clr/1982/1982_3_555.pdf

(1982)the applicant—Participation of the General Manager in the First Instance Disciplinary Board which heard the disciplinary case and was composed of five members is not contrary to the rules of Natural Justice. Disciplinary offences—Disciplinary proceedings—Complete record of 5 the evidence intended to be adduced at the disciplinary trial made available to applicant's counsel before the commencement of the hearing—And applicant afforded opportunity by Investigating Officer to exculpate herself—Therefore she was well acquainted with the case and could prepare her defence. 10 Disciplinary offences—Disciplinary proceedings—Disciplinary tribunal —No requirement for strict compliance with rules of procedure and evidence applicable before a Court of Law—What is expected from such tribunal is toact ingoodfaith, hear the caseinajudicial spirit and in accordance with the principles of substantial justice 15 —And where there are specific rules of procedure provided, such rules have to be followed. Disciplinary offences—Disciplinary conviction—Judicial control— An Administrative Court cannot, as a rule, interfere with the subjective evaluation of the- relevant facts as made by the appro- 20 priate organ. Disciplinary offences—Disciplinary conviction—Sentence—May be imposed on a date other than that on which conviction was pronounced. Practice—Recourse for annulment—Application and opposition— Grounds of law on which they are based—Must be stated precisely and concisely. 25 The applicant was at the material time an employee of the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority, holding the post of Operator I, and performing the duties of cashier at the Larnaca 30 Sectional Office. As a result of certain accusations against her for irregularities in the discharge of her duties and in view of the seriousness of such accusations, the General Manager of the respondent 1 Authority ("the General Manager") appointed an Investigating Officer under regulation 41(l)(

1. b)53 of the Personnel General Regulations, to carry out an investigation concerning such accusations. For the purpose of his investigation the Investigating Officer took written statements from employees of the Authority and he, also, interviewed 556 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. the applicant on two occasions and took statements from her. After completinghisinvestigationhesubmittedthefilecontaining all the evidential material he collected to the General Manager who, after considering the material put before him, came to the conclusion that there was a prima facie case against the applicant for the commission of disciplinary offences. Then the General Manager drafted a charge* for such offences and submitted the case to the 1st instance Disciplinary Board of the Authority under regulation 41 of the above Regulations and, at the same time, he informed the applicant by letter dated February 24, 1979 as follows: 5 10 "Having considered the accusations against you I have concluded that thereis prima facie case againstyou; therefore and in compliance with Regulation 41 paragraph 6(
2. a)of the Personnel General Regulations, I have drafted the relative charge which I attach herewith and I have referred yourcasetoa Disciplinary Boardoffivemembers". 15 The First Instance Disciplinary Board which heard the disciplinary case against the apphcant was composed of the General Manager,twoManagers,oneAssistant ManagerandoneSection Manager. The presentation and the prosecution of the case on behalf of the Authority was conducted by the Personnel Manager and the defence of the applicant was handled by her counsel. Applicant was represented throughout the proceedings by an advocate, who, acting on her behalf, prior to the hearing inspected the file of the case and was supplied with copies of all statements of witnesses which were taken by the Investigating Officer, including the statements of the applicant. 20 25 The Fist Instance Disciplinary Board delivered its decision on 2.6.1979 and found apphcant guilty of the charges against her. Counsel for the applicant then-addressed in mitigation theBoard,whichadjourned itsdecision onsentence till 16.6.1979 whenitdecided toimposeupon apphcant thesentenceofdismissal from the service of respondent 1Authority. The apphcant appealed against such decision, under the Personnel General Regulations,tothe2nd Instance Disciplinary Boardwhich heard the appeal on 8.8.1979 and reserved its decision. It gave its decision on 15.10.1979 and dismissed the appeal both in respect of the conviction and the sentence imposed upon the applicant. 30 35 * The charge appears at p. 567 post. 557 Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)Hence this recourse for a declaration that the decision of the respondents dated 2.6.1979 and 16.6.1979 by which she was found guiltyofcertaindisciplinary offences aswellasthedecision of 15.10.1979 dismissing her disciplinary appeal were null and void and of no legal effect. 5 Counsel for the applicants mainly contended: (

1. a)That once the General Manager was the person who framed the charge against the apphcant he formed an opinion about his guilt, as a result of which he was biased during the trial, and his participation in the 10 Disciplinary Board amounted to violation of the rules of natural justice. (
2. b)That the charge was defective and not in compliance with theRegulations*asaresult ofwhichthe applicant was embarrassed in her defence in that she was not 15 aware of the facts of the case when defending herself. (
3. c)That the Disciplinary Board wrongly admitted evidence as to the previous conduct of the applicant; and that this course violated regulation 46

(4)which provided that theproceduremust "in asfar aspossiblebesimilar 20 to the hearing of a criminal case tried summarily", in that inadmissible evidence was allowed to be given. (

1. d)That on the material before it the First Instance Disciplinary Board could not find the applicant guilty of the charges brought against her. (
2. e)That the mitigating circumstances of the applicant were not taken into consideration in imposing sentence and that the sentence was imposed on a different date from that of the adjudication of the guilt. (
3. f)That the respondents acted in violation of legulation ^Q 45

(5)** of the Personnel General Regulations in that the case was sent to the Disciplinary Board first and then communicated to the applicant and as a result, the applicant was not afforded the opportunity of * The relevant regulation is regulation 45

(4)which provides as follows: "In disciplinary proceedingsallrealfacts constitutingtheoffence charged and any existing elements of guilt should be defined". ** Regulation 45

(5)is quoted at p. 609 post. 558 25 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. giving an explanation or making a statement before the case was sent to the Disciplinary Board. 5 10 Counsel for the respondent raised the preliminary objection that the recourse in so far as the decision of 2.6.1979 of respondent 2, the First Instance Disciplinary Board was concerned, was out of time as more than 75 days elapsed since the day when such decision was communicated to the applicant and thedaywhenthe recoursewas filed. On theother hand counsel for the apphcant contended that the decision of 2.6.1979 and that of the second Instance Disciplinary Board constituted a composite administrative act and, therefore, each one of them could be made the subject of a recourse. Held,(/) on thepreliminary objection: 15 20 25 30 35 That though it iscorrect that in thecase of a composite administrative act, if the component parts have the characteristics of an executory act, they preserve their executory character and eachone of them iscapableof beingchallenged byrecourse, when the composite administrative act is completed, the independent intermediate parts merge into the final act and their executory character is lost by such changes and cannot be challengedindividually; that thedecision of the Fiist Instance Disciplinary Board has merged in the decision of the Second Instance Appellate Board and in consequence it has lost its executory character and cannot be challenged by the present recourse; thattheonlydecision thatcanbechallengedisthat oftheSecond Instance Disciplinary Board, which is not out of time. Held,further, that though the last decision of a composite administrative act is the only one that can bechallenged, nevertheless,-once the intermediate component parts are a legalprerequisitetothefinalact, theirvalidity maybeexaminedindeciding thevalidityofthefinalact, astheinvalidity ofapart ofacomposite administrative act renders all acts which follow, including the final concluded act, null and void; that, therefore, though the decision of the First Instance Board cannot be challenged by thepresent recourse, the grounds of appeal advanced against the validity of such decision and argued before the Second Instance Disciplinary Board and which were rejected by such Board may be grounds of law in considering the validity of the decision of the Second Instance Disciplinary Board. 559 Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)Held,(II) on the meritsof the recourse: (l)(

1. a)That the requirements of natural justice are that the accused person should know the nature of the accusation made, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case and that the tribunal should act in good faith; that, also, under the 5 principles of impartiality and fairness the rule against bias has evolved the existence of which may vitiate a judicial or quasi judicial decision; that the application of the rules of naturaljustice before administrative tribunals does not however impose an obhgation on them to adopt the regular form of 10 judicial procedure. (l)(
2. b)That at no time did the General Manager take any decision as to the guilt of the accused; that the only action he took after considering theevidence put before him,was to draft the charge and send the case for trial, informing the apphcant 15 accordingly; that as from the time of the appointment of the Investigating Officer till and including the trial by the First Instance Disciplinary Board, the General Manager was acting in compliance with the provisions of the Personnel General Regulations; that in the present case the General Manager was 20 not sitting as a chairman of the First Instance Disciplinary Board on an appeal from his own decision but was sitting as a member of a collective organ which has in the first instance to hear the case and decide whether the apphcant was guilty of theaccusations againsther; that from such decision an appeal 25 lied to an entirely differently composed collective organ, the Second Instance Disciplinary Board; that the fact that the General Manager acting in compliance with the Personnel General Regulations found from the material put before him by the Investigating Officer that theie was a prima facie case 30 againsttheapphcant tosendherfor trialbefore theFirstInstance Disciplinary Board, does not amount to a finding of guilt which had to be arrived at after hearing of evidence both from the prosecution and the applicant and after evaluating properly such evidence as regards credibility and weight; that the prose- 35 cution in the present case was conducted by the Personnel Manager and not by the General Manager and that, therefore, there was no irregularity by the participation of the General Manager in the First Instance Disciplinary Board; accordingly contention (
3. a)should fail. 4Q 560 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(2)That the charge against the applicant was in compliance with regulation 45

(4)in that all material facts alleged wereset out in the charge; that the complaint of the apphcant that she was not aware of the real facts when defending herself, is unfounded, especially in view of the fact that a complete recoid of the evidence, intended to be adduced at the trial was made availabletohercounselbefore thecommencement ofthehearing and, therefore, both from the facts set out in the charge and thefacts disclosed insuchevidenceshewould bewellacquainted withthecaseandprepare her defence; thatifanyfactwassought to beestablished which was not within her knowledge from the material made available to her, there was nothing to prevent hercounsel to apply for an adjournment to consider the defence of the applicant and at no stage of the proceedings there was suchapplication bycounselfor applicant; accordingly contention (b) should fail.

(3)That regulation 46

(4)should be read together with regulation 46

(5)(c) and 46

(6); that under regulation 46

(5)(c) there is a complete departure from the rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings by allowing the admission of evidence which is not admissible in civil or criminal proceedings and under regulation 46

(6)the Board is allowed before deliberation to rely not only on the evidence adduced at the hearing, but on any other evidence as well from other lawful source with the only restriction that the accused must be informed of such evidence; that the combined effect of'regulations 46

(5)(c) and 46

(6)is to secure a person charged with the commission of a disciplinary offence to know the charge against him, have a fair trial,to berepresented at suchtrialbycounsel of hischoice, cross-examine the witnesses testifying against him, be allowed to giveevidence and callwitnesses incontradiction of theprosecution witnesses and in case the Disciplinary Board intends to take cognisance of any other evidence which was not called at the trial but came to the knowledge of the Board from other lawful sources he should be informed of such evidence; that the decision of the Board should be duly reasoned so that the accused may know how the decision was reached and be in a position to contest the correctness of such decision on appeal; that the fact should not escape the attention that such a Board consists of laymen and a layman at an inquiry of this kind is ofcourseat agreat disadvantage compared toa trained advocate 561 Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)or a properly composed Court of Law; that whereas when a case is tried before a Court of Law, civil or criminal, the rules of procedure and evidence have to be strictly complied with, there is no similar requirement for strict compliance with such rules at a hearing before a tribunal who is not a judge in the 5 proper sense of the word; that what is expected from such tribunal is to act in good faith, hear the casein ajudicial spirit and in accordance with the principles of substantial justice; that where there are specific rules of procedure provided, such rules have to be followed; accordingly contention (c) should 10 fail.

(4)That it is well settled that an administrative Court in dealing with a recourse madeagainst a disciplinary conviction cannot, as a rule, interfere with the subjective evaluation of the relevant facts as made bytheappropriateorgan;thatonthebasis 15 of the material before this Court the verdict that the applicant was guilty as charged, which was reached unanimously by the members of the respondent

(2)Board, was reasonably open to it and cannot, and should not, be interfered with by this Court; that the respondents did not act under a misconception of fact 20 in reaching their verdict and thecontention of counselfor applicant that the conviction was not warranted by the evidence, is untenable; accordingly contention (d) should fail.

