(3)***of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Law, Cap.300A. Amongst the criteria, on the basis of which leaders of other political parties were invited to participate in the "Meet the Press" series of television programs, was either the fact that their parties had, at that time, Members of their own in the House of Representatives, or the fact that invitations had been extendedto themby thePresident oftheRepublicto participate, and they had indeed participated in the past, in meetings of the National Council. Actually, all the leaders of political parties who appeared in the "Meet the Press" programs had been invited by the President of the Republic to participate in the National Council, and had so participated in the past, and their parties,with theexception of one of them, wererepresented in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, the political party of which the applicant Article 29.1 is quoted at p. 618 post. Article 28 is quoted at p. 620 post. Section 19

(3)is quoted at p. 620 post. 615 Ptedllos τ. C.B.C.

(1981)is the leader was not, at that material time, represented in the Houseof Representatives,norhas theapplicantever beeninvited by the President of the Republic to participate in a meeting of the National Council. Held,

(1)that the applicant cannot succeed in this recourse 5 in respect of the failure of the respondent to reply to his said cable, because having proceeded, by means of the present recourse, in relation to the substance of the matter for which a reply to his cable hadbeen sought by him,henolongerconti­ nues to have any existing legitimate interest in respect of the 10 failure to reply to his cable, in the sense of Article 146.2 of the Constitution, since it has not been shown that the failure to reply to him has caused him any material detriment, which would have entitled him to claim relief under paragraph 6 of Article 146, after having obtained a judgment in his favour 15 in this recourse under paragraph 4 of Article 146.

(2)That in the light of the relevant principles regarding the application of the doctrine of equality, which is safeguarded by Article 28 of the Constitution (see, inter alia, Republicv. Arakian

(1972)3 C.L.R.294) boththeabove criteria are reason- 20 able and thateither of them is sufficient tojustify a classification of leaders of political parties which does not offend, as being either arbitrary or invidious, Article 28 of the Constitution; accordingly the recourse must fail. Application dismissed. 25 Cases referred to: Kyriakides v. The Republic,1 R.S.C.C. 66 at p. 77; Papadopoullos v. The Republic

(1965)3 C.L.R. 401 at p. 414; Georghiades v. The Republic

(1966)3 C.L.R. 153 at p. 173; lacovides v. TheRepublic

(1966)3 C.L.R. 191 at p. 196; 30 Sevastidesv. The Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 309 at p. 318; loannides v. The Nicosia Municipality

(1968)3 C.L.R. 551 at p. 554; Sofocleous v. The Republic

(1974)3 C.L.R. 63 at p. 70; Cullen v. TheRepublic

(1974)3 C.L.R. 101 at p. 105; 35 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. The Federal Communications Commission (No.2), 23 L. Ed. 2d 371 at p. 377; ColumbiaBroadcasting Systemv.DemocraticNationalCommittee, 36 L. Ed. 2d 772 at p. 789; 616 3 C.L.R. PitsiUos τ. C.B.C. The Republic v. Arakian

(1972)3 C.L.R. 294; 5 Anastassiou v. The Republic

(1977)3 C.L.R. 91; The Republicv. Demetriades

(1977)3 C.L.R. 213; loarmides v. The Republic

(1979)3 C.L.R. 295; Antoniadesv. The Republic

(1979)3 C.L.R. 641; American Partyof Texas v. White, 39 L. Ed. 2d 744 at p. 760; Ferguson v. Skrupa, 10 L. Ed. 2d 93 at p. 98. Recourse. Recourse for a declaration that the refusal of the respondent 10 to reply to applicant's cable dated 3.3.1981 and to include applicant, as a political parly leader, in the "Meet the Press" series of television programs

