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(1982)1982 September 24 [HADJIANASTASSIOU, LORIS, PIKIS, JJ.] NAVSIKA STYLIANOU AND OTHERS, Appellan ts-Defendants, v. K.YRIACOS PAPACLEOVOULOU AND ANOTHER, Respondents-Plaintiffs. (Civil Appeal No. 6163). Rectification—Presupposes an agreement though not necessarily a binding contract between the parties. Practice—Pleadings—Issue not pleaded may be raised so long as pleaded facts justify a claim therefor. Estoppel*—Equitable estoppel—Proprietary estoppel—Principles 5 applicable—Encouragement to proceed with a transaction need not solely emanate or derivefrom representations of the promisor express or implied—A representation may in appropriate circumstances arise from silence—Sale of land—Conveyance of plot other than that covered by sale—Sellers sitting back and 10 allowing purchasers to assume occupation of property, subject matter of the sale, and effect considerable improvements to it— Such conduct coupled with the otherfacts of the case constitutes representationsfrom which it would be inequitable to allow sellers to withdraw—Proprietary estoppel applicable. 15 Prior to 1951 Haralambou Sawa Aresti ("Haralambou"), who was the sister of the appellants, became the registered owner of a plot of land belonging to her parents, which was identified as plot
  1. Both she and her husband ("Savvas Aresti") as well as the transferors of the three quarter share in the 20 property, that is the appellants, were under the impression that what was conveyed to Haralambou was a plot other than that represented by plot 116, notably what came to be identified For a further explanation of proprietary estoppel see Odysseosv. A. Pierts Estates Ltd. and Another reported in this Part at p. 557 post. 542 1 CL.R. Stylianou v. Papacleovoulou as plot
  2. The land to whichplot 116related was barren land which was never cultivated by anyone. Plot 29 came in the possession of Haralambou and it was cultivated by her until 1951 when it was sold to the respondents. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Haralambou agreed to sell, in 1951, through her husband the arable plot of land she cultivated, that is now identified as plot 29, to respondent
  3. She purported to convey the plot of land sold to respondent l; but owing to a mistake in the indentification of the property, she transferred plot 116 instead of plot
  4. Thereafter, respondent 1assumed possession of the land represented asplot 29,believingto be the registered owner therefor. Labouringunderthisimpression,not onlyheoccupied the property but effected considerable improvements to it. In 1957,hepurported to donate thisplot of land to his daughter upon her marriage and believed he had accomplished this task, by transferring plot
  5. So, the mistake was perpetuated. Thereafter, respondent 2assumed, asthefather had doneearlier, possession of plot 29, adding to the improvements made by her father. In consequence of these improvements, the land in question has become a most valuable piece of land, the value of which is presently estimated in thousands of pounds. The respondents were in blissful oblivion of the true facts until 1971, when Sawas Aresti discovered that what Haralambou had acquired by registration and transferred to the respondents, was a plot of land other than plot 29, viz. plot
  6. In an action by respondents the trial Couit found that Appellant 3,thebrother,gifted onhisownvolition andinitiative his heieditary share in all the properties of his parents to his threesisters,includingplot29andexecutedapower, constituting Sawas Aresti hisattorney toimplement the gift; that thisAresti purported to do in accordance with the instructions of his principal albeit without success with regard to plot 29, for, instead, plot 116 was transferred; that the remaining two appellants, the sisters of Haralambou, agreed to sell to their sistertheirshareinall theproperties of their parents inconsideration of a sum of £50.- paid to each one of them; that as in the case of their brother, theyissued Sawas Aresti with a power of attorney in order to transfer their share in all the properties of their parents to Haralambou; that thereafter, Sawas Aiesti took the appropriate steps to have the property first registeied 543 Stylianou τ. Papacleovoulou in the name of the heirs and them transferred it in the name of his wife. But owing to a mistake arising from the certificate issued by the mukhtai of the village, the land now represented by plot 29 was identified as plot
  7. So,inthe years 1948-49, when Sawas Aresti purported to convey the land in question to his wife in exercise of the powers that appellants vested in him, he transferred plot 116 instead of plot 29.
