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URIANTAFYLIDES, P.] S. & G. COLOCASSIDES CO. LTD., and PRESIDENT INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES COURT (CIVJ7 Application No. 21/76). Termination of Employment (Temporary Restrictive Provisions) Law, 1974 (Law 50 of 1974)—"Finality clause" in section 4(

  1. a)of the Law—Does not preclude an appeal by way of a Case Stated. Industrial Disputes Court—Appeal from—Statutory provision providing that judgment of Industrial Disputes Court "shall be final"—Right of appeal by way of a Case Stated. Mandamus—Industrial Disputes Court—Refusing to state case in in view of "finality clause" in section 4(
  2. a)of the Termination of Employment (Temporary Restrictive Provisions) Law, 1974 (Law 50 of 1974)—Said clause not precluding an appeal by way of a Case Stated—Order of mandamus directing that a Case be stated as applied for. The applicants sought to be declared a stricken business in the sense of the Termination of Employment (Temporary Restrictive Provisions) Law, 1974 (Law 50/74) but the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance rejected their application; they, then, challenged the Minister's decision before the Industrial Disputes Court but that Court upheld the decision of . the Minister. The applicants applied, in writing, for a Case Stated, but the President of the Industrial Disputes Court informed them that he could not state a Case because the provision in section 4(a)* of the above Law to the effect that the decision of the Industrial Disputes Court "shall be final" ex*Section 4(
  3. a)provides as follows: "4. In thecaseof a stricken businessthefollowing provisions shallapply— (
  4. a)whether a business is a stricken one is determined by the Minister on the application of the employer, and in case the employer is not satisfied with the decision of the Minister he may make a recourse, within seven days from the communication to him of the decision of the Minister, to the Industrial Disputes Court, the decision of which on the matter shall be final". 59 1977 Febr. 7 IN RE S.&G. COLOCASSIDES CO. LTD. 1977 Febr. 7 eludes an appeal to the Supreme Court by way of a Case Stated. . G COLOCASSIDES CO. LTD. Hence the present application for an order of Mandamus directing the President of the Industrial Disputes Court to state a Case, under rule 17 of the Arbitration Tribunal Regulations, 1968 by way of an appeal from the decision of the Court. s It was common ground that this was, indeed, an instance when if it were to be found that the refusal to state a Case was erroneous then an order of Mandamus had to be made. ι 5 10 Held,that when a statute says that a decision of an inferior tribunal "shall be final" it does so on the assumption that the tribunal will observe the law; that if a tribunal goes wrong in law and the error appears on the face of the record the Su­ preme Court will interfere by certiorari to quash the conviction 15 (see, inter alia,Tehraniand Another v. Rostron [1971] 3 All E.R. 790 at pp. 792-793); that the finality clause in section 4(
  5. a)of Law 50/74 does not preclude an appeal, by way of a Case Stated, to thisCourt, in accordance with therelevant pro­ cedure specified in rule 17 of the 1968 Rules; and, that, ac- 20 cordingly, an orderof Mandamus,as applied for, willbe made. Application granted. Cases referred to: Reg. v.Shiel andOthers [1900] 82 L.T. 587; Regina v. Medical Appeal Tribunal, Ex parteGilmore,[1957] 25 1 Q.B. 574 at pp. 583-585; Tehrani and Another v. Rostron [1971] 3 All E.R. 790 at pp. 792-793. Application. Application for an order of Mandamus directing the 30 President of theIndustrial Disputes Courtto state a Case, under rule 17 of the Arbitration Tribunal Regulations, 1968 by way of an appeal from thedecision of suchCourt in caseNo. 31/76. 