clr/1981/1981_1_589.pdf

(1981)in their effort to establish their authority in the island; that in furtherance of these orders, he took charge of the police station and assumed responsibility for its guard; that implementing the orders hehad received he ordered his subordinates to shoot at anyone who moved in the street and failed to stop 5 when warned to in defiance of the night curfew imposed by the usurpers of State power; that the men under his command were conscripts of the National Guard; and that following the orders they had received the men under the command of the appellant fired at the bus wherein the deceased travelled 10 as a passenger, inflicting fatal wounds on him who, in consequence thereof, met with his death. Appellant was found liable under the provisions of section 12

(1)(a)*oftheCivilWrongsLaw,Cap. 148 andheld answerable in damages. The widow who was an attractive young lady of 27, sought, also, compensation under the provisions of section 58of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148. At the time of his death the deceased was earning £124.486 mils and had be been alive he would be earning £182 per month at the time of the trial. The 20 widow was supported by her husband but a fortnight after his death she was employed as a special constable, a position she still held, earning £53per month. The trial Court awarded £750 as damages for loss of expectation of life; and after taking into consideration the possibility of marriage of the widow 25 it fixed the multiplier at 5 and the multiplicant for the past 3 1/2 years at £30 per month and for the 18 months to come at £35. Upon appeal by the defendant it was contended that: (I) The decision or verdict of the trial Judge on the issue 30 ofliability was wrongin law and infact, and in particular that (

1. a)the appellant gave the orders to the persons who fired the fatal shots in consequence of which Theodotos Demetriou met with his death; (
2. b)that he gave unqualified orders to his subordinates to shoot at anyone 35 who moved in the street and failed to stop when warned Section 12(l)(
3. a)provides as follows: "Any person who shall join or aid in, authorize, counsel, command, procure or ratify any act done or to be done by any other person shall be liable for such act". 590 15 1 C.L.R. 5 Anastassiouv.DemetrioaandAnother to in defiance of the night curfew; (
4. c)that any orders the appellant might have given were illegal and/or not . within the scope of hislawful authority; (
5. d)that superiors orders even in the case of persons serving in the military forces could not be invoked as a defence.

(2)The award of damages to the widow for the sum of £1515 for loss of dependency was wrong in principle as being too high a sum having regard to the age of the widow. 10 15 Held,

(1)that the orders of those who perpetrated the coup were illegal; that soldiers not only have the right but duty to disobey illegal orders of their superiors; that in the light of the evidence before the trial Court that the appellant has given unqualified orders to his subordinates to shoot at anyone who moved in the street this Court is in agreement with the findings of the trial Court; accordingly the appeal should fail.

(2)(After dealing with the principles regarding the determination of the value of the dependency) that the sum awarded is not excessive and this Court will not interfere with the award. 20 Appeal dismissed. Cases referred to: Attorney-General of the Republic v. Aresti

(1975)2 C.L.R.9; Keighly v. Bell (decided by Willes J. in 1866); 25 Thomas (decided in 1816 cited in Glanville Williams Criminal Law (The General Part) at p. 391); Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke [1968] 3 All E.R. 561; Adams v. Adams [1970] 3 All E.R. 572; Kartambi and Others v. Alfa Shoe Factory and Others

(1968)1 C.L.R. 324; 30 Poullou v. Constantinou.(\m) 1 C.L.R. 177; Mallett v. McMonagle [1969] 2 All E.R. 178; Taylor v. 0 ' Connor [1970] 1 AH E.R. 365; Gavin v. V/ilmot Breeden Ltd. [1973] 3 All E.R. 935; Cookson v. Knowles [1977] 2 All E.R. 820; 35 Papadopoullos v. Tryfonos and Another