(5)That in imposing sentence on theapplicant the respondent

(2)Board took into consideration whatever counsel for the 25 apphcant said in mitigation; that the fact that the sentence was imposed on a date other than that on which applicant was found guilty, which, as alleged, vitiates the proceedings, is entirely unfounded; that what happened in this case, is that after applicant was found guilty, counsel addressed the Board 30 in mitigation and the Board reserved its decision on sentence; that therewas nothing wrongin following such course and there was no contravention either of the Regulations or the procedure in criminal cases; that even a proper Court of Law trying a criminal case may, on occasions, reserve the imposition of 35 sentence to a future date to have time to reflect on the sentence which is going to impose in the circumstances of a case; accordingly contention (e) should fail.

(6)That the General Manager in informing the apphcant by his letter of the 24th February, 1979 that the case had been 40 562 3 CX.R. 5 10 15 20 Mitidou v. CY.T.A. referred to the Disciplinary Board, acted in compliance with the provisions of regulation 41

(6)(a); that the object of regulation 45

(5)is to afford an accused person the opportunity of having available for perusal all the material which was in the file of the disciplinary proceedings before the hearing of the case and thus be able to prepare his defence accordingly; that this Court is unable to agree with counsel for applicant that applicant was not afforded the opportunity of giving an explanation exculpating herself before the file was sent to the Disciplinary Board; that the applicant was interviewed twice by the Investigating Officer before the investigation was completed by him and before the dossier was sent to the General Manager for further action and whatever she said appears in her statements which were included in the dossier of the case; that even if, as alleged, there was not strict compliance with regulation 45

(5), in the circumstances of this case, this is considered as not amounting to such a violation of the ruleswhich might have been treated aba breach of a mandatory nature non-compliance with which might have embarrassed in any way the applicant or prejudiced her in her defence; accordingly contention (f) should also fail. Application dismissed. Obsenations with regard to the proper presentation of thegrounds of Law in the application and the opposition. Cases referred to: 25 Pelides v. The Republic, 3 R.S.C.C. 13 at pp. 17, 18: Orphanides v. The Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 385 at p. 392; Nemitsas Industries Ltd. v. 77ieMunicipal Corporationof Lhnassol and Another

(1967)3 C.L.R. 134; - 30 35 HjiGeorghiou v. The Republic

(1974)3 C.L.R. 436 ai p. 445; Angelidou and Others v. The Republic

(1975)3 C.L.R. 404; Christodoulou and Another v. CYTA

(1978)3 C.L.R. 61; loannou v. Eectricity Authority

(1981)3 C.L.R. 280 at p. 299; Kanda v. Government of Malaya [1962] A.C. 322 at p. 537; ' Kazamias v. The Republic

(1982)3 C.L.R. 239; Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society [1958] 2 All E.R. 579 at pp. 598, 599; King v. Sussex Justices, ex parte Afc Carthv [1924] I K.B. 256 at p. 259; 563 Mitldou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)R. v. Camborne Justices, ex parte Pearce [1954] 2 All E.R. 850 at p. 855; General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943] 2 All E.R. 337 at pp. 342, 343, 345; Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A.C. 120 at pp. 132, 140; 5 Republic of Cyprus v. Mozoras

(1966)3 C.L.R. 356 at pp.401, 402; Russel v. Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All E.R. 109 at p. 118; Re Pergamon Press [1970] 3 All E.R. 535; 10 Furnell v. Whangerei High Schools Board [!973] 1.AI1 E.R. 400 at p. 412; Republic v. Georghiades

(1972)3 C.L.R. 594; Kyprianou v. Public Service Commission

(1973)3 C.L.R. 206 at pp. 219, 222, 223; Savoulla and Others v. The Republic

(1973)3 C.L.R. 706 at pp. 712, 713; 15 Decisions of the Greek Council of State Nos. 1235/57, 1587/50, 1051/61, 1052/61, 1211/65, 677/66, 2675/68, 1578/50,426/65, 2115/65, 2654/65 and 1129/66; 20 Leeson v. General Medical Council [1889] 43 Ch. D. 366; Allinson v. General Council of Medical Council [1894] I Q.B. 750 at p. 758; Cooper v. Wilson [1937] 2 All E.R. 726 at pp. 735-736, 742; Rex v. Varnsley Metropolitan Borough Council [1976] 3 All 25 E.R. 452: Vrakas and Another v. The Republic

(1973)2 C.L.R. 139 at pp. 155-165; Franklin and Others v. Minister of Town and Country Planning [194η 2 All E.R. 289 at p. 296; 30 Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.] Ltd. v. Lannon and Others [1968] 3 All E.R. 304 at p. 310; Enotiadou v. The Republic

(1971)3 C.L.R. 409 at p. 415; Constantinou v. 77ie Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 190 at p. 207; Georghiades v. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R., 396 at p. 405. Recourse. Recourse against the decision of the respondent whereby 564 35 : C.L.R. 5 Mitidou τ. CY.T.A. applicant was found guilty of certain disciplinary offences and against the decision dismissing her disciplinary appeal. A. Poetis, for the applicant. A. Hadjioannou, for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. SAVVIDES J. read the following judgment. By the present recourse the applicant seeks a declaration of the Court to the effect that the decision of the respondents dated 2.6.1979 and or 16.6.1979by which shewas found guilty of certain disciplinary 10 offences as well as the decision of the respondents which was communicated to her by letter dated 26.10.1979 to the effect that her disciplinary appeal was dismissed, are null and void and of no legal effect. The facts of the case are shortly as follows :- 15 The applicant was at the material time an employee of the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority, holding the post of Operator I. It is an undisputed fact that on the 30th January, 1979 (the date of the alleged disciplinary offences) she was performing the duties of cashier at the Larnaca Sectional office. 20 As a result of certain accusations against the applicant for irregularities in the discharge of her duties and in view of the seriousness of such accusations, the General Manager of the Respondent 1 Authority appointed an investigating officer under regulation 41, paragraph 1(b) of the Personnel General 25 Regulations, to carry out an investigation concerning such accusations and at the same time he interdicted the applicant pending such investigation under regulation 50, paragraph 3 of thesame Regulations. By letter dated 31.1.1979the applicant was informed by the Personnel Manager of the decision of the 30 General Manager to interdict her as from such date and that Nicos Malekos was appointed as an investigating officer to carry out an inquiry concerning accusations against her for "conduct unbecoming to an employee in her capacity as such and/or act capable to.cause material or moral damage to the 35 Authority and/or irregularity and breach of trust in admi­ nistration". The investigating officer for the purpose of his investigation took written statements from employees of the Authority who were in a position to give any information as to facts related 565 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)to the object of his investigation and also collected any material necessary thereto. In the course of such investigation he inter­ viewed the applicant on two occasions, the first on the 2nd February, 1979 and the second on the 12th February, 1979 for the purpose of examining the applicant as to what she had 5 to say respecting the accusations against her. The applicant in a statement signed by her on 2.12.1979 and in answer to a question concerning the condition of her cash collections on 30.1.1979, said the following: "So long as my integrity is at stake, I have nothing to say except that on that date Γhad 10 u deficit of £11.843 mils which I paid from my handbag". At the interview of 12.2.1979 the answer of the applicant to all questions put to her by the investigating officer was, " I have nothing to say"'. The investigating officer after completing his investigation 15 submitted the file containing the statements of witnesses taken by him, including the statements of the applicant together with and other evidential material, to the General Manager of res­ pondent 1 Authority. The General Manager after considering the material put before him came to the conclusion that there 20 was a prima facie case against the applicant for the commission of disciplinary offences, drafted a charge for such offences and submitted the case to the 1st Instance Disciplinary Board of the Authority undertheprovisions of regulation 41, paragraph 6(

1. a)of the Personnel General Regulations. At the same time, 25 he informed the applicant accordingly by letter dated 24th February, 1979, the contents of which were as follows: "Having considered the accusations against you, I have concluded that there is prima facie case against you; there­ fore and in compliance with Regulation 41 paragraph 6(
2. a)of the Personnel General Regulations, 1 have drafted the relative charge which I attach herewith and I have referred your case to a Disciplinary Board of five members". 30 On the same date the General Manager sent another letter to the applicant calling her to attend the hearing of the case 35 before the Disciplinary Board on 22nd March, 1979, informing her at the same time that she could appear personally or accom­ panied by an advocate or any other person of her choice. The applicant was represented throughout the proceedings 566 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Sawides J. by an advocate, who, acting on her behalf, prior to the hearing inspected the file of the case and was supplied with copies of all statements of witnesses which weretaken by the investigating officer and which contained the evidence intended to be adduced 5 at the hearing, as well as the statements of the applicant which were made to the investigating officer. On 23.3.1979 the applicant attended the hearing before the First Instance Disciplinary Board which was composed of the General Manager, two Managers, one Assistant Manager and 10 one Section Manager. The presentation and the prosecution of the case on behalf of the Authority was conducted by the Personnel Manager and the defence of the applicant was handled by her counsel. The applicant was charged, pleaded not guilty andthehearingcommenced onthat day,continued on the follow15 ing day and was concluded on 29.3.1979. The minutes of the proceedings were produced as exhibit I before this Court. The charge against the applicant as appearing in exhibit I. reads as follows: "The aforesaid officer is charged with the commission of the following disciplinary offences, contrary to Regulation 33,paragraph 4,sections(f). (h),(i)and (
3. ih)of the Personnel General Regulations. 20 1. Conduct unbecoming with the status of an employee. 25 2. Acts that might cause material or moral damage to the Authority. 3. Irregularities in administration. 4. Acts amounting to abuse of authority or confidence entrusted to her. On the 30th January, 1979 and whilst the accused was per30 forming the duties of a cashier at the cash of the Larnaca Sectional Office, she made a mistake as a result of which a fictitious surplus was observed in her cash which the accused took away from her cash with the intent to appropriate same. Moreover, the accused acted in a way tending to harm the 35 good reputation of the Authority in that she involved persons strangers to the Authority for the purpose of covering up her offence". . 567 Sawides J. Mltidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)Respondent

(2)Board delivered its decision on 2.6.1979 whereby applicant was found guilty of the charges against her. Counsel for applicant then addressed in mitigation and respondent

(2)adjourned its decision on sentence till 16.6.1979 when it decided to impose upon applicant the sentence of dis- 5 missal from the service of respondent 1Authority. Such decision, (copy of which was produced as exhibit 2) was communicated to the applicant by letter dated 16.6

1. The applicant appealed against such decision, under the Personnel General Regulations, to the 2nd Instance Disciphnary Board which sat 10 as an appellate Court on 8.9.1979 heard the appeal and reserved its decision. Applicant was represented at the hearing of the appeal by her counsel. (The minutes of the hearing of the appeal appear in exhibit 3). The members of the 2nd Instance Disciplinary Board met on 15.10.1979 and reached their decision ]5 whereby the appeal was dismissed both in respect of conviction and in respect of the sentence imposed upon the applicant. (Copy of such decision isbefore this Court as exhibit 4) Such decision was communicated to the applicant by letter dated 26.10.1979, in consequence of which the applicant filed the 20 present recourse against the respondent Authority as respondent I and against the 1st Instance Disciplinary Board as respondent
2. As I have heard no argument as to whether respondent 2 was a necessary party to these proceedings or not, especially in view of the fact that its decision was dealt with on appeal 25 by the 2nd Instance Disciplinary Board whose decision was the final decision and the latter was not considered as a necessary party in the proceedings and as no objection was raised in this respect, I shall not deal with this matter. The grounds of law on which the recourse is based, 16 in 30 number, are set out in the application They may be grouped as follows:(A) Grounds 1-7 inclusive, concern procedural irregularities in respect of which objections were made during the trial. Such alleged irregularities are:

(1)Tne participation of the General Manager who was the person who drafted the charge against the applicant, was irregular.

(2)The determination of an objection raised in respect of 568 35 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Sawides J. such participation without hearing argument, was irregular.

(3)The President of respondent 2wasdecidingthe objections himself without consulting the other members. 5 10 15

(4)The President stated that the Board expected from the applicant to prove that she was innocent in order to acquit her.

(5)Notwithstanding the fact that there was a preliminary objection as to the framing of the charge, in that particulars of the facts on which each count wasbased were not stated in each count, such objection was left to be decided at the end thus the applicant was not aware of the real facts when defending herself.

