(1983)1983 December 29 [PIKIS, J.] IN T H E MATTER OF ARTICLE 146 OF THE CONSTITUTION RE: APPLICATION BY C. KARAYIANNIS AN INTERESTED PARTY HEBE NISHIOTOU, Applicant, v. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND/OR THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION, Respondents. (Case No. 311/83). Contempt of Court—for failure or refusal to comply with judgments of the Supreme Court issuedin the exercise of its revisionaljurisdiction—Power to punish for such contempt vests in a single judge of the Supreme Court—Articles 146.5and 150of the Constitution—Section 11
(2)of the Administration of Justice (Miscellancous Provisions) Law, 1964 (Law 33/64). 5 This was an application for the committal for contempt of Leonidas Koullis, the Director of Secondary Education, for refusal or failure to comply with judgments of the Supreme Court, issued in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, on 10 14th October, 1983 and 29th November, 1983, respectively. Counsel for the respondents objected to the jurisdiction of a single Judge, mainly on the ground that the power of the Supreme Constitutional Court to punish for contempt, conferred by Article 150of the Constitution, was bestowed to the Supreme 15 Court as a collective body, by virtue of the provisions of section 11
(2)ofLaw 33/64,and not to a single Judge to whom revisional jurisdiction was entrusted. Held, that considering the nature of the jurisdiction and the intention of the makers of the Constitution to bestow upon the 20 Supreme Constitutional Court a power similar to that exercised by superior English Courts to punish for contempt, it can fairly 1498 3 C.L.R. 5 10 ]5 20 25 30 Nissiotou v. Republic be concluded that they intended to invest the Supreme Constitutional Court withthenecessaryjurisdictionto administer justice effectively; that, therefore, power to punish for contempt was not an independent speciesofjurisdiction but oneincidental totheexerciseofeveryjurisdictionoftheSupreme Constitutional Court in the interests of the orderly and effective transaction of judicial business in fact, an attribute of itsefficacy; moreso, in view of the system of separation of powers entrenched in the Constitution, and the need to sustain the autonomy of the judiciary; that, consequently, sub-section2 of s. 11—Law33/64, by vesting thejurisdiction of the Supreme Constitutional Court under Article 146to a single Judge, they vested jurisdiction in the same Judge functioning as a superior Court with the paraphernalia of such jurisdiction, the most significant of which ispowerto punishfor contempt;that anycontrary interpretation would be antagonistic to the nature of the power to punish for contempt, as encountered in the Constitution, and the intention of the constitutional legislator to invest every superior Court with power to punish for contempt; accordingly a single Judge of this Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application (see, also, Article 146.5 of the Constitution). Order accordingly. Cases referred to: Joannides v. Republic-
(1971)3 C.L.R. 80; Attorney-Genera! of the Republicv. Ibrahim, 1964 C.L.R. 195: Republic v. Vasstliades
(1967)3 C.L.R. 82; R. v. Almon[1765] Wilm. 243 at p. 254; Balogh v. The CrownCourt [1974] 3 All E.R. 283 at p. 290; Prodromou v. Republic
(1983)3 C.L.R. 990; Nishiotouv. Republic(reported in thispart at p. 1483, ante). Application. Application by Constantinos Karayiannis, an interested party, for thecommittal for contempt of Leonidas Koullis,the Director of Secondary Education, for refusal or failure to comply with 35 judgments of the Supreme Court issued in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. L. Papaphilippou, for the applicant. A. Evangehu, Senior Counsel of the Republic with R. Vrahimi (Mrs.), for the respondents. 40 Cur. adv. vult. 1499 NissJotou \. Republic
