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Obsah (4)Article 125Article 192Article 20Article 54a

3 C.L.R. 1982 March II [SAVVIDES, J.] IN THE MATTER

ARTICLE 146

THE CONSTITUTION PANAYIOTIS KAZAMIAS, Applicant, v. THE REPUBLIC

CYPRUS, THROUGH THE COUNCIL

MINISTERS, Respondent. (Case No. 234/81). Administrative Law—Administrative acts or decisions—Reasoning —Need for due reasoning—Decision

Council

Ministers terminating Public

ficer's services in the public interest, in exercise

powers under sections 6(f) and 7

the Pensions Law, Cap. 311—Invoking allegations

unbecoming conduct on the part

the

ficer without mentioning particulars

such allegations, or the evidence on which the Council

Ministers relied, or any surrounding circumstances and failing to specify the matters

public interest—Reasons mentioned in the decision not such as to enable in the first instance, the person concerned, and the Court on review, to ascertain whether the decision is wellfounded infact and in Law—Sub judice decision not properly or sufficiently reasoned—Annulled. Administrative Law—Administrative acts or decisions—Reasoning —Administrative decision taken in the public interest—A general averment

public interestdoesnot amount toasufficientreasoning —But the invocation

public interest must be justified with a specification

the serious reasons

public interest which are involved. Public interest—Administrative decision taken in thepublic interest— Invocation

public interest must bejustified with a specification

the serious reasons

public interest which are involved. Public

ficers—Disciplinary control—A matter within exclusive 239 Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)competence

Public Service Commission—Article 125.1

the Constitution—Termination

Public

ficer's services, by Council

Ministers, in the public interest in exercise

powers under sections 6(f) and 7

the Pensions Law, Cap. 311—After fiiuiing the

ficer guilty

unbecoming conduct—As such finding 5 amounts to a disciplinary

fence under the Public Service Law, 1967 (Law 33/67) // renders the

ficer subject to the disciplinary powers

the Public Service Commissionfor a disciplinary

fence under section 73

(1)

theLaw—Council

Ministers by cssuming competence in a matter which is within the exclusive competence 10

the Public Service Commission has acted in excess or abuse

powers—Sub judice decision annulled—There cannot at one and the same time be two authorities with concurrent power to exercise disciplinary control over Public

ficers—Even assuming that Council

Ministers had competence to deal with alleged 15 misconduct

ficer it was bound to inform the applicant

the accusations against hitn and give him the opportunity to make his defence in accordance with the "audi alteram partem,, rule

r.atural justice—And as the

ficer had been in the service prior to independence, in accordance, also, with his terms and 20 conditions

service before Indepeidence, which have been safeguarded by Article 192.1

the Constitution and are afforded to the

ficer by regulation 59

the Colonial Regulations. Natural Justice—Rules

—Audi alteram partem—Termination

Public

ficer's services, by Council

Ministers, in the 25 public interest, in exercise

powers under sections 6(f) and 7

the Pensions Law, Cap. 311—After finding him guilty

unbecoming conduct—Predominant purpose

termination

services the imposition on

ficer

a disciplinary punishment— Assuming Council

Ministers had power to deal with alleged 30 misconduct

ficer it ought to inform him

the accusations against him and give him the opportunity to make his defence —Failure to do so amounts to flagrant vioL tion

the above rule

natural justice. Public

ficers—Terms and conditions

service—

ficers in Public 35

fice prior to Independence—Disciplinary control over, governed by Colonial Regulations—Article 192.1

the Constitution. Public

ficers—Administrative measure—Disciplinary measure— When an administrative decision assumes the character

a 240 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic sanction and has adverse effect on the positionof ωιindividual personaffectedshouldbe given the opportunity

questioning the reason for the adverse decision. The applicant was appointed in the Public Service on the24th September, 1941. After a successful career he was promoted to the post

Director-General

the Ministry

Communica­ tions and works and continued holding this post till the 11th June, 1981, when the Council

Ministers decided to termi­ natehis services in the public interest. And hencethis recourse. The sub judice decision, which was taken in exercise

the Council's powers under sections 6(f)* and 7*

the Pensions Law Cap.311 (as amended)and was communicatedto applicant I by letter**

the Minister

Communications and works date 11th June, 1981, reads as follows: "The Council

Ministers in exercising the powers vested in it by sections 6(0 and 7

the Pensions Law, Cap. 31 i (as later amended), and any other power in this respect vested initand,after athoroughexamination

thematerial produced in relation 'to the unbecoming conduct' in public

Mr. Panos Adamides, Director-General Ministry

Education and Mr. Panayiotis Kazamias, Director-General

the Ministry

Communications and Works, which

fends basically the very subsistence

the State and the proper and unfettered functioning

the State and its Public Service, having taken into consideration the condi­ tions

such Service and the usefulness

the aforesaid public

ficers thereto and generally all the circumstances, * Sections 6(

  1. f)and 7 read as follows: "6(
  2. f)No pension, gratuity or other allowance shall be granted under this Law to any

ficer except on his retirement from the public service in one

the following cases: ( 0 in the case

termination

employment in the public interest as provided in this Law. 7. Where an

ficer's serviceis terminatedby theCouncilof Ministers on theground that,having regard to theconditions

the public service, the usefulness

the

ficer thereto and all the other circumstances

the case, such termination is desirable in the public interest, and a pension, gratuity or other allowance cannot otherwise be granted to him under the provisions

this Law, the Council

Ministers may, if he thinks fit grant such pension, gratuity or other allowance as he thinksjust and proper,notexceeding inamountthatfor which the

ficer would beeligibleif heretired from thepublic servicein the circumstances described in paragraph (e)

section 6

this Law". ** The letter is quoted at pp. 249-50post. 241 Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)came to the conclusion that their stay in the Public Service could not only serve no useful purpose to it, but it would also be very detrimental thereto and decided that their services should be terminated as from today in the public interest, with full retirement benefits, to which they are entitled". 5 Counsel for the applicant mainly contended: (a) That the sub judice decision was based on a misconceived and/or illegal reasoning and/or is lacking

sufficient reasoning. (b) That the sub judice decision was taken in manifest illegality and/or in excess or/and abuse

power in that it involved a manifest violation

the Rules

Natural Justice in that no opportunity to be heard was given to the.applicant. (c) That the sub judice decision was illegal in that it was taken by an incompetent organ and constituted a violation

Articles 122and 125.1*

the Constitution and

the Public Service Law, 1967 (Law 33/67) and also

the Pensions Law, Cap. 311. On the other hand Counsel for the respondent Counsel

Ministers in his opposition maintained that the subjudice decision was lawfully taken in the light

the following relevant facts:

(1)The Council

Ministers at its meeting

the 11th 25 June, 1981 decided to terminate the services

the applicant as Director-General

the Ministry

Communications and Works as from 11.6.1981 in the public interest.

(2)The Council

Ministers at its meeting

the Ilth June, 1981, took into consideration undisputable facts ™ and information emanating from reliable sources, according to which the applicant publicly and in a manner not Article 125.1

the Constitution provides as follows: 125.1. Save where other express provision ismade in this Constitution with respect to any matter set out in this paragraph and subject to the provisions

any law,it shall be the duty

the Public Service Commission to make the allocation

public

fices between the two Communities and to appoint, confirm cmplace on the permanent or pensionable establishment, promote, transfer, retire and exercise disciplinary control over, including dismissal or removal from

fice

, public

ficers". 242 15 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic permitted, presented the Republic as being without head and as lacking

good and able government. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

(3)It is understood that the applicant in this way, undermined ("eklonize") the confidence

the public and

the Public Service in the ability and effectiveness

the supreme organs

the State and thus he undermined the existence

the State.

(4)In the circumstances, it becomes obvious that the use­ fulness

the applicant in the Public Service, ceased to exist.

(5)The decision

the Council

Ministers for the termi­ nation

the services

the applicant which was commu­ nicated to him by the letter

the appropriate Minister on the 11.6.1981 was not taken as a disciplinary measure for the punishment

the applicant but as an administra­ tive measure which was necessary in the public interest. Counsel for applicant, both prior to the hearing by letter. as well as in the course

the hearing, asked to be informed

the source and nature

the material before the Council

Ministers which led it to the conclusion that the conduct

the applicant was unbecoming conduct in public undermining the State and its Public Service, but there was no response to such request. Held, (l)(a) that it is a well established principle

Administrative Law that Administrative decisions have to be duly reasoned; that due reasoning is essential to enable the Courts to carry out properly their function

judicial control

admi­ nistrative actions; that the sub judice decision is not properly or sufficiently reasoned; that such decision is overshadowed by a cloud

generalities invoking allegations

unbecoming public conduct on the part

the applicant

such nature as to make it necessary in the public interest to impose upon hini the ultimate punishment

terminating his permanent appoint­ ment with the Government service, without mentioning particulars

such allegations, or the evidence on which the Council

Ministers relied, or any surrounding circumstances and also by failing to specify (έίειδικεύση) the matters

public interest involved; that the reasons mentioned in the decision are not such as the enable in the first instance, the person 243 Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)concerned, and the Court on review, to ascertain whether the decision is well founded in fact and in law; that the Minister's letter to the applicant conveying to him the decision

the Council

Ministers and the decision itself as recorded in the minutes

the Council

Ministers, are so obscure and sub- 5 stantially inadequateandwould leaveinthemindof aninformed reader such real and substantial doubt as to the reasons for suchdecisionandastothematterswhichtheCouncilofMinisters did ordid nottakeintoaccountintaking thesubjudicedecision, that they do not comply with the well established principles 10

proper reasoning, compliance to which is necessary under the general and well established principles

administrative law; and that, therefore, the sub judice decision is defective and in the result it must be annulled. (l)(b)That though inthe subjudice decision therewas further 15 reference to thedecision having been taken in the public interest a genera] averment

public interest does not amount to a sufficient reasoning but the invocation

public interest must be justified with a specification (έ&ιδίκευσις)

the serious reasons

public interestwhich are involved (see,in this respect, 20 "Modern Trends

the Principle

Legality in Administrative Law" 1973 Ed., by Tahos, p. 146).

(2)(a)UnderArticle 125.1

theConstitution theorgan expres­ sly entrusted with the duty

"exercising disciplinary control over, including dismissal or removal from

fice

, public 25

ficers" is the Public,Service Commission established undei Article 124

theConstitution; that an organic law was enacted (Law 33/67) providing amongst other things, for the procedure in disciplinary matters (see sections 80,81 and 82

Law 33/67); that the fundamental duties

public

ficers are set out in 30 section 58

(1)

Law 33/67 and breach

any such duties con­ stitutes an

fence which is included in the disciplinary

fences set out in section 73

(1)in rtspect

which disciplinary proceedings may be taken against him and in case he is found guilty to render him liable to the sentences set out in section 35 79

(1);that thefinding

theCouncilof Ministersof unbecoming conduct in public undermining the State and its public service on thepart

the applicant,is afinding amountingtothebreach

the fundamental duties

a public

ficer under section 58

(1)(b)(d) and (c)

Law 33/67 and rendering him subject to the 40 244 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic disciplinary powers

the Public Service Commission for a disciplinary

fence under section 73

(1); that disciplinary control

public

ficers including dismissal is a matter within the exclusive competence

the Public Service Commission. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

(2)(b) That the respondent in the present case, as it appears from the minutes

the decision, assumed competence under the provisions

section 7

Cap. 311 on a disciplinary matter which is within the exclusive competence

the Public Service Commission; that thore cannot at one and the same time be two authorities with concurrent power to exercise disciplinary control over public

ficers, the one an independent organ deriving its powers from the Constitution and the other the Government itself relying on legislative provision; that the object

the introduction in the Constitution

Article 125

.1 was to entrust the safeguarding

the efficiency and proper functioning

the public service

the Republic, expressly including the exercise

disciplinary control over public

ficers, to the Public ServiceCommission, an independent and impartial organ outside the governmental machinery, and at the same time, safeguarding the protection

the legitimate interests

public

ficers; that if such power was also retained by the Government, the whole object

Articlt 125.1 would be defeated and the safeguarding afforded to public

ficers by such Article would have disappeared; that since disciplinary control over public

ficers is within the exclusive competence

the Public Strvice Commission, the Council

Ministers by assuming such competence in the present case, has acted in excess and/or abuse

powers and in the result, the sub judice decision becomes null and void on this ground as well. On the assumption that the Council

Ministers had competence to deal with the alleged misconduct

the applicant: Held(\\ that mere perusal

the contentsof thesubjudicedecision as recorded in the Minutes

the Council and

the letter communicating the decision to the applicant and

all surrounding circumstances in mind, leaves no room for doubt that the predominant purpose

the sub judice decision taken by the Council

Ministers was to impose upon the applicant a disciplinary punishment, the most serious one, for alleged public misconduct, without affording him the opportunity

being heard; that even if any doubt might have existed, which 245 Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)in the present case doesnot exist, this court would have reached the same conclusion allowing the benefit

doubt to operate in favour

the applicant (see Pantclidou v. Republic, 4R.S.C.C. 100); and that, therefore, the respondent was bound to afford the applicant the right to beinformed

the accusations against 5 him and the chance to repudiate same.

