clr/1983/1983_2_301.pdf

(1983)after considering the objection, decided thai he faced no impediment moral or legal to take up the application. in deciding as he did the Judge stated that the test to be applied in such cases revolves on the logical reactions of reasonably thinking members*of the community to the possibility of bias in the context of lack of impartiality on the part of the Judge and that the Courts are not concerned with the reactions of a suspector an accused person astowhoisgoingtotry thecase. 5 Counsel for the appellant mainly contended.

(1)Thatthetest usedbythetrialJudgewaswronginas much 10 as there should be a mixed subjective and objective test.

(2)That upon the objection being raised on the ground of bias the trial Judge should not have embarked to determineit because bydealingwith theapplication hebecame ajudge in hisowncause anddetermined lusown position 15 in the matter.

(3)That the Police failed to place before the Court any material or material sufficient to justify ihe inference of reasonable suspicion or giving rise to reasonable suspicion concerning the implication of the appellant 20 in ihe offences order investigation. In the course of the hearing of these appeals counsel for the appellants soughtto makeuseoftheminutesofpreviousremand applications; and to this course counsel for the respondents raised an objection. Held,

(1)(on the questionoftheuseofthe minutesofprevious remand applications) that the contents of the minutes of the proceedings in previous remand applications cannot be referred to in the present proceedings and that any attempt to do so would indirectly amount to a review of the orders made, a 30 courseimpermissible, astheywerefinal andlegallymadeaccording to the provisions of theConstitution and the Law.

(2)On the question of bias (

1. a)that the test to be applied is whether a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in Court and knowing all the relevant facts could have a reasonable 35 suspicion that a fair trial for the appellant was not possible; that in the present case there were no circumstances suggesting that a reasonable and fair—minded person sittingin Court and 302 25 2 C.L.R. 5 10 20 Economides and Another v. Police knowing all the relevant facts could have a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for the appellant was not possible and that the trial Judge could .be reasonably suspected of being biased by the mere fact that he had dealt with similar remand orders in the recent past in which the same appellant was remanded in custody or by the mere fact or combined thereto by the fact that the Judge had dealt also with similar applications in respect of other persons; accordingly contention (
2. a)should fail. (
3. b)That an objection, where bias is alleged, has to be taken at the earliest moment in the proceedings and has to be decided by the Judge concerned whose decision is always subject to judicial review by appeal or by means of prerogative writs where no appeal lies from his final decision in the proceedings on which the question of bias was raised.

(3)On the merits of the appeals (after·dealing with the prin-, ciples governing the making of remand orders, the length of the detention and the review by theCourt of Appeal of the discretion of the trial Judge—vide pp. 316-318post) that the Court which entertains ah application for remand in custody' must examine only the reliability of the source but not the worth or probative value ofthe evidence;that thereexisted before theJudge evidence on the basis of which he could come to the conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion that the appellants' were connected with the commission of the offence; accordinglythe appeals must fail. Appeals dismissed. Cases referred to: 30 35 Vrakas v. Republic

(1973)2 C.L.R. 139; . R. v. Colchester Magistrate [1979] 2 All E.R. 1035; Pilavakis v. Queen, 19 C.L.R. 163; Tataris v. Queen, 24 C.L.R. 250; Theodorou v. Police

(1971)2 C.L.R. 245; . Ex parte Rodosthenous, 1 R.S.C.C. 127; R. v. Liverpool City Justices, Ex parte Topping [1983] 1 All E.R. 490 at pp. 493-494; Allinsonv. GeneralCouncilof Medical EducationandRegistration [1894] 1 Q.B. 750 at p. 758; 303 Economides and Another \ . Police (1983J MetropolitanProperties iF.G.C.) v. Lannon[1968] 1 All E.R. 304 at p. 310; Vasuliadesv. Vasnliades,18 C.L.R. 10 at p.21:" Hassipv. Police, 1964 C.L.R. 48; Tsiridesv. Police

