clr/1981/1981_1_445.pdf

(1981)Uponappealagainstthe order of the District Court staying the proceedings:Held, that though the Court has an inherentjurisdiction to stay proceedings such jurisdiction is a discretionary one to be exercised very sparingly and only in exceptional cases when 5 an action ought not to go on beyond all reasonable doubt; that the mere fact that the respondents have applied before a Judge of the Supreme Court,in a recourse under Article 146 of the constitution, in the circumstances of this case, is not a reason to grant a stay of theproceedings inview of theurgent 10 nature of the proceedings which had to be decided as quickly as possible in the public interest once the interest of thepublic, including the tenant and the people visiting his shop,was invol­ ved; that,therefore,thetrial Judge has notexercised hisinherent powers to grant a stay properly; accordingly the appeal must 15 be allowed and the trial Judge should hear and determine the proceedings. Appeal allowed. Cases referred to: Shackleton v. Swift [1913] 2 K.B. 312; 20 Attorney-General v. Ibrahim, 1964 C.L.R. 195; Hinckley and South Leicestershire Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Freeman [1940] 4 All E.R. 212 at pp. 216-217; Yates and Another v. Paterson and others [1954] 1 All E.R. 619 at p. 621; 25 HjiNicolaou v. Gavriel and Another

(1965)1 CL.R. 421 at p. 432; State Machinery Import Co. v. Limassol LicensedPorters Asso­ ciation and Others [1979] 1 C.L.R. 506; Lawrance v. Norreys [1890] A.C. 210, at p. 219; 30 Salomon v. Secretary of State for India [1906] 1 K.B. 613 at p. 638; Goldsmith v. SperringsLtd., [1977]2All E.R. 566at pp. 574-575; Starr v. National CoalBoard, [1977] 1All E.R. 243 at pp. 247248, 250; 35 Thompson v. South Easter Railway Co. [1882] 9 Q.B.D. 320; Adamson v. Tuff MooreandRoberts [1881] 44 Law Times 420; 446 1 C.L.R. M/ty Limassol τ. Archbishop of Cyprus Perry v. Croydon Borough Council [1938] 3 All E.R. 670; Williams v. Hunt [1905] 1 K.B.D. 512; Poulette v. Hill [1893] 1 Ch.

1. Re Chapman's Settlement [1953] 1All E.R.
2. 5 Appeal. Appeal by plaintiff against the order of the District Court of Limassol (Artemis, D.J.) dated the 10th May, 1979, (Action No. 2602/78)whereby all proceedings in the above action were stayed pending the final determination of recourse No. 32/79 10 filed with the Supreme Court by defendant
3. J.P. Potamitis,for the appellant. A.P. Anastassiades, for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. L. Loizou J.: Thejudgment of the Court will be delivered 15 by Mr. Justice Hadjianastassiou. HADJIANASTASSIOU J.: In this case the appellant, the Muni­ cipal Corporation of Limasfol, appeals against the order of a Judge of the District Court of Limassol dated 10th May, 1979, whereby he stayed the proceedings in Action No.2602/78 20 pending the final determination of an application made by respondent 2 before one member of the Supreme Court of Cyprus in recourse No. 23/
4. On 20th November, 1978, the Municipal Corporation of Limassol commenced an action by a writ of summons against 25 defendant 1,the Archbishop of Cyprus, and defendant 2 Costas Papoutsos of Limassol, informing them that if they would fail to enter an appearance, judgment would be signed against them in their absence. By thestatement of claim,the Municipal Corporation alleged 30 that defendant 1is the owner of a two storey building situated at Christodoulos Hadjipavlou Street No. 133, and within the municipal limits. Defendant 2 is the tenant of the ground floorof thesaid building andhas beenusing itas a barber shop. The Committee of the Municipal Corporation, having exa35 mined thesafety of thatbuilding—being a ruinous one—reached the conclusion that it was dangerous to the people passing by throughthesaid street, as wellas to thesafety of thetenantand 447 Hadjianastassiou J. M/tyLimassolτ.Archbishopof Cyprus