(2)That, moreover, since applicant had been in the public service prior to Independence and at a time when the Colonial Regulations were regulating the procedure to be followed in case

dismissal

a public

ficer in the public interest under 10 regulation 59

such Regulations he had to be informed

the report

the heads

thedepartment in which hehad served and be given the opportunity

submitting a reply to the complaints by reason

which his retirement was contemplated; that such provision was part

the terms and conditions

his 15 service which after Independence have been safeguarded under Article 192.1

the Constitution and could not be altered to hisdisadvantage; and that, therefore, the Council

Ministers by failing to inform the applicant

the accusations against him and give him the opportunity to make his defence, had 20 acted in flagrant violation

the basic rule

natural justice which is summarised in the maxim "audi alteram partem"; that, also, by depriving him

his vested right under the terms and conditions

service before the Independence day, afforded to him by the Colonial Regulations and in particular regulation 25 59 which terms and conditions have bsen safeguarded under Article 192.1

the Constitution, the Council

Ministers has violated Article 192.1; accordingly the sub judice decision has to be annulled on this ground as well. Held,further, that even in cases where a decision is not

30 a disciplinary nature but is an administrative measure, as suggested by counsel for the respondent, it iswell settled that when an administrative decision assumes the character

a sanction and hassufficiently adverseeffect ontheposition

anindividual, as in the circumstances

the present case, the courts require 35 that the person affected should be given the opportunity

questioning the reason for the adverse decision. Sub judice decision annulled. PercurLm: That the power to terminate the service

a public

ficer prior to independence did not emanate from 40 246 Kazamias v. Republic 3C.L.R. sections

f) and 7

ιhe Pensions Law, Cap. 311 but from the Colonial Regulations and that sections 6(f) and 7 were only ancillary pro\isions enabling the Council

Ministers to grant pension or gratuity in such cases. 5 Cases referred to: McClelland v. N. Ireland Health Board [1957] 2 AM E.R. 129 at p. 134, Markides v. Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. 8 at p. 12; 10 HadjiSavva v. Republic

(1972)3 C.L.R. 174; Nedjati v. Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. 78 at p. 82; Yiallourou v. Republic
(1976)3 C.L.R. 214 at p. 219; Nicolaou v. Republic
(1969)3 C.L.R. 42 at p. 5b; Papapetrou v. Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. 61 ai p. 6b; 15 Georghiades v. Republic (i960) 3 C.L.R. 252 a' p. 276; Papaleontiou v. Republic
(1967)3 C.L.R. 624; Lyssictou v. Papascvva and Another
(1968)3 C.L.R. 173 at pp. 184-185; Rcllis v. The Gieek Commiuid Chamber, 5 R.S.C.C. I I ; 20 • Jacovides v. Republic
(1966)3 C.L.R. 212 at p.221; Zuvros v. Council .for Registration

Architects uul Civil Engineers

(1969)3 C.L.R. 310 at p. 315; 25 Kcsapis v. Councilfor Regishatum

Architects and Civil Engi­ neer

(1967)3 C.L.R. 270 at pp. 275, 276; Constantinides v. Republic
(1967)3 C.L.R. 7 at p. 14; Metaphoriki Eteria v. Republic
(1981)3 C.L.R. 221 at p. 237; Poyscr ai.d Mills' Arbitration [1963J I All Ε R 612 at ρ bI6; GivQiidanΛ Co. Ltd. v. the Minister

Homing [1966] 3 AI! E.R. 696; 30 PEO v. Hoardof Cinematograph Film Censors

(1965)3 C.L.R. 27 at pp 38-39; Decisions

the Greek Council

State Nos. 942/1971,1005/33, 354/38. 1711/65, 070/58, 1415/58; Christodoulou v. Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 603; 35 Republic v. Mozoras
(1966)3 C.L.R. 356; Morcoullides v. Republic, 3 R.S.C.C. 30 at p. 35; HcdjiCeorghiou v. Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 326: 247 Kazamias v. Republic
(1982)Kalisperas v. Republic, 3 R.S.C.C. 146; Pantclidou v. Republic, 4 R.S.C.C. 100; Michaelv. Republic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 206 at p. 216; Philippouv. Republic
(1981)3 C.L.R. 153; Koudounas v. Republic
(1981)3 C.L.R. 46; HadjiPetrisv. Republic
(1968)3 C.LR. 702 at p. 706; Psoitisv. Republic
(1971)3 C.L.R. 372 at p. 373; Kaida v. Government

the Federation

Malaya [1962] A.C. 322. 5 Recourse. Recourse against the decision

the respondent to terminate applicant's service as a Director-General

the Ministry

Communications and Works in the public interest. T. Papadopoulos, for the applicant. S. Georghiades, Senior Counsel

the Republic, for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. SAWIDES J. read the following judgment. The present recourse is directed against the decision

the Council

Ministers dated 11.6.1981 wheieby the service

the applicant 20 as Director-General

the Ministry

Communications and Works, was terminated "in the public interest". The applicant who was appointed in the Public Service on 24.9.1941, after having passed the Civil Service qualifying examinations and after a successful career since the day

h : s 25 appointment, was promoted to the post

Director-General

the Ministry

Communications ;nd Workj which is one

the highest posts in the hierarchy

Civil Service. He had been holding this post since May, 1959 till August, 1960 (the transitional period) and continued holding same till 11.6.1981, 30 when his service was terminated by the sub judice decision

the Council

Ministers. The fact that the applicant during his long term

service had shown excellent performance in the discharge

his duties, is manifested by his promotion in various important posts in the hierarchy

Civil Service, and, 35 also, by the facts that— (a) he was granted a scholarship for University studies 248 10 15 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. during theyears 1949-1952 at the University

Wales where he graduated with a B.A. Degree with Hons. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 (

  1. b)He was granted another post-graduate scholarship in Oxford from May, 1968to July, 1968in Transport Economics. (
  2. c)During theperiod 1973-1976, in addition to his duties, he served as a Chairman

the Ports Authority by decision

the Council

Ministers. Healso served in such capacity as from January, 1981 by decision

the Council

Ministers till the date

the termi­ nation

his service. (d) He had also been appointed bythe Council

Ministers as a member

the Planning Committee

the Town Planning Council,

the Joint Labour Committee and other Committees. During his term

fice he represented Cyprus in various International Conferences (International Organisation

Civil Aviation, International Port Union,TheCommittee

Experts

the United Nations for Commercial Development, Tnternational Labour

fice, etc.) by decisions

the Council

Ministers. A full list

the international Committees in which he participated as representative

Cyprus andthe part played by himinsuch Committees issetoutinAnnex 2attached to his application for an interim order in this recourse. I need not expand upon them, as the facts contained therein which manifest a distinguished career, have not been disputed by the respondent whose counsel stated in his address that the sub judice decision was not taken either onlack

efficiency or integrity but in the public interest. On 11.6.1981 the Council

Ministers decided to terminate the service

the applicant "inthepublic interest" and commu­ nicated such decision to him by letter dated li.6.1981 which was handed over to himby his Minister, the Minister

Com­ munications and Works. The contents

such letter (copy

which is annexed to the affidavit for an interim order as Annex 1) reads as follows:" "Εχω έντολήν παρά τοϋ 'Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου όπως πληροφορήσω ύμας ότι το Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου κατά 249 Sawides J . Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)την σημεριυήυ του Συνεδρίαν, ενασκούν τάς εξουσίας ϋφ' ών περιβέβληται δυνάμει των άρθρων 6(στ) καΐ 7 τοϋ περί Συντάξεων Νόμου, Κεφ. 311, (ως έτροποποιήθη μεταγενε­ στέρως), και πάσαν άλλην προς τοΰτο χορηγουμένην αύτώ έξουσίαυ και κατόπιν ενδελεχούς εξετάσεως τών προσκομι- 5 σθέντων στοιχείων έν σχέσει προς τήν άνεπίτρεπτονδημοσία συμπεριφοράν σας, ή οποία θίγει βασικώς αυτήν ταύτην τήυ κρατικήν Οπόστασιν καΐ τήυ κανονικήν καιάπρόσκοπτον λειτουργίαν τοΰ κράτουςκαΐ της Δημοσίας αύτοΰ Υπηρεσίας, λαβόν ΰπ' όψιν τάς συνθήκας της Υπηρεσίας ταύτης και 10 τήν είς αυτήν χρησιμότητα σας και έν γένει άπάσας τάς περιστάσεις, κατέληξεν είς το συμπέρασμα ότι ή παραμονή σας είς τήν Δημοσίου Ύπηρεσίαν όχι μόνου ούδεμίαυώφελημότητα θά παρεϊχεν εις ταύτην, άλλα και θα ήτο λίαν επι­ βλαβής δι* αυτήν καϊ άπεφάσισευ όπως αΐ ύπηρεσίαι σας 15 τερματισθώσιυ άπό σήμερον προς τό δημόσιον συμφέρον, μέ πλήρη τά ωφελήματα άφυπηρετήσεως, τών οποίων δικαιούσθε". The English translation

which reads as follows:"1 have been instructed by theCouncil

Ministers toinform 20 you that the Council

Ministers at its today's meeting, in exercising the powers vested in it by sections 6(f) and 7

the Pensions Law, Cap. 311 (as later amended) and any other power in this respect vested in it and after a thorough examination

the material produced before 25 it in relation to your unbecoming conduct in public which

fends basically the very subsistence

the State and the proper and unfettered functioning

the State and its Public Service, having taken into consideration the conditi­ ons

such service and your usefulness thereto and gene- 30 rally all the circumstances, came to the conclusion that your stay in the Public Service could not only serve no useful purpose to it, but also, it would be very detrimental thereto, decided that your service be terminated as from to-day in the public interest, with full retirement benefits, to which 35 you are entitled". As a result

the above decision, applicant filed the present recourse, whereby he seeks—"a declaration

the Court that the act and/or decision

the respondent which was commu- 250 3 CUR. 5 Kazamias v. Republic SawidesJ . nicated tohimby letter dated 11.6.1981 signed by theMinister

Communications and Works, whereby the service

the applicant as Director-General

the Ministry

Commu­ nications and Works, was terminated, is null andvoid and/or illegal and

no legal effect". The grounds

law on which this recourse is based, as set out in the application, are the following :- 10 "

(1)The jub judice act and/or decision

the respondent was taken in manifest illegality and/or in excess or/and abuse

power in that:(a) itwasof a punitive and/or disciplinary nature and the disciplinary provisions

the Public Service Law 33/67 have not been complied with. 15 (b) Itinvolves a manifest violation

the Rules

Natural Justice in that no opportunity to be heard was given to the applicant (

  1. c)The provision inthe Pensions Law onwhich the respon­ dent relied, has no application m the present case (
  2. d)It is intended to serve alien objects. 20

(2)Thesub judice decision is illegal, in that it was taken by an incompetent organ and constitutes a violation

Articles 122 and 125.1

the Constitution and

the Public Service Commission Law (Law 33/67) and also

the Pensions Law, Cap.311. 25

(3)The sub judice decision is illegal, in that it was taken in violation

Articles 192.1and7(b)

the Constitution and/or s 86

(1)

Law 33/67 and/or

the Colonial Regulations which, under the provisions

the said Article

the Constitution and the Law apply inthe case

the applicant. 30 35

(4)The sub judice decision is illegal andof no effect, inthat it was taken under the provisions

sections 6(f)and 7

Cap. 311 which arenotin force or ceased to bein force or are deemed to have been amended since the Independence and thereafter and/οι were superseded in thelight

Articles 12, 18, 19,33, 122,125, 179,182 and 192of the Constitution

the Republic

Cyprus 251 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)
(5)The sub judice decision is illegal, in that it was taken by an improperly constituted organ, that is, which was constituted in violation

Articles 46 and 59

the Constitution, in that it included members who could not and/or had no right to participate in it. 5

(6)-The sub judice decision violates the fundamental principles

Administrative Law and

the Rules

good and proper administration and illegally deprives the applicant

his permanent post in the Public Service.

(7)The respondents acted under a misconception

facts 10 and/or they relied on inexisting or inaccurate or misconcepted facts and/or they took into consideration facts which they could not have taken into consideration.

(8)The sub judice decision is based on a misconcepted and/ or illegal reasoning and/or is lacking

sufficient and legal reasoning". 15 By their opposition the respondents maintain that the sub judice decision was lawfully taken in the light

all relevant facts which, as set out in the opposition, are the following :"

(1)The Council

Ministers at its meeting

the 11th June, 20 1981 decided to terminate the services

the applicant as Director-General

the Ministry

Communications and Works as from 11.6.1981 in the public interest.

(2)The Council

Ministers at its meeting

the 11th June, 1981, took into consideration undisputable facts and 25 information emanating from reliable sources, according to which the applicant publicly and in a manner not permitted, presented the Republic as being without head, and as lacking

good and able government.

(3)It is understood that the applicant in this way, under- 30 mined ("eklonize") the confidence

the public and

the Public Service in the ability and effectiveness

the supreme organs

the State and thus he undermined the existence

the State.

(4)In the circumstances, it becomes obvious that the useful- 35 ness

the applicant in the Public Service, ceased to exist. 252 3 C.L.R. 5 Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J.