(1973)2 C.L.R. 204; Nicolettidesv. Police

(1973)2 C.L.R. 222; Stamataris andAnother v. Po/zce

(1983)2 C.L.R. 107at p. 113; Aquilarv. TVAiw 21, L. Ed 2d 723; Spinelliv. U.S., 21 L. Ed. 2d 637. 5 Appeals against remand orders. 10 Appeals by Phaedon G. Economides and Another against the orders of the District Court of Larnaca (Eliades, D.J.) made on the 21st April, 1983 whereby they were remanded in Police custody for 8days in relation to the investigation into the commission by them of the offences of illegal possession and im- 15 portation of narcotics in Cyprus. G. Cacoyiannis, for appellant No. I. P. Polyviou, fqr appellant No.2. A. M. Angelides, Senior Counsel of the Republic, of the respondents. 20 The following ruling of the Court was delivered on 26.4.1983 by: A. Loizou J. In these appeals from a remand order, counsel for the appellant has sought to make use of the minutes of previous remand applications. Tothis counsel for the respon- 25 dentsraised an objection. In our view the contents of the minutes of the proceedings in previous remand applications cannot bereferred to inthe present proceedings. Any attempt to do so would indirectly amount to a review of the orders made, acourse impermissible, asthey were 30 final and ascounsel acknowledged, legallymade according to the provisions of the Constitution and the law. Certainly counsel is entitled to argue as he did before the Judge who took cognizanceof this remand application that theissueby thesame Judge of two remand orders in the recent past connected with the same 35 case was apt to raise suspicion of bias on the part of the Judge in the mind of the appellant, in hiseffort to persuade us that the Judge wrongly assumed jurisdiction in the present proceedings 304 2 C.L.R. Economides and Another v. Police and that consequently hewasdisqualified from dealingwiththe application. We, therefore, uphold the objection. Order accordingly, The following judgment of the Court was delivered on 5 28.4.1983 by: A. Loizon J. Thetwo appellants were remanded incustody bya JudgeoftheDistrict Court of Larnaca for eight days on theapplication ofthePolice-based onsection24oftheCriminal ProcedureLaw,Cap. 155-pending investigations into thecom10 mission of offences involving (

1. a)illegal importation of heroin in Cyprus, and (
2. b)conspiracy to commit an offence. Before the Judge entertained the application on its merits a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of appellant No. 1 totheeffect that thelearnedJudgewasdisqualified from hearing 15 theapplication for remand onthe ground that hewasbiased as he had heard and determined two previous similar applications concerning thefirst appellant, namely, an application dated the 20th March, 1983, for eight days when he remanded him in custody after a hearing and another application, what might be 20 arenewalofthefirst one,datedthe28thMarch, 1983,whichhe granted for five days though eight days were applied for. At the expiration of the second remand order the appellant wasreleased bythe Larnaca Policewithout beingcharged with the commission of any offence in connection with the importa25 tion and possession of heroin. Ithasbeenurgedthatappellant No. 1 havingbeendissatisfied. felt gravely aggrieved that he had been detained in custody for thirteen daysand therefore a suspect in his position wouldhave had probable grounds or reasonable grounds to suspect that 30 justice would not be properly administered in his case. It was in addition argued that as the same Judge had heard and determined theapplication ofthePolicefor theremandincustody for most, if not all the other suspects concerning the case of heroin, which he renewed consecutively from the 5th March, 35 1983,oDwards, therewasa reasonable suspicion in themindof the appellant that thelearned Judgehavingheard evidenceconcerning the other suspects in a case so serious as this, might, wellunwillingly, havebeeninfluenced by such other evidencein considering and determining the application of the appellant 40 inasmuch as it might be difficult for the learned Judge to dif305 A. Loizou J. Economides and Another v. Police

(1983)ferentiate the case of the other suspects from the case of the appellant. The pertinent question being not whether justice was being done, but whether justice should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The appellant, it was argued, felt aggrieved at the previous 5 remand orders concerning himself and reasonably felt that the learned Judge was not likely to approach his case with the necessary impartiality, free of bias. He objected, therefore, to thelearnedJudgetakingtheapplication for hisremand incustody and applied that the case should bedealt with by another Judge. 10 From the refusal of the appellant's application by the trial Judge, this first ground of appeal is taken. The case of Vrakas v. The Republic

(1973)2 C.L.R. 139, was relied upon in support of this ground of appeal asin that case a question of bias had been raised and extensively dealt with, by 15 Triantafyllides, P., who delivered the judgment of the Court, by reference to the leading English cases on the subject to which reference has also been made by learned counsel in the present appeal. The learned Judge after referring to thecase of Vrakas(supra) 20 and to the case of R. v. ColchesterMagistrate [1979]2 All E.R. p.1035, and to the cases of Pilavakis v. Queen, 19 C.L.R-, 163, Tataris v. Queen, 24 C.L.R., 250, Theodorou v. Police

