Law Reserved No. 187). Constitutional Law—Right tofreedom
speechand expression in any form—Article 19
the Constitution—Right safeguarded thereunder not limited by reference to the truth or falsity
a statement made in the exercise
such right—And it, therefore, extends tofalse as well as to true statements. Constitutional Law—Constitutionality
legislation—Section 50
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154, as amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment) Law, 1965 (Law 70/65) constitutional, in viewof Article 19
the Constitution, provided the expression "impairing public confidence in the State or its organs" is interpreted as referring to the organs
the State as institutions
Government. Criminal Procedure—Question
law arising during the trial—Appropriate stage
reservationfor opinion
Supreme Court—Section 148
the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155. The accused were charged before the District Court
Nicosia for contravention
the provisions
section 50
the * Section 50
the publicin the state or its organs or to cause fear or concern to the public or to disturb in any way public peace and order shall be guilty
an
fence and shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or with a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds or with both such imprisonment and tine: Provided that it shall be a good defence for the accused to prove to the satisfaction
the Court that the publication wasmade in good faith and on the basis
facts justifying such publication. For the purposes
this sub-section, the provisions
paragraphs (a) and (b)
section 201 in relation to good faith shall apply". 63 Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
the defence, made before arraignment, supported by the prosecution, the following questions
Law were reserved under section 148
the Criminal Procedure Law. Cap. 155, for the opinion
the Supreme Court: 5 "
s.50(l)
the Criminal Code, as amended by Law 70/65, are contrary to the provisions
the Constitution, and
speech and expression in every way, as entrenched by paras. 1 & 2
10
the Constitution, extends to the publication
false news and information". Held, (!) that the right safeguarded by Article 19
the Constitution is not limited by reference to the truth or falsity
a statement made in the exercise
such right; therefore, 15 it extends to false as well as to true statements.
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154, as amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment) Law, 1965 (Law 70/65), is constitutional, in view
the State as institutions
Government. Observations with regard to the appropriate stage at which questions
law should be reserved under section 148
the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155. 25 Order accordingly. Cases referred to: In re Charalambous
the European Court
Human Rights—Vol. 24, Publications
the European Courts
Human Rights, p. 22; Section 148
the proceedings, reserve a question
law arising during the trial
any person for the opinion
the Supreme Court. 64 30 2 C.L.R. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria Schenck v. U.S.
Architects andCivil Engineers v. Christodoulos Kyriakides
Nicosia & Others
the European Commission
Human Rights; X v. Federal Republic
Germany—Decisions and Reports
the Commission, Vol. 3, p. 159; X. and Church
Scientology v. Sweeden—Decisions and Reports
the Commission, Vol. 16 at p. 68; X. v. United Kingdom—Decisions and Reports
the Commission, Vol. 16, p. 101. 35 Question
Law Reserved. Question
Law Reserved on 21.9.1981 by the District Court
Nicosia (Fr.Nicolaides, D.J.)for the opinion
the; Supreme 65 Police τ. Ekdodiki Eteria (19S2) Court under section 148
the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, before the entering
a plea by the accused in Criminal Case No. 15071/81 instituted by the Police against the above respondents who were charged for publishing false information in contravention
section 50
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154. 5 A. Evangelou, Senior Counsel
the Republic, for the A ttorney-General. A. Markides, for the accused. Cur. adv. vult. 10 1982 March 29. The following judgments were read. TRIANTAFYLLIDES P.: Mr.Justice Pikiswillstate theunanimous opinion
the Court regarding the two questions
law which have been reserved by the District Court
Nicosia in the present case. 15 PIKIS J.: The right safeguarded by Article 19
the Constitution is not limited by reference to the truth or falsity
a statement made in the exercise
such right; therefore, it extends to false as well as to true statements. Section 50
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154, as amended 20 by the Criminal Code (Amsndment) Law, 1965 (Law 70/65), is constitutional, in view
the State as institutions
Government. 25 TRIANTAFYLLIDES P.: Mr. Justice Pikis will deliver the first judgment, giving his reasons for the opinion
the Court, and any one
the other Judges
the Court, including Mr. Justice Hadjianastassiou who is abroad on duty, may give in due course his own reasons for the unanimous opinion
the Court. 30 PIKIS J.: in Criminal Case No. 15071/81, raised before the Nicosia District Court, a number
charges were preferred against a publishing company and Zacharias Papanicolaou for contravention
the provisions
section 50
the Criminal Code whereby it is made a crime to publish under 35 certain circumstances false news and information. On the oral application *
the defence made before arraignment, supported by the prosecution, two legal questions were reserved 66 2 C.L.R. Police v. EkdoUki Eteria Pikis J. under s. 148
the Criminal ProcedureLaw,' for theopinion
the Supreme Court. Section 148
theSupremeCourt,atanystage
theproceedings,aquestion 5
law arising during the trial. Not every point emerging can be reserved. The verb "arising" signifies the points
law that may be reserved. Their determination must be crucial, either to the outcome
the case or disposal
an asoect
it that,foreshadows such outcome. 10 15 20 25 30 35 in conferring on the outcome
the appeal, doubts wer; expressed about the correctness
the procedure followed, particularly the stage at which the questions were raised, as well as the desirability
reserving questions
law before immediate need arises for the solution
a given legal question. Notwithstanding the question-marks surroun ding the propriety and timeliness
the reference
the sub-judice questions to the Supreme Court, we decided to proceed and deal with the matters raised in view
the absenceofanyobjection totheprocedurefollowed andargument on thesubject. However, we must notbe taken as sanctioning theprocedureadopted. Itispertinenttoremindof the observa tionsof Triantafyllides, P.,in Re Charalambous
the case. Any lesser standard may result in the Supreme Court delivering opinionson quasi theoreticalissues, somethingimper missible under our system
law. Although we shall proceed to dispose
the case, foi the reasons indicated, note must be made
the doubts entertained by some membeis
theCourt whether it is at all possible to reserve a question before pica. There is force in the argument that the issues arising in the case are, with few exceptions, denned after plea. Be that as it may we shall proceed to dispose
the issues raised for our opinion. Having expressed these reservations, we shall proceed to deal with the substance
matters in issue, assuming for the purpose
these proceedings, that the questions were properly raised. The questions reserved for theopinion
theSupremeCourt 40 are the following:(Α) Κατά πόσον τό "Αρθρο 50
s. 50
the Criminal Code, as amended by Law 70/65, are contrary to the provisions
