clr/1979/1979_2_15.pdf

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14/60) does not confer an unqualified right of appeal but one subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. \55Sections 131 and 137(l)(a) of the latter Law. The seven respondents in these appeals were tried by the Assize Court of Limassol on four counts charging them with the premeditated murder of four persons. At the close of the case for the prosecution the Assize Court ruled that a prima facie case had not been made out against the respondents sufficiently to require them to be called upon and make their defence on any of the four counts of the information and acquitted and discharged all seven respondents of the offences charged under the said counts. The Assize Court, however, were of the view that the evidence adduced by the prosecution disclosed a prima facie case against all respondents for offences contrary to sections 40 and 41 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154 and directed that two new counts be added to the information charging the respondents for offences contrary to the said sections and called upon them to plead to the new counts. The Attorney-General of the Republic appealed against the above decision of the Assize Court to acquit the seven respondents of the offences of premeditated murder. 25 At the commencement of the hearing counsel for the re15 Attorney-General τ. Pouris & Others

(1979)spondents raised a preliminary objection to the effect that there was no right of appeal against an acquittal by an AssizeCourt. Part V* of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, which is the part dealing with appeals, makes no provision for appeal against an acquittal by an Assize Court; and both parties were agreed that whether there is a right for such an appeal or not depends on the provisions· of section 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, I960 (Law 14/60) which runs as follows: 5 "25

(2)Subject to theprovisions of the CriminalProcedure Law but save as otherwise in this subsection provided every 10 decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to the High Court. Any such appeal may be made as of right against con­ viction or sentence on any ground." It was argued by the Duputy Attorney-General of the Re- 15 public that there is a right of appeal from judgments of acquittal both by District Courts and Assize Courts and that such right is given clearly and unambiguously by s. 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, I960; and that in this respect the relative pro­ visions of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 and particu- 20 larly s. 137 thereof, which limits the Attorney-General's right of appeal against an acquittal to judgments of acquittal by a District Court on the grounds therein specified, has been impliedly repealed and that such right, since the enactment of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 and by virtue of the provisions 25 of s. 25

(2)thereof now covers judgments of acquittal by an Assize Court also. Held, {TriantafyHides P. dissenting)that there is no right • The relevant sections are sections 131, and 137(l)(a) which run as follows: "131(0 Subject to the provisions of any other enactment in force for the time being, no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Court exercising Criminaljurisdiction except as provided for hy this Law.

(2)There shall be no appeal from an acquittal except at the instance or with the written sanction of the Attorney-General, as in this Law provided. 137(l)(a) The Attorney-General mayfa) appeal or sanction an appeal from any judgment of acquittal by a District Courton any of the following grounds:- 16 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others of appeal from an acquittal by an Assize Court and that, therefore, the present appeals do not lie. Per L. Loizou J., A. Loizou, Malachtos, Demetriades and Savvides, JJ. concurring: 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

(1)It is to my mind quite clear that the scope of section · 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 was to abolish the requirement, for which provision is made in sections 132(I)(

1. b)and (
2. c)and 133(l)(
3. b)of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 for leave to appeal against conviction or sentence by any person convicted and sentenced either by a District Court or an Assize Court. If the sentence "every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to the High Court" were to be taken in isolation and unqualified it might certainly appear that it did confer a right of appeal from a judgment of acquittal by an Assize Court.

(2)But the whole subsection is expressly made "subject to" theprovisions of the Criminal Procedure Law; and these opening words are in my view equivalent to "without prejudice to" the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law and that the only reasonable explanation why it was thought necessary to introduce them was to keep in force the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law relating to appeals "save as otherwise in the subsection provided" and cannot reasonably be construed as ousting such provisions by implied repeal. If it were to be held that the right to appeal from a judgment of acquittal by every Court were no longer subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law it seems to me that this would also mean that the Attorney-General's written sanction, for which provision is made in sections 131

(2)and 137

(1)of the Criminal Procedure Law, would no longer be a prerequisite to the filing of an appeal against an acquittal by a District Court contrary to the decision in the case of Xenophontos v. Charalambous, 1961 C.L.R. 122.

(3)On the other hand the sentence "every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to the High Court" occurring in the first paragraph of the subsection, upon which the main force of the argument that the Attorney-General's right of appeal from an acquittal is extended to judgments of acquittal by an Assize Court was based, is qualified and explained by the second paragraph of 17 Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)the subsection which provides that "any such appeal"—that is to sayany such appeal as intheprecedingparagraph provided— "may be made as of right against conviction or sentence on any ground".

(4)In the light of the above I am not inclined to hold that 5 the provisions of subsection

(2)of section 25 can be relied upon in support of the view that they give a right of appeal against an acquittal by an Assize Court in words clear, express and free from ambiguity. On the contrary it seems to me that if the intention of the Legislature was to give an unquali- 1Q fied right of appeal from anyjudgment of acquittal both by a District Court and an Assize Court such intention could have been expressed in clear and unequivocal terms free from any doubt or ambiguity.

(5)In the result I feel bound to resolve this issue in favour 15 of the respondents and hold that, having regard to the present state of the Law, there is no right of appeal from an acquittal by an Assize Court and that, therefore, the present appeals do not lie. Per Hadjianastassiou, 3., A. Loizou, and Demetriades, 33. 20 concurring:

(1)The Supreme Court in dealing with the interpretation of s. 25

(2), in a series of decisions (see, interalia,Georghadji and Anotherv. Republic

(1971)2 C.L.R. 229) established that that section does not confer an unqualified right of appeal, but a 25 limited one, qualified by the opening words "subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law".

(2)In my view, these introductory words are intended to save the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law both as to the form that a criminal appeal may be made, as well as in 30 substance. In Rodosthenous& Another v. The Police, 1961 C.L.R. 48, it was expressly held that the introductory parts of s. 25

(2)require that an appeal should be made in the form envisaged by Cap. 155. But obiter dicta in the samejudgment suggested that s. 25

(2)must be read, except to whatever extent 35 there is express departure, subject to theprovisions of Cap. 155. This was supported by a decision of the High Court delivered shortly afterwards, viz., Xenophontos v. Charalambous, 1961 C.L.R. 122, where it was expressly decided that s. 25

(2)does 18 2 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Attorney-General τ. Pourls & Others not confer an unqualified right of appeal against every decision of theCriminalCourt,butalimited oneconferred by the express provisions of Cap. 155. Two subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court establish firmly that a right of appeal exists only where it is expressly conferred either by the provisions of Cap. 155, or by the provisions of s. 25

(2)of Law 14/60. See Christofiv. Police

(1970)2 C.L.R. 117 and Georghadji and Another (supra). In the latter case, it was pointed out that the limitation of the right of appeal in the manner indicated in no way conflicts with the provisions of Article 155.1 of the Constitution because the Constitution does not provide for a right of appeal against all decisions of the Courts of the Re­ public, but only for such rights as may be conferred by law.

(3)That the only express right of appeal conferred by s. 25

(2)is a right of appeal against conviction or sentence.

(4)The expression in s. 25

(2)"but save as otherwise pro­ vided" would be superfluous if the legislature intended to esta­ blish a right of appeal against every decision of a Court exer­ cising criminaljurisdiction. Equally, I think it would be superfluous to make express reference to a right of appeal against conviction or sentence.

(5)I think a comparison of the provisions of s. 25

(1)with those of s. 25

(2)is again suggestive of legislative intent. Inthe former case the right of appeal is made subject to the rules of Courtwithout qualification, andinthelatter it is extended inthe way expressly referred to therein.

(6)Finally, and having regard to the principle enunciated in a number of cases that a right of appeal cannot be invented and theexistence of any such right must be found in theexpress proprovisions of a statute, I am of the view that the Attorney-Ge­ neral has no right to appeal against a verdict of acquittal by an Assize Court. PerA. Loizou, 3.: Thewording of section 25

(2)of theCourts of Justice Law, 1960, is not so clear and unambiguous as to enable metohold thatit confers ontheAttorney-General, or to anyone else, a right to appeal against an acquittal from a jud­ gment of an Assize Court,which admittedly did not exist under the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 and in particular Part V thereof, which specially dealt with the right of appeal; nor is 19 Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)there any clear indication from the words used therein, as it should be in such cases, that this pre-existing provisions were by necessary implication repealed, altered, or modified, thereby. Appeals dismissed. Cases referred to: Healey v. Ministry of Health [1954] 3 All E.R. 449 at pp. 453, 454; Benson v. Northern Ireland Transport Board [1942] A.C. 520 at p. 528; Cox v. Hakes [1890] 15 App. Cas. 506 at p. 522; yry L. v. L. [1962] P. 101 at p. 118; Corporation of Blackpool v. Starr Estate Co. Ltd. [1922] 1A.C. 27 at p. 34; Shourrisw. The Republic andKazantzis v. The Police, 1961 C.L.R. 11 at pp. 12-13; j 5 Xenophontos v. Charalambous, 1961 C.L.R. 122, at pp. 125, 126, 127-128; McNabb v. United States, 87 Law. Ed. 819 at p. 827; R. v. Georghiades

(1972)3 C.L.R. 594 at p. 680; R. v. Simpson [1914] L.J. Q.B. Vol. 83, 233 at p. 237; R. v. Jejferies [1968] 3 All E.R. 238 at p. 240; 20 R. v. Smith (Martin) [1974] 1 All E.R. 651 at pp. 654-656; Re Central FundsCosts Order[1975]3AllE.R. 238atpp.241-243; Varellas and Others v. The Police, 19 C.L.R- 46; The Police v. Nikola and Others, 7 C.L.R. 14; Petri v. The Police

(1968)2 C.L.R. 1; Savva and Another (No. 2) v. The Police

(1977)12 J.S.C. 2092 (to be reported in

(1977)2 C.L.R.); R. v. Ramsgate (Inhabitants)

(1827)6 B. & C. 712; Barrel! v. Fordree [1932] A.C. 676 at p. 682; Hack v. London Provident Bldg. Society [1883] 23 Ch. D. 103 at p. 108; Rodosthenous and Another v. 77iePolice, 1961 C.L.R. 48at p. 49; Christofi v. The Police

(1970)2 C.L.R. 117 at p. 119; Georghadji and Another v. The Republic

(1971)2 C.L.R. 229 at pp. 233, 234; Lazarou and Others v. The Police

(1973)2 C.L.R. 81 at pp. 82-83; 20 5 25 39 35 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others Savva and Another (No. 1) v. The Police

(1977)12 J.S.C. 2088 at p. 2089 (to be reported in

(1977)2 C.L.R.); The Republic v. Kalli (No. 1), 1961 C.L.R. 266 at p. 286; R. v. Collins [1969] 3 All E.R. 1562 at pp. 1563-1564; 5 The Attorney-General v. Sillem and Others, 11 E.R. 1200 at pp. 1207-1208; R. v. West Kent Quarter Sessions Appeal Committee. Ex parte Files [1952] 2 All E.R. 728 at p. 730; R. v. London County 3ustices [1890] 25 Q.B.D. 357 at p. 360; 10 15 R. v. Duncan [1880-81] 7 Q.B.D. 198 at p. 199; Commonwealth of Australia and Others v. Bank of New South Wales [1950] A.C. 235 at p. 307; W. & J.B. Eastwood Ltd. v. Herrod (Valuation Officer) [1968] 2 Q.B.D. 923 at p. 936; affirmed on appeal: [1970] 1 All E.R. 774; Corocraft Ltd. andAnother v. Pan American Airways Inc. [1969] 1 Q.B.D. 616 at p. 638; 20 Holme v. Guy [1877] 5 Ch. D. 901 at p. 905; The River Wear Commissioners v. William Adamson and Others [1976-77] 2 A.C. 743 at pp. 763-765; The Eastman Photographic Materials Company, Limited v. The Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade-marks [1898] A.C. 571 at p. 573; 25 The South Eastern Railway Company v. 77ie Railway Commissioners, ά c. TheMayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of Hastings [1879-80] 5 Q.B.D. 217 at p. 240; Thomson v. Lord Clanmorris [1900] 1 Ch. 718 at p. 725; Pratt v. Cook, Son and Company (St. Pauls) Limited [1939] 1 K.B. 364 at p. 382; 30 35 Rex v. Paddington and St. Marylebone Rent Tribunal—ex parte Bell London and Provincial Properties Limited, 65 T.L.R. 200 at p. 203; Keates v. Lewis Merthyr Consolidated Collieries, Limited [1911] A.C. 641 at p. 642; Committee for Privileges, Viscountess Rhondda's Claim [1922] 2 A.C. 339 at pp. 368-370; Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v. Gallagher [1963] A.C. 349 at p. 366; 21 Attorney-General τ. Pouris & Others

