(1982)1982 September 7 [Lows, J.] IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 146OF THE CONSTITUTION IOANNIS CHRISTOPHI IOANNOU, Applicant, v. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, THROUGH THE DISTRICT OFFICER NICOSIA, Respondents. (CaseNo. 409/81). AdministrativeLaw—Administrative acts or decisions—Confirmatory act—Isnotofanexecutorynature andcannot bemade thesubject ofarecourse—When administration confirms aprevious executory act after a new inquirytheresulting newact is itselfexecutory too, and thertforejusticiable—A new inquirytakes place when 5 the administration takes intoconsideration new substantive legal or real material—Nonew material taken into consideration by administration in reachingsub judice decision—Therefore nonewinquiry has takenplace—And decision reacheda confirmatoryoneofprevious executory decision—Which cannot bemade \Q the subject of arecourse. Constitutional Law—Equality—Discrimination—Article 28 of the Constitution—Fact that administration did not apply the law onanother occasion doesnotcreate a rightof annulment because of its application in this case. 15 Administrative Law—Administrativeacts or decisions—Legality— Governed by the legislation inforce at the time whentheyare made. Abuse or excess of powers—Burden of establishing—Rests upon the person propounding same. 20 Vestedrights—Grant of Buildingpermit to applicant which was valid 1002 3 C.L.R. Ioannou v.Republic for oneyear—Rights that vest in him not rights ad infinitum but for one year. 5 10 15 20 25 On October 9, 1974 the applicant obtained a building permit from the District Officer Nicosia with a view to erecting a pigsty. The permit covered the proposed building of 14 sties plus a store and like all permits it was, by virtue of section 5 of the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96, valid for one year from the date of the issue thereof, unless renewed consonant to the provisions of the proviso* to the same section. The applicant, owing to financial difficulties, was unable to construct all the plies during the period of the validity of his said permit; instead he managed to build in time only 9 out of the 14 enclosures and started operating his pigsty at some time in 1975,using only those sties he had been able to complete. On 15.11.1979 he submitted a written application to the District Officer Nicosia seeking a renewal of his said permit in order to be enabled to construct the remaining enclosures. The District Officei Nicosia by a later dated 24.1.1980 (attached to the opposition and maikid appendix "B") lefused theieby the !enewal of the said permit on the ground that the aforesaid pigsty of the applicant was situated within the zone for which a piohibition foi the constiuction of any stiuctutes to be used as pigsties was already in existence, the relevant notification having been promulgated in Supplement No. 3 of the Official Garette No. 1515 of 27.4.1979. No lecourse was filed against the decision of the Distiict Officer dated 24.1.1980. 30 On20.7.1981 Counsel actingon behalf oftht applicant addiessed to the District Officer a letter by virtue of which the District Officer wa^ substantially asked to reconsider his decision of 24.1.1980. The District Officer turned down the application by letter dated 7.10.1981 and hence this recourse. The proviso to section 5of the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96 reads as follows: "Provided that, if the work or other matter is not completed within that period, the permit shall be renewable at any subsequent time if not conflicting with any Regulations inforce at thetimeofsuch renewal upon payment of the fee prescribed for the original permit or of two pounds whichever is the less. The permit so renewed shall be valid for one year from the date of renewal". 1003 Ioannoo v. Republic
(1982)Counsel for the applicant mainly contended: (
- a)That the sub judice decision affects vested rights of the applicant. (
- b)That the respondents discriminated against applicant because they granted a covering peimit to a company 5 in respect of a far greater number of sties. (
- c)Thattherespondents actedinabuse orexcessof powers and thtir decision was taken under misconception of facts and was contrary to law. The lespondents in thtir opposition laised the preliminary objection that the act oi decision challenged was meiely infonnatory and or confirmatory of a previous act or de cision and as such is not justiciable. 10 Held, (/) on the preliminary objection: That a confirmatory decision of the administiation is not 15 of an executory natuie and therefore it cannot be made the subject-matter of a recourse; that when the administration confirms a previous executoiy act after a new inquiry then the resulting new act or decision is itself executory too,and therefore justiciable; that when does a new inquir) exist, is a question 20 of fact; that in genoal, it is consideied to be a new inquiry the taking into consideration of new substantive legal or real material; that since no new substantive legal oi leal material was placed by applicant by his Iettei of 20.7.1981 befoie the respondents for consideration no new inquiry has been carried 25 out; accoidingly the decision of 7.10.1981 is confirmatory of the previous executory decision of 24.1.1980 and as such it cannot fat made the subject of a recourse. Held, (ΙΓ), on the merits of the recourseassumingthat the subjudice decision is an executory one:
(1)The applicant obtained a building permit on 9.10.1974, which according to section 5 of the Stieets and Buildings Regu lation Law, Cap. 96 was valid foi ont year; consequently the rights that vested in the applicant by viitue of the said permit, weie not lights vested in him ad infinitum but simply for one 35 yeai during which all the buildings enumeiated in the permit ought to have beencompleted;accoidingly contention(al should fail. 1004 30 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 Ioanoou v. Republic
(2)That the fact "that the administtation did not apply the Law on another occasion, no annulment is created due to its application in this case; that, moreovei, the unlawful act of the administration in the past towaids othei peisons does not create obligation to the administiation to repeat likewise the contravention; and that, therefore, the sub judice decision does not infringe the notions oi" equality, envisaged by Article 28 of the Constitution and does not constitute discrimination; accordingly contention (b) should fail.
