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(1981)1981 October 9 [SAWIDES, J.] LINMARE SHIPPING CO. LTD., Plaintiffs, v. MOUNIR BOUSTANI, Defendant. (AdmiraltyAction No. 18/79). Promissory estoppel—Charterparty—Demurrage—Shipowners having a lien on cargo for demurrage—Defendant not a party to the charterparty but givingassurances to owners that he would pay demurrage—Owners relying on such assurances and releasing thecargo over which theyhadalien thusacting totheirdetriment 5 —Defendant cannot be permitted to act inconsistently withhis assurances—Adjudged to pay demurrage. Injunction—Interlocutory injunction—Mareva injunction—Restraining defendantfrom removing his assets outof thejurisdictionpending determination of theaction—Judgmentfor plaintiffintheaction— 10 Order continuing inforce Mareva injunction, inaidofexecution, grantedin the exerciseof the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to controlits ownprocessand inparticular in orderto prevent anypossibleabuseof such process—Todo otherwise objectfor which injunction wasgrantedwouldbedefeatedandwouldamount 15 to abuse of the process of the Court. Bymeans of a charterparty dated June 27, 1978,the plaintiffs agreed to hire their vessel "Brothers Luck" to Agence Generaie MaritimeSariandets.,CamileM.BoustanyandEmileBoustany, of Beirut, for the carriage of certain goods from Albania to 20 Beirut. By the said charterparty and addendums thereto it wasagreedthat thecharterers shouldpayto theplaintiffs demurrages al therate of U.S.$1,900 per dayand that the shipowners should have a lien on the cargo for, interalia,demurrage due to the owners. The ship arrived at the discharging porl on 25 the 16th August, 1978, the discharge commenced on the 29th August and was completed on the 9th September,
  1. On 386 1 C.L.R. 5 10 Linmare Shipping v. Boustanl these facts demurrage was incurred at the discharging port amounting to U.S.$28,429,
  2. The defendant was not a party to the above charterparty, but in an addendum thereto he was named as the person to whom cables or telexes relating to the charterparty should be sent; and at a meeting which he had with Mr. Montanius, an advocate acting on behalf of the ship-owners, he assured Mr. Montanios that he was going to pay the demurrages himself. As a result of this promise and assurance the master of the ship, upon being informed of the situation, consented to unload and deliver thecargo, ovei which a lien already existed in favour of the ship-owners, which they could enforce by arresting the cargo, and they thus acted to their detriment. 20 Followingtherefusal ofthedefendant topaytheaboveamount as demurrages the plaintiffs proceededtorecoverthisamountby means of this action and, also, obtained aninterim injunction ("theMarevainjunction")restrainingthedefendant from removing his assets out of the jurisdiction. In the course of his address counsel for theplaintiff appliedthatthemarevainjunction should continue to remain in force after judgment inaid of execution. 25 Counsel for the plaintiff mainly contendedthat inthecircumstancesofthepresent casethedefendant isbound topay because undei the doctrine of promissory estoppel,which is applicable in this case, he should not be permitted to act inconsistently with the said premise or assurance. 15 30 35 Held,(l)thal theplaintiffs' evidenceasto theamount of demurrages due and the reason why such demuriageswere caused,has not beencontested and no evidencewas called by the defendant on this issue to contradict the evidence called by the plaintiffs or substantiate any allegations to the contiary in the answer; and that, therefore, the plaintiffs have proved their claim for demurrages to the extent of U.S.$28,429.70.
(2)On the questionwhetherthe defendantis answerable for theabove amount, afteraccepting theevidence of Mr. Montanios as trueandreliable andrejecting thatof the defendant: That under the doctrine of promissory estoppel where by his words or conduct one party to a transactionmakesto the other a promise or assurance which is intended toaffect thelegal relations between them, and the other party acts upon it altering 387 Limnare Shipping τ. Bonstani
(1981)his position to his detriment, the party making the promise or assurance will notbe permittedto actinconsistently with it (see Hadjiyiannisv.Attorney-General of the Republic
(1970)1 C.L.R. 32 at pp. 48 and 49); that on the evidence as acceptedby this Court it finds that the defendant was well acquainted with all 5 material facts concerning plaintiffs* claim for demurrages in the present case and that by his words and conductpromised and assured the plaintiffs that he would pay the demurrages, as a result of which the plaintiffs relying on such assurance, released the cargo over which they had a lien, thus acting to 10 their detiiment; that, therefore, the plaintiff has proved his claimagainst thedefendant; accoidingly judgment will be given against the defendant for the equivalent in Cypius Pounds of U.S.$dollars 28,429.70 with costs.