(1979)Chandler and Others v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] A.C. 763 at p. 791; Themistocles v. Christophi, 6 C.L.R. 121; Electricity Authority of Cyprus v. Partassides and Others, 20(II) C.L.R. 34 at pp. 36-37; 5 Hints v. The Police

(1963)1 C.L.R. 14 at pp. 25-27; Petrides and Others v. The Republic, 1964 C.L.R. 413 at pp. 424-428; Eraklides v. The Police

(1971)2 C.L.R. 8 at pp. 13-14; Athanassi v. The Police

(1974)2 C.L.R. 7 at pp. 13-14; 10 Garnet v. Bradley [1877] 2 Ex. D. 349 at pp. 351-352; Ex parte Attwater. In re Turner [1877] 5 Ch. D. 27 at p. 32; Seward v. The Owner of the "Vera Cruz" [1884-1885] 10 A.C. 59 at pp. 68-69; Kutner v. Phillips [1891] 2 Q.B. 267 at pp. 271-272; 15 Barker v. Edger and Others [1898] A.C. 748 at p. 754; Felton and Another v. Bower and Co. [1900] 1 Q.B. 598 at pp. 602-604; In re Chance [1936] Ch. 266 at pp. 270-271; In re Berrey. Lewis v. Berrey [1936] Ch. 274 at p. 279; 20 Walker v. Hemmant [1943] K.B. 604 at pp. 605-606; Garnett v. Bradley [1877-1878] 3 A.C. 944 at p. 966; Goodwin v. Phillips [1908-9] 7 C.L.R. 1 at p. 16 (decided by the High Court of Australia); Charnock v. Merchant [1900] 1 Q.B. 474 at pp. 476-477; 25 Pilkington v. Cooke, 153 E,R. 1336; Luby v. Warwickshire Miners' Association [1912] 2 Ch. 371 at pp. 380-381; Ellen Street Estates Limited v. Minister of Health [1934] 1 Q.B. 590 at pp. 595-596; 30 Kouppis v. The Republic

(1977)11 J.S.C. 1860, at pp. 1877-1887 (to be reported in

(1977)2 C.L.R.); Walker v. The King

(1939)S.C.R. 214; Lattoni and Corbo v. The Queen

(1958)S.C.R. 603; The Queen v. Sheets, 16 D.L.R.

(1979)The addresses of counsel were concluded on the 31st August, 1978, and the Assize Court gave its decision under section 74(c) of Cap. 155 on the 8th September, 1978 and expressed the view, and so ruled, that a prima facie case had not been made out against the accused sufficiently to require them to be called upon and make their defence on any of the four counts of the information and acquitted and discharged all seven accused of the offences charged under the said counts. 5 The Assize Court, however, were of the viewthat the evidence adduced by the prosecution disclosed a prima facie case against 10 all accused for offences contrary to sections 40 and 41 of the Criminal Code committed by all accused acting in concert on the 15th, 16th and 17th August, 1974, at various areas of the ' Limassol district and directed that two new counts be added to the information charging the accused for offences contrary to 15 the said sections and called upon them to plead to the new counts. At the next sitting of the Assize Court on the 11th September, 1978, senior counsel of the Republic appearing for the prosecution made an application on behalf of the Attorney-General 20 of the Republic under section 148

(1)of the Criminal Procedure Law to reserve for the opinion of the Supreme Court a number of questions of law which had arisen during the trial. Counsel appearing for the accused objected to the application but the Court being of the opinion that, in view of the mandatory pro- 25 visions of section 148

(1)in the case of an application by the Attorney-General, they had no discretion in the matter, the President of the Assize Court did, on the same day, reserve for the opinion of the Supreme Court the questions of law as applied for and adjourned the proceedings pending the opinion of the 30 Supreme Court on the questions of law so reserved. On the same day, 11th September, 1978, the seven accused filed appeals Nos. 3923-3929 against the decision of the Assize Court to add the two new counts. On the 20th September, 1978, the Attorney-General filed 35 the present appeals (Nos. 3932-3938) against the decision of the Assize Court to acquit the seven accused of the offences of premeditated murder. On the 21st September, 1978, the seven accused filed appeals Nos. 3939-3945 against the decision of the Assize Court to 40 24 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v..Pouris & Others L. Loizou J. reserve for the opinion of the Supreme Court the questions of law applied for on behalf of the Attorney-General. Then on the 2nd October, 1978, Application No. 15/78 was filed on behalf of the Attorney-General for an order of certio5 rari to remove into this Court for the purpose of its being quashed the ruling of theAssize Court that no prima facie case had been made out against the accused and an order of mandamus directing the Assize Court to call upon the accused to make their defence pursuant to section 74(l)(c) of the Criminal Procedure 10 Law. On the 19th October, 1978, counsel appearing for accused 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 filed application 18/78 for an order of cetiorari to remove into this Court and quash the decision and/or ruling of the Assize Court to reserve the questions of law applied for 15 on behalf of the Attorney-General for the opinion of the Supreme Court. Finally, on the 21st October, 1978,counsel appearing for the other two accused i.e. accused 1and 3fileda similar application under No. 20/78 in relation to the same decision and/or ruling 20 of the Assize Court. All these proceedings were listed before this Court on the 23rd October, 1978. At the request of the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic and with the consent of counsel appearing for the re25 spondents the Court agreed that appeals Nos. 3932-3938 filed by the Attorney-General should be taken first. At the commencement of the hearing counsel appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the effect that there was no right of appeal against an acquittal by an Assize 30 Court. After hearing able and extensive argument from counsel on both sides for four days this Court has, at this stage, to decide this preliminary point. It may be said at the outset that both sides were agreed that 35 an appeal against an acquittal by an Assize Court would only lie if given by the words of a statute which were clear, express and free from ambiguity. 25 L. Loizou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)I am in full agreement with the above proposition, which is indeed supported by a wealth of authority,and I do not propose to dwell on this principle at any length. In the case of Healey v. Ministry of Health [1954] 3 All E.R. 449, a civil case, in which the question of thejurisdiction of the 5 Court to hear the dispute was heard as a preliminary point and was determined against the plaintiff he appealed to the Court of appeal against such decision. Morris, L.J., as hethen was,in the course of hisjudgment said this: (at p. 453). "In my judgment there is no right of appeal to the Court 10 from the determination of the Minister. None is given by reg. 60 or in any other regulation. There can certainly be no implication of a right of appeal. Had it been desired to provide some machinery or procedure for an appeal from the decision of the Minister, it could have been done. Any 15 such prescribed appeal might or might not have been an appeal to the courts. Questions as to which methods for determining rights are the most desirable raise issues of policy which are for Parliament to decide; but the courts cannot invent a right of appeal where none is given. The 20 courts will not usurp an appellate jurisdiction where none is created." and Parker L.J. (at p. 454) said: "A right of appeal is the creature of statute, and the regulations give no right of appeal. Further, the absence of 25 such words as 'whose determination is final' or 'whose determination shall not be called in question in any Court of law' cannot preserve ajurisdiction which apart from such words did not exist." In Benson v. Northern Ireland Transport Board [1942] A.C. 30 520, a Court of summaryjurisdiction in Northern Ireland having dismissed a summons under section 15,sub-s.l, of the Road and Railway Transport Act (Northern Ireland), 1935, for contravention of which a fine of 100L might be imposed, and ordered the complainants to pay a sum in respect of costs, the complain- 35 ants appealed to quarter sessions, which dismissed the appeal. On a case stated, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland held that an offence had been committed and that the decision of the Court of summary jurisdiction should be reversed. The de26 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others L. Loizou J. fendants appealed to the House of Lords. The relevant statute was the Summary Jurisdiction and Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland), 1935, section 24, sub-s.l of which provided that "an appeal shall lie to a Court of quarter sessions against an 5 order of a Court of summary jurisdiction, in cases of a civil nature by either party whether he is the complainant or defendant, and in other cases by any party against whom an order ismade for payment of any penal or other sum, or for any term of imprisonment, or for the estreating of any recognizance to a 10 greater amount than twenty shillings." The House of Lords held that the order for payment of costs was not "an order for the payment of any penal or other sum" within section 24, sub-s.l, of the Summary Jurisdiction and Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland), 1935, and accord15 ingly since the case was of a criminal nature there was no right of appeal from the dismissal of the summons. Viscount Simon L.C., in the course of his speech, after citing a number of authorities on the subject said: (at p. 528) 20 25 30 "In the light of the above pronouncements, very clear statutory language would be needed to establish, by way of exception to the general rule, a right of appeal from a decision dismissing the criminal charge, and nothing contained in s.24 of the Act of 1935could establish such an exception. The conclusion that the dismissal of the complaint is final necessarily leads to the view that the whole of the proceedings from the moment that the resident magistrate discharged the appellant are misconceived. Neither the deputy recorder nor the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland had any jurisdiction to deal with the matter, and this also applies to the House itself." In Cox v. Hakes [1890] 15 App. Cas. 506, another House of Lords case, a clerk having been sued in an Ecclesiastical Court for offences against the ritual of the Church and pronounced guilty of contempt and contumacy, a writ de contumace ca35 piendo was issued, and he was arrested and imprisoned. A rule nisi for a habeas corpus having been granted the Queen' s Bench Division made the rule absolute and the clerk was discharged from custody. The Court of Appeal having reversed the order making the rule absolute the casewent to the House of 27 L. Loizou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)Lords which reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and restored the decision of the Queen' s Bench Division on the ground that the appeal to the Court of appeal was not "in a criminal cause or matter" within section 47 of the Judicature Act 1873; but that no appeal lay to the Court of Appeal under 5 s.I9 from an order discharging a person under habeas corpus. Lord Halsbury, L.C., in the course of his speech said: (at p. 522): "My Lords, upon the merits of this appeal I have of course formed no opinion. The preliminary point has alone been 10 argued; and I will only say that if it be true, as one of the parties contends, that there has been a disobedience to the law obstinate and persistent, I have no doubt at all that the law either is or can be made strong enough to deal with it. But Your Lordships are here determining a question which 15 goes very far indeed beyond the merits of any particular case. It is the right of personal freedom in this country which is in debate; and I for one should be very slow to believe, except it was done by express legislation, that the policy of centuries has been suddenly reversed and that 20 the right of personal freedom is no longer to be determined summarily and finally, but is to be subject to the delay and uncertainty of ordinary litigation, so that the final determination upon that question may only be arrived at by the last Court of Appeal." 25 But whereas, as it emerges from their respective arguments advanced before this Court, the parties were agreed that whether there is a right of appeal against an acquittal by an Assize Court or not depends on the provisions of s.25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law 1960 (Law 14 of 1960) their views were diametri- 30 cally opposed as regards the interpretation of the section and its true meaning and effect. It is undisputable that Part Vof the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, which is the part dealing with appeals, makes no provision for appeal against an acquittal by an Assize Court. 35 On the contrary sub-section

