← Κύπρος

clr/1982/1982_3_988.pdf

(1982)1982 September 17 [LORIS, J.] IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 146 OF THE CONSTITUTION PANAYIOTIS PANTELI LOIZOU, Applicant, THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE COMMANDER OF POLICE AND/OR THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND DEFENCE, Respondents. (Case No. 152/75). Natural justice—Rule of audi alteram partem—Termination of applicant's acting appointment to rank of Acting Police Inspector —True nature andpurpose of termination wasto impose a sanction —Applicant never given the chance to be heard before such termination—Above rule of natural justice violated. The applicant, a police sergeant was on 15.9.1972 appointed to the rank of Inspcctoi. On 7.8.1975 he was, by virtue of a judicial warrant, arrested as a suspect for attempted murder. He remained in custody foi 14 days and was,released as there was no evidence justifying prosecution. On the same day it 10 came to the knowledge of the Divisional Police Commander that applicant appeared prima facie to beinvolved in disciplinary offences; so he was interdicted on the same day and disciplinary proceedings were commenced against him pursuant to the provisions of regulation 8of the Police (Discipline) Regulations. 15 These disciplinary proceedings eventually resulted in the conviction of the applicant of two disciplinary offences. Also, on the same day (7.8.1975) the Divisional Police Commander decided to terminate the acting appointment of the applicant independently of the outcomeof the pending disciplinary pioceed- 20 ings, owing to applicant's airest which rendered him incapable of performing his duties and the fact that the future applicant's posting with the guard of the General was not feasible due to 988 5 3 C.L.R. 5 Loixou τ. Republic the abolition of the institution of secondment of an officer to the office of the Chief of Staff of the National Guard. The termination was approved by the Chief of Police on the same day andwas onsuchdatesanctioned by the Minister ofInterior. Hence this recourse. Itwas commonground thattheapplicantwas neither informed beforehand of theintendedterminationof hisacting appointment nor was heheaid before such decision was taken by therespond­ ents. 10 15 20 25 30 35 Held, that as the true natuie and purpose of the sub judice decision was to impose a sanction on the applicant, the latter ought to have been given the chance to be heard before such decision was taken; that this was never done and therefore one of the most important rules of naturaljustice was violattd, notably the rule that both sides must be heard—audiatur et alteiam partem—; accoidingly the sub judice decision must be annulled. Subjudice decision annulled. Cases referred to: Kalisperas v. The Republic, 3 R.S.C.C. 146; Pantelidou v. The Republic,4 R.S.C.C. 100; Rallis v. TheGreekCommunal Chamber, 5 R.S.C.C. 11; Ladaki-Philippouv. The Republic
(1981)3 C.L.R. 153; Marcoullides v. The Republic, 3 R.S.C.C. 30 at p. 35; Republic v. Mozoras
(1966)3C.L.R. 356 at pp. 399-400; Kazamiasv. TheRepublic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 239 at pp. 284-299. Recourse. Recourse against the decision of the respondents whereby applicant's acting appointment to the rank of Police Inspector was terminated. E. Efstathiou, for the applicant. CI. Antoniades, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. LORIS J. read the following judgment. The applicant in the present recourse prays for the annulment of the decision of the respondents dated 7.8.75 published in the Weekly Bulletin of 989 Loris J. Loizou v. Republic
(1982)Police Force Orders (Appendix A to the recourse) by virtue of which his acting appointment to the rank of Police Inspector was terminated. The facts of the presenf case are briefly as follows.
(1)On 26.8.55 the applicant joined the Police Force. 5
(2)On 15.6.69 he was promoted to the rank of Police Scigeant.
