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(1983)1983 June 21 [HADJIANASIASSIOU, STYLIANIIUS. PIKIS. JJ.] ALECOS CONSTANT! Ν IDES. Appellant' Plaintiff· v.
  1. EKDOTIK1 ETER1A VIMA LTD.,
  2. GEORGIOS XENOFONTOS (ALIAS G. SERTIS),
  3. TYFO PRESS LTD.,
  4. GENJKON PRAKTORION 7YPOU POULIA & KONIARI LTD., Respondents-Defendants. (Civil Appeal No. 6487J. Abuse of the process of the Court—Inlierent power of the Court to restrain abuse of its process—Dismissal of libel action instituted by chief editor of newspaper—Appeal against dismissal—Between dismissal andfiling of the appeal, appellant publishing articles in his newspaper portraying, inter alia, the trial Court and the 5 judiciary in its entirety as guilty of lack of impartiality—Thus seeking to vindicate himself by a process of trial through the press—Though Court of Appeal cannot take cognizance in these proceedings of accusations that appellant committed criminal or civil contempt, the exercise by him of his statutory right of appeal, 10 while questioning the impartiality of the judiciary amounts to a gross abuse of the process of the Court—Appeal stayed until appellant restores the Authority of the Court. The appellant, who was the editor-chief of "Simerini", a daily newspaper, took exception to an article by a columnist of 15 " N e a " daily newspaperand instituted a libel action againstthe author, publishersand distributors of the newspaper. Follow­ ing thedismissal of his action hefiled an appeal challengingthe findings of the trial Court, the inferences drawn therefrom and disputing the validity of the reasoning of the trial Court. 20 Between thedelivery of thejudgment by the trial Court andthe filing of the appeal the appellant wrote five articles, in "Simerini" newspaper, under his name having directly or in348 I C.L.li. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Constantlnides t . Viina Ltd. directly as their subject-matter thejudgment of the trial Court These articles contained a scurrilous attack on the Judges who tried the case and accused them of dishonesty. They, also, questioned the impartiality of the trial Court as well as vhe Judiciary. By isolating certain passages of the judgment out of context, the author tried to ridicule the trial Court, as well a-» hold the Judges to public contempt and he, also, assented in effect that he was the victim of ajudiciary lacking impartiality. Upon an application by the respondents, based on the provisions of Article 162 of the Constitution, section 44 of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14/60) and on the inherent powers and practice of the Court, there was sought an order staying the proceedings pending redress by the appellant. Held,
(1)that though this Court cannot take cognisance in these proceedings of accusations that appellant committed criminal or civil contempt it has inherent power not only to restrain abuse of process but also to secure obedience to the law; that associated with the power to restrain abuse is the undoubted power of the Court to control proceedings before it; that not only conduct diminishing the authority and constitutional role ofthe Courts may bestopped intheexercise ofthe inherent powers of the Court, but the exercise of rights given bylawaswell,whenever fraught with anulterior motive; that the jurisdiction to restrain abuse of process is the only power available totheCourt tostopaparty from subverting thecourse of justice.
(2)The appellant sought to vindicate himself by a process of trial through the press; that vindication was sought by portraying the trial Court and the Judiciary in its entirety as guiltyoflackof impartiality ofwhichheclaimedtobethevictim; that the deployment of means of this kind for self vindication, would destroy the Judiciary asaninstitution ofthe State; that what appellant has done, is to seek the intervention of this Courton appeal,for thesustainance ofhisrightswhiledisputing the inclination of the Judiciary to administer justice; that a litigant cannot seek theintervention oftheCourt in the interests of justice while questioning the impartiality of the Court for, a corrupt Judiciary doesnot administerjusticeaccording tolaw but justice according to convenience; that unless the grave abuse of process is restrained, the floodgates of abuse of the 349 Constantinidcsv. Vima Ltd.