(6)Evidence as to previous conduct of the applicant was heard.

(7)The above irregularities amount to violation of the rules of natural justice. (B) Matters touching the weight of evidence adduced and conviction on such evidence. 20 (I) The surplus is referred to as "fictitious" which means that there was no surplus which the applicant appropriated (legal ground 8).

(2)There was no evidence in support of the charge (legal ground 9). 25

(3)The Board was not sure about the guilt of the applicant; nevertheless, found her guilty (legal ground 10). (C) Matters touching the decision itself: 30

(1)The applicant was found guilty on alternative counts, i.e. guilty on counts 1 and 2 or alternatively counts 3 and 4 (legal ground 11).

(2)The decision is unfounded (legal ground 14). (D) Matters touching sentence.

(1)The Board felt bound to impose the sentence of dismissal (legal ground 13). 569 Savvidei J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(2)The sentence was imposed on a different date from that of the adjudication of the guilt (legal ground 15).

(3)The mitigating circumstances of the applicant were not taken into consideration (legal ground 12). The last legal ground concerns the decision on appeal before the Second Instance Disciplinary Board and is to the effect that such Board made the same mistakes and/or it failed to give any reasons and/or it did not understand the arguments of the applicant before it. 5 At this stage I would like to point out that expressions in 10 brackets accompanying the grounds of law, such as "protakouston!!!"" ("unheard of") followed by explanatory marks as it happened in the present case, not only they do not add anything of substance to the force of the legal ground but on the contrary, they may be taken as tending to show an effort 15 to impress the reader by the addition of such remarks and exclamations rather than the substance of the legal ground. The least I should say in this respect, is that I consider the inclusion of such expressions as scandalous, unnecessary and undesirable. The application was opposed and the legal grounds set out 20 in the opposition are: " i . The recourse in so far as the decision of 2.6.1979 of Respondent 2 is concerned, is out of time as more than 75 days elapsed singe the day when such decision was communicated to the applicant and the day when the 25 recourse was filed.

1. Though by the present recourse two decisions arc being attacked, the one being the decision of the First Instance Disciplinary Board in respect of which the time has elapsed, and the other that of the Appellate Board 30 of the Authority, legal grounds 1-15 relate expressly to ihe decision dated 2.6.1979 of Respondent 2, whereas ground 16 which is expressly directed against the decision of the Appellate Board (the Second instance Disciplinary Board) merely adopts grounds 1-15 with the only addition 35 that the decision of the 2nd Instance Disciplinary Board on Appeal which was communicated to the applicant on 570 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. 26.10.1979 is not reasoned and such Appellate Board did not understand the arguments of the applicant. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
2. Without prejudice to the above, it is alleged that the sub judice decision was lawfully taken for the following reasons: (a) The General Manager was not the prosecutoi and Chairman of the 1st Instance Disciplinary Board at the same time but only the Chairman and the duty of the prosecutor was carried out by the Personnel Manager. The General Manager drafted the charge under the provisions of Regulation 41

(6)(

1. a)of the Personnel General Regulations because he thought that there was evidence justifying such course. This, however, does not mean that he decided about the guilt of the applicant. It is for this reason that he wrote 'there is a prima facie case'. These were expounded by counsel for applicant before the Disci­ plinary Board at length, as well as grounds 2, 3, 4 up upto and including 15 as they appear in detail in the minutes which are attached as exhibit Ά ' in the present recourse. (
2. b)A careful persual of the minutes proves that the above mentioned grounds are legally unfounded and that the decision of the Board was legally taken. Respondents will refer to the said minutes as well as the minutes of the appeal which are attached as exhibit 'B' as well as to the sub judice decisions which are attached as exhibit ' C , and the relevant' Regulations of the Personnel General Regulations. (
3. c)Respondents stress the fact that all the facts and the evidence were made available to the applicant, as well as the whole file together with the charge-sheet and applicant was fully informed and she was not in any way hindered in her defence; the seriousness of the sentence is not a ground for annulment". Pausing here for a moment, I wish to remark that in admi­ nistrative recourses the legal grounds on which both the appli­ cation and the opposition are based, must be stated precisely and concisely to enable the reader to understand in the first 571 SiKWides J. Mitidou v. CY.TJV.

(1982)instance, what is the issue in the case, leaving full argument and exposition of the law at the hearing. In the present case in ground 3(

1. a)instead of a mere presentation of a legal ground, a whole argument is set out, concluding with a general and abstract reference to the legal arguments contained in the volu- 5 minous record of the proceedings attached to the opposition. I wish also to point out that in ground 3(
2. a)of the Opp. there is reference totheaddressbeforetheDisciplinary Board of "counsel for applicant". I presume that this is a clerical mistake and counsel for respondents, most likely, intended to refer to 10 counsel for the respondents and not to counsel for applicant As this, however, is not a matter which may have any bearing in the outcome of the case, I leave it at that. Counsel for applicant in his address in support of the grounds that the framing of the charge was defective contended: 15 (
3. a)That it did not contain particulars of facts in respect of each charge (
4. b)The statements of facts refer to all counts in general, without any specification as to which of such facts refer to each specific charge. Furthermoie, the facts 20 contained in the last paragraph of the statement of facts are not referred to in anyone of the charges (
5. c)An objection was taken at the hearing as to the way the charge was drafted and decision was reserved on such objection The decision was taken at the end 25 of the trial together with the final decision dealing with the substance of the case. (
6. d)It was repugnant to regulation 45, paragraph 4 which expressly provides that in disciplinary proceedings dll real facts constituting the offence charged aswell as 30 dny existing elements of guilt should be defined. In dealing with legal ground 6, he drew the attention of the Court to certain parts of theevidence, as appearing in the record of the proceedings, where evidence on facts as to previous conduct of the applicant not referred to in the charge was allowed, 35 notwithstanding that objection was taken on several occasions on the admissibility of such evidence. The admission of such 572 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. evidence, counsel contended, was contrary to regulation 45, paragraph 4 which safeguards the basic rule of natural justice that an accused person should know what he is going to face at the trial and have time to make his defence. It was also 5 contrary to regulation 46, paragraph 4 which provides that the trial should be conducted as far as possible in the same manner as a criminal case tried summarily, and in criminal proceedings evidence of other acts or previous conduct of the accused not related to the case under trial, is not admissible. 10 Furthermore, the admission of such evidence amounts to violation of the rules of natural justice because by the introduction of such facts the applicant was taken by surprise and was confronted with facts which she did not have in mind and she did not prepare to defend herself. Also, by the admission 15 ofsuchevidence, the Board was influenced in forming an opinion in the case. In any event, the reason for which such evidence was admitted is legally unfounded. Dealing with the ground that the procedure was contrary to the Personnel General Regulations, he referred to the provi20 sions of regulation 45

(5)and stressed the fact that whereas under the said regulation the disciplinary proceedings are communicated to the interested party and they are subsequently sent to the secretary of the Disciplinary Board, in the present case such course was not followed. In the letter of the General 25 Manager dated 24.2.1979 sent to the applicant, the following are mentioned: "30" "Having considered the accusations against you I have drafted the respective charge which I am sending to you ,and I have referred your case to the Disciplinary Board consisting of five members". Such course, according to counsel for applicant, has deprived the applicant of the possibility to give any explanations on the accusations against her before the case was presented to the Disciplinary Board. 35 As to the participation of the General Manager in the First Instance Disciplinary Board, counsel submitted that under regulation 41

(6)(a) of the Regulations, it is the duty of the General Manager to examine all the material necessary in the case and if he considers that a disciplinary offence has been 573 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)committed, then he sends the case to the Disciplinary Board. In the present case the General Manager had already formed an opinion about the guilt of the applicant, as it appears in the letter of the 24th February, 1979, whereby he informed the applicant that he concluded that there was a prima facie case 5 against her and, therefore, by his participation as Chairman of the respondent 2 Board he acted in violation of the rules of natural justice. He also submitted that once the Audit Rollwas amongst thedocuments handed tothe General Manager by the Investigating Officer, the General Manager was a 10 necessary witness and could not preside the Board which was trying the case. He finally added that the General Manager was biased against the applicant, a fact which is evidenced by the conduct of the General Manager during the proceedings before the respondent 2 Board, as appearing on the record 15 and gave amongst others, the following examples:

(1)The General Manager was changing his rulings all the time.

(2)When a question as to the production of a certain book arose the General Manager said, "if it is necessary to 20 have it produced, we shall produce it".

(3)One of the witnesses said in his evidence that a colleague of his told him that the Geneial Manager said to him that if the applicant continued to make trouble, the General Manager intended to interdict her and that 25 they should not raise any objection to that. Dealing with the substance of the charge and the evidence adduced, counsel contended that there was no evidence that there was any surplus and what was the exact amount of such surplus. Even if it is accepted that, there was a surplus, such 30 surplus must be a real one and not fictitious and the applicant is not charged for appropriating a real surplus but that she appropriated a fictitious surplus. In concluding on the legal grounds relating to the decision of respondent 2 Board, he submitted that the fact that members 35 of the Disciplinary Board were not sure as to the guilt of the accused is manifested by their finding the applicant guilty on counts 1 and 2 and alternatively, on counts 3 and 4. 574 \ 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Sanides J. Counsel for applicant in expounding legal ground 16 which refers tothedecisionof theAppellate Board (the Second Instance Disciplinary Board) submitted that the decision of the respondent 2Board and that of the Appellate Board constitute a com5 posite administrative act and any defect in the decision of the respondent 1 Board which renders such decision a nullity, affects also the decision of the Appellate Board once the latter affirmed the decision of the respondent 2 Board and, therefore, his arguments on grounds 1-15 extend and apply to ground 10 16 and he concluded as follows: "Theway of thought and the line of direction of the Appellate Board appear in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the second page of the decision which speak for themselves and, therefore, I shall make no comment on them". 15 I shall pausehere again to observethat it isthe dutyof counsel to make comments on any matters which he deems necessary to establish his case and not just state in general terms that the facts speak for themselves and that he will make no comments. In conclusion, he submitted that under regulation 47

(5)20 the period for filing a recourse against the decision of the respondent 2 Board is suspended when an appeal is made to the Appellate Board and therefore the present recourse in so far as the decision of respondent 2 Board is concerned, was not filed out of time. 25 Counsel for the respondents contended— (a) that the recourse against the decision of respondent 2 Board is out of time. Such decision is a complete executory act and under Article 146.2 of the Constitution the applicant had a right to attack it, provided that she filed her recourse 30 withinthe period of 75daysand any provision in the Regulations to the contrary, cannot override the provisions of the Constitution. The stay- of execution provided for by regulation 47

(5)of the Personnel General Regulations, suspends only the execution pending an appeal but does not divest a person 35 of his legal right under the Constitution to contest its validity by filing a recourse. (b) The decision of the respondent 2 Board lost its executory character, once it has been challenged by way of appeal to the 575 Sawides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)Second Instance Disciplinary Board and it has merged in the decision of the latter. The procedure contemplated by the Rules does not make thedecision of theFirst Instance Board and that ofthe Appellate Board a composite act but each one is self-contained and once 5 the decision of the respondent 2 Board is barred by limitation oftime, theonly decision which could bethesubject of a recourse is that of the Appellate Board which is the final decision. (