(1982)5 After finding as above the trial Court made an order for rectification of the register so that plot 29 be registered in the name of respondent 2 and plot 116 in the name of the IQ administrator of the estate of Haralambou. Uponappeal by thedefendants: Held,
(1)that rectification presupposes an agreement,though not necessarily a binding contract, between the parties, to the instrument to be rectified; that the facts of the case nowhere 15 disclose any agreement between respondents and appellants, nor were they parties to any instrument susceptible to rectification; and that, consequently, the submission of the appellants that thejudgment of the trial Court is fraught with a misdirection with regard to the applicability of the remedy 20 of rectification is well founded.
(2)That though respondents*case was notcast on proprietary estoppel this does not appear to be an insurmountable obstacle provided the pleaded facts and the findings of the trial Couit justify the appreciation of the case in that perspective; that the 25 facts of this case warrant theapplication of proprietary estoppel in vindication of the rights of therespondents (see p. 554post); that the encouragement to proceed with a transaction need not solely emanate or derive from the representations of the promisor express or implied; that a representation may, in 30 appropriate circumstances arise from silence.
(3)That applying this reasoning to the facts of the case, the appellants sat back and allowed the respondents to assume occupation of theproperty andeffect considerable improvements to it; that such conduct,coupled with the authorisation eailier 35 furnished to Sawas Aresti to dispose of their property, constitutes representations from which it would be inequitable to allow the appellants to withdraw, having regard to the way respondents modified their position thereafter; that the above 544 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Stylianou τ. Papacleovoalou conduct of the appellants could not but strengthen the belief of the respondents, that no one other than themselves had a right over thepropertyinconsequenceofwhichtheytook trouble and incurred considerable expenses to improve the property; thattheappellantsshould not,insuchcircumstances,be allowed, in equity, to reap any benefits from their conduct or watch the respondents suffer such injustice; that in view of all the above, proprietary estoppel is properly applicable to the facts of the case, thereby justifying the remedies granted by the Court, and inasmuch as a court of equity must ensure that its orders do not work injustice the subsidiary oider made for the vestingback of plot 116intheestateof Haralambou,is aremedy perfectly warranted by thefacts of the case; and so, for reasons different from those given by the trial Court, the judgment of the Court will be upheld. -^. Appeal dismissed. Cases referred to: Beale v. Kyte [1907] 1 Ch. 564; ThomasBates & Sons v. Wyndham'sLingerie Ltd. [1981] 1 All E.R. 1077; . Joscelyn \. Nissen[1970] 1 AH E.R. 1213 (C.A.); Saunders v. Anglia Building Society [1970] 3All E.R. 961 (H.L.); Dronev. Evangelou [1978] 2 All E.R. 437; Re VanderveWs Trusts (No. 2) [1974] 3 All E.R. 205 (C.A.); Hadji Yiannis v. Attorney-General
(1970)1 C.L.R. 32; Papadopoullos v. NationalBank of Greece
(1979)1 C.L.R. 10; Central LondonProperty Trust v. High TreesHouseLtd. [1947] 1 K.B. 130; Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. [1874-1880] All E.R. Rep. 187 at p. 191; Crabb V. Arun D.C. [1975] 3 All E.R. 865; Inwarde v. Baker [1965] 1 All E.R. 446; Taylor FasionsLtd. v. Liverpool VictoriaTrustees Co. [1981] 1 All E.R. 897; Amalgamated Investmentsv. Texas Commerce [1981] 1All E.R. 923; Western FishProducts v. Penwith D.C· [1981] 2 All E.R. 204: Greasley v. Cooke [1980] 3 All E.R. 710; Spiro v. Lintern [1973] 3 AU E.R. 319. 545 Stylianou f. Papacleovoalou
(1982)Appeal. Appeal by defendants 2, 3and 4 against thejudgment of the District Court of Paphos (Kourris, P.D.C. and Kronides, D.J ) dated the 4th September, 1980 (Action No. 814/71) whereby it was ordered that certificate of registration No. 8465 of plot 29 5 in the name of defendants 2, 3 and 4 be cancelled and be registered in the name of defendant 1and that defendant 1transfer the said plot in the name of plaintiff No.