(1981)those who visited his barber shop including the owners of the neighbouring building. With that in mind, the Committee addressed a letter to the tenant drawing his attention to the dangers, and called upon the owners, defendants 1 and 2, to take steps immediately 5 to pull down that building. In addition, the said Committee made it clear that if they failed within a period of three days to do so, the Committeewould proceed with the pulling down of thesaid building and oftakingeverynecessary stepfor the safety of the public; and that they would hold them liable for all the 10 costs needed for that operation. The defendants, having failed to comply with the contents of that notice, and particularly because defendant 2 refused to leave the said premises, the Municipal Corporation sought a declaration of the Court

(1)that it was entitled to pull down 15 the said building belonging to defendant 1 and occupied by defendant 2;

(2)an order prohibiting both defendants from stopping and/or interfering with the pulling down of the whole building;

(3)an order ordering both defendants to evacuate immediately thesaid building in order to enable the plaintiffs 20 to pull it down; and

(4)that the plaintiffs would be entitled to collect fiom defendant 1 all the costs which the plaintiffs would spend for pulling down the building. On 28th February, 1978, the plaintiffs made an application seeking judgment against defendant 2 for failing to file his 25 defence in time. On 28th December, 1978, counsel for the plaintiffs made an application seeking judgment against defendant 1 as per thestatementof claim allegingthatdefendant 1 failed to enter an appearance to the writ of summons which was served on him on 30th November, 1978. 30 On 23rd January, 1979, counsel appearing for defendant 2 made an application to the Court viz., that all proceedings in this action be stayed pending the final determinationof appli­ cant's recourse No. 32/79, filed with the Supreme Court of Cyprus, (copy of which is attached hereto as exhibitA). This 35 application was based on Article 146

(4)and

(5)of theConsti­ tution of the Republic of Cyprus, and the inherent power? of the Court, and rule 48 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 448 1 C.L.R. M/tyLimassolv.ArchbishopofCyprus Hadjianastassioii J. In support of this application, the affiant, Costas Papoutsos, allegedthathewasastatutorytenantofthepremisesinquestion, and according to the adviceof his lawyers,the letter addressed to him dated 9th November, 1978,containing the said decision 5 onwhich theaction wasbased isnull and void and of no effect whatsoever. In addition, the affiant alleged that he hadfiled a recourse 32/79 in the Supreme Court of Cyprus, and he was asking that the said decision of the Municipal Corporation of Limassol be declared null and void for the reasons stated in 10 thecopyof therecoursemarked exhibitA. Theaffiant further alleged that because there was a likelihood—as his lawyers advised him—that the Supreme Court might decide that the decision of the Municipal Corporation is not a valid one,itis just and reasonable that thetrial Courtshould issueorgrant an 15 ordersuspendingtheoperation oftheproceedings inthepresent action until the determination and/or decision of the Supreme Court. The applicant concluded that if by chance the Court will refuse to grant an order, the refusal would have adverse results regardingthepresent caseand itwould entail irreparable 20 lossto him. Finally, he prayed that it wasjust and reasonable to grant in his favour the order sought. On 30thJanuary, 1979,counsel for defendant 2fileda notice opposing the application of the Municipal Corporation dated 28thDecember, 1978, andfixed for hearingonthe2nd February, 25 1979. This application was based on rule 48, onthe inherent powersoftheCourtandArticle146

(4)and

(5)oftheConstitution of the Republic. In support of this application, the affiant, Costas Papoutsos, alleged that the relief sought by the plaintiffs, the Municipal 30 Corporation in the said action No. 2602/78, depends on the legality or not ofthedecision ofthesaid Municipal Corporation which has been sent to him by a letter dated 9th November, 1978, He further stated that because he was disputing both the real facts referred to in the said letter of the Municipal 35 Corporation, and particularly those upon which the said Municipal Corporation has based the relevant decision, as well as the legal and constitutional validity of such a decision after the advice given to him by his lawyers, hefiledin the Supreme Court a recourse against the Municipal Corporation by which 40 he is doubting the legality of the said decision for the reasons appearing in the said recourse. 449 Hadjianastassiou J. M/tyLimassol τ.Archbishop of Cyprus