1. c)The recourse against the decision of the Second Instance Disciplinary Board is legally unfounded as no" legal grounds 10 are given in support of the allegation that such decision is null and void; the fifteen grounds which are set out inthe application are in support of the recourse against the decision of the First Instance Disciplinary Board and only ground 16 is advanced against the decision of the Appellate Board. The said fifteen 15 grounds refer to the composition and the procedure before the First Instance Disciplinary Board the decision of which has not been challenged in time, and have nothing to do with the procedure before the Appellate Board. (
2. d)The procedure before the respondent 2 Board was proce- 20 dure before an administrative Tribunal and therefore compliance with the rules of procedure and evidence is not so strict as in the case of trial before a Criminal Court. (
3. e)Evidence of similar conduct by the applicant on other occasions was admissible to prove mens rea or intent or system 25 in view of the nature of the charge which the accused was facing. In any event the admission of such evidence does not nullify the proceedings once there was other ample admissible evidence which was accepted by the respondent 2 Disciplinary Board and on which the applicant was found guilty. 30 (
4. f)Sufficient particulars were mentioned in the charge, enabling the applicant to make her defence, but in addition, the whole file of the case containing the evidence against her was made available to her and she knew the evidence proposed to be tendered against her and could prepare her defence. 35 Furthermore, all the particulars set out in the charge referred to all and each one of the offences respectively. Counsel concluded his address by submitting that both deci576 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Simides J. sions are duly reasoned and in the decision of the respondent 2 Board the evidence is analysed as well as the reasons why the accused was found guilty; the contents of such decision clearly show that in reaching their decision the members of 5 the Board were not influenced by any facts emanating from inadmissible evidence or answers to questions objected to. Before dealing with the legal grounds posing for consideration in the present case, Ishall examine briefly the preliminary objec­ tion raised by counsel for respondents, in that the recourse 10 against thedecision of respondent 2 is outof time andthat in any event it lost its executory character having merged inthe decision of the Second Instance Disciplinary Board. Counsel for applicant contended that the decision of res­ pondent 2 andthat of the Second Instance Disciplinary Board 15 constitute a composite administrative act and,therefore, each one of them can bethesubject of a recourse before this Court. It is correct that in the case of a composite administrative act, if the component parts have the characteristics of an execu­ tory act,they preserve their executory character and eachone 20 of them is capable of being challenged by recourse. Butwhen the composite administrative actis completed, theindependent intermediate parts merge into the final act and their executory character is lost by such changes and cannot be challenged individually. The legal position is summed up by Tsatsos— 25 Recourse for Annulment, 3rd Ed.at p. 152 as follows: 30 35 " Άφ' ής δμως ή σύνθετος διοικητική ενέργεια περατωθη, 1 αποβαίνει απαράδεκτος ήπροσβολή δι αιτήσεως ακυρώσεως της αρχικήςή μεμονωμένης τώνενδιαμέσων πράξεων,αΐτινες άποβάλλουσι πλέον τον αυτοτελώς έκτελεστόν αυτώνχαρακτήρα. Προσβλητή εφεξήςείναι μόνονήόλη σειρά των οΰτω δια τοϋαποτελέσματος,εις6 άπέβλεψαν, συνεχόμενων πρά­ ξεων. Προσβαλλομένης δέ τυχόν μόνης τής τελικής πράξεως Θεωρείται συμπροσβαλλομένη ή Ολη σύνθετος διοικητική ενέργεια καίτούτο διότι μετά την περάτωσιν τηςσυνθέτου διοικητικής ενέργειαςαίπροηγηθεϊσαι τήςτελικής μερικώτεραι και πρότεροναυθύπαρκτοι πράξειςάπόλλυσι την αΰτοτέλειαν αυτών". ("From the moment, however, that the composite admi­ nistrative act is completed, the challenge of the original 577 Savvides J. Mitidou Y, CY.T.A.

(1982)or isolated intermediate acts which lose their individual executory character, becomes unacceptable. Capable of being challenged thereafter is the whole series of all inter­ connected acts which aimed at the achieved result. And when only the final act is challenged, the whole composite 5 act is considered as challenged at the same time and this because after the completion of the composite administra­ tive act those acts which preceded the final act, and which were partial and independent, lose their self-contained character"). 10 Also in the Conclusions from the Jurisprudence of theGreek Council of State, 1929-1959 at p. 244, under the heading "Com­ posite Administrative Act" it reads: "Μετά την εκδοσιν τής διοικητικήςπράξεωςτής αποτελούσης τό τέρμα τής όλης συνθέτου διοικητικής ενεργείας, αύτη 15 άπετελεϊ έκτοτε ένιαίαν πράξιν, πλήρως συντελεσθεΐσαν, καΐ συνεπώς εφεξής προσβλητή είναι μόνον ή τελευταία πράξις, ουχί δε αυτοτελώς μεμονωμένη και ενδιάμεσος πρδξις. ήτις απώλεσε την ιδίαν αύτης αύτοτέλειαν συγχωνευθείσα εΐς τήν τελικην. Προσβαλλομένης όμως τής τελικής πράξεως 20 παραδεκτώς προβάλλονται και λόγοι αναγόμενοι εϊς τάς μερικωτέρας καΐ συγχωνευθείσας πράξεις, ή διαπίστωσις δε τής άκυρότητος τινός έξ αυτών επιφέρει τήν ακυρότητα τών άκολουθησασών μερικωτέρων πράξεων, δια τήν εκδοσιν των οποίων ή κριθείσα ώς παράνομος αποτελεί νόμιμον 25 προυπόθεσιν". ("After the issue of the administrative act constituting the end of the whole composite administrative action the same constitutes then a single act, fully completed and conse­ quently thereafter only the final act can be challenged but 30 not the separate and isolated intermediate act which has lost its individual executory character having been merged in the final act. By challenging the final act it is accepted that reasons referring to smaller and merged acts may be put forward, and the assertainment of the invalidity of 35 any oneof thembrings about theinvalidity of the subsequent smaller acts, for the issue of which the act which was found to be illegal constitutes a legal prerequisite"). and at p. 242: . 578 _ Επίσης ένσω- 40 3 C.L.R. MiUdou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. ματοΰται ή πραξις πρωτοβαθμίου διοικητικού οργάνου κατόπιν προσφυγής, κατά νόμονασκούμενης ενώπιον δευτερο­ βαθμίου, είς τήν άπόφασιν τοϋ τελευταίου ". 5 (" „ Also the act of a first instance administrative organ is incoiporated,' after a recourse, made in accordance with the law before a higher organ, in the decision of the latter „"). (Sec also Kyriacopoulos—Administrative Law, vol. C at pp. 98, 99, Spiliotopoulos—Manual on Administrative Law, 10 paragraph 159 at pp. 154, 155). There are numerous decisions of the Greek Council of State confirming the above principle. I shall refer only to a few of them which have some bearing in the present case. In Case 1235/57 where the Council was dealing with a decision of a 15 Second Instance Committee which had dismissed the appeal of the applicant from the decision of a First InstanceCommittee, it was held that the decision of the First Instance Committee which was challenged together with the decision of the Second Instance Committee, had lost its executory character having 20 merged in the decision of the Second instance Committee. In Case 1587/50 in similar circumstances, it was held that the decision in the First Instance was not an executory act any longer after the decision of the Second Instance Committee, as it had lost its self-existence having been incorporated in the 25 last one which was the only executory act capable of being challenged. Also, in Case 1587/50 in which the recourse was directed both against the decision of the executive committee of a Hospital and against the decision of the Board of the Hospital whereby the appeal from the decision of the executive 30 committee was dismissed, it was held that the recourse against the first instance decision was unacceptable as it had lost its executive character due to the decision of the appellate Board and in consequence the only decision which could be challenged was that of the Appellate Board. 35 In the decision of our Supreme Constitutional Court in Pelides and The Republic

(1962)3 R.S.C.C. p. 13 at pp. 17, 18, it was held that: "The Court takes this opportunity of stressing that though 579 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)Article 146 grants it exclusivejurisdiction in administrative law matters there is nothing in such Article to prevent procedures for administrative review of executive or administrative acts or decisions from being provided for in a Law. Such review may be either— (

1. a)by way of confirmation or completion of the act or decision in question, in which case no recourse is possible to this Court until such confirmation or completion has taken place (e.g. under section 17 of CAP 96); or (
2. b)by way of review by higher authority or by specially set-up organs or bodies of an administrative nature, in which case a provision for such a review will not be a bar to a recourse before this Court but once the procedure for such a review has been set in motion 15 by a person concerned no recourse is possible to this Court until the review has been completed. Such review procedures, as aforesaid, are in no way contrary to, or inconsistent with, Article 30 of the Constitution because specially set-up organs or bodies of an 20 administrative nature are not judicial committees or excepptional courts in the sense of paragraph 1of such Article". Reverting now to the case under consideration I have come to the conclusion that the decision of the First Instance Disciplinary Board has merged in the decision of the Second Instance 25 Appellate Board and in consequence it has lost its executory character and cannot be challenged by the present recourse. The only decision that can be challenged is that of the Second Instance Disciphnary Board. It is, however, well settled that though the last decision of 30 a composite administrative act is the only one that can be challenged, nevertheless, once the intermediate component parts are a legal prerequisite to the final act, their validity may be examined in deciding thevalidity of thefinalact, asthe invalidity of a part of a composite administrative act renders all acts 35 which follow, including the final concluded act, null and void. (Sec Kyriacopoulos—Greek Administrative Law, Vol. 3 at p. 99, Tsatsos—Recourse for annulment, 3rd Ed. at p. 152, 580 5 10 \ \ \ 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. Conclusions from the Jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State (1929-1959) at p. 24 and also our own case law. See, inter alia, Orphanides v. The Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 385, at p. 392, Νemitsas Industries Ltd. v. The Municipal Corporation 5 of Limassol and Another

(1967)3 C.L.R. 134, Savvas HjiGeorghiou v. The Republic

(1974)3 C.L.R. 436 at p. 445, Ero Angelidou and Others v. The Republic

(1975)3 C.L.R. 404, Christodoulou and Another v. CYTA

(1978)3 C.L.R. 61,Ioannou v. Electricity Authority

(1981)3 C.L.R. 280 at p. 299). 10 Therefore, though the decision of the First Instance Board cannot be challenged by the present recourse, the grounds of appeal advanced against thevalidity of such decision and argued before the Second Instance Disciplinary Board and which were rejected by such Board may be grounds of law in considering 15 the validity of the decision of the Second Instance Disciplinary Board. For this reason, I find- that grounds 1-15 of this recourse, though directed against the decision of the First Instance Disciplinary Board being grounds of law intended to establish the irregularity or the validity of acts or decisions 20 which preceded the decision of the Second Instance Disciplinary Board, which is the final decision challenged under paragraph Β of the prayer in this recourse, have to be examined. 25 Legal grounds 1-6 refer to irregularities at the hearing which, according to legal ground 7, amount to violation of the rules of natural justice. The rules of natural justice which may, briefly, be expressed in the words that "no man shall be ajudge in his own cause and both sides shall be heard" have been interpreted by the Courts to mean impartiality and fairness on the,part of a judge in the 30 exercise of hisjudicial function or onthepart of anadministrator in the exercise of a quasi judicial function. In Kanda v. Government of Malaya [1962] A.C. 322, Lord Denning, at p. 337 summarised such rules as follows: f 35 'The Romans put them in thetwo maxims; Nemojudex in cause sua: and Audi alteram partem. They have lecently been put in the two words, Impartiality and Fairness". Ina recentcase, Kazamiasv. TheRepublic

(1982)3 C.L.R.239, I had the opportunity of reviewing a number of cases and legal 581 Savvides J. Mitidoa v. CY.T.A.