  1. G. Constantinides with A. Pandelides, for appellant
  2. A. Pandelides,for appealIants 2 and
  3. 10 No appearance for respondent 1, defendant 1at the trial. E. Korakides, for respondents-plaintiffs. Cur. adv.vultHADJIANASTASSIOU J.: The judgment of the Court will be delivered by Pikis, J. 15 PIKIS J.: The appellants, defendants 2, 3 and 4 before the trial Court, and Haralambou Savva Aresti, deceased, were the children of Stylianos Yianni and Myrianthi Panayi, who passed away, the mother in 1927 and the father in
  4. The estate of Haralambou was represented in these proceedings by her 20 husband, the administrator, Sawas Aresti. The couple of Stylianos and Myrianthi owned immovable property in three villages of the Paphos district, at Tremithousa, Emba and Mesoyi, that devolved on their death to their children; the appellants and Haralambou. What became of these properties 25 after 1933,and arrangements and agreements made among the heirs for their cultivation and distribution, were the subject of conflicting contentions and evidence before the trial Court. There were,however, some indisputable facts to which wemay refer in order to elucidate the background to the case: 30 Haralambou became, prior to 1951,theregistered owner ofa plot of land belonging to her parents, identified as plot
  5. Sawas Aresti, her husband, who,according toevery indication, played a dominant role in the management of the property affairs of his wife, testified that both he and his wife, as wellas 35 the transferors of the three quarter share in the property, that is the appellants, were under the impression that what was conveyed to Haralambou wasa plot other than that represented by plot 116,notably what came to be identified as plot
  6. In 546 1 C.L.R. Stylianou ?. Papacleovoalou Pikis J. actual fact, the land to which plot 116 relates is barren land which wasto all appearances nevercultivated byanyone,either by the heirs or their parents. But it belonged,as the adjoining plot 29, to the parents of the appellants and Haralambou. 5 Plot 29came,in theevidenceofAresti,in the possession of his wife andit wasthat plot that shecultivated until 1951whenshe soldit to theplaintiffs before thetrial Court, therespondentsin this appeal. The version of the respondents before the trial Court sup10 ported bythatoftheadministrator oftheestateof Haralambou, as to events surrounding the sale of a plot of land by Haralambou to the respondents, is the following: Haralambou agreed to sell, in 1951, through her husband the arable plot of land she cultivated, that is now identified 15 as plot 29, to respondent
  7. She purported to convey the plot of land sold to respondent 1, but owing to a mistake in the identification of the property, she transferred plot 116 instead ofplot
  8. Thereafter, respondent 1 assumed possession of the land represented asplot 29,believingto be theregistered owner 20 thereof. Labouring under this impression, not only he occupied the property but effected considerable improvements to it. In 1957,hepurported todonatethisplot oflandtohisdaughter upon her marriage and believed hehad accomplished this task, by transferring plot
  9. So, the mistake was perpetuated. 25 Thereafter, respondent 2 assumed, as the father had done earlier, possession ofplot 29,addingto theimprovements made byherfather. In consequence oftheseimprovements, theland in question hasbecomea most valuable piece ofland, thevalue of which is presently estimated in thousands of pounds. 30 The respondents were in blissful oblivion of the true facts until 1971,when Sawas Aresti discovered, to his surprise and dismay,thatwhatHaralambouhadacquired byregistration and transferred to the respondents, was a plot of land other than plot 29,viz.plot
  10. Thishediscovered inconsequence ofthe 35 imposition of taxation on the heirs of his deceased parents-inlaw. Sawas Aresti sought to remedy the mistake by invoking the collaboration of the appellants in virtue of alleged agreements among theheirs of his deceased parents-in-law as to the dispo40 sition of their hereditary share and the authority they furnished 547 Pikis J. Stylianou v. PapacleoTooloo
(1982)him with by the issue of powers of attorney to implement the agreements among the heirs. The appellants refused to collaborate, notwithstanding the absence of any protestation on their part to the possession and enjoyment of the property by the respondents for more than two decades; rising, so to say, 5 from their slumber with regard to their alleged rights, they claimed ownership of the property. Thus they resisted the action oftherespondentsfor acorrection ofthemistakeand the rectification of the instrument of transfer and registration, and pressed forward a counterclaim for trespass, charging the 10 respondents with unauthorised entry and occupation of the property. The trial Court, in a detailed and well reasoned judgment, evaluated the contentious evidence before it, and concluded, as we may appropriately summarise, that appellants were doing 15 nothing other than endeavouring to gain an advantage from an errorthat occurred atthetimeoftheregistration oftheproperty in the name of their deceased sister perpetuated thereafter in the circumstances above indicated. They found the evidence of the appellants to be contradictory, unreliable, and in many 20 respects, false. These findings were, so far as we may judge from the printed record, not only warranted by the evidence before the Court, but inescapable. There is no room whatever for disturbing these findings. On the contrary, there is every reason for upholding them and we so adjudge. 