(3)That it h a caidinal principle of Administrative Law that the legality of administrative acts is govemtd by the legislation in foict at the time when they are made; that the burden of establishing abuse oi exeess of powtis rests upon the person propounding same; that in refusing renewal of the permit on 24.1.1980 the lespondent was neither acting contraiy to law or under a misconception of facts, nor was he acting in abuse or excess of his poweis; accoidingly contention (c) should fail. Held, fuither, that the rtFpondent would have beui peifectly justified in refusing renewal of the peimit even if the change 'n the lelevant legislation was effected after the submission of the application foi lenewal (15.11.1979) but prioi to his decision on 24.1.1980 (see Lordou and Others v. Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 427). Application dismissed. Cases referred to: Kolokassidts v. The Republic
(1965)3 C.L.R. 549 and on appeal
(1965)3 C.L.R. 542; Ktenas and Another (No. Π v. The Republic
(1966)3 C.L.R. 64, and on appeal
(1966)3 C.L.R. 820; 30 Papaleontiou v. The Republic
(1966)3 C.L.R. 557; Varnava v. The Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 566 at p. 575; loannou v. The Grain Commission
(1968)3 C.L.R. 612; Megalemou v. The Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 581; Kelpis v. The Republic
(1970)3 C.L.R. 196; 35 HjiKyriacos & Sons Ltd. v. The Republic (19711 3 C.L.R. 286; Police Association and Others v. The Republic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 1; Liassidou v. 77ie Municipality of Famagusta
(1972)3 C.L.R. 278; 1005 Ioaonou v. Republic
(1982)SalamisHoldings Ltd. v. The Municipality of Famagusta
(1974)3 C.L.R. 344; LordosApartotels Ltd. v. The Republic
(1974)3 C.L.R. 471; loannouv. The Commander of Police
(1974)3 C.L.R. 504; Limassol Chemical Products Company Ltd. \. The Repvblic 5
(1978)3 C.L.R. 52; Dr. G.N. Marangos Ltd. v. The Municipality of Famagusta
(1979)3 C.L.R. 73; Lordou andOthers v. The Republic
(1968)3C.L.R. 427at p. 433; Nissis v. The Republic
(1967)3 C.L.R.