(1982)authorities on the rules of natural justice and Τ adopt what I said in that case in this respect. In Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society, [1958] 2 All E.R. 579, Harman, J. in expounding the principles which should govern an inquiry carried out by a quasi judicial body when the 5 interests of an individual are at stake and after considering a line of English decisions on this point, concluded as follows at page 599: "What, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind? First, I think that the person accused 10 should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and, thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really is anything more". 15 Under the principles of Impartiality and Fairness the rule against bias has also evolved, the existence of which may vitiate a judicial or quasi judicial decision. The rule against bias is important because using Lord Hewart's, C.J., words in The King v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] I K.B. 256 20 at p. 259, "justice should not only be done, but should mani­ festly and undoubtedly be seen to be done". In dealing with the above principle in R. v. CamborneJusti­ ces ex parte Pearce [1954] 2 All E.R. 850, Slade J., at p. 855 had this to say: 25 "While indorsing and fully maintaining the integrity of the principle reasserted by Lord Hewart, C.J., this Court feels that the continued citation of it in cases to which it is not applicable may lead to the erroneous impression that it is more important that justice should appear to be 30 done than it should in fact be done". The application of the rules of natural justice before admi­ nistrative tribunals does not however impose an obhgation on them to adopt the regular form of judicial procedure. In General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943] 2 All E.R. 337, a House of Lords decision, Lord Wright had this to say at pp. 342, 343: "The question of a failure of 'natural justice' is what is 582 35 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. to be considered in this appeal. But before considering the meaning of these words, I must first observe that they can in this case be properly taken as a description of what the council has to do, namely, to make 'due inquiry', which under the statute is the governing criterion, that is an independent inquiry by the council as the body responsible for its own decision. 'Natural justice' seems to be used in contrast with any formal or technical rule of law or procedure. Some light on what it connotes may be got from the authorities, to certain of which I now refer. Thus Spackman v.Plumstead Board of Works(\) was a case of administrative decision in a matter of local government. Under the relevant Act an architect's certificate was made conclusive for fixing a general line for buildings. The EARL OF SELBORNE, at p. 240 made some general observations, and said: No doubt in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice that he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. Theie could be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essenceofjustice. I have italicised the two phrases which the EARL OF SELBORNE seems to me to use as meaning what is generally meant by 'natural justice'. He adds ?.i p. 240. This is a matter not of a kind requiring form, not of a kind requiring litigation at all, but requiring only that the parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound such

(1)[1885] 10 App. Cas. 229. 583 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him". And he concluded on this point at p. 345,as follows: "If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect 5 of any decision, it is indeed immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from the essential principles of justice. The decision must be declared to be no decision". In Local Government Board v. Arlidge[1915] A.C. 120, Via- ^Q count Haldane, L.J., at p. 132, had this to say: " when the duty of deciding an appeal isimposed, thosewhosedutyitistodecideitmustactjudicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity 15 of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in thespirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. But it does not follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must be the same. In the case of a Court of 20 lawtraditioninthiscountryhasprescribedcertainprinciples to which in the main the procedure must conform. But what that procedure is to be in detail must depend on the nature of thetribunal. In modern times it has become increasingly common for Parliament to give an appeal in 25 matters whichreallypertaintoadministration,ratherthanto the exercise of thejudicial functions of an ordinary Court, to authorities whose functions are administrative and not in the ordinary sense judicial". And Lord Parmoor, at page 140, said: "Where,however,thequestionofthepropriety ofprocedure is raised in a hearing before some tribunal other than a Court of law there is no obligation to adopt the regular forms of legal procedure. It is sufficient that the case has been heard in a judicial spirit and in accordance with 35 the principles of substantial justice. In determining whether the principles of substantial justice have been complied with in matters of procedure, 584 30 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. regard must necessarily be had to the nature of the issue to be determined and the constitution of the tribunal". 5 10 15 20 Josephides, J., in The Republic of Cyprus and Mozoras

(1966)3 C.L.R. 356, after referring to the above dictums, said at pp. 401, 402: "It will thus be seen that in applying the rules of natural justice there is no obligation on the tribunal to adopt the regular forms of judicial procedure; it is sufficient if the hearing is made in accordance with the principles of substantial justice, and the duty is discharged by hearing evidence viva voce or otherwise (see General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943] 2 All E.R. 337, per Viscount Simon L.C. at page 340). In short, it is not required of a tribunal to conduct itself as a court or to conduct a trial. Provided they act ingood faith, they can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view (per Lord Lorebum L.C, in Board of Education v. Rice [1911] A.C. 179 at page 182)". Harman, J., in Byrne v. Kinematrograph Renters Society (supra) at p. 598. said: 25 30 35 "It seems to me that bodies like K.R.S., who exercise monopolistic powers and may ruin a man by their recommendations, ought not to act in an arbitrary manner or, at the least, that, if they do, as this body did, set up an investigation committee which is a quasi-judicial body, they must be taken to hold out to those over whom they claim to exercisejurisdiction the assurance that the proceedings will be fair. Indeed, in the present case the plaintiff was expressly told that he would get a fair hearing. It has, however, often been pointed out that it is a great mistake to suppose that the principles of natural justice require a body of this sort to conduct themselves as though they were a court of law". And went on citing the following which was said by Tucker, L.J., in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All E.R. 109 at p. 118: "Throughout this inquiry (the plaintiff) was, at every 585 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)stage, it seems to me, given an opportunity of presenting his case and of asking any question which he desired to ask. It is true that he was not in terms asked: 'Have you got any witnesses? Do you want an adjournment?'. A layman at an inquiry of this kind is, of course, at a 5 grave disadvantage compared with a trained advocate, but that is a necessary result of these domestic tribunals which proceed in a somewhat informal manner. Counsel for the plaintiff, in the course of his forceful argument on this point, again and again said: 'What would be said of 10 localjustices who acted inthis way?'. With all due respect, the position is totally different. This matter is not to be judged by the standards applicable to local justices. Domestic tribunals of this kind are entitled to act in a way which would not be permissible on the part of localjustices ]5 sitting as a court of law. The conclusion I have reached on this aspect of the case is that there was no material on which a jury could have arrived at a conclusion that this inquiry was conducted in a way contrary to the principles of natural justice. If, as I think is the better view, 20 it really was a matter of law for the decision of the judge, I should unhesitatingly hold that there was nothing here which was contrary to the principles of natural justice as laid down in the various authorities which have been brought to our notice. There are, in my view, no words 25 which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being 30 dealt with, and so forth. Accordingly, I do not derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice which have been from time to time used " The above view of Tucker, L.J., has been referred to with approval on many occasions in recent English case law (see, 35 inter alia, Re Pergamon PressLtd. [1970] 3All E.R. 535,Furnell v. Whangarei High Schools Board [1973] 1 All E.R. 400 at p. 412, and in our own cases, The Republic v. Georghiades

(1972)3 C.L.R. 594, Kyprianou v. Public Service Commission

(1973)3 C.L.R. p. 206). 40 Having dealt with the legal principles relating to the applica586 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. tion of the rules of natural justice in proceedings before administrative tribunals in the discharge of quasi judicial functions, I am coining now to consider whether there was a violation of such rules, as alleged by counsel for the applicant. 5 I shall deal first with ground 1which is directed against the participation of the General Manager in the Disciplinary Board because, as it is contended, once he was the person who framed the charge against the applicant, he formed an opinion about the guilt of the applicant, as a result of which he was biased 10 during the trial. Under the Personnel General Regulations (regulation 41)» it is the duty of the General Manager of the Authority when it is reported to him by the Head of a Section or Office of the Authority that a disciplinary offence was committed, to adopt 15 one of the following courses: (

1. a)If no further investigation is necessary in respect ofthecommission of suchoffence thenhe hasto formulate the charge and send the case for trial before the Disciplinary Board. 20 (
2. b)If the offence is of such nature that requires further investigation, he has to appoint one or more investigating officers of a higher rank to that of the person against whom the investigation is made, to carry out an investigation. 25 It is the duty of such investigating officer to hear witnesses, take their statements, hear and take a statement from the person against whom the accusation is made and after completing the dossier of the investigation, to submit same together with any real evidence to the General Manager. The General 30 Manager, after considering the material submitted to him, he can either put an end to the investigation, if he comes to the conclusion that there is no prima facie case for the commission of the disciplinary offence, or, if satisfied that there is a prima facie case, he must formulate the charge and remit the 35 caseto thecompetent Disciplinary Board, informing at the same time the employee concerned, about the course taken. In cases where the offence is not so serious as to deserve any 587 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)punishment, such as reduction in office, temporary suspension from work, compulsory retirement or dismissal, the case may be dealt with by the General Manager,or his Deputy, or by a Disciphnary Board consisting of three members appointed for such purpose, by the General Manager or his Deputy. 5 When the offence is of a more serious nature, involving more serious sanctions such as compulsory retirement, or dismissal, the competent organ to deal with the case is the First Instance Disciplinary Board which, under regulation 44 is composed of the General Manager as Chairman, three Managers from 10 the highest personnel of the Authority and one employee of the Authority elected by the General Manager amongst those employees of the higher or highest personnel recommended by the Personnel Trade Union. Inthepresentcase,duetotheseriousnatureoftheaccusations, 15 the General Manager submitted the case for trial before the First Instance Disciplinary Board. Thecomplaint of the applicant is that the General Manager had already made up his mind about her guilt when drafting the charge and informing her that therewasa prima facie caseagainst her, and, therefore, 20 his participation as a Chairman of the Disciplinary Board, in the circumstances, amounts to violation of the rules of natural justice because being the person who initiated the proceedings was biased against the applicant. I find myself unable to agree with counsel for applicant on 25 this contention. The General Manager was neither the person who carried out the investigation against the applicant, nor the person who prosecuted the applicant inthiscase. The General Manager in the discharge of his duties under the Regulations, when complaints were madeto him against the applicant about 30 the commission of disciplinary offences, he assigned a Senior Officer of the Authority as aninvestigating officer to investigate the case. When such investigation was completed and the dossierofthecasewassubmitted tohim,hefound that thematerial contained therein disclosed a prima facie case against the 35 apphcantfor thecommissionofcertain disciplinaryoffences. In compliance with the Regulations, he drafted a charge in respect of such offences, and sentthecasefor trial before thecompetent Board. Thecase wasprosecuted before the Disciplinary Board by the Personnel Manager, under regulation 44

(7)(a). At 40 588 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. no time did the General Manager take any decision as to the guilt of the accused. The only action he took after considering the evidence put before him, was to draft the charge and send the case for trial, informing the applicant accordingly. As 5 from the time of the appointment of the investigating officer till and including the trial by the First Instance Disciplinary Board, the General Manager was acting in compliance with the provisions of the Personnel General Regulations. In Savoulla and Others v. The Republic

(1973)3 C.L.R. 706 10 where the promotion to the rank of Sergeant of a number of police officers was contested by the applicant who was not promoted on the ground that the promotions were effected by the Acting Commander of the Police on the recommendation of the relevant Selection Board which was chaired by him, it 15 was held that: 20 " the participation of the Deputy Commander in the Selection Board, during the time when he was Acting Commander, and his conduct, later, in deciding, in his capacity as Acting Commander, on the promotions to be made, though perhaps undesirable, did not, nevertheless, amount to a material irregularity vitiating the Administrative process which resulted in the promotions challenged by these recourses". Before reaching such conclusion the Court asserted the prin25 ciple concerning the undesirability of the participation in the functioning of two organs, the one which expresses the formal opinion and the organ which takes the final decision. At pp. 712, 713of thejudgment, Triantafyllides, P. had this to say: 30 35 "It is correct that it is a principle of administrative law that where the administrative process concerned requires action on the part of two distinct organs—(one of them being a collective organ empowered to express a formal opinion and the other of them being the organ which takes the final decision after examining the correctness of such opinion)—the organ which is responsible for reaching the final decision should, unless a Law otherwise provides, be different from, and should not participate in the functioning of, the organ which expresses the formal opinion, so that the organ taking the final decision can reach its 589 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)own independent conclusion (see, inter alia, the decisions of the Council of State in Greece in Cases Nos. 2764/1964 and 2517/1967)". In the case of Kyprianou v. The Public Service Commission