25 In accordance with the findings of the trial Court, appellant 3, the brother, gifted on his own volition and initiative his hereditary share in all the properties of his parents to his three sisters, including plot 29, and executed a power, constituting Sawas Aresti his attorney to implement the gift. This Aresti 30 purported to do in accordance with theinstructions of his principal albeit without successwith regard toplot 29,for, instead, plot 116 was transferred. The remaining two appellants, the sisters of Haralambou, agreed to sell to their sister their share in all the properties of their parents in consideration of a sum 35 of £50.- paid to each one of them. As in the case of their brother, they issued Sawas Aresti with a power of attorney in order to transfer their shareinalltheproperties oftheir parents to Haralambou. Thereafter, Sawas Aresti took the appropriate steps to have the property first registered in the name of 40 548 1 C.L.R. Stylianou τ. Papacleovoalou Pikis J. the heirs and then transferred it in the name of his wife. But owing to a mistake arising from the certificate issued by the mukhtar of thevillage,the land now represented by plot 29 was identified as plot
  1. So, in the years 1948-49, when Sawas 5 Aresti purported to convey the land in question to his wife in exercise of thepowers thatappellants vested in him,he transfer­ red plot 116 instead of plot
  2. Notthat plot 116 was outside the agreement of. the parties; for the heirs had furnished Sawas Aresti with power to transfer all the immovable pro10 perties of their deceased parents to Haralambou. The respondents in their statement of claim contended that it would be unconscionable to allow the appellants to reap such considerable benefits from the situation above arising, and that it would be unjust to allow them to resile from their acts and 15 the representation made, inter alia, by their attorney, Sawas Aresti. Elsewhere, they laid stress on the absence of any pro­ testation from the appellants to the use and occupation of the property, for years, by the respondents, in order to emphasize the encouragement given in that way by the appellants to the 20 respondents to effect improvements to the property. They prayed for an order of rectification in order to correct theerror that occurred with regard to plots 116 and
  3. Also, they raised a claim for the ownership of the property by virtue of adverse possession, though this part of their case was notmuch 25 pressed before the Court. In the defence submitted on behalf of theestate of Haralambou, there is an acknowledgment of the correctness of the averments of the respondents reinforcing its factual validity, coupled with an averment that respondent 1 was, at the time of purchase of the property, aware of the 30 background facts of the case, that is that appellants had, prior to 1951, constituted Sawas Aresti as their attorney for the transfer of the property in the name of Haralambou- The trial Court does not, in its judgment, refer specifically to these admissions though, from the general tenor of the judgment, it 35 can be safely inferred that they accepted them as a sound state­ ment of facts. The trial Court, after making its findings, vindicated the claim of respondents by making an order for rectification of the register so that plot 29 be registered in the name of respondent 2, and plot 116 in the nameof theadmini40 strator of the estate of Haralambou. The implications arising from thefindings of the Courtare not spelled out with the same 549 Pikis J. Stylianou v. Papacleovoulou
(1982)lucidity as their findings offact; the impression one is apt to gain is that the trial Court was so impressed with the manifest justice of the case of the plaintiffs that they felt right to order rectification asthe only practical means ofdoingjustice to their case. We likewise feel theresult arrived at, isajust one. But 5 that doesnot givean end tothematter nor doesit absolveusof responsibility to examine the implications in law, arising from the findings of the trial Court; and more specifically whether they warrant the remedies granted. RECTIFICATION: Let ussay straight away that if the action 10 was one for rectification of the original instrument of transfer and consequent registration of the property in the name of Haralambou, in proceedings between Haralambou and the appellants, rectification would not only be a legitimate but an inevitable remedy. An instrument of transfer of immovable 15 property is, on authority, amenable to rectification whenever, as a result of the common mistake of the parties to the transaction, it fails to give effect to the avowed intention of the parties to it. (See Snell'sPrinciples of Equity, 27/Aed„p. 617Beale v.Kyte [1907] 1Ch. 564). In the light of thefindings of 20 the Court, the instrument of transfer failed to giveeffect to the intention of the parties, by recording a plot other than that the appellants intended to convey to Haralambou, that is plot 116 instead of plot 29. (See Snell'ssupra, p. 612). Rectification, on the other hand, presupposes an agreement, though not 25 necessarily a binding contract, between the parties, to the instrument to be rectified, and as Mr. Pandelides, counsel for appellants,rightlypointed out,thiselementisaltogether missing in the instrument here under consideration and the registration that followed. Therefore, he