- 10 Recourse. Recourse against the refusal of the respondents to renew applicant's building permit No. 074726 for the erection of a pigsty on his land situate at Shia village V. HadjiGeorghiou, for the applicant. 15 A. Vladimirou, for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. LORIS J. read the following judgment. The applicant in the present case, applied to and obtained from the appropriate authority - the District Officer of Nicosia - a building permit 20 under No. 074726 dated 9.10.74 with a view to erecting a pigsty on his land situate at Shia village,of NicosiaDistrict,covered by plot 173 of the Government Survey Sheet/Plan XXXIX/
- The aforesaid permit covered the proposed building of 14 sties plus a store and like all permits regulated by the provisions 25 of s. 5 of the Streets and Buildings Law Cap. 96, was valid for one year from the date of the issue thereof, unless renewed consonant to the provisions of the relevant proviso of the same section which reads as follows: "Provided that, if the work or other matter isnot completed 30 within that period, the permit shall be renewable at any subsequent time if not conflicting with any Regulations in force at the time of such renewal, upon payment of the fee prescribed for the original permit or of two pounds whichever is the less. The permit so renewed shall be valid for 35 one year from the date of renewal." It seems that the applicant, owing to financial difficulties, 1006 3 C.L.R. loannou v. Republic Lorls J. was unable to construct all the sties during the period of the validity of his said permit; instead hemanaged to build intime only 9 out of the 14enclosures and started operating his pigsty at some time in 1975, using only those sties he had been able to 5 complete. On 15.11.79 the applicant submitted a written application to the District Officer Nicosia (photo-copy of same is attached to the opposition and marked appendix "A") seeking a renewal of his said permitinorder tobeenabled toconstruct theremaining 10 enclosures. The District Officer Nicosia, addressed to the applicant a letter dated 24.1.80 (attached to the opposition and marked appendix "B") refusing thereby the renewal of the said permit on the ground that the aforesaid pigsty of the applicant was 15 situated within the zone for which a prohibition for the con struction of any structures to be used as pigsties was already in existence, the relevant notification having been promulgated in Supplement No. 3 (Κ.Δ.ΓΪ. 74/79) of the Official Gazette No. 1515 of 27.4.
- 20 The last paragraph of the said letter of the District Officer Nicosia went onto add thattheaforesaid pigsty of theapplicant is situate "very near to the inhabited area and any extention thereof will create additional nuisance to the inhabitants." On 20.7.81 counsel actingonbehalf of theapplicant addressed 25 tothe District Officer Nicosia letter exh. 1by virtue of which the District Officer was substantially asked to reconsider his decision of 24.1.80 (vide Appendix "B"). The applicant by means of the present recourse challenges the validity of the decision of the respondent dated 7.10.81 30 (exh. 2) on five grounds of Law which appear in the recourse and may, very briefly, be stated as follows:
(1)Decision of respondents was taken under misconception of facts and was contrary to Law.
(2)Abuse or excess of power by respondents. 35
(3)Sub judice decision affects vested rights of applicant.
(4)Discrimination against applicant. 1007 Loris J. Ioannou v. Republic
(1982)
(5)Sub judice decision obscure, uncertain and not properly reasoned. The respondents in their opposition raised the preliminary objection that the act or decision challenged was merely informatory and or confirmatory of a previous act or decision and 5 as such is not justiciable. Subject to the above objection the respondents maintain that their said decision was taken according to law and the Constitution and they deny any sort of discrimination against the applicant. 10 The parties did not apply to the Court that the preliminary issue raised bythe opposition be determined in the first instance, so in deciding on the merits of the recourse I shall pronounce to-day on this issue as well. Before doing so, I consider it pertinent at this stage to deal as briefly as possible with the 15 legal aspect on this point. It is a well settled principle of Administrative Law that a confirmatory decision of the administration is not of an executory nature and therefore it cannot be made the subject-matter of a recourse. According to Stassinopoulos on the Law of 20 Administrative Disputes, 4th ed. at p. 175 a confirmatory act is one which repeats the contents of a previous executory act and signifies the adherence of the administration to a course already adopted; but when the administration confirms a previous executory act after a new enquiry then the resulting new act or 25 decision is itself executory too, and therefore justiciable. These principles have been adopted by our Supreme Court in a great number of cases such as: Kolokassides v. The Republic