the Constitution), 5 and (Β) Κατά πόσον τό δικαίωμα της ελευθερίας τοΰ λόγου και της καθ' οίονδήποτε τρόπον έκφρασης όπως κατοχυρώνεται άπό τά εδάφια 1 καΐ 2 τοΰ "Αρθρου 19 τοϋΣυντάγματος επεκτείνεται καΐ στή δημοσίευση ψευδών είδήσεωνκαι πληρο- 10 φοριών. (English translation: Whether the right to freedom
speech and expression in every way, as entrenched by paras. 1 & 2
the Constitution, extends to the publication
false news and information). 15 The first question concerns the constitutionality
s.50(l)
the Criminal Code, as amended by Law 70/65. The second mainly raises a question
interpretation
Logic and convenience dictate consi deration
the second question as a prelude to thedetermination 20
the first inasmuch as interpietation
THE CONSTITUTION DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TRUE AND FALSE NEWS AND INFORMATION! 25 To answer the question, we must first consult the wording
and ascertain whether the right
freedom
speech and expression is in any way qualified by the content
the expression, particularly its truth and accuracy. The 30 language
warrants no differentiation between a true and a false statement whereas the nature
the right is such as would render obnoxious to its enjoyment even limitations dependent on theneed for truth. Freedomof speech and expres sion is an aspect
freedom
man itself. It should never 35 be subjected to restrictions other than those absolutely necessary for social preservation and harmony. The question was resolved the same way in the U.S.A. and the celebrated dictum
68 2 C.L.R. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria Pikis J. Brandeis, J., "that unless it is free for error, it is not free for truth", serves to define the boundaries
the right (Whitney v. California
speech and expression as the pillar
5 liberty not to be diminished except for a most compelling cause such as State security. (See Attorney-General v. The B.B.C. [1980] 3 All E.R. 161 (H.L.) ). The safeguard
freedom
speech and expression is the hallmark
a humane and civilised society. A court
law pronouncing on the fundamental 10 freedoms
the subject, cannot but give full expression to the right, extending it to the limits wairanted by the Constitution. OPINION
THE SUPREME COURT ON THE SECOND QUESTION RESERVED: The right safeguarded by paragraphs 1 and 2
15
the Constitution is not limited by reference to the truth or falsity
a statement made in exercise
the right; theiefore, it extends to false as well as to true statements. False news or information may legitimately be taken into account in discerning whether need arises to legislate for th<; 20 limitation
the right in the interests
one or more causes for which restrictions may be introduced in accordance with Article 19.3. Truth may be toleiated even where it appears to be damaging to, for example, State security. No justification exists foi suffering falsity in similar circumstances. After 25 all, truth is the most lasting material for laying durable social and national foundations. Consequently, intolerance to false news or information, damaging to the causes foi which freedom
speech and expression may be limited, is not intrinsically derogatory to the exercise
the right. 30 CONSTITUTIONALITY
SECTION 50
THE CRIMINAL CODE, CAP. 154: The submission made on behalf
the accused is briefly that s. 50
the public in the State or its organs, and (b) publications causing fear or alarm to the public. 69 Pikis J. Police τ. Ekdodiki Eteria
some
theprovisions
a section
thelaw vitiates,inthesubmission
Mr.Markides,theconsti tutional validity
the section in its entirety. Consequently, we were invited to rule that s.50(l) should be struck down as unconstitutional. It was strenuously and ably argued by Mr. Markides that Article 19 confers no power for the limitations
freedom
expression for the sustainance
confidence
the public in the State simpliciter or any
its organs. Further, he argued that causing fear and alarm, irrespective
the repercussions 10
suchconducton.Statesecurity or public order,is nota cause for which freedom
speech andexpression may be legitimately restricted. Extensive reference was made to the provisions
the Indian v Constitution, notably Article 19, safeguarding freedom
15 speech andexpression, and Indiancase law on itsinterpretation and the validity
legislative provisions designed to limit the right, notably s.505(l) and 124-A
the Indian Penal Code. Less voluminous was the reference to U.S.A. and Greek case law on the subject
freedom
expression. Lastly, brief 20 reference was made to decisions
the European Commission and European Court
Human Rights on the interpretation andambitofArticle 10.2oftheEuropeanConventionon Human Rights, the wording
which is in many respects similar to Article 19
our Constitution. 25 For the Republic the case was again well aigued by Mr. Evangelou who, like Mr. Markides, took pains to enlighten us on foreign jurisprudence on the approach to limitations
freedom
expression where constitutionally entrenched. The essence
his submission isthats.50(l)shouldbebroadly viewed 30 as awhole,its aimsidentified andthenexamine itsconstitutional validity. Viewed from the prism
its purposes, s.50(l) aims to protect State security, constitutional and pubUcorder, legiti mate heads for the limitation
the right under Article 19.3. I examined the rival submissions with keen awareness
the 35 importanceof theissuesarising for considerationandthemission
the court as the guardian
human rights and fundamental liberties. 70 5 2 C.L.R. Police v. Ekdodfkl Etcrifl Pikis J. ARTICLE 19
THE CONSTITUTION: Article 19.1 proclaims the right to freedom
speech and expression in every form. This is the basic norm, establishing the paramountcy
the right signifying the commitment
5 the State to the fullness
the right. Limitations are the exception and authority for their introduction must be sought in the Constitution itself and from no other source. Article 19.2 is explanatory
.1, definitive
the breadth
the right. A right not to be interfered with bv any 10 public authority and one that should be enjoyed regardless
frontiers, the attribute
a universal right. Article 19.3defines thecausesintheinterestsofwhichfreedom
speech and expression may be limited and the prerequisites to legislative action. It provides:15 20 25 "The exercise
the rights provided in paragraphs 1and 2
this Article may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary only in the interests
the security cf the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the publichealth or the public morals or for the protection
the reputation or rights
others or for preventing the disclosure
information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
the judiciary". The causes inrespect
_which freedom
speech and expression may be limited can be grouped into three categories:Category1—State secmity, constitutional order and—public order—the integrity
the State. 30 35 Category2—Public health, pubhc morals, the protection
therightsofothersandpreservation
confidential information—Social Harmony. The concept
rights in the sense
It must be stressed that the law acknowledges no right to any citizen for the enjoyment
the confidence
others. A vague attempt was made to peg 71 Pikis J. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
.3, an effort that collapses on appreciation
the abovereality. Category3—The authority and impartiality
the judiciary— Justice. In India it was decided that the causes enumerated in Article 5 19
the Indian Constitution, for which freedom
speech may be limited, are exhaustive. (See Basu's Commentary
the Constitution
India, 5th ed., Vol. 1, p. 550). Any attempt, it was held, to legitimize limitations beyond the scope
the Constitution should be struck down as an infringement 10
the Constitution. I accept this as a sound proposition