(2)of section 131 which is the opening section of this Part expressly states that "there shall be no appeal from an acquittal except at the instance or with the written sanction of the Attorney-General, as in this law provided." 28 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others L. Loizou J. Thesection whichdealswithappealsbythe Attorney-General is section 137which expressly states that the Attorney-General mayappealorsanctionanappealfrom anyjudgment ofacquittal by a District Court on the grounds therein enumerated. 5 10 The first subsection of section 131 which is framed in more general terms reads as follows: "131

(1). Subject to the provisions of any other enactment in force for the time being, no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction except as provided for by this Law." So, as the learned Deputy Attorney-General has submitted, the whole matter starts and finishes in section 25

(2)of the Courts ofJustice Law,

1. Indeed, if arightof appeal exists against an acquittal by an Assize Court such right could only 15 emanate from the provisions of this section. Great emphasis was placed by the learned Deputy AttorneyGeneral of the Republic to a passage from the speech of the Earl of Selborne L.C., in the House of Lords in the Vera Cruz [1884] 10 App. Cas. 59 at p. 68, which is repeatedly cited in 20 Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed. The passage reads as follows: 25 3Q "Now if anything be certain it is this, that wherethere are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from, merely byforce ofsuchgeneral words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so." This passage is cited at p. 160, chapter 7 of Maxwell which dealswithpresumptions regardingjurisdiction undertheheading 'Presumption Against Creating New, and Enlarging Existing Jurisdictions*. In the same page the learned author also cites the case of 35 L. v.L. [1962]P.
2. This wasa casein which a wife, whose husband had deserted her in 1938,obtained a divorce from him in 1955 butdidnotthenproceedwiththeprayerfor maintenance 29 L. Loizou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris St Others

(1979)and secured provision included in her petition because she was at that time in receipt of specified monthly sums from him under a deed of covenant, made in October, 1953,by which he covenanted to pay such sums during their joint lives or for sevens years, whichever was the shorter period. In 1957, the 5 wife, for her own reasons, opened negotiations for the payment by her former husband of a lump sum in substitution for the monthly sumsremaining to bepaid under thedeed of covenant. She was independently advised and clearly understood and accepted the agreement eventually reached for the payment by 10 her former husband of the lump sum of£660,on four attached conditions. That agreement gave her substantial advantages as compared with the superseded deed of covenant. A consent summons was thereupon taken out on behalf of the husband, and on February 13, 1958, it came before the registrar, who 15 made an order in the form customary since

1. It recited that the husband having paid and the wife having accepted the sum agreed "in full satisfaction of all present and future rights to maintenance for herself and by consent it is ordered that the petitioner's application for maintenance in the prayer of 20 the petition be dismissed." On March 8, 1961, the wife, relying on the provisions of section 1 oftheMatrimonial Causes(Propertyand Maintenance) Act, 1958,which hadcomeintoforce onJanuary 1, 1959,issued a summons, asking for secured provision and maintenance 25 during joint lives. It was in the first instance held that the Act of 1958 had given the Court jurisdiction to award maintenance to a wife on a fresh application although her original application had been dismissed in pursuance of an agreement sanctioned by the Court, and the wife was given leave tofilea 30 new claim. Section 1 of the Matrimonial Causes (Property and Maintenance) Act, 1958, provided that "any power of the Court, under the enactments mentioned in the next following subsection, to make an order on a decree for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation shall be excercisable 35 either on pronouncing such a decree or at any time thereafter ". On appeal by the husband it was held, allowing the appeal, that the Act of 1958did not give the Court jurisdiction to entertain a fresh application for maintenance by a wife who had in pursuance of an agreement sanctioned by the Court 40 received an agreed capital sum and had her application for 30 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others L. Loizou J. maintenance dismissed. It was further held that the Act of 1958, by section 1, did no more than enlarge the time within which an existingjurisdiction in relation to maintenance awards might be exercised, by enabling the Court to award maintenance 5 either "on" a decree or "at any" time thereafter; and precedent and practice prior to the Act of 1958 tended to show that there was no jurisdiction, once an application for maintenance had been dismissed, to entertain a fresh application or a plurality of applications. 30 15 20 25 30 35 40 Willmer L.J., in the course of his judgment said: (at p. 118) "If, as I think, jurisdiction to maintain such a second application did not exist before, I cannot construe the provisions of the Act of 1958 as conferring it. All that is provided by section 1 is that any power of the Court to award maintenance under section 19 of the Act of 1950 might be exercised either on pronouncing the decree of divorce, or at any time thereafter. That is to say, the section merely enlarges the time within which an existing power of the Court might be exercised If the legislature had intended to confer a new right to make a second application for maintenance in a case where a previous application had been dismissed, it would be reasonable to expect that such a provision would have been expressed in clear and unambiguous terms." The same passage from the Vera Cruz is cited at p. 196 of Maxwell (supra) in- the chapter dealing with Construction to avoid collision with other provisions under the special heading of the maxim 'Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant'. In the same page is cited the case of Corporation of Blackpool and Starr Estate Co. Ltd. [1922] 1 A.C.
2. Lord Haldane in the course of his speech in the House of Lords after referring to the facts had this to say: (at p. 34) "My Lords, in that state of matters we are bound, in construing the general language of the Act of 1919, to apply a rule of construction which has been repeatedly laid down and is firmly established. It is that wherever Parliament in an earlier statute has directed its attention to an individual case and has made provision for it unambiguously, there arises a presumption that if in a subsequent statute the Legislature lays down a general principle, that general 31 L. Loizou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)principle is not to be taken as meant to rip up what the Legislature had before provided for individually, unless an intention to do so is specially declared. A merely general rule is not enough, even though by its terms it is stated so widely that it would, taken by itself, cover such cases of 5 the kind I have referred to." In approaching this issue it is well to bear in mind a passage from the same edition of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, at p. 29, which is in these terms: "Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, any- 10 thing is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the Court as to what is just and expedient; words are not to be construed, contrary 15 to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely be­ cause no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the Court is to expound the law as it stands, and to 'leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others'." 20 Section 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law reads as follows: "

(2). Τηρουμένων τών διατάξεωντου περί Ποινικής Δικονο­ μίας Νόμουπλην cosάλλωςπροβλέπεται είςτο εδάφιοντοΰτο, πδσα άπόφασις δικαστηρίου άσκοϋυτος ποιυικήνδικαιοδοσίαν θα υπόκειται είς εφεσιν είς το 'Ανώτατον Δικαστήριον. 25 Πάσα τοιαύτη έφεσις δύναται νά άσκηθή κατά της κατα­ δικαστικής αποφάσεωςή της έπιβαλλούσης ποινήντοιαύτης δι' οιουδήποτε λόγου." and in English "

(2). Subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law but save as otherwise in this subsection provided every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to the High Court. Any such appeal may be made as of right against con­ viction or sentence on any ground." In the case of Theodoros Panayioti Shourris v. The Republic and Gregoris N. Kazantzis v. The Police, 1961 C.L.R. p. 11, 32 30 35 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others L. Loizou J. the two applicants who had been convicted and sentenced by a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction, applied severally to the then High Court for leave to appeal under the relevant sections of Part V of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155. 5 In view of a probable discrepancy between the Greek and Turkish versions of section 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960, the question arose whether leave to appeal was required. The discrepancy in question was that whereas in the Greek version it is provided that " every such appeal may be 10 made (δύναται υά άσκηθη) against conviction or sentence on any ground" in the corresponding Turkish text the words "hak olarak" are used. The words "hak olarak" mean "as of right". It was held that there is no conflict between the Greek word "δύναται" and the Turkish words "hak olarak" used in the 15 corresponding Turkish text of the subsection in that what is expressed by "hak olarak" in Turkish "as of right" is conveyed by the Greek word "δύναται" used in the Greek version which connotes, when unqualified, not merely the power or ability to appeal but also the legal right to do so and that consequently 20 a person convicted may lodge a notice of appeal in all cases either against conviction or against sentence and that leave of the High Court or any Judge thereof was no longer necessary. The concluding paragraph of the unanimous short judgment of the Court delivered by O'Briain, P., the then President of 25 the High Court, reads as follows: 30 "In the result, this Court is of opinion that in the case of appeal against conviction or sentence thesection in question, section 25

(2), gives a convicted person the right to appeal from every such decision and leave by this Court or any Judge thereof is no longer a requisite. In future, no such applications for leave to appeal should be made. A person convicted may lodge a notice of appeal in-all cases." 35 About a month later the case of Maroulla Xenophontos v. Panayiota Charalambons, 1961 C.L.R. 122 went before the High Court on appeal. The appellant in this case preferred a charge in the District Court of Nicosia sitting at Morphou against the respondent 33 L. Loizou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)charging the latter with insult contrary to section 99 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154. By reason of the absence of the appellant's advocate when the case was called for hearing, it was dismissed for want of prosecution andtherespondent was discharged in accordance with the provisions of section 89

(2)of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155. The complainant appealed from that acquittal. 5 When the appeal went before the High Court a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent that the order ofthetrialJudgeamounted toanacquittalandthat,accordingly, 10 no appeal lay to the High Court save with the written sanction of the Attorney-General which had not been given as required by sections 131

(2)and 137(l)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Law. Counsel for the appellant argued that the provisions of 15 section 25 of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960,give an unqualified right of appeal from a decision of every Court exercising criminal jurisdiction, including a decision to acquit. It was further contended that since the enactment of that section the written sanction of the Attorney-General referred to in the 20 Criminal Procedure Law, was no longer required, in cases of appeals from judgments of acquittal. As it appeared to the Court that the rights and privileges of the Attorney-General were directly involved in this argument, the Court, with the consent of the parties, gave notice to the 25 Attorney-General of the point raised by the parties and indicated to him that it would be proper to hear argument, on his behalf, on this point if he desired to be heard and adjourned the case.At the adjourned datethe Attorney-General appeared, in person, to argue the matter. 30 At p. 125 of the report O'Briain, P., says this in relation to the submissions of the Attorney-General: "The Attorney-General submitted that section 25, subsection

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960, provides that every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdic- 35 tion is appealable to the High Court, but 'subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law'. He submitted that the provisions of section 131

(2)of Cap. 155are applicable to this case that section being one of the provisions 34 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others L. Loizou J. of the Criminal Procedure Law relating to acquittals. The effect of his argument was that there is, in a case such as this no appeal except with the written sanction of the Attorney-General as provided in that Law." 5 and at p. 128 it appears that the Attorney-General, in the course of his argument, stated that the right of appeal conferred upon the Attorney-General by section 137 of the Criminal Procedure Law now extends to acquittals by Assize Courts. In the course of hisjudgment the President of the then High 10 Court said: (at p. 126) ' 15 20 "It is, I think, correct that a right of appeal clearly given in unqualified terms in a statute cannot be cut down by provisions of another procedural statute or statutory order. The difficulty arises, from the point of view of the appellant that in section 25 the right of appeal, though clearly given, is no less clearly qualified by the opening words of the subsection. Furthermore, the concluding sentence of subsection