(1965)3C.L.R. 549and on appeal
(1965)3 C.L.R. 542. Ktenas and another (NoA) v. The Republic
(1966)3 C.L.R. 64 and on appeal
(1966)3 C.L.R. 820. Papaleontiou v. The Republic
(1966)3 C.L.R. 557. Varnava v. The Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 566. Ioannou v. The Grain Commission
(1968)3 C.L.R. 612. Megalemou v. The Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 581. Kelpis v. The Republic
(1970)3 C.L.R. 196. 1008 30 35 3 C.L.R. Ioannou v. Republic Lorii J. HjiKyriakos & Sons Ltd. v. The Republic
(1971)3 C.L.R. 286. Police Association & others v. The Republic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 1. Liasidou v. The Municipality of Famagusta
(1972)3 C.L.R. 278. 5 Salamis Holdings Ltd. v. The Municipality of Famagusta
(1974)3 C.L.R. 344. Lordos Apartotels Ltd. v. The Republic
(1974)3 C.L.R. 471. Ioannou v. The Commander of Police
(1974)3 C.L.R. 504. Limassol Chemical Products Company Ltd. v. The Republic 10
(1978)3 C.L.R. 52. Dr. G.N. Marangos Ltd. v. The Municipality of Famagusta
(1979)3 C.L.R. 73. As to the question when does a new enquiry exist Stassino poulos on the Law of AdministrativeDisputesstates the following 15 at p. 176: 20 25 30 "Πότε υπάρχει νέα έρευνα, εΐναι ζήτημα πραγματικόν. θεω ρείται όμως γενικώς νέα έρευνα ή λήψις υπ' όψιν νέων ουσι ωδών νομικών ή πραγματικώνστοιχείων, κρίνεται δέαυστη ρώς το χρησιμοποιηθέν νέον ΰλικόν, διότι δέν πρέπει ό άπολέσας την προθεσμίαν δια την προσβολήν μιας εκτελεστής πράξεως, νά δύναται να καταστρατηγη την προθεσμίαν ταύτην δια της δημιουργίας νέας πράξεως, ή οποία εξεδόθη κατ' έπίφασιν μέν κατόπιν νέας έρεύνης, κατ' ούσίαν δμως επί τη βάσει τών αυτών στοιχείων. Νέαέρευναυπάρχει Ιδίωςέάν, προ της εκδόσεως της νεωτέρας πράξεως, λαμβάνη χώραν έξέτασις στοιχείων κρίσεως νεωστί προκυπτόντων ή προϋπαρχόντων μέν άλλα τέως άγνωστων, άτινα νϋν λαμβάνονται προσθέτως δια πρώτην φοράν υπ' όψιν. Όμοίως νέαν έρευναν συνιστά ή διενέργεια αυτοψίας ^ ή συλλογή συμπληρωματικών έπϊ της υποθέσεως πληρο φοριών". The English translation of the above prepared by the Re gistry of this Court reads as follows: 35 "When does a new inquiry exist, is a question of fact: In general, it is considered to be a new inquiry the taking 1009 Loris J . Ioannou v. Republic
(1982)into consideration ofnewsubstantive legal or real material, and the new material is meticulously considered, for he who has been out of time in attacking an executory act, should not circumvent such a time limit by the creation of a new act, which it was issued nominally after a new inquiiy, but in substance onthe basis ofthe samematerial. Especially there does exist a new inquiry where, before the issue of the subsequent act, there takes place consideration of newly produced material or pre-existing but unknown, which are now taken into consideration in \Q addition, but for the first time. Similarly, it constitutes a new inquiry the carrying out of a local inspection or the collection of additional information in the matter under consideration". In the present recourse it is abundantly clear that the adrai- 15 nistration gave its decision on 24.1.80 (vide letter of Appendix "B"). It must be borne in mind that the said decision was never challenged. The question which nowfalls for determination is whether a new enquiry wascarried out by the respondents in the light of 20 exh. 1 before they have given their reply inexh.2. As already stated: Whendoes an enquiry existisa question of fact. I have considered exhs. 1and 2 in the light of the written addresses of counsel of both sides and I have observed the following: (
- a)No new substantive legal or real materialwasplaced by exh. 1 before the respondents for consideration. (
- i)In spite of the fact that the application dated 20.7.81(exh. 1) speaksof "a permitfor extention of the pigsty" in para. 3thereof, the fact remains 30 that thesaid application wasanapplication for the renewal of the permit of 1974with a viewto enabling the applicant to construct the remaining five enclosureswhichhewasunable toconstruct within the period of the validity of the original permit; 35 this is abundantly clear from the combined effect of paras 2 and 3 of exh. 1. This fact was al1010 25 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Ioannou v. Republic Loris J. ready known to the respondents from Appendix " B ' \ and the employment of nice but vague words in exh. 1in connection with the intended future operations of the pigsty cannot be by any stress of imagination considered as "new substantive legal or real material." (
- ii)Reference to Mylo Ltd. in exh. 1cannot be considered "as a new substantive material"; first of all such a material was not new anyway; it is clear from exh. 7. that the respondents had the opportunity of examining everything connected with the pigsty of the said company more than a year prior to the time when exh. 1 was addressed to them. As to the question of the alleged discrimination I shall have the opportunity of dealing with such an allegation later on in my present judgment. (
