clr/1981/1981_1_401.pdf

(2)of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2 (as amended)—Whether Chairmancan appeal against the decisionof the Disciplinary Board—Section 17

(4)of theAdvocates Law (as set outin section 8 of Law 40/75). Advocates Law Cap.2 (as amended)—Chairman of LocalBarCommittee—Whether a "complainant" withinthe meaning ofsection 17

(4)of theLaw (as set outinsection 8of Law40/75). 10 On October 25, 1976, the Chairman of the Local Bar Committee of Limassol, acting under section 17

(2)(c) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2 (as amended by Laws 42/61, 20/63, 46/70 and 40/75) made a report* to the Attorney-General of the Republic, as Chairman of the Advocates Disciplinary Board, to the effect that Advocate A. Neocleous, of Limassol, ("the respondent-advocate"), has committed the disciplinary offences of disgraceful or unprofessional conduct because he,has served as a Minister under Nicolaos Sampson in the Council of Ministers which was formed during the coup d'etat of July, 1974. The Disciplinary Board acquitted the respondent advocate onthegroundthathisconduct didnotconstituteanydisciplinary offence either under S.17

(1)of the Advocates Law (supra) or under the provisions of the Advocates (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1966. The Chairman of the Local Bar Committee of 15 20 • The report is quoted in full at pp. 403-4 post. 401 Ιο re Χ.Υ. an Advocate

(1981)Limassol, acting under s. 17

(4)* of the Advocates Law(supra), as set out in section 8 of the Advocates (Amendment) Law, 1975 (Law 40/75), filed an appeal against the decision of the Disciplinary Board. On the solepreliminarypoint whether, in view of theprovisions of thesaidsection17

(4),the Chairman of theLimassol Bar Com­ mitteehadarightof appealagainst thedecision of the Disciplinary Board: 5 Held,(Triantafyllides, P. and Demetriades J. dissenting) that the Chairman of the Limassol Local Bar Committee cannot 10 be consideied as a "complainant" under section 17

(4)of the Advocates Law (as set out in section 8 of Law 40/75) and in consequence he cannot appeal against the decision of the Advo­ cates Disciplinary Board; accordingly the appeal must be dis­ missed. 15 Appeal dismissed. Cases referred to: Attorney-General of the Republic v. Pouris and Others

(1979)2 C.L.R. 15; Allinson v. GeneralCouncilof MedicalEducation andRegistraHon [1894] 1 Q.B. 760; In re an Advocate, 9 C.L.R. 11; McEniffv. General DentalCouncil [1980] 1 W.L.R. 328 at pp. 330, 331,332. . Appeal. Appeal by the Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee, against the decision o f t h e Disciplinary Board whereby it was decided that the conduct of advocate Andreas Neocleous did not constitute any disciplinary offence either under the provisions of s. 17

(1)of the Advocates Law or under the pro- 30 visions of the Advocates (Practice and Etiquette) Rules, 1966. Section 17

(4)reads as follows: "The Attorney-General of the Republic, the convicted advocate or the complainant may within two months of the delivery of the decision by the Disciplinary Board, appeal to the Supreme Court, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by rules issued by the Supreme Court in this respect, which, in accordance with the aforesaid rules proceeds to thehearingof theappeal andis vestedwith thepower toeither confirm the decision of the Disciplinary Board or set aside or modify it or issue such other order as it may deem fit". 402 20 25 1 C.L.R. 5 Ιο re X.Y. an Advocate P. Pavlou, for the appellant Local Bar Committee of Limassol. L. Clerides with T. Eliades, members of the Advocates Disciplinary Board, as amici curiae. L. Papaphilippouwith G. Kaizer,A. Evzonas, M.Christofides, Chr. Solomis, A. Andreou,for the respondent advocate. Cur. adv. vult. The following judgments weie read: 10 L. Loizou J.: This is an appeal against the decision of the Disciplinary Board of the Bar Association in disciplinary procee­ dings against Mr. Andreas Neocleous an advocate, of Limassol. The facts in so far as they are relevant for the determination of the issue before this Court are briefly as follows: 15 20 25 30 35 On the 25th October, 1976, the then Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee made a report to the Attorney-General of the Republic as Chairman of the Disciplinary Board against the respondent advocate. As expressly stated therein such report was made under the provisions of s. 17

(2)(c) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2 (as amended). The report which is self-explanatory reads as follows: "Έντιμε κ. Συνάδελφε, Ύπό την Ιδιότητα μου ώς Προέδρου τοΰ Δικηγορικού Συλλόγου Λεμεσού καΐ δυνάμει των έΕουσιών δι* ών περιβέβλημαι δυνάμει της παραγράφου (γ) τοΰ εδαφίου

(2)τοϋ άρθρου 17 τοΰ ττερί Δικηγόρων Νόμου ΚΕΦ.2 (ώς έτροποποιήθη) διά τής παρούσης καταγγέλλω τον συνάδελφον Άνδρέαν Νεοκλέους έκ Λεμεσού, ώς ενοχον έπονοιδίστου ή ασυμβιβάστου προς τό επάγγελμα διαγωγής ή/καΙ δια­ γωγής αντικείμενης προς τους περί Δεοντολογίας τώνΔικηγόρων κανονισμούς καΐ δη τους κανονισμούς 2, 3 καΐ 4 ή/καΙ άλλους τοιούτους διότι εδέχθη διορισμόν καΐ υπηρέτησε ώς υπουργός είς τό ύπό τόν κ. ΝικόλαονΣαμψώνπραίικοπηματικόν καΐ παράνομον Ύπουργικόν Συμβούλιον. Ή παρούσα καταγγελία υποβάλλεται ύμϊν κατόπιν εντολής ιού Δικηγορικού Σώματος Λεμεσού έν Γενική Συνελεύσει λαβούση χώραν την 24ην Μαΐου 1975 καΐ της δυνάμει της εναυτή ληφθείσης αποφάσεωςγενομένης είς έμέ έγγραφου καταγγελίας αριθμού δικηγόρων μελών τοϋ Δικηγορικού Συλλόγου Λεμεσού". 403 L. Loizou J. ID re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)("In my capacity as Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee and byvirtue ofthepowers with which Iamvested on the basis of paragraph (c) of subsection

(2)of section 17of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2 (as amended), I hereby report my colleague Andreas Neocleous, of Limassol, 5 as guilty of disgraceful or unprofessional conduct and/or conduct which is contrary to the Advocates Rules of Etiquette and in particular rules 2, 3and 4, and/or any such other rules, because he had accepted appointment and served as a Minister in the 'illegal Council of Ministers' 10 formed by the coup d'etat under Mr. Nicolaos Sampson. Thepresent report issubmitted toyouontheinstructions ofthe Limassol Bai Association ata General meetingwhich took place on the 24th May, 1975, and on the basis of a decision taken during it upon a written report made to 15 me by a number of advocates members of the Limassol Bar Association"). By its decision of the 9th January, 1980, the Disciplinary Board, being of the opinion, for the reasons stated in full in the said decision, that the conduct of the advocate concerned 20 reported by the Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee did notconstituteanydisciplinary offence eitherunder theprovisions of s. 17

(1)of the Advocates Law or under the provisions of the Advocates (Practice and Etiquette) Rules, 1966, came totheconclusion that thecasedidnot fallwithin itscompetence. 25 On the 4th February, 1980, the present Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee presumably acting under the provivisions of s.l7

(4)of the Advocates Law (as set out in s.8 of the Advocates (Amendment) Law, 1975 (Law 40 of 1975) )filed an appeal in this Court against the decision of the Disciplinary 30 Board challenging its correctness on four grounds. Onthe26th Apiil, 1980,counsel appealingfor the respondent advocate filed a notice to the effect that at the hearing of the appeal they would apply to the Court that certain preliminary points of law be heard in the first instance. 35 When the appeal came up for hearing before the Full Bench of this Court an application was made on behalf of the respondent advocate that the first of such points of law be heard as a preliminary issue. This preliminary point reads as follows: 404 1 C.L.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate L. LoEzoa J. " ( α ) "Οτι δέν υπάρχει νομίμω*&φεσι$ενώπιον τοϋ 'Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου". ("That there is not in law an appeal before the Supreme Court")5 With the consent of all concerned and with the leave of the Court this legal issue was heard as a preliminary point of law. And this is the only issue that this Court has to decide at this stage. The substance of the arguments advanced on behalf of the 10 respondent, very biiefly, were: 15 20 (a) That in the light of the provisions of sub-section

(2)of s.17 and sub-section

(4)of the same section (as set out in s.8 of Law 40 of 1975) the Chairmanof the Limassol BarCommi­ ttee has no right of appeal not being a complainant (παραπονούμενος) and that, therefore, these proceedings could not, in law, commence. (b) That as the Rules for which provision is made in sub­ section

(4)of s.17 for regulating the procedure of filing and hearing an appeal had not been made by the Sirpieme Couit the said section is imperfect in th9 sense that it is not yet appli­ cable. Counsel appearing as amici curiae agreed with the above submissions, although they had some doubts in so far as the part of the aigument relating to the rules was concerned, and 25 further added that in view of the provisions of s.17

(7)of Cap. 2 which provides that "the Disciplinary Board in carrying out an enquiry under this section shall have the same powers and shall conduct the enquiry as nearly as may be as a Couit of summary jurisdiction" even if there was a right of appeal by 30 the Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee there would be no such right in case of acquittal and this in view of the provi­ sions of sections 131

(2)and 137

(1)of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155. The case of TheAttorney-General of theRepublic v. Pouris and Others

(1979)2 C.L.R. 15 was cited in support 35 of this proposition. The substance of the argument of counsel for the appellant onthis issue, on theotherhand,was thattheword "complainant" (παραπονούμενοξ) in sub-section

(4)of s. 17 included the Chairman of a Local Bar Committee. He mainly based his 405 L. Lolzou J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)argument on the dictionary meaning of the woids "report" and "complainant". It was further contended that s.l7

(4)gave a substantive .right which could not be defeated in view of a procedural technicality and that it was not legally possible to divide the whole section in two parts and say that the first 5 part is in force and the second is not. It will be convenient and useful,to give a brief account of thedevelopment ofourlawrelatingtothedisciplineofadvocates to its present state. Prior to the enactment of the Advocates Law, 1933 (Law 10 20 of 1933) there was no provision in the Advocates Laws, for the time being in force, with regard to discipline. The only provision until then was to be found in clause 183of the Cyprus Courts of Justice Order 1882 which was subsequently reproduced in clause 192of the Cyprus Courtsof Justice Order 15 1927. By the enactment of Law 20 of 1933 on the 8th June, 1933, the previous enactments relating to advocateswereconsolidated and amended and provision relating to discipline was made in s.ll thereof which reads as follows: 20 "11.

(1)TheSupremeCourt shallhave powerto orderthe nameofanyadvocatetobestruckofftheRollofAdvocates or to order any advocate to be suspended from practising during such period as it may think fit; and any Court shall have power to suspend any advocate temporarily 25 from practisingbeforeitpendingareference tothe Supreme Court which may confirm, disallow or extend the period of such suspension or may order such advocate to besuspended from practising in any Court in Cyprus during the period of his suspension or may order his name to be 30 struck off the Roll.

(2)Where by any such order as aforesaid the name of any advocate is ordered to be struck off the Roll or any advocate is suspended from practice the Chief Registiar shall forthwith upon thefilingof the order cause a notice 35 statingtheeffect oftheoperativepartthereoftobepublished in the Cyprus Gazette.

(3)The Supreme Court may, if it thinks fit, at any 406 1 C.L.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate L. Lofzou J. time after the expiration of five years from the date of an order striking the name of an advocate off the Roll of Advocates, order the Chief Registrar to replace on the Roll the name of such advocate." 5 Theabovesectionwasnot affected byany oftheamendments toLaw20of 1933 untilthe 11thJanuary, 1949,whentheAdvocates (Amendment) Law, 1949 (Law 2 of 1949) was enacted. By^s.3 of the above Law s.ll of Law 20 of 1933was repealed and the following section was substituted therefor: 10 "11.