(1971)2 C.L.R. 245, Ex Parte Rodosthenous, 1 R.S.C.C. 127, said that in proceedings for a remand in custody order "the Police must 25 place before the Court material justifying the conclusion of a reasonable suspicion connecting the suspected person with the commission of the offence" and that in that respect "the Police should show that

(1)an offence has been committed,

(2)investigations into the offence are pending and that

(3)the de- 30 tention in custody of a person is justified for the purpose of completing the investigation". He then pointed out that if the suspect was dissatisfied with the previous decisions of the Court concerning his previous remand he could have challenged their reasoning by filing an appeal before the Supreme Court, some- 35 thing which he did not do and "to say the least he cannot argue now the validity of these decisions". Infact at the outset of thehearing of this appeal weruled that the contents of the record of the earlier two applications could 306 2 C.L.R. Economides and Another v. Police A. Loizoo J. not bemadeuseofherebycounselinasmuchasbyallowinghim to do so that would amount to an indirect review of the orders made, a course impermissible. The learned Judge then mentioned that several testshad been advanced asto whatmaycon5 stitute bias which results in a violation of the rules of natural justice and said:- 10 15 20 "These revolve on the logical reactions of reasonably thinking members of the community to the possibility of biasinthecontext of lack of impartiality onthe part ofthe Judge. The Courts are not concerned with the reactions of a suspect or an accused person as to whoisgoingto try thecase,as suchan acknowledgment would tantamount to therightofasuspectoranaccusedpersontochoosehisown Judge, something which would shake the foundation of justice. The Courts are concerned with the reactions of members of the community who may encounter doubts as to the impartiality of the Courts if these are sufficient to justify the arrival of such conclusion. 1 have considered the submission raised and from an examination of the principles involved and the expected newevidencetobegiven,Idonotentertainanydoubtsthat I face no impediment, moral or legal,to takeup thisapplication. The proceedings to continue." Inarguingthisfirst ground ofappealcounselfor thisappellant 25 hasurged that thetest usedbythelearnedtrialJudgewaswrong inasmuch as there should be a mixed subjective and objective test. The question to be asked should be "would a suspect in thepositionofthissuspecthavehadprobablegroundsorreasonable grounds to suspect that justice would not be properly ad30 ministered in his case?" Or putting it in another way, the Court should placeitself intheposition of thesuspect andconsider and determine whether objectively that particular suspect· couldreasonablyhavehadcausetosuspectthatjusticewouldnot be properly administered in his case, and not to test it by the 35 logical reactions of reasonably thinking members of the community at large. In the case of R. y.Liverpool CityJustices, exparte Topping [1983]1 All E.R. p.490, a casethat turned onthe questionof biasthrough knowledgeofother chargesagainstdefendants and 307 A. Loizou J. Economides and Another \. Police

(1983)the exercise of the Justices' discretion to hear or not the case Ackner L.J. reviewed the authorities as regards the appropriate test and referred to the case of (pp. 493-494) Allinson v.General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 Q.B. 750, at p. 758,per Lord Esher Master of the Rolls, that the test 5 of actual bias as distinct from the appearance of bias is inappropriate and also to what Lord Denning, Master ofthe Rolls, said, who preferred the test of appearance of bias to that of actual bias, when he dealt with the question in Metropolitan Properties (F.G.C.) v. Lannon [1968] 1 All E.R. 304, at 310, 10 and concluded by saying the following: "In our view,therefore, the correct test to apply iswhether there is the appearance of bias, rather than whether there is actual bias. In the past there has also been a conflict of view as to the 15 way in which that test should be applied. Must there appear to be a real likelihood of bias? Or is it enough if there appears to be a reasonable suspicion of bias? (For a discussion on the cases, seede Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th Ed. 1980) pp. 262-264 and H. 20 W.R. Wade, Administrativi Law (5th Ed. 1982) pp. 430432)). We accept the view of Cross L.J., expressed in Hannam v. Bradford City Council [1970] 2 All E.R. 690 at 700, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 937 at 949, that there is really little, if any, difference between the two tests: 25 'If a reasonable person who has no knowledge of the matter beyond knowledge of the relationship which subsists between some members of the tribunal and one of the parties would think that there might well be bias, then thereis in his opinion a real likelihood of 30 bias. Of course, someone else with inside knowledge of the character of the members in question might say: 'Although things don't look very well, in fact there is no real likelihood of bias'. But that would be beside the point, because the question is not whether the tri- 35 bunal will in fact be biased, but whether a reasonable man with no inside knowledge might well think that it might be biased.' We conclude that the test to be applied can conveniently 308 2 C.L.R. 5 Economides and Another v. Police A. Loizou J. be expressed by slightly adapting the words of Lord Widgery C.J. ir> a test which he laid down in R. v. Oxbridge Justices ex p. Burbridge

