← Κύπρος

clr/1982/1982_1_16.pdf

(1982)1981 December 30 {Lows, STYUANIDES A N D PIKIS, JJ.] CHRYSTALLA DEMETRIOU AND OTHERS, Appellants-Applicants, v. S A W A S IOANNIDES, Respondent. (Civil Appeal No. 6079). Landlord andtenant—Rent controlledpremises—Owner whosecontract has not been terminated or expired—Can apply to the Court jor recovery of possession when the prerequisites laid down by section 16
(1)(Λ)of the Rent Control Law, 1975 (Law 36/75) exist —Sections 7, 11 and 21 of the Law. 5 Landlord and tenant—Recovery ofpossession—Order for—Suspension —In exercising discretion whether to suspend enforcement cf the order, and if so for how long, it is relevant to have regard to the existence of any arrangement between the parties, as to the length of stay—Enforcement of order of recovery of possession '0 suspendedfor one year—Section 16
(2)of the Rent Control Law, 1975 (Law 36/75). Rent Control Law,1975(Law 36/75)—Definition of "owner" in section 1 of the Law—Not prima facie exhaustive of who qualifies as an owner for the purposes of the Law. '5 Landlord and tenant—Practice·—Costs—Need not follow the event. The respondent has since January, 1964 been, the tenant of a dwelling house belonging to the appellants under a contract of lease dated 16th December,
  1. The original duration of the tenancy was oneyear but the lease was renewable from 20 year to year unless terminated by a written notice. No attempt was made to terminate the agreement and the respondent 16 1 C.L.R. Demetriou & Others τ. loannides remainedinoccupationuntiltheappellantsapplied*for recovery of possession on the ground that the premises were reasonably required for material alterations or reconstruction. The trial Judge dismissed the application, notwithstanding his findings that the premises were required for the purposes stated by the appellants, on the ground that an owner of rent controlled premises cannot seek recovery of possession under section 16 of Law 36/75 for as long as thecontractual tenancy has not been terminated. The trial Judge based his decision primarily on the definition ol "owner"** in section2 of Law 36/75 and after holding that this definition was exhaustive as to who qualifies as an owner for the purposes of the law, he concluded that inasmuch as the owner of premises leased for a period of time certain, is precluded by the contract from obtaining possession of the premises, he cannot successfully invoke the provisions of section
  2. Uponappeal by the owners: Held, (Stylianides J. dissenting)
(1)that the wording of the definition of "owner" in section 2 of Law 36/75is not prima facie exhaustive of who qualifies as an owner for the purposes of the Law; that on the contrary the employment of the word "includes" is apparently designed to remove doubts that might otherwise exist as to the position of an owner with no amenity to recover the premises because of the provisions of the Law; and that theconstructionplaced by the learned Judge * The application was based on s. 16(l)(h) of the Rent Control Law, 1975 which reads as follows: "16.-0) No judgment or order for the recovery cf possessicn of any dwelling house or business premises to which this Law applies, cr for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom, shall be given or made except in the following cases: (h)wherethedwelling houseor business premises arereasonably required by theowner for thesubstantial alteration or reconstructionthereof insucha way as toaffect thepremises,or for thedemolition thereof, and the Court is satisfied that the owner has, where necessary, obtained the necessary permit for such alteration, reconstruction ordemolitionand hasgiven tothetenantnotlessthan threemonths' notice in writing to vacate the premises". ** "Owner" is defined as follows by s. 2 of Law 36/75: " 'Owner*, includes,in relation to any premises, any person, other than the tenant, who is or would be, but for the provisions of this Law, entitled to possession of the premises, and in case of sub-tenancy a tenant who sublets the premises or any part thereof". 17 Demetriou &Others v. Ioannldes
(1982)on the definition of "owner", if accepted, would create innumerable difficulties and would render, in effect, inapplicable some of the fundamental provisions of the Law, such as those of s.ll.
(2)That since section 21
(1)* relegates to ineffectiveness 5 every term of a contract of lease that is not consistent with the provisions of the law any contractual term that confers a right to remain in occupation, notwithstanding the existence of one or more of the grounds set out in s. 16
(1), entitling an owner to recover possession, is abrogated and consequently 10 invalid (see the qualification imposed by section 21 with regard to the amenity of a tenant to vacate the controlled premises); that thepower to order ejectment isnot dependent onthe rights of the owner, but on the status of the premises and theexistence of the factors enumerated in the successive provisions of section 15 16;that since the trial Judgehasfound that theappellants made out their case under section 16(l)(h) the appeal must beallowed and an order of ejectment must be made; that in exercising the discretion whether to suspend the enforcement of the ord^r and if so for how long, it is relevant to have regard to the 20 existence of any arrangements between the parties, as to the length of stay; accordingly the enforcement of the order will be suspended for a period of one year.
