clr/1982/1982_1_35.pdf

(1982)of £254 qualified as an "οφειλή"* ("legal obligation") under the above Law. If so, the appellant would be entitled to the benefits of the Law because he was a displaced person. The trial Court held that thi liability in question was outside the ambit of the Law inasmuch as the obligation to make good the damage and restore the premises to their former condition, accruedandbecamelegallyenforceable,subsequent tothe crucial date notably 14.8.1974. Uponappealby thetenant. Held, that the relevant date is stipulated not by reference to the time of entorceability of the monetary obligation but the date on which it was assumed or incurred; that the fact that the monetary obligation need nothave become enforceable by 14.8.1974 viewed in conjunction with the provisions of sub­ paragraph(f)particularly theemploymentof theword "δημιουργηθείσης" (created),clearly suggest that relief is pegged to the genesis and not the discharge of the obligation; that thenotion of a "legal obligation" in the context of the 1979 legislation is not co-extensive with that of a presently enforceable right for the recovery of money owing; that this construction is also consonant with the wider aims of the law, designed to give * " * 'Οφειλή'" is defined as follows by section 2 of Law 24/79: '"Οφειλή περιλαμβάνει τάς πάσηςφ ύσεως χρηματικάςυποχρεώσεις οφειλέτου, ήσφαλισμένας ή μή, είτε αύται οφείλονται δυνάμει δικα­ στική; αποφάσεως ή διατάγματος είτε δυνάμειοίασδήπατεσυμβάσεως ή συμβάσεως ένοικιαγαραςή πωλήσεως έττΐ πιστώσει οΙασδήποτε Ιδιοκτησίας είτε αύται κατέστησαν άπαιτηταϊ είτε μή αλλά δένπερι­ λαμβάνει ποσά- (στ) οφειλής δημιουργηθείσης μετά την 14ην Αυγούστου 1974" (" 'Legal obligation' " includes all monetary liabilities of a debtor of any nature whatsoever, secured or unsecured, whether payable under ajudgment or order of a Court or under any agreement or hire-purchase agreement or credit sale agreement of any property and whether payable presently or not but does not include amounts(

1. a)(
2. b)(
3. c)(
4. d)(
5. e), ( 0 in resDect of a legal obliRation created after the 14th August, 1974.") 36 1 CX.R. 5 10 15 20 25 Marathovoimiotis v. Theodotou relief in respect of obligations undertaken upon a basis or assumptions that were destroyed by the devastating events associated with theTurkish invasion of the country;that mani­ festly, it was within the contemplation of the legislature to extendrelief tothosewho,as a resultoftheTurkishinvasion,lost theirfinancialbase for the discharge of obligations undertaken prior to the calamitousevents of 1974; that,therefore, thelegal obligationinquestion,asumof£254.-issubject totheprovisions of Law 24/79 because the obligation to make good damage caused to the building was assumed prior to 14.8.1974, in 1972, when the contract was executed, and because the damage crystallised prior to 14.8.1974; accordingly the appeal should be allowed. Held, further, that the purposive construction of statutes is especially warranted in the case of social legislation because the wider aims of the law are easily identifiable as well as the mischief against which they are directed;that Law 24/79 forms an important aspect of the social legislation, enacted in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion, in the interests of social harmony; that were this Court to accede to theconstruction placed upon "οφειλή" ("legal obligation") by the trial Judgt, it would inexorably be driven to the conclusion that a debt, no matter how large, assumed prior to 14.8.1974, would be outsidetheambitof theLaw,if payable subsequentto 14.8.1974; thatthatcouldnotbetheintention of thelegislature and enough was said in the Law to make this abundantly clear. Appeal allowed. Cases referred to: Krasismenos v. HjiChanni

(1963)2 C.L.R. 448. 30 Appeal. Appeal by applicant against the judgment of the District Court of Nicosia (HadjiConstantinou, S.D.J.) dated the 15ih January, 1981 (Appl. No. 162/79) whereby his application for a stay of judicial proceedings against himand for a declaration 35 that he was a stricken debtor under the provisions of the Debtors' Relief (Temporary Provisions) Law, 1979 (24/79) was dismissed. A. Danos, for the appellant. G. Papatheodorou, for the respondent. 40 Cur. adv. vult. 37 Marathovouniotis v. Theodotou