(1)If any advocate is convicted by any Court of any offence which,intheopinionoftheSupremeCourt,involves moral turpitude or is,intheopinion ofthe Supreme Court, guilty of disgraceful, fraudulent or unprofessional conduct, the Supreme Court may— 15 (

1. a)order the name of the advocate to be struck off the Roll of Advocates; (
2. b)suspend the advocate from practising for such period as the Court may think fit; 20 (
3. c)order the advocate to pay, by way of fine, any sum not exceeding five hundred pounds; (
4. d)warn or reprimand the advocate; (
5. e)make such order as to the payment of the costs of the proceedings before the Supreme Court as the Court may think fit. 25 30 35

(2)Proceedings to enforce any of the penalties provided by sub-section

(1)may be commenced by the Supreme Court of its own motion or by an application to a Judge of the Supreme Court in Chambers for a rule to issue to the advocate calling upon him to show causewhy he should not be dealt with under the provisions of the said sub-section. An application under this sub-section may be made by the Attorney-General or, withtheleaveofthe Supreme Court, by any person aggrieved by the conduct of the advocate.

(3)Where by any order mads by the Supreme Court 407 L. Loizou J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)under the provisions of sub-section

(1)the name of any advocateisordered tobestruckoffthe Rolloranyadvocate is suspended from practice, the Chief Registrar shall forthwith cause anoticestatingtheeffect thereof tobe published in the Gazette. 5

(4)Hie Supreme Court may, if it thinks fit, at any time after the expiration of five years from the date of an order striking the name of an advocate off the Roll of Advocates, order the Chief Registrar to replace on the Roll the name of such advocate. The Chief Registrar 10 shall forthwith cause the effect of any such order to be published in the Gazette.

(5)For the purposes of compelling payment of any fineor any costs ordered to be paid under the provisions of this section, the Supreme Court shall have power to 15 issue the same process asmaybeissued to compel payment of a judgment debt". This section was reproduced as s.10 in the Advocates Law, Cap. 3 in the 1949 edition of the Laws of Cyprus. Cap. 3 wasrepealedbytheAdvocatesLaw, 1955(No.38of 1955)which 20 by its sections 11,12 and 13madethefollowing provisions relating to discipline: "11. Every advocate shall be deemed to be an officer of the Supreme Court and shall be liable to disciplinary proceedings as in this Part provided. 25 12.

(1)There shall be established a Disciplinary Board to exercise, subject to the provisions of this Law, control and disciplinary jurisdiction over every advocate.

(2)TheDisciplinary Board shallconsistof theAttorney -General, or in his absence or incapacity of the Solicitor- 30 General, as Chairman, the Chairman of the Bar Council, as ex officio member, and three advocates, out of whom two shall have not less thanfifteenyears practice, elected every three years by an ordinary general meeting of the Bar Association, to hold office, until another election 35 takes place, as elected members: Provided that anyelected member whoseperiod of office has expired shall continue to hold oflSce for the purpose 408 1 CX.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate L. Lofzoa J. of completing any enquiry commenced at the time he was a member: Provided further that in case of absence or incapacity of the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General, the Chairman of the Bar Association shall act as Chairman of the Boaid. 10 15 20 25 30 35 13.

(1)If any advocate is convicted by any Court of any offence which, in the opinion of the Disciplinary Board, involves moral turpitude or if such advocate is, in the Iopinion of the Disciplinary Board, guilty of disgraceful fraudulent or unprofessional conduct, the Disciplinary Board may— (

1. a)order the name of the advocate to be struck off the * Roll of Advocates; (
2. b)suspend the advocate from practising for such period 1 as the Disciplinary Board may think fit; (
3. c)order the advocate to pay, by way of fine, any sum not exceeding five hundred pounds; (
4. d)warn or reprimand the advocate; (
5. e)make such order as to the payment of the costs of the proceedings before the Disciplinary Board as the Disciplinary Board may think fit.

(2)Proceedings to enforce any of the penalties provided by sub-section

(1)may be commenced— (

1. a)by the Disciplinary Board of its own motion; (
2. b)by the Attorney-General; (
3. c)on a report made to the Disciplinary Board by any Court or a Chairman of a Local Bar Committee; (
4. d)by an application, with the leave of the Disciplinary Board, of any person aggrieved by the conduct of the advocate.

(3)The Disciplinary Board shall forthwith send to the Chief Registrar— (a) copy of any complaint or report made against an advocate under sub-section

(2); (b) copy of its decision in the enquirj, 409 L. Loizou J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)and the Chief Registrar shall, subject to any order of the Supreme Court under sub-section

(4)or

(5), make the necessary entries in the Roll of Advocates.

(4)If no copy of the decision of the Disciplinary Board hasbeonreceived bytheChief Registrar after theexpiration 5 of three months from the date on which any complaint or report has been made to the Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court may make any order in the matter of such complaint or report as the Disciplinary Board might have made under the provisions of sub-section

(1). 10

(5)The Supreme Court may, of its own motion or on the application of the complainant or of the advocate whose conduct is the subject of the enquiry, review the whole case and either confirm the decision of the Disciplinary Board or set it aside or make such other order as 15 it may deem fit.

(6)The Disciplinary Board may, if it thinks fit, at any time after the expiration offiveyears from the date of an order striking the name of an advocate off the Roll of Advocates, inform the Chief Registrar that in the opinion 20 oftheDisciplinary Boardthenameofsuchadvocateshould be restored to the Roll; the Chief Registrar shall refer the matter to the Chief Justice who may direct that the name of such advocate be replaced on the Roll. The Chief Registrar shall forthwith cause a notice of the direction 25 of the Chief Justice to be published in the Gazette.

(7)The Disciplinary Board in canying out an enquiiy under this section shall have the same powers and shall conduct the enquiry as nearly as may be as a Court of summary jurisdiction.

(8)Any decision of the Disciplinary Board shall be deemed to be an order of a Court of summary jurisdiction and shall be enforced in the same manner as an order of such Court is enforced". These sections were reproduced under the same numbers 35 in the Advocates Law, Cap. 2 of the Laws of Cyprus, 1959 edition, but they were subsequently renumbered as sections 15, 16and 17,respectively, by s. 5of Law 5of 1961. 410 30 1 C.L.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate L. Loizou J. Finally section 17was amended by section 8of the Advocates (Amendment) Law, 1975 (No.40 of 1975) by the deletion of sub-sections 3,4, 5and 6 thereof and thesubstitution therefor of the following sub-sections: 10 \ "

(3)ΤόΠειθαρχικόν Συμβούλιον αποστέλλει προς τών Άρχι\ πρωτοκολλητήν άυτίγραφον της αποφάσεως αυτού κατά τήν ίρευναν καΐ 6 Άρχιπρωτοκολλητηξ, μετά τήνπάροδον (τής νενομισμένης προθεσμίας εφέσεως εάν5ένεχη γίνει τοιαύτη ψ\ τηρούμενη? πάσης αποφάσεωςτοϋ Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου, επίτηςγινομένης εφέσεως, ή βάσει τοϋεδαφίου 5,προβαίνει είς τάς άναγκαία$ καταχωρήσεις έυ τ φ Μητρώω τών Δικη­ γόρων. \ 15 20 25 30 35 \

(4)Ό Γενικός ΕΙσαγγελεύς της Δημοκρατίας, ό καταδι­ κασθείς ή ό παραπονούμενος δύναται εντός δύο μηνών άπό της εκδόσεως τ η ;αποφάσεως ύπότοΰ ΠειΘαρχικοϋ Συμβου­ λίου νά έφεσιβάλη ταύτην, συμφώνως προς τήν έπ! τούτω ύπό εκδιδομένου διαδικαστικού κανονισμού υπό τοΰ 'Ανω­ τάτου Δικαστηρίου προβλεπομένην διαδικασίαν, είς τό Άνώτατον Δικαστήριον τό όποιον συμφώνως προς τόν ρηθέντα διαδικαστικόν κανονισμάν προβαίι*ι είς άκρόασιν της εφέσεως καΐ κέκτηται εϋουσίαν όπως είτε επικύρωση τήν άπόφασιν τοΰ Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου είτε άκυρώση ή τροποποίηση ταύτην ή έκδώση έτερον διάταγμα ώς ήθελε θεωρήσει πρέπον.

(5)Παρά ιάς διατάζεις τού εδαφίου

(4)τό Άνώτατον Δικαστήριον κέκτηται έΕουσίαν όπως αυτεπαγγέλτωςάναθεωρή, συμφώνως προς τήν επί τούτω προβλεπομένην διαδικασίαν ύφ*οίουδήποτε διαδικαστικού κανονισμού, οίανδήποτε άπόφασιν τοΰ ΠειΘαρχικοϋ Συμβουλίου διά πειθαρχικόν αδίκημα τελεσθέν εντός τοΰ δικαστικούκτιρίουή άφορων είς μέλος οίουδήποτε δικαστηρίου καΐ κέκτηται Ι£ουσίαν δπως ίϊτε επικύρωση τήνάπόφασιντοΰ Πειθαρχικού Συμβου­ λίου είτε άκυρώση ή τροποποίηση ταύτην ή έκδώση έτερον διάταγμα ώς ήθελε θεωρήσει πρέπον.

(6)Τό Πειθαρχικόν Συμβούλιον δύναται, έάν θεώρηση πρέπον, καθ* οίονδήποτε χρόνου μετά παρέλευσιυ πέντε ετών άπότης ημερομηνίας διαγραφήςτοΰ ονόματος δικηγόρου έκ τοΰ Μητρώου τών Δικηγόρων, νά διατάΕη δπως άποκατασταθη τό όνομα τούέν λόγω δηκηγόρου είςτό Μητρφον 411 L. Loizou J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)καϊ ό Άρχπτρωτοκολλητής μεριμυφαμελλητί διά τήν άττοκατάστασιν τοΰ ονόματοςτούτουέντφ Μητρώωκαΐ δημοσίευσιν σχετικής είδοποιήσεως έν.τη έπισήμω έφημερίδ; της Δημοκρατίας." ("

(3)The Disciplinary Board sends to the Chief Registrar 5 . acopy of itsdecisionin theenquiryandtheChief Registrar, after the lapse of the time prescribed for an appeal if no such appeal has been made, or subject to any decision of the SupremeCourt, on the appeal, or on the basis of sub­ section 5, makes thenecessary entries in the Roll of Advo- 10 cates.

(4)TheAttorney-General of the Republic,theconvicted advocate or the complainant may within two months of . the delivery of the decision by the Disciplinary.Board, appeal to the Supreme Court, in accordance with the 15 procedure prescribed byRules issued by theSupremeCourt in this respect, which, in accordance with the aforesaid Rules proceeds to the hearing of the appeal and isvested with the power to either confirm thedecision of theDisci­ plinary Board or set aside or modify it or issue such other 20 order as. it may deem fit.

(5)Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection

(4)the SupremeCourthaspower toreview,of its ownmotion, in accordance with the procedure provided in this respect by any Rules of Court, any decision of the Disciplinary 25 Board relating to a disciplinary offence committed within the Court building or relating to a member of any Court and has power either to confirm the decision of the Disci­ plinary Board or to set aside or modify it or make any order as it may deem fit. 30

(6)The Disciplinary Board may, if it thinks fit, at any time after the expiration of five years from the date of an order striking the name of an advocate off the Roll of Advocates, order that the name of such advocate be restored to the Roll and theChief Registrar shall forthwith 35 causetherestorationof hisnametotheRollandthepubli­ cation of a relevant notice in the official Gazette of the Republic"). Another minor amendment to paragraph (c) of sub-section 412 1 C.L.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate L. Loizou J.