(1983)process of the Court by trial through the press, would be opened to the detriment of the Judiciary; that the exercise by the appellant of his statutory right of appeal, while questioning the impartiality of the judiciary in the manner above stated, amounts to a gross abuse of the process of the Court; and 5 that, therefore, unless the appellant first restores the authority of the Court, it would be an abuse on his part to invoke its powers to obtain justice in the case; accordingly, the appeal should be stayed. 10 Appeal stayed. Per curiam; Nothing said in this judgment is designed to limit the right of the public to criticize judicial action. Not only the public especially the press - has a right, but a duty as well to criticize judicial action whenever they think that criticism is merited in the public interest. 15 Cases referred t o : Hadkinson r. Hadkinson [1952] 2 All E.R. 567 (C.A.); Mavrommatis & Others v. Republic
(1967)I C.L.R. 266; Athlitiki Efimeris "O Filathlos" & Another v. The Police
(1967)2 C.L.R- 249; Mouzouris & Another C L . R . 287; 20 v. Xylophaghou Plantations
(1977)I R. v. Bloomsbury [1976] I All E.R. 897 (C.A.); Castanho v. Brown & Root (U.K.) Ltd. ά Another [1981] 1 AH E.R. 143 (H.L.); 25 Church of Scientology v. D.HS.S. [1979] 3 All E.R. 97 (C.A.); Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. [1977] 2 All E.R. 566 (C.A.); Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. Green [1979] 1 All E.R. 726; Hammersmith v. Magnum Automated All E.R. 401 (C.A.); Forecourts [1978] 1 A.-G. v. Chaudry [1971] 3 All E.R. 946 (C.A.); 350 30 Constantinide^ v. Vima t.ld. I C.I..R. R. r. Metropolitan Police Comr. [1968] 2 All E.R. 319 (C.A.): Police r. Ekdotiki Eteria [1982] 2 C.L.R. 6 3 : A.-G. r. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1973] 3 AH E.R. 54 ( H . L . ) ; Re- Raphael Uhcvau-d) [1973] 3 Ail E.R. 19: 5 Pitsillos r. HadjiNhoiaou .
(1981)I C.L.R.
  1. Application. Application by respondents 1and 2 requesting that the Court should not take cogni'/ance of the appeal against the judgment of the District Court of Nicosia (Artemides, Ag. P.D.C. and 10 loarxnides, DJ.) dated the 24th September, 1982 (Action No. 5692/77) because of the allegedly contemptuous statements made by the appellant in "Simerini" newspaper. E. Efstathiou with N. Stytianidou (Miss), for applicantsrespondents 1 and
  2. 15 χ. Syllouris, for respondent—appellant. A. hulianus with
  3. Macheriotou {Mrs.), for respondents 4 in the appeal. Cur. adv. vult. HADJIANASTASSIOI! J.: The judgment of the Court will be 20 delivered by Mr. Justice Pikis. PJKISJ.: The appellant was theeditor-chief of "SIMERINI"; a daily newspaper, whereas respondent 2 - Georghios Xenofontos, alias Sertis -a columnist of "ΝΕΑ", another daily news­ paper. There were virulent exchanges between them from the 25 columns of the respective newspapers with little effort made on either side to restrain impassioned feelings. The appellant took exception to an article of Sertis published in the issue of "ΝΕΑ" of 13.11.77 and instituted a libel action against the author, publishers and distributors (Civil Action No. 5692/77 30 before the District Court of Nicosia). The appellant averred that the publication was defamatory of himself, falsely and maliciously, accusing him directly and by necessary implication of collaboration with the Turks and pro­ motion of their interests, grave accusations in the context of 351 l*ikis,l. Conslantinidcs \. Vim;i Lid. (I9S3) Cyprus tragedy. He claimed damages for the smear on his reputation and, an injunction restraining repetition as well as any other remedy the Court might consider appropriate. The author and publishers made a joint defence denying liability, in particular they denied that the article was motivated 5 by malice or written in bad faith. It was, in their contention, written in the discharge of their journalistic duty. In their view, what it contained was a fair comment on a matter of public interest. Further, they pleaded that allegations of fact set out therein were true and comments made thereupon fair. |0 Their defence amounted to what is known in libel law as a rolled up plea. The distributors entered a separate defence. denying liability on different grounds. The case proceeded to trial before the Nicosia District Court - the Full Court because of the height of the claim -composed of 15 Artemides, Ag. P.D.C. and loannides, D.J. It was a hotly contested action. At the end of the trial the Court reserved judgment for consideration. The judgment of the Court was delivered on 24.9.