(1981)In addition, he alleged that the District Court of Limassol lacks competence and jurisdiction to examine the validity or not of thesaid decision of the Municipal Corporation onwhich the said Corporation relies in the present action; and that the presentapplicationexparteof theplaintiffs cannotstandbecause both his application, as well a? thefilingof his defence in the present actionshould befiledwhen therecoursewhichispending before the Supreme Court is decided. 5 Finally, he went on to add that in the meantimehe had filed an application to stop theproceedings in the present action till 10 the delivery of the decision of the Supreme Court,and that the recourse has beenfixedfor hearing on the 15th February, 1979. On 31st January, 1979, counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation opposed the application of defendant 2, and the said opposition was based on Articles 144 and 146

(1)of the 15 Constitution,and on theCivil ProcedureRules,Order 48,rule

1. In support of this application,theMunicipal Secretary Sawas Georghiou, in his affidavit said that the application by the applicant cannot stand and cannot be supported by the legal and factual elements (as he was advised by counsel). Finally, 20 in paragraph 4 he said that the adjournment of the present proceedings in the action would prolong the time of trying the case and in accordance with the opinions of the municipal engineers—which he believesas being true—thepassage of time entails danger to the passers by and to the owners of the neigh- 25 bouring buildings, as well as to all those who use the barber shop of defendant
2. Finally, he denied that the pulling down of thesaid building would causeirreparable damageto defendant 2,but hewent onto stale thatevenif therecoursewould succeed, it was only a question of money, and themunicipal corporation 30 was in a position to compensate defendant
3. The trial Judge, having considered thearguments andconten­ tionsof bothcounsel,hereachedtheconclusionthattheproceed­ ings should be stayed pending the determination of the recourse of the applicant. The learned Judge, in taking that stand said 35 at p. 22:"Even though Iamof theviewthatproceeding and deciding upon this Action will not mean encroaching upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as I will not 450 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 M/tyLimassolτ.Archbishop ofCyprus HadjianastassiouJ. . be deciding upon the validity of the decision (since the decision is presumed to be a valid one until the opposite is decided), Ifeel thatif Iproceedand determinetheAction and, if I give Judgment for the Plaintiffs and subsequently theSupreme Courtannuls thedecision Iwill have enforced a void decision and despite the pronouncement of the invalidity of the act it will be impossible to make redress if the building will have been demolished by then. In such a case I feel that compensation would not be a sufficient remedy and Ifeel thatwhat ought to be doneis to preserve the status quo until the question of thevalidity of thedeci­ sion is determined by the appropriate Court. As legalissuesmustbe determinedas speedily as possible this Court should not be allowed to say that the fact that a decision upon the matter by the Supreme Court may entail delay, is a reason in favour of dismissing the Appli­ cation". There is nodoubt thatsubject to theprovisions of theMuni­ cipal Corporations Law (as re-enacted)and of any otherlaw in 20 force, the duties and powers of the Municipal Councils are enumerated in part 3 of the law. According to s. 137, the council has power to deal also with buildings which are in a dangerous state. This section says that: 25 30 35 40 "If any building within any municipal limits is deemed by the council to be in a ruinous' state and dangerous to passengers or to occupiers of the neighbouring buildings, the council shall immediately cause a proper hoarding or fence to be put for the protection of passengers, and shall cause notice in writing to be given to the owner of the building, if he is known and resident within themunicipal limits, and shall also cause a notice to be put on thedoor or other conspicuous part of the building or otherwise to be given to the occupier thereof, if any, requesting him forthwith to take down, secure or repair the building as thecircumstancesshall require;andif theowner oroccupier does not begin to repair, take down or secure the building within the space of three days after any such notice has been so given or put up as aforesaid, and complete the repairs or taking down or securing as speedily as possible, the council may cause all or so much of the building as 451 Hadjianastassiou J. M/tyLimassolτ.Archbishopof Cyprus