theconstitutional law,that is,wherearight isdefined inabsolute terms and the permissible exceptions to it are enumerated in the Constitution the introduction
further exceptions constitutes a violation
the right safeguarded. The constitutional 15 premise is that for the effective exercise
the freedom guaranteed in Article 19no exceptions are justified other than those in Article 19.3. The decisions
the U.S.A. courts on the legitimacy
limitations to freedom
expression, are
limited assistance 20 because unlike Article 19
our Constitution, the limitations are not ingrained in the Constitution but are the product
case law evolved in the context
thejudicial doctrine acknowledging residual powers tothe State to legislate "police powers" as a concomitant
sovereignty. Also, decisions
the 25 European Commission and European Court
Human Rights, though instructive,
fer only indiiect assistance to the solution
the problem in hand for they concentrate primarily on the definition
the outer limits
State power to enact restrictions not inconsistent with the Convention, leaving a wide margin 30
appreciation to member States as to need to limit the right guaranteed by Article 10.2
the Convention. (See, inter alia, The Handysidecase
the European Court
Human Rights—Vol.24,Publications
theEuropean CourtsofHuman Rights, p. 22). 35 Inmyopinion, Article 19.3enumeratesexhaustively thecauses in respect
which freedom
speech and expression may be limited. Next, my task is to examine whether the limitations introduced by s.50(l) are peimissible under Article 19.3
the Constitution. 72 40 2 C.L.R. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria Pikis J. A useful test as to the necessary link between the impugned statute and the permissive clauses
the Constitution is that adopted in India. The relationship between the two must be rational or proximate. (See Basu's Commentary
the Consti5 tution
India, 5th ed., Vol. 1, p. 551). Rationality isa matter
logic; proximity a question
fact and degree within the fabric
the society in which the statute will be applied. This is a salutary approach, necessitating a direct link between the exceptior and the constitutional clause to which it is associated. 10 In myjudgment, the relation between the two must be manifest. The limitation must serveexclusively one or more
the purposes for which Article 19.3 permits lestrictions
freedom
speech and expression. Any lesser standard would weaken the constitutional guarantee
the right. 15 20 25 A study
s.50
the objects and identification
the purposes
the law. Section 50
the public in the state or its organs or to cause fear or concern to the public or to disturb in any way public peace and order shall be guilty
an
fence and shall be punishable with imprisonment for a teim not exceedingtwoyears or with afinenotexceedingfivehundred pounds or with both such imprisonment and fine: Provided that it shall be a good defence for the accused to prove to the satisfaction
the Court that the publication was made in good faith and on the basis
facts justifying such publication. 30 · For the purposes
this sub-section, the provisions
paragraphs (a) and (b)
section 201 in relation to good faith shall apply". A reading
the section as a whole reveals that uppermost in the mind
the legislatute was the protection
State security, 35 constitutional order and public order from the publication
false news and information. The primary purpose
the law is protection
social tranquillity and public order from pernicious falsehood. A more loosely defined purpose is the protection
State authority from the same evils. Prima facie 73 Pikis J. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
expression for legitimateconstitutional purposes;whethertheactual limitations are justifiable is a subject we shall discuss later. The next question I mustgrapple with iswhether need arosefor thelimitation
freedom
expression in the interests
public and 5 constitutional order and State security. THE PREREQUISITES FOR THE LIMITATION
THE RIGHT UNDERARTICLE 19.3: A seriesof decisions
the European Commission and Court
Human Rights establish that the initial appreciation
the 10 need for legislation rests with the competent State authorities, the House
Repiesentatives in Cyprus. (See the case
Handyside, supra, and Fawcett on the Application
the European Convention
HumanRights, p. 215, on the analysis
Case No. 753/60, 3 Yearbook, 318). But the final arbiter 15 to pronounce on the existence
the necessity are the courts
each State, the peimanent guardians
constitutional order. To ascertain whether it was necessary to introduce permissible limitationsregard mustbehadtothenationaland socialrealities at the time
the enactment and subsequent thereto. For 20 arguably limitative laws
fundamental rights are ipso facto
a temporary character. So, if the reasons that necessitated the enactment disappear, so must the law enacted in reaction thereto. Regrettably in 1965 and ever since, the State was threatened with internal and external subversion that threatened 25 the very existence
the State in 1974 with the staging
the treacherous coup d' etat and the catastrophic Turkish invasion that followed. Consequently, the legislature rightly discerned threats to the integrity
the State and sought to shield it from false news and information. It is unnecessary to debate the 30 severaltestssuggestedinthecourseofargumentfor the definition
"necessary" or discuss differences between the Cyprus and Indian Constitution as to the prerequisites for valid limitations
freedom
expression. The Constitution
India postulates a less stringent test for the introduction
limitations "in the 35 interests
", as compared to Cyprus. The notion
"necessary" does not import absolute necessity while it requires a lot more than mere desirability. "Necessary", in the context
.3, encompasses legislative action without which there is a serious though not inevitable risk that one or more 49
the causes defined therein will be imperilled. 74 2 C.L.R. Police *. Ekdodiki Eteria Pikis J In my judgment, it was perfectly legitimate for the House
Representatives, and Ϊ so hold, to legislate for the protection
State security, public and constitutional order threatened by subversion from many quarters. The winds
destruction 5 blowing around the island and within it, were too serious to be ignored. In the face
such dangers freedom
expression could be limited in accordance with Article 19.3. IMPAIRING CONFIDENCE
THE PUBLIC IN THE STATE AND ITS ORGANS: 10 Mr. Markides primarily directed his attack on the consti tutionality
s.50(I) to that part
the section that makes it an
Tence to impair (κλονίζει) confidence
the public in the State and its organs. The gist
his submission is that the State, its organs in particular, independently
the position 15 they hold in the State hierarchy, have no right to the confidence
the public. Any attempt to acknowledge such right would, in his contention, defeat the democratic principle that freedom
speech aims to uphold. Extending to political figures, functionaries
the State,a right to the confidence
the public, 20 it was submitted, would be antinomous to the basis precept,
democracy. 25 30 35 40 Lengthy reference was made to the definition
"government established by law" in the context
S.124A
the IndianPenal Code as a legitimate subject for the restriction
the right to freedom
speech and expression. Government, according to Indian decisions, is a proper subject for protection only if understood in an impersonal sense as the embodimtnt
State authority and constitutional order. The institution
govern ment is distinguished from the persons holding
fice from time to time, symbolizing the authority but not embodying it. (See Basu's Commentary