(1968)1 C.L.R. 80. 591 Anastassiou?.DemetriouandAnother

(1981)Appeal. Appeal by defendant against the judgment of the District Court of Larnaca (Pikis, P.D.C.) dated the 7th January, 1978 (Action No. 1098/75) whereby he was adjudged to pay to the estate of the deceased Theodotos Demetriou, who was shot by soldiers under the command of the defendant, thesum of £2,325.—. 5 A. Efiychiou, for the appellant. A. Andreou, for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. 10 HADJIANASTASSIOII J. read the following judgment of the Court. This is an appeal by the defendant Demetrios Anastassiou ofLarnaca from thejudgment ofthePresident ofthe District Court of Larnaca dated 7thJanuary, 1978,inwhichhe awarded to the estate of the deceased Theodotos Demetriou, late of 15 Larnaca, whowas shot by soldiers under the command of the defendant, the sum of £810 as demages and £1,515 for loss of dependency to his widow. THE FACTS: In the early hours of 16thJuly, 1974,Theodotos Demetriou 20 was conveyed to Larnaca hospital appearing to bedead according to all outward indications. On 17th July, 1974, a post mortem examination wascarried outonthebody ofthe deceased in order to ascertain thecauses of death. A medical certificate wasissuedbythemedicalofficer whocarried outtheexamination 25 and confirmed that the death of the victim came about because of internal cerebral haemorrhage. The deceased was buried on 18th July, 1974. In order to examine the circumstances leading to the death of the deceased and appreciate the facts surrounding his death, 30 we think it is necessary to refer tothetragic events of 15thJuly, 1974. Indeed, theSupreme Court hasconsistently takenjudicial notice of the calamitous events of July and August 1974,and the anomalous situation produced thereafter. See AttorneyGeneralv. Aresti,

(1975)2 C.L.R. 9, in which I was one of the 35 members of the Court. Thenotoriety of those events and their impact onthefuture ofourcountry andthefate ofits inhabitants issuch as tojustify noticing not only thehappening ofthe event but its details as well. The extent to which notorious events 592 1 C.L.R. Anastassiou ν,Demetriou and Another Hadjianastassiou J. may benoticedisproportionate totheir notorietyandthedegree to which they have become public knowledge. We, therefore, find ourselves in agreement with the learned Judge that the events of that period were so devastating in nature as to leave 5 a lasting effect on the minds of the inhabitants of our country, whereas a mass of legislation introduced for the purpose of coping with the situation created by those events reminds us constantly of their occurrence and implications. The coup d'etat of 15th July, 1974, its manifestation, the details of its 10 progress, themotives of those who organized it andperpetrated it as well as its eventual collapse are so well known as tojustify the Court to notice many of its details that have become since public knowledge. On the morning of 15th July, 1974, a date to be remembered 15 for ever, a military coup was organized with theavowed aim of overthrowing theGovernmentof Cyprus and the explicit object of installing in its place a puppet Government subservient to the wishes of the military junta that ruled Greece at the time. The coup was organized by Greek officers of the National 20 Guard, as well as their agents and co—conspirators in Cyprus. Greek officers then serving with the National Guard for the purpose of training Cypriot guardsmen acting in abuse of their position and duties, secretly organized the coup and led the NationalGuardinaneffort togain political power in Cyprus 25 and run the country according to the whims of the Presidential Palace and other Government installations throughout the island and soon after the manifestation of the coup they gained control of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation proclaiming over theradiosuccess of thecoupand thedeathof thePresident 30 of the Republic. By a stroke of luck, the President of the Republic, the late Archbishop Makarios, was saved from the treacherous attack directedagainst thePresidential Palace,andcalledonthe Cyprus 35 people to resist thetreasonous gang that was trying toestabhsh itself in power. Later in the day a puppet Government was sworn inandbegan usurping Government authority. A curfew was imposedontheordersof the usurpers of power prohibiting themovementof pedestrians andvehicular traffic. Inthe mean40 time, they started a manhunton an unprecedented scale. To completethe picture of the unsavoury events of 15lh July, 1974, no army unit or any distinct section of it opposed the coup. 593 HatUianastassioa J. Anastassiou v. Demetriou andAnother