(1983)Pikis J. read thefollowingjudgment. This is an application for thecommittalfor contempt of LeonidasKoullis,theDirector of Secondary Education, for refusal or failure to comply with judgments of the Supreme Court, issued in the exercise of its re\isional jurisdiction, on 14th October, 1983 and 29th November, 1983, respectively. 5 The competence of a single Judge of the Supreme Court to assume jurisdiction for proceedings for contempt, has been questioned in view of theprovisions of section 11 of theCourts of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law—33/64, particularly 10 those of sub-section 2 Thejurisdiction of a single Judge, Mr. Evangelou submitted, is limited to the areas of jurisdiction specifically assigned by sub-section 2 of section 11, and that encompasses the exercise of revisional jurisdiction as well and. matters incidental Jhereto. The residue of revisional juris- 15 diction, assigned by the Constitution to the SupremeConstitu tional Court, vested, under the provisions of section 11
(1)— Law 33/64, in the Supreme Court as a collective body. In support of his submission Mr. Evangelou made reference to the decision of the SupremeCourtin loanntdes ν TheRepublic 2C
(1971)3 C.L R. 8, and argued that it lends some support tothe views propounded, affecting the limitations of the jurisdiction > of a single Judge of the Supreme Court. In that case theFull Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with an application for the committal ofanumberofpersonsfor contempt,for disobedience 25 of an order of a single Judge of the Supreme Court, issued in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, piohibiting thedepu tation of the applicant. The Full Bench of the SupremeCourt took cognizance of thecase, as we were told by counsel for the applicant—and were able to verify from examination of the file 30 of the case—after a written application of the applicants that thecasebe tried by theFull Benchonaccountofthe seriousness of the issues raised therein and the repercussions from dis obedience of the order upon society as a whole. I have gone through the judgments delivered in the above case with very 35 great care. In none of them was the issue of jurisdiction dis cussed or touched upon directly or indirectly. Objection to thejurisdiction of a single Judge, mainly rests on the premise that the power of the SupremeConstitutional Court to punish for contempt,conferred by Article 150 of the 40 1500 3 C.L.R. Nissiotou v. Republic Pikis J. Constitution, was bestowed to the Supreme Court as a collective body, by virtue of the provisions of section 11
(2)of Law 33/
- and not to a single Judge to whom revisional jurisdiction was entiusted. The jurisdiction of a single Judge is strictly limited 5 to the instances explicitly enumerated in sub-section
- A necessary implication of this submission, as counsel for the Attorney-General acknowledged, is that a single Judge of the Supreme Court exercising revisional jurisdiction, cannot claim jurisdiction to punish for contempt, at any stage of the proceed10 ings, before, at the lime or after the hearing. Only the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has such power. Mr. Papaphilippou opposed the submission of Mr. Evangelou and contended that the entrustment of revisional jurisdiction of the Supreme Constitutional Court to a single Judge, neces15 sarily implied transfer of all the powers of the Supreme Constitutional Court to deal effectively with a case including power to punish for contempt at any stage of the proceedings, including the aftermath of the trial. The starting point in the process of resolution of the issue 20 raised before us, is section 9 of Law 33/64, vesting in the Supreme Court established under the provisions of section 3 o f the same law, the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the two superior Courts of the land, namely the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court. In the face of disintegration of the 25 two superior Courts on account of the events of 1963-64, need arose to enact a law to fill the vacuum and make possible the functioning of thejudicial authorities of the State inthe interests of social order. The Law, notably Law 33/64, was tested and found to be constitutional in the case of The Attorney-General 30 of the Republic v. Ibrahim And Others, 1964 p.