(3)On theapplication thatthemarevainjunctionshouldcontinue 15 in force in aid of execution: That if the application of the plaintiffs in this respect is dis­ missed,defendant will be entitled upondelivery of thisjudgment if no provision is made to thecontrarytoremove his assets out of thejurisdiction and,therefore, theobject for which theinjun- 20 ction was granted will be defeated; that leaving it open to the defendant to defeat the veiy purpose for which the injunction was granted, would be an abuse of the process of the Court; that,therefore,intheinherentjurisdiction ofthisCourtto control its own process and in particular to prevent any possible abuse 25 of such process, the application will be granted and an order that theMareva injunction continuein force in aid of execution is made accordingly. Judgment for plaintiff against the defendant for U.S.$ 30 28,429.70 with costs. Order continuing inforceMareva injun­ ction granted. Cases referred to: Hadjiyiannis v. Attorney-General of the Republic
(1970)1 C.L.R. 32 at pp. 48 and 49; Xenopoulosv. Constantinidou
(1979)1 C.L.R. 521; W.J. Adam and Co. Ltd., v. El Nasr Export and Import Co. [1972] 2 All E.R. 127; 388 35 1 C.L.R. JJnmare Shipping v. Doustani MarevaCompagnia NavieraS. A. v. International Bulkcarriers [1975] 2 L1.L.R.509; [1980] 1 All E.R. 213; Stewart Chartering v. C. & O. Managements [1980] 1 All E.R. 718. 5 Admiralty action. Admiralty action for demurrage amounting to the sum of U.S.$28,429.70 or their equivalent in Cyprus currency arising out of the delay in unloading the ship "BROTHERS LUCK" at Port Said, Egypt. 10 G. Michaelides for Montanios and Montanios, for the plaintiffs. S. McBride, for the defendant. Cur. adv. vult. SAVVIDES J. read the following judgment. The plaintiffs' 15 claim in this action against the defendant is for US$28,429.70 or their equivalent in Cyprus currency as demurrages due by the defendant in respect of the ship "BROTHERS LUCK" under a charterparty and/or by virtue of an undertaking by the defendant to pay such demurrages and in the alternative; as 20 damages for breach by the defendant of an agreement to pay such demurrages. The plaintiffs are a shipping "Company and are the owners of the vessel S/T "BROTHERS LUCK". By a charterparty in GENCON form, dated 27th June, 1978, (exhibit 1), entered 25 into between the plaintiffs of the one part and Agence Generate Maritime Sari and ets. and Camile M. Boustany and Emile Boustany, of Beirut, of the other part (hereinafter to be referred to as "the charterers"), the plaintiffs hired their vessel "BROTHERS LUCK" to the charterers for the carriage of a 30 cargo of 5,000 M.T. 5% Moloo Cement from Durres, Albania, to Beirut. By an addendum No. 1(exhibit 2a) to the aforesaid charterpaity, it was agreed that the discharging port shall be substituted to one safe Egyptian Mediterranean port, and by an addendum No. 2 (exhibit 2b) to the aforesaid charterparty 35 the charterers nominated as discharging port Port Said, Egypt. Bythe aforesaid charterparty and addendums 1 and 2 thereto, it was agreed that the charterers should pay to the plaintiffs demurrages at the rate of US$1,900.—per day or pro rata for any part of a day payable every three days in advance, less 389 Sawides J. Limnare Shipping v. Boustani
(1981)2 1/2% address commission. By Clause 8 of the aforesaid charterparty, it was provided that the owners should have a lien on the cargo for, interalia, demurrage due to the owners. The said vessel, according to the plaintiffs, arrived at port anchorage Port Said at 19.00 hrs. On the 16th August, 1978, 5 and noticeof readiness (copy of which was producedasexhibit 5),wasthereupontenderedtothecharterersagentswho accepted thesameat 10.00hrs. of the 17thAugust, 1978. Thedischarge commenced at 08.00 hrs. on the 29th August, 1978, and was completed at 11.00 hrs. on the 9th September, 1978. These 10 facts are affirmed by an agreed statement of facts dated 9th September, 1978, copy of which, bearing the signatures of the parties concerned was produced as exhibit 4. It is alleged that in the light of the above, demurrage was incurred at the discharging port amounting to US$28,429,70. 15 Two bundles of documents consisting of copies of telexes andtelegramsexchangedbetweentheplaintiffs andthecharterers and theplaintiffs andoneNaoum,a shippingagentof Limassol, alleged by the plaintiffs to be the agent of the defendant, in connection with the present case, were produced as exhibits 20 6(a)to 6(g),and 7(a)to 7(f), subject to a reservation byCounsel for the defendant as to whether they were relevant or binding on the defendant. The version of the plaintiffs as to how the defendant enters the sceneis as follows: Intheaddendum No. 2totheCharter- 25 paity (exhibit 2(