(1)of section 17is of no consequence for the purposes of this case. It will be seen from the above that the Disciplinary Board was first established and assumed the exercise of control and 5 disciplinary jurisdiction over advocates on the 6th September, 1955, by Law 38of 1955;and by sub-section

(5)of section 13 ofDiesameLawthedecisionsoftheDisciplinary Boardbecame subject to review by the Supreme Court. This right of review was exercised either by the Supreme Court of its own motion 10 or on the application of the complainant or of the advocate whose conduct was the subject of the enquiry. But the enactment of Law 38of 1955brought about certain other changes to the provisions relating to discipline. Prior to its enactment proceedings to enforce any of the penalties 15 provided by the law in force could only be commenced by the Supreme Court of its own motion or by an application to a Judgeofthe SupremeCourt in Chambers for a ruleto issueto theadvocate callinguponhim to showcausewhy heshouldriot bedealtwith undertheprovisionsof the law.Anapplication of 20 this nature, however, could only be made by the AttorneyGeneral or, withthe leaveof the Supreme Court, by anyperson aggrieved by the conduct of the advocate. Also the Chairman of a Local Bar Committee as well as any Court where, by section 13

(2)(c), thereof addsd to those who could commence 25 proceedings before the Disciplinary Board for the enforcement of thepenaltiesprovided by sub-section

(1)of thesamesection. Therightofanypersonaggrievedbythsconductoftheadvocate to apply for the commencement of proceedings was, by paragraph (d), retained but again with the leave, this time, of the 30 Disciplinary Board. It is significant however, that under sub-section

(5)of this same section the case could only be reviewed by the Supreme Courteitherofitsownmotionorontheapplication ofthecomplainant or of the advocate whose conduct was the subject 35 of the enquiry. As stated earlier on sections 11, 12and 13have, by section 5 of Law 42 of 1961,been renumbered as sections 15, 16and 17and these are the numbers under which they appear in the law now in force, the Advocates Law, Cap. 2. 413 L. Lolzou J . In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)After the amendment of section 17 by Law 40 of 1975 the right of appeal is contained in sub-section

(4)thereof. Under the provisions of this sub-section such right is expressly limited to theAttorney-General of the Republic,totheperson convicted and to the complainant (παραπονούμενος). And the issue that falls for determination by this Court at this stage is whether the Chairman of a Local Bar Committee has a right of appeal against the decision of the Disciplinary Board or to put it in another way whether the Chairman of a Local Bar Committee can be said to be a "complainant" (παραπονούμενος) within the meaning of this word in the said sub-section

(4). 5 io I am clearly of the opinion that the word "complainant" in the now repealed sub-section

(5)of section 17 of Cap. 2 and "παραπονούμενος" in sub-section

(4)(as set out in 15 s. 8 of Law 40 of 1975), which is now in force, relate to the "person aggrieved" occurring in paragraph (d) of sub-section

(2)of section 17 and to nobody else. This view is strengthened by the fact that under the present sub-section

(4)the AttorneyGeneial of the Republic has been added as a person who can 20 appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Disci­ plinary Board. It seems to me that if the word "complainant" (παραπονούμενος) was either capable or meant to include all those to whom reference is made in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of section 17

(2)the Legislative Authority would not have 25 deemed it necessary in enacting Law 40 of 1975, on the 1st August, 1975 to make specific provision giving the AttorneyGeneral of the Republic a right of appeal since he was already included in paragraph (b) of sub-section

(2). In the light of the above Ifeel bound to determine the preli- 30 minary point raised and argued before this Court in favour of the respondent advocate and hold that the Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee has no right of appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Disciplinary Board. Having come to this conclusion, which disposes of the present appeal, I do not consider it either necessary or desirable to deal with the other points raised. ΧΑΤΖΗΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΣΙΟΥ Δ.:* Τήν 25ην 'Οκτωβρίου, 1975, ό Πρόεδρος τού Δικηγορικοί/ Συλλόγου Λεμεσού μέ επιστολή του * An English translation of this judgment appears at pp. 425-35 post. 414 35 1 C.L.R. 5 In re X.Y. an Advocate Hadjianastassiou J. υπέβαλε προς τό Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο μέβάση τήνπαράγραφο (γ) τού εδαφίου

(2)τοΰ άρθρου 17τοΰ Περί Δικηγόρων Νόμου Κεφ.2 (δπως τροποποιήθηκε) καταγγελία κατά τοΰ δικηγόρου 'Ανδρέα Νεοκλέους, άπότή Λεμεσό, "ώς ένοχου έπονειδίστου ή ασυμβιβάστου προς τό επάγγελμα διαγωγής ή/καί διαγωγής αντικείμενης προς τους περί Δεοντολογίας τώνΔικηγόρων Κανονι­ σμούς ή καΐ άλλους τοιούτους" γιατί δέχθηκε διορισμό καΓυπη­ ρέτησε σανΥπουργός στόύπότόνκ. Νικόλαον Σαμψών πραξι­ κοπηματικό Υπουργικό Συμβούλιο. 10 'Αντίγραφο της καταγγελίας πού έγινε κοινοποιήθηκε στον δικηγόρο 'Ανδρέα Νεοκλέους ό όποϊος μέεπιστολή τουημερομη­ νίας 11'Ιουλίου, 1977, μεταϋύ άλλων. Ισχυρίζεται 6τι "ή πολιτική διαγωγή καΐ συμπεριφορά ενός δικηγόρου δέν ελέγχεται ύπό καϊ διάτης διαδικασίαςτοΰ ΠειΘαρχικοϋ Συμβουλίου. Ή πολιτική 15 πράϋις δέν είναι άσκησις δικηγορίας καϊ περαιτέρω αύτη δέν στοιχειοθετεί τό άποδιδόμενον ή οίονδήποτε * άλλο πειθαρχικά παράπτωμα". 20 Είναι χρήσιμο νά τονίσω Οτι τά πειθαρχικά αδικήματα είς τήν Κύπρο ορίζονται άπότό άρθρο 17

(1)τού Περί Δικηγόρων Νόμου (Κεφ. 2 όπως μεταγενέστερα τροποποιήθηκε). Αυτά είναι— (α) καταδίκη άπό οποιοδήποτε δικαστήριο γιά ποινικό αδίκημα πού, κατά τήν γνώμη τοΰ ΠειΘαρχικοϋ Συμβου­ λίου ενέχει ηθική αίσχρότητα- καϊ 25 30 35 (β) ένοχος έπονείδιστης, δολίας ή ασυμβίβαστης προς τά επάγγελμα διαγωγής. Ποια είναι ή "ασυμβίβαστη προς τό επάγγελμα διαγωγή" καθορίζουν μεταΕύ άλλων οι περί Δεοντολογίας τών Δικηγόρων Κανονισμοί τοΰ 1966. Τό Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο τό όποϊον επελήφθη της πειθαρχικής καταγγελίας εναντίον τοΰ δικηγόρου 'Ανδρέα Νεοκλέους έΕέδωσε τήν απόφαση του, άφοΰ έλαβε ύπ' όψη καϊτές αγγλικές αυθεντίες, οί όποιες ορίζουν πότε αδίκημα έπονείδιστης, δολίας ή ασυμβίβαστης προς τό επάγγελμα διαγωγής συνιστά πειθαρχικό παράπτωμα. Τό Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο άφοΰ εδέχθη δτι διανάάποτελεΤ "ασυμβίβαστη προς τό επάγγελμα διαγωγή" ή διαγωγή πρέπει νά σχετίζεται μέ τήν άσκηση αύτοΰ τούτου τοΰ επαγγέλματος, καϊδχι νά απο­ τελεί έ£ωεπαγγελματική διαγωγή, τονίζει: 415 Hadjianastassiou J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)"Στην Κύπρο δέν έχομε νά έξετάσωμε κατά πόσο ανεξάρτητη άπό τό επάγγελμα διαγωγή είναι τέτοιας φύσεως πού θά ήταν ανάρμοστη έάν έπεδεικνύετο κατά τήν άσκηση τοΰ επαγγέλματος". Άφοΰ επίσης άυαφέρθη είς τές σχετικές παρατηρήσεις τοΰ 5 Λόρδου Esher, M.R., πού είπε στήυ υπόθεση Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 Q.Bστές σελίδες 760, 761,προσθέτει δτι "ό περί οΰ πρόκειται δικηγό­ ρος αποδεχόμενος διορισμό υπουργού στή πραξικοπηματική κυβέρνηση δέν ενήργησε ύπό τήν Ιδιότητα του ώς δικηγόρος". 10 Μέ αυτό ώς γνώμονα τό Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο τονίζει: "Στην παρούσα υπόθεση έφόσο δέν μπορεί νά υποστηριχθεί δτι ή ανάληψη υπουργικής Θέσεως στό πραξικοπηματικό Υπουργικό Συμβούλιο αποτελώ ανάρμοστη μέ τό επάγγελμα διαγωγή ή διαγωγή έξωεπαγγελματική ή οποία μπορεί νά Θεωρηθεί σαν δόλια, παραμένει νά εξετασθεί άυ εϊναι 'έπονείδιστη διαγωγή' ύπο τήν έννοια της διατάξεως τοΰ άρθρου 17

(1). 15 'Ενώ γι' άλλα επαγγέλματα οί σχετικοί Νόμοι προβλέπουν δι* 'άνέντιμον ή έπονείδιστον* διαγωγή τό άρθρο 17

(1)προβλέπει μόνο γιά 'έπονείδιστον διαγωγή'. 20 Ή ανάληψη υπουργικού αξιώματος στό πραξικομηματικό υπουργικά συμβούλιο άσονδήποτε κατακριτέακαϊάξιόμεμπτη μπορεί νά είναι κατά τήν γνώμη τού ΠειθαρχικούΣυμβουλίου δέν αποτελεί 'έπονείδιστον' διαγωγή ύπό τήν έννοια τοΰ 25 άρθρου 17

(1)τοΰ Περί Δικηγόρων Νόμου. Είναι επίσης χαρακτηριστικό δτι ή ανάληψη υπουργικού αξιώματος στό πραξικοπηματικά υπουργικό συμβούλιο δέν εμπίπτει σέ καμμιά άπό τΙς διατάξεις τών περί Δεοντολογίας τών Δικηγόρων Κανονισμών τού 1966 άν καϊ αυτοί δέν είναι 30 εξαντλητικοί τοΰ θέματος. Ή ανεξάρτητη άπό-τήν άσκηση τοΰ επαγγέλματος 'έπο­ νείδιστη* διαγωγή πρέπει νά είναι τέτοιας σοβσρας φύσεως ώστε νάκαθίστα τό περί ούπρόκειται πρόσωπο ακατάλληλο υά εξακολουθεί νά είναι μέλος τοϋ εντίμου δικηγορικού έπαγ- 35 γέλματος— . Τό 'Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο στή Κύπρο στην υπόθεση In re an Advocate 9 C.L.R. 11 απεφάσισε δτι κάθε διαγωγή ή ό416 1 C.L.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate Hadjianastassioa J. ποίαάπετέλει κώλυμαγιά τήν έγγραφηενόςδικηγόρουμπορεί νά δικαιολογήσει καϊ τήν διαγραφή αύτοΰ έν τώ μεταξύ". Τελικά τό Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο καταλήγει: 5 "Γιά δλους τους πιόπάνω λόγους τό Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο είναι της γνώμης δ η ή καταγγελομένη πράξη δέν αποτελεί πειθαρχικό αδίκημα ούτε σύμφωνα μέτΙς διατάξειςτοΰάρθρου 17

(1)ούτε σύμφωνα'μέ τΙς διατάξειςτών περί Δεοντολογίας τών Δικηγόρων Κανονισμών τοΰ 1966 καϊσυνεπώς δένεμπί­ πτει στην αρμοδιότητα τού ΠειΘαρχιγοΰ Συμβουλίου". 10 Τήν 4ην Φεβρουαρίου,1980, ό νέος Πρόεδρος τοΰ Δικηγορικού Συλλόγου Λεμεσοΰ, ώς παραπονούμενος, Ιφεσίβαλε τήν απόφαση τού ΠειΘαρχικοϋ Συμβουλίου διά τηςοποίας ά'Ανδρέας Νεοκλέους απηλλάγη της κατηγορίας της έπονειδίστου ή ασυμβιβάστου προς τό επάγγελμα διαγωγής ή/κα! διαγωγής αντικείμενης προς 15 τους περί Δεοντολογίας τώνΔικηγόρων Κανονισμούς διότι εδέχθη διορισμό καιυπηρέτησε ώς υπουργός είςτό ύπό τόνκ. Νικόλαον Σαμψών πραξικοπηματικό καϊ παράνομο " Υπουργικό Συμβού­ λιο". 01 λόγοι επί τώνοποίων βασίζεται ή παρούσα ϊ-φεση είναι: 20 25 30 35 (α) Ή απόφασητοΰΠειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου δτι "δένμπορεΤ επίσης νά υποστηριχθεί σοβαρά δτι ή συμμετοχή στην πραξι­ κοπηματική κυβέρνηση ανεξάρτητα άπό οποιαδήποτε άλλη νομική ευθύνη όσονδήποτε άξιόμεμπτη καϊ άν είναι, άποτελεϊ δολία επε ασυμβίβαστη προς τό επάγγελμα διαγωγή δπως απαιτεί ό περί Δικηγόρων Νόμος", είναι εσφαλμένη. (β) Ή απόφαση τοϋ Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου ότι " γ ι άνά αποτελεί ασυμβίβαστη προς τό επάγγελμα διαγωγή, ή διαγωγή πρέπει νάσχετίζεται μέτήν άσκηση αύτοΰ τούτου τοΰ επαγγέλ­ ματος καϊ δχι νά αποτελεί έξωεπαγγελματική διαγωγή", είναι εσφαλμένη καϊ ασυμβίβαστη προς τό υψηλό λειτούργημα τού δικηγόρου. (γ) Ή απόφαση τοΰ ΠειΘαρχικοϋ Συμβουλίου δτι "ή κατα­ γγελλόμενη πράξη δέν άποτελΰ πειθαρχικόν αδίκημα ούτε σύμ­ φωνα μέτιςδιατάξειςτούάρθρου17