(2)'any such appeal may bemade as of right against conviction or sentence on any ground' with its significant omission of any reference to acquittal is, in my opinion, a point rather against Mr. Pantelides' s" - counsel's for the appellant-'argument." But as the issue before the Court was an acquittal by District Court the Court were not prepared to express an opinion 25 regarding acquittals by Assize Courts· and they considered it sufficient in order to determine the preliminary point before them to say that there were not in section 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 any words "clear, express and free from any ambiguity", giving a general right of appeal against acquittals 30 as contended on behalf of the appellant and held that no appeal from an acquittal by a District Court could be brought without the written sanction of the Attorney-General as in the Criminal Procedure Law provided. In the result the appeal was dismissed. 35 In Evangelos Christofi v. The Police

(1970)2 C.L.R., p. 117, the appellant appealed against the ruling of the District Court of Limassol whereby it was ruled that a preliminary inquiry be held in the case of the appellant and another person who were charged together in a charge-sheet charging appellant of being 35 L. Loizou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)a member of an unlawful association contrary to s.56(l) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154, and the other person of holding an office in an unlawful association contrary to s.56

(2)of the Criminal Code. Vassiliades P., who delivered the unanimousjudgment of the Court of Appeal said: (at p. 119) "The first question which arises is whether such an appeal lies. Counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted that the appeal lies under s.25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (No. 14 of 1960) which reads: 5 10 The submission on behalf of the appellant is that the decision to hold a preliminary inquiry is a 'decision' of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction and, therefore, it is subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court. We find ourselves unable to accept this submission. The 15 section provides that an appeal lies under sub-section

(2)'subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law', save as 'otherwise provided' in the sub-section. The provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, governing appeals in criminal cases, are contained in Part V of the 20 statute, sections 131-153 inclusive. The opening section 131

(1)reads: '131

(1). Subject to the provisions of any other enactment in force for the time being, no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Court exercising cri- 25 minal jurisdiction except as provided for by this Law.' It is clear, we think, that when sub-section

(2)of s.25 of the Courts of Justice Law, refers to 'every decision', this must be read 'subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law'; and, therefore, it can only refer to 30 'decisions' which are subject to an appeal under the Criminal Procedure Law. The ruling against which the present appeal is taken, is not, as far as we can see on the basis of the argument that wehave heard, such a decision." In the result the appeal was dismissed. In Photini Polycarpou GeorghadjiandAnother v. TheRepublic 36 35 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others L. Loizou J.

(1971)2 C.L.R. 229, the appellants appealed against a ruling of the Assize Court of Nicosia refusing an application by the appellants, made in the course of the hearing of a criminal case whereby they sought permission "jointly or separately to enter 5 an appearance through Counsel with the right to summon witnesses and the right to speak." The Supreme Court having heard argument on the issue of jurisdiction of this Court to -entertain an appeal against a ruling of this kind was of the view that no appeal could be made to this Court against such ruling 10 and dismissed the appeal. Triantafyllides, P., in giving the reasons for thejudgment had • this to say: (at p. 233) 20 "As has been stated in the judgment delivered by Vassiliades, P. in the case of Christofis v. The Police

(1970)2 C.L.R, 117the effect of s.25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (14/60) is that, save as otherwise provided by the said section (in relation to conviction or sentence), an appeal from a decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction lies only subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155). 25 Sub-section

(1)of s. 131 of Cap. 155 lays down that 'Subject to the provisions of any other enactment in force for the time being, no appeal shall lie from anyjudgment or order of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction except as provided for by this Law.' 15 30 Having not been referred, by learned counsel for the Appellants, to any provision in Cap. 155, or in any other enactment, enabling an appeal to be made against the ruling of the Assize Court, which is the subject-matter of these appeals, we reached the conclusion that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to deal on appeal with such ruling." Then after referring and dealing with certain authorities cited the learned President had this to say: (at p. 235) 35 "It is, also, interesting to note that soon after the Rodosthenous case there was examined, again, in the case of Xenophontos v. Charalambous, 1961 C.L.R. 122, the question of the right of appeal under section 25

(2)of Law 14/60 and it was held that as the general right of appeal 37 L. Loizou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)provided for by section 25

(2)is qualified therein by the words 'subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law' it was not possible to appeal against an acquittal by a District Court without the sanction of the AttorneyGeneral, which is required by virtue of section 131

(2)of 5 the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155). In approaching the issue before us we have borne in mind, also, that the Courts cannot invent a right of appeal where none is given nor will they usurp an appellate jurisdiction where none is created." \ 10 In Loizos Savva <&. Another (No. 1) v. the Police

(1977)* 12 J.S.C. 2088, an appeal from a decision concerning bail, a preliminary objection was raised by counsel for the respondents to the effect that this Court does not possess jurisdiction to deal with the appeals under s. 157 of the Criminal Procedure Law, 15 Cap. 155. The learned President of this Court in dealing with the submission of counsel had this to say: (at p. 2089) "He has submitted, in this respect, that, as has been decided in cases such as Xenophontos v. Charalambous, 1961 C.L.R. 122, Christofi v. The Police,

(1970)2 C.L.R. 117, 20 Georghadji and Another v. The Republic,

(1971)2 C.L.R. 229 and Lazarou and Others v. The Police,

(1973)2 C.L.R. 81, the right of appeal, provided for under s. 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14/60), can be exercised in criminal matters on the basis only of the relevant pro- 25 visions of Cap.

1. We see no reason to disagree with him on this point." In the textbook 'Criminal Procedure in Cyprus' by A. N. Loizou and G. M. Pikis published in 1975 the authors deal with the right of the Attorney-General to appeal at p.
2. In 30 relation to an appeal against an acquittal by an Assize Court one reads the following: "It is a moot point whether the Attorney-General has a right to appeal against an acquittal by the Assize Court; there is no precedent on the matter in Cyprus. Traditio- 35 nally under the Common Law, an acquittal by an Assize Court cannot be questioned on appeal, whereas decisions * To be reported in

(1977)2 C.L.R. 38 2 C.L.R. 5 10 Attorney-General τ. Pouris & Others L. Loizou J. of lower Courts may be reviewed by means of prerogative orders. The Criminal Procedure Law nowhere expressly confers a right on the Attorney-General to appeal against an acquittal from the judgment of an Assize Court. It is submitted that, in the absence of any express provision conferring on the Attorney-General a right to appeal against an acquittal from a judgment of the Assize Court, the Attorney-General has no right either to appeal or sanction an appeal from such judgment. It must not be forgotten that under the Common Law there is no right to appeal against an order of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction, unless such right is expressly conferred by statute. There is no right to invent a right to appeal where none is given by statute." 15 It was forcefully argued by the learned Deputy AttorneyGeneral that thereis a right of appeal from judgments of acquit­ tal both by District Courts and Assize Courts and that such right is given clearly and unambiguously by s. 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960; and that in this respect the relative provi20 sions of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 and particularly of s. 137 thereof which limits the Attorney-General's right of appeal against anacquittaltojudgments of acquittal by aDistrict Court on the grounds therein specified has been impliedly re­ pealed and that such right, since the enactment of the Courts of 25 Justice Law, i960 and by virtue of the provisions of s. 25

(2)thereof now covers judgments of acquittal by an Assize Court also. 30 35 4Q On the subject of implied repeals one reads the following in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed., under the heading "Repeal by implication not favoured" at p. 191: "A later statute may repeal an earlier one either expressly of by implication. But repeal by implication is not favoured by the Courts. 'Forasmuch', said Coke, 'as Acts of Par­ liaments are established with such gravity, wisdom and universal consent of the whole realm, for the advancement of the commonwealth, they ought not by any constrained construction out of the general and ambiguous words of a subsequent Act, to be abrogated.' If, therefore, earlier and later statutes can reasonably be construed in such a way that both can be given effect to, this must be done. If, as 39 L. Loizou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)with all modern statutes, the later Act contains a list of earlier enactments which it expressly repeals, an omission of a particular statute from the list will be a strong indication of an intention not to repeal that statute. And when the later Act is worded in purely affirmative language, 5 without any negative expressed or implied, it becomes even less likely that it was intended to repeal the earlier law." And in Craies on Statute Law at p. 366 under the heading "Implied Repeals": "Where two Acts are inconsistent or repugnant, the later will be read as having impliedly repealed the earlier. The Court leans against implying a repeal, 'unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be 15 implied. Special Acts are not repealed by general Acts unless there is some express reference to the previouslegislation or unless there is a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together'. 'The latest expression of the will ofParliament must alwaysprevail'. It doesnotmatter 20 whether the earlier or the later enactment is public, local and personal, or private, or is penal or deals with civil rights only, and the rule is equally applicable to Orders in Council or Rules of Court if they have statutory force and are made under authority empowering the rule-makers 25 to supersede prior enactments as to procedure. Before coming to the conclusion that there is a repeal by implication the Court must be satisfied that the two enactments are so inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot stand together before they can, from the language of the later, 30 imply the repeal of an express prior enactment—i.e. the repeal must, if not express, flow from necessary implication." There is substantive provision in Part Vof the Criminal ProcedureLawandmoreparticularly insections 131 and 137thereof 35 that an appeal by the Attorney-General from a judgment of acquittal is limited to a judgment by a District Court; and the question is whether the wording of s.25

(2)of the Criminal Procedure Law, 1960 warrants abrogation of such provision. Turning now to s. 25

(2)it isto my mind quite clear that the 40 40 10 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others L. Loizou J. scope of this subsection was to abolish the requirement, for which provision is made in sections 132(l)(

1. b)and (
2. c)and 133 (l)(
3. b)of the Criminal Procedure Law, for leave to appeal against conviction or sentence by any person convicted and sentenced 5 either by a District Court or an Assize Court. If the sentence "every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to the High Court" were to be taken in isolation and unqualified it might certainly appear that it did confer a right of appeal from a judgment of acquittal by an 10 Assize Court. But the whole subsection is expressly made "subject to" the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law; and these opening words are in my view equivalent to "without prejudice to" the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law and that the only re15 asonable explanation why it was thought necessary to introduce them was to keep in force the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law relating to appeals 'save as otherwise in the subsection provided' and cannot reasonably be construed as ousting such provisions by implied repeal. If it were to be held that the 20 right to appeal from ajudgment of acquittal by every Court were no longer subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law it seems to me that this would also mean that the AttorneyGeneral' s written sanction, for which provision is made in sections 131

(2)and 137

(1)of the Criminal Procedure Law, 25 would no longer be a prerequisite to the filing of an appeal against an acquittal by a District Court contrary to the decision in the Xenophontos case (supra). On the other hand the sentence "every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to the 30 High Court" occurring in the first paragraph of the subsection, upon which the main force of the argument that the AttorneyGeneral' s right of appeal from an acquittal is extended to judgments of acquittal by an Assize Court was based, is qualified and explained by the second paragraph of the subsection 35 which provides that "any such appeal"—that is to say any such appeal as in the preceding paragraph provided—"may be made as of right against conviction or sentence on any ground." In the light of the above I am not inclined to hold that the provisions of subsection