  1. b)) in paras. 'D' and Έ ' the following are recorded: "D. Cableor telex to NAUSHIP with ETA P. Saidalso DATE/ TIME of vessel's arrival at P. Said, above cable to be sent attention Mr. MOUNIR BOUSTANY. E. MASTERtophoneifpossible Mr.MOUNIRBOUSTANY at Phone No. 68619 or 68988 LIMASSOL advising him vessel's ETA P. SAID AND DATE/TIME of vessel's » arrival". On the 18.8.1978 and 24.8.1978 two cables (exhibits6(
  2. b)and 35 6(
  3. a)) respectively, were sent by the Master of the ship to the defendant advising him of thearrival of thevessel and holding him fully responsible for delays due to non-presentation of 390 30 1 C.L.R. Linmare Shipping v. Boustani Sawides J. documents for, discharge of cargo. Such telegraphs were sent to.Naoum Shipping.Company with attention to the defendant. . On the.23.8.1978 the following telex (exh. 7(
  4. b)) was sent 5 by Camile Boustani, one of the charterers, to the plaintiffs: 10 "Communicated contents (of plaintiffs' telex of same date) to buyers Mounir Boustani Limassol C/o Naoum Snipping, requesting them settle demurrage with you as per our agreement with them. Suggest you also get in touch with them on the subject". On the same day in an exchange of deliberations in the same telex (exh. 7(
  5. c)) between the Master of the ship (P.W.I) and Naoum, the latter alleging that the defendant was near him reading the message, the following were stated: 15 20 "Captain Linas (P.W.I). Good evening this is Naoum on the telex and Mr. Mounir G. Boustani is next to me reading message. About demurrages no problem, we are giving instructions to receivers to cash it to Master if you wish which is the quickest way. (From P.W.I) Redemurragesisimperativeto havelatest tomorrow noon. (From Naoum) 25 OK directly to you or shall we give them to Master and he will confirm it to you as you wish Capt. Linas. (From P.W.I) Please arrange with Mr. Boustani and his bank to confirm remittance of the three first days demurrage. (From Naoum) 30 OK noted Mr. Boustany isreading your message now and he saysthat youget him out of thisheadachefor discharge the earliest in the morning please". On 26.8.1978 the plaintiffs sent a telex (exh. 6(
  6. d)) to the defendant and Naoum at the address of Naoum Shipping Company in Limassol expressing their disappointment for the delay 35 in payment of demurrages contrary to what had been agreed and asking defendant to hand over to Mr. Montanios within 391 Sawides J. Linmare Snipping v, Boustani
(1981)the same day a cheque covering demurrages already due and to arrange for all future demurrages to be paid timely in order to avoid complications. On 28.8.1978 a telex (exh.7(d) ) was sent by Naoum to the plaintiffs explainingthereasonfor delayof settlement ofdemurrages and stating inter alia: 5 "We regret we did not honour our promise and thereisnointentionatallforavoidingtosettledemurrages". On29.8.1978thefollowingtelex(exh.7(e)) wassentbyEmile Boustani, one of the charterers, to the plaintiffs: 10 "Ref. your telex 28/8 to Camile Boustani guidance my brother Camile presently abroad. I have phoned Mounir Boustani in Cyprus requesting him to settle matter with you without delay in order to avoid consequences. He promised that he will deposit a bank guarantee in your 15 favour until settlement of your claim. Presume matter arranged by now". On 24.8.1978 the following telex (exh. 8) was sent by the plaintiffs to Mr. Montanios, their advocate in Limassol: "We refer to our todays telephone conversation in which 20 on behalf of owners, we have authorised you to accept/ collect demurrage at discharging port of Port Said i.e. US$5,557.50 representing demurrage 24-27/8 X US$ 1,900.