(1981)shall be in a ruinous condition and dangerous as aforesaid to be taken down, repaired, rebuilt or otherwise secured in such a manner as shall be requisite: Provided that if theconditionof thebuilding is suchthat in the interests of the public safety it is necessary that it 5 be taken down, secured or repaired immediately, the council shall forthwith proceed to cause the same, or so much thereof as is in a dangerous condition,to be taken down, secured or repaired without service of notice on the owner or occupier as herein provided for. In any of 10 , the foregoing circumstances all expenses incurred by the ' / municipalcorporationinputtingupeveryfence orhoarding / and in taking down, repairing, rebuilding, or securing 1 the building, shall be paid by the owner thereof, unless he is actually a pauper, and may be recovered as a civil 15 debt". The first question raised in this appeal is whether the trial Court has jurisdiction to stay proceedings pending the deter­ mination of therecoursefiledby defendant2 before the Supreme Court of Cyprus. Time and again it has bten said the Court 20 has an inherentjurisdiction to stay proceedings and that such jurisdiction is a discretionary one to be exercised by theCourt if it thinks fit and in a proper case, terms may be imposed,but it ought to be very sparingly exercised and only invery except­ ional cases. The general practice is, however, that you should 25 not stay actions unless theaction,beyond all reasonable doubt, ought not to go on. (See Vaughan Williams, Lord Justice in Shackleton v. Swift [1913]2 K.B. at p. 312). Counsel for theappellant argued, both before the trial Court and in this Court, that the Court in deciding to examine the 30 question of staying the proceedings, should look in exercising its discretion by applying the principles applicable in cases of interim orders, and that in the pre.-ent case should determine (

1. a)that there is no question of irreparable damage once the building is inaruinousconditionandshouldnotstay theprocee- 35 dings because the Municipal Corporation is in a position to compensate defendant 2for any loss which he may suffer; (
2. b)that it was not necessary for the applicant to file a recourse before the Supreme Courtunder Article 146 of theConstitution because the learned Judge hadjurisdiction to decide questions 40 452 1 C.LJR. M/tyLimassolv.ArchbishopofCyprus HadjianastassiooJ. of unconstitutionality of a law or a decision just raised before him. He relies on The Attorney-General v. Ibrahim, 1964 C.L.R. 195. Finally, counsel invited the Court to take the stand that this isnota proper casefor theCourt to haveexercised 5 his discretionary power to stay the proceedings. In Shackleton v. Swift [1913]2 K.B. 304, Vaughan Williams, L.J., dealing with the question of staying the proceedings in an action, had this to say at pp. 311-312:10 15 20 25 30 "To stay an action, to say that an action shall not be tried, is generally to take a step which ought not to be taken except in a very clear case. It not unfrequently arises under the Judicature Act and Rules that there is an application to stay an action, or an application to declare that an action isfrivolous, and in those cases the practice under the Judicature Act has always been not to stay the action under the general powers of the Judicature Act, because it is a strong thing to say to a plaintiff who is bringing an action that his complaint will not be heard, to say that it will be stayed without there having been a trial, without the evidence having been heard. Generally speaking, the consequence is that the judges are very slow to stay actions; that does not mean that there is no discretion in the judges; but the general practice is that you should not stay actions unless the action, beyond all reasonable doubt, ought not to go on In the present case we have this difficulty—that Rowlatt J. came to the conclusion that this action ought to be tried, it seems a strong thing for other judges to say that there is clearly no cause of action; especially is that so in a case where thepower to stay theaction is a discretionary power. The Judge who heard the case at chambers exercised his discretion". In Hinckley and South Leicestershire Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Freeman, [1940] 4 All E.R. 212, Farwell, 35 J., dealing with the adjournment of proceedings, and with the inherent power of a Court to adjourn proceedings for a stated time, said at pp. 216-217;"The proposition that this Court has not power to adjourn any matter on any proper ground isnew to me. No doubt 453 HadjianastassiouJ. M/tyLimassolv.ArchbishopofCyprus