(1972)Times, 21 June and referred to by him in R. v. McLean, ex p. Aikens

(1974)139 JP 261 at 266: would a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting inCourt and knowingall the relevant facts havea reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for the applicant was not possible?" Needless to say that the Allinson case was referred to by the 10 Privy Council in the case of Aphrodite N. Vassiliadesv. Atermis N. Vassiliades, 18 C.L.R., p. 10, at p. 21, when considering an appeal to it from the judgment of the then Supreme Court of Cyprus and that both the Allinson case and the Metropolitan Propertiescase, as well as other cases, were also referred to and 15 relevant passages quoted in the Vrakas case (supra). The reactions of a reasonable and fair-minded person acquainted with the facts of a case as to the test of bias, approved above. offers it seems to us in most cases a reliable test to determine whether there isbias in a given case. But wemust not be taken 20 asadopting ahard and fast rule for allthecases. Nor should we overlook the realities of Cyprus, always relevant when it conies to applying the law in this country. In Theodorou v. Police

(1971)2 C.L.R. 245, 258, it was pointed out that Cyprus is a small place and many things are common knowledge. Judges 25 with their training and impartiality can validly be expected to adjudicate in case solely by reference to the evidence. Only in the face of special circumstances can thisposition be doubted. It should not be ignored, as pointed out in Vassiliadescase (supra) p. 21, that "it is then a question of substance and fact 30 whether the objection is good". In the present case,there are nocircumstances suggesting that a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in Court and knowing all the relevant facts could have a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for the appellant was not possible and that the trial 35 Judge could be reasonably suspected of being biased by the mere fact that he had dealt with similar remand orders in the recent past in which the same appellant was remanded in custody or by themere fact or combined thereto by thefact that the Judge had dealjt also with similar applications in respect 40 of other persons. 309 A. Loizou J. Economides and Another v. Police