(1)ούτεσύμφωνα μέτΙς διατάξεις τώνπερί Δεοντολογίας τών Δικηγόρων Κανονισμών τοϋ1966 καϊ δτι δένεμπίπτει στην αρμοδιότητα τοΰΠειθαρχικούΣυμβου­ λίου εΐναι εσφαλμένη. (δ) Ή περί ής ή καταγγελία πράξις καΐ/ή συμπεριφορά τοϋ 417 Hadjianastassiou J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)εγκαλουμένου δικηγόρου συνιστά πειθαρχικά αδικήματα δυνάμει τοΰ άρθρου 17

(1)τοΰ Νόμου Κεφ.2 καϊ τών Κανονισμών 2 καΐ/ή 3 καΐ/ή 4 τών περί Δεοντολογίας τών Δικηγόρων Κανονισμών, 1966 καΐ/ή άλλως πως. Τήν 26ην 'Απριλίου, 1980,ό περί οΰ πρόκειται δικηγόρος Ιοωσε είδοποίηση δτι κατά τήν ακρόαση της υποθέσεως του θα ζητηθή ή εκδίκαση των κάτωθιπροδικαστικώννομικώνσημείων ήθεμάτων: 5 (α) "Οτι δέν υπάρχει νομίμως έφεση ενώπιον τού 'Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου. (β) "Οτι δέν ύπάρχβι αδίκημα επειδή δέν πληρούνται αί προϋποθέσεις τοΰ άρθρου 17

(1)είς τήν ύπό κρίση υπόθεση. 10 (γ) "Οτι διά της παρόδου έξ ετών περίπου μεταξύτηςαποδι­ δομένης πράξεως καϊ της αποφάσεως τού Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου καϊ άν υπήρχε ακόμη αδίκημα τούτο παρεγράφη.

(6)"Οτι ή απόφαση τού Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου προσβάλλεται μόνον διάπροσφυγήςκατάτό άρθρον 146.1 τούΣυντάγματος καϊ αϊ σχετικά! πρόνοιαι τού Περί Δικηγόρων Νόμου πρέπει νά έρμηνεύωνται ύπό τό κράτος της διαδικασίας τοΰ άρθρου 146.1. 15 Προτού ασχοληθώ μέ τό μοναδικά προδικαστικά νομικό σημείο (α) μέ τό όποιο συνεφώνησαν δλοι οί δικηγόροι τών διαδίκων, 20 καϊ επετράπη ύπό τοϋ 'Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου νά συζητηθή, είναι χρήσιμο νά τονίσω δτι είς πρόσφατη απόφαση είς τήν υπό­ θεση McEniffs. General Dental Council (P.C) [1980] 1W.L.R. 328 τό 'Εφετείο τονίζει ποίες είναι οί κατευθυντήριες γραμμές πού πρέπει νά ακόλουθη τό Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο κατά τήν 25 εκδίκαση πειθαρχικών κατηγοριών καϊ τ! αποτελεί ασυμβίβαστη προς τό επάγγελμα διαγωγή. ΕΙς τήν υπόθεση McEniff v. General Dental Council (P.C) [1980] 1 W.L.R. 328 ό Λόρδος Edmund-Davies παρατηρεί στην απόφαση του στες σελίδες 330, 331, 332: "The conviction has been attacked on two grounds: (I) that the legal assessor misdirected the Disciplinary Com­ mittee as to what constituted infamous or disgraceful conduct in a professional respect; As to

(1), reference must first be had to the opening of 35 the case before the Disciplinary Committee by Mr. Hidden. Having outlined the facts he continued: 418 30 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 In re X.Y. an Advocate Hadjianastassiou J. 'May I pause now only to say one or two words on the law, of which you will be fully familiar, and no doubtyouwillbeadvised byyourlearnedlegalassessor in any event. You will remember that the test of what is infamous conduct in.a professional respect was laid down clearly inthecase of Allinson v. General Council of MedicalEducation and Registration [1894] 1 Q.B.

1. Lopes L.J. in fact devised the test, with the assistance of the otherjudges, and theimmortal words are these: 'If it is shown that a medicalman, in the pursuit of his profession, has done something with regard to it which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency', then it is open to the General Medical Council to say that he has been guilty of 'infamous conduct in a profes­ sional respect'. There is some assistance equally in the case of Rex v. General Medical Council [1930] 1 K.B.
2. Scrutton L.J. said at p. 569: 'It is a great pity thattheword 'infamous' is used to describe the conductof a medical practitionerwho advertises. As in the case of theBar so in the medical profession •advertising is serious misconduct in a professional respect and that is all that is meant by the phrase 'infamous conduct'; it means no more than serious misconduct judged according tc the rules writttη or unwritten governing the profession'. Your com­ mittee will be aware of the case of Felix v. General Dental Council[1960] A.C. 704'. At theconclusionof theevidence and speeches of counsel, the legal assessor, exercising his indubitable right under rule 4 of the General Dental Council Disciplinary Committee· (Legal Assessor) Rules 1957 (S.I. 1957 No. 1470) to advise the Disciplinary Committee of his own motion where it appears desirable to do so, concluded his short observations by saying: 'As far as what constitutes infamous or disgraceful conduct is concerned, to which both advocates have referred, for methewords of ScruttonL.J. of 'serious misconduct in a professional respect' mean quite 419 HadiianastassIoD J. Ια re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)plainly that it is for the committee, applying their own knowledge and experience, to decide what is the appropriate standard each practitioner should adhereto,nota special standardgreater thanisordina­ rily to be expected, but the ordinary standard of 5 the profession. I think I have said very little that is in any way new to any member of thecommittee, but having regard to the submissions made to you I thought I ought at Ijast to say what I have said*. These observations have been criticised as wrong in 10 law that they failed to draw a distinction between mere negligent conduct and infamous or disgraceful conduct. The submission is that there was a misdirection, in that, although in his opening remarks counsel for the Discipli­ nary Committee had made passing reference to Felix v. 15 General Dental Council [I960] A.C. 704, the legal assessor failed toremindtheDisciplinary Comroittesof animportant passage in the speech of Lord Jenkins, who, in delivering the judgment of this Board in that case, said at p. 720: 'Granted that the full derogatory force of the 23 adjectives 'infamous* and 'disgraceful* in section 25 of the Act of 1957 must be qualified by the consi­ deration that what is being judged is the conduct of a dentist in a professional respect, which falls to be judged in relation to the accepted ethical standards 25 of his profession, it appears to their Lordships that these two adjectives nevertheless remain as terms denoting conduct deserving of the strongest repro­ bation,andindeedsoheinousastomerit,when proved, the extreme professional penalty of striking-off'. 30 Although th3facts inFelixwerequiteunlikeofthepresent case, these observations are of compelling significance. For it has respectfully to be said that,although prolonged veneration of the oft-quoted words of Lopes L.J. has clothed them with an authority approaching that of a 35 statute, they are not particularly illuminating. It is for this reason that their Lordships regard Lord Jenkins' exposition as so valuable that, without going as far as to say that his words should invariably be cited inevery disciplinary case, they think that to do so would be a 40 commendable course. But, having said that, it has to be 420 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 In re X.Y. an Advocate Hadjianastassiou J . added that the committee in the instant case were duly reminded of decisions which have long been approved of by this Board as accurately stating the relevant law. And their Lordships have in mind in this context the following observations of Lord Guest in Sivarajah v.General Medical Council [1964] 1 W.L.R. 112, 117: 'The committee are masters both of the law and of the facts. Thus what might amount to misdirection in law by a Judge to a jury at a criminal trial does not necessarily invalidate the committee*s decision. The question is whether it can 'fairly be thought to have been of sufficient significance to the result to invalidate the committee's decision* (Fox v. General Medical Council [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1017, 1023)'. - In their Lordships' judgment, it cannot be said that the advice tendered by the legal assessor in this case contained such a defect, and the first ground of criticism must there­ fore be rejected". θ ά ήθελα νά μοϋ έττιτραπη νά τονίσω καϊ νά προσθέσω ότι οί παρατηρήσεις τοϋ Λόρδου Jenkins είναι τόσο πολύτιμες και τόσο χρήσιμες πού κατά τήν γνώμη μου πρέπει νά αναφέρονται είς όλες τές αποφάσεις τοΰ εκάστοτε Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου. 'Οπως ανάφερα προηγουμένως τό μοναδικό προδικαστικόνομικό σημείο είναι ότι δένυπάρχεινομίμωςέφεσηενώπιοντοΰ 'Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου. Πιστεύω ότι προτού ασχοληθώ μέ τΙς αγορεύσεις τών συνηγόρων θά ήτο χρήσιμο νά έίετάσω ποΐαι είναι αί έΕουσίαι τοΰ Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου γιά τήν επιβολή κυρώσεωνενα­ ντίον δικηγόρων. Τό "Αρθρον 17

(2)τοϋ Περί Δικηγόρων Νόμου, (Κεφ. 2) τό όποιον παραμένει ώς είχε, ορίζει: "

(2)Proceedings to enforce any of the penalties provided by subsection

(1)may be commenced— (

1. a)by the Disciplinary Board of its own motion; 35 (
2. b)by the Attorney-General; (
3. c)on a report made to the Disciplinary Board by any Court or a Chairman of a Local Bar Committee; (
4. d)by an application, with the leave of the Disciplinary Board, of any person aggrieved by the conduct of the advocate". 421 Hadjianastassiou J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)To 1975 ή Βουλή των'Αντιπροσώπων έψήφισε τόν Νόμον40/75 πού όρΙζιι δτιόπαρών Νόμοςθά αναφέρεται ώςόΠερί Δικηγόρων (Τροποποιητικός) Νόμος τοΰ 1975 καϊθά αναγιγνώσκεται όμοΰ μετά τοΰ Περί Δικηγόρων Νόμου (έν τοΤς έφεΕής αναφερομένου ώς ό "βασικός Νόμος"). Τό "Αρθρον 17

(4)καϊ

(5)τοΰ βσσικοΰ 5 νόμου προβλέπει: "

(4)Ό Γενικός Είσαγγελευς της Δημοκρατίας,ό καταδικασθείς ή ό παραπονούμενος δύναται εντός δύομηνών άπότης εκδό­ σεως της αποφάσεως ύπό τοϋ Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου νά έφεσιβάλη ταύτην, συμφώνως προς τήν επί τούτω ύπό \Q εκδιδομένου διαδικαστικού κανονισμοΰ ύπό τοϋ 'Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου προβλεπομένην διαδικασίαν, είς τό Άνώτατον Δικαστήριον τά όποιον συμφώνως προς τόν ρηθέντα διαδικαστικόν κανονισμάν προβαίνει εΙ; άκρόασιν της εφέσεως καϊ κέκτηται έΣουσίαν δπως είτε επικύρωση τήν άπόφασιν 15 τοΰ Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου εΐτε άκυρώση ή τροποποίηση ταύτην ήέκδώση έτερον διάταγμα ώςήθελεθεωρήσει πρέπον.