(2)of section 25 can be relied upon in 40 support of the view that they give a right of appeal against an 41 L. Loizou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)acquittal by an Assize Court in words clear, express and free from ambiguity. On the contrary it seems to me that if the intention of the Legislature was to give an unqualified right of appeal from any judgment of acquittal both by a District Court and an Assize Court such intention could have been expressed in clear and unequivocal termsfree from any doubt or ambiguity. 5 In the result I feel bound to resolve this issue in favour of the respondents and hold that, having regard to the present state of the Law, there is no right of appeal from an acquittal by an Assize Court and that, therefore, the present appeals do not lie. 10 HADJIANASTASSIOU J.: In these appeals, the question raised is whether the Attorney^General of the Republic has a right to appeal against the acquittal of the respondents from the judgment of the Assize Court of Limassol·—sitting in Nicosia district. 15 The seven respondents have been accused of the premeditated murder of four victims, and after a long trial lastingfor a number of days, they were acquitted by the Assize Court. The Assize Court, at the close of the case for the prosecution, upheld a submission of the defence that a prima facie case has not been 20 made out against anyone of the respondents sufficiently to require each to make a defence. The trial Court in upholding that submission had this to say:"...We may as well repeat what we have stated earlier on about the testimony of this witness (Vrountos): We find 25 ourselves unable to act upon his evidence when same stands alone and unsupported by other evidence. So, allegations of Vrountos unsupported by other evidence as to what was said or done to him by any one of the accused have been disregarded by us: such allegations are inter alia the 30 alleged words uttered by accused 1 at the road block of Pareklishia (village) at about 4.30-5.00 p.m. of 16th July, 1974, and similarly the alleged explanation given to Vrountos about the latter' scompanions byaccused 4at the same place and time. 35 In connection with the incident at the petrol station of P.W. 92 where accused 7 allegedly said: 'Kamete piso re, simera efaamen Kammian ikosarian, an fame akoma ena 42 2 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others Hadjianastassiou J. ti pirazi", we must say that such conduct cannot be considered but a mere puffery and boasting which cannot be taken seriously to mean more than a threat in view of the fact that according to the evidence both of Xenias (P.W. 92) and his wife (P.W. 98), despite the fact that accused 7 and his companions were armed and P.W. 92 was unarmed, the former left at the end without even arresting P.W. 92. Wehave considered very carefully the conduct of accused 7 in connection with the investigation of this case. We have noted in particular his entries in Exh. 49(k) to the effect that he interrogated P.W. 50 and P.W. 109 about probable use of their excavators in connection with this case, whilst both these witnesses deposed before us that they were never so interrogated. In view, however, of our findings as to the cause of death and in particular the identification of the victims, such conduct, however reprehensible, cannot go beyond a serious suspicion. But as stated in Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, 7th Edition, p. 110:- 'Circumstances of suspicion merely without more conclusive evidence, are not sufficient to justify conviction, even though the party offer no explanation of them.' " * Then the trial Court concluded in these terms:" For all the above reasons, we hold the view that a prima facie case has not been made out against the accused sufficiently to require them to be called ujon to make their defence on any one of the four counts of the present infoimation and all accused are hereby acquitted and discharged on counts I, 2, 3 and 4 of the information." The Deputy Attorney-General, feeling aggrieved from the 30 judgment of the Assize Court, appealed against that decision on a number of legal points, and claimed that under the provisions of the Courts of Justice Law 1960, sub-section 2 of s. 25, the right to appeal is given clearly and unambiguously against the acquittal of the Assize Court. 35 Before dealing with the submission of counsel, I consider it pertinent to deal first with the accusatorial system. In Cyprus. the common law accusatorial system of criminal justice has been in force for almost a century and has come to be cherished and respected as a corner stone of fairness. This success should 43 Hadjianastassiou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)partly be attributed to the system of criminal procedure that is in force in Cyprus—a system emanating from the English system of criminal procedure, as well as from other countries, adapted in certain respects to suit the conditions prevailing in our country. In McNabb v. United States, 87 Law. Ed. 819, Frankfurter, J., dealing with the procedural safeguards, said at p. 827:"The interruption of the trial for this purpose should be no longer than is required for a competent determination of the substantiality of the motion. As was observed in Nardone 10 v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 'The civilized conduct of criminal trials cannot be confined within mechanical rules. It necessarily demands the authority of limited direction entrusted to the Judge presiding in Federal trials, including a well-established range of judicial discretion, subject to 15 appropriate review on appeal, in ruling upon preliminary questions of fact. Such a system as ours must, within the limits here indicated, rely on the learning, good sense, fairness and courage of federal trial Judges.' The history of liberty has largely been the history of 20 observance of procedural safeguards. And the effective administration of criminal justice hardly requires disregard of fair procedures imposed by law." In R. v. Georghiades,

(1972)3 C.L.R. 594, A. Loizou, J., dealt with a case involving disciplinary proceedings against the 25 applicant, and said at p. 680:"Since the aforesaid judicial pronouncement, the Public Service Law has been enacted. It lays down a procedure which takes cognizance of the aforesaid principles of law and which afford to a civil servant every safeguard of 30 procedural fairness. In fact, it ensures that the civil servant is not only afforded an opportunity to know the case against him throughout the hearing of the case, but also at the preliminary stage of its investigation by an investigating officer. It introduces the accusatorial system folio- 35 wed in criminal proceedings in our country for almost a century and which has come to be cherished and respected as a corner stone of fairness." It appears, therefore, that the history of liberty has largely 44 5 2 C.L.R. ' Attorney-General τ. Pouris & Others Hadjianastassiou J. been the history of observance of procedural safeguards, and the effective administration of criminal justice hardly requires disregard of fair procedures. Furthermore, I would add, that because of the Constitution of Cyprus and in particular PartII, 5 the fundamental rights and liberties have played an important part in moulding present-day rules of criminal procedure in upholding ίη an effective way civil rights and liberties. With this in mind, the first question is which are the appeal­ able decisions of the District Court and Assize Court liable to 10 appeal before the enactment of Law 14/60. There is no doubt that strict adherence to procedural safeguards is vital for main­ taining a healthy system of criminal justice and a prerequisite in effectively upholding some fundamental presumptions deeply rooted in Cyprus in our system, such as the presumption of 15 innocence. The decisions of the District Courts and the Assize Court liable to appeal are to be found in sections 132, 133, 135 and 136 of the Criminal Procedure Law which define any decision of the trial Courts in the exercise of their criminal jurisdiction, 20 that may be the subject of the appeal. The right to appeal from ajudgment of a Court of first instance and other incidental matters relevant to appeals are regulated by the provisions of Part (V) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155. The right to appeal against an acquittal from a judgment of the District 25 Court is regulated by the provisions of section 131

(1)which says that: "Subject to the provisions of any other enactment in force for the timebeing, no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction except as provided for by this Law;" and by sub-section 2, "There shall 30 be no appeal from an acquittal except at the instance or with the written sanction of the Attorney-General, as in this Law provided." 35 I think that the strict regulation of the right to appeal against acquittal by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, is salutary and consonant with the traditional position at common law that a man should not be tried twice for the same offence. In R. v. Simpson, [1914] L.J. Q.B. Vol. 83, 233, Ridley J., delivering"the first judgment said at p. 237:- 40 "In Reg. V. Duncan7 Q.B.D. 198, an indictment had been 45 Hadjianastassiou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others *

(1979)preferred against the defendant for obstruction of a highway and he had been acquitted. A rule was granted calling upon him to shew cause why the verdict for him should not be set aside and a new trial ordered. In the course of the argument the following observation was made per Curiam: 5 'Has a new trial ever been granted after acquittal on a criminal charge?' and Mr. Charles, Q.C., who was shewing cause, said, 'No new trial can be granted either after conviction or acquittal.' Lord Coleridge, C.J., in giving 10 judgment said: 'It isplain that wecannot interfere. What may have been the constitutional or legal principles on which the practice was founded it is much too late to inquire. The practice of the Courts has been settled for centuries, and is that in all cases of a criminal kind where a 15 prisoner or defendant isin danger of imprisonment no new trial will be granted if the prisoner or defendant, having stood in that danger, has been acquitted.' In my opinion that is a principle which we ought to be slow to transgress. It is true that in this case the consequences if we reversed 20 the acquittal could not be so serious as they might be in other cases. But we are dealing with a principle of great importance, and if we make an exception in this case it would probably be sought to be extended to others. If a person has stood in peril of a conviction and been acquitted 25 I think we cannot interfere with that acquittal." It must not be forgotten that under the common law there is no right to appeal against an order of the Court exercising criminal jurisdiction, unless such right is expressly conferred by statute. As it was aptly said, there is no right to invent a right 30 to appeal when none is given by statute. It appears further that the prosecutor has no right to appeal against an acquittal from a judgment of the Assize Court. This was conceded by the Deputy Attorney-General, but he may appeal against a judgment of acquittal of the District Court with the sanction of 35 theAttorney-General. Also,the Attorney-General may appeal on his own motion against a judgment of acquittal of the District Court, independently of who the prosecutor is. But I repeat, the Attorney-General, in the absence of any express provision conferring on hima right to appeal against an acquittal 40 46 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others Hadjianastassiou J. from the judgment of the Assize Court, has no right either to appeal or sanction an appeal from s"ch judgment. In Healey v. Ministry of Health, [1954] 3 All E.R. 449, Morris L.J., dealing with the question of jurisdiction of the Court of 5 Appeal, said at p. 453:- 10 15 20' "The plaintiff is asking the Court to assume a jurisdiction to overrule the Minister. By raising the preliminary issue the defendant invites the Court to rule now that it is not endowed with any jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. In my judgment there is no right of appeal to the Court from the determination of the Minister. None is given by reg. 60 or in any other regulation. There can certainly be no implication of a right of appeal. .Had it been desired to provide some machinery or procedure for an appeal from the decision of the Minister, it could have been done. Any such prescribed appeal might or might not have been an appeal to the Courts. Questions as to which methods for determining rights are the most desirable raise issues of policy which are for Parliament to decide; but the Courts cannot invent a right of appeal where none is given. The Courts will not usurp an appellate jurisdiction where none is created." Parker, L.J., delivering a separate judgment, had this to say at p. 454:- 25 30 35 "The issue to be tried is whether the Minister having made a determination, this Court has jurisdiction by declaration, not to declare that his determination is null and void or that it should be quashed, but to make another determination and one in the opposite sense to that made by the Minister. In my opinion the Court has no such jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to invest the Court with an appellate jurisdiction, as opposed to a supervisory jurisdiction, which it certainly has not got. A right of appeal is the creatute of statute, and the regulations give no right of appeal. Further, the absence of such words as 'whose deteimination is final' or 'whose determination shall not be called in question in any Court of law' cannot preserve a jurisdiction which apart from such words did not exist." 47 Hadjianastasstou J. Attorney-General τ. Pouris & Others

(1979)In R. v. Jefferies, [1968] 3 All E.R. 238, Widgery, L.J., in dealing with the question of the right of hearing an appeal, had this to say at p. 240:"Whatever may be the powers of Courts exercising a ju­ risdiction that does not derive from statute, the powers of 5 this Court are derived from, and confined to, those given by the Criminal Appeal Act,

1. We take it to be a general principle that whenever a party to proceedings dies, the proceedings must abate, unless his personal re­ presentatives both have an interest in the subject-matter 10 and can by virtue of the express terms of a statute (or from rules of Court made by virtue of jurisdiction given by a statute) take the appropriate steps to have themselves substituted for the deceased as a party to the proceedings. Although in this case the estate would benefit if the widow 15 were allowed to continue the appeal and were successful, there is no procedure whereby she can be substituted as an appellant, and we do not see how there can be an inherent power in the Court to allow this when the appeal is itself the creature of statute. We would add that not only the 20 wording of s. 3 of the Act of 1907 but the general tenor of the statute as a whole is such as to make the right of appeal strictly personal to the 'person convicted'. Moreover neither the Criminal Appeal Rules, 1908·, nor any sub­ sequent amendment of them purports to provide procedure 25 for the substitution on the record after the death of the person convicted of someone who could either embark on or continue an appeal." In R. v. Smith (Martin) [1974] 1 All E.R. 651, Lord Denning, M.R., dealing on appeal with the question of the jurisdiction of the Crown Court, raised this question at pp. 654-656:- 30 "What is the position of the Crown Court? It is a Court newly constituted under the Courts Act
2. It takes the place of the old Courts of assize and of quarter sessions. The judges of the Crown Court are High Court judges, 35 circuit judges, recorders, with the help occasionally of magistrates. The Courts Act 1971 says nothing expressly of thejurisdiction of the Crown Court over solicitors. But I. S.R. & Ο 1908 No.
3. 48 2 C.L.R. 5 10 Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others Hadjianastassiou J. the Act says in terms that the Crown Court is part of the Supreme Court: see s. 1