(1973)3 C.L.R. 206, where one of the complaints was that the 5 head of the Inland Revenue Department Mr. N. Ionides, who reported the applicant to the Commission and who was a complainant regarding applicant's conduct directly affecting him, appeared before the Commission during the disciplinary proceedings not only as a witness but also, as a person who was 10 putting questions to witnesses testifying before the Commission who were his subordinates in his Department and as it was alleged, could not feel entirely free to speak the whole truth and say things against Mr. Ionides, Triantafyllides, P., at p. 219 concluded as follows on this point: 15 "In the light of the foregoing I am of the view that no irregularity occurred because of anything done by Mr. Ionides in connectionwith the disciplinary process against the applicant; even if it were to be assumed that anything complained of in this respect by the applicant amounted 20 to an irregularity, there is definitely no doubt in mymind that such irregularity was not of a material nature; and it has beenaccepted by case-law thatthereare irregularities which are of a substantial nature and affect the validity of the relevant administrative process and that there are 25 also less serious, immaterial, irregularities which do not affect such validity (see, in this respect, Traitc Pratique de la Fonction Publique by PJantey, 3rd ed., vol. Α., p. 495, paragraph 1544, and Contentieux Administratif by Odent, 1970/71, vol. 5, p. 1446)". 30 In the Greek Administrative Law though the principle that a person cannotbe ajudgeinhis owncase is wellfoundedthere are exceptions either provided by law (Cases 1051/61, 1052/61, 1211/65, 677/66, 2675/68) or by the regulation concerning the constitution of the collective organ. Furthermore, there are 35 decisions of the Greek Council of State where theparticipation of thepersonwhotookthefirst instancedecisioninthecollective organ which dealt with thevalidity of such decision, was found as not violating the above principle. Thus, in Case 1578/50, where administrative investigation which led to the conviction 40 590 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. of the applicant was also a member of the appellate Board which dismissed the appeal of the applicant, it was held: 5 10 15 20 25 30 " 'Επειδή επί τοΰ γεγονότος ότι τήν διοικητικήν άνάκρισιν, κατόπιν της οποίας εξεδόθη ή προσβαλλομένη άπόφασις, διεξήγαγεν ό Ιατρός, Α. Μάντης, μέλος τοϋ 'Αδελφάτου τοϋ Νοσοκομείου, ουδεμία δύναται να θεμελιωθή άκυρότης, διότι ούτε αί διατάξεις των άρθρων 25-47 τοΰ ν. 4548 τοϋ 1930 'περί καταστάσεως των δημοτικών υπαλλήλων*— αΐτινες, ρυθμίζουσι τά της πειθαρχικής διώξεως τών δημοτικών υπαλλήλων, οΰτε αϊ διατάξεις τοϋ α π ό 17 Μαίου—8 "Ιουνίου 1944 διατάγματος *περ! κωδικοποιήσεως είς ένιαϊον κείμενον τών περί Δημοτικών Ιδρυμάτων διατάξεων' (Ε.Φ. 121), οΰτε αϊ διατάξεις τοϋ 'Οργανισμού τοϋ Τζαννείου Νοσοκομείου, κυρωθέντος δια τοϋ ά π ό 16/27 Σεπτεμβρίου 1946 βασ. διατάγματος εκδοθέντος κατ* έξουσιοδότησιν τοΰ άρθρου 34 τοϋ δ/τος της 7 Matou 1944, άποκλείουσι τοϋτο απορριπτέου άποβαίνοντος τοϋ σχετικού λόγου ακυρώσεως". ("Because of the fact that the administrative investigation, whereby the sub judice decision was issued, was carried out by Dr. A. Mantis, member of the staff of the hospital, no invalidity can be founded because neither the provisions of sections 25-47 of law 4548 of 1930 'for the state of muni­ cipal officers' —which regulate the disciplinary proceedings of municipal officers, nor the provisions of the from 17th May—8th June, 1944 order 'for the codification in a single text of the Municipal __. institutions -_ provisions' (E.F. 121), nor the provisions of the Organization of the Jannion Hospital, ratified by the from 16/27 September, 1946 royal decree issued by authorization of section 34 of the order of 7th May, 1944, exclude this rendering the said ground for annulment unacceptable"). In case No. 426/65 it was held: 35 " 'Επειδή και ό λόγος ακυρώσεως, καθ' δν τοϋ Διοικητικού Συμβουλίου τοϋ Νομαρχικοϋ Ταμείου μετέσχεν ώς μετά ψήφου μέλος ό Δ/ντής τών Τεχνικών Υπηρεσιών τοΰ Νομού, καίτοι ούτος εξέδωσε τήν περί εκπτώσεως πραξιν, τούτο δ' αντιτίθεται είς γενικήν τοϋ Διοικητικού Δικαίου, 'Αρχήν, 591 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)καθ* ήν δέν συνάδει προς τους κανόνας της χρήστης Δ/νσεως να συμπίπτουν έν τ φ αύτώ προσώπω αϊ Ιδιότητες τοΰ κρίνοντος καΐ τοΰ κρινόμενου,' τυγχάνει, ωσαύτως, απορ­ ριπτέος, ώς αβάσιμος, διότι ή ανωτέρω αρχή δέν δύναται να τύχη εφαρμογής οσάκις τό έκδόσαν τήν κρινομένην πραξιν 5 όργανον μετέχει ώς άπλοΰν μέλος έτερου πολυμελούς συλ­ λογικού οργάνου, όπερ μάλιστα δέν αποφασίζειάλλ' απλώς γνωμοδοτεί έπ! της πράξεως ταύτης", ("Because the ground for annulment,whereby in the Board of the District Fund the Director of the Technical Services 10 of the District participated as a voting member, although he issued the act for disqualification, this is contrary to the general principle of Administrative Law whereby it it is not in conformity with the principles of proper admi­ nistration to coincide in the same person the properties 15 of the onejudging and the one being judged, is, therefore, untenable as groundless, because the above rule cannot be applied when the organ which issued the challenged act participates as a mere member of another multi­ members collective organ which in fact does not decide 20 but simply advises on the said act"). Also, in case No. 2115/65, it was held: "Δέν υφίσταται ϋποχρέωσις έκ γενικής τινός αρχής όπως τα συλλογικά όργανα (Έπιτροπαΐ Απαλλοτριώσεων), έτπλαμβάνωνται της κατά νόμον αναθεωρήσεως τών αποφάσεων 25 των υπό σύνθεσιν διάφορον εκείνης, ΰφ' ήν έξέδοσαν τήν άναθεωρουμένην πράξιν". ("There is no obligation from any general rule that collective organs (Acquisition committees), undertake the revision of their decision under the law under a different composition 30 from that under which they issued the act under review"). I have already dealt with the evolution under the English Law, of the principle that "justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done" as expounded in the King v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy 35 and R. v. CamborneJustices ex parte Pearse (supra). In Leeson v. General Medical Council [1889] 43 Ch. D. 366, the decision of the council was attacked on the ground 592 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. of bias. The medical practitioner had been held guilty of infamous conduct within sect. 29 because he had allowed himself to be cover to an unqualified person as if he were duly practising under the Act. The complaint of bias 5 was grounded on the fact that of the twenty-nine persons who had held the inquiry, two were members of a body called the Medical Defence Union, one of the objects of which was to procecute and suppress unauthorised practitioners. The proceedings had been instituted by 10 the Union, but these two members were not of its managing body. The court refused to interfere. It held (FRY, L.J., dissenting) that the two members had not such an interest in the matter in question as to disqualify them from acting. 15 20 25 30 35 40 In Allinson v. General Council of Medical Council [1894] 1 Q.B. 750, a Court of Appeal comprised of Lord Esher, M.R., and Lopes and Davey, L.JJ. agreed with the view of the majority in Leesoris case. Lord Esher, M.R. stated at p. 758: "But Leesoris casealso decidesthat thereare other relations to the matter of a person who is to be one of the Judges which may incapacitate him from acting as a Judge, and they held that the crucial question is, as Bowen, L.J., said, whether in substance and in fact one of the Judges has in truth also been an accuser. What is the meaning of that? The question is to be one of substance and fact in the particular case. That is the fact which has to be decided? If his relation is such that by no possibility he can be biassed, then it seems clear that there is no objection to his acting. The question is not, whether in fact he was or was not biassed. The Court cannot inquire into that. There is something between these two propositions. In the administration of justice, whether by a recognised legal Court or by persons who, although not a legal public Court, are acting in a similar capacity, public policy requires that, in order that there should be no doubt about the purity of the administration, any person who is to take part in it should not be in such a position that he might be suspected of being biassed. To use the language of Mellor, J., in Reg v. Allan, 4 B. & S. 915, at p. 926. 'It is highly desirable that justice should be admi593 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)nistered by persons who cannot be suspected of improper motives . I think that if you take that phrase literally it is somewhat too large, because I know of no case in whicha man cannot be suspected. There aresome people whose minds are so perverse that they will suspect without 5 any ground whatever. The question of incapacity is to be one 'of substance and fact', and therefore it seems to methattheman'spositionmustbesuchasthatinsubstance and fact he cannot be suspected. Not that any perverselyminded person cannot suspect him, but that he must bear 10 such a relation to the matter that he cannot reasonably be suspected of being biassed". In Cooper v. Wilson[1937J 2 All E.R. 726, the plaintiff, a sergeant in the Liverpool city police force, brought an action against the chief constable, certain other members of the Liver- 15 pool city police force and the watch committee claiming, inter alia, that the hearing before the watch committee was invalid in that the chief constable who dismissed him from the police force after an inquiry and whose decision was the subject of an appeal to the watch committee was sitting together with the 20 members of the Committee and remained with them after the evidencehad been heard and theappellant andthe other parties had withdrawn, while they were considering their decision. The chief constable at the commencement of the hearing read a statement of the case which he had prepared for the watch 25 committee setting out the facts as found by him and concluded with the expression of his opinion that the watch committee after hearing the evidence would arrive at the same conclusion ashimself. In the circumstances it washeld by majority (Greer and Scott, L.JJ. consenting and Macnaghten, J. dissenting) 30 that the hearing before the watch committee was conducted in amanner contrary totheprinciplesofnaturaljustice. Greer, L.J. had this to say in his judgment at page 734: "When the plaintiff came into the presence of the watch committee to present his case in resisting confirmation 35 of the chief constable's decision and asking for its reversal, he saw before him, seated at the table, opposite to where he would be giving his evidence, the deputy chairman, Mr. Alderman Eills, and, seated next to him, the chief constable, and, next to the chief constable, the deputy 40 594 ^ C.L.R. 5 Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Sawides ·'- chief constable, and, to any outsider who happened to come in with him, it would seem as if the chief constable and the deputy chief constable were placed in a position where they would act with the committee as judges of the police application for dismissal and of the plaintiff's appeal against the findings of the chief constable". And at pages 735-736: 10 15 20 25 30" "But I think he is fairly entitled to complain that the presence on the bench, when they were deliberating as to whether they would or would not affirm his sentence, or" one of the respondents to his appeal wascontrary to natural justice, and that it thereby invalidated the decision of the watch committee, and entitled him to have a declaration to that effect. I think the cases relied upon by Mr. Wooll, R. v. Essex Justices, Ex p. Perkins^) R. v. London Count) Council, Ex p. Akkersdyk, Ex p. Ferniema

(2)and R. v. Brixton Income Tax Comrs.{3), establish the proposition that, if the conduct of thejustices issuch as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that justice does not seem to have been done, then their decision should be set aside.— I ask myself what would anyone have thought who came into the room where the committee were sitting, after the plaintiff had gone out while they were considering their decision,andfound, sittingon the benchwiththecommittee, one of the respondents to the appeal, who had opened the case, though he had left the calling of the witnesses to Superintendent Hughes. Such a person, if reasonable, would have been likely to say to himself, There has been an opportunity here for one of the parties to influence the judgment of the committee, and it looks as if justice may seem not to have been done' ". And Scott, L.J. at page 742: 35 " the risk that a respondent may influence the court

(1)[1927] 2 K.B., 475.