Indian Constitution, 5th ed., p. 658, and thedecision in Kedermath,cited therein). A clear distinction is madebetween theinstitution and its temporary representatives. A similar distinction was made in Greece,in interpreting "authority" in the context
s.181
the Greek Penal Code, whereby it was made an
fence to insult pubhc authorities. (See Criminal Chronicles 1
the State, in no way synonymous or identifiable with the holder
fice from time to time. So, insults directed against the holder
public
fice, 75 Pikis J. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
freedom
expression and democratic rule. In a democratic society the public has a salient interest in the preservation
State authority and the rule
law. Sustaining confidence in the institution
government, is essential for constitutional order. It is legitimate under Article 19.3 to 10 sustain confidence in the institutions
government. On the other hand, the maintainance
constitutional order is not dependent on the confidence
the public in the holders
Stateoffices. Any attempttoequatethem with theinstitution they represent would stifle criticism and diminish thedemocratic 15 principle. "Constitutional order" undei Article 19.3 refeis to the order established by the Constitution andlaws saved or enactedthere under. The legislature had a right, in the light
the threats to constitutional order earlier outlined, to restrict freedom
20 speech and expression for the sake
its preservation. Publicationstending to underminetheinstitutions
theState, as the vehicle
government, can be restricted whenever neces sary, as earlier expounded. The instruments
government, those representing or symbolizing State authority, such as 25 ministers, are in their peisonal capacity outside the concept
constitutional order. Freedom
speech and expression cannot be limited for the protection
their personal status or authority, either in the government or society at large. Before I finally pronounce whether impairment
public 30 confidence in the State or its organs, in s.50(l), is reconcilable with the provisions
.3, it is convenient to deal briefly with the second submission, that is, the constitutiona lity
the provision "causing fcai and alarm'/. The submission is that stirring fear and alarm per se, poses 35 no threat to State security or public order; therefore, it is incompatible with Article 19.3. Here, again, reference was madeto Indiancase law andanumber
decisions
the U.S.A. 76 2 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 Police v. Ekdotiki Eteria Pikis J. Federal Supreme Court on the theme
public order and the kind
threats from which it may justifiably be protected. In U.S.A. the prevalent trend
judicial opinion is that no limitations are permissible in the name
public order except in the face
a clear and present danger to public order. (See Basu's Commentary, supra, 5th ed., Vol. 1, p. 552). Such a danger arises only where immediate serious violence is either expected or advocated. But it need not actually occur and pre-emptive action isjustified for the preservation
public order. Constitutional guarantees
liberty and freedom would be neutralized without public order. The dictum
Holmes, J. that "the most stringent protection
free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic", coupled with his reminder as to the elemental need for order without which the guarantee
civil rights would be a mockery, serves to indicate that public order may be threatened from a wide range
activities, including panic created by a false alarm. (Schenck v. U.S.
public order has led to the prohibition
a multitude
activities inherently liable to disturb public order, such as the use, under certain circumstances,
sound amplifying instruments, the expulsion
hecklers from meetings and assemblies, as well as utterances tending to incite an immediate breach
the peace. (See Basu's supra, p. 625). In India, a less stringent test was adopted not requiring pioof
an imminent danger to public order before limitations are introduced. (See Basu's supra; p. 553). CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
STATUTES TO ASCERTAIN THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY: 30 Every law ispresumed to be constitutional unlessthe contrary is proved, beyond any reasonable doubt. (See The Board for Registration
Architects and CivilEngineers v.Christodoulos Kyriakides
the legislature over the field
legislation and weaken the constitutional principle
separation
powers essential for the vindication
the rule
law. The judges are not the overlords
legislative action. 40 They will not examine a statute minutely but broadly, starting 77 Pikis J. Police τ. Ekdodiki Eteria
Representatives are the arbiters
legislation. Only where they transgress irretrievably the constitutional limitations to their legislative power is the Court entitled to intervene. A safe assumption in examining the constitutionality
a law, is that the legislature intended 5 to legislate within the framework
the Constitution. In deciding upon the constitutionahty
a statute it is axiomatic that if susceptible to an interpretation reconcilable with the provisions
the Constitution, a beneficial construction must be adopted saving the enactment. A beneficial construction 10 maybe adoptedprovided thiscan be achieved without thwarting the languags
the Act. (See Kyriakides, supra; Neophytos Sofroniou& Others v. Tfie Municipality
Nicosia & Others
Statute in Constitu- 15 tional Law, 1970, pp. 26 and 27). Where the purposes
a section
the law, as they emerge on a consideration
its provisions in their totality, arecompa tible with constitutional dictates, the Court may justifiably interpret linguistically inadequate provisions as merely falling 20 short
giving effect to the objects
the legislature and save the Act. That a section
thelaw must be evaluated as a whole before pronouncing on its constitutionality as a whole, is clear from the decision
the Supreme Court in Papadopoulos v. The 25 Republic
S.5IA
the CriminalCode,whereby itismadeanoffence topublish material calculated or likely to encourage violence or promote feelings
ill will among citizens or sections
the community. The 30 Court upheld it as constitutional. The case
Papadopoulos supra, establishes two propositions relevant to our case: (a) Itbecomes "necessary" underArticle 19.3and,therefore,permis sible for the legislature to limit freedom
speech penalising publications directly antagonistic to one or more
the causes 35 enumerated in Aiticle 19.3 and (b) the cause in the name
which the prohibition is enacted need not be specified in the law so long as the association between the two is manifest. The State as a legal institution is synonymous with constitu tional order itself. The maintenanceof confidence in the State 40 78 2 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Police τ. Ekdotfki Eteria Pikis J. tantamounts to supporting the foundations
constitutional order. Consequently, the protection
this institution from publications undermining public confidence in the substratum
constitutional order, the State, is a proper subject for limitation
thefreedom guaranteed by Article 19.1. Thelimitation is directly referable to constitutional order. A more difficult question poses, respecting limitations about the organs
the State. In its literary connotation the wording
the law restricts the right for purposes outside the compass
Organs
the State in the sense
the holders
fice are not under Article 19.3 a legitimate cause for the limitation
the right safeguarded by Article 19.1. Enough was said earlier in the judgment to indicate why constitutional order has to do with the institutions
the State and not those who symbolize it. Can section 50