submitted the remedy of rectifi- 30 cation was not available at the instance of the respondents. The case of Thomas BatesandSonsv. Wyndham's Lingerie Ltd. [1981]1 AllE.R. 1077(C.A.),containsastatement onthenature of the remedy of rectification and its application nowadays. Despite the emphasis laid on the equitable nature of the relief, 35 it is more than clear that the remedy is not available against persons, not parties to an agreement, or, more appropriately, not parties to the instrument sought to be rectified. A prior agreement and execution of an instrument found thereon, is an indispensable prerequisite for a valid invocation of the re- 40 medy of rectification. (See Joscelyn v. Nissen [1970] 1 All 550 1 C.L.R. Stylianoa v.Papadeovodou POdsJ. E.R. 1213 (C.A.)). Regrettably, the trial Court overlooked thenature oftheequitable relief of rectification and is vulnerable on that score. The passage in the judgment of the trial Court, sanctioning rectification, reads as follows:5 10 "As we have been satisfied that defendants 2, 3 and 4 were entitled to beregistered asownersof plot29,and aswe have been satisfied that there was a common mistake in the registration of plot 116 in the name of plaintiff 1, and subsequently in the name of plaintiff 2, we grant the order for rectification, andweorder that the certificate of registration, No. 8465,of plot 29 in thename of all the defendants, be cancelled, and that plot 29 of Sheet/Plan 45/59 at the locality of 'Katarrakhtes* in the area of Emba village, be registered in the name of defendant 1 . „" 15 We completely discard the possibility of the trial Court's attention being directed towards a common mistake of the nature of non est factum for, where a common mistake of this category is relied upon, the remedy is not rectification but rescision. (See Saunders v. Anglia Building Society [1970] 3 20 All E.R. 961 (H.L.)). The facts of the case nowhere disclose any agreement between respondents and appellants, nor were they parties to any instrument susceptible to rectification. Consequently, the submission of the appellants that the judgment of the trial Court is 25 fraught with a misdirectton with regard to the applicability of the remedy of rectification, is well founded. Counsel for the respondents rested his impassioned address on thejustice of the case so strong as to cry out for a remedy in law or equity. To leave the respondents, he submitted, remediless in the cir30 cumstances of the case, would be tantamount to allowing the respondent to reap considerable benefits from their unconscionable conduct. Like any other Bench, we are sensitive to the merits of the case, but may we remind that our mission is to do justice according to law. To this end, we applied our35 selves feeling dutybound to ascertain whether the findings of the Court warrant the remedies granted or any other remedies. PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL: The facts of the case, vocal as they are about the merits of the case of the respondents, led us focus our attention on the equitable doctrine of estoppel with a 551 Pikis J. Stylianou v. Papacleovoalou
(1982)view to deciding whether they justify its application in the circumstances of the case. Equitable estoppel has gained, in recent decades, considerable ascendency under the guidance of Lord Denning M.R., as a fundamental aspect of English law. The imaginative, if we may say so with respect, application of 5 the doctrine by English courts, in diverse circumstances, has broadened the frontiers of justice. The difficulty is that re­ spondents' case was not cast in that frame nor did the trial Court endeavour toevaluate thefacts from the angle of equitable estoppel. That does not, however, appear to be an insur- 10 mountable obstacle provided the pleaded facts and the findings of the Court justify the appreciation of the case in that perspective. In Drane v. Evangelou [1978] 2 All E.R. 437, it was held that the trial Court could raise the issue of trespass notwithstanding the fact that it had not been pleaded so long 15 as the pleaded facts justified a claim for trespass. In another case, Lord Denning pointed out that so long as the material facts giving rise to a claim are pleaded, a party may obtain any remedy warranted thereby, the rule being that he is not precluded from departing from his pleading with regard to the 20 remedies warranted, as a legal consequence of pleaded facts. (See Re VanderveWs Trusts (No. 2) [1974] 3All E.R. 205 (C.A.)). This being the law, we directed out minds to deciding whether the facts of the case, as found by the trial Court, warrant the application of proprietary estoppel. 25 The principles of equity, also known as the doctrines of equity, are part of Cyprus law in virtue of the provisions of s.29(c) of the Courts of Justice Law (14/60). Equitable estoppel is a fundamental doctrine of equity and it is recognised as such in Cyprus, as well. (See Hadji Yiannis v. TheAttorney-General 30
(1970)1 C.L.R. 32). The decision of the Supreme Court in Papadopoulos v. National Bank of Greece
(1979)1 C.L.R. 10, suggests that equitable estoppel is applicable in Cyprus in much the same way as in England, and is subject to the same limitations. It should not be extended beyond its proper 35 boundaries. The impetus for the widespread application of equitable estoppel inmodern times stemmed from thedecision of Denning, J., as he then was, in Central London Property Trust v. High Trees House Ltd. [194η K.B. 130—[1956] 1 All E.R.