—less 2.5 add comm. You are further authorised to collect all future demurrage 25 which is payable every three days in advance. The above amount and all future amounts will be paid by Mr. M. Boustani and/or Mr. Naoum who is contactable at phone 54939/55226 telex 2029". After receipt of the telex of 24.8.1978, Mr. E. Montanios 30 tried to get in touch with Naoum and the defendant which he finally succeeded and both Mr. Naoum and the defendant attended Mr. Montanios's office. According to the evidence of Mr. Montanios, Mr. Naoum, who was a shipping agent, presentedhimselfasactingforthedefendant inthiscase. Whilst 35 at his office, Mr. Montanios told them that he had instructions 392 1 C.L.R. Llomare Snipping ?. Boustani SawWes J. to collect the money due according to their agreement because the ship owners had telephoned to himin this respect andtalso had sent him a telex (exh.8)the contents of which heconveyed to the defendant and Mr. Naoum. 5 A conversation took place between Mr. Montanios and the defendant during which Mr. Montanios asked the defendant if he had brought the cheque. The defendant did not deny any connection with the case, but on the contrary he asked to beinformed whythere was such a delay because, as he said, 10 according to the evidence of Mr. Montanios, "I have a lot of money,thisispeanutsfor me,Ican payimmediatelybut I want to know why there was this delay. I do not want people to fool me". According to the evidence of Mr. Montanios the defendant assured him that he wasgoingto pay and as a result 15 the master of the ship upon being informed of the situation consented to unload and deliver the cargo over which a lien already existed in favour of the plaintiffs which they could enforce by arresting the cargo. On 22.9.1981 the plaintiffs sent to the defendant through 20 N?oum ShippingCompany anexpressregistered letterenclosing copy of the Time Sheet of discharging with particulars of the demurrages claimed to which no reply was received as a result of which the present action was instituted. The facts related to the demurrages are supported by the 25 evidence of the master of the ship, P.W.I, and details appear on the agreed statement of facts signed by the parties to the charterparty (exh.4)and they havenot been seriously contested by the defendant, his line of defence being that hehad nothing to do with the present case and that the evidence of the master 30 and the contents of the documents is, so far as his name is mentioned, hearsay evidence. The defendant in his evidence, which was given in Arabic and interpreted into English, denied any connection with either the charterers or the plaintiffs. His story was that Camile 35 Boustany (one of the charterers) and Naoum with whom he had no business transactions whatsoever, approached him in Limasscl and requested him to help them in disposing a cargo of cement which was loaded on a ship in Limassol Port and in response to their request piomised and in fact did help 393 Sarrides J. Linmare Shipping v. Boustani
(1981)them in disposing such cargo by introducing to them the Manager of the Arab Foreign Trading Co. who happened to come to Cyprus. He had no other contact either with the Charterers or Naoum and in any event nonewith the plaintiffs. As to the meeting at theoffice of Mr. Montanioshis version was as follows: 5 "A. I with Naoum went to the office of Mr. Montanios. The lawyer was insisting on seeing me three times but I went on this occasion with Naoum. Iwent and I told him that I had nothing to do with this business. The responsible 10 people is Arab Foreign Trading Co. Montanios asked me: 'Is this Camile your brother?', and I told him no. Q. Did you promise to pay the demurrages? A. I told him: 'Do not insist on asking me, 1 have nothing to do with Camile Boustani, my name is Mounir and Ϊ 15 have nothing to do with this case'. Q. Did you try to help in this case? A. Ask Naoum and ask Camile Boustani about this case". He denied that he said anything to Mr. Montanios to the effect that he was a rich man and that he had a lot of money 20 and could pay and that he only wanted to know why therehad been a delay at Port Said. Hefurther denied that Mr.Monta­ nios mentioned anything about the telex (exh.8). To a further question as to the reason why he was called by Mr. Montanios at his office together with Naoum he said that 25 the conversation with Mr. Montanios was as follows: "Do you know something about thecase of the ship'BRO­ THERS LUCK', I said "I know nothing about it, I do not know the owner of the ship, I do not know thename of the ship, the only thing I know is that Camile Boustani 30 sold the cement to the Egyptian firm". Defendant admitted that he knew Naoum and he used to seehim at his office, but denied thattheyever had any conversa­ tion with Naoum about this case or that any telexes were com­ municated to him by Naoum in connection