(5)The decision

the Council

Ministers for thetermina­ tion

the services

the applicant which was communi­ cated to him by the letter

the appropriate Minister on the 11.6.1981 was not taken as a disciplinary measure for the punishment

the applicant but as an admini­ strative measure which was necessary in the public interest". In arguing the case before the Court,counsel for the applicant contended that the Government has violated each and every 10 rule or principle

Natural Justice acting in glaring abuse

power and in an unlawful way, assuming for itself powers and functions which are no longer entrusted to the Council

Ministers or which have to be read subject to the relevant constitution! provisions. Hestressed thefact that it was obvious i5 from the contents

the letter communicating the decision

the respondent to the applicant, that it relied on sections 6(f) and 7

the Pensions Law, Cap. 311 and by such letter the applicant is charged with "unbecoming conduct" (ανεπίτρεπτου συμπεριφοράν). 20 25 Such accusation, according to counsel for the applicant, makes it quite apparent that the termination

the services

the applicant were in respect

conduct which may either be touching upon the fringes

a criminal

fence, if they were spoken under circumstances upon which a charge under section 46A

the Criminal Code could be framed, or an

fence under section 73(l)(b)

the Public Service Law (Law 33/67), or a disciplinary

fence under sub-clause

(4)

the first part

the First Schedule to the Law (Law 33/67). The allegations contained in the letter as to the conduct

the applicant are covered, counsel argued, under a cloud

generality and confusion, and the respondent refused to give particulars

the alleged circumstances,both by failing to answer a written request

counsel for applicant sent to the respondent and also by failing to comply with repeated requests made 35 during the trial

this case as to what were the "αδιάσειστα γε­ γονότα και πληροφορίες....από αξιόπιστεςπηγές",which are the alleged facts which led the respondent to the conclusion that the conductof the applicantwas injurious to the public interest.Such refusal, counsel contended, deprives the applicant

knowing 40 what were such facts and informations, in what way they were 30 253 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)communicated to the respondent, whether they were truthfully conveyed, whether they referred to words amounting to bona fide criticism, whether the place they were spoken was public or not. Counsel submitted that the applicant never uttered the alleged or any other words to similar effect, and this 5 is confirmed by the affidavit sworn by the applicant in support

his application for interim order which is before the Court. Counsel also argued that no proper reasoning is contained either in the said letter or in the decision itself, as appearing in the extract from the minutes

the Council

Ministers 10 which was produced before the Court. He further argued that though the Council

Ministers had no jurisdiction in the case, since disciplinary matters are within theexclusivejurisdiction

the Public Service Commission under Article 125.1

the Constitution and the provisions

Law 15 33/67, assuming that there was such jurisdiction in the Council

Ministers, a decision terminating the service

the applicant for a disciplinary or quasi disciplinary

fence, could not be taken by any procedure which ignored the paramount Rule

Natural Justice which is the right to know

the accusations 20 made against him and to beheard in his own defence. Furthermore, once the alleged words

the applicant were directed against the Government

the Republic, which, in the circumstances consists

the President and his Ministers, the decision

the Council

Ministers was taken in violation

the next 25 Rule

Natural Justice,inthat itwastaken bypersons personally affected and under such Rule, no one shall be a judge in his own cause. In consequence, the decision

the Council

Ministers is null and void on this ground. In dealing with legal ground

(5)in that the decision was taken 30 by an improperly constituted organ, counsel submitted that the Council

Ministers wasimproperly constituted, in that it included members who could not and/or had no right to participate in the taking

the decision, such members being the Minister to the President and the Deputy Minister

Interior, the first 35 one being the head

a Ministry, the creation

which is contrary to the provisions

the Constitution, and the other holding a post which was also created contrary to the Constitution. Counsel further contended that the Council

Ministers 40 254 I \ \ ι 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Sav\ides J- in any event had no jurisdiction to dismiss the applicant under the provisions

sections 6(f) and 7of the Pensions Law, because such provisions are merely provisions enabling the Council

Ministers to give pension in cases

civil servants whose 5 services were terminated on any

the grounds set out therein, one

which was dismissal in the public interest, in which cases, due to the absence

any other provision, pension was not payable to the civil servant so dismissed. Counsel submitted that prior to the Independence day, the power to dismiss an 10

ficer in the public interest, was derived from the Colonial Regulations and not from Cap. 311. Such Regulations made ample provision as to the punishment

a civil servant both in cases

misconduct and cases where public interest was involved. • Also the procedureto be followed was set out therein 15 under which, in all cases, a civil servant had the right to be heard in his own cause. Such right, counsel submitted, is a vested right safeguarded to him under Article 192.1

the Constitution. 20 25 30 35 40 Apart from the rights

the applicant under the Colonial Regulations which had been preserved under Article 192

the Constitution, counsel contended that all other disciplinary power has been vested after Independence in the Public Service Commission, by virtue

Article 125

.1

the Constitution and there cannot be concurrent or similar power in any other body, because the situation will arise

two authorities with parallel or concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction, something which cannot be accepted as a possibility. In dealing with the question as to whether the act

the Ministers was an administrative measure or a disciplinary sanction, counsel submitted that even if the Court reached the conclusion that such action amounted to an administrative measure, again it was subject to judicial scrutiny and it is upon the Court to decide as to the essence and the true nature

their action. Counsel expounded on the meaning

public interest and when such matter can be invoked. He submitted that invoca­ tion

public interest must be justified with a specification

the serious reasons

public interest and how the conduct

the applicant affected that public interest. The invocation should refer to real facts and circumstances, supported by 255 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)evidence and not by a general averment, asin the present case. Those

fended by the conduct

the applicant, counsel concluded, have appointed themselves, asinvestigators,prosecutors, witnesses, judges and executors

their own judgment as to what amounted to public interest. Counsel for respondent in opening his address, produced a copy

the decision

the Council

Ministers

the 11th June, 1981,which was put in as exhibit No. 1and said that it wasthe best hecould do at the moment, but hedid not exclude thepossibilitythatatsomelaterstageinthecourseofthehearing 10 it might be possible to put before the Court more details in compliance with the wishes expressed by counsel for the other side, provided that the Council

Ministers was prepared to give him all data required by the other side. Though such statement wasmadeon the 10thNovember, 1981,nosuchparti- 15 culars were given on the lines requested by counsel for the applicants till the 11th December, 1981 when counsel for the respondent continued hisaddressandthehearingwasconcluded. Dealing with the question

reasoning, counsel contended that there was sufficient reasoning in the letter communicating 20 thedecisionoftherespondenttotheapplicant. Onthequestion

violation

the Rules

Natural Justice, counsel submitted that the rule concerning the right

hearing was not violated in the present case,becausethe decision

the Council

Ministers was an administrative measure in the public interest, and 25 not a sanction taken against the applicant for the commission

a disciplinary

fence by the applicant and, therefore, the Council

Ministers was not bound to accord the applicant the right to be heard. As to the violation

the rule that one cannot be a judge 30 in his own cause, counsel contended that in the present case the Council

Ministers was the only competent organ under section 7

the Pensions Law, to terminate the service

a public

ficer on the grounds

public interest and, therefore, the implication

the Law

Necessity may override the rule 35 that onecannot beajudgeinhisowncause,astherewasnobody else entrusted with such power. He contended that even if the alleged conduct

the applicant constituted a disciplinary

fence, irrespective

whether any disciplinary proceedings 256 5 3 CL.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. were taken or not, the Council

Ministers was entitled, in the circumstances

the present case, to terminate the service

the applicant on the ground

public interest as, by his conduct, the applicant could no longer remain in the Public Service, 5 because he has presented the Government as being without head, without a leader and that the country as lacking

good and efficient government, showing an intention that he was not prepared to co-operate with this Government and with its Ministers in his capacity as Director

the Ministry in 10 question. Such termination

the service

the

ficer in question was not made for the purpose

punishing him but because his continued presence in the Public Service would be against the public interest. In support

his argument that the act

the Council

Ministers was an administrative mea15 sure, counsel tried to draw a distinction between a disciplinary act and an administrative measure and concluded, on this point, that in the case where an administrative measure is taken, the Rules

Natural Justice do not apply. Dealing with the Pensions Law, counsel for the applicant sub20 mitted that the Pensions Law, Cap. 311, is not an enabling law giving power to the Council

Ministers to grant pensions in cases

termination

service, but it is a law which does give power to terminate the service

a public

ficer and at the same time to decide if any and what gratuity or pension the 25 public

ficer in question will receive. Section 7 is a composite section, in that it both gives power to terminate the service and also discretionary powers to decide what, if any, pension or gratuity the public

ficer concerned will receive on termination

such service. Counsel further stated that though dis30 ciplinary proceedings cannot be taken by the Council

Ministers and though the Council

Ministers does not have parallel jurisdiction with the Public Service Commission to exercise disciplinary proceedings, yet, it has the power to terminate the employment

public

ficers in the public interest as such 35 power is vested in the Council

Ministers by Article 54

the Constitution, which is indicative but not exhaustive

the executive powers

the Council

Ministers under the Constitution. Counsel contended that the powers which are vested in the Council

Ministers by virtue

section 6(f) and section 40 7

Cap. 311, and by virtue

the residuary overall executive powers with which it isvested by Article 54

the Constitution, 257 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)are different to the disciplinary powers vested in the Public Service Commission by virtue

the Constitution and the Public Service Law, 33/67. These powers

the Council

Ministers must be exercised in the public interest and not directly for reasons which are disciplinary and which have the object or are motivated by the desire to punish the public

ficer for misconduct, rather than to effect a change in his position in the Public Service which is dictated by more general reasons

public interest and in which any possible misconduct has no relevance, except a very secondary one. 5 10 On the question

the constitution

the Council

Ministers, counsel argued that the Council

Ministers was properly constituted and that there was no excess number

ministers than the number provided for by the Constitution which is ten Ministers,plusthe Minister

Education who wasappointed 15 over a Ministry which was created under the Law

Necessity after it was found that the Communal Chamber could not properly operate, a fact which is not disputed in the present case. The fact that one Minister, that is, the Minister

Interior was also Minister

Defence, is not contrary to the provi- 20 sions

the Constitution, because the Constitution does not provide for specific Ministries but only fixes the number

Ministers. As to the Deputy Minister

Interior, his position was that

an under-sccretary, who, though attending the meetings

the Council

Ministers, is not participating in 25 the taking

the decisions. Counsel contended that there is no provision in the Constitution about the quorum

the Council

Ministers, but only that the decision should be a majority decision, in the present case, the decision was taken by six Ministers who were present, 30 unanimously, and, therefore, there was majority decision. And counsel concluded his argument by submitting that the decision

the Council

Ministers was properly taken within the powers vested in it under the provisions

section 6(f) and section 7

the Pensions Law. 35 It is clear from the contents

the letter sent to the applicant embodying the decision

the Council

Ministers for his dismissal from the Public Service, and from the whole tenor

the arguments before me, that in taking such decision the 258 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. Council

Ministers relied on section 6(f) and section 7

the Pensions Law, Cap. 311, as amended by Laws 9/67 to 39/81. 5 The Pensions Law, Cap. 311 is according to its title, "A Law to provide for the payment

pensions, gratuities and other allowances" to public

ficers. It embodied the provisions

the previous Pensions Law, Cap.288

Vol. Ηof the Legislation

Cyprus, 1949, as amended by Laws 4/52 to 28/58. Regarding thecircumstances inwhich pension may be granted, section 6 reads as follows:- 10 "No pension, gratuity or other allowance shall be granted under this Law to any

ficer except on his retirement from the public service in one

the following cases " And it then proceeds to enumerate the various cases which include, inter alia, the attaining

the age

60, on transfer 15 to other public service, on the abolition

fice, on compulsory retirement for the purpose

facilitating improvement in the organisation

the Department, on medical grounds, etc. to which, for the purposes

the present case, I need not refer in detail, save in respect

case under paragraph (f)

s. 6 20 which is material to the present case and which reads as follows: "(f) in the case

termination

employment in the public interest as provided in this Law". 25 Though section 6 has undergone a number

amendments, the provision contained in paragraph (f) is still the same as in the original text

Cap. 311. As to matters relating to termination

employment in the public interest, the respective provisions are contained in section 7, which, used to read as follows: 30 35 "Where an

ficer's service is terminated on the ground that, having regard to the conditions

the public service, the usefulness

the

ficer thereto and all the other circum­ stances

the case, such termination is desirable in the public interest, and a pension, gratuity or other allowance cannot otherwise be granted to him under the provisions

this Law, the Governor in Council may, if he thinks fit, grant such pension, gratuity or other allowance as he thinks just and proper, not exceeding in amount that for 259 Sawides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)which the

ficer would be eligible if he retired from the public service in the circumstances described in paragraph (e)

section 6

this Law". Paragraph (e)

section 6to whichreference ismadeby section 7, is the case

retirement on medical grounds. The following amendments were brought about to section 7 by section 3

Law 38/79:- 5 (a) The words "by the Council

Ministers" were interposed after the words "is terminated" in the first line

section 7. 10 (b) The words "the Governor in CouncM" referred to therein were substituted by the words "The Council

Ministers". Till the year 1955 there was no provision in the old Pensions Law, Cap. 288, about the granting

pension in the case

15 termination

employment in the public interest. Paragraph (f)

section 6 used to read as follows:"in the case

removal on the ground

inefficiency as provided in this Law". And section 7

Cap. 288 used to read:- 20 "Where an

ficer is removed from his

fice on the ground

his inability to discharge efficiently the duties thereof, and a pension gratuity or other allowance cannot otherwise be granted to him under the provisions

this Law, the Governor-in-Council, may, if he considers it justifiable 25 having regard to all the circumstances

the case, grant such pension, gratuity or other allowance as he thinks just and proper, not exceeding in amount that for which the

ficer would be eligible if he retired from the public service in the circumstances described in paragraph (c) 30

the preceding section". In 1955 and as a result

the provisions

section 3

Law 1

1955, paragraph (f)

section 6 and also section 7,

Cap. 288 were amended by the introduction

the words "in the public interest" and the so amended sections appear as stated 35 in section 6(f) and section 7