(1);and that it isa superior Court of record: see s. 4

(1). It follows that every solicitor, who is admitted to practise in the Supreme Court, is automatically an officer of the Crown Court as well as of the Court of Appeal and of the High Court; and it being a superior Court of record, he is necessarily subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Crown Court has, therefore, as full and ample a jurisdiction over solicitors as the High Court has. It can order a solicitor personally to pay the costs occasioned by his negligence, just as the High Court can. No matter whether thejudge is a High Court judge or a circuit judge, he can make such an order. 15 The remedies in case the Courtgoes wrong. 20 But if the Crown Court makes a mistake and orders a solicitor to pay costs when he does not deserve it, what remedy has the solicitor got? This raises the wide question: if a person is aggrieved by an order made by the Crown Court, what is his remedy? How can it be put right? 25 30 35 (i) The DivisionalCourt. The first question is whether he has any recourse by applying to the Divisional Court. The answer isthis:seeingthat the Crown Court isa superior Court of record, the remedies of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition do not lie to it: see Ex parte Fernandez 1 ; R. v. Justice of the CentralCriminalCourt exparte London County Council 2 ; except insofar as the statute may so provide. In s. 10 of the Courts Act 1971;the statute does provide for a case stated, or mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, in matters which do not relate to trial on indictment. There are many matters falling under this head, such as summary offences, licensing matters, and so forth. But no suchJurisdiction is given in respect of 'matters relating to trial on indictment'. They are expressly excluded. So there is no recourse to the Divisional Court for them. 1. [1861] 10 C.B.N.S. 3. 2. [19251 2 K.B. 43 [1925] All E.R. Rep. 429. 49 Hadjianastassion J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)(

1. ii)The Courtof Appeal. So far as trials on indictment are concerned, the only remedy, so far as I can see, is that given by the Criminal Appeal Acts to the criminal side of the Court of Appeal. These give an appeal to a *person convicted'; see ss.l(
2. l)and 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 5 1968. He can appeal after he is convicted. But not before. It seems that there is no appeal against an interlocutory order: see R. v. Collins1. This may, at first sight, seem surprising, but on consideration, there is much to be said for it. The trial Judge should have the final 10 word on such matters as adjournments, joint or several trials, bail, particulars and so forth. The only remedy is this: in case a trial Judge should make a mistake on an interlocutory matter, such as to cause injustice, the man can appeal against his conviction, and it will be taken into 15 account at that stage: see R. v. Grondowski and Malinowski.2 But save in this way, there is no appeal to the Court of Appeal against an interlocutory order. Nor is there any appeal to the Court of Appeal against any other order, judgment or decision of the Crown Court 20 which relates to trial on indictment: see s. 10(l)(
3. a)of the 1971 Act. Take a case where an accused man, who was acquitted, applied for costs. The circuit judge refused it. The man sought to upset his decision by means of certiorari. The Divisional Court held that it was a decision 're- 25 lating to trial on indictment' and no appeal lay by case stated, certiorari or any other way: see Ex parte Meredith3. Likewise, when a circuit judge ordered two men, who had been acquitted to make a contribution towards the costs of their defence. They applied for certiorari to quash. 30 The Divisional Court held that the decision related to 'trial on indictment* and that there was no remedy by certiorari or in any other way: see R v. Crown Court at Cardiff, ex parte Jones 4 . (iii) The result. Speaking generally, it appears that in 35 matters relating to trial on indictment, there is no recourse 1. (1969] 3 All E.R. 1562; [1970] 1 Q.B. 710. 2. [1946] 1 All E.R. 559. 3. [1973] 2 AH E.R. 234. 4. [1973] 3 All E.R. 1027. 50 2 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Attorney-General τ. Pouris & Others Hadjlanastassiou J. from the Crown Court to any higher Court save by the person convicted. But in matters which do not relate to trial on indictment there is recourse to the Divisional Court by any party aggrieved on a point of law or for excess of jurisdiction. Then what about the present order on a solicitor to pay the costs personally? Is that order one 'relating to trial on indictment'? The words 'relating to' are very wide. They are equivalent to 'connected with' or 'arising out of. So interpreted, they cover the present case. The order against the soUcitors arose out of a trial by indictment. It related to the adjournment of it. It was, therefore, an order 're­ lating to trial on indictment'. But, if I am wrong about this—if the order against the solicitors was not a matter relating to trial on indictment— the solicitors could have recourse to the Divisional Court. Conclusion. In my opinion the circuit judge (sitting in the Crown Court to try a case on indictment) hadjurisdiction to order the solicitors to pay the costs personally; but there is no procedure by which the solicitors can challenge the order in any higher Court. This seems to me very unfortunate. But we can, I think, do something to remedy the injustice. We can express our views on the matter in the hope that what we say may be heeded by those concerned." In Re Central FundsCosts Order [1975] 3 AH E.R. 238, a pri : vate prosecution was brought by Β against the defendant. In consequence the defendant was convicted at the Central Crimi­ nal Court. Following the conviction an order was made that the prosecution costs should be paid out of central funds pur­ suant to s. 3a of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1973. On ta­ xation the Crown Court allowed a lesser sum to Β than the substantial costs that he had in fact incurred and that he had asked for. He then sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, against the taxation order of the Crown Court. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, held that it had no statutory or inherentjurisdiction to hear an appeal against the taxation by the Crown Court of a prosecutor's costs. Lord Widgery, C.J. having heard the contention of counsel, dismissed the motion and said at pp. 241-242:51 Hadjianastassiou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)"But none of those to my mind even begins to show that we are exercising, or are entitled to exercise, a general supervision over the Crown Court from this Court, the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division. The other way in which Mr. Bennion seeks to support his contention is to take us through a number of cases and a number of definitions in the dictionaries supportive of the view that a superior Court has powers of supervision, and that such powers of supervision can go to costs. ... 5 In our opinion the matter is finally put beyond argument 10 by reference to the recent authorities to which counsel appearing as amicus curiae has drawn our attention." ... (See R. v. Jefferies; R. v. Collinsand R. v. Smith (supra)). Finally, his Lordship, having relied on the authorities quoted earlier, said at pp. 242-243:" I think it remarkable that we have progressed through so many years without this difficulty having come to light before. It may be because few private prosecutors have put up the amount of money that Mr. Bennion has in this case, and it is no doubt high time that the question of 20 taxation of the prosecutor's costs should be carefully considered, and carefully considered in the light of the fact that we may be talking about really large sums of money. The days are past when matters of costs could be brushed aside as beingunimportant additions to the really interesting 25 argument. The amount of money involved in this case and others of its kind is such that the recipient of its costs must be protected by a proper system of appeal so that the costs are assessed by a person knowledgeable in the subject, and that there is one appeal which involves the 30 consideration of the matter by another knowledgeable person." Having reviewed and analysed the law in the different sets of cases quoted earlier in this judgment, I have reached the conclusion that the Attorney-General of the Republic is not given 35 a right of appeal under the Criminal Procedure Law from a decision of acquittal of the Assize Court. 1would, therefore, find myself in agreement with counsel on this issue. The second question is whether, having regard to the wording of s.25

(2)of Law 14/60, an accused person or a prosecutor is 40 52 15 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others Hadjianastassiou J. entitled to appeal against every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction. There cannot be any doubt that the said enactment confers an unfettered right to appeal against conviction and sentence on any ground, and it is now clear that 5 those provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law that deal with applications for leave to appeal against conviction and/or sentence must be treated as having been abolished by necessary implication. Iam aware, of course, that the Courts lean against the principle of repeal by implication, but our Supreme Court 10 has accepted such principle1. In Rodosthenous and Another v. The Police, 1961 C.L.R. 48, it was held that an application to the High Court for a review of the decision of a lower Court as to bail, is, in fact, an appeal under s. 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law 1960, against such decision, and the provisions, 15 therefore, of ss. 138 and 139 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155relating to appeals should be complied with. O'Brian P., delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court, had this to say:20 25 30 35 40 " The Court has considered what to do in this matter which, unfortunately, is complicated by the fact that some decisions of the former Supreme Court have treated these applications in the nature of revisional applications without strictly defining them as appeals or as applications to the jurisdiction of the Court for bail. The matter is further complicated, or rather becomes so, by reason of the fact that the Court sitting to-day is dealing with the first such application since the Courts of Justice Law, 1960, and the Constitution were enacted, and has to consider carefully the question of setting a precedent. As we understood Mr. Pavlides, he has put this application to the Court as an application to review the decision of the learned District Jurdge and we take the view that that, in effect, means that that is an appeal against his order. We are satisfied, having considered this matter, that having regard to the terms of the Courts of Justice Law, section 25, we have jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal. Section 25

(2)commences with the words 'subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law' and the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law relating to appeals appear to be sections 138and

1. It is clear that this application
2. See Shourris v. The Republic and Kazantzis v. The Police, 1961 C.L.R.
3. 53 Hadjianastassiou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)is not in compliance with sections 138 and 139. We are faced with the express provision of section 138 that no notice of appeal shall be valid unless it complies with the requirements of this section. The Court has carefully considered the matter, and having 5 made due allowance for the difficulty that the applicants found themselves in, by reason of the matters referred to and terminology of the language in some of the judgments, we think that the proper thing to do is to hold that this matter is not properly before the Court, as an appeal, by 10 reason of not complying with the sections that I have mentioned. The Court, however, having regard to the fact that it is a matter involving the liberty of the citizen, is prepared to give every facility to the parties to put the case in the 15 list and to have it heard at the earliest possible moment after they lodge notices of appeal in a proper form setting out the grounds of appeal." In view of the difficulties which the Court faced in that case, the Court, in Georghadji & Another v. The Republic,

(1971)2 C.L.R. 229, held that the Ruling of the Assise Court refusing application to enter an appearance was an interlocutory matter, and no appeal lies against such ruling. Triantafyllides, P., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said that the Court possessed no jurisdiction to entertain the present appeals, and added at pp. 233-234:" As lias been stated in the judgment delivered by Vassiliades, P. in the case of Christofis v. The Police

(1970)2 C.L.R. 117 the effect of section 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960(14/60) isthat, save as otherwise provided 30 by the said section (in relation to conviction or sentence), an appeal from a decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction lies only subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155). Sub-section

(1)of section 131 of Cap. 155 lays down 35 that 'Subject to the provisions of any other enactment in force for the time being, no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction except as provided for by this Law. 54 20 25 2 C.L.R. 5 10 15 Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others Hadjianastassioa J. Having not been referred, by learned counsel for the appellants, to any provision in Cap. 155, or in any other enactment, enabling an appeal to be made against the ruling of the Assize Court, which is the subject-matter of these appeals, we reached the conclusion that the Supreme Court hasnojurisdiction to deal on appeal with such ruling. Counsel for the appellants submitted that we possessed jurisdiction to entertain these appeals even in the absence of any specific statutory provision to that effect. He contended in this respect that though no provision for an appeal against a decision refusing bail exists in the relevant Part—Part V—of Cap. 155 yet such an appeal was entertained, after the coming into force of Law 14/60, in the case of Rodosthenous and Another v. The Police, 1961 C.L.R. 50." Then, the learned President, having dealt with the submission of counsel, came to the conclusion that it was not a valid one and in doing so, he reviewed the cases of Varellasand Others v. The Police, 19 C.L.R. 46; The Police v. Nikola and Others, 20 7 C.L.R. 14;Petri v. ThePolice,