(3)That in proceedings under rent control legislation costs need not necessarily follow the event (see Katsiantonis v. 25 Frantzeskou
(1981)1 C.L.R. 566); that having regard to the proceedings in their entirty and the point raised on appeal this Court will refrain from making an order as to costs. Appeal allowed. Cases referred to: 30 Chandlerv. Strevett [1947] 1 All E.R. 164; Cummingv. Danson [1942] 1 All E.R. 653; • Section-21
(1)of Law 36/75 provides as follows: *'21.-
(1)A tenant who,under the provisions of thisLaw,retainspossession of any dwelling house or business premises shall, so long as he retains possession, observe and be entitled to the benefit of all the terms and conditions of the original contract of tenancy, so far as the same are consistent with the provisions ofthis Law, and shall beentitled to give up possession of the dwelling house or business premises only on giving such notice as would have been required under the original contract of tenancy". 18 1 C.L.R. Demetriou & Others v. Ioannldes Briddon v. George [1940] 1 All E.R. 609; Rhodes v. Conford [194η 2 AH E.R. 601; Georghiades and Others v. Lambi
(1976)8 J.S.C. 1332; Andreou v. Christodoulou
(1978)1 C.L.R. 192; 5 Yerasimou v. Rousoudhiou
(1974)1 C.L.R. 107; Meitz and Others v. Pelengaris
(1977)1 C.L.R. 226; Yiannopoulos v. Theodossiou
(1979)1 C.L.R. 215; Katsiantonis v. Frantzeskou
(1981)1 C.L.R. 566; Λ/ι v. Shenikli, 20 C.L.R. (Part II) 68; 10 tfim/ou v. Solomon
(1978)1 C.L.R. 425; Heath v. OrouTi [1972] 2 All E.R. 561; fiiAer v. Taylors Furnishing Stores Ltd. [1956] 2 All E.R. 78; Middle East Entertainment Co. Ltd. v. Savvides, 22 C.L.R. 217; Gilbert v. GiVferi [1928] P. 1; 15 R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte De Demko [1959] 1 Q.B. 268; Becke v. Smi/A [1836] 2 M. & W. 191 at p. 195; Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1963] 1 All E.R. 655 at p. 664; 20 Artemicu v. Procopiou [1965] 3 All E.R. 539 at p. 544; Cramas Properties Ltd. v. Connaught Fur Trimmings Ltd. [1965] 2 All E.R. 382; Western Bank Ltd. v. Schindler [1976] 2 All E.R. 393 at p. 399; Re Maryon—Wilson's Will Trusts [1967] 3 AH E.R. 636 at 25 P. 642; Remon v. City of London Real Property Co. Ltd. [1921] 1K.B. (C.A.) 49 at p. 55; Philips v. Copping [1935] 1 K.B. 15; Regional Properties Ltd. v. Oxley [1945] 2 All E.R. 418; 30 Katsikides v. Constantinides
(1969)1 C.L.R. 31; William Mcllroy Ltd. v. Clements [1923] W.N. 81 149. Appeal. 35 Appeal by applicants against the judgment of the District Court of Nicosia (Fr. Nicolaidss, D J ) date the 26th February, 1982 (Appl. 553/79) whereby their application for the recovery 19 Demetriou A Others τ. loannides
(1983)of possession of theirpremises at No.7Hadjidhakis Sir.Nicosia, onthegroundthatthepremiseswer;requiredfor materialaltera­ tions or reconstruction, was dismissed. S. Spyridakis, for the appellants. A. Ladas, for the respondent. 5 Cur. adv. vult. Lo^is J.: Thefirstjudgment of the Court will be delivered by Pikis, J. I had the advantage of reading in advance the judgment aboue to bs delivered, I agree with it and there is nothing I wish to add. 10 PIKISJ.: Theappellants andtherespondent are,respectively, theowners andtenantof thehouseatNo. 7,Hadjidhakis Street, Nicosia. Theresponded hasbeeninoccupationsince1.1.1964, by virtue of a contractof lease, dated 16.12.1963. The original duration of the tenancy was one year but in accordance with 15 the terms of the agreement the leasewas renewable from year toyear unlessterminatedbyawrittennoticeinthewayenvisaged therein. No attempt was made to terminate the agreement, and therespondent remained in occupationuntil theinstitution of thepresentproceedings whereby theappellants/owners sought 20 recovery of possession on the ground that the premises were reasonably required for material alterations or reconstruction, in accordancewith a permitsecuredfromtheNicosiaMunicipa­ lity. Fr. Nicolaides, D.J., dismissed the application, notwith- 25 standing