Cap. 311, subject to the amendments brought about to section 7 by section 3

Law 260 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. 38

1979 which was enacted after the Independence

Cyprus. Law 1of 1955 was enacted at a time when the Colonial Regulations were part

the Colonial Legislation which extended to all Colonies set out therein, including Cyprus which was 5 then a Colony. Under Regulation 59

the Colonial Regulations, power was vested to the Governor, to terminate the service

an

ficer in the public interest, and the procedure to be followed in such case is set out therein. Regulation 59 provided as 10 follows:- 15 20 25 "Notwithstanding the above provisions, if the Governor considers that it is desirable in the public interest that any

ficer should be iequired to retire from the Service on grounds which cannot suitably be dealt with by the procedure laid down in Regulation 58, he shall call for a full report from theheads

the departments inwhich the

ficer has served; and if, after considering that report and giving the

ficer an opportunity

submitting a reply to the complaints by reason

which his retirement is contemplated, he is satisfied, having regard to the conditions

the Service, the usefulness

the

ficer thereto and all the other circumstances

the case that it is desirable in the public interest to do so, he may require the

ficer to retiie and the

ficer's service shall accordingly terminate on such date as the Governor shall specify. In every such case the question

pension will be dealt with under the laws or iegulations

the Colony". (The underlining is mine). Regulation 59did not contain any provision asto the question 30

any pension being payable to an

ficer whose services were terminated in the public interest, but expressly reserved that matter to be dealt with under the laws or regulations

each Colony. As I have already mentioned, till the enactment

Law 1

1955 whereby the old Pensions Law (old Cap. 288) 35 was amended, there was no provision in the Pensions Law for the granting

any pension to a civil servant whose services were terminated under the powers vested in the Governor by Regulation 59. Comparing the wording

section 7

the Pensions Law (Cap. 311) with that

Regulation 59, one 40 will notice that it is the same in the material respect underlined 261 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)inthetextofRegulation 59setouthereinaboveasthat embodied in Cap. 311. It is also evident that whereas under Regulation 59there is express power to "require the

ficer to retire and the

ficer's service shall accordingly terminate on such date as the Governor shall specify", under the provisions

section 5 7 the power contemplated therein is to grant pension gratuity or other allowance "where an

ficers serviceisterminated _ and a pension, gratuity or other allowance cannot otherwise be granted to him under the provisions

this Law- _. ". Considering the objects

the Pensions Law as set out in its 10 title, the express power for termination

service

a civil servant in Regulation 59 and the phraseology

section 7 as tothe power to grant pension which, in this respect is the same as that

Regulation 59, and comparing the provisions

Regulation 59 to those

section 6(f) and section 7, one can 15 reach the conclusion that the power to terminate the service

a public

ficer emanated not from sections 6(

  1. f)and 7of the PensionsLaw,butfrom Colonial Regulation 59 and thatsection 6(
  2. f)and section 7 were ancillary provisions enacted to give effect to Regulation 59 under the provision contained in the 20 last sentence

such Regulation. In dealing with the position as it existed prior to Independence, 1 find myself unable to accept tiie argument advanced by counsel for the respondent that the power for dismissal emanated from section 7

the Pensions Law and not from the Colonial Regulations. 25 Regarding the tenure

fice and the dismissal

a civil servant, one has to examine the situation as it was prior to Independence and how it developed after the Independence

Cyprus under the provisions

the Constitution

Cyprus which came into force on the 16th August 1960 as well as 30 under any laws enacted under such provisions since Independence. Prior to Independence the holding

fice by civilservantswasregulated bytheColonial Regulations. Under regulation 56 it was provided that:"An

ficer holds

fice subjecttothepleasureoftheCrown, 35 and the pleasure

the Crown that he should no longer hold it may be signified through the Secretary

State, in which case no special formalities are required". Thoughin thesaid Regulation thetenure

office isdescribed asbeingsubject tothepleasureoftheCrown,onceacivilservant 40 262 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. had qualified by examination and probation and was taken on establishment, he was secure in his employment till retiring age, save in cases

misconduct or inefficiency. This has been well-established by the House

Lords in McClelland v. N. 5 IrelandHealth Board [1957]2 All E.R. 129, in which Lord Goddard, summarised the position

civil servants as to tenure

fice as follows, at page 134:- 10 "Although a civil servant, as is well known, is employed at the pleasure

the Crown and can be dismissed at any moment, in fact once he has qualified by examination or piobation and is taken on the establishment he is secure in his employment till he reaches the ret-ring age, apart

course from misconduct or complete inefficiency". To the same effect is the decision

our Supreme Constitu15 tional Court in Markides v. The Republic

(1961)2 R.S.C.C. 8 in which the Court dealing with the question

pensions and gratuities, had this to say at p. 12:- 20 25 "Notwithstanding the fact that under the constitutional and legal principles prevailing in Crown Colonies, such as the former Colony

Cyprus was, matters

pension and giatuity are, by legal fiction, regarded as discretionary acts

grace, they were nevertheless vested 'rights'

the individual concerned, inasmuch as they could be vindicated through the appropriate administrative procedure". (see also, GeorghiosHadjisavvav. Republic

(1972)3 C.L.R. 174, in which the same principle was adopted). Under regulation 57, theie was provision how a public

ficer represented to the Governor as guilty

misconduct not

a serious nature was to be treated. The material part

such 30 regulation, reads as follows:- 35 "If it is represented to the Governor that an

ficer has been guilty

misconduct, and the Governor is

opinion that the misconduct alleged isnotserious enough to warrant proceedings under Regulations 58 and 60, with a view to dismissal, he may cause an investigation to be made into the matter in such manner as he shall think proper, and the

ficer shall be entitled to know the whole case made against him and shall have an adequate opportunity throughout

making his defence. 263 Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J.

(1982)If as aresult theGovernoris

opinion thatthe allegation is proved, he may inflict such punishment upon the

ficer by way

fine or reduction in rank, or otherwise, as may seem to him just. In the case

an

ficer holding an

fice appointment 5 to which is subject to the approval

the Secretary

State, or an

ficer who, though not holding such an

fice, was selected for appointment by the Secretary

State, the punishment proposed shall be immediately reported to theSecretary

State and thereportshall be accompanied 10 by a statement

the

fence, the evidence in support,. and such observations as the

ficer has made or desires to make. The Secretary

State may approve, vary or remit the punishment. This Regulation is without prejudice to any local law 15 or regulation providing for the punishment

ficers by the Governor or the head

a department", (The underlining is mine). Where the conduct

an "

ficer" was such as to make him liable for dismissal by the Governor, this could only be done 20 subject to the provisions and the procedure contemplated by regulations 58, 59 and 60. Regulation 58 was applicable to

ficers who neither held an

fice appointment to which was subject to the approval

the Secretary

State, nor was selected for appointment by 25 the Secretary

State and the power

his d-smissal by the Governor was subject to theprocedure set outtherein and which was as follows ίΟ) The

ficer shall be notified in writing

the giounds 30 upon which it is intended to dismiss him; and he >hall be given a full opportunity

exculpating himself. (ii) The matter shall be investigated by the Governor with the aid

the Head

the

ficer's Department, or such other

ficer or

ficers a; the Governor may 35 appoint; piovided that in the case

an

ficer whose pensionable emoluments exceed £600 per annum, 264 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Saviides J. the procedure laid down in Colonial Regulations 60(i) to (vii) shall be followed. 5 (iii) If any witnesses are called to give evidence the

ficer shall be entitled to be present and to put questions to the witnesses. (iv) No documentary evidence shall be used against the

ficer unless he has previously been supplied with a copy thereof or given access thereto. 10 15 (v) In lieu

dismissal theGovernor mayat his discretion impose some lesser panalty such as reduction in rank, stoppage

increment, fine or reprimand. Alternatively, if the proceedings disclose grounds for so doing, he may without further proceedings lcquiie the

ficer to retire in accordance with Regulation 59. (vi) If the

ficer is convicted on a criminal charge, the Governor may, upon a consideration

the proceedings

the Court, dismiss the

ficer or subject him to some lesser penalty". In the case

an

ficer holding an

fice appointment to 20 which was subject to the approval

the Secretary

State, or who, though not holding such an

fice, was selected for appointment bythe Secretary

State, theright

the Governor for h's dismissal was subject to a more strict procedure safeguarding the rights

the

ficer, which provided that: 25 3Q ~r "Reg. 60 __._„ (i) The

ficer shall by direction

the Governor be notified in writing

the grounds on which it is proposed to dismiss him and he shall be called upon to state in writing before a dayto be specified (which day must allow a reasonable interval for the purpose) any grounds upon which he relies to exculpate himself. (ii) If the

ficer does not furnish such statement within the time fixed bytheGovernor, orifhe fails to exculpate himself to the satisfaction

the Governor, the Governor shall appoint a Committee to inquire into the matter. The Committee shall consist

not less than three persons. The chairman shall be a Judge, 265 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)Magistrate, or Legal

ficer. The members

the Committee shall be selected with due regard to the standing

the

ficer concerned, and to the nature and quality

the complaints which are subject

the inquiry. The head

the

ficer's department shall not be a member

the Committee. (iii) The

ficer shall be informed that on a specified day the question

his dismissal will be brought before the Committee and that he will be allowed and, if the Committee shall so determine, required to appear before the Committee and defend himself. 5 10 (iv) Ifwitnesses are examined by the Committee, the

ficer shall be given an opportunity

being present and

putting questions to the witnesses on his own behalf, and no documentary evidence shall be used against 15 him unless he has previously been supplied with a copy thereof or given access thereto. (\) The Committee mayinitsdiscretion permit the Government or the

ficer, to be represented by an

ficer in the public service oi, inexceptional cases,by solicitor 20 or counsel, and may at any time, subject to such adjournment as in the circumstances may be required, withdraw such permission; provided that wheie the Committee permit the Government to be represented they shall not refuse the

ficer permission to be 25 similarly represented. (vi) If during the course

the inquiry further grounds

dismissal are disclosed, and the Governor thinks fit to proceed against the

ficer upon such grounds, the

ficer shall by the Governor's direction be 30 furnished with a written statement thereof and the same steps shall be taken as are above prescribed in respect

the original grounds". Paragraphs (vii) and (viii) set out the procedure to be followed after the report

the Committee was submitted to the Governor 35 and considered by him in Executive Council, and the functions

the Secretary

State after such report was submitted to him. In addition to the above Regulations, dealing with misconduct 266 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J.

an

ficer, regulation 59to which reference has already been made, provided how an

ficer could be dismissed in the public interest. Examining regulations 57, 58, 59and 60, one will notice that 5 the power vested in the Governor for imposing any punishment eitherbywayoffine,reduction inrank,ordismissal,presupposed a right, given to the

ficer, to know the case against him and to have adequate opportunity throughout to make his defence, and under no circumstances the Governor was empowered 10 topunishor dismisshimwithout affording himsuch opportunity in the manner provided for by each respective regulation. Having dealt with the position

civil servants prior to Independence, Iam nowcomingtoconsider theposition asfrom the Independence Day under the provisions

the Constitution 15

Cyprus. Under Article 192

the Constitution, the terms and conditions

service

a public

ficer, as already applicable to him prior to the Independence Day, were preserved. Paragraph (I)

Article 192

provides as follows:20 25 "Save where other provision is made in this Constitution any person who,immediately before the date

thecoming into operation

this Constitution, holds an

fice in the public service shall, after that date, beentitled to the same terms and conditions

service as were applicable to him before that date and those terms and conditions shall not be altered to his disadvantage during his continuance inthe publicservice

the Republic on or after that date". And paragraph

(7)

Article 192provides:"7.