(2)[1892] 1 Q.B., 190

(3)[1913] 29 T.L.R. 7)2. 595 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)is so abhorrent to English notions of justice that the possibility of it, or even the appearance of such a possibility, is sufficient to deprive the decision of all judicial force, and to render it a nullity. In my view, this action is open to the same objections 5 as isthecommittee's conduct in allowingthe chief constable, really the prosecutor, on the re-hearing, and respondent on the appeal, to sit on the bench with them, but in a more acute degree, as there was, from the appellant's point of view, secrecy, and the risk of bias through the tribunal 10 seeing one party without the other being present. Some relevant aspects of such procedure were discussed by EVE, J., in his judgment in Lawv. Chartered Institute of Patent Agents{\), although others did not arise in that case; but I agree with the general views of the learned judge 15 in that case, and in particular with this passage on p. 290: *A person who has a judicial duty to perform is disqualified from performing it if he has a bias which renders him otherwise than an impartial judge, or if he has so conducted himself in relation to the matters 20 to be investigated as to create in the mind of a reasonable man a suspicion that he may have such a bias' ". The principles set out in Cooper's case were applied in Rex. v. Bamsley Metropolitan Borough Council [1976] 3 All E.R. 452, where it was found that there was a breach of the rules 25 of natural justice by local authority since the Committee had heard the market Manager's evidence in the absence of the applicant or his representative, and the market Manager, who was in the position of a prosecutor had been present at the deliberations of the Committee when it came to its decision. 30 In Vrakas and Another v. The Republic

(1973)2 C.L.R. 139at pp. 155-165, there isa review of the relevant English case law on this subject. Reference is made, inter alia, to the following cases: Franklin and Others v. Minister of Town and Country 35 Planning[1947] 2 All E.R. 289, where Lord Thankerton defined "bias" as follows in delivering the judgment of the House of Lords (at page 296): (I)[1919] 2 Ch. 267. 596 3 C.L.R. 5 10 Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. "I could wish that the use of the word 'bias' should be confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance, in my opinion, is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator. The reason for this clearly is that, having to adjudicate as between two or more parties, he must come to hisadjudication withan independent mind, without any inclination or bias towards one side or other in the dispute". Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon and Others [1968] 3 All E.R. 304, where Lord Denning had this to say (at p. 310): 15 20 "Nevertheless, there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not enough: See R. v. CamborneJustices, Ex Parte Pearce [1954] 2 All E.R. 850; R. v. Nailsworth Justices, Ex Parte Bird [1953] 2 All E.R. 652". And at page 158 of Vrakas case the judgment reads: "In the Nailsworth Justices case, Lord Goddard C.J. after stressing that 'it is most important that justice should be seen to be done', observed (at p. 654):- 25 - 30 35 'Objection cannot be taken to everything which might raise a suspicion in somebody's mind—As Day, J., said in R. v. Taylor etc. JJ. Laidler Ex p. Vogwill (14 T.L.R. 185): 'anything at any time which could make fools suspect'. It is not something which raises doubt in somebody's mind that is enough to cause - an order or a judgment of justices to be set aside. There must be something in the nature of real bias. The fact that a person has a proprietary or a pecuniary interest in the subject-matter before the Court which he does not disclose, has always been held to be enough to upset the decision of the Court, but merely that a justice may be thought to have formed some opinion • beforehand is not, in my opinion, enough to do so". And then it goes on at page 161 as follows: "In The Queenv. Sir Robert Carden,5 Q.B.D. 1, Cockburn 597 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)C.J., in dealingwith the issueof the province of a magistrate before whom a person is brought, with a view to his being committed for trial or held to bail, said (at p. 6):'It is no part of his province to try the case. That being so, in my opinion, unless there is some further 5 statutory duty imposed on the magistrate, the evidence before him must be confined to the question whether the case is such as ought to be sent for trial, and if he exceeds the limits of that inquiry, he transcends the bounds of his jurisdiction' ". 10 After reviewing the English case law in Vrakas case (supra) the Supreme Court in deciding one of the grounds of the appeal, related to the allegedly improper composition of the trial Court in circumstances making it to appear that justice could not be seen to be done in that one of the three Judges of the said 15 Court was disqualified from sitting as a trial Judge, as he was the judge who had held the preliminary inquiry in such case and committed the accused for trial, had this to say at page 160 (per Triantafyllides, P.): " we do not think that their convictions should 20 be set aside on this ground, because the functions of the Judge concerned at the preliminary inquiry and at the trial were distinctly different. In the former instance he did not have to evaluate the evidence as regards credibility (see section 94 of Cap. 155), whereas at the trial credibility 25 was a primary consideration both for the purpose of deciding whether there had been made out a prima facie case by the prosecution (see section 74

(1)(b) of Cap. 155 read in the light of R. v. Kara Mehmed, 16 C.L.R. 46, at p. 49) and for the purpose of deciding at the end of the trial 30 whether the Appellants were guilty or innocent". And at pages 164and 165thejudgment concludes as follows: "It was held (in Morgan v. Bowker [1964] 1 Q.B. 507) that 'although the justices had come to a prima facie view when considering whether the articles should be the subject 35 of proceedings under section 3

(3)of the Obscene Publications Act, 1959, they were not determining the issue at that stage, so that there can be no valid objection to the 598 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. same justices hearing the summons when it was issued'. Lord Parker, C.J. said (at p. 515):- 5 10 15 20 25 'For my part, I feel that there is nothing whatsoever in this point, and I would go further and say that it isapointthat ought nevertohavebeentaken. Justices must come to a prima facie view when the articles are brought before them, as these justices did. They arenot determiningthematter;they aremerelydeciding whether a summons should issue. It seems to me quite wrong to suggest that because they have taken a prima facie view, they are in some way biased or incapable of approaching with an open mind the hearing of the summons. I feel that there is nothing whatsoever in that objection'. In the light of all the foregoing we think that the 'coram nonjudice' issue raised bycounselfor theAppellants cannot bedecided intheirfavour. Inour opinion the participation in the trial of the Judge who held the preliminary inquiry cannot properly lead to the conclusion that any real likelihood of bias could be said to exist or that justice was not seen to be done, or even that it was undesirable for such a coursetohavebeen adopted; itisa well-known established practice in Cyprus for Judges who have committed persons for trial by an Assize Court to take part in the trial by such Assize Court, as Judges in the District Comts are reliedon, dueto their training, to befully capable of keeping entirely separate in their minds the difference between the function of a Judge holding a preliminary inquiry and the function of a Judge trying a case". -3• " The case of Cooperv. Wilsonand other cases to similar effect are distinguishable from the present case. In the present case the General Manager was not sitting as a chairman of the First instance Disciplinary Board on an appeal from his own decision but was sitting as a member of a collective organ which had 35 in the first instance to hear the case and decide whether the applicant was guilty of the accusations against her. From such decision an appeal lied to an entirely differently composed collective organ, the Second Instance Disciplinary Board. The fact that the General Manager acting in compliance with 599 Savtides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)the Personnel General Regulations found from the material put before him by the investigating officer that there was a prima facie case against the applicant to send her for trial before the First Instance Disciplinary Board, does not amount to a finding of guilt which had to be arrived at after hearing of 5 evidence both from the prosecution and the applicant and after evaluating properly such evidence as regards credibility and weight. The prosecution in the present case was conducted by the Personnel Manager and not by the General Manager. I, therefore, find that there was no irregularity by the partici- 10 pation of the General Manager in the First Instance Disciplinary Board. As to the other irregularities alleged by counsel as tending to prove that the General Manager was biased in that— (

1. a)once the audit roll was handed to him by the investiga- 15 ting officer, the General Manager was becoming a witness in the case; (
2. b)in the course of the hearing when reference was made to a book he said that "if you need this book we shall produce it", thus identifying himself with the prose- 20 cution; (
3. c)he had already decided about the guilt of the accused when drafting the charge and informing the applicant that there was prima facie case against her; (
4. d)he said to one of the employees that he was going to 25 interdict the applicant; (
5. e)he was changing his rulings all the time. I shall deal briefly with them before concluding legal ground(l). As to (a), the audit roll was handed to him together with all other material collected by the Investigating Officer. After 30 the completion of the investigation, it did not come in hispossession in the capacity of an investigating officer who might have to give any evidence connected with it. Independently of this, at no stage of the proceedings it was pointed out that the General Manager was a necessary witness in the case. 35 As to (c), I have already dealt with it earlier in my judgment. As to (e), in view of the fact that the same matter is set out 600 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. as a separate ground of law (legal ground 6), [ shall deal with it when I consider ground

(6). As to (b) and (d), such matters if taken as irregularities are not material irregularities of a substantial nature to affect 5 the validity of the whole process before the Board, which was composed of five high officials of the respondent Authority of whom the General Manager was one. (See Kyprianou v. The Republic(supra) at p. 219 as to the effect of irregularities). In the result, ground

(1)fails. 10 Counsel for applicant did not advance any argument in respect of legal grounds

(2)and

(3). With reference to ground

(2)Ifindthat there is no substance in it as the decision by which the objection was overruled was taken after the Board heard what counsel had to say in support of same. As to ground

(3)15 the alleged complaint of counsel for the applicant arose only on one occasion as it appears from the record of the proceedings which is before me. According to such record, counsel for applicant made a remark to the Chairman of the Board that when a decision had to be taken on an objection, such decision 20 had to be taken by all the members, to which the Chairman observed: "I have overruled your objection after all other members of the Board have agreed" (see page 13of exhibit 1). No comment was made by counsel to the observation of the chairman and no similar complaint was made by counsel on 25 any other occasion in the course of tht.- hearing at which quite a number of objections was raised. The observation of the Chairman as recorded, disposes of the complaint of counsel. But even if it did not, such irregularity is not so serious as to vitiate the proceedings. 30 I, therefore, find that legal grounds

(2)and

(3)fail. I come now to ground

(4). There is nothing in the record of the proceedings in support of the allegation that the President stated that it was expected from the applicant to prove that she was innocent in order to acquit her. Counsel for applicant in 35 arguing the case before the Appellate Board advanced the same allegation which he prefaced as follows: "Before I proceed further, I wish to mention something which is not 601 Savvides J . Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)appearing in the record and in respect of which I have to make an affidavit". (See page 3 of the record of the Appellate Board, exhibit 3). No such affidavit was ever made and the Appellate Board very rightly did not take cognisance of this fact. The inclusion 5 of this unfounded allegation in the grounds of law in the present case was superfluous, prejudicial and unnecessary, once there was no evidence to substantiate it. Therefore, I find ground

(4)completely unfounded. Legal ground

(5)is two-legged, the one leg being that the 10 charge was defective and not in compliance with the regulations, as a result of which theapplicantwas embarrassed inher defence as she was not aware of the facts of the case when defending herself and the other that the objection taken in that respect was left to be decided at the end of the trial. I shall deal first 15 with the first leg of such objection. Regulation 45

(4)provides as follows: "In disciplinary proceedings all real facts constituting the offence charged and any existing· elements of guilt should be defined". (" Έν τη πειθαρχική άγωγηδέον νάόρίζωνται τά συνιστώντα το διωκόμενου αδίκημα ττραγματικά περιστατικά ώς και τά υπάρχοντα στοιχεία ένοχης"). 1 am satisfied that the charge against the applicant was in compliance with regulation 45

(4)inthatall material facts alleged 25 were set out in the charge. The complaint of the applicant that she was not aware of the real facts when defending herself, if unfounded, especially inview of thefact thata completerecord of the evidence, intended to be adduced at the trial, was made available to her counsel before thecommencement of thehearing 30 and, therefore, both from the facts set out in the charge and the facts disclosed in such evidence she would be well acquainted •with the case and prepare her defence. If any fact was sought to be established which was not within her knowledge from the material made available to her, there was nothing to prevent 35 602 20 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. her counsel to apply for an adjournment to consider the defence of the applicant. At no stage of the proceedings there was any such application by counsel for applicant. I am coming now to the second leg of legal ground

(5)by which it is alleged thattheobjection raised was left to be decided at the end of the trial. On this point, the following appear in the record of the proceedings (page 9 of exhibit 1) after the objection was raised: "Chairman:- Judgment is reserved on the objection. Is there a matter for adjournment? Poetis:- Τ have no objection if the other side applies for an amendment. Markides:- The facts of each count will be testified by witness and the charge-sheet has been drafted in accordance with the Personnel General Regulations. The whole file of the case with all particulars of the accusa­ tions has been brought to her notice and in accordance with the Personnel General Regulation. This is the correct procedure to be followed. Chairman:- Shall we be wasting our time? Poetis:- No; if it is found in the end that he acted properly, then, surely the correct procedure was followed. Chairman:- In the present case if your objections are sustained, you will simply waste your time. Let the case proceed. Poetis:- Once this is the decision, I have no alter­ native but to proceed". 10 ]5 20 25 30 From the above one may infer that though decision on the objection was reserved, the objection was not persisted after the remarks made by the Chairman about delays and the state- 603 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)ment of counsel for applicant that he would proceed with the case. As a result, ground

(5)fails. Legal ground

(6)concerns evidence as to previous conduct of the applicant which was admitted in the course of the hearing. An objection was raised inthis respect and the Board sustained 5 such objection but later when the matter was brought up again, the Board reconsidered its position and found that it could accept such evidence for the reasons given in their decision as such evidence was sought to be put in to prove system or intention or the modus operandi under which the accused was 10 acting at the material time. It has been contended that there was a violation of regulation 46

(4)which provides that the procedure must "in as far as possible be similar to the hearing of a criminal case tried summarily", in that inadmissible evidence was allowed to be given. 15 Regulation 46