60 Μ. Christophides,for the applicants. R. Gavrielides, Counsel of the Republic, for the At­ torney-General of the Republic. Cur. adv. vult. 5 Thefollowing judgment was delivered by:TR1ANTAFYLL1DES, P.: In this case the applicants are seeking an order of Mandamus directing the President of the Industrial Disputes Court to state a Case, under rule 17 of the Arbitration Tribunal Regulations, 1968—(see 10 Not. 151) in the Third Supplement to the Official Gazette of February 28, 1968)—by way of an appeal from the Decision of such Court in case No. 31/76. That decision was given on May 4, 1976, and counsel for the applicants (who were, also, the applicants in the 15 said case before the Industrial Disputes Court) applied, in writing, for aCase Stated, on May 24, 1976. 20 By a notice dated May 26, 1976, the President of the Industrial Disputes Court informed the applicants that he could not state a Case because, inhis view, such a course was excluded by section 4(
  6. a)of the Termination of Em­ ployment (Temporary Restrictive Provisions) Law, 1974 (Law 50/74), which reads as follows:"4. Έν περιπτώσει πληγείσης επιχειρήσεως έφαρμό. ζονταιαϊακόλουθοι διατάξεις— 25 30 35 (ο) εάν έπιχείρησις είναι πληγείσα καθορίζεται τη αιτήσει τοΰ εργοδότουύπότοϋ 'Τπουργοΰ, και έν περιπτώσει καθ1' ην όεργοδότης δενεί­ ναι ικανοποιημένος έκτης αποφάσεως τοϋ'Τ­ πουργοΰ δύναται ούτος να προσφυγή εντός επτάημερών άπότης εις αυτόνκοινοποιήσεως της αποφάσεως τοΰ 'Τπουργοΰ είς το Δικαστήριον 'Εργατικών Διαφορών τοΰ οποίου ή άπόφασις επί τοΰ θέματοςείναιτελειωτική*". ("4. In the case of a stricken business the following provisions apply— (
  7. a)whether a business is a stricken one is deter­ mined by the Minister on the application of the em­ ployer, and in case the employer is not satisfied with . thedecision of the Minister he may make a recourse, 61 1977 Febr. 7 IN RE s. & G. COLOCASSIDES CO. LTD. **77 *J ; IN R E s. &G. within seven days from the communication to him of the dicision of the Minister, to the Industrial Disputes Court, the decision of which on the matter shall be final;") COLOCASSIDES co. LTD. T h e said section 4(
  8. a)was amended by the Termination 5 of Employment (Temporary Restrictive Provisions) (Amendment) Law, 1974 (Law 6 2 / 7 4 ) , but such amendment is not material for the purposes of the present case. . T h e applicants had sought to be declared a stricken business, in the sense of Law 5 0 / 7 4 , but the Minister of La- 10 bour and Social Insurance—who is the Minister referred to in section 4(a), above—rejected their application; they, then, challenged the Minister's decision before the Industrial Disputes Court, but that Court upheld the decision of the Minister. By his aforementioned notice, of May 26, 1976, the President of the Industrial Disputes Court has taken the view that the provision in section 4(
  9. a)to the effect that the decision of such Court "shall be final" excludes an appeal to the Supreme Court by way of a Case Stated. 2 0 During the hearing before me counsel for the applicants, as well as counsel who appeared for the Attorney-General, have submitted that this view is incorrect inasmuch as what may be described as the "finality clause" in section 4(
  10. a)cannot exclude an appeal, by way of Case Stated, in 25 order to test the legality of the decision of the Minister. It has not, of course, been at all in doubt, at any stage during the hearing of this case before me, that the President of the Industrial Disputes Court, in refusing, as he did, to state a Case, has acted with absolutely good faith, 30 solely because he thought that in law he was not empowered to do so; and this was not an instance where he had to exercise any discretionary powers. It is common ground that this is, indeed, an instance when if it were to be found that the refusal to state a Case 35 was erroneous then an order of Mandamus has to be made (see, also, Atkin's Encyclopaedia of Court Forms in Civil Proceedings, 2nd ed., vol. 14, p . 14, and Reg. v. Shiel and Others [1900] 82 L.T. 587, where, however, it was, eventually, found that the refusal to state a Case was not er- 40 roneous and so an order of Mandamus was not made). 