(1981)Onthecontrary,theyallowedthemselvestobecomeinstrumental for the furtherance of the designs of the usurpers of power. Andinseekingtoestablishtheirauthority theusurpersofpower used all the armoury of the National Guard and were aided in their purposes by the Greek contingent stationed in Cyprus 5 under international treaties who, like the National Guard, employed their men and weaponry to establish themselves unlawfully in power. Reverting now to the deceased, it appears that he was an employee of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus and he was at 10 hishome on the night ofthe 15thJuly, 1974,where hewasresiding with his wife. At about midnight or shortly afterwards, hewas awakened and wasgiven orders to report to duty. Although he was reluctant at first to comply with those orders, being on leave, he eventually complied with the said orders. 15 Hedressed andentered theEACbusassignedfor thepurposeof conveying him to his work as well as other employees. The driver of the bus Michalakis Xenofontos, an employee of the Electricity Authority, took the deceased from his house and an armoured soldier was occupying a seat near him. Indeed, 20 a police land rover was assigned to escort the bus with all the other passengers to the office of the Electricity Authority. The house of the deceased was very near the police station which normallywasaccommodating adivisionofthe policeresponsible for the policing of the rural areas of Larnaca referred to as a 25 rural area police station, The police station was within easy vitw from the yard of the house of the deceased where the wife of the deceased Eleni Theodotou Demetriou stood to say goodbye to her husband following the bus as il was driven off in the section of the aforesaid police station at a distance of 50- 30 100 yards from their house. According to the driver, the bus waswell lighted, both inside and outside. The streets were deserted except for the soldiers whoweremanningcheckpoints andpersonswhoweredescribed 35 as "praxikopimaties"—rebels, who no doubt were trying to intimidate the population and establish their rule. The bus came under heavy fire as it approached the police station soon after starting off. It was indeed fired by personswho were standing on the roof of the station. The driver, in spite of the fact that he was injured, managed to bring the bus to a stand- 40 still. Before leavingthe bus,the driver noticed that Theodotos 594 1 CX.R. Anastassiouτ.Demetriouand Another Hadjuutastassion J. Demetriou was motionless as he had been shot, and appeared to be dead. Solomonides who was one of the passengers was also injured and he made a run for his house. Indeed, the soldier who was escorting the bus was also injured. Inthe 5 meantime,Michalakis Xenofontos was conveyed totheLarnaca hospital where he was given medical treatment and soon after­ wardshesaw atthehospital thebody of the deceasedTheodotos Demetriou. Both the widow of the deceased as well as the driver of the 10 bus testified that the shots had been fired exclusively from the roof of the police station. It appears further that Demetrios Anastassiou, the defendant, was a second lieutenant in the Cyprus Army having first joined the army in the year 1961 as a corporal. In July, 1974, he was attached to theNational 15 Guardonassignment from thearmy authoritiesof theRepublic, and had instructions from his superiors to guard the police station. At 1.00 a.m. of the 16th July, 1974, the defendant was in his office and heard the shots. He was told by the soldiers when he went upto the roof that two cars wereappro20 aching with their lights flashing. They called them to stop and fired warning shots, but when they did not stop they shot at the vehicles. He further added that he heard voices, but he could not say if they were calls to the vehicles to stop. Ho made arrangements to take the injured persons to the hospital 25 and he added that he did not make any inquiries as to who fired theshotsbecause all theguards had beenfiringat thesame time. Questioned further, he said that he did not take down the nam&s of the soldiers but he reported the incident orally on the telephone to his superiors. 30 Itwas thecasefor theplaintiffs thatdefendant No. 1 is answer­ able for damages to the estate and dependent of the deceased for the death of Theodotos Demetrioufor the reason that he had issued orders to his subordinates at the police station to fireat anyone who moved and in that way he authorized and 35 aided the unlawful acts that caused the death of the deceased. In support of their case, they produced a statement on oath made by the defendant before the coroner who held an inquesl into the causes of death of the deceased, which was admitted in evidence as a statement against interest. Defendant No.1 40 did not dispute making the statement recorded in exhibit 4 before the coroner, but tried in evidence to explain it away 595 Hadjtanastassiou J. Anastassiou v. Demetriou andAnother