(4)should be read together with regulation 46

(5)(c) and 46

(6). Under regulation 46

(5)(c) there is a complete departure from the rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings by allowing the admission of evidence which is not admissible in civil or criminal proceedings and under regulation 20 46

(6)the Board is allowed before deliberation to rely not only on theevidenceadduced at thehearing,but on anyother evidence as well from other lawful source with the only restriction that the accused must be informed of such evidence. The combined effect of regulations 46

(4), 46

(5)(c) and 46

(6)25 is to secure a person charged with the commission of a disciplinary offence to know the charge against him, have a fair trial, to be represented at such trial by counsel of his choice, crossexamine the witnesses testifying against him, be allowed to give evidence and call witnesses in contradiction of the piose- 30 cution witnesses and in case the Disciplinary Board intends to take cognisance of any other evidence which was not called at the trial but came to the knowledge of the Board from other lawful sources he should be informed of such evidence. The decisionof theBoard should bedulyreasoned sothat theaccused 35 may know how the decision was reached and be in a position to contest the correctness of such decision on appeal. The fact should not escape the attention that such a Board consists of laymen and a layman at an inquiry of this kind is of course at a great disadvantage compared to a trained advocate or a 40 propeily composed Court of Law. 604 .3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. Before concluding on legal ground

(6), I wish to observe that whereas when a case is tried before a Court of Law, civil or criminal, the rules of procedure and evidence have to be strictly complied with, there is no similar requirement for strict 5 compliance with such rules at a hearing before a tribunal who isnot ajudgeintheproper sense ofthe word. What isexpected from such tribunal is to act in good faith, hear the case in a judicial spirit andin accordance withthe principles of substantial justice. Where there are specific rules of procedure provided, 10 such rules have to be followed. I come now to grounds 8, 9, 10 which touch the weight of evidence and conviction on such evidence. Counsel contended that on the material before it, the respondent 2 Board, could not find the accused guilty of the charges 15 brought against her. It is well settled that an administrative Court indealing with a recourse made against disciplinary conviction cannot, as a rule, interfere with the subjective evaluation of the relevant facts as made by the appropriate organ (see Enotiadou v. The Republic,

(1971)3 C.L.R. 409 at p. 415 in 20 which reference is also made to the decision of the Council of State in Greece in cases 2654/1965 and 1129/1966. Also, Kyprianou v. The Public Service Commission,

(1973)3 C.L.R. 206 at pp. 222, 223). In Constantinouv. The Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 190at p. 207 25 the Court had this to say: 30 35 "I would like to reiterate once again what has been said in a number of cases, that the evaluation of the evidence remains the province of the council, and that the Court, in reviewing the determination of the council, would not interfere if there was any evidence on which the council could reasonably have come to the conclusion to which they did. If, on the other hand, there was no evidence upon which they could reasonably have arrived at that conclusion or they have misconceived the effect of the facts before them, or they misdirected themselves on the question of the law, then their decision can be reviewed by this Court". See also Lefkos Georghiades v. The Republic

(1972)3 C.L.R. 594 at p. 647. 40 On the basis of the material before me, I am quite satisfide 605 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)that the verdict that the applicant was guilty as charged, which was reached unanimously by the members of the respondent

(2)Board, was reasonably open to it and cannot, and should not, be interfered with by this Court. The respondents did not act under a misconception of fact in reaching their verdict 5 and the contention of counsel for applicant that the conviction was not warranted by the evidence, is untenable. It is contended under ground 11 that the decision is a nullity as the applicant was found guilty on alternative counts. A perusal of the contents of the judgment on this point clearly 10 shows that the accused was found guilty on all counts set out in the charge irrespective as to whether after the finding of guilt the Board proceeded on to state that the applicant was guilty both in respect of counts

(1)and

(2)and in the alternative of counts

(3)and

(4). The decision in this respect, reads as 15 follows: "To Συμβουλίου εξετάζον τάς προσαφθείσας δια τοϋ κατη­ γορητηρίου κατηγορίας της κατηγορουμένης παρατηρεί πώς αύται ολαι αναφέρονταιείς πράξεις πού άπάδουν προς τήν ύπαλληλικήν ιδιότητα της κατηγορουμένης και τείνουν 20 να φέρουνΟλικήν ή ήθικήνζημίαυ είςτήν 'Αρχήν, διαζευκτικούς δέ αποτελούσας ατασθαλίας εν τη διαχειρίσει τηςπεριουσίας τής 'Αρχής καΐ συνιστώσα^ κατάχρησιν υπηρεσιακής εμπι­ στοσύνης. Έν ολίγοις το Συμβουλίου εξευρίσκει πώς διά της αποδείξεως ΰπό τής κατηγορούσης αρχής τών ώς άνω 25 πράξεων τής κατηγορουμένης έπεδείχθη πλήρως ή ένοχη ταύτης είς όλας τάς κατηγορίαςήτοι τάς ύπ' αριθ. 1 και 2 και διαζευτικώς 3 καΐ

1. Ώς έκ τούτου ευρίσκει ένοχου τήν κατήγορουμένηυ αντιστοίχως καθ' ότι έτιίστευσε πλήρως τους μάρτυρας της κατηγορίας, παρατηρεί δέ πώς ή προ- 30 σπάθεια τής κατηγορουμένηςνά άποδώσηείς άλλαελατήρια τήν μαρτυρίου τών κυρίων μαρτύρωυ κατηγορίας απέτυχε ολοσχερώς". ("The Council in examining the charges preferred by the charge sheet against the accused observes that all refer 35 to acts which are unbecoming to accused's service status and tend to bring about material and moral damage to the Authority or alternatively constituting irregularities in administering the property of the Authority and consti­ tuting abuse of service confidence. In short the Council 40 finds that by the proof by the prosecuting authority of the above acts of the accused her guilt has been fully proved 606 3 C.L.R. 5 Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Sav*ides J. on all counts i.e. No. 1and 2and in the alternative 3and
2. Therefore it finds the accused guilty respectively because it believed in toto the prosecution witnesses, and it observes that the attempt of the accused to attribute the testimony of the main prosecution witnesses to other motives failed entirely"). As I have said earlier in this judgment, it should not escape our attention that Disciplinary Boards of this type consisting of laymen who are at a grave disadvantage compared with 10 trained lawyers are not expected to frame their decision in strict legal phraseology as it is expected from a Court of Law. As to legal ground

(14)I find that it cannot stand as the decisions both of respondent

(2)Board and the Second Instance Disciplinary Board are properly and sufficiently reasoned as 15 required under the established principles of administrative Law. Grounds

(12),

(13)and

(15)concern the sentence imposed upon the applicant. Nothing was said in support of these grounds of law by counsel for applicant in his long address 20 before me, but once they have been set out in the application, I shall examine them briefly. Ground

(13)is drafted in such a vague way that one cannot understand what its object is. The fact that the Board "felt bound" to impose the sentence of dismissal is obvious from 25 the decision. It felt so bound as explained in the decision due to the seriousness of the charge on which the applicant was found guilty. There isnothingshowingthateitherthe respondent

(2)Board or the Appellate Board were not aware that there was a variety of sentences out of which they could select the 30 most appropriate one in the circumstances of the case. The reasons why the sentence of dismissal which is"the most serious one, was imposed, are sufficiently explained in the decision of the respondent

(2)Board and such reasoning was adopted on appeal by the Second instance Disciplinary Board. It 35 was within the powers of both Boards to impose such sentence and nothing has been put forward to support that such sentence was manifestly excessive or that the discretion of the respondents in imposing such sentence was wrongly exercised. The fact that the sentence was imposed on a date other than 40 that on which applicant was found guilty, which, as alleged, vitiates the proceedings, isentirely unfounded. What happened 607 Savvides J. Mitidou v. CY.T.A.

(1982)in this case, is that after applicant was found guilty, counsel addressed the Board in mitigation and the Board reserved its decision on sentence. There was nothing wrong in following such courseand there was no contravention either of the Regulations or the procedure in criminal cases. Even a proper Court 5 of Law trying a criminal case may, on occasions, reserve the imposition of sentence to a future date to have time to reflect on the sentence which is going to impose in the circumstances of a case. In imposing sentence on the applicant the respondent

(2)10 Board took into consideration whatever counselfor the applicant said in mitigation. In the result, grounds

(12),

(13)and

(15)fail. The last ground, ground

(16), is directed against the decision of the Appellate Board (The Second Instance Disciplinary BoaTd). 15 Having in mind the proceedings on appeal as appearing in exhibit 3 and the decision of the Appellate Board (exhibit 4) which is duly reasoned, I am satisfied that the applicant was afforded every possible opportunity of arguing her case before 20 such Board which patiently heard all arguments advanced by her counsel in support of the grounds of appeal, other than those abandoned by him at the hearing of the appeal. From the material before me I am satisfied that in reaching its decision to dismiss applicant's appeal, the Appellate Board acted judi- 25 cially, in the spirit and within the sense of its responsibility, and after it had afforded the applicant the opportunity of adequately presenting her case in accordance with the Personnel General Regulations. Grounds

(1)-

(15)refer to alleged irregularities before the 30 respondent

(2)Board which were the grounds of appeal before the Second Instance Disciplinary Board and were rejected by the latter. In my decision I have also rejected such grounds, as unfounded, therefore, I find that the decision of the Second Instance Disciplinary Board was properly reached and was 35 duly reasoned. Ground

(16)therefore, fails. In his written address counsel for the applicant advanced an additional ground of law that the respondents acted in violation of regulation 45

(5)of the Personnel General Regulations in that the case was sent to the Disciplinary Board first and then 40 608 3 C.L.R. Mitidou v. CY.T.A. Savvides J. communicated to the applicant and as a,result, the applicant was not afforded the opportunity of giving an explanation or making a statement before the case was sent to the Disciplinary Board. Regulation 45

(5)reads as follows: 5 10 15 20 25 " Ή πειθαρχική α γ ω γ ή κοινοποιείται είς τον έγκαλούμενον, και ακολούθωςδιαβιβάζεται μετά τοΰ σχηματισθέντος πειθαρ­ χικού φακέλλου ώς καΐ ολοκλήρου τοΰ άτομικοΰ φακέλλου τοΰ εγκαλουμένου, είς τον γραμματέα τοΰ Πειθαρχικοΰ Συμβουλίου. Ό εγκαλούμενος δικαιούται νά λάβη γνώσιν τοΰ πειθαρχικού φακέλλου προ της συζητήσεως της ύποθέθέσεως είτε αυτοπροσώπως είτε δια πληρεξουσίου ή τοΰ δικηγόρου του κατόπιν έγγραφου εξουσιοδοτήσεως, συντασ­ σόμενης περί τούτου πράξεως, ήτις υπογράφεται υπό τοΰ π α ρ ' ώ εΰρηται ό φάκελλος υπαλλήλου καΐ τοΰ λαβόντος γνώσιν, ή , έν άρνήσει τοΰ δευτέρου,υπό μόνουτοΰπ ρ ώ τ ο υ " . ("The disciplinary action' is notified to the accused and then transmitted with the formed disciplinary file as well as the complete personal file of the accused to the secretary of the Disciplinary Board. The accused is entitled to have knowledge of the disciplinary file before the discussion of the case either personally or by attorney or by his advocate by written authorization and an act is drawn up in this respect, which is signed by the officer in whose custody the file is found and by the person obtaining knowledge or, in case the second one refuses by the first one only"). This regulation must be read in conjunction with paragraph 6(a) of regulation 41 which sets out the procedure for instituting disciplinary proceedings. Regulation 41

(6)(a) reads as follows: 30 35 40 " Ό Γενικός Διευθυντής μελέτα τό συγκεντρωθέν ΰπό τοΰ έρευνήσαντος Λειτουργού ύλικόν καΐ, εάν κρίνη δτι διεπράχθη πειθαρχικόν αδίκημα, διατυπώνει σχετικήν κατηγορίαν και παραπέμπει την ϋπόθεσινείς τό κατά τήν κρίσιν τουάρμόδιον νά εκδίκασητήν ύπόθεσινπειθαρχικόν "Οργανονκαικοινοποιεί ταΰτα είς τον περί ού πρόκειται ύπάλ