(1982)1982 October 11 [L. Loizou, DEMETRIADES, PIKIS, JJ.] IOANNiS VAKANAS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL THOMAS AND ANOTHER, Respondents-Defendan ts. (Civil Appeal No. 6229). Negligence—Road accident—Main road—Side road—''Halt sign" —Motorist travelling along the main road need not anticipate, unless he has someforewarning of such aneventuality that another user of the road will emerge on a main roadfrom a side road without first stopping and making certain that it is safe so to 5 do—Side road driver held whollyto blamefor the accidentbecause he failed to stop at the halt sign. Negligence—Users of the road—Duty to take due carefor observance of rights of other users of the road—Whether such duty discharged a question of fact—The duty is to avoid exposing other users \0 of the road to reasonablyforeseeable dangers—•What is a foreseeable danger—In determining risks which are reasonably likely to arise one is guided by reason and the experience of mankind —Courts should be guided by standards of common sense. These proceedings arose out of a traffic accident, at Dem. 15 Sevens Avenue, Nicosia, close to the junction with Ayii Omoloyitae Avenue, involving the appellant, a pedal cyclist, and respondent 1, a motor car driver. The trial Court found the cyclist solely to blame fox the accident after finding that he emerged on Dem. Severis Avenue without fir<,t halting, as 20 required by a halt sign at the junction of the two avenues, and proceeded to cross diagonally Severis Avenue at a time when it was highly dangerous so to do, in view cf the presence of the motorcar of the respondent on the road, and its direction, leaving little margin of manoeuvre to the motorist to avoid 25 the accident. Upon appeal by the cyclist; Held, that a motorist travelling along the main load need 530 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Vakanas v. Thomas & Another not anticipate, unless he has some forewarning, of such an eventuality,that another user of the road willemerge on amain road from a sideroad withoutfirststopping and making certain thatitissafesotodo(see,interalia, Varnakkidesv. PapaMichael andAnother
(1970)1 C.L.R. 367); that the tort of negligence isintendedtomaintainreasonablestandards ofbehaviour among neighbours; that this duty takes the form of exhibition, in the case of users of the road, of due care for the observance of the rights of other users of the road; that the precise duty in given circumstances depends on the facts of the case; that whether this duty has been discharged, or whether there is a breach of it, is decided as a question of fact; that the standard to be observed isfixedimpersonally and universally in relation to the safety of other users of the road; that its discharge varies with thefacts of each case; that the duty is to avoid exposing other users of the road to reasonably foreseeable dangers; that foreseeable danger is one that reason and common sense suggest it is reasonably likely to materialise, as opposed to a risk, the occunence of which is a meie possibility; that if motorists and users of theroad were to act onthe assumption that other users of the road were inevitably bound to be negligent, we would be imposing an impossible burden on users of the road, far beyond what reason and experiencejustify; that in deteimining the risks which are leasonably likely to aiise, one is guided by reason and theexpeiience ofmankind; that therobust standards of common sense should guide the Court in its appreciation of a given situation; that it is unprofitable to be perplexed by niceties, such as the precise point from which the parties were in sight of one another, that tends to give the impression that we are concerned with a mathematical exercise; that applying these principles to the facts of the case, the one factor to be singled-out in the conduct of the parties, is the rushness with which the cyclist emerged on the road, reducing, in the circumstances, to the minimum the ability of the motorist to avoid thecollision; that no blameshould beattached tothemotorist for the accident; accordingly the appeal should fail. Appeal dismissed. Cases referred to: Varnakkides v. Papamichael andAnother
(1970)1 C.L.R. 367; Elpiniki Panayiotouv. Georghios Kyriacou Mavros
(1970)1 C.L.R. 215; Karikatou v. Soteriou, Soteriou v. Apseros
(1979)1C.L.R. 150. 531 Vakanas τ. Thomas & Another
(1982)Appeal. Appeal by plaintiff against thejudgment of the DistrictCourt of Nicosia (Stylianides, P.D.C. and Fr. Nicolaides, D.J.)dated the 31st January, 1981,(Action No.2481/79) whereby his claim for damages for personal injuries sustained by him in a traffic 5 accident was dismissed. E. Vrachimi (Mrs.), for the appellant. S. Erotocritou (Mrs.), for the respondents. L. Loizo»' J.: We consider it unnecessary to hear the re spondents in reply. The appeal fails. Mr. Justice Pikis will 10 give our reasons for dismissing the appeal. PIKIS J.: This appeal is directed against the findings and conclusions of the District Court of Nicosia in relation to an accident that occurred on 10th April, 1975, at Dem. Severis Avenue, close to the junction with Ayii Omoloyitae Avenue, 15 involving the appellant, a pedal cyclist, and respondent 1, who was in charge of motorcar under Reg. No. DB336. The cir cumstances preceding and attending the collision, were the subject of careful anddetailedanalysis by thetrial Court. They found the cyclist solely to blame for the accident,absolving the 20 motorist of any liability for its occurrence. Briefly,thetrial