(3)On 15.9.72 the applicant was appointed co the acting rank of Police Sub-Inspector pursuant to the provisions of Regulation 11 of the Police (General) Regulations 1958 as amended. (Vide appendices A and Β attached to yie opposition. 10 [It must be noted here that the rank of Sub-Inspector was abolished in 1974 (vide Κ.Δ.Π. 210/1974)]
(4)The said acting appointment of the applicant was termi- 15 nated by virtue of the decision of the respondents dated 7.8.75. (Vide appendix Γ/l attached to the opposition.) The applicant attacks theaforesaid decision of the respondents on seven grounds of law set out in his recourse the main two being that the said decision of the respondents was taken (
  1. a)20 in direct conflict with the Rules of Natural Justice, (
  2. b)contrary to the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1958. The respondents in their opposition support their aforesaid decision as rightly and lawfully reached according to the Police Law, Cap. 285, the Police (General) Regulations - in particular 25 regulation 11 thereof - and in the light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the present case. The main facts relied upon in their opposition are, very briefly, as follows. (
  3. i)On 7.8.75 the applicant was arrested by virtue of a 30 judicial warrant as a suspect for attempted murder; he remained in custody for 14 days and he was then released "as there was no evidence justifying prose­ cution." (
  4. ii)On the same day it came to the knowledge of the 990 35 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 tolzoa v. Republic Lorls J. Divisional Police Commander of Section A, under whom the applicant wasserving,that the latter appea­ red prima facie tobeinvolvedindisciplinary offences; so hewasinterdicted onthe same day and disciplinary proceedings were commenced against him pursuant to theprovisions of regulation 8of the Police (Disci­ pline) Regulations. It may beadded here that these disciplinary proceedings eventually resulted in theconviction of the applicant for two disciplinary offences set out in Appendix "Δ" of the opposition. (Hi) As stated in para. 5 of the opposition "under the circumstances the Divisional Police Commander of SectionA decided toterminatethe actingappointment of the applicant independently of the outcome of the pending disciplinary proceedings, owingto applicant's arrest which rendered himincapable ofperforming his duties andthefact that thefuture applicants posting with the guard of the General wasnot feasible dueto the abolition of the institution of secondment ofan officer to the office ofthe Chief ofStaff of the Natio­ nal Guard." Learned counsel appearing for therespondents submittedin his written address that: 25 30 35 (
  5. a)The main complaint of the applicant, notably the violation of the Rules of Natural Justice is devoid of any legal support as Regulation 18 of the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1958(which provides for the punishment to be imposed on any member ofthe Force found guilty of an offence against the Discipline Code)does notmakeany provision forthe termination of an acting appointment. (
  6. b)The duration ofthe acting appointmentisofa tempo­ rary nature according tothe provisions of regulation 11 of the Police (General) Regulations 1958. (
  7. c)The reduction inrank inquestion wasnot imposed as a sanction, but was merely carried out as a "pure administrative measure" in which case no question 991 Lorfs J. Lolzou v. Republic
(1982)arises for hearing the other side. Learned counsel based this leg of his submission on (
  1. i)"The Greek Administrative Law" by Elias Kyriacopoulos, 4th ed. pages 327-328 and (
  2. ii)the Conclusions from the Jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State 1929-1959 at p. 360(Σ.Ε. 1411/46). 5 The relevant passage from the Conclusions from the Juris­ prudence of the Greek Council of State 1929 - 1959 at p. 360 (Σ.Ε. 1411/46) reads as follows: 'Επίσης εκρίθη ότι υποβιβασμοί γενόμενος κυρίως 5Γ 10 ακαταλληλότητα συναχθεΐσαν καΐ έκ πειθαρχικών παρα­ πτωμάτων καϊ ουχί λόγω πειθαρχικής διώξεως νομίμως συντελείται καΐ άνευ κλήσεως είς άπολογίαν". ("It was also held that reduction effected mainly onaccount of incompetence deduced from disciplinary faults as well, but not due to disciplinary action is lawfully effected and without need arising to call upon in defence.") 