the rules
construction earlier referred to? Is it susceptible to an inter pretation compatible with the provisions
In my judgment the answer is in the affirmative for the following reasons. The organs envisaged by s.50(l) are portrayed in the alternative to the State, on indication that they should be understood in an institutional and not a personal sense. Further, the general objects
the law, one
thembeing consti tutional order, are an additional consideration for a purposive interpretation, in this area, to legislate for the protection
constitutional order. In my judgment, it is possible, without doing violence to the language
the law, to construe "organs
the State" as referring to the institutions
government as distinct from the persons holding
fice. Consequently, this part
the law cannot be rejected as unconstitutional. Likewise, although engendering a fear and alarm, is not in itself a legitimate subject for limitations underArticle 19.3;thecontext in which it is employed, clearly suggests that what is contemplated is conduct detrimental to State security and public order. And it should be thus construed. Read in this light, an interpretation that
fers itself in view
the wording
the law in its entirety, the law imports legitimate limitations to the right guaranteed by Article 19.1.2. Nothing that is said in this judgment should discourage the legislature from finding an early opportunity to streamline the wordmg
the law, in the interests
clarity and certainty, along the interpretation adopted m this judgment. 79 Pikis J. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
THE SUPREME COURT ON QUESTION I: Section 50
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154, as amended by Law 70/65, is constitutional in viewof theprovisions
para. 3ofArticle 19provided theexpression "impairingpublicconfidence in the State orits organs" isinterpreted asreferringto the organs 5
the State as institutions
Government. LORIS J.: I have had the advantage
reading in advance thejudgment delivered by Mr. Justice Pikisin whichthere appear his reasons for the opinion
the Court. I agree with this judgment and have nothing useful to add. 10 April 8, 1982. TRIANTAFYLLIDES P.: On March 29, 1982, the unanimous opinion
the Supreme Court regarding two questions
law which were reserved, under section 148
the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155, by the District Court
Nicosia, was stated to be as follows:- 15 'The right safeguarded by Article 19
the Constitution is not limited by reference to the truth or falsity
a statement made in the exeicise
such right; therefore, it extends to false as well as to true statements. Section 50
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154,as amended 20 by the Criminal Code (Amendment) Law, 1965 (Law 70/65), is constitutional, in view
Aitide 19
the State as institutions
Government". 25 On the same day Mr. Justice Pikis delivered ajudgment giving his own reasons for the opinion
the Supreme Court and it was then stated, also, that "anyone
the other Judges
the Court, including Mr. Justice Hadjianastassiou who is abroad on duty, may give, in due course, his own i'easons for the una- 30 nimous opinion
the Court". So, I shall now proceed to do this: I have had, indeed, the privilege
studying the very erudite judgment
my brother Judge Mr. Justice Pikis and I am giving separately my own reasons, not because I minimize in any way 35 hisvaluable contribution towards the formulation
the opinion 80 2 C.L.R. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria Triantafyllides P.
the Supreme Court on the two questions
law which were reserved, but because, in some respects, my approach to the matter is not exactly the same as his. I would like to begin by stating that 1was strongly inclined 5 to find, in view
the very premature, in my opinion, stage at which the two questions
law concerned were reserved for the opinion
the Supreme Court, that the said questions
law are not "questions
law" in the sense
section 148
Cap. 155and that, therefore, this Court, in the present procee10 dings, could not express its opinion thereon. In Re Charalambous,
section 148
considering the fate
this application, wefelt that wehad to examinethe meaning
theexpression 'a question
la\ arising during the trial' as used in subsection
section 148. As this point was not argued, initially, by either side, we invited counsel to address us in relation thereto and we are, indeed, grateful to them for the assistance they have given us. We have come to the conclusion that subsection
section 148doesnot enable eithei side to a criminal proceeding to raise before the trial Court a question
law at a stage
its own choosing and to apply that such question should be reserved at such stage for our opinion; in our view 'a question
law arising during the trial' means only a question
law arising during the trial at a stage at which it has to be decided in order to enable the trial to proceed further in accordance with the law and rules
practice relating to criminal procedure; and within the ambit
such expression it is not included a question
law which was prematurely raised at a stage
the trial at which it does not have to be decided for the purposes
the trial at that paiticular stage; because, in our opirion, section 148 does not provide a procedural machinery by means
which a party to"a criminal case can seek a ruling on a point
law, from the Supreme Court, in anticipation
the stage
the trial at which the state
the law in relation to such point may or will become actually material and
immediate importance for the further progress
the case; what is envisaged 81 Triantafyllides P. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
law is,so to speak, obtruding itself upon thetrial Court and demanding an answer straightway'*. The Charalambous case, supra, was referred to by this Court with approval in The Republic v. Sampson,
section 148
Cap. 155: "The use
the word 'may' in this context signifies the 10 existence
a discretion in such instance . Such discretion, however, should be exercised judicially andthoughasitwaspointedoutinthecaseofCharalambous (supra) an application should not be refused merely for the sake
avoiding an interruption
the trial,yet, undue 15 interruptions are not conducive to the good administration
criminaljustice. Furthermore, the notion
shortening proceedings by securing in advance a statement
the law by the Court that has thefinalword in the matter, cannot solely be the reason foi exercising a Court's discretion in 20 favour
reserving a question
law. It is a discretion to be exercised, when an application at the instance
the defence ismade onlyfoi the sake
doingjustice in acase and particularly for the sake
saving an accused person from embarrassment in theconduct
hisdefence and from 25 the likelihood
the detrimental consequences which a iuling given against an accused may bring. If anything, it would only be proper that such a question should be reserved after the ruling
a trial Court is given, so that itsreasoning, if persuasiveenough, mayrender unnecessary 30 an application for suchareservation orrevealtheir thinking in case they eventually refuse to reserve. It is in the province
trial Courts to determine points
law, whether novel or not, together with thedetermination
the factual issues that arise in the course
a criminal trial and if 35 reservationsoflawaremadefor theopinion
theSupreme Court without the trial Court's pronouncement on the issues raised, the impression may be formed that for legal points trial Courts should seek in advance, the assistance
this Court. This is not the purpose
section 148 40 82 2 CUR. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria Triaotafyttides P.