hisfindingsthatthepremises wererequired for thepur­ poses stated by the owner, ontheground thai an owner of rent controlled premites cannot seek recovery of possession under section 16 of the Rent Control Law 36/75, for as long as the conlractual tenancy has not been terminated. The appeal 30 turns almost exclusively on the soundness of this view of the law. Section 16(l)(h) lays down the prerequisites for recovery of possession of premises, subject to control for purposes of reconstruction and malerial alterations. It is unnecessary 35 to debate in detail these pre-conditions for, according to the findingsof the trial Court,tha appellants overcame the hurdles posed by law and satisfied the Court about the validity of the 20 1 C.L.R. Demetriou & Others v. Ioannidcs Pikis J. claim of the appellants. However, it would noi be superfluous ifbriefreferencewasmads,bywayofguidance,totheprinciples relevanttotheinterpretation ofsection 16(l)(h)for itsprovisions are frequently invoked by owners of immovable property for •5 recovery of possession of rent controlled premises. It is for the landlord to satisfy the Court that hi is in need ofthe premisesfor the purposesenvisaged bythe law, andJhat the need is.reasonable. Need imports a subjective element; so longasthe needisgenuine, the owner cannot be faulted for 10 raising the demand, whereas reasonableness requires objective scrutiny of the need.. The objective evaluation of the demand for recovery of possession must be examined from a broad commonsenseviewpoint inthesamevein asmen of the world transact their affairs in daily life. (Sse, inter alia, Chandler 15 v. Strevett[1947J 1All E.R. 164; Cumming v. Danson [1942]1 All E.R. 653 (C.A.); Briddon v. George [1940] 1All E.R. 609; Rhodes v. Cornford [1947] 2 All E.R. 601 (C.A.) ). Dicta in Georghiades &Others v.Lambi
(1976)8J.S.C. 1332,shed light ontheelement ofurgencyassociatedwiththedemandnecessary 20 for sustaining the application. The need must be definite and immediate (Andreouv. Christodoulou
(1978)1 C.L.R. 192). Lastly theburden is on the owner to satisfy ich;Court that the formalities set out bythelaw asa prelude to an order for recovery, such as securing the necessary permits and giving Ihe 25 statutory notice, are satisfied (see, Andreas Yerasimou v. AndreasRousoudhiou
(1974)1 C.L.R. 107). The conditions set out by the law were found to have been satisfied in this case, except that the Court held thai s. 16conferred nojurisdiction to make an ejectment order for as long as the contracl 30 between the parties subsisted. The Judge based his decision primarily on the definition of an "owner" supplied by s.2of Law 36/75. It is implicit from ths reasoning given in support of thejudgment that the definition of"owner"was held tobe exhaustive as to who qualifies as an owner for the purposes 35 of the law, notwithstanding the phraseology of the section, particularlytheword"includes"thatfollows"owner".Inaccordance with this definition, the concspt of an owner includes, inrelationto anyimmovableproperty, apersonthat isentitled, orwouldbeentitled,butfor theprovisions ofthelaw,topossei.40 sion of the premises. Therefore, the Judge concluded that inasmuch as the owner of premises leased foi a period of iime 21 Pikis J. Demetriou &Others v. Ioannides
(1982)certain, is precluded by the contract from obtaining possession of Ihe premises, he cannot successfully invoke the provisions of s.
  1. The wording of this definition is not prima facie exhaustive of who qualifies as an owner for the purposes of thelaw. Onthecontrary,theemployment oftheword"includes" 5 is apparently designed to remove doubts thai might otherwise exist asto the position of anownerwithno amenity to recover thepremisesbecauseof theprovisions ofthelaw. Theconstruction placed by the learned Judge onthedefinition of"owner", if accepted, would create innumerable difficulties and would 10 render,ineffec',inapplicablesomeofthefundamental provisions of thelaw, such as those ofs.