(1968)2 C.L.R. 1,Xenophontos v. Charalambous,1961 C.L.R. 122. Finally, he added that "In approaching the issue before us, we have borne in mind, also, that the Courts cannot invent a right of appeal where none is given nor will they usurp an appellate jurisdiction where none 25 is created." In England, as I have shown earlier, the Criminal Justice Act, 1968, does not refer to interlocutory appeals, and the Appeal Court, in R. v. Collins (supra), held that it had no inherent power to deal with interlocutory appeals. On the other hand, 30 in Cyprus it was said that in general there is no right to appeal against interlocutory orders of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction because a decision is not final. But the Supreme Court, however, consistently held or assumed that it had such power and that there was a right of appeal by both sides against 35 a decision of bail. ' I must confess—speaking for myself—that we have never clearly indicated the grounds upon which such jurisdiction was exercised. I repeat that we had assumed jurisdiction and rested our reasoning on the necessity of reviewing such decisions on appeal because of their implications on 55 Hadjianastassiou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)the liberty of the subject. I fully agree, however, that a decision on the question of bail is not final, in the sense that it does not dispose of the charge, if any, against the accused, and is neither a conviction in any true sense of the word. Furthermore, it is also correct to say that decisions on bail cannot be said to be within the provisions of sections 132-133 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 5 In the case of Lazarou and Others v. Police,

(1973)2 C.L.R. 81, it was held that there was no right to appeal against an order of the Judge remanding the accused in custody over an 10 adjournment of a criminal case. Triantafyllides, P., having repeated that s, 25

(2)of Law 14/60 does not create an unlimited right of appeal in criminal cases but only a right of appeal regulated by Cap. 155,in dismissing the appeal, said at p. 82:" We do not propose to refer to other cases in the past in 15 which appeals against remand orders were entertained; because none of them involved a remand order at a stage of the proceedings such as the one in the present case. In the absence of any authority to the contrary—and none was cited—we are of the opinion that it is not possible to 20 construe section 157 in such a manner as to deduce from its provisions that we possess jurisdiction thereunder to interfere on appeal with an order for remand in custody made on the adjournment of the hearing of a criminal case by another Court exercising criminal jurisdiction." 25 Pausing here for a moment, if the effect of detention was at the root of the appellate jurisdiction exercised in respect of decisions as to bail, the Supreme Court has not consistently upheld this as a reason for conferring jurisdiction to the said Court to hear an appeal against detention. In Savva and Another (No. 1) v. ThePolice,

(1977)* 12J.S.C. 2088, a case of bail, Triantafyllides, P., dealing with the objection of counsel for the respondents that the Court of appeal did not possess jurisdiction to deal with those appeals under s. 157 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, said at p. 2089:"He has submitted, in this respect, that, as has been decided in cases such as Xenophontos v. Charalambous, 1961 * To be reported in

(1977)2 C.L.R. 56 30 35 2 C.L.R. . 5 10 15 Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others Hadjianastassiou J. C.L.R. 122, Christofi v. The Police,

(1970)2 C.L.R. 117, Georghadjiand another v. The Republic,

(1971)2 C.L.R. 229 and Lazarou and others v. The Police,

(1973)2 C.L.R. 81, the right of appeal provided for under section 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14/60), can be exercised in criminal matters on the basis only of the relevant provisions of Cap. 155. We see no reason to disagree with him on this point. He has, however, went on to argue further that in dealing with the present appeals we would not be a 'Court exercising criminal jurisdiction', in the sense of section 157

(1)of Cap. 155, and, consequently, we are not vested with jurisdiction to entertain them. It seems that counsel for the respondents thought fit to raise this objection regarding our jurisdiction in view of the fact that in Leftisv. The Police,'

(1973)2 C.L.R. 87, we chose not to pronounce finally in this connection." Then, the learned President, having referred to Varellasand Others v. The Police, 19 C.L.R. 46, continued as follows:- 20 25 30 35 40 "...the Supreme Court did not sustain the objection and proceeded to deal with an appeal concerning bail. Since the Varellascase appeals of this kind were made both by persons in custody, to whom bail had been refused, as well as by the police, in cases in which bail had been granted, and in all those cases, to which we need not refer specifically, the appeals were entertained and decided, without any objection as to jurisdiction having been raised. Thus, a practice was established on the basis of what was decided in the Varellascase; but, of course, such practice cannot, in our view, be treated as being of so conclusive a nature as to preclude counsel for the respondents from reverting to the subject of the correct construction of section 157

(1)of Cap. 155. What we have been called upon to decide is whether in dealing with the present appeals we are a 'Court exercising criminal jurisdiction' in the sense of that section; though admittedly this is an issue which did present some difficulty, we have, in the end, reached the conclusion that, since any Court, when dealing at any stage with an application for bail, is exercising for this purpose criminal juris57 Hadjianastassiou J. Attorney-General τ. Pouris & Others

(1979)diction, we, too, when sitting on appeal from a decision concerning bail, are exercising, to the required limited extent, criminal jurisdiction in the sense of section 157

(1)of Cap. 155; in our opinion this view is the one which is the most consonant with the protection of the interests of 5 justice in general and of the liberty of the subject in parti­ cular; and it coincides, too,with theproper construction of section 157

(1), above. We hold, therefore, that we have jurisdiction to proceed to deal with these appeals on their merits." 10 With respect, I was a member of this Court also, as well as in the case of Loizos SavvaandAnother(No. 2) v. The Police,

(1977)* 12J.S.C. 2092, and Itake it that we have assumed juris­ diction to proceed to deal with those appeals, because the said decisions involve theliberty of the subject who would remain in 15 prison without a trial. Whether suchapracticecanbeconsider­ ed as anomalous, Ithink it is toolatenow to try and changethe position as presented in a number of judicial authorities of this Court regarding the right of appeal in Cyprus. Turning now to the question as to whether having regard to 20 the true construction of s. 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960, the Attorney-General is entitled to appeal against the acquittal of the Assize Court,it has been said that thefirstand most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in 25 their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and, other­ wise,intheir ordinary meaning,andthe second,thatthephrases and sentences are tobe construed according totherules of gram­ mar. "It is very desirable in all cases to adhere to the words of anAct of Parliament, givingto themthat sense which is their 30 natural import in the order in which they are placed." See R. v. Ramsgate (Inhabitants), [1827] 6 B.& C.712,per Bayley,J. Furthermore, it was said that from those presumptions it is not allowable to depart where the language admits to noother meaning. Nor should there be any departure from themwhere 35 the language under consideration is susceptible to another meaning, unless adequate grounds are found, either in the hi* To be reported in

(1977)2 C.L.R. 58 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others Hadjianastassiou J. story or cause of the enactment or in the context or in the consequences which would result from the literal interpretation, for concluding that that interpretation does not give the real intention of the legislator. If there is nothing to modify, nothing to 5 order, nothing to qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences. "The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves, and arrive, if possible, at their meaning, without in 10 the first place, reference to cases." (See Barrell & Fordree, [1932] A.C. 676, 682, per Warrington, L.J.; see also Hack v. London Bldg. Society [1883] 23 Ch. D. 103, 108; see also Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th edn., at pp. 3 &4). With this in mind, I will also deal with Mary Sewardand The 15 Owner of the "Vera Cruz", [1884] 10A.C. 59 H.L. In this case, the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 (24 Vict. c. 10) which by s. 7 gave the Court-of Admiralty "Jurisdiction over any claim for damages done by any ship" did not give a jurisdiction over claims for damages for loss of life under Lord Campbell's Act 20 (9 &10Vict. c. 93);and the Admiralty Division cannot entertain an action in rem for damages for loss of life under Lord Campbell's Act. In confirming the decision of the Court of Appeal and dismissing the appeal, Earl of Selborne, L.C. said at pp. 68-69:25 30 35 40 " Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. For that principle I may refer to Hawkins v.Gathercole 6 D.M. &G. 1. That case arose under the judgment Act, 1 &2 Vict. C. 110, s. 13,which provided that a judgment should be binding, inter alia, on all the interest of the debtor in 'lands, tenements, rectories, advowsons, tithes', and so forth, and that for the amount of the judgment these different descriptions of property to which he might be entitled should be charged in the same manner as if 'the person against whom the judgment should have 59 Hadjianastassiou J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)been entered up had power to charge the hereditaments, and had by writing under his hand agreed to charge them with the amount of the debt'. The question arose as to an ecclesiastical benefice. By the restraining Act of Eliza­ beth a clergyman had no power to charge his benefice, 5 but Lord Cranworth thought, when the case came before him in the first instance,that those words in sec.13 relieved him from the want of power indirectly in that particular case, and in favour of the creditor did away with the effect of the restraining Act of Queen Elizabeth, putting him in 10 the situation of a man who could charge, and who had charged. But that decision was reversed: it was held that all those general words about tithes and rectories, and so on, were capable of a reasonable application to subjects not affected by any particular legislation; and that the 15 statute of Elizabeth, not being referred to in any way, the Act being in diversa materia, and not containing the sligh­ test indication of any such intention,was not unnecessarily to be repealed or altered by such general words. I need not read more from the case than the words of Turner 20 L.J. (6 D.M. & G. 31). 'Can', he says, 'the Statute of Elizabeth be held to be practically repealed' (and of course alteration in any important particulars is pro tanto the same) 'by such general words as are contained in the 13th section of this statute? I venture to think that it cannot, 25 grounding that opinion upon the authorities to which I have generally referred, and adding to them the 11th Case in Jenkins, fifth century, in which it is thus said, Ά special statute does not derogate from a special statute without express words of abrogation.' To me it seems to be not 30 only easy but right to construe the words in the Act of 1861 in a sense in which they are quite inapplicable to this particular cause of action, and leave all the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act in full force and effect, not modified or interfered with; because in truth 'damage done by any 35 ship' was a form of expression naturally applicable to that description of damage, maritime damage, as to which, in cases falling within thejurisdiction of the Admiralty Court, the ship was treated as, so to say, in delicto, and was liable to a proceeding in rem, such as the 35th section contem- 40 plated. I think that I have said all that is really necessary. The 60 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General r. Pouris St Others Hadjlanastassion J. argument from the Merchant Shipping Act, as it appears to me, manifestly fails." With respect, I would fully endorse and follow the principle enunciated in that case. In reaching my own conclusion as to 5 the correct meaning of s. 25

(2)of Law 14/60, I shall certainly bear in mind the words of the Lord Chancellor, and I would be guided by such a far reaching statement of the law. The Deputy Attorney-General, in his full and able argument, put forward a number of propositions, and tried to persuade 10 this Court that the new enactment gives such right to the Attorney-General to appeal against the acquittal of the Assize Court; and that it is in the interest ofjustice that he should possess the right to appeal against both convictions and acquittals from the decisions of all Courts. This, he argued, is also within the new 15 constitutional structure calling for a right to an appeal against both conviction as well as acquittal, thus safeguarding at a final stage, through the special structure of the Supreme Court, the constitutional balance of bi~communal justice. See Article 155.3 and 159.4 of the Constitution. 20 I think it is no disrespect not to deal with each separate submission counsel has put forward—certainly he has done his very best in arguing this appeal. Now, section 25

(2)of Law 14/60 says: 25 " Subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law but save as otherwise in this subsection provided every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to the High Court. Any such appeal may be made as of right against conviction or sentence on any ground." 30 Counsel, in trying to construe the provisions of that section, said that the words "but save as otherwise in this sub-section provided" have one true meaning only, and that isthat whatever it follows prevails over any procedural or other limitation or restriction of Cap. 155;and that where there isa conflict, section 35 25 of the Courts of Justice Law prevails. I have considered very carefully all the contentions of counsel for the appellant, and in giving the words of this section their 61 Hadjlanastassion J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)ordinary meaning, I have reached the conclusion that his arguments fail for the following reasons:

(1)The Supreme Court in dealing with the interpretation of s. 25

(2), in a series of decisions established that that section does not confer an unqualified right of appeal, but a limited 5 one, qualified by the opening words "subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law". In my view, these introductory words are intended to save the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law both as to the form that a criminal appeal may be made, as well as in sub- 10 stance. In Rodosthenous & Another(supra),it was expressly held that the introductory parts of s. 25

(2)require that an appeal should bemadein theform envisaged byCap. 155. But obiter dicta in the samejudgment suggested that s. 25

(2)must be read, except to whatever extent there is express departure, 15 subject to the provisions of Cap. 155. This was supported by a decision of the High Court delivered shortly afterwards, viz., Xenophontos v. Charalambous (supra),where it was expressly decided that s. 25

(2)does not confer an unqualified right of appeal against every decision of the Criminal Court, but a 20 limited one conferred by the express provisions of Cap. 155. Two subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court establish firmlythat a right of appeal exists only where it is expressly conferred either by the provisions of Cap. 155, or by the provisions of s. 25

(2)of Law 14/60. See Christofi (supra)and 25 Georghadji and Another (supra). In the latter case, it was pointed out that the limitation of the right of appeal in the manner indicated in no way conflicts with the provisions of Article 155.1 of the Constitution because the Constitution does not provide for a right of appeal against all decisions of 30 the Courts of the Republic, but only for suchrightsas may be conferred by law. I think I have said enough in order to show that the right of appeal is a creation of the legislature.