(1983)Wehave come, therefore, to the conclusion that this ground should fail. Before coming to the appeal on the merits we may say a word as to the second ground which is to the effect that upon the objection being raised on the ground of bias the learned 5 trial Judge should not have embarked to determine it because by dealing with the application he became a judge in his own cause and determined his own position in the matter and with thisheadded to thereasonabledoubts inthemind oftheappellant as to the likelihood ofjustice being seen to bedone in this 10 case. Wedo not subscribe to this point nor do we accept the suggestion that the Judge ought to have adjourned the case andlet this appellant file the appropriate proceedings at the Supreme Court under Article 155of the Constitution for theprerogative 15 writs of Certiorary and Prohibition, an application, which in fact was turned down. Weare of the opinion that an objection which in accordance withauthority, Vrakascase(supra)hastobetakenattheearlitst moment in the proceedings where bias is alleged, has to be 20 decided by the Judge concerned. His decision always being subject tojudicial review byappeal or by means of prerogative writswhereno appeal liesfrom hisfinaldecisionintheproceedings in which the question of bias was raised. Had an application to adjourn thecasebeengranted it would 25 have been tantamount to at least, indirectly accepting the objection raised as to bias. Having dealt with thesepoints that were raised by appellant I, we turn now to the rest of the grounds of appeal in respect of which both appellants have,through their respectivecounsel, 30 advanced arguments. In effect this ground is that the Police failed to place before the Court any material, or material sufficient to justify the inference of reasonable suspicion or giving rise to reasonable suspicion concerning the implication of the appellant in the offences under investigation. 35 Ithas beenurgedbybothcounsel that the Court relied only on the allegation of a police officer, namely, Chief Inspector Prokopis Georghiou,thathehadreasonable groundsto suspect 310 2 C.L.R. Economides and Another v. Police A. Loizou J the appellant and on an allegation from another police officer, namely, Police Sergeant Kyriacos Pisioftas, that a person in custodyhad madea statement implicating theappellant without there being any further evidence, either regarding the alleged 5 grounds of suspicion, or about the reliability or credibility of the person in custody allegedly implicating the appellant; furthermore, that on this witness being asked by counsel if he considered the suspect who gave the statement against the appellants as credible, his answer was "he cannot decide if 10 the suspect is credible or not. In fact what he said was that he was not the appropriate organ *o armodios' to answer". The totality of the circumstances that were placed before learned Judge were the following: This was a case of illegal importation of heroin into Cyprus and conspiracy to commit 15 an offence, committed on the 5th March, 1983. The crimes were under investigation. The two appellants were arrested by virtue of a judicial warrant on the 19th April, 1983. For the completion of the police inquiries Chief Inspector Prokopis Georghiou, asked for their remand in custody for eight days 20 as there was pending a great volume of work for completion of the examinations, and that their release would interfere with the investigations, namely, that witnesses would be affected and evidence destroyed. That five persons were already in custody in respect of this case and that a number of other 25 persons outside Cyprus were still wanted. That it was a very serious case, the culprits of which were operating throughout the world, and that against theappellants thereexisted evidence which created reasonable suspicion that they were implicated intheoffence, and that statements would betaken from persons 30 inLimassol, Larnaca and Nicosia andmaybealsofrom abroad. Appellant No. 1had been remanded in custody twice before. As already seen both such applications were opposed and on the second occasion five days instead of the eight applied for were granted by the Court. Appellant No. 1was released on 35 the 2nd April, 1983, on C£500- bail to appear on the 12th April, 1983, regarding a charge of bribery which was one of theoffences inrespect of which his remands wereordered. On the 12th April, he appeared at Larnaca Police and a new date wasgiventohim toappear, namely,the30thApril.Withregard 311 Λ. Loizou J. Economides and Another v. Police

(1983)to the importation of heroin he was neither charged nor was he released on bail in respect thereof. As for the Appellant No. 1, the first time a statement was obtained from him was the 5th March, 1983, and a search was carried out in his house the same night, but he was not charged with any offence. 5 In re-examination witness Prokopis Georghiou was asked why a charge was not brought against Appellant No. 1 on the 2nd April, when he was released. After an objection the Judge permitted the question as being relevant to the evidence which came from the cross-examination and the answer was that "on 10 the 2nd April, 1983, when Appellant No. 1 was released, the facts inthehands of thePolicewere insufficient for this appellant to be charged on the question of heroin but on the 19th April, 1983 At that moment and before thewitness completed his answer 15 counsel of Appellant No. 1objected oncemoreand the objection was upheld by the Court. Attempts by the officer appearing on behalf of the Police to put further questions and after more objections were made and upheld by the Judge the second witness, Police Sergeant Pishioftas, was called. An objection 20 then was made on the ground that that witness was sitting in Court next to the prosecutor during a great part of the hearing. Section 73 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 was invoked, which provides about witnesses leaving the Court during the hearing of a criminal case after a plea of not guilty 25 is made when the Court directs that all witnesses should leave the Court. It should be pointed out, however, that under paragraph (b) of the proviso, failure to comply with the provisions of this section does not invalidate the proceedings. So even if we were to consider that section 73 of the Law applies 30 as a matter of fairness to all other proceedings which though not strictly speaking criminal, yet they have a quasi criminal character, again the fact that the witness was in Court when the previous one was giving his testimony could not in law exclude him. As very rightly the Judge did, he warned him- 35 self of the danger of acting on his evidence, not losing sight of its vulnerability. He pointed the lack on the part of this witness of any personal interest in the proceedings, the nature of the evidence adduced by him and his willingness to forward 312 % C.L.R. Economides and Another v. Police A. Loizou J- to the Court for the Court's perusal—the statement allegedly incriminating both suspects—constituted circumstances that made proper the admission of his evidence. Police Sergeant Pishioftas who served at the C.I.D. Larnaca 5 and took part in the investigations of the case as from the 5th March, 1983, testified that on the 19th April, 1983. one of the other suspects already in custody made a voluntary statement in which he incriminated the two suspects. He further stated that he knew that the first suspect was arrested on the 10 19th March, 1983, and released on the 2nd April. 1983. thai one of those in custody was Kyriacos Panayiotou, the personal driver of the first suspect and that on the 5th March, 1983, on instructions or with the.permission of Appellant No. I. suspect Panayiotou asked Andreas Stamatari to take deliver) 15 of the suitcase with the narcotics from Larnaca Airport, that the first suspect bribed the policeman who was a guard of the suspects and was taking from him information. He also said that for the completion of the case they would take more than 50 statements from all over Cyprus. 20 With regard to the statement of the suspect he said that if a statement gives elements of reasonable suspicion then they would proceed with the arrest of a person., He further said that he was ready to produce to the Court this statement for examination by the Judge. Mr. Cacoyannis objected to the ' 25 production of the statement for examination by the Judge. As regards Appellant No. 1, he said that the new elements against him came from the statement of the suspect of the 19th April, 1983. On this evidence the learned Judge after referring to the argu30 ments advanced and the legal position, both regarding the freedom of the citizen and his rights under the Constitution and the European Convention of Human'Rights and after referring to the leading cases of Hassip v. The Police, 1964 C.L.R. 48; Tsiridesv. The Police