  2. Section 11provides lhal no owner shall have the right to ask for an order for recovery of possession of properties situated within a stricken area. If theinterpretation of Lhetrial Court wascorrect, then theprovi- 15 sions of s. 11would beinapplicable in the case of owners with a right to recovery of possession, independent of the provisions of the law. That could not have been the intention of the legislature nor is the interpretation adopted by the trial Judge consonant with the wider aims of the law, as may be gatheicd 20 from a reading of its provisions in their entirety. I proceed to give my reasons for this view of the law. Section 21
(1)relegates to ineffectiveness every term of a contract of lease that is not consistent with the provisions of the law. Therefore, any contractual term that confeis a right 25 to remain in occupation, notwithstanding the existence of oice or more of the grounds set out in s. 16
(1), entitling an owner to recover possession, is abrogated and consequently invalid. Thatthisisso,isabundantlyclearfromthequalificationimposed by s. 21 with regaid to the amenity of a tenant to vacate the 30 controlled premises; in his case, lhe re-levant provisions of the lease are saved by an express legislative provision. Section 16
(1)empowers, in its definitive part, the Court to make an order of recovery of possession in respect of rent controlled premises,that is, controlled housesaudshops,without reference 35 to the owner. On any interpretation of the plain introductory provisions of s. 16
(1),thejurisdiction to makean eviction order is not defined by reference to the rights of the owner but by reference to the status of the premises, and made dependent on whether the premises are subject to control. Illustrative 40 ol this appreciation of the law, arethe provisions of s. 16(l)(
  1. a)22 1 C.L.R. Demetriou & Others v. Ioannldes Pikis J. that confer power on the Courtto make an ord*r of ejectment whenever rent lawfully due remains unpaid, without drawing any distinciion between rent owing under a contract or by viriue of the operation of theprovisions of thelaw. Thepower 5 to orderejectmentis not deperdenton therights of the owner, but on— (
  2. a)the status of the premises, and (
  3. b)theexistenceof thefactorsenumerat3diη thesuccessive provisions of s. 16. 10 Both houses and ihops, aredefined by reference to (hedateon which the building was completed, quite independently of the rights of theowner over the property. Itis instructive tocon­ trast the definition of "residence"and"shop"on theonehand, and "owner" on the other. In theformer instance,the defined 15 word is followed by "means" whereas in the latter case by "•ncludes". In the first case the definitions are exhaustive, wherever in the second expansive of the ordinary meaning of the word. 20 25 30 35 40 Not only theprovisions of s. 16but those of s. 7as well,are informative of the wider aims of the law which were briefly to regulate the supply and possession of immovable property in ordertoremovetheworseevilsof thescarcity ofaccommoda­ tion created by the Turkish invasion. Like sections 21 and 16,s. 7reveals, as well,theintention of thelegislature toreduce any contract between the' parties to relative ineffectiveness; it confers power on the Court to adjust the rent of controlled premises independently of any contract between the parties. InElite G.Meitz & Othersv. Andreas Pelengaris
(1977)1 C.L.R. 226, it was decided that the provisions of s. 7 supersede any contractualprovisions,with regard to rent,and by virtue of the provisions of s. 21
(1)any attempt to by-pass the provisions of s. 7by a contractor otherwise, would be doomedto failure for, anycontractual provisions designedtotakeawaythepowers vested intheCourtto adjust rent,would be null andvoid. By the same logic, one arrives to the same conclusion with regard to th;interpretationand application of the provisions of s. 16, regulating sscuricy of tenure. If the interpretation given by thetrialCourtto"owner"wasconect,the ownei of rentcontrol­ ledpremises,whosecontract hasnotbeenterminatedorexpired, would have no right to apply to the Court for the adjustment 23 Pikis J. Demetrioa & Outers v. Ioannldcs
(1982)of the rent; and in consequence, the power bestowed on the Court to adjust therentintheinterests of1hewider aimsofthe legislation, would be neutralised. However, we have it from authority, thecaseof Meitz, supra,that contractual stipulations with regard to rent, are superseded by the provisions of s. 7, 5 independently of the right of the owner to recover possession in one way or another. As in the case of s. 16, so with s. 7 the powers of the Court are defined by reference to the status of the premises and the jurisdiction conferred thereby vests in the Court in the case of all rent controlled prem'ses. 10 In Yiannopoubs v. Theodossiou
(1979)1 C.L.R. 215, it was decided that the Rent Control Law, 1975, transforms, unlike previous enactments, a contractual tenancy into a statutory one. Although the Court left open the degree and extent of thi transformation, whether total or partial, it is implicit 15 from the tenor of the judgment that the transformation is complete with regard to matters specifically dealt with by the law, such as the rent payable,the increase that may belegally sought, and the circumstances under which possession may be recovered. Although the termination of the contract of lease 20 isnolongeraprerequ'site to fhecreation ofastatutorytenancy, nonetheless the statutory tenancy established by the provisions of the law is no different from a statutory tenancy undei the previous law,in thesensethat inboth casestheright to remain in occupation arises from the statute and not the contract. 25 Thoseterms of the contract that do not conflict with theprovisionsofLaw36/75aresavedbys.21 buttheirvaliditynolonger depends on the efficacy of the contract but on the;r incorporation, as part of the terms of a statutory tenancy. It has been argued that il cannot have been the intention of the legislature 30 to confer a right on the owner to claim recovery of possession wherenone existsunderthecommonlaworthelawofcontract. We endorse the view that the principal aim of lhe law was to enhancegenerallysecurity of tenuieandnotto limitit;but that was not the sole aim of the law;the fundamental purpose was 35 to make the supply of houses and shops, in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion, an important part of social wealth, subject tocontiol. Thelegislatureinitswisdomcontrolledsecurity oftenureinthetermsofs.