(5)Παρά τάς διατάζεις τού εδαφίου

(4)τό Άνώτατον Δικαστήριον κέκτηται έϋουσίαν όπως αυτεπαγγέλτως άναθεωρή, συμφώνως προς τήν έπ! τούτω, προβλεπομένην 20 διαδικασίαν ύφ* οίουδήποτε διαδικαστικού κανονισμού, οιαν­ δήποτε άπόφασιν τοΰ Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου διάπειθαρ­ χικόν αδίκημα τελεσθέν εντός τοΰ δικαστικού κτιρίουήάφορων μέλος οίουδήποτε δικαστηρίου καϊ κέκτηται έϋουσίαν όπως είτε επικύρωση τήν άπόφασιν τοΰ Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου 25 είτε άκυρώση ή τροποποίηση ταύτην ή έκδώση έτερον διάταγμα ώς ήθελε θεωρήσει πρέπον". Θά ήτο χρήσιμο νάτονίσω ότι άν συγκρίνουμε τό εδάφιο

(4)μέ τό εδάφιο

(2)τού Άρθρου 17 τοΰ Περί Δικηγόρων Νόμου (Κεφ. 2) φαίνεται αμέσως ότι τό Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο δύναται 30 σύμφωνα μέτό εδάφιο

(2)νά άρχίση διαδικασία επιβολής ποινής, άλλα κατά τό εδάφιο

(4)δέν δύναται νάέφεσιβάλη απόφαση του. Επαναλαμβάνω όμως ότι ό Γενικός ΕΙσαγγελεϋς δύναταινά άρχίση διαδικασία καϊ νά έφεσιβάλη απόφαση τού Πειθαρχικού Συμβου­ λίου. 35 Ό κ.Παπαφιλίππουδιά τόνέγκαλούμενον δικηγόρον ίσχυρίσθη (α) Οτιέν αντιθέσει μέτά δικαίωμα τοΰ Γενικού ΕΙσαγγελέα τόσο τό Δικαστήριο όσο ό Πρόεδρος τοπικού δικηγορικού συλλόγου δέν δύνανται ούτε νά αρχίσουν διαδικασία οΰτε νά έφεσιβάλουν απόφαση τού Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου διότι, κατά τήν γνώμη 40 422 1 C.L.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate Hadjianastassiou J. τοϋ συνηγόρου, τό εδάφιον

(2)(c) τούΆρθρου 17 δέν προβλέπει δτι ή διαδικασία δύναται νά άρχίση ύπό τού Δικαστηρίου ή ύπό τοΰ Προέδρου τοΰ τοπικού δικηγορικού συλλόγου ώς είς τάς περιπτώσεις τού Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου καϊ τοΰ Γενικού 5 Εϊσαγγελέα. Περαιτέρωόσυνήγορος υπέβαλε δτιέάνδνομοθέτης έπεθύμη νά καταστήση τό Δικαστήριο ή τόνΠρόεδρο 'Επιτροπής τοπικού δικηγορικού συλλόγου διάδικον θά προέβλεπε τοϋτο, και ίσχυρίσθη δτι λογικώς δέν υπήρχε πρόθεση νά καταστήση τά Δικαστήριο διάδικοούτε καϊ τόν Πρόεδρον 'Επιτροπής τοπικού 10 δικηγορικού συλλόγου. *Εν τούτοις ύπεοτηρίχθη επίσης δτι καϊ οί δύο άντϊ νά ενεργήσουν ώς διάδικοι έχουν δικαίωμα νά υποβάλουν έκθεση είς τό Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο τό όποιον Ιχπ εξουσία, νά άρχίση τήν διαδικασία. *Η διαφορά τοΰ εδαφίου

(2)(α) έκτού

(2)(c) καταλήγει δ συνήγορος είναι δτι είς μέν τήν 15 περίπτωση τοΰ εδαφίου

(2)(α) τό Πειθαρχικά Συμβούλιο έι«ργΐΤ αυτεπαγγέλτως είς δέ τήν περίπτωση τοΰ εδαφίου

(2)(c) τό Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο ενεργεί κατόπιν εκθέσεως εϊτε παρά τού Δικαστηρίου είτε παρά τοΰ Προέδρου τοπικοΰ δικηγορικού συλλόγου. 20 Τό ερώτημα τή όποιον τίθεται είναι ποίος είναι ό παραπο­ νούμενος-· είς τήν παρούσαν υπόθεση. Παρόλο πού θά ήτο πλεονασμός είμαι της γνώμης δτι έκ της συγκρίσεως τών εδαφίων

(2)και

(4)τοΰ Άρθρου 17 καϊ έκ της λογικής ερμηνείας τού εδαφίου

(4)οί μόνοι οί οποίοι μπορούν νά 25 έφεσιβάλουν είναι ό Γενικός Είσαγγελέας, δ καταδικασθείςκαϊ ό παραπονούμενος. Κατά τήν γνώμη" μου ή λέΕη τταροητονούμενος δέν μπορεί παρά νά σημαίνη πρόσωπο τό όποιου έζήτησε έναρΕη διαδικασίας κατά τό εδάφιον

(2)(δ) καϊδένπερι­ λαμβάνει τά πρόσωπα τά αναφερόμενα είς τά εδάφιο

(2)(γ), 30 ήτοι τόν Πρόεδρον 'Επιτροπής τοπικού δικηγορικού συλλόγου. Εϊναι επίσης ορθό νά λεχθή ότι ό Πρόεδρος τοϋ δικηγορικού συλλόγου δταν υποβάλλει έκθεση κατά τό άρθρον 17

(2)(γ) ούτος δένκαθίσταται διάδικος τηςπειθαρχικής διαδικασίας επειδή υποβάλλει καταγγελία, αλλά επί τη βάσει τής καταγγελίας τό 35 Πειθαρχικό Συμβούλιο θέτει είς εφαρμογή τό μηχανισμό καϊ διε­ ξάγει τήν πειθαρχική διαδικασία, θ ά ήτο παράλειψη νάμήν αναφέρω ότι τόσο τό Δικαστήριο ή καϊό Πρόεδρος τοΰτοπικοΰ δικηγορικού συλλόγου δέν δύνανται νά είναι διάδικοι ώστε νά τους παρέχεται τό δικαίωμα υποβολής εφέσεως. 40 Αντιθέτως ό κ. Παύλου είς μία μακρά καϊ εμπεριστατωμένη 423 Hadjianastassiou J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)αγόρευση υπεστήριξε, μεταξύ άλλων άφοΰ ανεφέρθη είςδιάφορα λεξικά προς ενίσχυση τηςεπιχειρηματολογίας του, δτιόΠρόεδρος τού εκάστοτε τοπικού δικηγορικού συλλόγου έχει δικαίωμανά καταχώρηση Ιφεση καϊ δ ηδΠρόεδροςπρέπει νάθεωρείται παθών ή πρόσωπο ζημιωθέν έφ' όσον είχε έξουσιοδοτηθη άπότήν δλομέ- 5 λεία τών μελών τοϋ τοπικού δικηγορικού συλλόγου. Ό κ. Παύλου ό όποιος δπως ανάφερα προηγουμένως υπεστήριξε σθε­ ναρά τήν επιχειρηματολογία του κατέληξε νά τονίση εμφαντικά δτι έάν δ Πρόεδρος τοΰ Δικηγορικού Συλλόγου Λεμεσού πού εκπροσωπεί τήν θέληση τής γενικής συνέλευσης τών δικηγόρων 10 Λεμεσού δέν μπορεί νά θεωρηθη παραπονούμενος τότε οί λέξεις χάνουν τήν σημασία τους. Καταλήγοντας ό κ. Παύλου υπεστή­ ριξε δτι τά δικαίωμα εφέσεως δέν μπορεί νά καταστρατηγηθή έξ' αΙτίας της ελλείψεως ώρισμένων διαδικαστικών κανονισμών. Ό κ. Κληρίδης αγορεύων υίοθέτησε τήν επιχειρηματολογία 15 τού κ.Παπαφιλίππου καϊίσχυρίσθη δτι ό Πρόεδρος τούτοπικού Δικηγορικού Συλλόγου Λεμεσού δέν μπορεί νά είναι παθών ή ζημιωθής καϊσυνεπώς δένμπορεί νάείναι διάδικος τόσον ενώπιον τού ΠειΘαρχικοϋ Συμβουλίου όσον καϊ ενώπιον τού Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου. Περαιτέρω ό κ. Κληρίδης είσηγήθη ότι καϊ άν 20 ακόμη υπήρχε δικαίωμα εφέσεως δέν ήδύνατο νά άρχίση ή έφεση εναντίον αθωωτικής αποφάσεως άνευ της αδείας τοΰ Γενικού Είσαγγελέα. Διά ακόμη μία φοράθάήθελα νά τονίσω ότιτό Ανώτατο Δικα­ στήριο εκλήθη νά άποφασίση ένακαϊ μόνο προδικαστικό νομικό 25 σημείο, ήτοι Οτι δέν υπάρχει νομίμως έφεση ενώπιον τοΰ Δικα­ στηρίου καϊ τίποτε περισσότερο. Άφοΰ εξέτασα πολύ προσεκτικά τό σύνολο τών αγορεύσεων τών συνηγόρων κατέληξα είς τό συμπέρασμα (α)ότι όΠρόεδρος τοΰ τοπικού δικηγορικού συλλόγου δέν δύναται νά θεωρείται 30 ώς παραπονούμενος διότι κατά τή γνώμη μου δέν θεωρείται ώςπαραπονούμενοςεντός της εννοίας τού άρθρου 17

(4)τού Νόμου 40/75, ώς επίσης καϊ διά τους λόγους πού ανέφερα ένωρίτερο* (β) επαναλαμβάνω δτι ή ύρθή ερμηνεία τού άρθρου 17

(4)τοΰ βασικού νόμου έξυπακούει ότι δ "παραπονούμενος" δέν δύναται 35 νά είναι τό Δικαστήριο ή ό Πρόεδρος τού τοπικού συλλόγου, διότι παραπονούμενος εΐναι εκείνος δ δποϊος υπέστη πραγματική ζημία σύμφωνα μέτό άρθρο 17

(2)(δ). Είςτή παρούσα υπόθεση δύνανται νά έφεσιβάλουν τήν απόφαση τοΰ Πειθαρχικού Συμ­ βουλίου έκτος τούπαραπονουμένου,ό καταδικασθείςκαι δ Γενικός 40 424 1 C.L.R. Inre X.Y. an Advocate Hadjianastassiou J. Είσαγγελέας. Είλικρινά πιστεύω Οτι ή ανάμιξη καϊ τού Δικα­ στηρίου έάν είχε δικαίωμα εφέσεως, ώς παραπονούμενος, θά έδημιουργοΰσε περισσότερα προβλήματα διά τό κύρος τών Δικα­ στηρίων. 5 Διά τους λόγους τους οποίους ανέφερα,καϊ έφ*δσο δέν δύναται ό Πρόεδρος τού τοπικού Δικηγορικού Συλλόγου νά έφισιβάλη τήν απόφαση, πιστεύω δτι δέν υπάρχει νομίμως έφεση ενώπιον τού Δικαστηρίου. θά ήτο δμω; αδιανόητοπροτοΰσυμπληρώσω τήν απόφασημου 10 νά μήν εκφράσω θερμές ευχαριστίες προς όλους τους συνηγόρους οί οποίοι μέ έβοήθησαν νά ετοιμάσω τήν απόφαση μου. Διά δλους τους μομικους λόγους τους οποίους ανέφεραή έφεση απορρίπτεται, άλλα άνευ εξόδων. 15 This is an English translation of thejudgment in Greek appearing at pp. 414-425 ante. HADJIANASTASSIOU J.: 20 25 30 35 On October 25, 1975 the Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee by means of a letter submitted a complaint to the Disciplinary Board under section 17

(2)(c) of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2 (as amended) against advocate Andreas Neocleous, of Limassol "as guilty of disgraceful or unprofessional conduct and/or conduct contrary to the Advo­ cates Practice and Etiquette Rules and/or other such Rules" because he accepted appointment and served as a Minister under Mr. Nicolaos Sampson in the Council of Ministers which was formed as a result of the Coup d'etat. Copy of thecomplaint was communicated to advocate Andreas Neocleous who by his letter dated 11th July, 1977, amongst others, he alleges that "the political conduct and behaviour of an advocate cannot be subjected to the control of, and the procedure, of the Disciplinary Board. The political act does not amount to practising as an advocate and moreover it does not constitute the disciplinary offence alleged or any other disciplinary offence". It is useful to stress that disciplinary offences in Cyprus are defined by section 17