(1973)2 C.L.R. 204; Nkolettidcs v. Policy 35

(1973)2 C.L.R. 22, and Stamataris and Another v. ThePolice

(1983)2 C.L.R. 107, concluded as follows:"I have considered very carefully the evidence adduced 313 A. Loizou J. Economides and Another v. Police

(1983)as to the grounds for the remand and I have come to the conclusion that within the contents of the totality of the material before me the suspicion of the Police is reasonable in character and genuinely entertained. Without disregarding the contents of sec.63of Law 7/76 5 concerning the status of the first suspect and bearing in mind the exceptional gravity of the offences, I consider the applicatioa as justified. Both suspects to remain in custody for 8 days pending investigations into the commission of the above-mentioned offences". 10 In this case we must say that we have had the advantage of veryablearguments from allsides. Theattention ofthisCourt was drawn to authorities dealing with every aspect of thecase, both English and American as well as to some Commonwealth caseswheremattersrelevanttotheissuesraisedintheseappeals 15 were discussed. It appears that in the U.S.where similar constitutional safeguards exist the question of issue of search warrants and the circumstancesunderwhichthatmaybedonecameunderjudicial examination in a number of cases regarding their legality and 20 constitutionality. We shall ourselves refer here to two of them, namely, the Aguilarv. Texas,12L.Ed.2nd723, whereareviewofanumber of authorities is made and Spinelli v. U.S.,21 L.Ed. 2ndp. 637. Under the 4th and 14th Amendments of the American 25 Constitution for the issue of a search and seizure warrant by a magistrate, to put it briefly, probable cause has to be shown and we were invited to follow by analogy the same principles. Inthe Aguilarv. Texas,case,it washeld byreference toprevious decisions that: "Although the reviewing Court will pay substantial deference to judicial determinations of probable cause, the Court must still insist that the magistrate perform his 'neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as as a rubber stamp for the police". And, " „ *that the inferences from the facts which lead to 314 30 35 it 2 CX.R. Economides and Another v. Police A. Loitou J. the complaint (must) be drawn by a neutral anddetached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferretting out crime' {Johnson v. U.S. 92 L ed 436)". 5 And that, "The Commissioner mustjudge for himself the persuasive­ ness of the facts relied on by a complaining officer to show probable cause. Heshouldnotacceptwithout quest­ ionthecomplainant'smereconclusion(2Led2dat 1509)". 10 15 20 And also that, "Here the 'mere conclusion* that petitioner possessed narcotics was not even that of the affiant himself; it was that of an unidentified informant. The affidavit here not only 'containsno affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein', it does noteven containan 'affirmative allegation' that the affiant's unidentified source 'spoke with personal knowledge'. For all that appears, the source heremerely suspected, believed or concluded that there were narcotics in petitioner's possession". And further, 25 30 35 , "The magistrate here certainly couldnot'judgefor himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on to show probable cause'. He necessarily accepted 'without question' the informant's 'suspicion', 'belief or 'mere conclusion'. Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information ςand need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jonesv. United States, 362 US 257, 4 L°ed. 2d 697, , the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose entity neednot be disclosed, see Rugcndorfw. United States, 376 US 528, 11 L ed 2d887, was 'credible' or his information 'reliable'. Otherwise, 'the inferences from 315 \ . Loizou J. Economides and Another \. Police