Courtfound thatthecyclist emerged on Dem. Severis Avenue without first halting, as required by a halt sign at thejunction of thetwo avenues, andproceededtocrossdiago nally Severis Avenue at a time when it was highly dangerous 25 so to do,in view of thepresence of the motorcarof therespon dentontheroad,andits direction,leaving littlemarginof mano euvre to the motorist to avoid the accident. Further,the trial Court held that the reaction of the motorist to the dangerous situation,createdontheroad bythepedalcyclist, was blameless, 30 in that hecould notreasonably anticipatethatthecyclist would enter the main road without first halting, in view of the slow pace at which he was seen approaching thejunction. He first sensed danger when the cyclist, in gross disregard to his safety and that of otherusers of the road,emerged onSeveris Avenue, 35 speeding up in an effort to cross to the opposite side. Faced with this dilemma,themotoristapplied brakes taking further to the left, hoping, thereby, to avert a collision. The cyclist emerged on to Severis Avenue from his right. He was nearly 532 1 C.L.R. Vabanas τ. Thomas & Another Pikis J. successful in avoiding a collision for, he had just managed to bring his car to a standstill before the cyclist collided with the front right bumper of the car, sustaining serious injuries, as the trial Courtfound, thatwould have entitled him to a substantive 5 award of damages had the motorist been held liable in negli gence. 10 15 20 25 Mrs. Vrahimi strenuously argued that the evidence before the trial Court warranted a finding that the motorist ought to have sensed the possibility of danger emerging earlier than he did, and that, in consequence, the precautions taken by the motorist to avoid the accident,were inadequate; therefore, he should beheldresponsible inpart,for theinjuries suffered bythe appellant. Shesubmitted it is unreasonable to presume, having regard to thedistance that the cyclist covered onthe main road uptothepointof impactinjuxtaposition tothedistance covered by themotorist upto thesame point,thatthecyclist was travel ling as fast, or faster than themotorist. Shemadethis submis sion notwithstanding the finding of the trial Court that the cyclist accelerated his speed in order to cross the road while the motorist was breaking down his speed in an effort to bring his car to a stop. Eventually, she submitted that the motorist ought to have taken steps to prevent the collision before the cyclist emerged on the main road^ inasmuch as the eventuality of the cyclist failing to stop, was one that ought reasonably to be anticipated. As the trial Court observed, relying onautho rity,theduty of areasonable motorist,andfor thatmatterof any user of the road, does not extend beyond taking precautions against a reasonably foreseeable danger. The cases of Varnakkides v. Papamichael andAnother
(1970)30 1C.L.R. 367,ElpinikiPanayiotou v.Georghios Kyriacou Mavros
(1970)1 C.L.R. 215, and Karikatou v. Soteriou,Soteriouv. Apseros
(1979)1C.L.R. 150, establish that a motorist travelling along the main road need not anticipate, unless he has some forewarning, of such an eventuality, that another user of the 35 road willemerge on a main road from a side road without first stopping and making certain that it is safe so to do. The tort of negligence is intended to maintain reasonable standards of behaviour among neighbours. This duty takes the form of exhibition, in the case of users of the road, of due care 533 Pikis J. Vakanas v. Thomas & Another
(1982)for theobservance oftherights ofother usersoftheroad. The precise duty in given circumstances depends on the facts of the case. Whether this duty hasbeen discharged, or whether there is abreach of it, isdecided asa question offact. Thestandard to be observed isfixed impersonally and universally in relation 5 to the safety of other users of the road. Its discharge varies withthefacts ofeachcase. Thedutyistoavoid exposingother users of the road toreasonablyforeseeable dangers. Aforeseeable danger is one that reason and common sense suggest it is reasonably likely tomaterialise,as opposed to arisk,theoccur- 10 rence of which is a mere possibility. If motorists and usersof the road were to act on the assumption that other users of the road were inevitably bound to be negligent, we would be imposing an impossible burden on users of the road, far beyond what reason and experience justify. In determining the risks 15 whicharereasonably likelytoarise,oneisguided byreason and the experience of mankind. The robust standards of common sense should guide the Court in its appreciation of a given situation. It isunprofitable tobeperplexed byniceties,suchas the precise point from which the parties were in sight of one 20 another, that tendstogivetheimpression that weareconcerned with a mathematical exercise. Applying these principles to the facts ofthecase, the onefactor to besingled-out in the conduct of the parties, istherushness with which thecyclistemerged on the road, reducing, in the circumstances, to the minimum the 25 ability of the motorist to avoid thecollision. No blame should be attached to the motorist for the accident. For the reasons above given, we judged it unnecessary to call upon the respondents to reply to the arguments raised in support of the appeal, taking the view that the appeal is bound 30 to fail. The appeal is dismissed. As there is no claim for costs, there would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. No order as to costs. 534 35