  1. 40 552 1 C.L.R. Stylianou v. Papadeovoulou Pikis J. The learned Judge found ample authority for its existence, especially in the exposition of the law on the subject, by Lord Cairns in Hughes v. MetropolitanRailway Co. [1874-1880] All E.R. Rep. 187,
  2. Lord Cairns pronounced that it is 5 the first principle of the courts of equity that a person will not beallowed to insist on his strict legalrightswhetherarising under a contract or on his title deeds or by statute, when it would be inequitable for him to do so having regard to the dealings between the parties. Since the decision in the High 10 Treescasethelawreportsabound withdecisionswhereequitable estoppel was successfully invoked to mitigate the vigour of the law. Itsjuridical basis was expanded. It has come to be acknowledged as a fundamental precept of justice designed to ensure standards of probity in the dealings of mankind, so 15 that lawandjusticemay march hand in hand. It isestablished that a party, making a promise, cannot resile therefrom when it would be inequitable for him so to do notwithstanding the absence of a legally recognised relationship between the promisor and the promisee. And it is inequitable for 20 the promisor to resile from his promise whenever, as a result of such representation, the promisee has modified his position in a way that it would be unjust for the promisor to withdraw from his representations; provided always, of course, that the representations made are clear and unambiguous, such as 52 could lead the promisee to act upon them. At one time the view prevailed that for the promisee to rely successfully on promissory estoppel, he had to establish suffering detriment as a result of acting upon the representations of the promisor. That is no longer the case and the proof of detriment as such, 30 isnot regarded as indispensable for the application of equitable estoppel. The basis of the doctrine has been broadened; all that the promisee need establish, is that it would be inequitable for the promisor to insist, in view of his representations by word of conduct, on the enforcement of his strict 35 legalrights. And inasmuch asthedoctrine ofequity inthisarea wasfounded onpromise,itwaslabelledpromissoryestoppel. Until the decision in Crabb v. ArunD.C. [1975] 3 All E.R. 865, it was debatable whether promissoryestoppel could found a cause of action. The prevalent view was that it could be 40 put forward as a shield but not used as a sword for the vindication of the rights of the promisee. In Crabbsupra, 553 Pikis J. Stylianou τ. Papacleovouiou
(1982)the Court of Appeal found there is no justification for this limitation norany intrinsicneedfor thuslimiting a fundamental doctrine ofjustice, and pronouncedthat in appropriate circum­ stances it could be invoked to find property rights; hence proprietary estoppel. Thedecision in Crabb was foreshadowed 5 to a degree by that in Inwarde v. Baker [1965] 1All E.R.