(1981)and generally whittle down its effect and implications. In his statement to thecoroner,thedefendant stated that at about 7.00 p.m. of the 15th July, 1974, he was ordered by his superiors at Larnaca National Guard headquarters to assume responsibilityfor guardingtheabovementioned policestation. Following 5 their instructions, he assumed the command of the station. Furthermore, in accordance with his instructions, he ordered the men at the station to shoot at anyone moving in the street in defiance of the night curfew and failed to slop when called to do so. He further explained that his subordinates at the 10 station had received the same ordersfrom othersaswell. Itissignificant tonotethatinhisstatementbefore thecoroner, he described his subordinates at the station as conscripts of the National Guard from which one may gather that they were wearing the uniform of National Guard conscripts, a statement 15 he sought to qualify before the trial Court by saying that not only soldiers, but irregulars also were moving about in the station, making it very difficult for him to control them. In his evidence, the defendant added that a chaotic situation prevailed at the time,and that he assumed responsibility for guard- 20 ing the police station. He further admitted that he issued orders to those he met at the station to shoot at anyone who disobeyed the night curfew, telling them that those were the orders they had and that they should act accordingly. Despite the responsibility he assumed for guarding the station and the 25 orders he had given, he maintained that he was unaware of the presence ofany personson the roof of thestation and mentioned in cross-examination for the first time that he had qualified hisorders to shoot by telling his subordinates not to fire before reporting the incident to him. 30 FINDINGS OFFACT: The learned trial Judge, having observed that the defendant had tried to mislead him asto the part heplayed on the day in question, and his readiness to implement the orders of those criminally usurping State power and the events of the night of 35 the incident in question, had this to say: "Having seen and heard the witnesses testify before me and bearing in mind the statement of defendant before the coroner, I make the following findings: 596 1 C.L.R. Anastassiou v. Demetriou and Another Hadjtanastassiou J. (

1. a)Defendant 1, an officer of the Cyprus army attached to the National Guard, was detailed by the army authorities of Larnaca to take charge of the aforementioned police station; 5 10 15 (
2. b)the orders were issued by supporters of the military coup in their effort to establish their authority in the island; (
3. c)defendant 1,infurtherance ofthoseorders,tookcharge of the police station and assumed responsibility for its guard. Implementing the orders he had received he ordered his subordinates to shoot at anyone who moved in the street and failed to stop when warned to in defiance of the night curfew imposed by the usurpers of State power. The same orders had been givenover theradio thenin the control of thecriminal gang that perpetrated the coup; (
4. d)the men under his command were conscripts of the National Guard; and 20 (
5. e)following the orders they had received the men under the command of defendant 1firedat the bus wherein the deceased travelled as a passenger, inflicting fatal wounds on Theodotos Demetriou who,in consequence thereof, met with his death". SUPERIOR ORDERS: 25 30 35 Then the learned Judge in posing the question whether in the light of hisfindingthe case was proved against defendant 1 and particularly as to whether superior orders constituted a shield to civil liability, had this to say:"To my comprehension, no Cyprus decided case has answered this question. In England the subject has attracted the attention of both constitutional and criminal law writers and judging from dicta of an eminent English judge, Willes J., in Keighly v. Bell,decided in 1866, there appearstobe no distinction with regard tothe implications of superior orders as a defence between criminal and civil liability. Obviously in both cases what is relevant is whetherthe orders,albeit illegal,constitute lawful authority 597 Hadjianastasstou J. Anastassiouτ.Demetriouand Another