- b)It is clear from the wording of exh. 2 that the respondents did not carry out a new enquiry before addressing exh. 2 to counsel acting for the applicant. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant in Ins written address speaks of a duty of the respondents to carry out a new enquiry as a result of his aforesaid letter. InthisrespectImust stressthat the respondents were under no duty to carry out such a new enquiry. On this point I am in full agreement with my brother Judge Hadjianastassiou, J. who stated the following in the case of Varnava v. The Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 566 at p. 575. "The question therefore is: Isthere an Omission on the part of the Respondent to re-examine the case of the applicant? In my view, in the absence of legislation regulating such matter there can be no question of an omission on the part of the Respondents because the administration had no duty to discharge; and because it was decided long ago that the applicant was not entitled to a gratuity benefit " In the present case the respondents have decided as early as 1011 Loris J. Ioamiou v. Republic
(1982)24.1.80 - and they have then communicated their said decision to the applicant -that thelatter wasnotentitled to a renewalof hispermit. The said administrative decisionwasnot challenged. The present recourse was filed on 2.11.81 and challenges a decision of the respondents dated 7.10.81 which is purely 5 confirmatory of their decision of 24.1.80. I find myself unable to agree with counsel appearing for the applicant who has submitted in his written address, inter alia, that Article 146 of our Constitution is wide enough to cover both executory decisions of the administration as well as con- 10 firmatory ones. It ismorethan clear from theauthoritiescited above that confirmatory decisions of the administration are not justiciable subject to the exception of course when the administration confirms a previous act or decision after a new enquiry, which is not the present case. 15 I shall now proceed toexamine the grounds advanced by the applicant in support of the present recourse assuming for a moment that the administrative decision in question was of an executory nature and could be the subject of a recourse. Asalready stated theapplicant challengesbythisrecoursethe 20 validity of the aforementioned decision on five grounds; these grounds boil down to two main points notably, (
- a)prejudicial affection of vested rights of applicant, (
- b)discrimination against applicant. Let usconsider first theissueof vested rights: Theapplicant 25 appliedtothe District Officer of Nicosiaand obtained abuilding permit under No. 074726 dated 9.10.74; this building permit covered the proposed building of 14sties plus a store and was valid, according to the provisions of s. 5 of the Streets and Buildings Law, Cap. 96, for one year. 30 Consequently the rights that vested in the applicant by virtue ofthesaidpermit,werenotrightsvested inhimadinfinitum but simply for one year during which all the buildings enumerated in the permit ought to have been completed. The applicant, for one reason or another did not erect allthe structures duringtheyearandhechoseto applyfor therenewal 35 1012 3 C.L.R. Ioannou v. Republic Lorls J- of his said permit some 4 years after its expiration. It is true that the proviso to s. 5of Cap. 96providesfor the.renewalof the permit (if the work is not completed within a year) at any subsequent time, but at the same time specifically emphasizes 5 that the permit shall be renewable "__ if not conflicting with any Regulations in force at the time of such renewal". And it must beborne in mind that the applicant appliedfor renewal of his permit as late as 15.11.79 whilst the relevant prohibition was already in existence having been published in the Official 10 Gazette on 27.4.1979. In the case of AndrianiLordouand othersv. The Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 427 at p. 433 it was laid down that, 15 20 "it is a cardinal principle of administrative Law that the legality of administrative acts isgoverned bythe legislation inforce at thetime when theyaremade. (SeeConclusions from theJurisprudence of the Greek Council of State 1929 - 1959p. 160; see also inter alia, Decision 1477/56 of the Greek Council of State). Theabove principle applies,even to casesin which there has been a change in the relevant legislation between the submission of an application for a permit and administrative action thereon..." 1 do not feel that I should embark any further on this issue; suffice ittosaythatfrom theaboveitisclearthat therespondent 25 refusing renewal of the permit on 24.1.80 (vide letter "B") was neither acting contrary to Law nor was he acting in abuse or excessofhispower. Accordingto thecase of Andriani Lordou (supra) the respondent would have been perfectly justified in refusing renewal of thepermit even ifthechange in therelevant 30 legislation was effected after the submission of the application for renewal (15.11.79) but prior to his decision on 24.1.80. The next complaint of the applicant is"discrimination". He alleges that inspite of the fact thai he was refused renewal of hispermit on 24.1.80for theerection of theremainingfive sties 35 which he had failed to construct within the original period of hispermit,acertaincompanyunderthenameof"MYLO LTD" was subsequently to that time given a covering permit for a far greater number of sties constructed on their property which is situated in the same area covered by the same prohibition 40 published on 27.4.79. 1013 Ijoris J. Ioannou τ. Republic