62 15 In relation to what has been described as the "finality clause" in section 4(a), above, the following statement of the law is to be found in Wade on Administrative Law, 3rded.,pp. 149,150:- 1977 heb ^_ m 7 RE s. &α COLOCASSIDES 5 10 15 20 25 30 "In order to preserve their control the courts have made a firm rule to put a narrow construction on the finality clauses which are commonly found in sta­ tutes. If it is provided that some decision 'shall be final' or 'shall be final and conclusive', this is interpreted to mean that there is no further appeal, but that the decision is still subject to judicial control if it is ultra vires, or even if it merely shows error on the 1 face of therecord . 'Parliament only gives the impress of finality to the decisions of the tribunal on condition that they are reached in accordance with the 2 law '. The same principle applies equally to certiorari and to the grant of a declaration8. This robust atti­ tude virtually deprives finality clauses of meaning for this purpose, since thereis no right of appeal any way unless expressly given by statute. But these clauses may be important for other purposes, for example when the question is whether the finding of one tri­ bunal may be reopened before another 4 ". In Regina v. Medical Appeal Tribunal. Ex parte Gilmore, [1957] 1 Q.B. 574, Denning L.J., as he then was, said (at pp. 583-585):"The second point is the effect of section 36

(3)of the Act of 1946 which provides that 'any decision of a claim or question... shall be final*. Do those words preclude the Court of Queen's Bench from issuing a certiorari tobring up the decision? This is a question which we did not discuss in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal. Ex parte Shaw*, because it did not therearise. It does
(1)R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal [1957] 1 Q.B. 574.
(2)Ibid., (Denning L.I.).
(3)Pyx Granite Co. Ud., v. M.H.L.G. [1960] A.C. 260.
(4)See R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner [1967] 1 AJC. 725; R. v. National Insurance Commissioner [1970] 1 Q.B. 477.
(5)[1952] 1 K.B.
  1. 63 co. LTD. }9Ίη ^7 F c IN R E s.& G. COLOCASSIDES co. LTD. arise here, and on looking again into the old books Ifind it verywellsettled thattheremedy by certiorari is never to be taken away by any statute except by the most clear and explicit words. The word 'final' is not enough. That only means 'without appeal'. It 5 does not mean 'without recourse to certiorari*. It makes the decision final on the facts, but not final on the law. Notwithstanding that thedecision is by a statute made 'final', certiorari can still issue for ex­ cessof jurisdiction or for error of law on the face of 10 the record. Lord Coke started this train of authority when he said that thewords of an Act of Parliament 'shallnot bind the King's Bench because the pleas there are coram ipso Rege': see Foster'sCase1.Kelynge C.J. 15 gave the train an impetus in 1670 when an order of the Commissioners of Sewers was brought before him. Itwas pointed out that the statute enacted 'that they should not be compelled to certify or return theirproceedings' and 'that they shall notbe reversed 20 but by other Commissioners'. Kelynge C.J. disposed of theobjection by saying: 'Yet it never was doubted, but that this courtmight question thelegality of their orders notwithstanding: and you cannot oust the ju­ risdiction of this court without particular words in 25 Acts of Parliament. There is no jurisdiction that is uncontrollable by the court': See Rex v. Smith2, Callis onSewers, 4thed.,p.
  2. A few years later, in 1686, the Court of King's Bench had a case where the collectors of the tax on 30 chimneys had distrained onthelandlord of a cottage. The Act said that 'If any question shall arise about the taking of any distress, the same shall be heard and finally determined by one or more justices ' The justices made a determination which was erro- 35 neous in law on its face in that it did not state suffi­ cientgrounds for making thelandlord liable. The court issued a certiorari to quash their deter­ mination and said: 'Thestatute dothnot mentionany
(1)[1615] 11 Co. Rep. 56b, 64b.
(2)
(1960)1 Mod.