15 Learned counsel for the respondents summed upin his written address the grounds for the termination of applicant's acting appointment as follows: I. 20 The arrest of the applicant (on 7.8.75) and his interdiction (on the same day) rendered the performance of his duties impossible. II. Future posting of the applicant with the Guard of the general was not feasible due to the abolition of the institution of secondment of an officer to the Chief of Staff of the National Guard. 25 It is a fact that the applicant was appointed in the acting rank of Police Inspector pursuant to the provisions of regulation 11 of the Police (General) Regulations; and it is apparent from 30 the wording of theaforesaid regulation that such anappointment was of a temporary nature. But this is not the point; nor is it, with respect, whether termination of an acting appointment is or is not a mode of punishment provided by regulation 18 of the Police (Discipline) Regulations. The gist of the present 35 recourse is: Was the termination of the acting appointment in 992 3 C.L.R. Loizou v. Republic Loris J. question an administrative act or decision meant to impose a sanction on the applicant or not? 5 10 For thepurpose of answeringthe above query it is necessary to ascertain the true nature and purpose of the administrative decision in question and in case there is doubt concerning the essential nature and predominant purpose of same, such decision must be treated as having disciplinary character. (Vide Kalisperas v. The Republic, 3 R.S.C.C. 146; Maro Pantelidou v. The Republic, 4 R.S.C.C. 100; Stavros Rattis v. The Greek Communal Chamber, 5 R.S.C.C. 11; Niki Ladaki-Philippou v. The Republic
(1981)3 C.L.R. 153). The relevant decision of the respondents which is contained in appendix Γ/l reads as follows: " Άρχ. ΓΤ.Φ.Λοχ. 947 15 ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟΝ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ ΑΡΧΗΓΕΙΟΝ ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΑΣ ΛΕΥΚΩΣΙΑ 7η Αυγούστου,
  1. Αρχηγών 'Αστυνομίας, Άναπλ. 'Υπαστυνόμος Παναγιώτης Π. Λοΐζου 20 25 Επιθυμώ να σας πληροφορήσω δτι 6 'Αναπληρωτής Υπαστυνόμος Παναγιώτης Π. Λοΐζου, όστις υπηρειεί είς τό Τμήμα Α' 'Αρχηγείου καϊ6 όποιος άπεσπάσθηώς οδηγός τοΰ 'Αρχηγού ΓΕΕΦ, συνελήφθη τήν 7.8-1975, δυνάμει δικαστικού εντάλματος 6ιά τήν Οπόθεσιν της άποπείρας φόνουτοΰ Ιωάννη Γεωργίου έκτοΰ χωρίου Σιδτήν 2.8.
  3. Ούτος τη έγκρίσει σα<, ετέθη είς διαθεσιμότητα μέ ημι­ σείας άπολαβάς άπό της 7.8.
  4. 30 35
  5. 'Ανεξαρτήτως της έκβάσεως της κατ' αύτοΰ υποθέσεως 6έν προτίθεμαι να τόν επανατοποθετήσω είς τά ίδια καθή­ κοντα, δι' ό καϊ αίτοΰμαι όπως ό άναπληρωματ'κός του διορισμός τερματισθη πάραυτα, μελειηθή* 6έ τό ενδεχόμενο μεταθέσεως του είς Λευκωσίαν. Πιθανώςθα ήθέλατε ή μετάθεσις νά πραγματοποιηθη μετά τήν τελικήν άπόφασιν δια­ θέσεως της κατ* αύτοΰ υποθέσεως ίνα μή δυσκολευόμεθα ποιος 'Αστυνομικός Διευθυντής θά χειρισθη τήν άρξαμένην πειθαρχικήν ύπόθεσιν. (υπ.) 'Αστυνομικός Διευθυντής Τμήματος Α' 'Εγκρίνω τόν τερματισμόν του 'Αναπληρωματικού διορισμού. 993 l.oris J. Loizou v. Republic
(1982)Τούτο έτυχε καϊ της επικυρώσεως τοΰ κυρίου 'Υπουργού 'Εσωτερικών. 7.8.1975 (ύπ.) 'Αρχηγός Αστυνομίας". ("No. P. Serg. 947 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR POLICE HEADQUARTERS NICOSIA 7th August, 1975. Chief of Police, Acting Police Inspector Panayiotis P. Loizou I wish to inform you that Acting Police Inspector Pana- 10 yiotis P. Loizou, who is serving at Section A of Police Headquarters and who was seconded to the post of driver of the General, was arrested on the 7.8.75, by virtue of a judicial warrant in respect of the case of the attempted murder of Ioannis Georghiou of Shia village on 2.8.75. 15 2. He was with your approval, interdicted with half of his salary as from 7.8.75. 3. Irrespective of the outcome of the case against him I do not intend to put him back to the same duties and therefore I apply that his acting appointment be terminated 20 immediately and that the possibility of his transfer to Nicosia be considered. Probably you might wish that the transfer be effected after the final decision disposing the case against him so that we will not find any difficulty as to which of the Divisional Commanders will handle the 25 disciplinary case. (Sgd.) Divisional Commander Section A' I approve the termination of the acting appointment. The approval of the Hon. Minister of Interior has been 30 obtained. 7.8.75 (Sgd.) Chief of Police"). The following facts emerge from the perusal of appendix Γ/1: A. (