(1981)the Court cannot postpone the hearing of a matter indefinitely, because, if a Court did so, it might thereby lead to defeating justice altogether, and a mere arbitrary refusal to hearaparticular caseisnot amatterwhich,whendealing with litigation, would ever become a recognised thing. 5 I cannot conceive any Judge taking a course of that sort. However, to say that ths Court has not always an inherent power to direct that any matter which comes before it should stand overfor aperiod iftheCourt thinksthat that is the proper way to deal with the matter is a proposition ]Q entirely new to me If the master is wrong in a particular case in thinking that that is the way to proceed, the litigant has his remedy in taking the matter to the Judge, and, if the Judge takes the view which the master took and the litigant is still 15 dissatisfied, hecangohigherand obtain, ifhecanareversal of the Judge's direction. To my mind, however, it is quite beyond anything which I have ever heard suggested in Court to say that the Court has not jurisdiction under its own procedure in a proper case to direct that a matter 20 should stand over for such period as the Court, in all the circumstances, thinks justice requires. In my judgment, the master had thejurisdiction, which was a properjurisdiction, to make the order which he has made, and, as far as thissummons seeksto get themaster's 25 direction reversed on theground that hehad nojurisdiction to make it, in my judgment, it fails, and should be dismissed". In YatesandAnother v. Paterson andothers [1954] 1 All E.R. 619, Sir Raymond Evershed M.R., dealing with the very same 30 question said at p. 621:"There is, I think, no doubt that, if a judge adjourns a case,just as if he refused an adjournment of a case, hehas performed a judicial act which can be reviewed by this Court, though I need not say that an adjournment, or a 35 refusal of an adjournment, is a matter prima facie entirely within the discretion of the Judge. This Court would, therefore, be very slow to interfere with any such order, but, in myjudgment, there is no doubt of thejurisdiction 454 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 M/tyLimassolτ.ArchbishopofCyprus HadjianastassiouJ. of this Courttoentertainappeals insuchmatters. Counsel for the plaintiffs referred usto Hinckley&South Leicester­ shire Permanent Benefit Building Society v.Freeman and Maxwell v. Rem as authority for what Ihave said. It maywell be that, if a case, andanimportant case, is known to be subject to appeal to the House of Lords, or from a judge of first instance totheCourt of Appeal, a judge may reasonably and properly think that it is in the general public interest notto decide another caseon the same lines until the result of the case under appeal has become known. I say that it may beso. Itdepends very much onall the circumstances of the particular case, and, if thejudges of the Chancery Division have reached the conclusion thatinthe public interest itwould bebetter generally to postpone dealing with applications of this kind until the decision in Re Chapman is known, then I should feel that it was, prima facie at anyrate,amatter for the Chancery judges to decide. Whether any such decisionby thejudges hasbeencometoIdonot,ofcourse, know. Ihave said what Ihave because Idesire toconfine myjudgmenttotheparticularcasewhichwe havebefore us. The point which counsel for the plaintiffs stressed most strongly before usis this. Itis essential, inorder thatthe proposed compromise should be effective at all, thatthe settlor should live until the date when the Court approves, if itdoesapprove,of thepresentscheme. Thereisevidence before us to show that the settlor; whois of the ripeage of eighty years, is also inavery delicate,not tosaypreca­ rious, state of health. Indeed,it is said by the deponent tothe affidavit, Dr. Ritchie,that,although itis impossible to say howlong heis likely tolive, hishealth is suchthat he might die within a very short space oftime. Whatever betherightanswer toacasenotaffected byaconsideration of that kind, it does seem to methat it might doa real injustice if this case were adjourned, perhaps for some months, and during that period the settlor were to die, and, therefore, I have come to the conclusion that we ought to intervene in this case, andthat thefact thatRe Chapman is pending before the House of Lords is not a sufficient justification for thejudge's decision to adjourn the present case". In Cyprus thequestion of the adjournment of cases hasalso 455 HadjianastassiouJ. M/tyLimassolv.ArchbishopofCyprus

(1981)occupied the time of the Courts, and in Eleni Gr. HjiNicolaou v. Mariccou Antoni Gavriel and Another,

(1965)1 C.L.R. 421, Zekia, P. had this to say at p. 432:"It should be borne in mind that the Court may adjourn the hearing of a case only *if it thinks it expedient for the 5 interests of justice', that is; in order to do justice between the parties and not for any other reason: see Maxwell v. Rem and others, [1928] 1 K.B. 645; [19271All E.R. Rep. 335; Hinktey and South Leicestershire P.B.S. v. Freeman [1941] Ch. 32; [1940] 4 All E.R. 212; Re Yates' Settlement io Trusts [1954] 1 All E.R. 619; Efstathios Ryriacou & Sons Ltd. v. Mouzourides

(1963)2 C.L.R. 1; and Civil Procedure Rules, Order 33, rule 6". _ _ _ _ _ In State Machinery Import Co. v. Limassol Licensed Porters Association and Others,

(1979)1 C.L.R. 506, on March 11, 15 1978, the District Court.of.Limassol made an order in Action No. 1748/77 by which there were added ninety-six new codefendants. Against that order there was filed civil appeal No. 5825 on March 20,