(2)that the onlyexpressrightofappeal conferred bys.25

(2)is a right of appeal against conviction or sentence;

(3)theexpression in s.25

(2)"but save asotherwise provided" would be superfluous if the legislature intended to establish a right of appeal against every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction. Equally, I think it would be superfluous 62 35 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris St Others Hadjianastassiou J. to express reference to a right of appeal against conviction or sentence.

(4)I think a comparison of the provisions of s. 25

(1)with those of s. 25

(2)is again suggestive of legislative intent. In 5 the former case the right of appeal ismade subject to the rules of Court without qualification, and in the latter it is extended in the way expressly referred to therein. Finally, and having regard to the principle enunciated in a number of cases that a right of appeal cannot be invented and 10 the existence of any such right must be found in the express provisions of a statute, I am of the view that the AttorneyGeneral has no right to appeal against a verdict of acquittal by an Assize Court. I think I ought not to conclude thisjudgment without saying 15 how much I owe in the preparation of it to certain writings in the "Criminal Procedure in Cyprus" by Justice A. Loizou and Judge Pikis. I would dismiss the appeal. A. Loizou J.: The elaboratejudgmentsjust deliveredbymy 20 brother Judges L. Loizou and Hadjianastassiou, which I had the privilege of reading in advance, and with which I agree, have made my task an easy one and render superfluous anything that I might wish to say on the point raised. The wording of section 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 25 1960,is not so clear and unambiguous as to enable meto hold that it confers on the Attorney-General, or to anyone else, a right to appeal against an acquittal from a judgment of an AssizeCourt, whichadmittedly did not existunder theCriminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 and in particular Part V thereof, 30 which specially dealt with the right of appeal; nor is there any clear indication from the words used therein, as it should be in such cases,that thesepre-existingprovisionswerebynecessary implication repealed, altered, or modified, thereby. DEMETRIADES J.: I am also of the opinion that the submis35 sion of counsel for the respondents that the Attorney-General of the Republic is not given, by section 25 of the Courts of Justice Law 14/60, the right to appeal against an acquittal by 63 Demetriades J. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)an Assize Court, must be upheld and that these consolidated appeals must, therefore, be dismissed. I have had the opportunity of reading the judgment of my brother Judges L. Loizou and T. Hadjianastassiou and since I am in full agreement with them I do not propose to make 5 any comments of myown. MALACHTOS J.: I have had the opportunity of reading and fully considering the judgment just delivered by L. Loizou, J. and I must say that I agree with the conclusions reached and the reasons given therein. I am,therefore, ofthe view that noappeal lies from an acquittal by an Assize Court and, consequently, the present appeals should be dismissed. SAWIDES J.: I have read in advance the elaborate judgment just delivered bymy brother Judge L. Loizou and I agree 15 with all that has been said by him in hisjudgment, and I find that I have nothing useful to add. I agree with the result that, having regard to the present state of the Law, there is no right of appeal from an acquittal by an Assize Court and, therefore, the present appeals should 20 be dismissed. TRIANTAFYLLIDESP.: These seven appeals,which were lodged by the Attorney-General of the Republic and which are being heard together in view of their nature,challenge theacquittals— inCriminal CaseNo.22534/77oftheDistrictCourtofLimassol— 25 of therespondents, by an Assize Court sitting in Nicosia; they were acquitted, on September 8, 1978,in respect of four counts charging all seven of them together with the premeditated murders of, respectively, four persons, on July 16, 1974,at a locality near the village of Ayios Tychonas in the District of Limassol. 30 The respondents were not acquitted at the end of their trial before the Assize Court, but when, at the close of the case for the prosecution, the Assize Court sustained submissions by counsel for the respondents, under section 74

(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law,Cap. 155,that a prima facie case had not 35 been made out against their clients, as accused persons, sufficiently to require them to make a defence in respect of the said 64 10 2 CX.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others Triantafyllides p. four counts of premeditated murder. The trial was not, however, concluded then, as, by means of the Ruling upholding the aforementioned submissions of counsel for the respondents, the Assize Court directed the addition to the information of two 5 new counts charging the respondents with use of armed force against the Government and, also, with carrying on war or warlike undertaking, between July 15 and July 17, 1974, that is in the course of the abortive coup d' etat which occurred on July 15, 1974, and called on the respondents to plead to the said new 10 counts. ' At that stage the further progress of the trial was interrupted because the Attorney-General applied, under section 148

(1)of Cap. 155, that the Court should reserve questions of law arising in relation to the acquittals of the respondents for the opi15 nion of the Supreme Court; and this matter is, also, pending before us as Question of Law Reserved No. 175; on the other hand, counsel for the respondents appealed against the addition of the two new counts (Criminal Appeals Nos. 3923-3929); but, for the time being we are dealing only with the appeals of 20 the Attorney-General against the acquittals of the respondents. At the commencement of the hearing of the said appeals (Nos. 3932-3938) counsel for the respondents objected that the Attorney-General of the Republic is not entitled to appeal against a verdict of acquittal by an Assize Court and their ob25 jection has been heard as a preliminary legal issue;thus no arguments were heard regarding the merits of these appeals; and it is in relation to the preliminary issue only that this Decision is now to be delivered. It is common ground that the right of appeal to the Supreme 30 Court isprovided bymeans of section 25of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14/60), which reads as follows:"25.—

(1)Subject to Rules of Court every decision of a Court exercising civiljurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to the High Court. 35

(2)Subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law but save as otherwise in this subsection provided every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to the High Court. 65 Triantafyllides P. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)Any such appeal may be made as of right against conviction or sentence on any ground.

(3)Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Law or in any other Law or in any Rules of Court and in addition to any powers conferred thereby the 5 High Court on hearing and determining any appeal either in a civil or a criminal case shall not be bound by any determinations on questions of fact made by the trial Court and shall have power to review the whole evidence, draw its own inferences, hear or receive further evidence and, 10 where the circumstances of the case sorequire, re-hear any witnesses already heard by the trial Court, and may give anyjudgment or make any order which the circumstances ofthecasemayjustify, includingan order of re-trial bythe trial Court or any other Court having jurisdiction, as the 15 High Court may direct." The provision of section 25 above with which we are particularly concerned issubsection

(2),and theeffect of theopening phrase of the said subsection, namely "Subject to theprovisions oftheCriminal Procedure Law", hasbeen already considered in 20 a number of cases in the past: In Rodosthenous and another v. ThePolice,1961 C.L.R. 48, O' Briain P.said (at p.49) in relation to an appeal against an order refusing bail pending trial:"We are satisfied, having considered this matter, that 25 having regard to the terms of the Courts of Justice Law, section 25,wehavejurisdiction to entertain suchan appeal. Section 25

(2)commences with the words 'subject to the provisions ofthe Criminal Procedure Law' and the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law relating to ap- 30 peals appear to be sections 138 and

1. It is clear that this application is not in compliance with sections 138and
2. We are faced with the express provision of section 138that nonoticeofappeal shall bevalidunlessitcomplies with the requirements of this section." 35 In Xenophontos v. Charalambous, 1961 C.L.R. 122, O'Briain P. stated the following (at pp. 125, 126):"The Attorney-General submitted that section 25, sub66 2 C.L.R. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others Triantafyllides P. section

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960, provides that every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction is appealable to the High Court, but 'subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law'. 5 10 It is, I think, correct that a right of appeal clearly given in unqualified terms in a statute cannot be cut down by provisions of another procedural statute or statutory order. The difficulty arises, from the point of view of the appellant that in section 25 the right of appeal, though clearly given, isno less clearly qualified by the opening words of the subsection." In Christofiv. The Police,

(1970)2 C.L.R. 117,Vassiliades P. paid (at p. 119):- 15 20 "The first question which arises is whether such an appeal lies. Counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted that the appeal lies under section 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (No. 14 of 1960) which reads:'25

(2). Subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, but save as otherwise in this subsection provided, every decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to the High Court. Any such appeal may be made as of right against conviction or sentence on any. ground.' 25 30 35 The submission on behalf of the appellant is that the decision to hold a preliminary inquiry is a 'decision' of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction and, therefore, it is subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court. We find ourselves unable to accept this submission. The section provides that an appeal lies under sub-section

(2)'subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law', save as Otherwise provided' in the sub-section. The provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155,governing appeals in criminal cases, are contained in Part V of the statute, section 131 to 153 inclusive. The opening section 131

(1)reads:'131

(1). Subject to the provisions of any other enact67 Triantafyllides P. Attorney-General v. Pouris & Others

(1979)ment in force for the time being, no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction except as provided for by this Law.' It is clear, wethink, that when sub-section

(2)of section 25 of the Courts of Justice Law, refers to 'every decision', 5 thismust be read 'subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law'; and, therefore, it can only refer to 'decisions' which are subject to an appeal under the Criminal Procedure Law. The ruling against which the present appeal is taken, is not, as far as we can see on the basis 10 of the argument that we have heard, such a decision." In Georghadji andanother v. The Republic,

(1971)2 C.L.R. 229, the relatives of a deceased person, who was referred to in the particulars of a count for conspiracy as a co-conspirator with four other persons who were the accused before an Assize 15 Court, applied for permission to enter an appearance in the proceedings through counsel with the right to summon witnesses and the right to speak; the Assize Court refused the application and allowed them only to retain counsel for a watching brief; they appealed against this ruling of the Assize 20 Court and in dismissing their appeal I stated the following (at pp. 233-236):" As has been stated in thejudgment delivered by Vassiliades,P.inthecaseof Christofisv. ThePolice

(1970)2 C.L.R. 117the effect of section 25

(2)of the Courts of Justice Law, 25 1960 (14/60) is that, save as otherwise provided by the said section (in relation to conviction or sentence), an appeal from a decision of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction lies only subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155). 30 Sub-section

(1)of section 131 of Cap. 155 lays down that 'Subject to the provisions of any other enactment in force for the time being, noappeal shall liefrom anyjudgment or order of a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction excep