(1)of the Advocates Law (Cap. 2 as amen­ ded subsequently). 425 Hadjianastassiou J. Ια re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)They arc— (

1. a)Conviction by any Court of a Criminaloffence which, in the opinion of the Disciplinary Board, involves moral turpitude; and (
2. b)guilty of disgraceful, fraudulent or unprofessional conduct. 5 What is "unprofessional conduct"is defined, amongstothers, by the Advocates Practice and Etiquette Rules, 1966. The Disciplinary Board which tried the complaint against advocate Andreas Neocleous delivered its judgment, having taken into 10 consideration the English authorities as well, which define when an offence of disgraceful, fraudulent or unprofessional conduct constitutes a disciplinary offence. The Disciplinary Board having accepted that for "unprofessional conduct" to exist such conduct should be connected with the exercise 15 of theprofession as such,and notto constituteconductoutside the profession, stresses: "In Cyprus we do not have to examine whether conduct not connected with the profession is of such a nature which would be unprofessional if displayed in the exercise 20 of the profession". Having also referred to the relevant observations of Lord Esher M.R. inthecase of Allinson v. General Council ofMedical Education and Registration [1894] 1 Q.B. pp. 760, 761 it adds: "The advocate in question by accepting the appointment of 25 a Minister in the Coup d'etat Governmenthas not acted inthe capacity of an advocate". With this in mind the Disciplinary Board stresses: "In this case since it cannotbe argued thattheundertaking of aministerialoffice intheCoupd'etatCouncilof Ministers 30 constitutesunprofessional conductorconductnotconnected with the profession which can be considered as fraudulent, it remains to consider whether it is 'disgraceful conduct' within the meaning of section 17

(1). Whilst in respect of other professions the relevant Laws 35 provide for dishonest or disgraceful conduct section 17

(1)provides only for disgraceful conduct. The undertaking of the office of a Ministei in the Coup 426 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 In re X.Y. an Advocate Hadjianastassiou J. d'etat Council of Ministers however reproachful and blamable it might be,inthe opinion ofthe Disciplinary Board it does not constitute 'disgraceful' conduct within the meaning of section 17

(1)of the Advocates Law. It is also characteristic that the undertaking of a ministerial office in the Coup d'etat Council of Ministers does not fall within any of the provisions of the Advocates Practice and Etiquette Rules, 1966 though they are not exhaustive on the matter. Disgraceful conduct not connected with the exercise of the profession should be of such a serious nature so as to render the person in question unsuitable to continue to be a member of the honourable legal profession In Cyprus the Supreme Court in the case of In re an Advocate, 9 C.L.R. 11held that conduct which constitutes an impediment for the emolment of an advocate may justify his striking off in the meantime". Finally the Disciplinary Board concludes: "For all the above reasons the Disciplinary Board is of opinion that the act complained of does not constitute a disciplinary offence in accordance with the provisions of section 17

(1)or in accordance with the provisions of the Advocates Practice and Etiquette Rules, 1966 and consequently it does not come within the competence of the Disciplinary Board". Onthe 4th February, 1980,thenew Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee, as complainant, appealed against the decision oftheDisciplinary Board bymeansofwhichAndreasNeocleous was acquitted of the charge of disgraceful or unprofessional 30 conduct and/or conduct contrary to the Advocates Practice and Etiquette Rules because he accepted an appointment and servedasa Minister intheillegal "Councilof Ministers" formed as a result of the Coup d'etat by Mr. Nicolaos Sampson. 35 The grounds of appeal are: (a) The decision of the Disciplinary Board that "it cannot also be seriously argued that participation in the Coup d'etat Government independently of any other legal liabilityhoweverblamable it mightbe,constitutes 427 Hadjianastassiou J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)cither fraudulent or unprofessional conduct as provided by the Advocates Law" is wrong. (

1. b)The decision of the Disciplinary Board that "for conduct to constitute unprofessional conduct, such conduct should be connected with the exeicist of the 5 profession as such and not to constitute conduct not connected with the profession" is wrong and inconsistent with the high office of an advocate. (
2. c)The decision of the Disciplinary Board that "the act complainedofdoesnotconstituteadisciplinaryoffence 10 in accordance with the provisions of section 17

(1)or in accordancewiththe provisions of the Advocates Practice and Etiquette Rules 1966 and that it does not come within the competence of the Disciplinary Board", is wrong. 15 (d) The act complained of and/or the conduct of the respondent advocate constitute disciplinary offences under section 17

(1)of the Law Cap. 2 and or rules 2 and/or 3 and/or 4 of the Advocates Practice and Etiquette Rules, 1966 and/or otherwise. 20 Onthe26thApril, 1980,the advocate in question gavenotice that at the hearing of his casehe will apply for the trial of the following preliminary points of law or questions: (a) That there is not in law an appealbefore the Supreme Court. (b) That there is no offence because the prerequisites of section 17

(1)are not fulfilled in this case. (

1. c)That by the lapse of about six years between the act complained of and the decision of the Disciplinary Board even if there existed an offence same has been 30 prescribed. (
2. d)That the decision of the Disciplinary Board can only be attacked by means of a recourse under Article 146.1 of the Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Advocates Law should be interpreted subject 35 to the procedure envisaged by Article 146.1. 428 25 1 C.L.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate Hadjianastassiou J . Before dealing with the only preliminary point of Law (
3. a)on which there was agreement by all counsel and leave was given by the Supreme Court to be argued, it is useful to stress that in a recent judgment in the case of McEniff v. General Dental 5 Council(P.C.) [1980] 1W.L.R. 328the Court of Appeal stresses which are the guide lineswhich should be followed by the Disciplinary Board at the trial of disciplinary charges and what constitutes unprofessional conduct. In the case of McEniff \. GeneralDental Council(P.C.) [1980] 10 I W.L.R. 328 Lord Edmund-Davies observes the following in his judgment at pp. 330, 331, 332: 15 "The conviction has been attacked on two grounds:

(1)that the legal assessor misdirected the Disciplinary Committee as to what constituted infamous or disgraceful conduct in a professional respect; As to

(1), reference must first be had to the opening of the case before the Disciplinary Committee by Mr. Hidden. Having outlined the facts he continued: 20 25 30 35 40 'May I pause now only to say one or two words on the law, of which you will be fully familiar, and no doubt youwill beadvised byyour learned legal assessor in any event. You will remember that the test of what is infamous conduct in a professional respect was laid down clearly in the case of Allinsonv.General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 Q.B.

1. Lopes L.J. in fact devised the test, with the assistance of the other Judges, and the immortal words are these: 'If it is shown that a medical man. in the pursuit of his profession, has done something with regard to it which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency', then it is open to the General Medical Council to say that he has been guilty of 'infamous conduct in a professionat respsct'. There is some assistance equally in the case of Rex v. General Medical Council [1930] 1 K.B.
2. Scrutton L.J. said at p. 569: 'It is a great pity that the word 'infamous' is used to describe the conduct of a medical practitioner who advertises. As in the case of the Bar so in the medical profession 429 Hadjianastassiou J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)advertising is serious misconduct in a professional respect and that is all that is meant by the phrase 'infamous conduct*; it means no more than serious misconduct judged according to the rules written or unwritten governing the profession'. Your committee will be aware of the case of Felix v. General Dental Council [1960] A.C. 704'. 5 Attheconclusion oftheevidenceandspeechesofcounsel, the legal assessor, exercising his indubitable right under rule 4 of the General Dental Council Disciplinary Com- 10 mittee (Legal Assessor) Rules 1957 (S.I. 1957 No. 1470) to advise the Disciplinary Committee of his own morion where it appears desirable to do so, concluded his short observations by saying: 'As far as what constitutes infamous or disgraceful 15 conduct is concerned, to which both advocates have referred, for me the words of Scrutton L.J. of 'serious misconduct in a professional respect' mean quite plainly that it is for the committee, applying their own knowledge and experience, to decide what is 20 the appropriate standard each practitioner should adhere to, not a special standard greater than is ordinarily to be expected, but the ordinary standard of the profession. I think I have very little that is in any way new to any member of the committee, but 25 havingregardto'thesubmissionsmadetoyou Ithought I ought at least-to say what I have said.' These observations have been criticised as wrong in law that they failed to draw a distinction between mere negligent conduct and infamous or disgraceful conduct. 30 The submission is that there was a misdirection, in that, although in his opening remarks counsel for the Disciplinary Committee had made passing reference to Felix v. General Dental Council [1960] A.C. 704, the legal assessor failed toremind the Disciplinary Committeeofanimportant 35 passage in the speech of Lord Jenkins, who, in delivering the judgment of this Board in that case, said at p. 720: 'Granted that the full derogatory force of the adjectives 'infamous' and 'disgraceful' in section 25 of the Act of 1957 must be qualified by the consi- ^ 430 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 In re X.Y. an Advocate Hadjianastassiou J. deration that what is being judged_is the conduct of a dentist in a professional respect, which falls to bejudged in relation to the accepted ethical standards of his profession, it appears to their Lordships that these twoadjectives neverthelessremain astermsdenoting conduct deserving of the strongest reprobation, and indeed so heinous as to merit, when proved, the extreme piofessional penalty of striking-ofT. Although thefacts inFelixwere quiteunlikeofthe present case, these observations are of compelling significance. For it has respectfully to be said that, although prolonged veneration of the oft-quoted words of Lopes L.J. has clothed them with an authority approaching that of a statute, they are not particularly illuminating. It is for this reason that their Lordships regard Lord Jenkins' exposition as so valuable that, without going as far as to say that his words should invariably be cited in every disciplinary case, they think that to do so would be a commendable course. But, having said that, it has to be added that the committee in the instant case were duly reminded of decisions which have long been approved of by this Board as accurately stating the relevant law. And their Lordships have in mind in this context the followingobservationsofLordGuestinSivarajahv. General Medical Council [1964] 1 W.L.R. 112, 117: 'The committee are masters both of the law and of the facts. Thus what might amount to misdirection in law by a Judge to a jury at a criminal trial does not necessarily invalidate the committee's decision. The question is whether it can 'fairly be thought to have been of sufficient significance to the result to invalidate the committee's decision' (Fox v. General Medical Council[1960] 1 W.L.R. 1017, 1023)'. In their Lordships' judgment, it cannot be said that the advice tendered by the legal assessor in this case contained such a defect, and thefirstground of criticism must therefore be rejected". I would liketo beallowed to stress and add that the observations of Lord Jenkins are sovaluable and so useful that inmy 40 opinion they should be included in all the decisions of Disci431 Hadjianastassloa J. In re X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)plinary Boards.As stated earlier theonlypreliminaryquestionof law isthatthereisnotinlawanappealbeforetheSupremeCourt. I believe that before dealing with the addresses of counsel it would be expedient to consider which are the powers of the Disciplinary Board for theimposition of sanctions against advocates. Section 17

(2)of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2, which remained as it was, provides: 5 "

(2)Proceedings to enforce any of the penalties provided by subsection

(1)may be commenced— (

1. a)by the Disciplinary Board of its own motion; 10 (
2. b)by the Attorney-General; (
3. c)on a report made to the Disciplinary Board by any Court or a Chairman of a Local Bar Committer; (
4. d)by an application, with the leave of the Disciplinary Board, of any person aggrieved by the conduct of 15 the advocate". In 1975 the House of Representatives enacted Law 40/75 which provides that this Law will be cited as the Advocates (Amendment) Law, 1975 and will be read together with the Advocates Law (hereinafter referred to as "the basic law"). 20 Section 17

(4)and

(5)of the basic Law provides: "

(4)The Attorney-General of the Republic, the convicted advocate or the complainant may within two months of the delivery of the decision by the Disciplinary Board, appeal to the Supreme Court, in accordance with the 25 procedure prescribed by Rules issued by theSupremeCourt in this respect, which, in accordance with the aforesaid Rules proceeds to the hearing of the appeal and is vested with the power to either confirm the decision of theDisci­ plinary Board or set aside or modify it or issue such other 30 order as it may deem fit.