the Criminal Procedure Law, the appellate jurisdiction
the Supreme Court being primarily to review the rulings and judgments for which complaint is made by way
appeal or other procedural means". 5 10 15 .20 25 30 35 Also, in the same case, I had the opportunity to state the following (at p. 18): "I should point out that it is highly desirable that in all cases in which a trial Couit is faced with the possibility
having to resort to the procedure under subsection
section 148, in circumstances in which subsection 3(b)
section 148 would be eventually applicable, the trial Court should express its own opinion on, the particular question
law raised before it, prior to deciding whether or not to actually exercise its discretionary powers under subsection
section 148; because, once the parties to the case know the decision
the trial Court on the question
law raised, they will be enabled to reconsider their position in the light
the reasoning contained in such decision; and, also, the trial Court will be assisted, inexercisingitssaiddiscretionary powers,byanycomments that may be made, by the parties, in relation to such reasoning. I would not go, however, so far as to say that reserving a question
law under subsection
section 148, without first having expressed its own opinion thereon, is a course which is never open to a trial Court, because, indeed, there do exist precedents when such a course was followed (see, for example, Queen v. Erodotou, 19 C.L.R. 144, and The Republicv. Liassis,
trials (see,inter alia, TheRepublic v. Kalli (No. 1),1961 CL.R. 266 and In re Charalambous and another,
the Assize Court was exercised in a manner which was reasonably open to it in the circumstances
this very serious case". The reason for which I have not, in the end, insisted that in 83 Triantafyllides P. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
law concerned were reserved at a premature stage excluded them from the jurisdiction under section 148
law it is necessary to decide what is the proper construction and appli cation
section 50
the Criminal Code, Cap. 154, as amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment) Law, 1965 (Law 70/65), as well as
paragraphs I, 2 and 3
the Constitution. t 5 10 Section 50
the public in the state or its organs or to cause fear or concern to the public or to disturb in any way public peace and order shall be guilty 35
an
fence and shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or with a fine not excee ding five hundred pounds or with both such imprisonment and fine: 84 30 2 C.L.R. Police >. Ekdodiki Eteria Triantafyllides Ρ Provided that it shall be a good defence for the accused to prove to the satisfaction
the Court that the publication was made in good faith and on the basis
facts justifying such publication. 5 For the purposes
this sub-section, the provisions
paragraphs (a) and (b)
section 201 in relation to good faith shall apply".) Paragraphs (I),
"Εκαστος έχει τό δικαίωμα ελευθερίας τοϋ λόγου καΐ της καθ* οίονδήποτε τρόπον εκφράσεως.
speech and expression in any form. 2. This right includes freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart information and ideas without interference by any public authority and regardless
frontiers. 3. The exercise
the lights provided in paragraphs 1and 2
this Article may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary only in the interests
the security
the Republic or the constitutional order or the public 15 20 25 30 35 85 Triantafyllides P. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
the reputation or rights
others or for preventing the disclosure
information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
the judiciary".) 5 Paragraphs
our Constitution correspond to paragraphs (I) and
the European Convention on Human Rights,
1950, which read as follows:"1. Everyone has the right to freedom
expression. This 10 right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing
broadcasting, television or cinema entei- 15 prises. 2. The exercise
these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, 20 in the interests
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
disorder or crime, for the protection
health or morals, for the protection
the reputation or rights
others, for preventing the disclosure
information received in confidence, 25 or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
the judiciary". The aforesaid Convention, due to its ratification by the European Convention on Human Rights (Ratification) Law, 1962 (Law 39/62), and in view
the Constitution, 30 forms part
the law
Cyprus
superior force to other ordinary legislation in Cyprus, such as section 50
Cap. 154 (see, in this respect, inter alia, Christou v. Christou, 1964 CL.R. 336, 346, Kokkinos v. The Police,
course, in the present instance, it has not been argued that section 50
Cap. 154 should be found to be invalid as being in conflict with the provisions
the European Convention on Human Rights and, therefore, we do not have to deal with this issue, but, nevertheless, the way in which Article 10
the Convention has been applied and ]5 construed is, indeed, very helpful for determining how our own corresponding Article 19 should be construed and applied. 10 In its judgment in the Handyside case (which was given on December 7, 1976) the European Couit
Human Rights stated the following (in paragraphs 48 and 49): 20 25 30 35 "48. TheCourtpointsoutthatthemachineryof protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights (judgment
23 July 1968 on the merits
the 'Belgian Linguistic' case, Series A no. 6, p. 35, § 10 in fine). The Convention leaves to each ContractingState,in the first place,the task
securing the rights and freedoms it enshrines. The institutions created by it make their own contribution to this task but they become involved only through contentious proceedings and onceall domestic remedies have been exhausted (Article 26). These observations apply, notably, to Article 10 § 2 . In particular, it is not possible to find in the domestic law
the various Contracting States a uniform European conception
morals. The view taken by their respective laws
the requirements
morals varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far reaching evolution
opinions on the subject. By reason
their direct and 87 Triantafyllides P. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content
these requirements as well as on 'necessity'
a 'restriction' or 'penalty' intended to meet them. The 5 Court notes at thisjuncture that, whilst the adjective 'necessary',within themeaning
§2,isnot synonymous with 'indispensable' (cf, in Article 2§2 and6§ 1, the words 'absolutely necessary' and 'strictly necessary' and, in Article 15§ 1 , the phrase 'to the extent strictly required by the 10 exigencies
the situation"), neither has it the flexibility
such expressions as 'admissible', 'ordinary', (cf. Article 4 §3), 'useful' (cf. the French text
the first paragraph
Protocol No. 1), 'reasonable' (cf. Articles 5 §3 and 6 § 1) or 'desirable'. Nevertheless, it is for the 15 national authorities to make the initial assessment
the reality
the pressing social need implied by the notion
'necessity' in this context. Consequently. Article 10 §2 leaves to the Contracting States a margin
appreciation. This margin is given 20 both to the domestic legislator ('prescribed by law') and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and apply the law in force. 49. Nevertheless, Article 10§2doesnot give the Contracting States an unlimited power
appreciation. The 25 Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the obseivance
those States' engagements (Article 19), isempowered to givethe final ruling on whether a 'restriction' or 'penalty' is reconcilable with freedom
expression as protected byArticle 10. The domestic margin 30
appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision. Such supervision concerns both the aim
the mcasuie challenged and its 'necessity'; it covers not only the basic legislation but also the decision applying it, even one given by an independent court. In this respect, 35 the Court refers to Article 50