(1983)the facts which lead to the complaint' will be drawn not 'by a neutral and detached magistrate', as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime', Giordenello v. United States, supra, 357 US at 486, 2 L 5 ed 2d at 1509':. Article 11, paragraphs 2(c) and

(6)of our Constitution must be read together and section 24of Cap. 155has to be construed .isa procedural enactment regulating theprocedurefor detention. In tiiejudgment of the Court delivered by Pikis, J., in Stoma- 10 rarisand Another v. The Police (supra) at p. 113 the position was summed up as follows: The task of the Judge dealing with an application for remand is twofold: (

1. a)To ascertain whether the suspicion is genuinely enter- 15 tained. This is essential in order to eliminate the possibility of the Police Authorities abusing their powers to seek the remand of a suspect in custody. (
2. b)To decide whether the suspicion is reasonable. It is reasonable if evidence, in the hands of the Police, 20 reasonably connects the suspect with the commission of the crime under investigation. The judge in this case formed the view that the suspicion of the Police Authorities was reasonable", The principles emerging from the precedent earlier referred 25 to in thisjudgment which are compatible with the constitutional provisions are the following: (
3. a)the Judge is the arbiter for the need for detention; (
4. b)he must inquire into the lawfulness and necessity of detention; (
5. c)as stated in Stamataris the need for reasonable suspicion which must be genuinely entertained 30 must exist at every stage of the investigation "at the time of arrest and on every subsequent application for remand in custody", bearing in mind as pointed out further down in Stamataris the need "... to maintain a healthy balance between individual liberty on the one hand and public interest 35 in the investigation and suppression of crime in the other"; (
6. d)such facts as possibly giving rise to reasonable suspicion 316 2 C.L.R. Economides and Another v. Police A. Loizou J. must be disclosed subject to what was said in the Tsirides case (supra) in a way not hampering the investigations; (
7. e)the reasonableness of the suspicion must ultimately be determined bythe Judge on the material placed before him; (
8. f)the material 5 before the Court cannot rest on the mere affirmation or conclusion of the deponent. Moreover, with regard to the length of detention there arc certain material considerations to be born in mind by the Judge which include—and the enumeration we are about to make 10 should not be considered as exhaustive:

(1)The nature and magnitute of the contemplated inquiry.

(2)The relationship of the inquiry with the suspect, i.e. if he can interfere with the evidence, his own safety and how his release is likely to affect the inquiry. 15

(3)With every newapplication for further remand the burden on the .Police becomes correspondingly higher (see Stamataris supra). In our view in examining applications for remand in custody, the Judges must examine and adjudicate upon not only whether 20 the suspicion of the Police is reasonable, as the Police organs consider it to be, but also whether it is objectively reasonable as a result of an examination of the elements which are placed before the Judge and which must refer not only to the existence of a reasonable suspicion but to facts which constitute such 25 suspicion, as the Judge is the final arbiter of reasonable suspicion. In the present case the evidence of Chief Inspector Prokopis would have been by itself insufficient as he did not disclose material to the Court to judge the reasonableness of the sus30 picion. These facts, however, were completed by adducing other evidence which tended to show that therewas in the hands of the Police evidence which connected the suspects with the commission of the offences under investigation, that is the statement of another person who was already in custody for 35 the case under investigation. Consequently there existed before the Judge evidence on the basis of which he could come to the conclusion that there existed reasonable suspicion that the 317 A. Loizou J. Economides and Another τ. Police

(1983)appellants were connected with the commission of the offence. It should be stressed, in particular, that the Court which entertains an application for remand in custody must examine only thereliability of the source,but nottheworth or probative value of the evidence. 5 Finally, regarding the functions of this Court with regard to remand orders, we would like to say that this Court on appeal exercises ordinary judicial review and examines first whether there was before theJudge who dealt with them inthe first instancesufficient evidence tojustify thecreationof reason- 10 able suspicion and secondly whether he exercised his discretion judicially asdetention is inessence amatterofjudicialdiscretion and this Court will not interfere if same exercised judicially (Hassip'scase (supra)). In fact, both these tasks were in our view duly performed by the Judge who entertained this appli- 15 cation for remand (Stamataris case (supra) at p. 111). For all the above reasons these appeals are dismissed. Appeals dismissed. 318