  1. Tothatclear aim,wemust give vent. There are aspects of s. 16 that could, with benefit, be 40 amended so as to increase security of tenure, and generally 24 1 C.L.R. Demetriou & Others v. loannides Pikis J. improve the position of tenants. This is not an appropriate case to make detailed recommendations for the amendment of the law, nor do the merits of the case necessitate such a discourse. We may endthispait of ourjudgment by repeating 5 thattheprovisions of s. 16confer power onthe Courtto ordir recovery of possession of premises subject to control, under Law 36/
  2. Further,theword "owner" doesnotbearthelimited meaningascribedtoit by thelearnedtrialJudge;thelaw merely seekstoexpandtheo»dinary meaningof thewordthatcertainly 10 encompasses all owners of property who stand in the position of a landlord vis-a-vis the statutory tenant. The trial Judge ruled thatthe appellants madeout their case under s. 16(l)(h),afindingthathas notbeen challenged before theCourt andouifully warranted,inourview,by theevidence 15 before it. In the exercise of our discretion, we suspend the enforcement oftheorderfor oneyear. Inexercising ourdiscre­ tion under s. 16
(2), whether to suspend the enforcement of the order and if so for how long, it is relevant to have regard to the existence of any arrangement between the parties, as to 20 the length of stay; this is indeed a legitimate consideration to have regard to in theexercise of ourjudicial discretion in this area. The appeal will be allowed. In proceedings underrent control legislation, costs need not necessarily follow the event, for the reasons indicated in Katsiantonisν:Frantzeskou
(1981)25 1C.L.R.
  1. Having legard to the proceedings in their entirety, and the point raised on appeal, we shall refrain from making an order as to costs. Appeal allowed. Order in terms. No order as to costs. 30 STYLIANIDES J : An old house situated at Hadjidakis Street, No. 7, in Nicosia, is the ownership of the appellants. The respondent is in occupation of this dwelling house as atenant thereof. He took up possession on 1.1.1964 by virtue of a contract of lease dated 16.12.
  2. 35 The duration of the lease was stipulated originally for one year but it was automatically renewed from year to year in the absence of a two months* notice of termination envisaged by thesaid agreement. Thssaid contractwas neverterminated by either parly. 25 Stylianides J. Demetriou &Others v. loannides
(1982)The appellants by Application No. 176/76 applied to the District Court for the determination of the ient, obviously expecting an increase That application was finally withdrawn on 30.11.1977 On 137.1979 th? appellants applied for therecovery of posses- 5 tion on the ground that the dwelling house was reasonably required for substantial alteration or reconstruction thereof under s. 16(l)(
  1. h)of the Rent Control Law, 1975 (Law No. ?6/75). The ingredients of thii ground are:(
  2. a)Service of a three months' notice in writing to the 10 tenant; (
  3. b)Ths premises are reasonably lequired by the landlord either for effecting substantial alteration or reconstruction; and, (
  4. c)The landlord has, where necessary, obtained the neces- 15 sary permit for such alteration or reconstruction. A? the circumstances relevant to this claim, including the obtaining of a permit by the landlord, are those existing at the date when the case is heard, it is sufficient if the landlord has obtained a permit on the date of the hearing. (Murude Mehmet 20 Ali v. Hassan Remzi Shenikli, 20, Part II, C.L.R. 68). The notion of "reasonable requirement" in a case of a claim for possession for the purpose of substantial alteration or reconstruction is linked only to whether or not it is reasonable for the landlord to obtain possession for that purpose, having 25 regard to the nature and extent of the proposed alteration or reconstruction, and it is unrelated to factors, such as of reasonableness and reasonable requirement, envisaged in other paragraphs of s. 16
(1). (Anastassia S. Kontou v. Antonis Solomou,
(1978)1 C.L.R. 425, following the English decision in Heath 30 v. Drown, [1972] 2 All E.R. 561). If the trial Judge is convinced that the requirements laid down in s. 16(l)(
  1. h)were satisfied, then there is no room for the exercice of any discretion on his part in relation to the making of an order for possession. (Fisher v. Taylors Furnishing 35 Stores, Ltd., [1956] 2 All E.R. 78, followed in Kontou case (supra) ). 26 1 C.L.R. Demetriou & Others v. loannides Stylianides J. The appellants satisfied the requirements of this ground. It was, however, submitted by counsel that the appellants were no! entitled to invoke 'he provisions of s.l6(l)(
  2. h)of the Rent Control Law, as the duration of the contractual tenancy had 5 not expired. The trial Judge in a careful and well consideredjudgment held that the appellants had no right to claim recovery of possession during the contractual period of the tenancy. Against this decision the appellants took this appeal. 10 It was maintained by Mr. Spyridakis for the appellants that having regard to the all-embiacive definition of "statutory tenanl" and "tenancy" in Law 36/75, viewed in the light of the decision in Yiannopoidos v. Theodoulou,
(1979)1 C.L.R. 215, where it was held that Law 36/75 transforms a contractual 15 tenancy into a .tatuiory tenancy even before the expiiy of the period of the contractual tenancy, power is conferred on the Courts by s. 16