  1. i)The applicant was arrested on 7.8.75 by virtue of a 35 judicial warrant as a suspect for attempted murder. (
  2. ii)On the same day he was interdicted. 994 5 3 C.L.R. Loizou τ. Republic Loris J. (iii) On the same day the Divisional Police Commander of Section A, under whom the applicant was serving, applied to the Chief of Police for the termination of applicant's acting appointment. 5 (
  3. iv)On the same day the Chief of Police approved such termination. (
  4. v)Such termination was sanctioned on the same day by the Minister of Interior. (
  5. vi)Onthe same day thetermination of theacting appointment was communicated to theapplicant. (Vide para. 5 of the opposition). 10 B. 15 20 Para 3 of the letter of 7.8.75addressed by the Divisional Police Commander of Section A to the Chief of Police is indicative of the reasons which led to the recommendation of the termination of the acting appointment of the appli­ cant. The relevant part thereof reads as follows: "Independently of the outcome of the case against him (theapplicant) I do not intend to place him again on the same duties, for this reason I apply that his acting appointment be terminated immediately " And further down "thepossibility of his transfer to Nicosia be examined." It can be deduced from the above that: 25 30 35
(1)The Divisional Police Commander of Section A decided on 7.8.75,i.e. on the day the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted murder, to terminate his (the applicant's) acting appointment "independently of the outcome of the case against him." In this respect it must beborne inmindthat.the applicant was in custody as a suspect for 14 days after the 7.8.75andhewas thenreleased "as therewas no evidence justifying prosecution" as stated in the last part of para. 4 of the Opposition.
(2)The Divisional Police Commander of Section A "did not intend to place him (the applicant) again on the 995 Loris J. Loizou v. Republic
(1982)same duties". The aforesaid portion of the letter in question signifies two things: (
  1. a)That"thesame duties"existedon the7.8.75(by "same duties" we understand "the Applicant's Posting with the guard of the General"),and no mention whatso- 5 ever is made therein that such duties were to be abo­ lished in the future as stated in para. 5of theOppo­ sition,where one of thereasons for theterminationof the applicant's actingappointmentputforward by the respondents is that the applicant's posting with the 10 guard of the General was not feasible due to the abolition of the institution of suchsecondment. Thus the aforesaid allegation contained in para. 5 of the Opposition is disproved and the relevant ground for termination of the applicant's acting appointment is 15 nullified. (
  2. b)It throws ample light on the intentions of the Divisio­ nal Police Commanderwhen he was reaching the sub judice decision. C. The last lines of para. 3 of Appendix Γ/l reveal that dis- 20 ciplinary proceedings were commenced against the appli­ cant on the day of his arrest but I must stress that such proceedings, which were eventually terminated some two months later ((8.10.75)—vide Appendix D)werenot in any way connected nor had any bearing on the decision of the 25 respondents for the termination of the applicant's acting appointment which was taken on 7.8.75. Having considered all the above facts established before me I am satisfied that the true nature and purpose of the admini­ strative decision challenged by the present recourse was a di- 30 sciplinary measure directed against theapplicant, for thereasons following:
(1)The haste with which the decision was taken and was carried into effect: (The Divisional PoliceCommander applied to the Chief of Police for the termination of 35 applicant's acting appointment on 7.8.75—that is the day on which the applicant was arrested as a suspect for attempted murder—the Chief of Police approved such termination and the appropriate minister sanctioned 996 3 C.L.R. Loizou v. Republic Loris J. same on the same day; and onthe same daythetermi­ nation was communicated to the applicant whowas in custody).
(2)Thewording of the decision (appendixΓ/1): 5 (
  1. a)Applicant's acting appointment to be terminated "immediately". (
  2. b)"Independentlyof the outcome of the case against him (theapplicant)Ido not intendtoplace himagain on the same duties..." 10 (
  3. c)"The possibility of his transfer (applicant's)toNicosia to be examined".