For the purposes

this Article- 30 (b) 'terms and conditions

service' means subject to ihe necessary adaptations under the provisions

this Constitution, remuneration, leave, removal from service, retirement pensions, gratuities or other like benefits". 35 Matters touching the appointment, promotion, transfer, retirementandexerciseofdisciplinarycontroloverpubhc

ficers 267 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)was assigned under Aiticle 125

the Constitution to the Public Service Commission established under Article 124. As to the duties and powers

the Public Service Commission, paragraph

(1)

Article 125

provides as follows:"Save where other express provision ismade in this Consti- 5 tution with respect to any matter s?t out in this paragraph and subject to the provisions

any law, it shall be the duty

the Public Service Commission to make the allocation

public

fices between the two Communities and to appoint, confirm, emplacs on the permanent or pensionable 10 establishment, promot.·, transfer, retire and exercise disciplinary control over, including dismissal or removal from

fice

, public

ficers". The comptence

the Public Service Commission under paragraph

(1)

Article 125

has been judicially considered in a 15 number

cases by this Court, but at this stage, I consider it sufficient to refer only to a few

them. InAhmedNedjati and TheRepublicof Cyprus

(1961)2 R.S.C.C. 78 at p. 82, the Supreme Constitutional Court said:"The Court is

the opinion that paragraph 1

Article 20

125 constituted the Public Service Commission as the only competent organ to decide on all matters stated therein concerning the individual holders

public

fices. It will be seen, therefore, that the objects

paragraph I

Article 125

include, not only the safeguarding

the 25 efficiency and proper functioning

the public service

the Republic, but also the protection

the legitimate interests

the individual holders

public

fices. This being so the interpretation

any particular provision

the sa;d paragraph 1of Article 125 should be made 30 in the light

the above objects due regard being had, at the same time, to the requirements

practicability and physical possibility". The above passage was cited and adopted by Triantafyllides, P. in the case

Yiallourou v. The Republic

(1976)3 C.L.R. 214 35 at p. 219. 268 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. In Nicolaou v. The Republic
(1969)3 C.L.R. 42 at p. 56 it reads:- 5 10 "In any case, I would require much more express and clear legislative language before I could hold that section 5
(4)deprives all the membeis

the Foreign Service—and not only some

them, for the sake

the exigencies

the service—

the independence ensured to them having their transfers decided upon by a Public Service Commission, be it the one under Atticle 124

the Constitution or the one under Law 33/67; because, without putting in doubt at all thegood faith

any Minister or Head

Department, it is plainly obvious that a public

ficer feels more inde­ pendent if his fate in theservice depends not on his superiors but on a separate autononous organ". 15 In 1967 an organic Law, The Public Service Law (Law 33/67) was enacted making provision for "the functioning

the Public Service Commission, for the appointment,promotion and retire­ ment

pubhc

ficers and their terms

service, disciplinary proceedings and other matters relating to the public service". 20 Under section 5 the functions

the Public Service Commis­ sion are set out as follows:- 25 30 35 "Πλην τών περιπτώσεων περϊ τών οποίων γίνεται ειδική πρόνοια ευτω παρόντι ή έν οίωδήποτε έτέρω υόμω «ς προς οιουδήποτε θέμαεκτιθέμενουέν τω παρόντιάρθρωκαιτηρουμέυωυ τώυ διατάξεων τοΟ παρόντος ή οιουδήποτε έτερου εκάστοτε έν ΐσχύϊ νόμου, αποτελεί καθήκοντης 'Επιτροπής ό διορισμός,ή έπικύρωσις διορισμού,ή ενταξις είς το μόνιμου προσωπικόν, ή προαγωγή, ή μετάθεσις, ή άπόσπασις και ή άφυπηρέτησιςδημοσίων ύπαλλήλωυ και ή έπ' αυτών άσκησις πειθαρχικούέλεγχου περιλαμβανομέυωντης απολύ­ σεως ή της απαλλαγής από τώυ καθηκόυτωυ αυτών". ("5. Save where other express provision is made in this or any other law with respect to any matter set out in this section and subject to the provisions

this or any other law in force for the time being, it shall be the duty

the Commission to appoint,confirm, emplace on thepermanent establishment, promote,transfer, second, retire and exercise disciplinary control over, including dismissal or removal from

fice

, public

ficers"). 269 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)Part V

the Law, deals with the appointments, promotions, transfers, resignations and retirements

public

ficers. Part VI with the duties and responsibilities

public

ficers. Part VII embodies the Disciplinary Code which sets out the disciplinary

fences and the punishments which can be imposed upon 5 a civil servant

such

fences as well as the procedure to be followed. Section 80 provides that when a public servant is reported to the appropriate authority (as defined in section 2), for having committed a disciplinary

fence, then, if the

fence is one set 10 out in Part I

Schedule I

the Law, the appropriate authority may deal summarily with the case by causing an investigation to be made inter-deparlmentally, as provided by section 81 and after such investigation, if a disciplinary

fence is disclosed, the appropriate authority may proceed to consider the case 15 in the manner provided therein by affording ths

ficer the opportunity to be heard. If the

ficer is found guilty, the appropriate authority may impose upon him any one

the sentences which are set out in Part II

Schedule 1. In cases where the appropriate authority comes to the conclusion 20 that due to the seriousness

the

fence or the circumstances under which it was committed a more serious sentence has to be imposed, then the case is referred to the Public Service Commission, and the procedure to be followed is set out under section 82. The Public Service Commission may impose on 25 such

ficer any one

ihe senlences set out in section 89

(1)ranging from caution and warning to the more severe ones, such as compulsory retirement or dismissal. A material provision which appears both in section 81 and section 82, is the right

the

ficer to be infoimed

the accusations against 30 him and defend himself. Under section 82, provision is made that the public

ficer should be informed

the charge against him, attend the hearing

the case to defend himself, summon witnesses for his defence and be represented by counsel

his choice. The trial before 35 the Commission undei the Regulations set out in the Annex to the said Law, is carried out in so far as this is possible in the same manner as a criminal case tried summarily. Article 54

the Constitution sets out the executive powers to be exercised by the Council

Ministeis which extend to 40 270 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. powers in all matters, other than those expressly reserved to the President and the Vice-President

the Republic and those within the competence

a Communal Chamber as provided by the Constitution. Such powers include, amongst others:5 "(a) the general direction and control

the Government

the Republic and the direction

general policy; (d) The co-ordination and supeivision

all public services; The competence

the Council

Ministers under Article 10 54 has been examined by this Court in a number

cases. In particular, paragraphs (

  1. a)and (
  2. d)were considered inPapapetrou and The Republic

Cyprus, 2 R.S.C.C. p. 61 at p. 66 where the Court, expressed its opinion as follows:15 20 25 30 35 "In theopinion

the Court the PublicSeivice Commission, which is established under Article 124, is vested under the Constitution with only those powers which it has expressly been given under Article 125. The residue

any executive power in respect

any matters concerning the public service

a State, which by its constitution has not been expressly given to an independentbody suchas a Public Service Commission, remains vested in the organ

the State which exercises executive power and within whose province the public service

the State normally otherwise comes and in the case

the Republic

Cyprus such organ, under Article 54

the Constitution, and paiticularly paragraphs (

  1. a)and (
  2. d)thereof, is the Council

Ministers. It is clear from the wording

paragraph 1

Article 125

that the Public Service Commission, ir addition to being entrusted with the task

the allocation

public

fices between the two Communities in accordance with Article 123,is only entrusted with powers, such as appointment, confirmation, etc., relating to public

ficers, as holders

public

fices, but not to the public

fices in question themselves. 271 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)As the executive power relating to the creation

new posts inthe public serviceof the Republic and to the making and amending

schemes

service concerning existing or new posts, is a power relating to public

fices and not to the public

ficers, as holders

such

fices, it is not, 5 thus, included among the powers which are entrusted to the Public Service Commission by Article 125 and such power remains vested in the Council

Ministers. This view regarding the effect

paragraph 1

Article 125

is clearly consonant with the powers

the Council 10

Ministers under Article 54

the Constitution, particularly paragraphs (

  1. a)and (
  2. d)thereof". (Vide also, Georghiadesv. The Republic

(1966)3 C.L.R. 252 at p. 276 where the said opinion was adopted). In Papaleontiou v. The Republic
(1967)3 C.L.R. 624 which 15 was a case

a Court Stenographer who had decided on his own to resign and he communicated such intention to the Government with a request that the termination

his services should be treated as having taken place in the public interest it was found that the case was not within the competence

the 20 Public Service Commission and that the appropriate organ to deal with the matter involved was the Council

Ministers. Triantafyllides J. (ashe then was) at p. 631,concluded as follows on this point: "Without going fully into the extent

the competence 25

the Commission—under Article 125.1—in matters

retirement or termination

services

public

ficers, I am satisfied that in the present instance it was the Council

Ministers which was the competent organ to deal with the matter involved in this recourse: 30 What happened was, in essence, that the Applicant had decided, on his own, to resign and he did communicate this to Government by his letter

the 1st January, 1966; he coupled the communication

his decision to lesign with a request that the termination

his services should 35 be treated as having taken place in the public interest, but he did not make his resignation conditional upon his request being granted. Whether or not the request

the Applicant would be 272 3 C.L.R. 5 Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. granted was a question entailing considerations

public interest and Government policy, as well asfinancialconsequences;these matters werebeyond the limited and specifically laid down competence

the Public Service CommissionunderArticle 125.1,andwithin theresidual competence

the Council

Ministers under Article 54of the Constitution". The construction

Article 54a

s to the residual competence

the Council

Ministers under such Article as expounded 10 in the above cases and to which I agree, was also adopted in Hadjisavva v. The Republic

(1972)3 C.L.R. 174 where Hadjianastassiou, J. at p. 192 said:- 15 20 25 "There is no doubt that the Public Service Commission is vested under the Constitution with only those powers which it has expressly been given under Article 125; and theresidueofanyexecutivepower inrespect

any matters concerning thepublicserviceof a State,whichbyitsconstitution has not been expressly given to an independent body suchasthePublicServiceCommission, remainsvested in the organ

the State which exercises executive power within whose province the Public Service

the State normally otherwise comes, and in the case

the Republic

Cyprus, suchorgan, underArticle 54ofthe Constitution, and particularly paragraphs (a) and (d), is the Council

Ministers". In dealing asto thepower to terminate the service

a public

ficer in the public interest prior to Independence I have concluded that such power did not emanate from section 6(f) and 7

the Pensions Law, Cap. 311but from the Colonial Regula30 tions and that sections 6(f) and 7were only ancillary provisions enabling the Council

Ministers to grant pension or gratuity in such cases. After Independence, one has to examine within whose competence matters

retirement

a pubhc

ficer "in the public interest" are and wherefrom such competence 35 isderived. InPapaleontiouv. TheRepublic(supra)inthespecial circumstances

that case, it was held that as the question entailed considerations

public interest and Government policy, it was not within the specifically laid down competence

the PublicServiceCommission underArticle 125.1butwithin 273 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)the residual competence

the Council

Ministers under Article 54

the Constitution. In Lyssiotou v. Papasavva and another

(1968)3 C.L.R. 173 at pp. 184-185, Josephides, J., had this to say:"It should, perhaps, be clarified that we are not here 5 concerned with the compulsory retirement

a public

ficer following disciplinary proceedings, which would no doubt be within the competence

the Commission; nor are we concernedwith the retirement

a public

ficer 'in the public interest", under the provisions

section 7 10

the Pensions Law, Cap. 311, which would appear to fall within the exclusive competence

the Council

Ministers (cf. the cases

the termination

the services

three Court Stenographers referred to in the case

Papaleontiou and The Republic,

(1967)3 C.L.R. 624)". 15 Though I am inclined to agree with the above opinion in that matters concerning the retirement

a public

ficer "in the public interest" other than the compulsory retirement

a public

ficer following disciplinary proceedings on matters which under Article 125.1 fall within the exclusive competence 20

the Public Service Commission would appear to fall within the exclusive competence

the Council

Ministers, I disagree that such competence is derived from section 7

the Pensions Law, Cap. 311 but from the residue

any executive powers vested in the Council

Ministers under Article 54

the Consti- 25 tution in respect

any matters concerning the public service which have not been expressly given to the Public Service Com­ mission under Article 125. Having embarked at some length with the position

public

ficers both prior to and after the Independence, I am now 30 coming to consider the legal grounds on which this recourse is based and which have been argued before me. The minutes

the meeting

the Council

Ministers at which the decision was taken have been produced as exhibit 1 and they read as follows:"To ΎττουργΊκόυ Συμβουλίου, ένασκοϋν τάς εξουσίας τά χορηγούμενος αύτω δυυάμει τών άρθρων 6(στ) και 7 τοΰ περί Συυτάξεωυ Νόμου, Κεφ. 311 (ως έτροττοποιήθη μετα- 274 35 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 Kazamias v. Republic Satrides J. γενεστέρως), και ττασαυ άλληυ προς τούτο χορηγουμέυην αύτω έξουσίαυ καΐ, κατόπινενδελεχούς εξετάσεως τώυ προσκομισθέυτωυ στοιχείωυ ενσχέσει προς τήυ ανεπίτρεπτουδημοσία συμπεριφοράυ τού κ. Πάνου Άδαμίδη, Γενικού Διευθυντού τού Υπουργείου Παιδείας και τοϋ κ. Παναγιώτη Καζαμία, Γενικού Διευθυντού τού Υπουργείου Συγκοιυωνιώυ και "Εργωυ, ή οποία θίγει βασικως αύτήυ ταύτηυ τήυκρατικήυ ΰπόστασιν και τήν κανονικήν και απρόσκοπτου λειτουργίαν τοΰ κράτους καΐ της Δημοσίας αύτοΰ Υπηρεσίας, λαβόν ΰ π ' όψιν τάς συυθήκας τηςΥπηρεσίας ταύτης καΐ την είς αυτήν χρησιμότητα τών προαναφερθέντωυδημοσίων ύπαλλήλωυκαϊ £νγένει άπάσας τάς περιστάσεις κατέληξευ είςτό συμπέρασμα ότι ή παραμονή αΰτώυ εϊς τήυ Δημοσίαυ Ύπηρεσίαυ όχι μόυου ούδεμίαυ ώφελημότητα θά παρεϊχευ είς ταύτηυ, αλλά και θά ήτο λίαυ επιβλαβής δι* αύτήυ και άπεφάσισευ όπως αί Οπηρεσίαι αυτών τερματισθώσι προς τ ό δημόσιου συμφέρον άπό σήμερον, μέ πλήρη τ ά ωφελήματα άφυπηρετήσεως, τών οποίων ούτοι δικαιούνται". The English translation

which reads as follows:- 20 25 30 35 40 " T h e Council

Ministers in exercising thepowers vested in it by sections 6(f) and 7

the Pensions Law, Cap.311 (as later amended), and any other power in this respect vested init and, after a thorough examination

the material produced in relation to the unbecoming conduct in public

Mr. Panos Adamides, Director-General

the Ministry

Education and Mr. Panayiot's Kazamias, DirectorGeneral

the Ministry

Communications and Works. which

fends basically the very subsistence

the State and the proper and unfettered functioning

the State and its Public Service, having taken into consideration the conditions

such Service and the usefulness

the aforesaid public

ficers thereto andgenerally all the circum­ stances, came to the conclusion that their stay in the Public Seivice could n o t only serve n o useful purpose to it, b u t it would also be very detrimental thereto and decided that their services should be terminated as from today in the public interest, with full retirement benefits, to which they are entitled". As I have already mentioned counsel for applicant, both prior to thehearing by letter, as well as in the course

the hearing, 275 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic (1982 asked to be informed

the source and nature

"the material before the Council

Ministers" which led it to the conclusion that the conduct

the applicant was unbecoming conduct in public undermining the State and its Public Service, but there was no response to such tequest. It was counsel's contention both in the grounds

law set out in the recourse and m his address to the Court that there was lack

due reasoning

the decision which violated one

the basic principles

admi­ nistrative law in that respect. 5 It is a well established principle

Administrative Law that 10 administrative decisions have to be duly reasoned. Due reaso­ ning is essential to enable the Courts to carry out properly their function

judicial control

administrative actions. (See Rallis and the Greek Communal Chamber,5 R.S.C.C. 11, Jakovides v. The Republic