- The Supreme Court established by Law 33/64, inherited the jurisdiction of the two superior Courts it replaced, and became the custodian of their powers. Now, the exercise of the jurisdiction and powers of the 35 Supreme Court, are regulated by the provisions of s.1-
- Subsection 1of section 11 invests the Supreme Court as a collective body with the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the two superior Courts, subject to two reservations:40 (a) The exeptions envisaged by sub-sections 2 and 3 of the same section of the law, and 1501 Pikis J. Nissiotou v. Republic
(1983)(b) exceptions or modifications embodied in subsidiary legislation enacted by the Supreme Court. The Rules then in existence, including the Rules pertaining to the functioning of the Supreme Constitutional Court, were saved by the proviso to section 17 of Law 33/64. The only 5 decision shedding some light on the interpretation of the provisions of s.ll and therelationship between its three sub-sections, is that of The Republic v. Vassiiiades
(1967)3 C.L.R. 82. The main issue before the Court in the above proceedings affected the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It 10 was decided by majority, Josephides, J. dissenting, that the provisions of sub-section 3purporting to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Couit, were limited in their application to the exercise of the appellatejurisdiction formerly exercised by the High Court on appeals from inferior Courts. 15 Appeals from a single Judge of the Supreme Court under the provisions of the proviso to sub-section 2 of section 11, lay before the Full Bench. Little, if any, guidance can be derived from the above decision; certainly, it offers no guidance on the subject of thejurisdiction of asingleJudge exercising revisional 20 jurisdiction lo punish for contempt. The submission of Mr. Evangelou that sub-section 2 of section 11 does not in terms specifically confer jurisdiction upon a single Judge of the SupremeCourttopunishfor contempt,iswellfounded. Consequently, unless weconclude that power to punish for contempt 25 is not an independent jurisdiction but a jurisdiction inherent in every Court administering justice ancillary to the exercise of its judicial functions, I must decline to assume jurisdiction and adjourn the matter before the Full Bench of the Supreme Court. The issue 1must determine is a serious one. I took 30 timeto study thematter andreflect upon theimplications of the rival submissions. Article 150 of the Constitution is couched in general terms and empowers the Supreme Constitutional Court to punish "for contempt of itself"'. It is relevant to notice that juris- 35 diction topunishfor contemptisapeculiarfeature oftheEnglish legal system, not encountered in the same form in other legal systems. Therefore, we can validly presume that the constitutional drafters, in enacting Article 150, intended to bestow upon the Supreme Constitutional Court a power comparable 40 1502 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Nissiotou v. Republic Pikis J. to that exercised by Courts of record in England. This view is reinforced by a comparison of the provisions of Article 150 with those of Article 162 conferring upon the High Court and Courts subordinate thereto, power to punish for contempt. The inescapable inference is that the makers of the Constitution intended to invest the Courts established therein, as well as subordinateCourts inthejudicial hierarchy,withpowertopunish for contempt, inmuch the same way as English Courts of record exercise a similar jurisdiction. It appears, therefore, profitable to explore, albeit briefly, the origin and nature of thejurisdiction to punish foi contempt exercised by English Courts. Undei English common law, jurisdiction to punish for contempt vests inevery Court of record, and that includes every superior Court and certain inferior Courts. It is a jurisdiction recognised ab antiquo to vest in every superior Court in the interests of the administration of justice. In the words of Wilmott C.J., in the celebrated opinion in R. v. Almon
(1965)Wilm. 243, 254, the jurisdiction of a superior Court to punish for contempt it depicted in these terms: "It is a necessary incident of every Court of justice _ _to fine and imprison for a contempt to the Court ". Bracton in the History of English Law, expressed the view there is no offence greater than the contempt and disobedience to orders of the Court—See, Borrie and Lowe on the Law of Contempt, 1973, p. 3. A more contemporary appreciation of contempt comes from Justice, the Organisation of Lawyers,whomade anevaluation of itssignificance in modern times in their 1959 Report, identifying contempt with the veiy existence of the legal system. "A Court" they said, "should have ample powers to enforce its orders and to protect these from abuse of itself or its procedure". Oswald, in his classic work on Contempt, defines it in the following terms: "To speak generally, contempt of Court may besaidtobe constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to inteifere with or prejudice parties, litigants or their witnesses during the litigation". The nature of thejurisdiction is, if 1 may say so with respect, explained in perfect clarity by Stephenson L.J., in Baloghv. The Crown Court [1974J 3 All E.R. 283 at p. 290 (letter /) and p. 40 291 (letter A): "If they are to do justice, they need power to administer it without interference or affront, as well as to 1503 Pikis J . Nissiotou v. Republic