(3)Thelack ofany reason whatsoever for suchtermination: ]5 20 25 30 35 (
  1. i)The applicant's arrest on suspicion of attempted murder was nota reason for thetermination ofthe acting appointment on the same day of his arrest; some 14days after such termination hewas released "as there was no evidence justifying prosecution". (
  2. ii)The commencement of disciplinary proceedings on the same day of applicant's arrest was nota reason either for the immediate termination of his acting appointment. Thefact thatsometwo monthsafter the termination oftheactingappointmentthesaid disciplinaryproceed­ ings resulted in the conviction of the applicant for two disciplinary offences could nothave any bearing on the sub judice decision of the respondents taken two months earlier. (
  3. in)Iwishtostress thatnowhereinthesubjudice decision "abolition ofthepostin the Guardofthe General"is referred to either expressly orbyimplication asone of the reasons for the terminationof the acting appoint­ ment of the applicant. Onthecontrary the wording of appendix Γ/Ι " Idonotintend toplace himagain on the same duties" denotes,as already stated above, that the "same duties" existed and would continue to exist after the termination of applicant's acting 997 Loris J. Loizou Y. Republic
(1982)appointment, but there was no intentionto place him "again on the same duties." In conclusion the coincidence of applicant's arrest with the termination of his acting appointmentcoupled with thecircum­ stances accompanying such terminationestablish beyond doubt that his acting appointment was terminated as a measure of punishment for theoffence hewas suspected tohave committed. 5 It iscommon ground thattheapplicantinthepresentcase was neither informed beforehand of the intended termination of his acting appointmentnor was he heard before such decision was 10 taken by the respondents. As stated earier on in my presentjudgment learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted in his written address, inter alia, thatwhen a reductioninrank or grade is notimposed as a sanction but is merely "a pure administrative measure" 15 then no question arises for hearing the other side; and he relied on the case Σ.Ε. 1411/46 cited in the Conclusions from the Jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State 1929 1959 at p. 360. In spite of my finding that thetruenatureandpurpose of the 20 sub judice decision was a disciplinary punishment Ifeel that I should go further and say that (a)thefacts of the aforesaid case decided by the Greek Council of Stateare completely different from the facts of the subjudice case, (
  1. b)The recent trendin Greece appears to have superseded that of the old cases con- 25 cerning the right of hearing. Thus in "Administration andthe Law" by Tsoutsos 1979 ed. at p. 132 we read the following: "Σαφέστερον καϊ άποτελεσματικώτΐρου ή νομολογία τοΰ 'ΕλληνικούΣυμβουλίουτηςΕπικρατείας εστράφη προσφάτως υπέρ της εφαρμογής της αρχής της ακροάσεως επί λήψεως 30 μέτρου προσωπικού χαρακτήροςκατ* ασκούντωνδημόσιον λειτούργημα,έναντιθέσειπροςτήνπαλαιοτέραννομολογίαν". ("In a clearer and moreeffective way thejurisprudence of the GreekCouncilof Statelately leaned towards theimple­ mentation of the rule of hearing onthe taking of measures 35 of personal character against persons holding public offices in contrast to the previous jurisprudence.") 998 3 CUR. Loizou τ. Republic Loris J. The author in the same text-book at p. 134 concludes as follows: 5 "Κατά ταϋτα δυνάμεθα έν συμπεράσματι να εϊπωμεν ότι κατά τήν νομολογίαν τοΰ 'Ελληνικού Συμβουλίου της Έπικρατείας ή αρχή της εκατέρωθενακροάσεωςεπιβάλλεταικαϊ άνευ ρητής διατάξεως είς τάς έξης περιπτώσεις: (α) Προκειμένης επιβολής πειθαρχικήςποινής είς πρόσωπον εύρισκόμενον ένυπηρεσιακή εξαρτήσει έκτής Διοικήσεως. 10 (β) ΈπΙ λήψεως διοικητικού μέτρου, απευθυνόμενου είδικως καθ'ώρισμένου προσώπουασκούντοςδημόσιονλειτούρ­ γημα λόγω αποδιδομένης είς αυτό ΰπαιτιότητος. (γ) ΈπΙ επιλύσεως ύπό διοικητικού οργάνουαμφισβητή­ σεως έγειρομένης μεταξύ δύο μερών ή κατά διοικητικής πράξεως, έξ ής ωφελείται τις". 15 20 ("Therefore, we can in conclusion, say that according to thejurisprudence of the Greek Council of State the rule of hearing both sides is obligatory without any express provi­ sions in the following instances: (
  2. a)In respect of the imposition of a disciplinary punishment on a person who is officially depended on the Administration. (
  3. b)On the taking of an administrative measure directed specially at a certain person exercisinga public function due to blame attributed to him. 25 (