(1982)LORIS J.: The judgment of the Court will be delivered by Pikis, J. PIKIS J.; A seemingly simple, but in the end, a fairly difficult question of statutory construction must be decided, that is, thenatureof theobligations inrespect of which reliefis conferred 5 by the Debtors' Relief (Temporary Provisions) Law, 1979 (24/79). The respondent leased in 1972 three shops to the appellant, upon terms embodied in a written contract, including one provi­ ding that upon termination of the tenancy the premises would 10 be returned to ths owner in ai good a conditionas ihat inwhich they were received. The appellant vacated the premises in 1976, not in the condition they were at the time of entry. An amount of £304 - was needed to restore thsm to the condition they were al the time of execution of the agreement and remedy 15 damage caused thsisto. In an agreed statement of facts, it is acknowledged that the amount of £304.- represents— (a) £254.- damage caused prior to 14.8.1974, and (b)£ 50.- damage caused thereafter. 20 The only question the trial Court was required :o resolve; was whether the amount of £254- qualified as an "οφειλή" under the 1979 Debtors' Relief Law. If so, the tenant would be entitled to the benefits of the law, being, as admitted, a displaced person. Hadjiconstantinou, S.D.J., in a brief judgment, upheld the submission of the respondent and held that the liability in question was outside the ambit of the law inasmuch as the obli­ gation to make good the damage and restore the premises to their former condition, accrued and became legally enforceable, subsequent to the crucial date, notably 14.8.1974. We were invited to hold, along with the trial Court, that inasmuch as the liability to pay did not materialise, in law, until after the termination of the tenancy, the obligation, subject matter of the appeal, is beyond the scope of the law and relief 35 must, therefore, be refused. It is the first time the Supreme Court is faced with the construction of "οφειλή" under the 1979 law. A decision 38 25 30 1 C.L.R. Marathovouniotis v. Theodotou Pikis J. of marginal relevance-to the issue in hand, is that of facovos loannou Krasismenos v. Ioannis Iosif Hjichanni

(1963)2 C.L.R. 448, where the Supreme Court had to determine the meaning of "debt" (χρέος),as encountered in the Agricultural Debtors' 5 Relief Law, 1962. It was narrowly decided, by means of the casting vote of the then President of the High Court, that a debt must be defined exclusively by reference to the document creating the chose in action, independently of antecedent liabi­ lities giving rise thereto. In this case, there is no controversy 10 about the fact that,the obligation for restoration of the premises to their original condition, was undertaken prior to 14.8.1974, notably in 1972, by virtue of the contract of the parties. Counsel made reference to McGreggor on Damages, 14th ed., with emphasis on the time when a legally enforceable right, 15 to make good damage caused to tenanted property, accrues in law. There is little doubt that the right to enforce the obli­ gation for repairs did not arise prior to the termination of the tenancy, but that does not solve the problem for the definition of "οφειλή" expressly says that, for relief to be granted, the 20 obligation need not become payable by 14.8.1974, suggesting thereby thata right to sue is nota conditionprocedentto seeking relief under the law. 25 30 35 40 In the end, the question to be answered is, as indicated, largely one of construction of the meaning of "οφειλή", for which an appropriate English translation is "legal obligation". The relevant date is stipulated not by reference to the time of enforceability of the monetary obligation but the date on which it was assumed or incurred. The fact that the monetary obliga­ tion need not have become enforceable by 14.8.74, viewed in conjunction with the provisions of sub-paragraph (στ)particu­ larly the employment of the word "δημιουργηθείσης" (created), clearly suggest that relief is pegged to the genesis and not the discharge of the obligation. The notion of a "legal obligation" in the context of the 1979 legislation is not co-extensive with that of a presently enforceable right for the recovery of money owing. The construction herein favoured is also consonant withthewider aims of the law, designed togiverelief inrespect of obligations- undertaken upon a basis or assumptions that were destroyed by the devastating events associated with the Turkish invasion of the country. Manifestly, it was within thecontem­ plation of the legislature to extend relief to those who, as a 39 Pikis J. Marathovouniotis τ. Theodotou

(1982)result of the Turkish invasion, lost their financial base for the discharge of obligations undertaken prior to the calamitous events of

1. The purposive contruction of statutes is especially warranted in the case of social legislation because the wider aims of the 5 law are easily identifiable as well as the mischief against which they are directed. The Debtors' Relief Law forms an important aspect of the social legislation, enacted in the aftermath of the Turkish inva­ sion, in the interests of social harmony. It was one of a series 10 of laws designed to ward oft" some of the worst likely conse­ quences of the disastrous events of
2. Social coherence was at risk and the measures taken should be equal to the threat. Were we to accede to the constructionplaced upon "οφειλή" J5 by thetrial Judge, we would inexorably be driven to the conclu­ sion thatadebt,no matterhow large,assumed priorto 14.8.1974, would be outside the ambit of the law, if payable subsequent to 14.8.
3. That could not be the intentionof the legislature and enough was said in the law to make this, in ourjudgment, 20 abundantly clear. Applying the law, as explained in thisjudgment,we are driven to hold that the legal obligation in question, a sum of £254.-, is subject to the provisions of the 1979 legislation because— (a) the obligation to make good damage caused to the 25 building was assumed prior to 14.8.1974, in 1972, when the contract was executed, and (b) the damage crystallized, as it emerges from the joint statement of the parties, prior to 14.8.
4. Therefore, the appeal is allowed and a declaration h made 30 that lhe dJM in question is subject to the provisions of Law 24/79 and, therefore, its payment suspended accordingly. There will be no ordei as 10 costs. Appeal allowed. No order as to costs. 40 3j