(1981)for .therecipient to engage in an unlawful act. The subject of superior orders as a defence was discussed in a number Of criminal cases referred to.and explained in Russel on Crime, 11th edition, part I at p. 93 et seq., and in still greater detail by Glanville Williams Criminal Law (The General Part) at p. 389 et seq. Dicey, the famous English constitutional writer, in his work 'Law of the Constitution, 9th edition' at pp. 193 and 194 makes what is regarded as aclassical statementof thelaw onthe subject: 5 'It is a well-known principle of the Constitutional 10 Law that official position and superior orders(whether of the»Crown or of a private master) are not inthem­ selves a justification for committing an act that would otherwise be a legal wrong'. It is worthy of note that no distinction whatever is drawn 15 between criminal and civil liability, the author evidently taking the view that no such differentiation is warranted either on principle or on authority". In the 19th century Judges and authors alike vacillated in their viewsas to theimplications of superior orders as adefence 20 and thecirciunstances underwhich superior orderscouldconsti­ tute a defence assuming they could be invoked to an extent as a shield for unlawful acts. Willes J., in Keighlyv. Bell, decidedin 1866,inclined to the viewthattheordersof asuperior might confer a defence to the wrongdoer provided they were 25 not "necessarily or manifestly illegal". On the other hand, in Thomas, decided in 1816,citedinGlanville Williams Criminal Law{TheGeneralfart) atp. 391, a naval sentinel was convicted of murdei for causing the aeath of a person, a passenger in A boat at which he fired pursuant to the orders of a superioi 30 after they failed to heed repeated warnings to keep off. The British Manual of Military Lawpublished in 1912 reco­ gnized superior orders as conferring a defence. But the revised editionof the manualpublished in 1944, under the impact of professor Lauterpacht, denied the validity of the rule no doubt 35 because of its implications in the world of today. And no effort hasbeenmade since toresurrect,if itever existed, superior orders as a defence for eithei a crime or a civil wiong. The Nuremberg Charter, adopted in 1945, excluded superior 598 1 C.L.R. Anastassiouv.DemetriouandAnother Hadjlanastassicq J. orders as a defence, recognizing them only as a factor that might justifiably ba taken into consideration in mitigation. (SeeArticle8). This Charter was intended to codify a global understandingofthelawinaccordancewithworld-wideconcep5 tions of humanity and its needs. The particular provision referring to superior orders was intended to prevent Nazi misanthropists from invoking superior orders in an effort to evade their responsibility for the grave crimes they committed against humanity. 10 Summarizing, it appears that under the common law there persisted in the 19th century a doubt whether superior orders conferred a defence. The better accepted view appears to have been all along that superior orders could not justify an illegal act. Those whoaccorded any validity to superior orders 15 as a defence limited its application to orders that appeared to be reasonable and were not manifestly illegal. In the 20th century the view prevailed that superior orders could under nocircumstancesconstitute adefence and thishasnowhardened into a positive rule of law. 20 There is no doubt that the rejection of superior orders as a defence is a hedge against arbitrary authority, safeguarding anunqualified spiritofrespectfor thelaws. Inthelastanalysis it is expected of men to reject illegal superior orders and guard the stateof legality that should obtain inevery civilized society; 25 for, if illegal superior orders are obeyed, they open the way to lawlessness. It is, after all, not only difficult but impossible to reconcile any doctrine recognizing superior orders as a defence and thefundamental principle of supremacy of thelaw, a prerequisite for sustaining the rule of law. 30 Anadditional reason that mayhavemilitated for the rejection of superior orders as a defence, in the case of soldiers, may be found in the need to protect the public from a possible abuse of authority by the military, leaving the public defenceless before the lethal weaponswith which they are equipped for the 35 defence of their country. Indeed, the coup d'etat carried out inCypruson 15thJuly, 1974,illustratesveryforcibly thereasons that must have led wisejurists to reject superior orders as a defence. If theofficers and men of the Cyprus National Guard did in their majority, refuse the orders of the criminal gang 40 of officers who organized the coup, the coup would collapse 599 Hadjianastassioo J. Anastassiouv.DemetriouandAnother

(1981)abinitioandthecountrywouldbesavedthe ruin and.destruction that.the coup d'etat piled on our country. In Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 3 All E.R. 561, the Privy Council decided that the assumption of power by usurpers of authority cannot possibly cloth with legitimacy 5 their actions, under any pretext or circumstances,and theillegality of their actions remains unaffected by considerations of recognition by foreign Governments. (See also Adams v. Adams [1970] 3 All E.R. 572. The Coup d'Etat Law of 1975 declared all acts of the puppet Government setupafterthecoup 10 d'etat as being devoid of any legal effect. In supporting thejudgment of the trial Judge, we agree that no reasonable human being could, for a moment, doubt the illegality of the orders 6 f those who perpetrated the coup nor fail to discern their purpose which was to strike the law at its 15 source and displace the elected Government of the country. Let it sink in the conscious of every soldier that not only has he a right but a duty to disobey illegal orders of his superiors. This is the only approach that reconciles the existence" of a standing army with the need to preserve a democratic regime. 20 Finally, the Judge found the defendant liable under the provisions of section 12(l)(