(1983)enforce their own orders and to punish those who insult or obstruct them directly or indirectly in the performance of their duty or misbehave in such a manner as to weaken or lower the dignity and authority of a Court of law. Indirect interference with judicial proceedings may now be the moie serious and the 5 more frequent kind of contempt, though it was insulting behaviour in Court which once called for punishment of even more horrifying severity". Immediately preceding the above quotation the learned judge notes that the power to punish for contc.Tipt is as old as the Courts themselves "necessary for the 10 performance of their functions of administering justice The learned authors of Halsbury's Law of England subscribe to the proposition that jurisdiction to punish for contempt, isajurisdiction inherent ineverysuperior Court—See, Halsbury's Laws of England, Alh ed., Vol. 9, para. 3. 15 Considering the nature of the jurisdiction and the intention of the makers of the Constitution, as analysed above, to btstow upon the Supreme Constitutional Court a power similar to that exercised by superior English Courts to punish for contempt, we can fairly conclude that they intended to invest the Supreme 20 Constitutional Court with the necessary jurisdiction to administer justice effectively. Therefore, power to punish for contempt was not an independent species ofjurisdiction but one incedental to the exercise of every jurisdiction the Supreme Constitutional Court in the interests of the orderly and effective 25 transaction of judicial business; in fact, an attribute of its efficacy. More so,in view of the system of separation of powers entrenched in the Constitution, and the need to sustain the autonomy of the judiciary. Consequently, sub-section 2 of s. 11—Law 33/64, by vesting the jurisdiction of the Supreme 30 Constitutional Court under Article 146 to a single Judge, they vested jurisdiction in the same Judge functioning as a superior Court with the paraphernalia of such jurisdiction, the most significant of which is power to punish for contempt. Any contrary interpretation would be antagonistic to the nature 35 of the power to punish for contempt, as encountered in the Constitution, and the intention of the constitutional legislator to invest every superior Court with power to punish for contempt. Moreover, Article 146.5 of the Constitution imposes a specific 40 1504 3 C.L.R. Nissiotou v. Republic Pikis J. duty upon authorities of the State to comply with judgments and orders of the Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, and associates this duty with the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In Prodromou v. The 5 Republic
(1983)3 C.L.R. 990, Malachtos, J., assumed, without any jurisdictional objection from counsel for the Republic, jurisdiction to inquire into whether an order of the Court was complied with by administrative organs of the State. Jurisdiction was assumed within the context of the revisional juris10 diction of the Court. I assumed the exercise of a similarjurisdiction in Nishiotou v. TheRepublic (Reported in this part at p. 1483,ante). In myjudgment, Article 146.5confers, independently of the provisions of Article 150 of the Constitution, jurisdiction to inquire into whether ajudgment or an order of 15 the Court wascomplied with. An additional ground for claiming jurisdiction in contempt proceedings, is found in the provisions of rule 18 of the Rules of the Supreme Constitutional Court, making applicable, subjecttonecessarymodifications, theprovisions ofthe CivilProce20 dure Rules, including Order 43(A) regulating the power of the Court to punish for contempt. The definition of "Court'* given by rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules, leaves no doubt thatjurisdiction vestsinasingleJudgetodealwithanapplication for committal for contempt. 25 It is interesting to notice that common law countries that adopted or evolved administrative law as a distinct jurisdiction of the Courts, have extended contempt jurisdiction to Courts exercising revisional jurisdiction. Notable examples are the Republic of Ireland and Canada—(See, papers sub30 mitted by the Representatives of Canada and Ireland in the recent "Constituent Congress of the International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions", held in Paris on 8-9 December, 1983). A survey of the powers of administrative Courts, modelled 35 on the continental precedent to deal with recalcitrant administrative authorities*, reveals a steady trend towards vesting * See, papers submitted by Representatives of countries to the "Constituent Congress of the International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions", held in Paris on 8-9 Dec., 1983. 1505 3 CX.R. Nissiotou v. Republic Pitis J. power in administrative Courts to impose punishments for refusal to obey or give effect to judgments of administrative Courts. A notable example is the decree of 16th July, 1980, empowering the Council of State of Fiance to impose financial penalties on jurisdic and artificial persons in the interests of 5 enforcing compliance with orders of the Court. In Italy, the Judge is empowered, in the face of refusal of the authorities toimplement adecision oftheadministrativeCourt,to nominate a commissioner ad actatotake,onbehalf oftheAdministration, all necessary measures to ensure compliance with an order of 10 the Court. For all fhe above reasons, 1 conclude that Ihavejurisdiction to take cognizance of the application A date will be given for its hearing Ordetaccordingly, 15 1506