the Convention ('decision or measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority*) as well as to its own case-law (Engel and others judgment
8June 1976, Series A no. 22, pp.41-42, §100). 88 2 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria Triantafyllides P. The Court's supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost attention to the principles characterising a 'democratic society'. Freedom
expression constitutes one
the essential foundations
such a society, one
the basic conditions for its progress and for the development
every man. Subject to paragraph 2
, it is applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter
indifference, but also to those that
fend, shock or disturb the State or any sector
the population. Such are the demands
that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society'. This means, amongst other things, that every 'formality', 'condition', 'restriction' or 'penalty' imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. From another standpoint, whoever exercises his freedom cf expression undertakes 'duties and responsibilities' the scope
which depends on his situation and the technical means he uses. The Court cannot overlook such a person's 'duties' and 'responsibilities' when it enquires, as in this case, whether 'restrictions' or 'penalties' were conducive to the 'protection
morals' which made them 'necessary' in a 'democratic society*." It is useful to refer, too, to the following decisions
the European Commission
Human Rights: In Application No. 6988/75,X\. FederalRepublic
Germany (See Decisions and Reports
the Commission, Vol. 3, p. 159), the relevant facts were found to be as follows (at p. 160): * "Applicant convicted
defamation by the county court
L. and sentenced to a fine
300DM. He had in fact strongly criticised the Mayor
X. in a press article headed 'Tyranny and Democracy'. In particular, he had accused him
fraud and
handling stolen goods". 89 Triantafyllides P. Police τ. Ekdodiki Eteria
September 29, 1975) stated the following (at p. 161): "The applicant finally complains
restrictions imposed on the exercise
his right to freedom
expression as envisaged in Article 10of the Convention. This provision 5 secures to everyone the right to freedom
expression. In the present case the Commission is
the opinion that there has been an interference with the applicant's freedom
expression, in the meaning
It considers however that in the circumstances
the case 10 such an interference was fully justified under the terms
paragraph 2of article 10as being 'a measure necessary_~ for the protection
the reputation
others'. An examination
this complaint by the Commission leads therefore to the conclusion that Article 10 has not 15 been violated. This part
the application must conse quently be declared inadmissible as being also manifestly ill-founded in themeaning
the Conven tion". In Application No.7805/77, X. andChurchof Scientologyv. 20 Sweden (seeDecisions andReports, Vol. 16,p.68),the relevant facts were found to be-as follows (at p. 69): "The application was introduced by the 'ChurchofSciento logy' in Sweden andby X., oneof the ministers. In 1973, the applicant church placed an advertisement in its periodical which is circulated amongst its members which read as follows: 25 'Scientology technology
today demands that you have your own Ε-meter. TheΕ-meter (Hebbard Electro meter) is anelectronic instrument for measuring themental 30 state
an individual and changes
the state. There exists no way to clear without an Ε-meter. Price: 850 CR. For international members 20% discount: 780CR.' 90 2 C.L.R. 5 10 15 Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria Triantafyllides P. The applicants define the Ε-meter as follows *A religious aitifact used to measure the state
electrical characteristics
the 'static field* surrounding the body and believed to reflect or indicate whether or not the confessing person has been relieved
the spiritual impediment
his sins'. Having received various complaints, the Consumer Ombudsman (Konsumentombudsmannen), basing himself on the 1970 Marketing Improper Practices Act (Lagen om otillborlig marknadsfbring) introduced an action before the Market Court (Marknadsomstolen) requesting an injunction against the applicants prohibiting the use
certain passages in the advertisement for the E-meter. After having heard expert witnesses, the Court granted the injunction. A petition for the re-opening
the case (Resning) was rejected by the Supreme Court." The Commission in its decision (
May 5, 1979) stated the following (at p.p. 72-74): 20 "
expression. This right includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by a public authority. 30 In the Commission's view the applicants are not prevented from holding their opinion on the religious character
the Ε-meter. However, they were imparting ideas about that opinion and the Market Court prohibited them from continuing to use a certain wording. This was an inter ference with the applicants' freedom to impart ideas under Article 10
these freedoms as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, inter alia, for the protection
health or morals and for the protection
the reputation or rights
others. 25 91 Triantafyllides P. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
Human Rights, 7 December 5 1977, paras. 42-59). It observes first, therefore, that the basis in law for the injunction issued by the Market Court was the Marketing (Improper Practices) Act 1970. Consequently, the Commission finds that the restriction imposed on the applicants' freedom to impart ideas was 10 prescribed by law within the meaning
the Convention. The Marketing Act aimed at protecting the rights
consumers. This aim is a legitimate aim under Article 10
the rights
others in 15 a democratic society. The remaining question to be examined concerns the 'necessity'
the measure challenged by the applicants. It emerges from the case law
the Convention organs that the 'necessity" test cannot be applied in absolute terms, 20 but required the assessment
various factors. Such factors include the nature
the right involved, the degree
interference, i.e. whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, the nature
the public interest and the degree to which itrequires protection in the circum- 25 stances
the case.' In considering this question the Commission again attaches significance to the fact that the 'ideas' were expressed in the context
a commercial advertisement. Although the Commission is not
the opinion that com- 30 mercial 'speech' as such is outside the protection conferred by Article 10
protection must be less than that accorded to the expression
'political' ideas, in the broadest sense, with which the values underpinning the concept
freedom
expression in the 35 Convention are chiefly concerned (see Handyside Case, supra cit, para. 49). 92 2 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria Triantafyllides P. Moreover, the Commission has had regard to the fact thatmostEuropeancountriesthathaveratified the Conven tion have legislation which restricts the free flow
com mercial 'ideas' in the interests
protecting consumers from misleading or deceptive practices. Taking both these observations into account the Commission considers thatthetestof 'necessity' inthesecondparagraph
Aitide 10 should therefore be a less strict one when applied to restraints imposed on commercial 'ideas'. The Commission notes that the applicants' periodical in which the advertisement appeared was circulated in 300copiestomembersoftheChurch. However theMarket Court concluded that the advertisements were designed tostimulate theinterestsbothof peisonsoutsidethe Church as well as its own members in acquiring an Ε-meter and were thus designed to promote its sales. In arriving at this conclusion the Court had regard to the following factors: 1. that the magazine although distributed only to members might be spread by members to other persons who could be enticed to purchase an E-meter; 2. that the advertisement does not appear to limit sale
an E-meter to members only or priests only or those studying for the priesthood; 25 30 3. in the advertisements readers are encouraged to seek 'international membership' which has the advantage