1. On March 29, 1978, the respondents in this appeal applied for stay of the proceedings in the action 20 pending the determination of appeal No. 5825and in theexercise of its discretion the trial Court made an order to that effect on April 8,
2. TZ~I ."^. On Appeal, Triantafyllides, P., said at p. 508:"lt is clear that, depending on whether or not the order 25 for the addition of the ninety-six co-defendants is unheld, the respondents, as defendants in the action, will have to frame their statement· of defence accordingly; they will, therefore, be affected by the outcome of appeal No. 5825, which was made against that order, especially as the action 30 cannot be proceeded with separately against, respectively, the respondents and the ninety-six new defendants, who will continue to be defendants if the order for their addition is upheld in appeal No.
3. We, consequently, cannot hold that it hasbeenestablished 35 to our satisfaction that the trial Judge, who granted the appeal from order for stay of proceedings, has exercised hisdiscretion ina wrongmanner, soas to render it necessary for us to intervene in favour of the appellants". 456 1 C.L.R. M/tyUmassolv.Archbishop"ofCyprus Hadjianastassiou J. There is no doubt, having regard to the authorities quoted, that the Court may, if it thinks it expedient for the interests ofjustice,postpone oradjourn thetrial for suchtime,and upon such terms (if any) as it may think fit. (See our own rule 6 5 Order 33 of the Civil Procedure Rules). But I would reiterate that unlikethejurisdiction under the Rulesof Court, the Court hasalso an inherentjurisdiction to stay or dismissproceedings, but such jurisdiction should be sparingly exercised and only in very exceptional cases. 10 · InLawrancev.iVorreyj,*[1890]A.C.210,H.L., Lord Herschell said at p. 219:"It cannot be doubted that the Court has ah inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action which is an abuse of the process of the Court. 'It is a jurisdiction which ought 15 tobeverysparingly exercised, and only invery exceptional cases. Idonot think itsexercisewouldbejustified merely because the story told in the pleadings was highly improbable, and one which it was difficult to believe could be proved". 20 (SeealsoSalamanv.SecretaryofStatefor India,[1906]1 K.B.D., 613, C.A. at p.
4. In a recent case, Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd., [1977] 2 All E.R. 566, Lord Denning M.R. had this to say regarding the stay or dismissal of proceedings at pp. 574-575:25 30 35 "In a civilised society, legal process is the machinery for keeping order and doingjustice. It can be used properly or it canbeabused. It isused properlywhen it isinvoked for the vindication of men's rights or the enforcement of just claims. It is abused when it is diverted from its true course so as to serve extortion or oppression; or to exert pressure so as to achieve an improper end. When it is so abused, it is a tort, a wrong known to the law. The judges can and will intervene to stop it. They will staythelegalprocess,iftheycan,beforeanyharmisdone... I knowthat theremedy bystayingtheprocessisa strong remedy,and onlyto beexercised inexceptionalcases. But there are cases in whichjustice may require it to be done. And then it should be done if the evidence is sufficient for the purpose". 457 HadjianastassiouJ. M/ty Limassolv. ArchbishopofCyprus