  4. It was prepared by the Presiding Judge Artemides, Ag. P.D.C. It is unnecessary at this stage to refer 20 in detail to the judgment. We shall note the result and the underlying reasoning. The Court found for the defendants, holding the comments made therein to have been fair on a matter of public interest. Shortly before the expiration of the time limited for appeal 25 under0.35,r.2,theappellant lodged thepresentappeal(theappeal was filed on 5.11.82). The appellant challenged the findings of the Court, the irferences drawn therefrom and, disputed the validity of the reasoning of the trial Court. We may fairly presume it was all 30 along within his contemplation to appeal against the decision of the trial Court. What happened between the delivery of judgment on 24.9.82 and the filing of the appeal on 5.11.82, is the subject-matter of an application by the respondents, notably the newspaper publishers and the author of the article complai- 35 ned of, based on the provisions of Article 162 of the Constitution, s.44 of the Courts of Justice Law - 14/60 and the inherent powers and practice of the Court. The pith of the application isthat the Court should not take cognizance of the appeal 352 1 C.L.Ii. Constantinides *. Vima Ltd. IMkis J. because of the allegedly contemptuous statements made by the appellant in "SIMERINI" newspaper, bringing to contempt the Judges who tried thecaseand, the Judiciary, as an important Institution of the State. Therefore, the Court is asked to stay 5 the proceedings pending redress and strike out the appeal or make any other order deemed appropriate in the event of the appellant failing or refusing to retract the grave accusations made against the trial Judges and the Judiciary. It is admitted that between the period that elapsed between 10 thejudgment of the trial Court and the lodgment of the appeal, the appellant wrote five articles under his name, apparently in the space reserved for editorial comments, having directly or indirectly as their subject-matter thejudgment of the trial Court, adverse to the appellant as it was. 15 20 25 30 35 40 It is the case for the respondents/applicants, that the contents of these articles constituted contempt upon the trial Court and the Judiciary as a whole, so much so that applicant ought not to be heard before he retracts them in a manner restoring the dignity and authority of the Courts. The English case of Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] 2 All E.R. 567 (C.A.) and the decisions of the Supreme Court in Theofylactos Mavrommatis and2 Others v. Cyprus Hotels Co. Ltd.
(1967)1C.L.R. 266 and Athlitiki Efimeris "O Filathlos and Another v. The Police
(1967)2 C.L.R. 249, were quoted in support of the submission that the Court ought not to hear the appellant because of his grave contempt upon the Court. To a question of the Court, whether he brought the complaints of his clients to the notice of the Attorney-General, counsel for the respondents/applicants replied, somewhat to our surprise, in the negative. The case of Hadkinson, supra, affirms the rule that a party in civil contempt forfeits hisright to a hearing bythe Court. There are exceptions to the rule, mainly in two situations: Where an audience is sought for the purpose of purging the contempt and, secondly, when the right is sought in order to defend fresh proceedings in the cause. In Theofylactos Mavrommatis, supra, the Supreme Court gave unqualified approval to the rule that a party in contempt should not be heard until the contempt is first purged. Vassiliades,P., speaking on behalf of the Court, conveyed the stand of the Court in these words: "We are not prepared to listen to any argument in this 353 WkisJ. Constaniinides \. Vima Ltd.
(1983)case, before we are assured that the order of the Court has been complied with." The third decision relied upon by applicants - Athlitiki Efimeris "O Filathlos'* and Another, supra, is of no direct relevance. It is a criminal case of contempt of Court, arising from the publi- 5 cation of an article capable of prejudicing the fair trial of pending judicial proceedings, in contravention to the provisions of s.44(l)(c) of the Courts of Justice Law - 14/60. Mr. Syllouris for the appellant submitted, we have no jurisdiction to deal with allegations of contempt of Court, acriminal 10 matter exclusively amenable to the jurisdiction of a criminal Court. Section 44 of the Courts of Justice Law cannot be invoked by the applicants for it is solely concerned with the commission of the crime of contempt of Court,as defined therein*; nor was the alleged contempt committed in the face of the 15 Court in the manner envisaged by s.44
(2)of Law 14/
  1. Section 44 limits freedom of expression safeguarded by Article 19 for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the Judiciary, a permissible limitation of the right in accordance with the final provisions of Article 19.3 of the Constitution. 20 Mr. Syllouris is right in submitting that we cannot take cognizance in these proceedings of the accusation that appellant committed a contempt of Court, acrimeunder s.44 of Law 14/
  2. Only a criminal Court can competently seize of the matter after a charge is properly preferred against the appellant. 25 There remain two other aspects of the application that merit closer examination. These are (A) Allegations of civil contempt and, (B) Abuse of the process of the Court. (A) Civil Contempt: 30 Civil contempt is committed, as the authorities establish, whenever a party disobeys an order of the Court. It is an extraordinary process designed to equip a civil Court with the armoury of a criminal Court in the interests of the efficacy of The statutory offence of contempt follows upon the lines of the common law offence of scandalising the Court. 354 1 C.L.R. Ct>nstiinliiiKles\. Vim» Ltd. Pikis J . the civil jurisdiction of the Courts. The cases relied upon by counsel for the applicants, notably Hadkinson and Mavrommatis, supra, go no further than establishing that civil contempt is committed whenever a party disobeys an order of the Court. 5 The exercise of the jurisdiction is procedurally regulated by Ord.42A of the Civil Procedure Rules. The decision in Antonis Mouzowis and Another v. Xylophaghou Plantations Ltd.