(1966)3 C.L R. 212 at p. 221, Zavros v. 15 The Council for Registration

Architects and Civil Engineers

(1969)3 C.L.R 310 at ρ 315, Kasapisv. Councilfor Registration

Aicfutects and Civil Engineers

(1967)3 C L R ρ 270 at pp. 275, 276, Constantmtdes v. The Republic
(1967)3 C L R. 7 at ρ 14, Metaphoriki Eteiia v. Republic
(1981)3 C L R 221 at 20 ρ 237). In Hadjisavva ν The Republic
(1972)3 C L R 174, Hadjianastassiou. J had this to say at p. 203 "It is one

the concepts

administrative law that admi­ nistrative decisions must be duly reasoned. Due reasoning is lequncd in order- to make possible the ascertainment

the proper application

the law and to enable the due carrying out

judicial control". And then he goes on to refer to the judgment

Megaw, J. in Re Poysei and Mills' Arbitration [1963] 1 All E.R. 612 at ρ 616 on the same topic, and he concluded as follows at p. 205. 25 30 "It is to be observed that the giving

reasons in England comes within the concept

error

law which includes the giving

leasons that are bad in law, or (if there is 35 a duty to give reasons) inconsistent, unintelligible or other­ wise substantially inadequate What amounts to du; reasoning in a question

degree 276 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. depending uponthenatureofthedecisionconcerned,but the reasoning behind an administrative decision may be found either in the decision itself or in the

ficial records related thereto*'. 5 Re Poyserand Mills"Arbitration is also referred to in the case

Givaudan& Co. Ltd. v. The Minister

Housing etc. [1966] 3 All E.R. 696. The Court in the latter case was dealing with an application to quash the Minister's decision dismissing an appeal against the refusal

a planning authority for the grant 10

planning permission. The facts

the case were shortly as follows :- i5 20 25 30 "An application for planning permission was refused by the local planning authority on three grounds. The applicantsappealed to the Minister

Housing and local Government, who appointed an inspector to hold a local inquiry. The inspector set out his conclusions in paras. 61-68

his report in which, after stating that the effect

a Bill (later enacted) might require consideration, he dealt with the three grounds and found in favour

the applicants on two

the grounds and against them on the third. He recommended, on the basis

the adverse conclusion, that the appeal should be dismissed. The Minister, in para. 3

his letter notifying his decision on the appeal and his reasons therefor, set out what appeared to be intended as a summary

paras 61-68

the report, omitting, however, a passage crucial to the inspector's conclusion on one

the grounds

objection onwhichhe had found in favour

the applicants. Paragraph 4

the Minister's letter stated merely that he agreed with the inspector's conclusions, without identifying which

those conclusions and accepted his recommendation. A copy

the Inspector's report wasenclosed with the letter. The Minister dismissed the appeal". Megaw, J. had this to say at page 698:- 35 "I have come to the conclusion that the Minister's letter

Aug. 6, 1965,is so obscure, and would leavein the mind

an informed reader such real and substantial doubt as to the reasons for his decision and as to the matters which he did and did not take into account, thai it does 277 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)not comply with the requirements

r. 11

(1); and that, therefore, on that ground the Minister's order must be quashed". And at page 699:"There can be no objection to the inclusion, by reference, 5 in the Minister's statement

reasons,

the inspector's conclusions, provided that those conclusions are, in them­ selves, sufficiently clearly and unambiguously expressed". In Zavros v. The Council

Registration

Architects and Civil Engineers (supra) Stavrinides, J. had this to say at p. 10 315:"It is evident that the whole object

the rule requiring reasons to be given for administrative decisions is to enable in the first instance the persons concerned, and the Court on review, to ascertain in each case whether the decision 15 is well founded in fact and in Law (cp. Porismata Nomologhias. p. 183, fiist paragraph); and from this three propo­ sitions follow: (I) the reasons must be stated clearly and unambiguously;

(2)they must be read in the sense in which reasonable persons affected thereby would understand 20 them;
(3)a decision cannot be supported by reasons stated in terms not fulfilling the object

the rule". 1η Pancyprian Federationof Labour (PEO) and The Board

CinematographFilm Censorsetc.

(1965)3 C.L.R. p. 27, Triantafyllides, J. (as he then was) had this to say—at pp. 38-39:25 "The absence

the proper reasoning that is required, either by legislative provisions or by general principles

administrative law, renders the administrative action concerned defective and, therefore, subject to annulment (see Conclusions from the Jurisprudence

the Council 30

State in Greece 1929-1959 p. 267). Such defect exist> in the present case in relation to the sub judice decision

the Censorship Committee and I have reached the view that in the circumstances

this caseit is a material defence which is sufficient to cause the annulment

such decision". 35 In the sub judice decision there is further reference to the decision having been taken in the pubhc interest. Counsel 278 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. for the respondent in addressing the Court said that he was not suggesting that the character

the applicant was such that his presence in the service would be detrimental to the service, but because the applicant expressed himself in such terms against 5 the Government that (to use counsel's own words) "in the public interest the person in question should no longer be in the public • service because he has presented the Republic as being 'without a Head* without a leader and the country lacking

good and efficient government, and if he has made it clear that he is not 10 prepared to co-operate with this Government and with there Ministers in his capacity as Head

the Ministry in question, then it might be open to the Council

Ministers to come to the conclusion that the public interest requiies the termination

the service

the

ficer in question". No such facts, how15 ever,appear anywhere in theminutes or the letter communicating the decision

the Council

Ministers to the applicant which led it to invoke public interest other than a general averment

public interest. 20 25 30 35 A general averment

public interest does not amount to a sufficient reasoning but the invocation

public interest must be justified with a specification (έΣειδίκευσις)

the serious reasons

public interest which are involved. See, in this respect, "Modern Trends

the Principle

Legality" in Administrative Law" 1973 Ed., by Tahos, where at p. 146 it reads:" Ή έννοια τοΰ δημοσίου συμφέροντος είναι ευρύτατη. Τοϋ κοινοϋ (δημοσίου) συμφέροντος διαφέρει τό συμφέρον τοΰ Δημοσίου (Fiscus). Ή αφηρημένη δέ έττίκλησίς του θά κατέληγεν είς αύθαιρεσίαν της Διοικήσεως. "Οθεν, πρέπει να εξειδικεύεται έν έκαστη συγκεκριμένη περιπτώσει. Διότι τότε θά εΐναι δυνατός ό δικαστικός έλεγχος της όρθης ή μη υπαγωγής τών πραγματικών γεγονότων είς την περί ής ό λόγος εννοιαν". ("The notion

public interest is very wide. That

common (public) interest differs from that

the public (Fiscus). Its abstract invocation would result in abuse by the Administration. Therefore it must be specified in every "particular case. Because then judicial control

the correct or not subjection

the actual facts to the said notion would be possible".) 279 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic (19S2) And under foot-note

(19)at p. 119:— "19. Ή έννοια τοΰ δημοσίου (κοινοϋ) συμφέροντος πρέπει νά διακρίνεταιτόσον τοΰ συμφέροντος τοΰ Δημοσίου (Fiscus), όσον καΐ τοΰ συμφέροντος της δημοσίας υπηρεσίας (ΣΕ. 309/1955, 801/1958, 2178/1970). Ή έν λόγω έννοια δεν είναι τόσον αόριστος ώστε νά μην υπόκειται είς δικαστικόν ελεγχον. 'Αντιθέτως, συνιστά νομικήν Ιννοιαν, δι* ό και δέν διαφεύγει τόν ελεγχον τοΰ ΣτΕ. Παράδειγμα: Ή κατά τό άρθρον 3 Ν. 2363/1953 άρνησις χορηγήσεως διαβατηρίου δέον νά αΐτιολογηται πλήρως δια της εξειδικεύσεως τοΰ σοβαρού λόγου δημοσίας τάξεως ή συμφέροντος ένεκα τοΰ οποίου ή διοίκησις προήλθεν είς τοιαυτην άρνησιν (ΣΕ. 154/1954, 1122/1964, 2306/1968, 942/1971 κ.ά.). 5 10 ("The concept

public (common) interest must be distinguished both from the public interest (Fiscus) and 15 the interest

the public service. (See C.S. 309/1955, 801/1958, 2178/1970). The said notion is not so vague as not to be subject to judicial control. On the contrary it constitutes a legal notion and therefore it does not escape the control

the Council

State. Example: The 20 refusal to grant a passport by virtue

section 3

Law 2363/1953 must be duly reasoned by the specification

the serious reason

public order or interest whereby the administration arrived at such refusal (see 154/1954, 1122/ 1964, 2306/1968, 942/1971 and others".) 25 Decision 942/1971

the Greek Council

State to which reference is made in the above notes was one

the cases where the issue

a passport was refused under statutory authority vested in the appropriate authority for the issue

passports to refuse such application foi "serious reasons

public order or interest". The material part

the decision reads as follows: (at pp. 1241, 1242) 30 " Ή κατ* έφαρμογήν της ανωτέρω δυνάμεως άρνησις της Διοικήσεως όπως χορήγηση διαβατήριονείς τόνύποβαλόντα σχετικήν αιτησιν, δέον, ώς έκ της φύσεως τοΰ μέτρου, συνε- 35 παγομένου περιορισμόν της προσωπικής ελευθερίας, νά αΐτιολογήται πλήρως δια της εξειδικεύσεως τοΰ σοβαροΰ λόγου δημοσίας τάξεως ή, συμφέροντος, Ινεκα τοΰ οποίου ή αποδημία τοΰ αναφερομένου ήθελε καταστη επιβλαβής είς 280 3 CUR. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. τήν χώραν, κατά τήν ούσιαστικήν εκτίμησαν της Διοικήσεως, έρειδομένην επί συγκεκριμένων πραγματικών περιστατικών. Ή τοιαύτη δέ αίτιολογία δέον νά προκύπτη είτε έκ της οίκείας διοικητικής πράξεως περί αρνήσεως χορηγήσεως διαβατηρίου είτε έξ έγγραφων στοιχείων είς ά αύτη αναφέρεται. Επειδή έν προκειμένω ή μνημονευθείσα 7038/16.9.1970 πραξις τοΰ Διευθυντού 'Αποδημίας καΐ Μεταναστεύσεως, της οποίας ή αίτιολογία συνιστά τήν αίτιολογίαν της επι­ δίκου σιωπηράς παραλείψεως της Διοικήσεως, αναφέρει απλώς ότι δέν εγκρίνεται ή χορήγησις διαβατηρίου εις τόν αΐτιοϋντα προς μετάβασιν του είς τό έξωτερικόν, δια σοβαρούς λόγους δημοσίας τάξεως και συμφέροντος, ήτοι αρκείται είς τήν άπλήν επανάληψιν της διατάξεως τοΰ νόμου, μή διαλαμβάνουσα τά έφ5 ών στηρίζεται συγκεκριμένα περιστατικά, καΐ ούτω στερείται της κατά τήν προηγουμένην σκέψιν απαιτουμένης αιτιολογίας. Ή Ιλλειψις δέ αύτη δέν άναπληρούται έκ τών στοιχείων τών διαβιβασθέντων ύπά της Διοικήσεως- φακέλλων, και δή τού ύπ* αριθ. 1/395863/ 203053 ά π ό 2.9.1970 έγγραφου της Γεν. Δ/σεως Έθν. Άσφαλείας, τό όποιον επικαλείται ή αύτη πράξις τού Διευθυντού Άποδηΐί'ας και Μεταναστεύσεως, διότι καΐ έν αύτω διατυπούται απλώς ή γνώμη περί τού μή ενδεδειγμένου της αποδημίας τοΰ αιτούντος, διότι ούτος εξερχόμενος θά παραβλάψη τ ά εθνικά συμφέροντα, άνευ επικλήσεως τών περίστατικών, κατ 1 έκτίμησιν τών οποίων έσχηματίσθη ή γνώμη αύτη. Συνεπώς ό μοναδικός λόγος της ύπό κρίσιν αιτήσεως, περί τού μή ήτιολογημένου της επιδίκου παραλείψεως, ελέγχεται βάσιμος, και δια τόν λόγον τοϋτον είναι αύτη άκυρωτέα, ώς και ή συνιστώσα τήν αίτιολογίαν αυτής ώς άνω πραξις τού Διευθυντού 'Αποδημίας και Μεταναστεύσεως". ("The refusal

the Administration, in the exercise

the above power to grant a passport to the one submitting the relative applica'ion, must, due t o the nature

the measure, involving the restriction

personal freedom, be duly reasoned by the specification

the serious reason

public order oi interest, by virtue

which the emigration

the above mentioned might become harmful to the country, according to the substantive evaluation

the Administra­ tion based on specific facts. Such reasoning should either appear in the respective act refusing the grant

a passpon or from written documents to which it refers. 281 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)Whereas the above mentioned act 7038/16.9.1970

the Director

Emigration and Migration, whose reasoning constitutes the reasoning

the sub judice tacit omission

the Administration, simply mertions that the issue

a passport to the applicant for proceeding abroad is not 5 approved for serious reasons

public order and inteiest, i.e. it is restricted to tht mere repetition

the provision

the law, not including the actual facts on which it is based and thus lacking the reasoning required under the above principle. This lack

reasoning is not supple- 10 mented by the files submitted by the Administration and especially by No. 1/395863/203053dated 2.9.1970document