  1. 64 1977 certiorari, which shows that theintention of the lawe makerswas,that acertiorari mightbebrought, other_^ wise they would have enacted, as they have done by IN ^ several other statutes, that no certiorari shall lie. s.& G. Therefore the meaning of the Act must be, that the COLOCASSIDES c0 LTD determination of the justices of the peace shall be · 1 final in matters of fact only': Rex v. Plowright . 5 In 1697,in thefamous caseof the Collegeof Physicians, Lord Holt gave the full weight of his authority to thosedecisions,especiallymentioning thecase of the Commissioners of Sewers2: see Groenveltv. BurweW. In 1760Lord Mansfield wasfaced withthe Conventicle Act which said 'that no other court whatsoever shall intermeddle with any cause or causes of appeal upon this Act: but they shall be finally determined inthequarter sessions only'.Nevertheless Lord Mansfield ordered certiorari to issue, saying: 'The jurisdiction of this court is not taken away,unless there be express words to take it away: this is a point settled': see Rex v. Moreley*. 10 15 20 25 - 30 35 In 1800 a conviction byjustices was erroneous on the face of the record, because it did not exclude a possible defence. When thedefendant moved tohave it quashed, the prosecutor objected 'that the defendant having electedto appeal to thesessions, thecertiorari wasin effect.taken away by the Act, because itissaid that thedetermination of thesessionsshould befinal': but Lord Kenyon C.J. said:-'That would be against all authority; for the certiorari being abeneficial writ for the subject, could not be taken away without express words': see Rex v. Jukes*,Joseph Chitty, commenting on this case, said that the words 'finally determine' merely prohibit a re-investigation of the facts: see Chitty's Practice, Vol. II, p.
  2. Finally, in 1823 the Court of King's Bench in its golden agepresided over byAbbott C.J. summed up the whole matter by saying that 'certiorari always
(1)
(1686)3 Mod. 94, 95.
(2)1 Mod. 45.
(3)
(1967)1 Ld. Raym. 454, 469.
(4)
(1760)2 Bur. 1041, 1043.
(5)
(1800)8 Term Rep. 542,
  1. 65 1977 Fe ^7 IN RE COLOCASSIDES co. LTD. lies, unless it is expressly taken away, and an appeal never lies, unless itis expressly given by the statute': seeRex v.CashioburyHundredJustices
  2. ** w a s n o doubt m a t train of authority whichLord Summer hadinmindwhenhesaidinRex v.NatBell 5 LiquorsLtd.2: 'LongbeforeJervis'sActsstatuteshad been passedwhich created an inferior court, anddeclared its decisions to be 'final' and 'without appeal', and again and again the Court of King's Bench had heldthat languageof thiskinddid notrestrictortake 10 away the right of the court to bring the proceedings before itself bycertiorari'. I venture therefore to use in this case the words I usedintherecentcaseof Taylor(formerlyKraupl) v. NationalAssistanceBoard3 (aboutdeclarations),with 15 suitable variations for certiorari: The remedy is not excluded by the fact that the determination of the board is by statute made 'final'. Parliament only gives the impress of finality to the decisions of the tribunal on the condition that they are reached in 20 accordancewith thelaw'. In my opinion, therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the statute says that the decision of themedical appeal tribunal is to befinal, it is open to this court to issue a certiorari to quash it for error of law on 25 the face of the record. It would seem to follow that a decision of the national insurance and industrial insurance commissioners is also subject to supervision by certiorari (apoint left open bytheDivisional Court in Reg. v. NationalInsuranceCommissioner, 30 Ex parte Timmis*);but they are sowellversed in the law and deservedly held in such high regard that it will be rare that they fall into error such as toneed correction". In the later case of Tehrani and another v. Rostron, 40 [1971] 3 All E.R. 790, Lord Denning M.R. stated (atpp. 792-793):
(1)
(1823)3 Dow. & Ry. 35.
(2)[1922] 2 A.C. 128, 159-160.
(3)[1957] P. 101.
