clr/1983/1983_3_1355.pdf

(2)1355 Petrides and Others v. Republic

(1983)of the Defence Regulations. Tt was common ground that in Order 18/72 there was not to be found any express provision enablingthe revocation ofalicenceissued byvirtueofthat order. Held,that though no express or implied provision about revocation isto befound in Order 18/72the licences which were 5 issuedto the applicants could berevoked provided such acourse was permissible under the relevant general principles of administrative law; that since the ground on which the licenceswere revoked was treated as establishing a reason of public interest militatingin favour ofthe revocation ofthe licencesin question; 10 that since this reason of public interest is not one unconnected with any conduct on the part of the applicants but that it is related to the use bythem of the motor vehicles in respect of which such licences were issued; that since fraudulent conduct of the person concerned may be a ground for the revocation 15 of an administrative act; that since no revocation of such an act ispossibleifapersonwhowasnot involved inthe fraudulent conduct has acquired bona fide, by virtue of that act, certain rights; and since an administrative decision revoking an earlier administrative act which was induced by fraudulent conduct 20 must beduly reasoned soasto sufficiently establishthe existence of the conduct which is relied on as a ground for revocation it follows that it hasto beexamined whether or not in each one of these cases the licence which was issued to the applicant concerned could bevalidly revoked on the basis of the prin- 25 ciples of administrative law; that since the Court does not have before it as yet all the necessary material for the purpose of an examination as aforesaid, and as no arguments have been duly advanced in this connection, the hearing of these cases has io proceed further in the light of this interim judgment. 30 Order accordingly. Cases referred to: A. & S. Antoniades& Co.v. Republic

(1965)3 C.L.R. 673 at p. 682; Michaelides v. Attorney-General of theRepublic

(1978)3C.L.R. 35 285 at p. 300; Curzon TobaccoCo. Ltd. v. Republic

(1979)3 C.L.R. 151 at p. 157; Yiangou v. Republic

(1976)3 C.L.R. 101 at p. 105; Republicv. Saranti

(1979)3 C.L.R. 139 at p. 143; 40 1356 3C U R . 5 10 15 20 25 Petrides and Others v. Republic . Louca v. PermitsAuthority

(1981)3 C.L.R. 190at p.194; Paschali v. Republic

(1966)3 C.L.R, 593at p.609; Georghiou {No. 2) v. Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 411 at p. 419; Decisions of the GreekCouncil of State Nos:1423/64, 2104/65, 2751/67, 2321/68, 2202/71 and2410/

1. Recourses. Recourses against the decision of the respondents whereby the licences permitting applicants to use their motor vehicles as taxis were revoked. A. Panayiotou, for applicants in Case Nos. 141/78 and 157/
2. L.N. Clerides, for applicant in Case No. 144/
3. E. Efstathiou, for applicant in Case No. 156/
4. A. Koukounis, for applicant in Case No. 162/
5. A. Poetis, for applicant in Case No. 178/
6. J. Erotokritou, for applicant in Case No. 223/
7. L. Papaphilippou,for applicant in Case No.251/
8. A, Mathicolonis, for applicant in Case No. 316/
9. A. Markides, for applicant in Case No. 317/
10. M. Vassiiiouyfor applicant in Case No. 348/
11. CI. Theodoulou, for respondents in Case Nos. 141/78 and 156/
12. R. Gavrielides,Senior Counsel of the Republic, for respondents. Cur. adv. vult. TRIANTAFYLLIDES P. read the following interim judgment. These cases have, in view of their related nature, been heard together on common legal issues. While they were being heard there were withdrawn cases 30 Nos. 224/78, 266/78 and 284/78, which were also being heard with them, andthe said three cases weredismissed accordingly. All theapplicants arechallenging decisions bymeans of which there were revoked licences permitting them to use motor vehicles of theirs as taxis. 35 As it appears fiom their contents, and as has been stated during the hearing before me by counsel for the respondents, the subjudice decisions were based ontheSupplies and Services 1357 Triantafyllides P. Petrides and Others v. Republic

(1983)(Licensing of Public Service Motor Vehicles) Order 1972 (No. 18, Third Supplement, Part I, to the Official Gazette of the Republic dated 28th January 1972, to be referred to hereinafter as "Order 18/72"). It is common ground that in Order 18/72 there is not to be found any express provision enabling the 5 revocation of a licence issued byvirtue of that Order, but counsel for the respondents has argued that the right to revoke such a licence is to be derived by necessary implication from the provisions of Order 18/72. The main common reason that was put forward for revoking the licences which had been issued to the applicants was, in each case, that though the motor vehicle in question had been licensed for use as a taxi, that isasa public servicemotor vehicle, it was,in fact, being used bytheapplicant concerned as a private motor vehicle. 10 One of the issues that was raised on behalf of the applicants was that Order 18/72 was invalidly made because Defence Regulation 55

(2), under which such Order was made, was not in force at the material time since the Defence Regulations, including the aforesaid regulation 55

