishment for contempt of Court, but they followed the view expressed in Churchman v. Shop Steward's Committee [1972] 3 All E.R. 603, that the requirement of personal service of an order of the Court involving a prohibition may be relaxed under cer30 tain circumstances, provided it is proved beyond reasonabledoubt that the order came to the notice of the person sought to be restrained. They also referred to Husson v. Husson [1962] 3 All E.R. 1056, and Westminster C.C. v. Chapman [1975] 2 All E.R. 1103, and concluded that the 35 evidence of the affiant for the applicants that appellant 2 was present during the proceedings and took cognizance of the order made was uncontradicted and that being so theobjection raised on her behalf should fail. Order 42A reads asfollows: 40 " l . Where any order is issued by any Court directing any act to bedone or prohibiting thedoing of any 295 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. act there shall be endorsed by the Registrar on the copy of it, to be served on the person required to obey it, a memorandum in the wordsor to the effect following: 'If you, the within-named A.B., neglect to obey this order, by the time therein limited, you will be liable to be arrested and to have your property sequestered'.
- An office copy of the order shall be served on theperson towhom theorder isdirected. The service shall, unless otherwise directed by the Court or a Judge, be personal". As indicated in the marginal note, rule 1wasintended to correspond to theold English Order 41,rule 5, which, totheextent that ismaterial,readsasfollows: 15 "Every judgment or order made in any causeor matter requiring anyperson todo an act therebyordered shall state1the time, or the time after service of the judgment, or order, within which the act is to be done, and upon theperson required to obeythesame there shall be indorsed a memorandum in the words ortotheeffect following,etc.". As pointed out in the note thereto, this rule only applies to ajudgmentor order todoanact. Itdoesnot apply to merely prohibitive orders; and the English authorities 25 given for that proposition are the cases of Selous v. Croydon Local Board,[1885] 53 L.T. 209, and Hudson v. Walker [1891] 64 L.J. Ch. 204, where North J. referred to Selous case and followed it observing that he did not see how any other construction could be put upon Order 30 XLI, rule 5.In theSelous caseitwasheldthat OrderXLI rule 5 had no application to a prohibitive order like the present one. Husson v. Husson[1962] 3 All E.R. 1056 also turned on theinterpretation of R.S.C.Ord. 42, r. 7 and reference 35 is made therein to the Annual Practice, 1963 edition, at p,
- where it is indicated that a distinction has to be drawn between mandatory and prohibitive injunctions and it is stated that an order requiring a person to do an act must be served on him. If, however, the order is to 40 296 10 20 restrain the doing of an act, the person restrained may be committed for breach of it, if he in fact has had notice of it either by his presence in Court when it is made or by being served with it or notified of it by telegram or in any 5 other way. Order 45, rule 5, of the English Rules of the Supreme Court (see 1965 Annual Practice) deals (a) with a person required by a judgment or order to do an act or (b) a person disobeying a judgment or order requiring him to ab10 stain from doing an act and under rule 7, thereof an order shall not be enforced under rule 5, unless (a) a copy of the order has been served personally on the person required to do or abstain from doing the act in question, and (b) in the case of an order requiring a person to do an act 15 the copy has been so served before the expiration of the time within which he was required to do the act. By paragraph 6 of that rule an order requiring a person to abstain from doing an act may be enforced under rule 5 notwithstanding that service of a copy of the order has not 20 been effected in accordance with that rule if the Court is satisfied that the person against whom it seeks to enforce the order had notice thereof either (a) by being present when the order was made or (b) by being notified of the terms of the order whether by telephone, telegram or other25 wise. Tn a note in the Supreme Court Practice for 1973 to Order 4 5 / 7 / 1 , atp. 668.it is stated that 30 35 40 "The new para.
(6)has been added presumably to resolve any doubt that under this Rule, as under the former practice, the Court has the power to proceed to the enforcement of a negative order by writ of sequestration or by order of committal even though the original order has not yet been served in accordance with the requirements of this Rule, provided however that the Court is satisfied that the person or party in question has had notice of it either by bcinq present when the order w?s made or by bcine notified of it.c terms by telephone, tele.eram or in such other manner as the Court may deem sufficient. A neeative order isoften made ex parte in circumstances of ereal urgency to preserve the status quo. and it would be highly inconvenient if it could not be enforced until it was first served as required by this Rule. The new 297 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS . LTD. para.