entitling such members to lower prices for books, tape recordings and Ε-meters. Such statements were not limited either to priests or those studying for the priesthood. Finally theMarket Courtdeemedthattheadvertisements were misleading and that it was important to safeguard theinterest
consumersin matters
marketing activities by religious communities and especially in the present 93 TriantafyOMes P. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
the Market Court. The Commission further notes that the Market Court did not prohibit the applicants from advertising the E-meter and did not issue the injunction undei penalty
a fine. The Court chose what would appear to be the least restri- 10 ctive measure open to it,namely the prohibition
a certain wording in the advertisements. Consequently, the Commission cannot find thattheinjunction against the applicants was disproportionate to the aim
consumer protection puisued. 15 Having regard to the above, the Commission therefore accepts that the injunction granted by the Market Court was necessary in a democratic society for the protection
the rights
others, i.e. consumers". In Application No. 8010/77, X. v. UnitedKingdom (see Deci- 20 sions and Reports, Vol. 16, p. 101), the relevant facts were found to be as follows (at pp. 101-102): "From 1971 to 1975 the applicant was a teacher in a public secondary school, in charge
English and mathematics. He received warnings from the headmaster for having 25 given religious education during class hours, having held 'evangelical clubs' on the school premises and for having worn stickers carrying religious and anti-abortion slogans on his clothes or brief case. After numerous interviews and exchanges
notes with 30 the headmaster in the course
which the applicant, setting out his strong beliefs, declared himself unwilling to change his behaviour, his dismissal was decided by the competent County authority. The applicant's appeals to the Employment tribunals were unsuccessful". 35 94 2 C.L.R. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria Triantafyllides P. The Commission in its decision (
March 1, 1979) stated the following (at p.p. 102-103): 5 10 15 20 25 30 "Nevertheless the Commission notes that an important factor in the dispute between the applicant and the headmaster concerned the latter's instruction to the applicant not to advertise by posters or stickers on school premises his political, moral or religious beliefs. The Commission considers that this instruction constitutesan interference withtheapplicant'sfreedom
expression. However the Commission is
the opinion that school teachers in non-denominational schools should have regard to the rights
parents so as to respect their religious and philosophical convictions in the education
their,children. This requirement assumes particular importance in a non-denominational school where the governing legislation provides that parents can seek to have their children excused from attendance at religious instruction and further that any religious instruction given shall not include 'any catechism or formulary which is distinctive
any particular religious denomination' (see Education Act 1944, Sections 25 and 26). In the present case the posters and 'stickers' objected to, reflected the applicant's strong Evangelical beliefs and his opposition to abortion. The Commission notes from the observations
the respondent Government that some
the 'stickers'worn on theapplicant's lapel and on his briefcase were considered
fensive to female members
staff and disturbing to children. Having regard to the particular circumstances
the case, the Commission considers that the interference with the applicant's freedom
expression isjustified as being necessary in a democratic society for the protection
the rights
others within the meaning
, paragraph 2,
the Convention". Inthe light
all the foicgoing, and on the basis
a correct 35 approach to the nature
the right safeguarded by means
paragraphs
our Constitution— 95 Triantafyllides P. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
the European Convention on Human Rights—I have no difficulty in sharing theopinion
the Supreme Court that theright safeguarded by Article 19
possible unconstitutionality
section 50
Cap. 154,because itrenderscriminal, incertain circumstances. specified categories
false statements and if false statements are notprotected byArticle 19then a provision such asthesaid section 50
the Supreme Court that section 50
the State as institutions
Government, I think that the constitutionality 15
the said section 50
to "the security
the Republic", "theconstitutional order" "thepublic safety" and the "public order", but, also, because
the reference therein to "the public morals" and to "the piotection
the 20 reputation or rights
others"; 1have formed this view in the light, inter alia,
the judgment
the European Court
Human Rights intheHandysidecase, supra, andofthe decisions
the European Commission
Human Righis in the cases
X. FederalRepublic
Germany,X. andChurchof Scientology 25 v. Sweden and X. v. United Kingdom, supra. April 9, 1982. HADJIANASTASSIOU J.: 1 have hadthe advantage
reading thedraft judgment
Mr. Justice Pikis. AsIrespectfully agree with the reasons given by him,1 would only add that our legislature should find the opportunity to streamline the 30 wording
our lawinaccordance withtheinterpretation adopted in this judgment. April 26, 1982. A. Loizou J.: I have had the advantage
reading the elaborate judgments
Pikis, J., and Triantafyllides, P., containing their reasons in support
the unanimous 35 opinion
the Supreme Court given on March 29th, 1982, 96 2 C.L.R. Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria A. Loizou J. regarding the two questions
law which were reserved by the District Court
Nicosia and I find that the matter has been so adequately dealt with by my two brothers that there is nothing I.can usefully add, except for some observations that 5 I regard essential. Thefirstis that in view
the close similarity between paras. 1, 2 and 3of Article 19
our Constitution and paras. 1and 2
f the European Convention on Human Rights
1950, which is applicable in Cyprus since its ratification by 10 the European Convention on Human Rights (Ratification) Law, 1962(Law No. 39of 1962),it isalways advisable in interpreting theprovisionsofArticle 19to haveregard to thecaselaw
the appropriate bodies entrusted with its international application, namely the European Commission and the European 15 Court,
Human Rights, in order to achieve, wherever there isroom, the desired uniformity
the law among the European States bound by the said Treaty. Secondly, the expression referring to the organs
the State in section 50
the Code coveringtheinstitutions
Government, asfound bythis Court, 20 may be applicable in an appropriate case whenever an attack ismadeon theperson
aholder
office tending to undermine or impair, there through, the institution he represents. This must be more so in the case
the Head
State and top functionaries, asit maybedifficult or impossible to differentiate 25 between the organ as an institution
Government and the person holding that
fice. Moreover, the permissible restrictions to be found in para. 3
, may also cover cases which come within the ambit
theprotection
the reputation or the rightsof others. 30 Ending I wish to reiterate that questions
law must be reserved with the utmost care and caution and if absolutely necessary for the determination
material poinis and at the appropriate stage
a trial. April 26, 1982. STYLIANIDES J.: 1have had the advantage 35
reading in advance the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Pikis in which there appear his reasons for the opinion
the Court. I agree with this judgment and have nothing useful to add. 97 Police v. Ekdodiki Eteria
Pikis, J., in support
the unanimous decision
this Court. I am also in agreement with the observations made by A. Loizou, J., in his judgment and I have nothing else to add. 5 March 29, 1982. TRIANTAFYLLIDES P.: The case is now remitted to the District Court for further proceedings in the light
the opinion
the Court. Order accordingly. 98
AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.