(1977)I C.L.R. 287, establishes that civil Courts in Cyprus have, as in England, jurisdiction to deal with civil contempt, exercisable 10 very much along the lines approved in Hadkinson, supra. Proceedings for civilcontempt are quasi criminal and the accusation must beproved with the same strictness as a criminal charge and, it is likewise subject to the same procedural safeguards. A civil Court has no jurisdiction to deal with acts undermining 15 the judicial process, unless committed in the face of the Court and always subject to the provisions of s.44
(2)of the Courts of Justice Law. It becomes apparent from the above that, many of the arguments raised in support of the application are irrelevant and 20 rest on a misconception of the law. We cannot take cognizance in these proceedings of accusations that appellant^ Alecos Constantinides, committed criminal or civil contempt. There remains to decide whether the conduct of the appellant was such as to make it an abuse, on his part, of the process of the 25 Court to seek judicial review of the judgment of the trial Court by way of appeal. Consequently, we shall examine the nature of the jurisdiction vested in the Court to stop abuses of the judicial process and, whether the conduct of the appellant amounted to an abuse. 30 (B) Abuse of the Process of the Court: The power of the Court to control judicial proceedings and restrain abuse of process, is an attribute of the autonomy of the Judiciary and a necessary tool for the efficacy of the judicial process. The decisions in Mavrommatis and Mouzouris, supra 35 though bearing on a different subject, are nonetheless illustrative of the need to stop a party to a proceeding from undermining the authority of the Court and making nonesense of the judicial process. The administration of justice in Cyprus is modelled on the 40 administration of justice under the common law judicial system, 355 Pikis J . Constantinidcs v.Vima Ltd.
(1983)subject to this clarification: The autonomy and separateness of theJudiciary inCyprusisentrenchedbyawrittenconstitution. A Courtof law hasinherent powerto controlproceedings before it - R. v. Bloomsbwy [1976] 1All E.R. 897 (CA) - as well as restrain abuse of the judicial process - Castanho v. Brown& 5 Root (U.K.) Ltd.andAnother [1981] 1 All E.R. 143 (HL). Abu­ sive acts or conductare easy to identify but hard toencompass in an apriori definition. Abuse of process of the Courtmay take a variety of forms and may on occasion be subtle to the point of deception. It is, therefore, best to concentrate on 10 instances of abuses of processjudicially recognised, inorderto distil therefrom the prevailing judicial trends, as well as ascer­ tain the ambit of the power of the Court to restrain abuses. Not only conduct diminishingtheauthorityand constitutional role of the Courtsmay be stoppedintheexercise of theinherent 15 powers of the Court,but the exercise of rights given by law as well, whenever fraught with an ulterior motive. h\ Church of Scientology v. D.H.S.S. [1979] 3 All E.R. 97 (CA), the right to discovery was held tobe subject tocontrolin theexercise ofthe powers of the Court,to suppress the abusive exercise of riglits. 20 Another example is the case of Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. [1977] 2 All E.R. 566 (CA), where it was proclaimed that the exercise of a right may be restrained if pursued not for its vin­ dication but in orderto securea collateral advantage. Alsothe exercise of a right may be restrained if calculated to cause in- 25 justice to the other party. Thus,in Castanho v.Brown ά Root {U.K.)Ltd. andAnother[1981] 1All E.R. 143 (HL), the right to serve notice of discontinuance, unfettered under the rules, was restrained in the interests of justice. As Oliver, J.pointed out in MidlandBank Trust Co. Ltd. v.Green [1979] 1 All E.R. 30 726, the jurisdiction to restrain abuse of process is the only power available to the Courtto stop a party from, and Ipara­ phrase, subverting the course of justice. Associated with thepower torestrain abuse, is the undoubted power of the Court to control proceedings before it. 35 The Supreme Court has inherentpower not only to restrain abuse of process butalso to secureobediencetothelaw - Ham­ mersmith v. Magnum Automated Forecourts [1978] 1 All E.R. 401 (CA). Its power may be exercised whenever thejustice of the case so requires-A-G v. Chaudry [1971]3All E.R.946(CA). 