(1982)The applicant maintains that such a treatment by the admi nistration constitutes discrimination against him and violates the principles of equality envisaged by the provisions of Article 28 of our Constitution. It must be noted in the first instance that: 5 (
- i)the company under the name 'MYLO LTD' is not a party to the present proceedings; (
- ii)the facts of the present recourse differ substantially from the facts alleged in respect of the said company. In the present recourse the sub judice decision of the re- 10 spondent is refusal to renew a building permit for intended erection of 5more sties on the land of the applicant, whilst the facts before me in connectionwith "MYLO LTD"refer to an application by the said company for relaxation of the Rules with a view to obtaining a covering permit for sties already 15 erected by the former owner of the land without permit, some thing unknown to the present owners, the purchasers namely "MYLO LTD". Exh. Ζ is an application by the Ministry of Interior to the Ministerial Council for (a)therelaxation of the Rules connected 20 with the restrictions imposed at Shia villageon27.4.79, (
- b)the authorization of the District Officer of Nicosia to issue a co vering permit. It is not known whether theMinisterial Councilhas approved the relaxation suggested; nor is it known whether the District 25 Officer of Nicosia as the proper authority has ultimately issued such a permit, although the address of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent (first para, at p. 5)points to that end. Be that as it may 1 have decided to treatas a fact thatthe proper authority has granted a peimit to "MYLO LTD"after 30 the relaxation of the relevant rules by the Ministerial Council. The question which falls for determination is this: Does this decision of the administration constitute discrimination against the applicant? Does this decision infringe the notions of equality of treatment envisaged by the provisions of Article 28 35 of our Constitution? 1014 3 C.L.R. Ioannou v. Republic I-oris J. The short answer to that is to be found in the Conclusions from the Jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State 1929 1959 at p. 158. 5 10 " Έκ τοϋ ότι ή Διοίκησις δέν εφήρμοσε τον νόμον els αλλην περίπτωσιν, δέν δημιουργείται άκυρότης έκ της εφαρμογής του έπϊ της κρινομένης υποθέσεως: 761
(36), ούτε ή έν τω παρελθόντι ή έναντι έτερων προσώπων; 1253
(48), 755, 756
(49), 892
(51)γενομένη μη νόμιμος ενέργεια της Διοι κήσεως δημιουργεί καΐ Οποχρέωσιν αύτης όττως έπαναλάβη άμοιομόρφως την παράβασιν: 353, 1187
(53), 1118, 1121
(54)". English Translation: 15 "Due to the fact that the Administration did not apply the Law on another occasion, no annulment is created due to its application in the sub judice case; nor does the un lawful act of the Administration in the past or towards other persons, create obligation to it to repeat likewise the contravention." Having dealt with the substantive grounds of the present 20 recourse I intend to deal very briefly with the remaining. 25 As regards ground I there is no evidence whatsoever that the respondent acted under a misconception of facts or contrary to the Law. Nor was any evidence adduced to suggest, even slightly, that the respondent acted in abuse or excess of power and we must not lose sight of the fact that the burden of establi shing abuse or excess of power rests upon the person propound ing same (Nissis v. The Republic
(1967)3 C.L.R. 671). As it emerges from the facts of this case the main decision of the respondent is that of 24.1.80(Appendix "B"); this decision 30 was never challenged by the applicant. The subjudice decision in thepresent recourse (exh. 2)as I held already is a confirmatory decision of the respondent and therefore not justiciable. Both decisions are quite clear and certain and they have the same reasoning which is quite sufficient to bring to the knowledge of 35 the applicant the reason for which the application was dismissed. Although I must say that the main decision that of 24.1.80 was 1015 Loris J. Ioannou v. Republic
(1982)moreexplicit, yet the subjudice decision, theconfirmatory one, although drafted in a rather laconical language contains and repeats the main reason for which the appUcation for renewal was refused. For all the above reasons the present recourse fails and it is accordingly dismissed. 5 Having given to the matter my best consideration I have decided to make noorder astothecostsofthepresentrecourse. Application dismissed. No order as to costs. 10 1016