(1981)In Starrv. NationalCoal Board, [1977] 1 All E.R. 243,Lord Scarman, L.J., dealing with the question of whether the Court has jurisdiction to grant a stay, said at pp. 247-248:"There are a number of propositions of lawwhich are not in dispute, and I mention them straight away so that one 5 may approach and consider that which is in issue between the parties. It is accepted that, where a plaintiff refuses toundergoamedicalexamination requestedbya defendant, the Court does have an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay until such time as he submits to such examination 10 whenitisjustandreasonablesotodo. Itisalsorecognised that a stay, if granted, does either shut out the plaintiff from the seat of justice or compel him against his will to submit to a medical examination: and, of course, that is an invasion of his personal liberty". 15 Then, having quoted a number of cases on this particular issue the learned Lord Justice concluded asfollows at p.250:"And soineverycase,as I seeit, theparticular facts of the case on which the discretion has to be exercised are allimportant. The discretion cannot be exercised unless 20 each party does expose the reasons for his action. I have already indicated that I do not regard this as a question of onus of proof. There is, in my judgment, a duty on each party in such a situation to provide the Court with the necessary material known to him, so that the Court, 25 fully informed, can exercise its discretion properly. However, I would add this comment: that at the end of the day it must be for him who seeks the stay to show that, in the discretion of theCourt, it should be imposed. Applying those principles, I think that thefirstquestion, 30 as one turns to the facts of the case, which one has to ask is: was the defendants'requestfor theexamination of the plaintiff by Dr. X a reasonable request? I have no doubt thatitwas. Dr.Xisadistinguishedconsultant neurologist. The opinion of a consultant neurologist was needed in 35 order that the defendants might properly repair their case. Sometimes, of course, one would not have to go further, and one could, as for instance, in Edmeades v. ThamesBoardMillsLtd [1969]2AllE.R. 127,impose astay merely because the reasonable request had been refused. 40 458 1 C.L.R. M/tyLimassolv.ArchbishopofCyprus Hfldjtanastessioo J. But sometimes one has to go further and to consider the plaintiff's reasons for refusing the request; and the present case h, in my.judgment, such a one". See also as to inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings, 30 5 Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd edn., 407 paragraph 767 and 768 of the same textbook as to which are the circumstances in which the action may be stayed. It is equally true to say that where there are cross actions between the same parties arising out of the same matter, one of them may be stayed. 10 (Thompson v. South Eastern Railway Co., [1882] 9 Q.B.D. 320; and Adamson v. Tuff Moore and Roberts, [1881] 44 Law Times 420); and there is power to stay proceedings pending the trial of its action {Perry v. Croydon Borough Council, [1938] 3 AH E.R. 670). 15 Finally, even if the plaintiff had a recourse to separate actions or proceedings in respect of the same subject matter, when all the relief to which he is entitled ought to be obtained in one action, a stay may be in one or more of the actions. (See Williamsv. Hunt, [1905] 1K.B.D. 512at pp. 514-515, following 20 Poulette v. Hill, [1893] 1 Ch. 277). Having quoted a great number of authorities in a variety of circumstances inwhich an action may be stayed, we turn now toconsider whether thetrial Judge rightly and properly exercised hisinherent powersto grant a stay. Withrespect to the decision 25 of the trial Judge, these proceedings were of an urgent nature once it involved the interest of the public including the tenant, and the people who were visiting his barber shop. In our view the trial Judge, as the authorities show, may grant a stay in order to dojustice to the parties, and that such inherent 30 jurisdiction to stay proceedings should be sparingly exercised, and only in very exceptional cases. This is indeed one of those exceptional cases, but with respect, the trial Judge did not give sufficient reasons, in our view of the urgency of the matter,and misdirected himself because at the end of the day it was for the 35 respondent who sought to stay the proceedings to show that in the discretion of the Court, it should be imposed. We would, therefore, adopt and follow the reasoning of Lord Scarman in Starr v. National Coal Board (supra) on this point. In view of the material before the trial Judge, and applying 459 HadjianastassiouJ. M/tylimassol *.ArchbishopofCyprus

(1981)the principles enunciated in a number of cases quoted earlier, and fully awarethat this Court would beslowto interfere with such orders, we have decided—having regard to the genera! public interest, to interfere with his decision to stay the proceedings in that action. But it may well be that if a case, and an 5 important case,isknown tobesubject toappeal tothe Supreme Court, a Judge may reasonably and properly think that it is in the public interest not to decide another case on the same lines until the result of the case under appeal. We say that it may be so. It depends very much on all the circumstances 10 of the particular case and the urgency of thematter. Themere fact that the respondent has applied before a Judge of the Supreme Court in a recourse under Article 146of the Constitution, with respect, in the particular circumstances of this case, i?not a reason to grant a stay oftheproceedings, becausethere 15 isevidencebefore usto showthat this isan urgent case,and it is in the public interest to be decided as quickly as possible. With that in mind, and fully cognisant that thecase ofChapman, [1953] 1 All E. R. 103,referredto by counsel inthecase of re Yates(supra), is distinguishable, and for the reasons we 20 have given, we have reachedtheconclusion toallowtheappeal and order accordingly that the trial Judge should hear and determine the proceedings. Forthereasonswehavestated,thisappeal shouldbeallowed, but in the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to 25 costs. Appeal allowed. No order as to costs. 460