(1981)as other leaders of political parties, because he was contemplatingto beacandidatehimselfinthegeneralelection;and,he signed the cable in his capacity as a leader of his party. It is an undisputed fact that the respondent failed to reply to this cable of the applicant. It has been contended, in this 5 respect, on behalf of the respondent, that the address of the applicant was unknown to the respondent, as it wasnot stated in the cable, but it has been proved bytheapplicant,bymeans of documentary evidence which he has produced before me, thathisaddressoughttohavebeenknown,infact,totherespon- 10 dent, through correspondence which was exchanged between them on another occasion. It has been submitted by the applicant that thefailure of the respondent to reply to his cable inquestioncontravenesArticle 29.1 of the Constitution, which reads as follows: 15 "I. Every person has the right individually or jointly with others to address written requests or complaints to any competent public authority and to have them attended to and decided expeditiously; an immediate notice of any such decision taken duly reasoned shall be 20 given to the person making the request or complaint and in any event within a period not exceeding thirty days". The applicant cannot, however, succeed in this recourse in respectofthefailure oftherespondenttoreplyto his saidcable, because having proceeded, by means of the present recourse, 25 in relation to the substance of the matter for which a reply to his cable has been sought by him, he no longer continues to have any existing legitimate interest in respect of the failure to replyto hiscable,inthe senseofArticle 146.2 of the Constitution, since it has not been shown that the failure to reply to 30 him has caused him any material detriment, which would have entitled him to claim relief under paragraph 6 of Article 146, after having obtained ajudgment in his favour in this recourse under paragraph 4 of Article 146. , In Kyriakidesv. The Republic, 1 R.S.C.C. 66, the following 35 were stated in this respect (at p. 77):"In the opinion of the Court paragraph 2 of Article 29 gives, inter alia, an aggrieved person a right of recourse 618 , 3 CL.R. \ ν 5 10 15 20 Pitsillos v. C.B.C. TriantafylUdes P. to a competent Court in respect of the failure to furnish him with a reply in accordance with paragraph 1 of such Article. It is clear that, where the competent public authority, which has failed to reply as above, is one of those referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 146, then this Court is the competent Court in question and proceedings lie before it under Article 146 in respect of such failure itself to reply. Where, however, a person who has not received a reply as provided under Article 29, has proceeded under Article 146 in respect of the substance of the matter for which a reply had been sought then it cannot be said that such a person continues any longer to have 'any existing legiti­ mate interest', as provided by paragraph 2 of Article 146, unless as a result of suchfailure itself he has suffered some material detriment which would entitle him to a claim for relief under paragraph 6 of Article 146 after obtaining a judgment of this Court under paragraph 4 of the same Article. Therefore such a person cannot,as a rule, claim under Article 146 a distinct and separate decision of this Court in respect of thefailure to comply with Article 29 whenhe has proceeded in respect of the substance of the matter for which a reply had been sought". 25 The approach adopted, as above, in the Kyriakidescase, supra, has bsen followed in, inter alia,Papadopoullos v. The Republic,

(1965)3C.L.R.401, 414, Georghiades v. The Republic,

(1966)3 CL.R. 153, 173, lacovidesv. The Republic,

(1966)3 C.L.R. 191, 196, Sevastides v. TheRepublic,

(1968)3 C.L.R. 30 309, 318,loannides v. The Nicosia Municipality,

(1968)3C.L.R. 551, 554, Sofocleous v. The Republic,

(1974)3 C.L.R. 63, 70 and Cutten v. TheRepublic,

(1974)3 C.L.R. 101, 105. The other complaint of the applicant, namely that he was not afforded the opportunity to appear, like other leaders of 35 political parties, in the "Meet the Press" series of television programs is based ontheargumentthathis exclusion from such programs constitutesacontraventionof Article 28oftheConsti­ tution, as well as of section 19

(3)of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Law, Cap. 300A. The material parts of Article 40 28, above, are its paragraphs 1 and 2 which read as follows:™ 619 Triantafyllides P . PitsiUos v. C.B.C.

(1981)" 1 . All persons are equal beforethelaw,theadministration andjustice and areentitled toequal protection thereof and treatment thereby. 2. Every person shall enjoy all the rights and liberties provided for in this Constitution without any direct or 5 indirect discrimination against any person on the ground of his community, race, religion, language, sex, political or other convictions, national or social descent, birth, colour, wealth, social class, or on any ground whatsoever, unless there is express provision to the contrary in this 10 Constitution". Section 19

(3)of Cap. 300A, above, reads as follows:"

(3)The Corporation shallatalltimeskeepafairbalance in the allocation of broadcasting hours as between any political parties". 15 In my opinion the true effect of section 19

(3)ofCap.300Ais that therespondent shouldnot discriminate against any political party in a manner which would now be inconsistent with the provisions of Article 28 of the Constitution. A corresponding to section 19