(2), are to be found in 20 the First Schedule to the Supplies and Seivices (Transitional Powers) (Cyprus) Order 1946, which, allegedly, ceased to be operative in Cyprus before Order 18/72 was made. After, however, it was held in the case of Cyprus Cement Company Limited v. The Republic,

(1983)3 C.L.R. 709, and affirmed on 25 appeal in the case of Vassiliko Cement Works Ltd. v. 77i:J Republic,

(1983)3 C.L.R. 719, that the Defence Regulations have continued to be in force, it cannot be found, in the piesent instance, that Order 18/72 was invalidly made under Defence Regulation 55

(2)as contended by counsel for the applicants. 30 As has been already pointed earlier on in this judgment in Older 18/72 there does not exist any express pro\ision permitting the revocation of a public service licence; nor can, in my opinion, be held that the power of revocation of such a licence is to be derived by implication from any one of the 35 provisions of Order 18/72. From our case-law it appears that the revocation of a particular administrative act may be expiessly regulated in sucli a manner by specific legislative piovision as to exclude the application of general principles of administrative law govern- 40 1358 15 3 C.I..Κ. Petrides and Others \. Republic TriantafyHides 1*. ing revocation of administiative acts which would otherwise have been applicable (see, for example, A. & S. Antoniades & Co. v. The Republic,

(1965)3 C.L.R. 673, 682, Michaelides v. The Attorney-General of the Republic.

(1978)3 C.L.R. 285. 5 300 and Curzon Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. The Republic,

(1979)3 C.L.R. 151, 157); or that a relevant express legislative provision may be so framed that the aforesaid general principles of admi­ nistrative law are applicable, too, in conjunction with such legislative provision (sec, for example, Yiangouv. TheRepublic 10

(1976)3 C.L.R. 101, 105 and The Republic v. Surunii

(1979)3 C.L.R. 139, 143); or if theredoes not exist at all in the statute concerned any express legislative provision enabling the revocation of an administrative act made under it then the relevant general principles of administrative law are applicable 15 (see, foi example, Louca v. The-Permits Ar'Iiority.

(1981)3 C.L.R. 190. 194). Though no express or implied provision about revocation is to be found in Order 18/72 there can be no doubt, in my opinion, that the licences which were issued to the applicants . 20 could be revoked provided such a course was permissible under the relevant general principles of administrative law, which have been expounded in case-law of our Supieme Court already icferrcd to in this judgment, and, also, in cases such as Paschali v. 77/L- Republic.

(1966)3 C.L.R. 593. 609, and Georghiou 25 (No. 2) v. The Republic,

(1968)3 C.L.R. 411. 419). In the sub judice decisions it is stated that the licences concerned were revoked for reasons of public interest; and, indeed, public interest is a recognized ground on the basis of which, in a proper case, an administrative act may be revoked 30 (see. for example, the Saranti case, supra). 35 40 As has already been stated in thisjudgment themaincommon ground on which the licences relating to the motor vehicles of the applicants were revoked was that such vehicles were being used as private motor vehicles instead of as public service motor vehicles, namely taxis; and it seems that the said ground was treated as establishing a reason of public interest militating in favour of the revocation of the licences in question. It appears, therefore, on the basis of the material at present before me, that the reason of public interest which was invoked in support of the revocation of the licences which had been 1359 IViantafyllides P. Petrides and Others *. Republic

(1983)issued to the applicants isnot one unconnected with any conduct on the part of the applicants but that it is related to the use by them of the motor vehicles in respect of which such licences were issued. In the Paschali case, supra (at p. 609), it was indicated that 5 fraudulent conduct of the person concerned may be a ground for the revocation of an administrative act; and, indeed, it appears to be well established that an administrative act may be revoked, even after the lapseof a longtime, if it hasbeen brought about by fraudulent conduct of a person who claims a benefit 10 under it (see, for example, in this respect, the Decisions of the Council of State in Greece in cases 1423/1964, 2104/1965, 2751/1967, 2321/1968, 2202/1971 and 2410/1971). Of course, the principle which permits the revocation of an administrative act which hasbeen induced by fraudulent conduct 15 is subject to certain limitations, such as the rule that no revocation of such an act is possible if a person who was not involved in the fraudulent conduct has acquired bona fide, by virtue of that act, certain rights (see, for example, the aforesaid Decision of the Council of State in Greece in case 2321/ 20 1968)and, also, the rule that an administrative decision revoking an earlier administrative act which was induced by fraudulent conduct must be duly reasoned so as to sufficiently establish the existence of the conduct which is relied on as a ground for revocation (see, for example, the aforesaid Decisions of the 25 Council of State in Greece in cases 2202/1971 and 2410/1971). In the light of the foregoing it follows that it has to be examined whether or not in each one of these cases the licence which was issued to the applicant concerned could be validly revoked on the basis of the principles of administrative law 30 which have already been referred to in this judgment, as well as of any other relevant principle of administrative law. Since I do not have before me as yet all the necessary material for the purpose of an examination as aforesaid, and as no arguments have been duly advanced in this connection, the hearing 35 of the cases has to proceed further in the light of this interim judgment, eithei jointly or separately, as may be directed in due course. Order accordingly. 1360