Gen. Directorate

National Security which is invoked by the said act

the Director

Emigration and Migra­ tion because in it, also, the opinion is simply stated that 15 applicant's migration is not indicated, because when he proceeds abroad he will prejudice the national interests, without invoking the facts on whose evaluation this opinion was formed. Therefoie the only ground

this application that the sub judice decision is notreasoned iswell-founded, 20 and for this rea?or it should be annulled as well as thj act

the Director

Emigration and Migratior constituting its reasoning".) Also, in Dagtoglou—General Administrative Law cd. Vol. A at p. 88. 1977 25 "To δημόσιο συμφέρον (ή εθνικό, γενικό ή κοινωνικό ή κοινό συμφέρον) δέν μπορεί νάορισθεί έκ τών προτέρων κατά τρόπο πού θά είναι απαλλαγμένοάπό αοριστολογίες,σφάλ­ ματα και μονομέρειες. Τό δημόσιο συμφέρον εΐναι μίαέννοια πού άποκτα πρακτική, χειροπιαστή σημασία, μόνο μέ τήν 30 συγκεκριμενοποίηση της". ("The public interest (or national, general or social or common interest) cannot be defined in advance in such a way as to be free from vagueness, mistakes and paitialities. The public interest is a notion which acquires practical, evident importance only with its specification"*. And at p. 89, " — Ήσυγκεκριμενοποίηση τούδημοσίουσυμφέροντοςγίνεται πρώτα-πρώτα άπό τό Ίδιο τό Σύνταγμα, κατόπιν (και 282 35 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Sattides J. είδικότερα) άπό τον νόμο και—κατ* εξουσιοδότηση τού νόμου —άπό τήν κανονιστική πράξη της διοικήσεως, άλλα και άπό τήν πράξη πού εκδίδεται κατ' άσκηση της λεγομένης διακριτικής εύχερείας της διοικήσεως. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Τό δημόσιο συμφέρον δέν αποτελεί λοιπόν κριτήριον πέρα καΐ υπεράνω τοΰ θετού δικαίου, άλλα εκφράζεται άπό αυτό, μέ τρόπο καΐ κατά τους τύπους πού αντιστοιχούν στην Ιεραρχίατού θετούδικαίου. Μέ άλλα λόγια,τό δημόσιο συμφέρον δέν μπορεί νά θεμελιώσει απαλλαγή άπό τήν αρχή της νομιμότητος, αλλά, αντιθέτως, δημόσιο συμφέρον είναι μόνο ότι τά συνταγματικώς οριζόμενα όργανα ορίζουν ώς δημόσιο συμφέρον. Τά όργανα αυτά εΐναι πρώτιστα ή συντακτική καΐ νομοθετική εξουσία. Ή διοίκηση καθορίζει τό δημόσιο συμφέρον μόνο στό πλαίσιο τοΰ συντάγματος και τών νόμων και μόνο εφόσον καΐ καθόσον εΐναι εξουσιοδο­ τημένη προς τούτο άπό τό σύνταγμα καΐ τους νόμους". (" The specification

public interest is made first

all by the Constitution itself, then (and in particular) by the law and—by the authority

the law—by the icgulatory act

the administration, but also from the act issued in the exercise

the so-called discretion

the administra­ tion. The public interest does not therefore constitute a criterion over and above the adopted law, but is expressed by it in a manner and with the formalities which correspond to the hierarchy

the adopted law. In other words public interest cannot establish exemption from the rule

legality, but on the contrary pubhc interest is only what the constitutionally appointed organs define as public interest. These organs are firstly the constitutional and legislative powers. The Administration defines the public interest only within the framework

the Constitution and the laws and only so long and as far as it is authorised in this respect by the Constitution and the laws".) With the above principles in mind and having iegard to the reasoning

the sub judice decision, I agree with the submission

learned counsel for the applicant that such decision is not properly or sufficiently reasoned. Such decision is oveishadowed by a cloud

generalities invoking allegations

283 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)unbecoming public conduct on the part

the applicant

such nature as to make it necessary in the public interest to impose upon him the ultimate punishment

terminating his permanent appointment with the Government service, without mentioning particulars

such allegations, or the evidence 5 on which the Council

Ministers relied, or any surrounding circumstances and also by failing to specify (εξειδίκευση) the matters

public interest involved. The reasons mentioned in the decision are not such as to enable in the first instance, the person concerned, and the Court on review, to ascertain 10 whether the decision is well founded in fact and in law (see Zavros' case (supra) ). The Minister's letter to the applicant conveying to him the decision

the Council

Ministers and the decision itself as recorded in the minutes

the Council

Ministers, are so 15 obscure and substantially inadequate and would leave in the mind

an informed reader such real and substantial doubt as to the reasons for such decision and as to the matters which the Council

Ministers did or did not take into account in taking the sub judice decision, that they do not complv with 20 the well established principles

proper reasoning, compliance to which is necessary under the general and well established principles

administiative law. In view

the above, I have reached the conclusion that the sub judice decision is defective and in the result has to be annulled. 25 Independently

my above conclusion, I am coming now to consider the next question which is posed, as to whether in the circumstances

the present case, and assuming that the Council

Ministers had competence in the matter, it was 30 within such competence

the Council

Ministers to terminate the applicant's service in the Government, in violation

the rules

Natural Justice and without affording him theprotection guaranteed by such rules. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the sub judice decision was an administrative measure taken by the Council

Ministers in the public interest under section 7

Cap. 311 and not a disciplinary sanction, and in consequence, the Council

Ministers was not legally bound to accord to the applicant 284 35 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. the right to be heard, though, as he conceded, ideally it would have been better if such right was given to the applicant. In suppoit

this argument, he relied on certain extracts from the "Conclusions

the Case Law

the Council

State in 5 Greece, 1929-1959), the decisions

the Greek Council

State in Case No. 1005/33, No.354/38, No. 1711/65, No.670/58 and No. 1415/58, to the French Administrative Law as expounded by Odent "Contentieux Administratif" (1965-1966) at p. 166 and Plantey "Traite Pratique de la Fonction Publique" 10 Paris, 1971 at p. 123 and, finally, to the decisions

this Court in Christodoulouv. The Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 603. Cases No. 1005/33, No. 354/38 and 670/58 to which reference has been made by counsel for respondent, deal with powers

the Council

Ministers in Giesce to dismiss a Mayor or a Muni15 cipal or Communal Council, derived from express provisions in the "Municipalities and Communities Laws" for the purpose

securing the proper functioning

a Municipality. Some

such cases fuither deal with the constitutionality

certain provisions in the said laws. Such cases are distinguish20 able from the present one and cannot be

any assistance in the matters undci consideration. Case No. 1711/65 does not advance the aigument

counsel foi respondent, but on the contrary, it is against such argument and may be rather cited in support

thecontentionof applicant 25 that the rules

Natural Justice have to be observed. This case (1711/65) deals with the temporary suspension

ths service

a public

ficer for a period

six months which may be extended for a further period

six months under express legislative provisions

Law 2500/1953 in cases specifically 30 enumerated theiein mainly dealing with inefficiency or inability

the public

ficer to perform his duties and lack

co-opera­ tion with his colleagues or with the Minister within whose juris­ diction the seivice

the

ficer falls. The last part

such decision, reads as follows:35 40 " 'Επειδή, έν προκειμένω, τά Ύπουργικόν Συμβούλιον, ώς δείκνυται έκ της προσβαλλομένης αποφάσεως του,έκρινεν 6τι επιβάλλεται, κατ' έφαρμογήν τών ανωτέρω διατάξεων, ή θέσις τού αιτούντοςείς διαθεσιμότηταδια τους έν τη εΐσηγήσει τού Ύφ. της Προεδρ. της Κυβερνήσεως εκτιθεμένους έν λεπτομέρεια λόγους. Είδικώτερον ή κρίσις αύτη τού 285 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου έστηρίχθη είς τάς δια της ανωτέρω είσηγήσεως τοΰ Υφυπουργού αποδιδόμενος είς βάρος τού αΐτιούντος συγκεκριμένας αΐτιάσεις, αΐτινες συνίστανται είς ανωμαλίας έν τ η εκτελέσει σοβαρών έργων αναστηλώσεως, είς αυθαιρεσίας καϊ παραβάσεις τών κειμένων διατάξεων κατά 5 τήν υ π ' αυτού άσκησιν τών καθηκόντων του ώς Διευθυντού 'Αναστηλώσεων καϊ είς τήν έλλειψιν πνεύματος συνεργασίας προς τους συναδέλφους του καϊ τόν προϊστάμενον αυτού Ύφυπουργόν, πασών τών αΙτιάσεων τούτων συναγομένων έκ τών είδικών έν τη ανωτέρω είσηγήσει μνημονευομένων 10 ενεργειών ή παραλείψεων τού προσφεύγοντος. 'Υπό τ ά δεδομένα δμως ταύτα καϊ λαμβανομένου ύ π ' δψιν ότι ή κρίσις περί τού σκοπίμου της επιβολής έν προκειμένω τού μέτρου της διαθεσιμότητος ερείδεται κυρίως επί τών ώς άνω απο­ διδόμενων συγκεκριμένων υπαιτίων παραβάσεων είς βάρος 15 τοΰ αιτούντος, έδει, κατά τήν αληθή έννοιαν τών έν τ η προη­ γουμένη σκέψει παρατεθεισών διατάξεων, νά προηγ^θη κλήσις αύτοϋ προς παροχήν εξηγήσεων έπ! τών ώς εΐρηται αιτιάσεων, ϊνα ούτω τ ό Ύπουργικόν Συμβούλιον, έν όψει και τών εξηγήσεων τ ο ύ προσφεύγοντος, άποφσνθη περί 20 της ανάγκης της επιβολής είς βάρος αύτοΰ τού δυσμενούς μέτρου της διαθεσιμότητος. Έν προκειμένω όμως, ώς έκ τοΰ φακέλλου προκύπτει δέν έτηρήθη ό ανωτέρω ουσιώδης τύπος της διαδικασίας καϊ, συνεπώς, διά τόν λά/σν τούτον, αυτεπαγγέλτως ϋ π ό τοΰ Δικαστηρίου έξεταζόμενον, άκυρωτέα 25 αποβαίνει ή προσβαλλομένη άπόφασις τοΰ 'Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου καϊ τό επί ταύτης Ιρειδόμενον Βασ. Διάταγμα περί θέσεως τού αΐτούντος εις διαθεσιμότητα, περιττής ούτω καθισταμένης τών λοιπών λόγων ακυρώσεων". ("Whereas, in this respect, the Council

Ministers as 30 is shown by its sub judice decision has decided that, in application

the above provisions it is necessary to inter­ dict the applicant for the reasons stated in detail ia the submission

the Deputy Minister

the Presidency

the Government. Particularly this decision

the Council 35

Ministers was founded on the specific accusations which by means

the above submission

the Deputy Minister were attributed to the applicant, which consist

anomalies in the execution

serious building works, atbitrarinesses and breaches

existing provisions in the execution by 40 him

his duties as Director

erection works and the 286 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J . lack

a sense

co-operation towards his colleagues and his'superior Deputy Minister, all these accusations gathered from the special in the above submission acts or omissions

the applicant. On the above facts and having in mind that the decision on the desirability

the imposition in this respect

the measure

interdiction is based mainly on the above attributted specific culpable breaches against the applicant, there should on the true meaning

the piovisions stated in the above opinion, have preceded a call on him to give explanations on the said accusations, and thus the Council

Ministers, in view, also,

the explanations

the applicant, may decide OP thenecessity

the imposition against him

this onerous measure

interdiction. But in this respect, as it appears from thefile, the above essential formality

the proceedings has not been obseived, and therefore, for this reason, having been examined by the Court on its own motion, the sub judice decision

the Council

Ministers and the Royal Decree based thereon inteidicting the applicant, are null and void thus rendering unnecessaiy the other reasons for annulment".) The recent trend, however, in Greece appears to have super­ seded that

the old cases concerning the right

hearing. Such trerd is explained in "Administration and the Law" (Διοίκησις καϊ Δίκαιον) by Tsoutsos 1979 Ed. at pages 132-133 as follows:"Σαφέστερον καϊ άποτελεσματικώτερον ή νομολογία τοΰ ελληνικού Συμβουλίου τής 'Επικρατείαςεστράφηπροσφάτως υπέρ τής εφαρμογής της αρχής τής ακροάσεως έπΐ λήψεως μέτρου προσωπικού χαρακτήρος κατ' ασκούντων δημόσιον λειτούργημα, έν αντιθέσει προςτην παλαιοτέραν νομολογίαν1. Ή κλήσις τού ενδιαφερομένου άπητήθη ύπό προσφάτου 2 αποφάσεως τοΰ Συμβουλίου τής 'Επικρατείας έπΐ τής εφαρ­ μογής τού άρ. 24 τού ν. 184/1914 'Περί συστάσεωςεμπορικών καϊ βιομηχανικών επιμελητηρίων', ώς αντικατεστάθη διά τοΰ αρ. 2 τοΰ ν.δ/τος 2649/1953