(1)to issue orders of ejectment and recovery of possession of controlled premises at any time after the tenant takes up possession of the premises and that all the stipulations 20 in the contract are abrogaied. Mr. Ladasfor therespondent referred to tht;mischief the Law Intended ro remedy, the intention of the legislature, and maintained thai during the period of the tenancy stipulated in a contract the landlord of controlled premises is not entitled to 25 claim recovery of possession under the Law. The rent control Law is a social piece of legislation. It is, according to its long title, "A Law to amend, consolidate and incorporate the Rent Control Laws and to provide for relative matters. (Cap. 86, Laws 17/61, 39/61, 19/65, 8/68 and 51/74)". 30 Rent control legislation was enacted for the first time in this country in 1941 during the Second World War—The Increase of Rent (Restriction) Law, No. 16/42. That Law was applicable, inter alia, to all premises within a radius of five miles from the Municipal Offices of the Municipal Corporations. 35 Section 8 of that Law restricted the ground of ejectment. One of the grounds is identical to the one invoked by the appellants in this cast;—Ground 8(l)(d). "Landlord" and "tenant" included any person from time to time deriving title under the original landlord or tenant. 27 Stylianides J. Demetriou & Others τ. IoaimUes
(1982)That Law was repealed and substituted by Law No. 13/54 enacted for the purpose of securing the availability of premises at equitable rents and the security of the possession thereof. It was modelled on the English rent control legislation. The definitions of "statutory tenant"and "landlord" aresignificant. 5 "Statutory tenant" was a tenant who, at the expiration or determination of his tenancy,continued 1ο be in possession of the premises. "Landlord"included,inrelationtoanypremises, any person,otherthan thetenant,whowas orwould havebeen butfor theprovisions of that Law, entitledto possession of the 10 premises, and in case of sub-tenancy a tenant who sublet the premises or any part thereof. Itmadeprovision for dstermina­ tion of the rent and for recovery of possession. Section 18providedfor therestrictionofejectmentto specified grounds. That Law is Cap.No. 108 of the 1949 edition of theStatutes of Cyprus and Cap. 86 of the 1959 edition. On the 31st December, 1958, the Governor in Council, in exercice of ths powers vested inhimby sub-section 2 of section 3 of the said Law, exempted from its operation all business 20 premisesandthusdeprived them,asfrom thatdate,oftheprote­ ction afforded to them by that Law. It was amended by Law 8/
  1. Section 18 was renumbered to s.16 but in otherrespects itremained unaffected. On the establishment of the Republic the Rent Restriction 25 (BusinessPremises)Law No. 17/61wasenactedcovering business premises which were built andfirstlet prior to thecominginto operation of that Law. The same definition of "landlord", 'tenant" and "statutory tenant" is found in the Rent Restriction (Business Premises) 30 Law No. 17/
  2. The relevant section for restriction of eject­ ments on certain grounds is s.
  3. Section 10 of Law 17/61 is identical to s. 16 of Cap.
  4. Under the aforesaid Laws the statutory tenancy was created after thedstermination ortheexpirationby effluxion of time of 35 the contractual tenancy. Under the general Law of the land a landlord on*the happening of theaforesaid event was entitled 28 15 1 C.L.R. Demetriou & Others v. loannfdes Stytlanides J. to recovery,of possession. The legislature by the provisions ofthesectionsto which I havereferred restricted hissuchright to the grounds specified therein. This is also the reason for the definition of "landlord" in the rent lestriction legislation 5 after
  5. Alandlordinrelationtotherent restrictionlegislation is a person who would have been entitled to possession but for the provisions of the Law. That was the state of the Law until the cataclysmic events ofthesummerof
  6. Almosttheone-thirdofthepopulation 10 fled fromtheirhomesandbusinesspremisesandwerecompressed tothearea underthecontrol ofthe State;thousands ofpersons were displaced; others were stricken by that emergency; areas became inaccessible and other areas neighbouring the Turkish occupied land became depressed. A temporary measure to 15 alleviate the condition of tenants was passid in the form of Law No. 51/74 that provided for the reduction of 20% of the rent payable by tenants stricken by the emergency. During a period of two months—fiom 20th July to 20th September —normal life in Nicosia was radically upsst; in other towns 20 for a thorter period. Ownersofbusinesspremisesanddwelhng housesfor lettinginthefreesouth,beingordinaryhumanbeings, were tempted to exploit the situation by asking extravagant rents,and owners,whosebusinesspremisesand dwellinghousts were not controlled, eithtr evicted or threatened to evict their 25 tenants after the expiiation of the contractual tenancy. TheLawsinoperationprovedinsufficient tomeetthesituation. Thiswasthe mischiefthelegislaturehadtoremedy. Theintention of the legislature wasto secure the availability of dwslling housesacd businessprsmisosatequitablerentsand thesecurity 30 of the possession jhsreof and to safeguard the public interest wherever required. The product of that intention and the remedy of that mischief is the Rent Control Law, 1975 (No. 36/75). (See Objectsand Reasons of the Bill published in Supplement No. 6 to the Oflficial Gazette of the 1.5.1975 and 35 s. 3 of the Law). It made provision for the determination of rent of dwslling houses and business premises in controlled areas—section 7; for the adjustment of rents of depressed areas—section 10; the restriciion of ejectment for non-payment of rent due as 40 from the 20ih July for a period of two months—section 11; 29 Stytianides J. Demetriou & Others v. Ioanoides
(1982)the exemptionfrom liability for payment of rentsin inaccessible areas—section 13; total exemption from payment of rents of business premises within the area of Nicosia, including some suburbs, for two months from the 20th July, and for business premises within the areas of other towns for a period of one 5 month;for thereductionof lents of premises by 20%ingeneral —section 15—intending to incorporate therein Law 51/
  1. Thesearetheprovisions by whichthelegislatureimplemented its intention with regard to rents. Some of these provisions aretransitional and others,notably s. 7,are of morepermanent 10 nature. In order to cover all premises the definitions of "dwelling house", "premises" and "business premises" were formulated so as to include premises completed and let for thefirst time before 31.12.
