(1982)1982 October 27 [L. Loizou, DEMETRIADES, PIKIS, JJ.] THE CYPRUS PHASSOURI PLANTATIONS CO. LTD., Appellants-Defendants, v. STEPHANOS GEORGHIOU, Respondent-Plaintiff. (CivilAppealNo. 6244). Terminationof Employment Law, 1967 (Law 24/67) (as amended by Law 6/73)—Recourse by employee against employer to Industrial Disputes Court—Withdrawal of recourse by employee and dismissalby Court—Employee cannot claim damagesby an actionin the District Courteventhough he withdrew his re- 5 course—Section 30 of the Law. The sole issue in this appeal was whether the respondentplaintiff could file an action in the District Court against his employers claiming damages for wrongful dismissal and a sum of £100 in lieu of notice of dismissal after he had first filed a 10 recourse to the Industrial Disputes Court which had been withdrawn by him and dismissed; and the deteimination of such issueturned ontheconstruction ofsection30*oftheTermination of Employment Law, 1967 (Law No. 24 of 1967 as amended by Law No. 6 of 1973). 15 Held, that inview of thewording of section 30the respondent having filed his recourse in the industrial Disputes Court, even though hewithdrewitand asa resultitwasdismissed,hecannot now claim damages by an action in the District Court. Appealallowed. 20 Appeal. Appeal by defendants against the ruling of the District Court of Limassol (Korfiotis, D.J.) dated the 25th February, 1981, * Section 30is quoted at pp. 768-69post. 766 1 C.L.R. Phassouri Plantations v. Georghiou (Action No. 579/80) whereby their application that a.point of law raised by them in.para; 3 of their statement of defence be disposed of preliminarily to the hearing of the action wasdismissed. 5 Appeal allowed. St. McBride, for the appellants. L. Georghiadou(Mrs.) with M; Constantinidou(Miss), for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. 10 L. Loizou J.: The unanimous judgment in this appeal will be delivered by Mr. Justice Demetriades. DEMETRIADES J.: This is an appeal against the ruling of a Judgeofthe District Court ofLimassol,bywhichan application made by the appellants that a point of law raised by them in 15 paragraph 3 of their Statement of Defence be disposed of preliminarily to the hearing of the action, filed by the respondentplaintiff, was dismissed. The point of law raised by the appellants is that the respondent, having elected to proceed by way of recourse to the In20 dustrial Disputes Court, had exhausted his remedies and that, after withdrawing that recourse -which,asa result, wasdismissed-theaction whichhefiled intheDistrict Court of Limassol, by which he claimed (a) damages for wrongful dismissal and (b)a sum of £100.-inlieu of notice of dismissal,wasno longer 25 maintainable. Thefacts ofthecaseastheyappearfrom therecordbeforeus, are the following: The respondent filed recourse No. 70/78 in the Industrial Disputes Court and on the 2nd March, 1979, before the commencement of the hearing, he applied for leave 30 to withdraw it. After counsel for the appellants consented to the withdrawal of the recourse, the Industrial Disputes Court granted leave to him to withdraw it and, as a result, the Court dismissed it as withdrawn. On the 21st February, 1980, the respondent in this appeal 35. filed Action No. 579/80 in the District Court of Limassol. Pleadings were exchanged and by their Statement of Defence the appellants, defendants in that action, raised the aforementioned preliminary point of law. After hearing arguments, the Court delivered its ruling and dismissed the application, 767 Demetriades J. Phassouri Plantations v. Georghiou
(1982)having found that as the claim of the respondent exceeded the amound of one year's emoluments which the Tribunal could award to him by virtue of the first Schedule to section 3 of the Termination of Employment Law, 1967 (Law 24/67), he was entitled to file an action in the District Court. 5 Counsel for the appellants, in arguing this appeal before us, conceded that the dismissal of the recourse of the respondent by the Industrial Disputes Court did not create a res judicata, as it was alleged in para. 3 of their defence. His argument before us, as well as in the District Court, was that in view of the pro- 10 visions of section 30 of Law 24/67, as amended by section 3 of the Termination of Employment (Amendment) Law, 1973 (Law 6/73), the respondent had forfeited his right to commence proceedings in the District Court. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent submitted that as the recourse filed in the 15 Industrial Disputes Court was withdrawn and there was no decision by that Court on its merits, the respondent could file an action in the District Court. Section 30, as amended by Law 6/73, reads as follows: "30.-(l) To Δικαστήριον Εργατικών Διαφορών κέκτηται 20 αποκλειστικήν αρμοδιότητα να άποφασίζη έπί άπασών των εργατικών διαφορών των αναφυομένων συνεπεία της εφαρ μογής τοϋ παρόντος Νόμου ή οιωνδήποτε Κανονισμών εκδο θέντων δυνάμει αύτοΰ ή αμφοτέρων, περιλαμβανομένου καί παντός παρεμπίπτοντος ή συμπληρωματικού προς τοιαύτας 25 διαφοράς Θέματος.