with this case. 35 394 1 C.L.R. Linmare Shipping v. Boustani Sawides J. Though the defendant requested that his evidence be given inArabicandtranslated intoEnglish,hegavemetheimpression that he was well acquainted with the English language and.on occasionswhenquestionswereputtohiminEnglishheanswered 5 them in English without waiting for the interpreter to translate same. This appears also from the evidence of Mr. Montanios, according to which, the conversation at his office took place in English. The defendant in giving evidence did not allege that he could not understand and speak English or that there 10 was a misunderstanding as to what was spoken at the office of Mr. Montanios. What hedeniesisthe whole of theconversation as related by Mr. Montanios and substituting his own version as to what was said between him and Mr. Montanios in the presence of Mr. Naoum. 15 As I have already said eailier in thisjudgment, the plaintiffs' evidence as to the amount cf demurrages due and the reason why such demurrages were caused, has not been contested and no evidence was called by the defendant on this issue to contradict the evidence called by plaintiffs or substantiate any 20 allegationstothecontrarycontainedintheanswer. I, therefore, findthat the plaintiffs have proved their claim for demurrages to the extent of US$28,429.70. What remains to beconsidered and which isthe issue in the piesent case, iswhether the defendant is answerable for this amount. 25 The plaintiffs tried to prove their case against the defendant bya seriesof documents in an effort to connect the defendant with the transaction and also by the oral evidence of advocate Mr. Montanios—who was acting for the plaintiffs—regarding an undertaking by the defendant to pay the amount of demur30 rages due, which induced the plaintiffs to proceed with the delivery of the cargo, 1hus abandoning their lien on same. The defendant on the other hand, denied any knowledge of any correspondence between the plaintiffs and the charterers or the plaintiffs and Mr. Naoum concerning him, and, he 35 further denied that the alleged conversation between him and Mr. Montanios did ever take place. The whole issue has to be decided on the acceptance or not of the evidence of Mr. Montanios, because in the absence of 395 Sawides J. Unmare Shipping v. Boustani
(1981)such evidence, I agree with what has been argued by Counsel for the plaintiffs that any reference to the defendant in correspondence exchanged between the plaintiffs and third parties or any mention of his name in an addendum to a charterparty not signed by him, is not by itself sufficient evidence to prove 5 any claim against him. In the case before me, I have no hesitation in accepting the evidence of Mr. Montanios as true and reliable evidence as against that ofthedefendant whoseversion Ihavenot believed, and infindingthat what took place in his office was as related by him. The defendant went to the office of Mr. Montanios together with Mr. Naoum after a request over the telephone to Mr. Naoum, whom Mr. Montanios described as the agent of the defendant. The evidence of Mr. Montanios on this point was as follows: "A I managed to contact Mr. Naoum and arranged for him and Mr. Boustani to come to myoffice, Mr. Boustani, the defendant, who is in Court today and I see him. Q. And did they come to your office? A. Yes,finallythe defendant came to my office accompanied 20 by Mr. Naoum. Mr. Naoum is a shipping agent and he was the shipping agent who presented himselfas actingfor Boustani in this case". (The underlining is mine). And in cross-examination: "I addressed the question because I understood that Mr. 25 Naoum wasactingasagent andthe questionwasaddressed to Boustani, have'you brought the cheque? Because he would hand over the cheque". Mr. Montanios was not cross-examined as to how Mr. Naoum presented himself as acting for the defendant or how 30 he understood that Mr. Naoum was acting as agent of the defendant. Though the evidence of Mr. Montanios was so crucial in this case and, though Mr. Montanios said in his evidence that the conversation took place in the presence of Mr. Naoum 35 who presented himself as the agent of the defendant, the defendant did not call Mr. Naoum, whom he knew so well 396 10 15 1 C.L.R. Linmare Shipping v. Boustani Sawides J. and used to visit him in his office, according to his evidence, to contradict Mr. Montanios and support his version that the