(3), above, provision in the 20 United States ofAmerica issection 315ofthe Communications Act of

1. It is pertinent, at this stage, to observe that the said section 315 has been held to be distinct from what is known in U.S.A. constitutional law as the "fairness doctrine" in relation to 25 broadcasting. In RedLionBroadcasting Co. v. TheFederal Communications Commission (No.2),23L. Ed.2d 371,Mr.JusticeWhitesaidthe following in delivering the opinion of theU.S.A.SupremeCourt (at p. 377):30 "The Federal Communications Commission has for many years imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues mustbe givenfair coverage. Thisisknownasthefairness 35 doctrine, which originated very early in the history of broadcasting and has maintained its present outlines for
2. 3 C.L.R. 5 Pitsillos v. C.B.C. Triantafyllides P. some time. It is an obligation whose content has been defined in a long series of FCC rulings in particular cases, and which is distinct from the statutory requirement of para. 315of the Communications Act that equal time be allotted all qualified candidates for public office." . As has bsen pointed out in Columbia Broadcasting System v.DemocraticNationalCommittee, 36L.Ed.2d772,the"fairness doctrine"isbasedontherightofthepublictobeinformed rather than on the right of any particular individual to broadcast 10 his own views on any matter. In that case Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated the following (at p. 789):- 15 20 "Thus, under the Fairness Doctrine broadcasters are responsible for providing the listening and viewing public with access to a balanced presentation of information on issuesofpublicimportance. Thebasicprincipleunderlying that responsibility is'the right of thepublic to be informed rather than any right on the part of the Government, any broadcast licensee or anyindividual member of thepublic to broadcast his own particular views on any matter Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 FCC 1246, 1249

(1949). Consistent .with that philosophy, the Commission on several occasions hasruledthat.no private individual or group has a right to command the use of broadcast facilities". . . . 25 As it appears from the material that has been placed before me in the present case, amongst the criteria, on the basis of which leaders of other political parties were invited to participate in the "Meet the Press" series of television programs,was either the fact that their parties had, at that time, Members of 30 their owninthe House of Representatives, or the fact that invitationshadbeenextendedtothem by the President of the Repu. blicto participate, andtheyhadindeedparticipatedinthepast, in meetings of the National Council. Actually, all the leaders of political parties who appeared in the "Meet the Press" pro35 grams had been invited by the President of the Republic to participate in the National Council, and had so participated in the past, and their parties, withthe exceptionofoneof them were represented in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, the political party ofwhichthe applicant 621 TriantafjHides P. Pitsillos v. C.B.C.

(1981)is the leader was not, at that materialtime, representedinthe HouseofRepresentatives,norhastheapplicanteverbeeninvited by the President of the Republic to participate ina meetingof the National Council. I find both the aforementioned criteriaasreasonableandthat 5 either of them is sufficient to justify a classification of leaders of political parties which does not offend, as being either arbitraryorinvidious,Article28oftheConstitution. Ihavereached this view in the light of the relevant principles regarding the application of the doctrine of equality, which is safeguarded 10 by Article 28, above; and these principles were expounded in, interalia,TheRepublicv.Arakian,

(1972)3C.L.R.294,Anastassiouv. TheRepublic,

(1977)3 C.L.R. 91,TheRepublic v. Demetriades,

(1977)3 C.L.R. 213,loannides v. TheRepublic,

(1979)3 C.L.R. 295 and Antoniades v. TheRepublic,

(1979)3 C.L.R. 15 641. An instance of the application of the doctrine of equality in relation to political and electoral matters is tobefound in the case of AmericanParty of Texasv. White,39 L. Ed.2d744, where Mr. JusticeWhiteindeliveringthe opinion ofthe U.S.A. 20 Supreme Court, adopted (at p.760)thefollowing dictumof Mr. Justice Black in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 10 L. Ed. 2d 93,98:" 'Statutes create many classifications which do not deny equal protection; it isonly'invidiousdiscrimination*which offends the Constitution' ". 25 For all the foregoing reasons I find that the present recourse of the applicant cannot succeed and it is dismissed accordingly but, in view of the issues which have been raised byhim, Iam not prepared to make any order of costs against the applicant and in favour of the respondent. 30 Application dismissed. No order as to costs. 622