  4. c)On resolving by an administrative organ of a dispute which has arisen between two parties or against an administrative act, whereby someone has derived some benefit".) Turning now to the sources of our own jurisprudence: It 30 was held as early as 1962 by the then Supreme Constitutional Court in the case of Marcoullides v. The Republic, 3 R.S.C.C. 30 at p. 35 that the Public Service Commission which exercises disciplinary control over the applicant "has to comply with certain well established principles of natural justice and the 35 accepted procedure governing dismissal of public officers " 999 Loris J. Loizou v. Republic
(1982)Elaborating on the subject of natural justice, Josephides, J. stated the following, inter alia, in the case of The Republic v. Mozoras
(1966)3 C.L.R. 356 at p. 399-400. "Now, what are the rules or principles of natural justice? The two essential elements of natural justice are in modern times usually expressed as follows: 5 (
  1. a)no man shall be judge in his own cause; and (
  2. b)both sides shall be heard, or audi alteram partem. Other principles which have been stated to constitute elements of natural justice, e.g. that the parties must have 10 due notice of when the tribunal will proceed, etc., may be said to be merely extensions or refinements of the two main principles stated above. According to Professor B. Schwartz in his book entitled "French Administrative Law and the Common Law 15 World"
(1954), at page 207, the British Courts have endeavoured to ensure administrative fair play through the concept of natural justice. The principles of natural justice can be said to be as much a part of British administrative law as the procedural demands that the United 20 States Supreme Court hasheld are required of the American administration under the "due-process" clause. In dealing with a statute prescribing that the particular decision should be made "after due inquiry" (see later in this judgment), Lord Justice Bowen said in Leason v. 25 General Council of Medical Education [1889] 43 Ch. D. 366, at page 383, 'The statute says nothing more but in saying so much it certainly imports that the substantial elements of natural justice must be found to have been present at the inquiry. The accused person must have 30 notice of what he is accused. He must have an oppoitunity of being heard, and the decision must be honestly arrived at after he has had a full opportunity of being heard'. Throughout the web of our system of administration of 35 justice in Cyprus (if I may borrow the happy phrase of Lord Chancellor Sanky in another context in the Wool· mington case) one golden thiead is always to be seen, that 1000 3 C.L.R. 5 Loizou v. Republic Loris J. is to say, that a,person is entitled to a fair hearing, which means that he must be informed of the accusation made against him and given an opportunity of being heard before judgment is passed on him. These principles are now enshrined in our Constitution, Articles 12.5 and 30 reproducing the provisions of Article 6 of the Rome Convention on Human Rights of 1950." I need not refer to other cases where the rules of natiual justice have been expounded except perhaps to the recent one of 10 Kazamias v. The Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 239, decided by my brother Judge Sawides J. where the relevant topic is expounded at length at pp. 284—299. From the above it is abuntantly clear that as the true nature and purpose of the subjudice decision was to impose a sanction 15 on the applicant, the latter ought to have been given the chance to be heard before such decision was taken. This was never done and therefore one of the most important rules of natural justice was violated, notably the rule that both sides must be heard - audiatur et alteram partem-. 20 I do not intend to deal with the remaining complaints of the applicant; they are ancillary to his main complaint which I have already sustained. The complaint that the sub judice decision was taken contrary to the Police (Discipline) Regulations cannot stand 25 as it is common ground that the Police,investigations were commenced on the same day the applicant Wasarrested (and the termination of hisacting appointment wasdecided and effected), but such proceedings as already stated earlier on in the present judgment, were completed some two months later and they 30 could not and in fact they did not have any bearing on the sub judice decision. In the result this recourse succeeds and the subjudice decision of the respondents is hereby annulled. Having given to the casemy best consideration I have decided 35 to make no order as to costs. Subjudice decisionannulled. No order as to costs. 1001

🔗 Στην επίσημη πηγή

AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.