40 356 1 C.L.R. Constantinides v. Vima Ltd. Pikis J. The above list of authorities is but a short list of cases, bearing on the subject of abuse of process. They illustrate the breadth ofthediscretion aswellasitsutilityfor theproper administration of justice. 5 What must next be decided is, whether the facts put before us, uncontested as they are, merit the intervention of the Court and, if so, whether they warrant one or more of the remedies sought by the applicants. On any view of the articles complained of, however bene10 volently onemayinterpret them,theycontaina scurrilous attack on the Judges who tried the case and, the Judiciary as well. Mr. Constantinides, under the guise of criticism, in the first article published three days after the delivery of judgment, questioned the impartiality of the trial Court, as well as the 15 Judiciary. He went further and sought to ridicule the trial Court as well, in a most unfair manner, designed to undermine the authority of the Courts. By isolating certain passages of the judgment out of context, the author tried to ridicule the trial Court, aswellashold theJudgestopubliccontempt. The 20 trial Judges in their effort to demonstrate the different meaning imported by "public interest" in the field of libel law, made reference to a disputed penalty award in a football match, in order to illustrate that, whereas the matter was not in itself of public interest, the public had shown exceeding interest in the 25 matter, in consequence of which the matter had become of interest to the public. Mr Constantinides portrays this illustration as a central theme of the judgment, irrelevant in the context of the libel issues of the case, in an attempt to cast doubts on the seriousness of the Court and ridicule the admi30 nistration of justice. Thearticlesthat followed, revealthat thefirst attack upon the trial CourtandtheJudiciary,wasnot anoutburst ofthemoment but part of a sustained effort to undermine the authority of the Judiciary. In the article published a few days later, on 1.10.82, 35 the appellant under the pretext of passing comment on an article published in another daily newspaper, accuses the trial Judges of dishonesty. Two days later, on 3.10.82, he reverted to the theme of the judgment, proclaiming the right of the public to criticizejudicial action, quoting a passage from Lord 40 Denning to the effect that, silence ought not to be the choice. 357 I'kis.J. Constantinides\. Vima Lid. {1983* We fully endorse the right of the public to criticize judicial action. The public - and that includes the press - is the watchdog of judicial standards, as well as the standards in even aspect of public life. Freedom of speech isthe pillar of freedom itself, the birthright of man, to repeat what was said in R. v. 5 Metropolitan Police Comr. [1968] 2 All E.R. 319 (CA). However rigorous criticism may be. it will not constitute contempt as it was pointed out in the above case, always provided that criticism is made bona fide in the interests of the public. However, it is worth reminding of what was also stressed in the same in decision that, those who criticize Judges must never forget that Judges cannot answer back. In Cyprus freedom of speech is constitutionally entrenched. Freedom of speech is a fundamental aspect of liberty, as the Supreme Court unanimous!) pronounced in Police v. Ekdotiki Etcria
(1982)2 C.L.R.
  1. It 15 is a right that can only be limited in the circumstances specifically envisaged by the Constitution. Such limitations may be imposed to restrain acts undermining the authority and impartiality of the Courts. In the last mentioned article the appellant tried to convey the impression he was doing no more than exercise the right of the press to criticize judicial action. Was the appellant a pressman detached from the facts, criticizing public action1; The question has only to be asked for the answer to become apparent, he was not. Again, under the guise of exercising a public duly, he ventilated a personal grievance notwithstanding his right of appeal and his intention to exercise it. He vindicated his cause through the press, by asserting in effect -and this isthe combined effect of his articles - that he was the victim of a Judiciary lacking impartiality. To complete the picture, brief reference shall also be made to the remaining two articles written, the first on 3.11.82 - two days before lodging the appeal - and the second, about 15 days after the notice of appeal wasfiled, on 23.11.