  1. In Crabb supra, an arrangement between riparian owners, involving the alteration of access to the property of plaintiff, was found to be legally enforceable and was made the subject of an order directing the registration of an easement in accord- 10 ance with the arrangement of the parties. The Court held it would beinequitable toleavetheplaintiff remediless and allow the defendant to sit back andenjoy thefruits of hisunconscion­ able conduct. Proprietary estoppel has, since, come to be recognised as an aspect of equitable estoppel. (See, inter 15 alia, Taylor Fashions Ltd. v. Liverpool Victoria TrusteesCo. [1981] 1 All E.R. 897, and Amalgamated Investmentsv. Texas Commerce [1981] 1All E.R. 923). It must be noted, however, that the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Western FishProducts v. Penwith D.C. [1981] 2 All E.R. 204, suggests 20 that proprietary estoppel should, in its application, be limited to the acquisition of rights in land, there being no justification for its extension beyond that. In our judgment, proprietary estoppel forms part of the doctrinesofequity andas suchisapplicable inCyprusinaccord- 25 ance with s.29(c) of the Courts of Justice Law, 14/
  2. Next, we must decide whether proprietary estoppel applies to thefacts of the case. We have examined thefindingsof the trial Court with the greatest care, without losing sight of the proper limitations of the doctrine. As Oliver, J., pointed out 30 in Taylor Fashions supra, it is undesirable to pigeonhole proprietary estoppel in watertight compartments or postulate its application to diverse circumstances; nor do the authorities suggest,as thelearnedJudgepointedout,aninflexible approach. The facts of each case must be pragmatically evaluated in order 35 to decide whether proprietary estoppel properly applies to the facts of the case. In our judgment, the following facts of the case warrant the application of proprietary estoppel in vindication of the rights of the respondents:554 40 1 CX.R. StyUanenν- Papadtwooloq Pikis J.
  3. The appellants put it within the power of Sawas Aresti, and through him within the power of Haralambou, to dispose of plot 29 as they might deem appropriate.
  4. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 The sale of the property of Haralambou to respondent 1 w^s negotiated by Sawas Aresti who wgs still, at the time of negotiation and transfer, lawfully entrusted by appellants with authority to dispose of their interest in plot 29; in fact, all the properties of his parents-inlaw-
  5. Respondent 1was aware of these facts and could validly presume that Sawas Aresti was properly authorised by the true owners to transfer the property to him. According to Robert Goff, J., in Amalgamated Invest­ ments supra, the encouragement to proceed with a transaction need not solely emanate or derive from the representations of the promisor, express or implied. The question.is whether the conduct of the promisee was materially influenced by such an encouragement. Indeed, there is a presumption that the representee acted on a representation made by the promisor, the burden being on the representor to prove otherwise. (See Greasley v. Cooke[1980] 3 All E.R. 710).
  6. 'A representation may, in appropriate circumstances, arise from silence; so it was held in Spiro v. Lintern [1973]3All E.R.
  7. Itarises in this way, as theCourt put it:^ "If A, having some right or title adverse to B, sees Β in ignorance of that right or title acting in amanner inconsistent withit,whichwould beto B's disadvantage if the right ortitle were asserted against him thereafter, A is under a duty to Β to disclose the existence of his right or title. Ifhestands by andallowsΒtocontinue in his course of action, A will not, if the other conditions of estoppel are satisfied, be allowed to assert his right or title against Β ". (See p. 326 LettersG-H). Applying the above reasoning to the facts of the case, the appellants sat back and allowed the respondents to assume 555 Pikis J. Stylianou v. Papacleovoalou
(1982)occupation of the property and effect considerable improvements to it. Such conduct, coupled with the authorisation earlier furnished to Sawas Aresti to dispose of their property, constitutes representations from which it would be inequitable to allow the appellants to withdraw, having regard to the way 5 respondents modified their position thereafter. The above conduct of the appellants could not but strengthen the belief of the respondents, that no one other than themselves had a right over the property inconsequence ofwhichtheytook trouble and incurred considerable expenses to improve the property. 10 The appellants should not, in such circumstances, be allowed, in equity, to reap any benefits from their conduct or watch the respondents suffer such injustice. In view of all the above, proprietary estoppel is properly apphcable to the facts of the case,therebyjustifying the remedies 15 granted by the Court. And inasmuch as a court of equity must ensure that its orders do not work injustice the subsidiary order made for the vesting back of plot 116 in the estate of Haralambou, is a remedy perfectly warranted by the facts of the case. So, for reasons different from those given by the trial Court, 20 we uphold the judgment of the Court. Notwithstanding the rule that costs follow the event, we shall make no order as to costs regarding the costs of this appeal for, having regard to the reasoning of thejudgment of thetrial Court, to take this appeal, was a reasonable step. In the result, the appeal is dismised. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. No order as to costs. 556 25

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