only connection he had with the ship and the charterers was to introduce to them a buyer at the request of Mr. Naoum 5 to facilitate the charterers in disposing the cargo. Counsel for the defendant submitted that his client does not understand English well and Mr. Montanios might have misunderstood what defendant said. The defendant did not allege in his evidence that he could not understand or could not follow 10 the conversation between Mr. Montanios and himself. Mr. Montanios, accordingtohisevidence,explained to the defendant the reason he called him at his office and communicated to him the contents of the telex (exhibit 8) which was connecting the defendant with the case and the claim for demurrages. The 15 defendant when confronted with such situation did not reject the allegations contained in exhibit 8, that he had to pay for such demurrages, but on the contrary by his words and conduct promised and assured the plaintiffs that he would pay the demuirages, as a result of which the plaintiffs released the cargo 20 and lost their lien over it, thus acting to their detriment. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that in the ciicumstances of the present case the defendant is bound to pay, as under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which is applicable in the present case, he should not be permitted to act inconsistently 25 with his said promise or assurance. The doctrine of promissory estoppel was examined in the case of Hadjiyiannis v. Attorney-General of the Republic
(1970)1 C.L.R.
  1. As stated in the aforesaid judgment at pp. 48 and 49: 30 35 "The doctrine of promissory estoppel is to the following effect, that is to say, where by his words or conduct one )arty to a transaction makes to the other a promise or Assurance which is intended to affect the legal relations between them, and the other party acts upon it, altering his position to his detriment, the party making the promise or assurance will not be permitted to act inconsistently with it: See Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. [1877] 2 App. Cas.
  2. H.L.; Birmingham &District Land Co. v. L. & N. W. Ry. [1888] 40 Ch. D. 268; Central London 397 Sawides J. Linmare Shipping v. Boustani
(1981)Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1947] K.B. 130; Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215; Foot Clinics
(1943)Ltd. v. Cooper's Gowns, Ltd. [194η K.B. 506;Charles Richards Ltd. v. Oppenhaim[1950] 1 K.B. 616; Braithwaite v. Winwood [I960] 1 W.L.R. 1257; Ajayi v. R.T. Briscoe 5 (Nigeria) [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1326 at 1330. This is 'the gist of the equity': Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Tungsten Electric Co. Ltd. [1955] 1 W.L.R. 761 at 764, per Lord Simonds (also at pages 781, 799). See also Evangelou v. Crompton
(1954)20 C.L.R. Part I, page 122, 10 a case which was decided by the District Court of Nicosia, in which these principles were applied". The same principle was reiterated in Xenopoulosv. Constantl· nidou
(1979)1 C.L.R. 521 in which reference is also made to the more recent decision of WJ. Adam and Co., Ltd., v. El 15 Nasr Export and Import Co., [1972] 2 All E.R. 127 in which Lord Denning, M.R. restated his views that detriment need not be proved in cases of promissory estoppel as follows: " I know that it has been suggested in some quarters that there must be detriment. But I can find no 20 support for it in the authorities cited by the judge. The nearest approach to it is the statement of Viscount SIMONDS in the Tool Metal case, that the other must have been led to alter his position, which was adopted by Lord HODSON in Emmanuel Ayodeji 25 Ajayi v. R.T. Briscoe (Nigeria), Ltd. But that only means that he must have been led to act differently from what he otherwise would have done". However in that case the other two members of the Court of Appeal left the question open, STEPHENSON, L.J. because he held the promisee had acted to his detriment and MEGAW, L.J., because he held that there had been a consensual variation of the contract for consideration. On the evidence as accepted by me, I find that the defendant was well acquainted with all material facts concerning plaintiffs' claim for demurrages in the present case and that by his words and conduct promised and assured the plaintiffs that he would pay the demurrages, as a result of which the plaintiffs relying on such