  2. "Slatutory tenant" under the new Law 15 means a tenant of premises completed and let for thefirsttime before 31st December,
  3. This date was extended by later legislation from year to year. This was a radical amendment to the pre-existing Law. By this amendment the contractual tenancies were trans- 20 formed into statutory tenancies and the benefit of the Law was madeavailableto all thetenants,includingthecontractual ones. (Meitzv. Pelengaris,
(1977)1 C.L.R.226; Yiannopoulos v. Theodoulou, (supra) ). Section 16 restricts ejectments to certain specified grounds 25 and is a reproduction of similar provisions in the pre-existing legislation. The question that poses for determinationis whether a land­ lord,whowould nothave beenentitledtorecovery of possession due to the clause of "duration of tenancy" ; n his contract, 30 is enabledby theLaw of 1975toinvoke therestrictive provisions of s. 16
(1)and recover possession. Is the Law enabling an owner, who entered inlo a contract of tenancy of, say, three years' duration, at any time during that period, to resort to Court and invoke any of the grounds specified in s. 16
(1)and 35 claim possession? This is the question that the trial Court decided in the negative. Had it been otherwise, the landlord would be entitled ίο 30 1 C.L.R. Demetriou & Others v. Ioannides Styliaoides J. invoke any of the grounds specified in s. 16
(1)and recover possession though he bargained for a longer period and he conferred possession by agreement to the tenant for a certain stipulated period. Thetenantatthesametimewouldbe entitled 5 to give up possession at any time after he took possession, without giving any notice to the landlord. If, for example, the duration of a tenancy is stipulated by the parties to be, say, three years, the landlord immediately after the tenant took up possession of the premises would be entitled to apply to the 10 Couit under any of the grounds set out in s. 16
(1)and claim possession and the tenant from the very first month would be entitled to give up possession without any notice. (Middle, East Entertainment Co. Ltd. v. Christos Savvides, 22 C.L.R. 217). 15 This is a consolidation Law and the presumption that Parliament does not intend to alter the existing Law applies with particular force, for, unless it is amended, the object of a consolidated Lawismerely to "reproduce the Law asit stood before". (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th edition, p. 21; 20 Gilbertv. Gilbert,[1928]P. 1,per Scrutton, L.J.; R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, exp. De Demko, [1959] 1Q.B. 268, per Lord Evershed, M.R.). The "golden rule" of construction is a modification of the literal rule. It was stated in this way by Parke B. in Becke v. 25 Smith,
(1836)2 M. & W 191, at p. 195:- 30 "It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to.the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further". The object or policy of the legislation affords the answer 35 to problems arising from ambiguities which it contains. They haveto b j construed as particular if the intention be particular. In interpreting the provisions of the Law we have to bear duly in mind the need to construe such prov:sions in a manner consistent with the object of Law 36/75 and to avoid producing 31 Stylianides J. Demetriou & Others v. Ioannldes
(1982)any unreasonable result. It is correct that "statutory tenant" . and "premises" are all-embracive definitions and that a contractual tenancy for the purpose of rent is transformed into a statutory tenancy due to the aforesaid definitions. Toconstruetheprovisionsof s. 16literallyandisolatedfrom 5 other parts of the Law, as increasing the rights of ejectment, is unreasonable and contrary to the intention of the Law. A different construction can be placed on s. 16if read subject to the provisions of s. 21
(1)which is consonant to the object of the Law when read as a whole. 10 To apply thewordsliterally isto defeat theobvious intention of the legislation and to produce a wholly unreasonable result. To achieve the obvious intention and produce a reasonable result we must do some violence to the words. The general principleiswellsotlled: Itisonlywherethewordsareabsolu- 15 telyincapableofaconstructionwhichwillaccordwiththeapparentintentionoftheprovisionsandwillavoidawhollyunreasonableresult,thatthewordsoftheenactment mustprevail. (Luke v. I.R.C. (InlandRevenueCommissioners), [1963] 1 All E.R. 655, per Lord Reid at page 664). 