1. a)of the Civil Wrongs and held him answerable in damages. According to the provisions of section 12(l)(
2. a)of the Civil Wrongs Law Cap. 148, "Any person who shall join or aid in, 25 authorize, counsel, command, procure or ratify any act done or to be done by any other person shall be liable for such act". With that in mind we are of the view that the purpose of this section shows clearly the aim of the legislature and makes it clear that its purpose was to render liable in tort persons who 30 contribute in one or more ways indicated therein to the production of the tortious act. APPEAL : On appeal, counsel for the appellant-defendant argued that the decision or verdict of the trial Judge on the issue of 35 liability was wrong in law and in fact, and in particular that (
3. a)the appellant gave the orders to the persons who fired the fatal shots in consequence of which Theodotos Demetriou met with hisdeath;(b)that hegaveunqualified orderstohissubordi600 1 C.L.R. Anastassiou v.Demetriou and Another Hadjianastassiou J. nates to shoot at anyone who moved in the street and failed to stop when warned to in defiance of the night curfew; (
4. c)that any orders the appellant might have given were illegal and/orwithinthescopeofhislawful authority;(d)that superiors 5 orders even in the case of persons serving in the military forces could not be invoked as a defence. We have considered carefully the argument of counsel for the appellant, andinthe lightof thevoluninousevidence appearing beforethetrialJudgethattheappellant hasgivenunqualified 10 orders to his subordinates to shoot at anyone who moved in the street, we find ourselves in agreement with thefindingsof the learned trial Judge. Indeed, we would gofurther and state that the evidence he gave before the coroner supports further the finding of the learned Judge because he conceded that he 15 had directions to shoot any person who moved inthe street and when called to stop did not do so. He further admitted that the soldiers have been given those orders by others as well as by him. For these reasons, we would dismiss this ground of law. 20 As to damages for loss of expectation of life, the learned trial Judge, having quoted a number of cases regarding this matter, reached the conclusion that a standard award should be made under this head and accepted that the amount of£750 is the correct amount of damages and that the estate of the 25 deceased is entitled to that amount plus £60 agreed funeral and testamentary expenses. Indeed, counsel appearing for the firstappellant did not challenge this figure. DEPENDENCY: It appearsthat thewidow of the deceased,an attractive young 30 lady of 27, seeks compensation under the provisions of section 58 of the Civil Wrongs Law, for the loss she suffered because of the death of her husband, that is to say, loss of the right to support. It is common ground that at the time of his death the deceased was earning £124.486 mils and that had he been 35 alive he.would be earning today £182 per month. The wife wassupported byher husband and thecoupleresidedinahouse belonging to the parents of the widow, paying no rent. A fortnight after thedeathofherhusbandthewidowwasemployed as a special constable, a position shestill holds, earning £53per 40 month. 601 Hadjtanastasstoo J. Anastassiouv.Demetriouand Another

(1981)The general principles regarding the determination of the value ofthedependencyhavebeenexpoundedbothbytheCourts inEnglandas wellas by ourownCourtsinCyprus. (See Savvas Kartambiand Othersv. A\fa Shoe Factoryand Others,

(1968)1 C.L.R. 324—Poullou v. Constantinou

(1973)1 C.L.R. 177— Mallettv.McMonagle[1969] 2All E.R. 178—Taylor v. O'Connor [1970] 1 All E.R. 365 (H.L.)—Gavin v. WilmotBreeden Ltd., [1973] 3 All E.R. 935 (C.A.).) 5 Indeed,thetask oftheCourtlay primarily inmakinga forecast of future losses and a quantification in a realistic manner of 10 the present value of future losses. A recent decision of the English Couit of Appeal suggests an approach that reduces, to an extent, the uncertainties inherent in the process laying down that losses suffered because of the loss of support up to the date of trial may be recovered as special damages. (See 15 Cookson v. Knowles, [197η 2 ΑΠ E.R. 820). Of course, the prediction for thelife expectation of thedeceased must bemade as at the date of his death. In the case of Taylor v. O'Connor(supra), Lord Pearson observed that annuity tables are not an infallible guide to the 20 choice of the multiplier which should, in each case, be fixed, as he observed, in the light of the particular facts of the case subject to two scaling down factors: .(