(4)[1955] 1 Q.B. 139. 66 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 1977 "Before I deal with the merits of the appeal, I must Fe 7 mention apreliminary point to whichcounsel for the ^ appellants drew our attention. There is a provision IN ^ in the 1968Actwhich says that 'thejudgment of the s.&G. court of quarter sessions ontheappeal shallbefinal', COLOCASSIDES c 0 LTD It is in Sch 7,para 11
(4).Counsel for the appellants suggested that this provision rendered any appeal from the recorder incompetent and that he had no power to state a case for the High Court. For this purpose hedrewour attention to a casein theHouse of Lords: Kydd v.LiverpoolWatchCommittee1,and the subsequent case of Piper v. St. MaryleboneLicensingJustices2.ButI mustsayatoncethatI donot think weshould accedeto thispreliminary objection. Much has happened since those cases were decided. The Courts havegiven more thought to the meaning of the legislature when it says that a decision of this orthattribunalistobe'final'. The modern cases establish this principle: when Parliament saysthat adecisionof aninferior tribunal is to be 'final', it does so on the assumption that the tribunal will observe the law. Parliament only gives the impress of 'finality* to the decision on thecondition that it is reached in accordance with law: and theQueen's courts will see to it that this condition is fulfilled. Accordingly if a tribunal goeswronginlaw and the error appears on the face of the record, the High Court will interfere by certiorari to quash the decision. It is not to be deterred by the enactment that the decision is 'final'. The decision may be final on the facts, but it is not final on the law. This was settled by Re Gilmore'sApplication*, where all the cases arecollected.Likewiseif a board or aMinister is entrusted with a decision affecting private rights, then even though it is said to be 'final*, the High Court can ensure that it is correct in point of law. It can do so by making a declaration as to the law by which the authority must abide. That was settled by Pyx Granite Co.Ltd. v. Ministryof Housing and
(1)[1908] A.C. 327.
(2)[1928] 2 K.B. 221.
(3)[1957] 1 All E.R. 796. 67 1977 Fcb 7 ^_ ΪΝ gjg s. & G. COLOCASSIDES co. LTD. 1 Local Government , and particularly by the speech of Viscount Simonds*. Counsel for the appellants agreed that, in the present case, if quarter sessions went wrong in law, the High Court would intervene by certiorari or a declaration. But he suggests that there 5 w a s n o power to state a case. This suggestion is a mere procedure point. It only goes to the machinery by which the High Court can intervene. If a point of law can be resolved by certiorari, or declaration, I do not see whv it should not also be resolved by case 10 stated". Phillimore L.J. said (at p. 797) in the same case: "Counsel for the appellants felt that he was bound to take the first point, namely, the preliminary point that this court had no jurisdiction. So far as that is 15 concerned, I entirely agree with thejudgment of Lord Denning M.R. I do not think that in this particular case, where the point was not taken before the Divi­ sional Court 3 and where a special application was made to us for leave to appeal out of time and to 20 expedite the appeal, it was open to the appellants to take the point at this stage. In any case, 1 think that Lord Denning M.R. is perfectly right and that there is an appeal by case stated, just, of course, as the appellants could have moved for certiorari. I do not 25 think that theprovision in para 11
(4)of Sch 7 to the Gaming Act 1968 that the appeal to quarter sessions should be final is sufficient to exclude the jurisdic­ tion of the Divisional Court or of this court on ap­ peal". 30 In the light of theprinciples expounded in the above re­ ferred to case-law, I have reached the conclusion that the finality clause in section 4(a) of Law 50/74 does not pre­ clude an appeal, by way of a Case Stated, to this Court, in accordance with the relevant procedure specified in rule 17 of the 1968 Rules; consequently, an order of Man­ damus, as applied for, is made, and it is directed, by means of it, that the President of the Industrial Disputes Court shall state a Case in response to the application made for
(1)[1959] 3 All E.R. 1.
(2)[1959] 3 All E.R. at 6, 7.
(3)[1971] 2 All E.R.
  1. 68 35 this purpose, by the applicants, on May 24,
  2. Of course, thePresident is not bound, in stating the Case, to act in any way which, in his opinion, is not warranted by theprocedureprescribed by the said rule
  3. 197 Fel * ^ [N RS s.& G. COLOCASSiniiS 5 10 ' In view of the novelty of the issue raised, and of the co. i.m. very fair stand taken by counsel for the Attorney-General. there shall be no order as regards the costs of these proceedings. Application granted No order as to cost 69

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