20 An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputedtoastatuteifthereissomeothsrconstruction available. Theresultcontended by theappellantswouldbequiteirrelevant to the mischief which the statutory provision was intended to meet, viz. the security of possession. (See also Artemiouv. 25 Procopiou, [1965]3All E.R. 539,at p. 544; Cramas Properties, Ltd. v. Connaught Fur Trimmings, Ltd., [1965]2 All E.R. 382, at p. 385; Western Bank Ltd. v. Schindler, [1976] 2 All E.R. 393, at p. 399). Thepoint waswellput byUngoed-Thomas, J., inReMaryon 30 —Wilson's Will Trusts, [1967] 3 All E.R. 636, at 642, where he said:"If the Court is to avoid a statutory result that flouts commonsenseandjustice,it must dosonotbydisregarding thestatute or overridingit, but by interpreting it in accord- 35 ancc with *he judicially presumed parliamentary concern for common sense and justice". Section 21
(1)which is a reproduction of identical provision of s. 15
(1)of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage 32 1 CL.R. DemetrioD & Others τ. Ioannides Stylianides J. Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, and of the rent restriction legislation in our country since 1942, reads as follows:- 5 10 "21.—
(1)A tenant,who, under theprovisions of thi* Law, retains possession of any dwelhng house or business premises shall, so long as he retains possession, observe andbeentitledtothebenefit of allthetermsandconditions of the original contract of tenancy, to far as the same are consistent with the provisions of this Law, and shall be entitled to give up possession of the dwelling house or business premises only on giving such notice as would have been required underthe original contractof tenancy". The phrase "terms and conditions" is not very technical. This section has always been a permanentfeatureof our rent control legislation. It is an indication as to the legal position 15 of a person who continued in occupation of premises merely by reason of theprotectionafforded by theLaw. (Per Bankes, L.J., inRemon v. Cityof London RealProperty Co. Ltd.,[1921] 1 K.B. C.A. 49, at p. 55). This provision is not framed as to extend to the cas5 of the 20 payment ofrent; itis notdealingwith rent. (Philips v. Copping, [1935] 1 K.B. 15; Regional Properties Ltd. v. Oxley, [1945] 2 All E.R. 418; Frixos Katsikidesv. Michael Constantinides,
(1969)I C.L.R. 31). In E. G. Meitz & Othersv. AndreasPelengaris (supra) it 25 was held that a clause in the tenancy agreement providing for progressively incieased rent for every succeeding year was inconsistent with section 7
(1)of Law No. 36/75 and with the contentsof theLaw asawhole andwith theobjectsof such Law, as manifested by section 3 as well as other provisions in it. 30 In England theright of renewal of a tenancy was held to be importedandincorporatedina statutory tenancy unders. 15
(1)of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920. (William Mcllroy Ltd. v. Clements,
(1923)W.N. 81 149). 35 The commencement and duration is an essential term of an agreement for a tenancy. The duration of the tenancy under the contract is a term of the "original contract of tenancy". 33 St}Kanides J. Demetriou &Others v. Ioannides
(1982)It is as a rule a contractual term for the interest of both, the landlord and the tenant. Applying the above principle and judicial pronouncements and bearing in mind the mischief that the legislation intended to remedy, its intention expressed in s. 3 of (he Law and the 5 Objects and Reasons, and reading the Law as a whole, I am unable to agree with the interpretation placed on the Law by mybrotherJudges. Iconsiders. 16
(1)asarestrictiveprovision. A landlord may invoke any of the grounds specified therein after the expiration or determination of the contractual period 10 of duration of the tenancy. The term of the duration of the contractual tenancy is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Law. It isa term the tenant hasto observe and is entitled to itsbenefit. Onthetransformation ofthecontractualtenancy into astatutory tenancy thisterm isimported and incorporated 15 into the statutory tenancy. My brethren decided otherwise. I am in the minority. Nowadaysa BillwasintroducedintheHouseof Representatives and published in the Official Gazette, Supplement No. 6, of 23rd December, 1981, page 244. I trust that in view of the 20 difference ofjudicial opinion the legislature will put their intention inthenewLawin an unambiguouslanguagefor the benefit of all concerned. For the aforesaid reasons I would dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances I would make no order as to costs. 25 Appealallowed.No orderas to costs. 34

🔗 Στην επίσημη πηγή

AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.