(6), therefore, is designed to enable the Court, if necessary before service, to prevent disobedience or further disobedience or to compel obedience to a negative order". By contrast in the old Order 41, rule 5, there was no 5 reference to orders prohibiting the doing of an act. Hence it was held that the order did not apply to prohibitory orders. In the new English Rules, whereprohibitory orders are also included in Order 45, rule 5, it was thought necessary to make express provisions under para. 6 of Order ]0
- rule 7, about enforcement of such an order before service of the copy thereof has been effected and pending such service. In the absence of such a provision in Order 42A of our Rules and the existence only of rule 2 hereinabove set out whereby the order shall be served on the per- ]5 son to whom the order is directed and the service unless otherwise directed by the Court, shall be personal, the English Rules are of no assistance. Therefore the appeal is allowed asfar as appellant 2 is concerned. Having dealt with this point, it is opportune to deal now 20 with the first ground of appeal—namely that "The trial Court wrongly decided that the appellants interfered with the plots in respect of which they wereordered not to and/ or that there is no evidence justifying such a conclusion and/or because the plan produced is not on scale and/or 25 that there is no evidence that they really interfered". The main witnesses in support of the allegations for contempt are A. Peratikos the rural constable and A. Trisveys, a forester, apart from the affidavit of one of the directorsof the respondent Company. Further the Court visited the 30 locus in quo at the conclusion of the hearing of the application in order to appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective, and its findings of fact are as follows: "After careful consideration of the evidence of Peratikos and Trisveys it emerges beyond doubt that the biggest part of 35 the lands, subject matter of the prohibitory order of the Court, were planted in December. 1976 with potatoes, barley and other cereals. Respondent 3 and some of the children of respondents 1 and 3 were repeatedly seen irrigating the potato plantations and moving about freely in 40 the land. This was wilful conduct on the part of respondent 3 contrary to the terms of the order of the Court and in defiance of it. There is no direct evidence that respondent 298 1 entered the land. However, he applied for compensation to the British authorities for damage caused to the potato crop situate within the lands subject matter of the order as well as pipes used for the irrigation of the lands claim5 ing to be the owner of the crop and the person who sufferred damage thereby. Such damage had been caused in the course of military exercises. The behaviour of respondent 1in the matter constitutes an admission on his behalf that the potato crop within the aforesaid lands was his 10 own. And this explains at the same time the interest of his children in the cultivation of this crop as well as the statement of his wife to witness Trisveys that she and her husband were theowners of thecrop. In the light of the totality of the evidence before us we 15 find that respondent 1 personally or through his agents, cultivated the lands subject matter of theprohibitory order of the Court, interfering thereby with the lands subject matter of the order in contravention of the terms of the order and thus he is liable to be committed for contempt". 20 On the totality of the evidence adduced we find no reason to interfere with the findings of fact and the conclusions drawn thereon by the trial Court. They were duly warranted by the circumstantial evidence adduced, which conclusively established the interference of the appellant 25 himself and through his servants and agents, members of his family with the property in question, over which he claimed proprietary rights and in respect of which he received compensation for damage to crops. Furthermore the trial Court properly directed itself on the standard of 30 proof necessary to substantiate a complaint for contempt which, as stated, has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the disobedience complained of being wilful in the sense of voluntary as opposed to accidental conduct. We turn now to the second ground of appeal, viz. the 35 non-service of the map (exhibit 1) referred to in the order. for the purpose of indentifying the property subject matter of the proceedings. It is an admitted fact (see para. 2 of the affidavit of applicant 1) that the prohibitory order of the 15th May, 1976, was issued after a long discussion on 40 many points, including the point of the accurate determination of the area affected by the application for the interim order. It appears that the reference to this map (exhi299 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. 1977 July 27 ANTONIS MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD. bit 1) at that hearing was made for the purpose of the identification of theproperties in dispute and as the appellant No. 1 attended that hearing, he cannot be heard to say that he did not know the boundaries of the land to which the interim order related, quite apart from the 5 fact that the interference was in respect of all 97 donums of land the subject of theproceedings. The order itself was duly served on him in accordance with the Rules, and the fact that an exhibit was not served on him is not, in the circumstances, such an irregularity as to invalidate the IQ proceedings. The case of Regina v. Jones, 169 E.R. 68 relied upon by counsel for the appellant, must be distinguished. In that case there was express provision in the relevant regulations that in all cases the taxed bill of costs and the justice's certificate of costs before the trial had to be at- 15 tached to thewarrant of the taxing officer and be delivered with it to the county treasuser. For all the above reasons this ground also fails. Ground 6 was that the trial Court wrongly assumed that the English cases decided after independence cannot af- 20 feet the common law applicable in this country and/or amend express statutory or other provisions of Cyprus law. The short answer to this ground, which, rightly, was not pressed, is that the trial Court never assumed that the decisions of the English Courts are binding on our courts. 25 However, they are of great persuasive authority as illustrating the common law, which in theory is not changed by particular decisions. The trial Court simply made a comparative analysis of the situation in England, in view of the fact that the English Rules of Court were the Rules on 30 which our rules were modelled though with occasional changes and various modifications. Therefore reference to the English authorities is useful in construing our legislative provisions whose origin is to be found in the English legal system. 35 With regard to the last ground of appeal, to the effect that the sentence imposed was excessive, we have no difficulty in dismissing this contention. This was the second disobedience by appellant No. 1;on the first occasion, he was fined £.
- and. apparently, he was not impressed by 40 the leniency exhibited by the Court on that occasion. Disobedience of an order of the Court is a very serious behaviour which should entail strict sanctions, as it under300 mines the very administration of justice and ultimately may render it nugatory. For the reasons given the appeal of appellant No. 1 is dismissed, the appeal of appellant No. 2 has already been allowed but in the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Appeal of appellant No. J dismissed. Appeal of appellant No. 2 allowed. No order as to costs. 301 1977 July 27 ANTON1S* MOUZOURIS AND ANOTHER v. XYLOPHAGHOU PLANTATIONS LTD.