(297), ορίζοντος ότι τά διοικητικά συμβούλια τών εμπορικών καϊ βιομηχανικών επιμελητηρίων δύνανται νά διαλυθούν δι' αποφάσεως τού 'Υπουργού 'Εμπορίουπλην άλλων λόγων, καϊ ένεκεναταξιών Trepi την διοίκησιν ή τήν έκπλήρωσιν τών έργων αυτών, 1. Σ.τ.Ε. 1311/56, ττερΐ ή$ανωτέρω. 2. Σ,τ.Ε. 419/65. 287 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic
(1982)παρέχεται δέ είςτόν Ύπουργόν ή ευχέρεια, άντϊ νά διάλυση τό διοικητικόν συμβούλιον, νά άπαγγείλη τήν έκπτωσιν μελών τίνων τής διοικούσης επιτροπής ή και τήν διάλυσιν ταύτης. Τό οΰτω λαμβανόμενον μέτρον δένέχει πειθαρχικόν χαρακτήρα, άλλ* αποτελεί μέτρον τάξεως, έφ' όσον έσημειώθησαν άνωμαλίαι τάςοποίας τά αρμόδια όργανα δένήδυνήθησαν νά προίδουν καϊ νά προλάβουν, λαμβανόμενον προς άποκατάστασιν τής ομαλής λειτουργίας τών ώς εϊρηται επιμελητηρίων καϊ έχον οΰτω κατ' αρχήν άντικειμενικόν χαρακτήρα. 5 'Εφ' δσον δμως τό μέτρον τούτο απευθύνεται είδικώςκαθ' ώρισμένου μέλους τών οργάνων διοικήσεως τών οργανισμών τούτων, κηρυσσομένου ατομικώς έκπτωτου τοΰ αξιώματος του, εκρίθη ότι λόγω τοΰ προσωπικού χαράκτηρος, όν λαμβάνει τό μέτρον, καϊ τής καταλογιζόμενης ούτω είς τόν 15 κηρυσσόμενον εκπτωτον ύπαιτιότητος, δέον όπως ούτος καλήται προηγουμένως προς παροχήν τουλάχιστον εξηγή­ σεων, ώστε νά έξασφαλίζηται ή άπόπάσης πλευράς άρτία άντιμετώπισις τοΰ ζητήματος έκ μέρους τοΰ 'Υπουργού. Συνεπώς, καϊ έπΐ λήψεως μέτρου ρητώς χαρακτηριζομένου 20 ώς διοικητικού καϊ ουχί ώς πειθαρχικού, επιβάλλεται τό πρώτον ή κλήσις προς παροχήν εξηγήσεων τού προσώπου, τό όποιον πρόκειται εϊδικώς νά θιγη, διατυπουμένου ψόγου είς βάρος του. Ή προσέγγισις της λύσεως ταύτης προς τήν ώς άνωέκτεθείσαν νσμολογίαν τοΰγαλλικού Συμβουλίου 25 'Επικρατείας, έπΐ λήψεως μέτρων κατ" ασκούντων δημόσια λειτουργήματα, είναι λίαν προφανής. Έπΐ πλέον καϊ έπΐ επιβολής τοΰμέτρου τήςδιαθεσιμότητος είς βάρος δημοσίου υπαλλήλου ή νομολογία εύρε τήν εύκαιρίαν νά έφαρμόση τήν αρχήν τήςακροάσεως. Συγκεκριμένως 30 επρόκειτο περί τήςπροβλεπομένης ύπό τούάρ. 9 τούν.δ/τος 2500/1953 διαθεσιμότητος, είς ην τίθενται ανώτεροι μόνιμοι πολιτικοί υπάλληλοι μετ' άπόφασιν τού Υπουργικού Συμ­ βουλίου, έκδιδομένην έπΐ τη ήτιολογημένη προτάσει τοΰ αρμοδίου Υπουργού, έφ' όσον δέν διαθέτουν τήν διά την 35 άπρόσκοπτσν λειτουργίαν τής υπηρεσίας ή άπόδοσιν ηύξημένου έργου άναγκαίαν έπάρκειαν ή καταλληλότητα, ή δέν επιδεικνύουν πνεύμα συνεργασίας μετά τών συναδέλφων των ή τοΰ προϊσταμένου Υπουργού. Είς περίπτωσιν 288 10 \ I 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 . 35 , Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J. καθ* ήν ή κρίσις περί θέσεως είς διαθεσιμότητα έστηρίχθη είς συγκεκριμένας αΙτιάσεις, συναγομένας έξ ενεργειών ή παραλείψεων τοΰ υπαλλήλου, έγένετο δεκτόν Οτι τό μέτρον τής διαθεσιμότητος δύναται νά ληφθη μόνον κατόπινκλήσεως τοΰ ενδιαφερομένου προς παροχήν εξηγήσεων έπΐ τών απο­ διδόμενων αύτφ συγκεκριμένων υπαιτίων παραβάσεων, ίνα τό Ύπουργικόν Συμβούλιον έν όψει καϊ τών εξηγήσεων τούτων άποφανθη περί τής ανάγκης της επιβολής τού δυσ­ μενούς μέτρου τής διαθεσιμότητος. Ή κλησις αύτη προς παροχήνεξηγήσεων αποτελεί ουσιώδη τύποντης διαδικασίας έξεταζόμενον αυτεπαγγέλτως ύπό τοΰ δικαστηρίου, ή μή τήρησις τοΰ οποίου επάγεται ακυρότητα της περί Θέσεως είς διαθεσιμότητααποφάσεως". ("In a clearer and more effective way the jurisprudence

the Greek Council

State lately leaned towards the implementation

the rule

hearing on the taking

mea* sures

personal character against peisons holding public

fices in contrast to the previous jurisprudence*. The hearing

the interested party was required by a recent decision

ths Council

State** in the application

Section 24

Law 184/1914 'Establishment

Chambeis

Commerce and Industry' as icplaced by section 2

cider 2649/1953

(297), providing that the Boards

the Chambers

Commerce and Industty may be dissolved by a decision

the Minister

Commerce besides other reasons, and because

irregularities in the administration or the completion

their works, and the Minister is vested with the discretion, Listsad

dissolving the Board, to pronounce the dismissal

some membeis

the Boaid or even its dissolution. The thus taken measuie docs not have a disciplinaiy character but it constitutes a measure

ordei since thers have been irregularities which the appropriate organs were unable to foresee and prevent taken for the restoration

the smooth functioning

the said chambers and having thus on principle an objective character. But since this measure is directed specially against a certain member

the administrative organs

these Orga­ nizations declaiing him personally dismissed from his * Case No. 1311/56

the Greek Council

State. ** Case No. 419/65

the Greek Council

State. 289 Savvides J . Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)post, it was decided that, due to personal character, which the measure takes, and the accusation attributed to the one declared as dismissed, he should be called before hand to give at least explanations, so as to safeguard from every aspect the entire handling

the problem by the Minister. Therefore, and on the taking

a measure expressly described as administrative and not as disciplinary it is imperative that the person, who is to be specially affected by attributing blame on him, be called upon to furnish an explanation. The approach

this solution to the above stated jurisprudence

the French Council

State, on the taking

measures against persons holding public

fices, is quite obvious. In addition and on the imposition

the measure

interdiction against a public

ficer the jurisprudence has found the chance to implement the rule

hearing. Preci­ sely it was about the interdiction envisaged by section 9

order 2500/1953, imposed on senior permanent political

ficers by a decision

the Council

Ministers issued on the reasoned submission

the appropriate Minister once they do not possess the required sufficiency or fitness or increased output for the unfettered functioning

tho service or they do not show a sense

co-operation with their colleagues or the superior Minister. In case the decision for placing under interdiction was based on specific accusations gathered by acts or omissions

the

ficer, it was accepted that the measure

interdiction can be taken only after calling on the interested party to give explanations on the attributed to him specific accusations, so that the Council

Ministers in view

these explanations may decide on the necessity

the imposition

the onerous measure

interdiction. This calling for the furnishing

explanations constitutes an essential formality

the proceedings biing examined by the court on its own motion, and its non-observance n-ndeis void the decision to impose an interdiction".) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 And he concludes at page 134 as follows:"Κατά ταύτα δυνάμεθα έν συμπεράσματι νά εΐπωμεν ότι κατά την νομολογίαν τοΰ ελληνικού Συμβουλίου τής Επι­ κρατείας ή αρχή τής εκατέρωθεν ακροάσεως επιβάλλεται 40 καϊ άνευ ρητής διατάξεως είς τάς έξης περιπτώσεις: 290 3 C.L.R. Kazamias v. Republic Savvides J . (α) Προκειμένης επιβολής πειθαρχικής ποινής είς πρόσωπον εΰρισκόμενον έν υπηρεσιακήεξαρτήσει έκ της Διοικήσεως. 5 (β) Έπΐ λήψεως διοικητικού μέτρου, απευθυνόμενου είδικώς καθ* ώρισμένου προσώπουασκούντος δημόσιον λειτούργημα λόγω αποδιδομένης είς αυτό ύπαιτιότητος. (γ) Έπΐ επιλύσεως ΰπό διοικητικού οργάνου αμφισβητή­ σεως, έγειρομένης μεταξύ δύο μερών ή κατά διοικητικής πράξεως, έξ ής ώφελεΤταί τις". 10 15 ("Therefore, we can in conclusion, say that according to thejurisprudence

the Gieek Council

State the rule

hearing both sides is obligatory without any express provisions in the following instances: (a) Inrespect

the imposition

a disciplinary punishment on a person who is

ficially depended on the Administration. (b) On the taking

an administrative measure directed specially at a certain person exercising a public function due to blame attributed to him. 20 25 (c) On resolving by an administrative organ

a dispute which has arisen between two parties or against an administrative act, whereby someone has derived some benefit".) The case

Christodoulou v. The Republic (supra) is distingui­ shable from the present case. Inthatcase the Court was dealing with a measure, not amounting to a disciplinary one, taken by the Commander

Police in the exercise

a legitimate right under the Police (General) Regulations 1958 to 1960. As to the position under the French Administrative Law, reference will be made later in this judgment, when citing the 30 case

The Republic

Cyprus and Antonios Mozoras

(1966)3 C.L.R. 356, where the principles under the French Law, are expounded. 35 Having consideied the position under the Gieek Admini­ strative Law, I turn now to the sources

our own jurisprudence on this matter emanating from our Constitution, statutory enactments and the decisions

our Supieme Court. 291 Savvides J. Kazamias v. Republic

(1982)One important case in this respect is The Republic

Cyprus and Antonis Mozoras (supra) which was decided at a time when there was no express statutory provision laying down the procedure to be followed by the Public Service Commission when exercising its functions under Article 125.1

the Constitution. Such provision has since been laid down by the enactment

the Public Seivice Law 33/67 to which I have already referred earlier in this judgment. Josephides, J. had thi& to say at pp. 399, 400:- 5 "As pointed out in theopening paragraphs

thisjudgment, 10 the whole case turns on the construction which may be placed on Article 125.1

our Constitution. Under that paragraph it is the duty

the Public Service Commission to 'retire and exercise disciplinary control over, including dismissal or removal from

fice,

public

ficers'. The 15 question which arises for consideration is, in the absence

any express statutory provision, laying down the procedure to be followed, the rules

evidence to be applied, or conferring any powers on the Commission, what is the proper course to be followed by the Commission in 20 carrying out that duty? As held in previous cases, the Commission in exercising disciplinary control has to comply with certain well-established principles

natural justice and the accepted proceduie governing the dismissal

public

ficers (Andreas A. Marcoullides and The Republic 25 (Public Service Commission), 3 R.S.C.C. 30 at page 35). Now, what are the rules or principles

natural justice? The two essential elements

natural justice are in modern times usually expressed as follows: (

  1. a)no man shall be judge in his own cause; and 30 (
  2. b)both sides shall be heard, or audi alteram partem. Other principles which have been stated to constitute elements

natural justice, e.g. that the parties must have due notice

when the tribunal will proceed, etc., may be said to be merely extensions or refinements

the two main 35 principles stated above. According to Professor B^Schwartz in his book entitled 'French Administrative Law and the Common Law World* 292 3 CUR. 5 . 10 15 20 25 Kazamias v. Republic SawHes J.

(1954), at page 207, the British Courts have endeavoured to ensure administrative fair play through the concept

natural justice. The principles

natural justice can be said to be as much a part

British administrative Law as the procedural demands that the United States Supreme Court has held are required

the American administration under the 'due-process* clause Throughout the web

our system

administration

justice in Cyprus (if I may borrow the happy phrase

Lord Chancellor Sanky in another context in the Woolmington case) one golden thread is always to be seen, that is to say, that a person is entitled to a fair hearing, winch means that he must be informed

the accusation made against him and given an opportunity

being heard before judgment is passed on him. These principles arc now enshrined in our Constitution, Articles 12.5 and 30 repro

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AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.