(2)Ουδέν των έν τω παρόντι άρθρω ερμηνεύεται ως έπηρεάζον το δικαίωμα έργοδοτουμένου όπως, άναφορικώς προς τερματισμόν απασχολήσεως, προσφυγή είς τό Έπαρχιακόν Δικαστήριον της 'Επαρχίας έν ή ό έργοδοτούμενος ήργοδο- 30 1 τεϊτο κατά τον χρόνον καθ όν άνέκυψεν ή διαφορά είς περί πτωσιν καθ* ην ή άξίωσις αϋτοϋείναι δι' αποζημιώσεις υπερ βαίνουσας τάς διά τοϋ παρόντος Νόμου δυνάμενος νά διεκδικηθώσι: Νοείται δτι ό έργοδοτούμενος 5έν δύναται νά προσφυγή είς τό Έπαρχιακόν Δικαστήριον έάν Ιχη υποβάλει αΐτησιν εΙς τό Δικαστήριον Εργατικών Διαφορών δυνάμει τοϋ παρό ντος Νόμου καί 6τι, έάν οΰτος προσφυγή είς τό Έπαρχιακόν 768 35 1 C.L.R. Phassotirl Plantations v. Georgbiou Demetriades J. Δικαστήριον, δέν δικαιούται νά ΰποβάλη αϊτησιν είς τό Δικαστήριον Εργατικών Διαφορών δυνάμει τοϋ παρόντος Νόμου. 5
(3)Τό Δικαστήριον Εργατικών Διαφορών κέκτηται έξουσίαν όπως, κατά τήν απόλυτον κρίσιν τοϋ Προέδρου αύτοΰ, έπιληφθη έκ νέου υποθέσεως τίνος, ή αναθεώρηση οίανδήποτε άπόφασιν έπί οίασδήποτε πληρωμής γενομένης Οπό τοϋ Ταμείου κατά πάντα χρόνον, έάν τούτο θεωρηθη ύττό τού Προέδρου ώς ορθόν καί δίκαιον". 10 (ι,30.-
(1)The Industrial Disputes Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate on all industrial disputes arising as a result of the operation of the present Law or any Regulations made thereunder or both, including any incidental or ancillary to those disputes matter. 15
(2)Nothing in this section contained shall be construed as affecting the right of an employee, in respect of a termina tion of employment, to have recourse to the District Court of the District in which the employee was employed at the time the dispute arose in case his claim is for damages exceeding those which may be claimed under the present Law: 20 25 30 Provided that the employee may not have recourse to the District Court if he has filed an application to the In dustrial Disputes Court under this Law and that, in case he has recourse to the District Court, he is not entitled to file an application to the Industrial Disputes Court under the present Law.
(3)The Industrial Disputes Court is empowered, at the absolute discretion of its President, to re-open a case or review any decision on any payment made by the Fund at any time,if thePresident considers thisjust and equitable)." From the wording of section 30, it is clear that the Industrial Disputes Court has exclusive jurisdiction to decide on all in dustrial disputes arising out of the operation of the law or any 35 regulations made thereunder or both of them. It is, also, clear from the wording of this section that an employee has the right, in relation to the terminationof hisemployment,lo file an action in the District Court of thedistrict where he was employed at the 769 Demetriades J. Phassouri Plantations v. Georghiou
(1982)time of the arising of the dispute,provided that his claim is for damages which exceed the amount of damages he can recover under the Termination of Employment Law, 1967. Section 30, by its proviso, in clear and unambiguous words deprives an employee of the right of action to the District 5 Court if hehasfiled an application before the Industrial Disputes Court and it further provides that if an employee files an action in the District Court, he is not entitled to apply tothe Industrial Disputes Court. The mere filing of an application before the Industrial Disputes Court bars any proceedings 10 before the District Court. There is no doubt in our mind that the legislator included this proviso to section 30 in order to have multiplicity of litigation avoided. Inviewofthewordingof section 30, wefind that therespondent, havingfiled his recoursein the Industrial Disputes Court, 15 even though he withdrew it and as a result it was dismissed, cannot now claim damages by an action in the District Court. However, in all probability, theclaim before the District Court could not be maintained under any circumstances because, apparently, it was improperly instituted, in that his claim for 20 damages did not exceed the damages which the Industrial Disputes Court could award to him. As it appears from the writ of summons the claim of the respondent does not exceed £1,000.-,whilst his annual earnings,as they appear in his Statement of Claim, exceeded that amount and, under the relevant 25 law, the Industrial Disputes Court could award to him as damages one year's emoluments. However, no final view need be expressed as the appeal clearly succeeds on other grounds. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The respondent to pay 30 the costs of the appellants. Appeal allowed with costs. 770