  2. The subject of the articles is again Judge Artemides and the pretext, a painting 35 exhibition of his works. The object of the author is transparent, to ridicule the Judge who gave judgment against him. These sarcastic articles end by advice given to Judge Artemides to give up his judicial office and devote himself exclusively to painting, thereby giving Cyprus its chance "to acquire its Pi- 40 casso." 358 20 ri 30 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 Constantinidcs \. Vima Ltd. Pikis J. In our judgment, the appellant sought to vindicate himself by a process of trial through the press. Vindication was sought by portraying the trial Court and the Judiciary in its entirety as guilty of lack of impartiality of which he claimed to be the victim. The deployment of means of this kind for self vindication, would destroy the Judiciary as an institution of the State. Certainly the adoption of such surreptitious methods of self vindication cannot coexist with the bona fide exercise of rights given by law, in this case the right to appeal. Trial through the press was condemned as a totally unacceptable procedure by the highest English Court, the House of Lords - A-G v.Times NewspapersLtd. [1973]3All E.R. 54(HL). If one was allowed to exercise a right given by law while pre-empting the outcome one way or another by means similar to those chosen by the appellant in this case, the constitutional role of the Judiciary, as the arbiter of the rights of the subject, would be destroyed. Worse still, self vindication would come to depend on the access of a party to the press, something that would put chief editors, as Mr. Constantinides, effectively above the law. What appellant has done, is to seek our intervention on appeal, for the sustainance of his rights while disputing the inclination of the Judiciary to administer justice. A litigant cannot seek the intervention of the Court in the interests of justice while questioning the impartiality of the Courts. For, a corrupt Judiciary does not administer justice according to law but justice according to convenience. The pertinent question is, what should be done in the face of the unacceptable conduct of the appellant. Certainly the Courts are not powerless to act. We noted earlier the breadth of our 30 jurisdiction to restrain abuses. In Re v. Raphael (deceased) [1973] 3 All E.R. 19, it was held that a Court of law has power to adjourn the hearing of a case if it is expedient in the interests of justice: Afortiori, a similar power vests in the Supreme Court as well. Access to the Courts must not be unjustifiably 35 impeded. In Pitsillos v. Hadj'Nicolaou
(1981)1 C.L.R. 642 we declared that a Court of law had no right to stop a litigant from prosecuting a civil action to its conclusion because of inappropriate remarks made bya litigant in the course of crossexamination of a witness. There the Judgehad ample powers to 40 deal with the litigant, under s.44
(2)of Law 14/60, if his conduct amounted to contempt in the face of the Court. Also the 359 Pikis J . Constantinides v. Vima Ltd.
(1983)Judge could have restrained the litigant from abusing the process, bydisallowing the question. The present case is different. Unless the grave abuse of process is restrained, the floodgates of abuse of the process of the Court by trial through thepress, would be opened to the detriment of the Judiciary. 5 We have examined the case with very great care, not least because it is the first of its kind to come before the Supreme Court. We are unanimously of the opinion that the exercise by the appellant of his statutory right ofappeal, while questioningthe impartiality of theJudiciary in themanner above stated, 10 amounts toagrossabuseoftheprocessoftheCourt. Therefore, unless the appellant first restores the authority of the Court, it would bean abuse on hispart to invoke its powers to obtain justice in thecase. If wewerepowerlesstoact inthesecircumstances, the authority of the Courts would be muted. !5 In our judgment the appeal should be stayed, Nothing said in this judgment is designed to limit the right of the public to criticizejudicial action. Not only the publicespecially the press - has a right, but a duty as well to criticize judicial action whenever they think that criticism is merited in 20 thepublic interest. Nobody isabove the law. Least of all the Judges. We are dutybound to administer justice according to law. The administration ofjustice is all important to the wellbeing of society and concerns everyone. We are not here confronted, asnoted above,witha bonafide criticism ofajudgment 25 of the Court, but with a litigant attempting to vindicate his proclaimed rights through the press, by destroying the premises upon which justice is administered, that is, the impartiality of the Judiciary. In the result the appeal is stayed. The order for stay shall 30 cease to operate if and when the appellant restores by appropriate action the authority of the Court to do justice in the case. Thereafter, itmay befixed for hearing on the application of anyparty to the cause. Thecosts of the present proceedings shall be borne by the appellant. 35 Order accordingly. 360

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