1. a)the present value of future earnings and (
2. b)future uncertainties. The choice of the multiplier should not be based on any bard and fast 25 rules and the subject should be approached from a broad angle guided by common sense. (See Gavinv. Wilmot(supra)). With these authoritiesinmind,andinthelight oftheevidence, the trial Judge reached the conclusion that the value of the dependency of the widowatthetimeofthedeathofherhusband 30 was £50 per month. Having considered theauthorities andthe principles on this point, we would support thejudgment of the trial Court. Then thetrialJudge,indealingwith theprospectof remarriage of the widow, which is a consideration relevant to the choice 35 of the multiplier, he adopted and followed the case of Yiannis ThomaPapadopoullosv. YiannoulaGregori TryfonosandAnother,

(1968)1C.L.R.

1. Indeed,the Supreme Court acknowledged that the prospect of re-marriage of a widow is a legitimate consideration for the lowering of the multiplier. Indeed, 40 602 1 C.L.R. Anastassionτ.Demetriouand Another Hadjianastasslou J. in the event of re-marriage, the loss of the right of support by the deceased is replaced by the newly acquired right of support by thesecond husband. In the case before us the palpable fact is that the widow 5 has remained unmarried for the past 3 1/2 years. The trial Judge, having considered her age and appearance, and having assumed that there was every possibility that she would marry again in the near future, decided that in the present case the multiplier should be fixed at
2. 10 15 20 25 30 Then, having raised the question what to do regarding the earnings of the widow from the employment she obtained after the death of her husband, had this to say at p. 43:"In the last analysis the Court must endeavour to make a realistic estimate of the loss resulting from the death of the husband and must not leave out of account any fact relevant to the determination of the issue. It is correct that thewife has noobligation to go out andwork in order tomitigate herdamagefrom thelossof therightof support. It is also true that the earning capacity of a widow is an asset in reserve that has all along been at the disposal of the widow and therefore it would be totally wrong to make a simple arithmetical calculation in order to give our answer. In my judgment the correct approach where the widow obtains employment for the first time after the death of her husband is to deduct from her loss such part of her earnings as may be attributed to thegreater amenity that the widow had to earn this money consequent on the death of herhusband. Itis not aneasy question to answer and as everything else in the area in the matter is fraught with an element of speculation". Finally, the learned Judge concluded as follows:- 35 "Guided by the aforementioned considerations and bearing in mind what the earnings of the husband would be for the coming eighteen months had he been alive, I decide to fix the multiplieant for the past 3 1/2 years at £30 per month and for the 18 months to come at £35 permonth. Out of this,we must deduct the sum of £374that willcome to the wife from the estate. 603 Hadjianastassiou J. Anastassiou v.Demetriou andAnother

(1981). In the result, there will bejudgment for the plaintiffs against defendant 1 as follows:(

1. a)£810 for the estate. (
2. b)£1,515for the widow, for loss of dependency. Defendant 1isadjudged to pay costs onthe scale ofclaims between £2,000 and £5,000. The action against defendant 2 is dismissed with no order as to costs". Finally counsel for the appellant argued at length that the award of damages to the widow for the sum of £1,515for loss of dependency was wrong in principle as being too high a sum having regard to the age of the widow. We have indeed considered very carefully the argument of counsel, but in the light of the authorities quoted earlier with whichwefindourselvesinagreement,wethinkthatinthe present case that sum of £1,515 is not excessive and we think that we should not interfere with that award. For the reasons we have given at length, we would dismiss the appeal with costs both in the Court below and costs in this Court in favour of the appellant., Appealdismissed with costs. 604