(5)Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection

(4)the Supreme Courthaspower toreview,of its ownmotion, in accordance with the procedure provided in this respect by any Rules of Court, any decision of the Disciplinary 35 Board ιelating to a disciplinary offence committed within the Couit building or relating to a member of any Court and has power either to confirm the decision of theDisci432 1 CL.R. IDreX.Y. anAdvocate Hadjianastassiou J. plinary Boaid or to set aside or modify it or make any order as it may deem fit". It would be useful to stress that if we compaie sub-section

(4)of section 17ofthe Advocates Law,;Cap.2 with sub-section 5

(2)it is clear that the Disciplinary Board may, in accordance with sub-section

(2), commence proceedings for the imposition of sentence, but in accordance with sub-section

(4)it cannot appealagainstitsdecision. IrepeathoweverthattheAttorneyGeneral may commence proceedings and appeal against a 10 decision of the Disciplinary Board. Mr. Papaphilippou for the respondent advocate contended (a) that contrary to the right of the Attorney-General both the Court and the Chairman of the Local Bar Committee can neither commence proceedings nor appeal against a decision 15 of the Disciplinary Board because, in the opinion of Counsel, sub-section

(2)(c) of section 17does not provide that the proceedings can be commenced by the Court or by the Chairman of the local bar Association as in the cases of the Disciplinary Board and the Attorney-General. Further counsel submitted 20 that ifthelegislatorwished torender theCourt orthe Chairman ofthelocalBarCommittee alitigant itwould have soprovided, and alleged that logically there was no intention to render the Court a litigant nor the Chairman of a local Bar Committee. Itwasneverthelessarguedthat both instead ofactingaslitigants 25 have a right to submit a complaint to the Disciplinary Board whichhas power tocommence theproceedings. The difference between sub-section

(2)(a) and

(2)(c), counsel concludes, is that in the case of sub-section

(2)(a) the Disciplinary Board acts on its own motion and in the case of sub-section

(2)(c) 30 the Disciplinary Board acts upon a complaint either from the Court or from the Chairman of a local Bar Committee. The question which arises is who is the complainant in this case. Though it would have been supetfluous I am of opinion that by a comparison of sub-sections

(2)and 35

(4)of section 17 and from the reasonable interpretation of sub-section

(4)the only ones who can appeal are the Attorney-General, the person convicted and the complainant. In my opinion the word complainant cannot but mean 433 Hadjianastassioa J. In reX.Y.anAdvocate

(1981)a person who applied for the commencement of proceedings in accordance with sub-section

(2)(d) and does not include the persons mentioned in sub-section

(2)(c), that is the Chairman of a local Bar Committee. It is also conect to say that when the Chairman of the Bar submits a 5 complaint in accordance with section 17

(2)(c)he isnot rendered a litigant in the disciplinary proceedings because he submits a report, but on the basis of the report the Disciplinary Board sets the machinery in motion and carries out the disciplinary proceedings. It would have been an omission not to state 10 that both the Court and the Chairman of the local Bar Committeecannot belitigants soas tobegranted the right of appeal. On the contrary Mr. Pavlou in a long and detailed address having referred to various dictionaries, in support of his argument, he argued, inter alia, that the Chairman of the local Bar 15 Committee has a right to lodgean appeal and that the Chairman should be deemed as a complainant or person aggrieved since he had been authorised by all the members of the local Bar Association. Mr. Pavlou who, as already stated, strongly supported his argument concluded by stressing emphatically 20 that if the Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee, who represents the will of the general meeting of the Limassol advocates, cannot be deemed as a complainant then the words are deprived of their meaning. In concluding Mr. Pavlou argued that the right of appeal cannot be infringed due to the absence of certain 25 Rules of Court. Mr. Clerides in his address adopted the aigument of Mr. Papaphilippou and alleged that the Chairman of the local Bar Committee Limassol cannot be a complainant or person aggrieved and consequently he cannot be a litigant both before the 30 Disciplinary Board and the Supreme Court. Further Mr. Clerides submitted that even if there existed a right of appeal the appeal against a decision of acquittal could not commence without the sanction of the Attorney-General. I would like to stress once again that the Supreme Court 35 was called upon to decide one and only preliminary issue, that there is not in law anappeal before theCourt and nothing more. Having considered very carefully the whole of the addresses I came to the conclusion (a) that the Chairman of the local Bar 434 1 C.L.R. Inre X.Y. an Advocate Hadjianastassloa J. Committee cannot be considered as a complainant because in my opinion he is not consideied as a complainant within the meaning of section 17

(4)of Law 40/75, as well as for the reasons stated above; (b) I repeat that the correct interpretation 5 of section 17

(4)of the basic law implies that the "complainant" cannot be theCourtor theChairman of the local BarCommittee, because the complainant is the one who sustained real damage in accordance with section 17

(2)(d). In this case, besides the complainant, the decision of the Disciplinary Board may be 10 appealed against by the person convicted and the AttorneyGeneral. I sinceiely believe that the mixing up of the Court also if it had a right of appeal, as a complainant, would have created more problems to the piestige of the Coutts. For the reasons stated and since the Chairman of the local 15 Bar Committee cannot appeal against ibis decision, I believe that there is not in law an appeal before the Court. It would however been unthinkable, before completing my judgment, not to express my warm thanks to all Counsel who helped me in preparing my judgment. 20 25 Forall thegrounds of law stated above the appeal is dismissed but without costs. MALACHTOS J. The respondent in this appeal, ap ractising advocate in Limassol, was on the 9th day of January, 1980, acquitted upon a charge of a disciplinary offence under section 17

(1)of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2, by the Disciplinary Board established under section 16 of the said Law. The charge was initiated by letter dated 25th October, 1976, from the then Chairmanof thelocal Bar Committeeof Limassol to the Chairman of the Disciplinary Board. This letter reads 30 as follows:- 35 " Ύπό τήν Ιδιότητα μου ώς Προέδρου τοϋ Δικηγορικού Συλλόγου Λεμεσού καϊ δυνάμει τών εξουσιών δι* ών περιβέβλημαι δυνάμει της παραγράφου (γ) τοϋ εδαφίου

(2)τοΰ άρθρου 17 τοΰ περί Δικηγόρων Νόμου ΚΕΦ. 2 (ώς έτροποποιήθη) διά της παρούσης καταγγέλλω του συνάδελφου Άυδρέαυ Νεοκλέους έκ Λεμεσοΰ, ώς ένοχου έπονειδίστου ή ασυμβιβάστου προς τό επάγγελμα διαγωγής ή/καΙ δια­ γωγής αντικείμενηςπρος τους περίΔεοντολογίαςτφυΔικηγό435 Malacbtos J. IDreX.Y. an Advocate

(1981)ρων κανονισμούς καϊ 6ή τους κανονισμούς 2, 3 κοί 4 ή/καΙ άλλους τοιούτους διότι εδέχθη διορισμού καϊ υπηρέτησε ώς Υπουργός ε!ς τό ύπό τόν κ. ΝικόλαουΣαμψών πραίικοπ ηματικόν καϊ παράνομου Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου. 'Η παρούσα καταγγελία υποβάλλεται ύμϊν κατόπιν εντολής τοϋ Δικηγορικού Σώματος Λεμεσού έυ Γενική Συνελεύσει λαβούση χώραντήν 24ην Μαΐου 1975 καϊ τηςδυνάμει της έν αυτή ληφθείσης αποφάσεως γενομένης είς έμέ έγγραφου καταγγελίας αριθμού δικηγόρων μελφν τού Δικηγορικού Συλλόγου Λεμεσού." 5 10 ("In my capacity as Chairman f the Limassol Bar Com­ mittee and by virtue of the powers with which I am vested on the basis of paragraph (c) of subsection

(2)of section 17 of the Advocates Law, Cap. 2 (as amended), I hereby report my colleague Andreas Neocleous, of Limassol, as 15 guilty of disgraceful of unprofessional conduct and/or conductwhich iscontrary totheAdvocates Rules of etiquette and in particular rules 2, 3 and 4, and/or any such other Rules, because he had accepted appointment and served as a Minister in the "illegal Council of Ministers" formed 20 by the coup d'etat under Mr. Nicolaos Sampson. The present report is submitted to you on the instructions of the Limassol Bar Association at a General Meeting which took place on the 24th May, 1975, and on the basis of a decision taken during it upon a written report made 25 to me by a number of advocates members of the Limassol Bar Association"). Section 17

(2)(c) of the Law referred to in the above letter is in these terms: "17

(2)Proceedings to enforce any of the penalties provided by subsection

(1)may be commenced— 39 (

1. a)(
2. b)(
3. c)on a report made to the Disciplinary Board by any Court or a Chairman of a Local Bar Committee". 35 As against the aforesaid decision of the Disciplinary Board the present Charman of the local Bar Committee of Limassol filed on the 4th day of February, 1980, the present appeal. 436 1 C.L.R. 5 In re X.Y. an Advocate Malachtos J. By notice dated 26th April, 1980, counsel for the respondent raised four legal points andon the 30th April, 1980,the date of hearing of this appeal, upon their appUcation,thefirstpoint i.e. "that there is not in law an appeal before the Supreme Court", was heard as a preliminary legal issue. As towho mayappeal, counsel for the respondent submitted, is provided by section 17

(4)of the Law, as amended by Law40 of 1975, andtheChairman of a local Bar Committee doesnot fall within the provisions of that section as hecannot beconsi10 dered as a complainant. , ,' '' 1 1 ' \ I ι ' This section reads as follows: 15 20 25 30 "17

(4). Ό Γενικός ΕΙσαγγελεύς της Δημοκρατίας, ό καταδι­ κασθείς ή ό παραπουουμενος δύναται εντός δύο μηυώνάπό τής εκδόσεως της αποφάσεωςύπό τοϋΠειθαρχικούΣυμβουλίου υάέφεσιβάλη ταύτην, συμφώυως προς την έπΐ τούτω ύπό εκδιδομένου διαδικαστικούκανονισμού ύπότού Άνωτάτου Δικαστηρίου προβλεπομένην διαδικασίαν, είς τό Άνώτατον Δικαστήριον τό όποιον συμφώνως προς τόν ρηθέντα διαδικαστικόν κανονισμού προβαίνει εϊς άκρόασιν της εφέσεως καϊ κέκτηται έξουσίαν δπως εΐτε επικύρωση τήν άπόφασιν τοΰ Πειθαρχικού Συμβουλίου εΐτε άκυρώση ή τροποποίηση ταύτην ή έκδώση έτερον διάταγμα ώς ήθελε θεωρήσει πρέπον". ("The Attorney-General of the Republic, the convicted advocate or the complainant may within two months of the delivery of the decision by the Disciplinary Board, appeal to the Supreme Court, in accordance with the procedure prescribed byRules issued by theSupremeCourt in this respect, which, in accordance with the aforesaid Rules proceeds to thehearing of the appeal andis vested with thepower to either confirm thedecision of the Disci­ plinary Board or set aside or modify it or issue such other order as it may deem fit"). The second legofthe argument ofcounsel for the respondent 35 isthatthis appeal cannotbedealtwith since noRules prescribing the procedure as tothehearing of appeals have been made by the Supreme Court as piovided by section 17

(4)of theLaw. Both the above submissions of counsel for the respondent were supported bythe ChairmanoftheBarCouncil who addres40 sed this Court as amicus curiae. 437 ά / \ J» Λ |Τ / Malachtos J. to re X.Y. an Adrocate

(1981)Now, the first question posed is whether the Chairman of the Local Bar Committee of Limassol on the facts of this case can be considered as a complainant within the meaning of section 17

(4)of the Law. The word "complainant" (paraponoumenos) in the context 5 ofthesaid section oftheLawshouldbegiventhesamemeaning as in criminal proceedings. This is clear from subsection 7 which provides that the Disciplinary Board in carrying out an enquiry under this section shall have the same powers and shall conduct the enquiry as nearly as may be as a Court cf 10 summary jurisdiction. In Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2nd edition, volume 1, page 403 a complainant is defined as the person aggrieved and is the victim of the offence. The person aggrieved or the victim of the offence may be the same person who reports 15 the case to the authorities, but there are instaaces where the person who reports the case and the person aggrieved are two different persons. To my mind the Chairman of the Local Bar Committee of Limassol,takinginto considerationthefacts ofthiscase,cannot 2J be considered as the complainant. Consequently, he has no right of appeal. In view of the fact that this is the majority decision of the Court on this point, I consider it unnecessary to pronounce on the second submission of counsel fci the respondent. 25 This appeal, therefore, should be dismissed. SAWIDES J.: I had the opportunity of reading in advance thejudgment of my brother Judge L. Loizou and I agree with the result he reached and which I fully adopt. I find it unnecessary to repeat the facts and the exposition 30 oftheLaw,inviewofthefactthattheyhavejustbeenexpounded in thejudgment of L. Loi/ou J. and with which I agree. A number of preliminary legal objections were raised by counsel for therespondent atthehearingof theappeal amongst which the question as to whether a Chairman of a local Bar 35 Committee is entitled to appeal against the decision of the Advocates Disciplinary Board under s. 17

(4)of the Advocates Law (Cap. 2) as amended by s. 8

(4)of Law 40 of 1975. 438 1 CX.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate Sarvldes J. I share the opinion that the Chairman of a Local Bar Committee, in the present case the Chairman of the Limassol Bar Committee, cannot be considered as "a complainant" under s.8

(4)of Law 40 of 1975 and in consequence cannot appeal 5 against the decision of the Advocates Disciplinary Board, established under the provisions of s.16 of Cap.