assurance, released the cargo over which they had a 398 30 35 1 C.L.R. Linmart Shipping v. Boustani Sawides J. lien, thus acting to their detriment. I, therefore, find that plaintiff has proved his claim against the defendant and I give judgment for plaintiff against the defendant for the equivalent in Cyprus Pounds of U.S. dollars $28,429.70 with costs. Costs 5 to be assessed by the Registrar. In the course of his address, counsel»for plaintiffs applied that the interim injunction restraining the defendant to take assetssufficient to coverplaintiffs* claim out of thejurisdiction, continue in force after judgment in aid of execution. The said 10 injunction, generally known asa Marevainjunction (see Mareva CompagniaNaviera S.A. v. InternationalBulkcarriers [1975] 2 L1.L.R. 509[1980] 1All E.R. 213)was granted on the application of the plaintiffs when this action was instituted and by consent was extended pending the final determination of the 15 action. There is no doubt that if the application of the plaintiffs in this respect is dismissed, defendant will be entitled upon deliveryofthisjudgment,ifnoprovisionismadetothecontrary, to remove his assets out of the jurisdiction and, therefore, the 20 object for which the injunction was granted, be defeated. The question of allowing a Mareva injunction to continue in force in aid of execution, was dealt with recently in the case of Stewart Chartering v. C. & O. Managements [1980] 1 All E.R. 718 in which Robert Goff, J. had this to say: 25 30 35 "I am therefore presented with the paradoxical situation that, because the plaintiffs have obtained an injunction designed to prevent the defendants from removing assets from the jurisdiction in order to prevent the plaintiffs from satisfying any judgment, they are inhibited from signing judgment in default of appearance which is, in the present situation, the next step which would ordinarily be taken by them with a view to enforcing their claim. The solution to this problem lies, in my judgment, in the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to control its own process, and in particular to prevent any possible abuse of that process. If the plaintiffs were unable to obtain a judgment in the present case without abandoning their Mareva injunction, it would be open to a defendant to 399 Sawides J. Linmare Shipping v. Boustani
(1981)defeat the very purpose of the proceedings simply by declining to enter an appearance. Suoh conduct would be an abuse of the process of the Court; and in my judgment the Court has power to take the necessary steps, by virtue of its inherent jurisdiction, to prevent any such abuse of 5 its process. The appropriate action to be taken by the Court in such circumstances is, in my judgment to grant leave to the plaintiffs, in an appropriate case, to enter judgment in default of appearance, notwithstanding that the writ is indorsed with a claim for an injunction. If 10 the Court so acts, it can also ordei that the Mareva injunction continue in force after thejudgment, in aid of execution. The purpose of a Mareva injunction is to prevent a defendant fiom removing his assets from the jurisdiction so as to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining the fruits 15 of his judgment; from this it follows that the policy underlying the Mareva injunction can only be given effect to if the Court has power to continue the Mareva injunction after judgment, in aid of execution. In my judgment, the piesent case is an appropriate case 20 for the Court so to proceed. I therefore give leave to the plaintiffs to enter judgment; and I shall also order that the Mareva injunction continue inforce in aid of execution". Adopting the view expressed bythe learned Judge in the above case, I also feel that leaving it open to the defendant to defeat 25 the very purpose for which the injunction was granted, would be an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, in the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to control its own process and in particular to prevent any possible abuse of such process, I grant the application and I make an order that the Mareva 30 injunction continue in force in aid of execution. Judgment for plaintiffs against the defendant for U.S.$28y429.70 with costs. Order continuing in force Mareva injunction granted. 400 35

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AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.