1. For this reason Ifindthatthepreliminary objection based onthisground by counsel for the respondent succeeds and the appeal has to be and is hereby dismissed. 10 Having so decided, I find it unnecessary to pronounce on the other preliminary objections raised by counsel for respondent. TPIANTAFYLLIDES P.: This is an appeal lodged by the Chairman of the Local Bar Committee of Limassol against thedeci15 sion of the Advocates Disciplinary Board, dated January 9, 1980, by means of which advocate A. Neocleous, of Limassol, was acquitted of the disciplinary offence of disgraceful or unprofessional conduct. Hehad been charged with such conduct becausehehas served as a "Minister" under Nicolaos Sampson 20 in the "Council of Ministers" which was formed during the abortive coup d'etat of July
2. Thecasewasbrought before theDisciplinary Board bymeans of a report of the at the time Chairman of the Local Bar Committee of Limassol, under section 17

(2)(c) of the Advocates 25 Law, Cap. 2, as amended by the Advocates (Amendment) Law, 1961 (Law 42/61), the Advocates (Amendment) Law, 1963 (Law 20/63), the Advocates (Amendment) Law, 1970 (Law 46/70), and the Advocates (Amendment) Law, 1975 (Law 40/75). 30 Subsection

(2)of section 17 of Cap. 2, reads as follows:"

(2)Proceedings to enforce any of the penalties provided by subsection

(1)may be commenced— (

1. a)by the Disciplinary Board of its own motion; (
2. b)by the Attorney-Geneial; 35 (
3. c)on a report made to the Disciplinary Board by any Court or a Chairman of a Local Bar Committee; (
4. d)by an application, with the leave of the Disciplinary 439 Triantafyllides P. IDre X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)Board, of any person aggrieved by the conduct of the advocate". Under subsection

(4)of section 17of Cap.2,whichwasintro­ duced by section 8 of Law 40/75, an appeal against a decision of the Disciplinary Board may be made to the Supreme Court 5 by the Attorney-General of.. the Republic, the convicted advocate or the complainant ("παραπονούμενος"). At the commencement of the hearing of the present appeal Mr. L. Papaphilippou, who is appearing for the respondent advocate, raised an objection that the Chairman of the Local 10 Bar Committee cf Limassol was not entitled tofile theappeal under section 17

(4)of Cap. 2, inasmuch as he was not a "complainant"; it was argued, in support of thesaid objection, that a "complainant", in the sense of section 17

(4), is only a "person aggrieved" in the sense of section 17

(2)(d) of Cap. 2, 15 and so a "Court" oi a "Chairman of a Local BarCommittee" making a report, as in this case, under section 17

(2)(c), can never be regarded as a "complainant" in the sense of section 17

(4). Mr. L. Clerides, who is a member of the Disciplinary Board 20 and has taken part in these proceedings as an amicus curiae, has agreed, in this respect, with counsel for the respondent advocate. After hearing, also, Mr. P. Pavlou, who is appearing for theappellantChairmanof theLoca'BarCommitteeof Limassol, 25 I find myself unable to agree with my learned brother Judges that the preliminary objection should be sustained: In my view the term "complainant" ("παραττονσύμενοί"), in section 17

(4)of Cap. 2, is wideenough to includein aproper case, such as the present one,a Chairmanof a Local Bar Com- 30 mittee who makes a report to the Disciplinary Board under section 17

(2)(c), and should not be restricted only to a person aggrieved who applies to the Board under section I7

(2)(d). It is useful, in this respect, to look at the legislative history of section 17 of Cap. 2: It was initially section 13 of the Advocates Law, 1955 (Law 38/55), which is now Cap. 2. Section 17

(2)is the same in 440 35 \ \ \ 1 C.L.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate Triantafyllides P. 1 Cap. 2 as section 13

(2)in Law 38/55, but subsection

(5)of section 17 of Cap. 2- (which was, originally, section 13

(5)of Law 38/55, and, eventually, section 17

(5)of Cap. 2)- read as follows prior to being replaced, by means of Law 40/75,by 5 the now in force subsection

(4)of section 17:- 10 "

(5)The Supreme Court may, of its own motion or on the application of the complainant or of the advocate whose conduct is the subject of the enquiry, review the whole case and either confirm the decision of the Disciplinary Board or set it aside or make such other order as it may deem fit". Priortotheenactmentofsection 13ofLaw38/55thereexisted a similar provision, namely section 11 of the Advocates Law, 1933(Law20/33), as amended by the Advocates (Amendment) 15 Law,1949(Law2/49),whichbecamesection 10oftheAdvocates Law, Cap. 3, in the 1949 Revised Edition of the Statute Laws of Cyprus. Under the said section 10there wasno provision for the setting up of an Advocates Disciplinary Board, and its functions 20 were performed by the Supreme Court; consequently, there was not to be found in the said section 10 any provision for an appeal to the Supreme Court by a complainant, such as the old subsection

(5)of section 17of Cap. 2 and the present subsection

(4)of the said section 17. 25 30 35 Subsection

(2)of section 10 of the aforementioned Cap. 3, which corresponds to subsection

(2)of section 17of the presently in force Cap. 2, read as follows:"

(2)Proceedings to enforce any of thepenalties provided by sub-section

(1)may be commenced by the Supreme Court of its own motion or by an application to a Judge of the Supreme Court in Chambers for a rule to issue to theadvocatecallinguponhimto showcausewhyheshould not be dealt with under the provisions of the said subsection. An application under this sub-section may be made bythe Attorney-Geneial or, with the leaveof the Supreme Court, by any person aggrieved by the conduct of the advocate". 441 Triantafyllides P. IDre X.Y. an Advocate

(1981)It is to be observed that in subsection

(2)of section 10 of Cap. 3, above, there was no specific reference to a "Court", or to a "Chairman of a Local Bar Committee", and, asitcould not be that they were not entitled to bring a complaint against an advocate before the Supreme Court which acted at the time 5 asa disciplinary organ, it must betaken that they wereincluded inthegeneralexpression "anyperson aggrieved";and,ofcourse, once the Chairman of a Local Bar Committee had placed a complaint before the Supreme Court he became, naturally, a complainant. When subsection

(2), above, was reenacted, by means of Law 38/55, as subsection

(2)of section 13 of the said Law(which later became what is now subsection

(2)of section 17 of Cap. 2)- special provision was madeby means of paragraph (

1. c)thereof so that a Court and a Chairman of a Local Bar 15 Committee were taken out of the general category of persons aggrieved, under paragraph (
2. d)thereof, in order that they could report complained ofconductof an advocatetotheDisciplinary Board, which was, at the same time, set up by means of Law 38/55, without needing to obtain, in this respect, the leave of 20 theDisciplinary Board. But,in myview,thisspecialtreatment, which was accorded to a Court or a Chairman of a Local Bar Committee, did not deprive them of the attribute of complainants, in the sense that each one of them could still be treated as a complainant in the senseof thethen inforce subsection

(5)25 in relation to the review of a case by the Supreme Court on appeal. In my opinion, the replacement of the said subsection

(5)by the new subsection

(4)of Cap. 17, regarding appeals to the Supreme Court,doesnot alterthesituation atallinthisrespect, 30 and, therefore, in so far as an appeal to the Supreme Court isconcerned, a Court or a Chairman of a LocalBar Committee can, in a proper case, such as the present one, be treated as a complainant. There are, indeed, instances in which a Chairman ofa Local 35 Bar Committee may,by hisreport, placebefore the Disciplinary Boad complained of conduct of an advocate which, in any event, affects all the members of his Local Bar Association in a manner rendering them collectively persons aggrieved, as, fcr example, when the unprofessional conduct of the advocate 40 442 10 \ 1 C.L.R. In re X.Y. an Advocate Triantafyllides P. concerned issuchthat it affects theinterests of every individual member of the Local Bar Association to which he belongs. . This is,indeed, the position, in thepresent case,inwhichthe members of Ihe Local Bar Association of Limassol decided 5 at a general meeting that the Chairman of their Local Bar Committee should report the respondent advocate to the Disciplinary Board in relation to his complained of conduct, which rendeied him a person who, in their own view, is unfit to practise as an advocate, together with them, as a member 10 of the Local Bar Association of Limassol. For all the above reasons I havereached the conclusion that the Chairman of the Local Bar Committee of Limassol could file the present appeal as a complainant in the sense of subsection

(4)of section 17 of Cap. 2. 15 There remain to be dealt with two other preliminary issues: It was submitted by Mr. L. Clerides, who appeared in the present proceedings as a member of the Disciplinary Board and as an amicus curiae, that, in any event, there does not exist a right of appeal against an acquittal by the Disciplinary 20 Board. He has based his contention on the provisions of subsection

(7)of section 17, which reads as follows:- 25 "

(7)The Disciplinary Board in carrying out an enquiry under this section shall have the same powers and shall • conduct the enquiry as nearly as may be as a Court of summary jurisdiction". He has submitted that in view of the reference to a "Couit of summary jurisdiction" in subsection

(7), above, an appeal against an acquittal by the Disciplinary Board can only be made by the Attorney-General, or with his sanction, in the 30 instancesenvisaged under section 137ofthe Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155. Inmyviewthereferencetoa"Courtofsummaryjurisdiction", in subsection

(7)of section 17 of Cap. 2, is only intended to regulate the procedure before the Disciplinary Board, and it 35 cannotbetreated aslimitingtherightofappealunder subsection

(4)of section 17of Cap. 2; if that was so then it would render practically meaningless the reference to the "complainant" in the said subsection

(4). 443 Triantafyllides P. In reX.Y.an Advocate

(1981)Mr.L.Papaphilippouargued,too,onbehalfoftherespondent advocate that, in any event, no appeal could be made bythe Chairman of the Local Bar Committee of Limassol, in the present case, under the aforesaid subsection

(4), because it is provided thereinthatanappeal,undei itistobemadeinaccord- 5 ance with the procedure laid down by Rules of Court to be made bytheSupreme Court, andno such Rules of Court have as yet been made. In myopinion it would not be proper to construe the aforementioned subsection

(4)as a provision by means of which it was legislated that the substantive right of 10 appeal,whichtheLegislaturegranted under it,wasmadeconditional,asregardsitsenjoyment, onwhenorwhethertheSupreme Court did or did not make Rules of Court pursuant to such subsection. Thefact that noRulesofCourt haveasyetbeen madeunder 15 subsection

(4)of section 17does not deprive of his substantive right of appeal any person entitled to appeal thereunder; and until such Rules are made the established practice as regards appeals hasto befollowed in making an appeal under thesaid subsection

(4). For all the foregoing reasons I have reached the conclusion that thepreliminary objections raisedbycounselfortherespondent advocateandbycounsel whoaremembers oftheDisciplinary Boardcannot besustained, andthis appeal shouldproceed to be heard on its merits. 20 25 DEMETRIADESJ.: I am in full agreement with thejudgment just delivered by the President of the Court. TRIANTAFYLLIDES P.: In the result, this appeal isdismissed by majority, with no order as to its costs. Appealdismissed. No 30 orderas tocosts. 444