clr/1983/1983_3_1507.pdf

(2)of the Law. Council of Ministers—Executive powers—Article 54 of the Constitution. 20 Constitutional Law—Right to property—Article 23 of the Constitution —Requisition of Turkish Cypriot properties—No violation of the right toproperty of tenants of these properties because requisition is one of the constitutionally permissible ways ofinterfering with proprietary rights. 1507 Arlstides v. Republic

(1983)Constitutional Law—Requisition—Prompt payment of compensation —Article 23.8(d) of the Constitution—Principles applicable —Article 23.4(c). Constitutional Law—Right to enter into contract—Article 26 of the Constitution—Safeguards only the right to enter into a contract 5 and not the rights under acontract—Majority judgment inChimom'des r. Mangli

(1967)I C.L.R. \25 followed—In view of the provisions of Article HA ofthe Constitution, sub judice requisition orders of Turkish Cypriot properties do not violate Article 26, even if if were, eventually, to be found that the minority view 10 in the Chimonides case was the correct one. Constitutional Law—Right to carry out any trade or occupation— Article 25 of the Constitution—Requisition of Turkish Cypriot properties—The right of applicants to carry out their occupation asfarmers not infringed because the said Article does not exclude \5 interference with things which may be necessaryfor the exercise of the rights safeguarded by if. Constitutional Law—Discrimination—Articles 6 and 28 of the Constitution—Reasonable distinctions consistent with essential nature of things do not amount to discrimination—Requisition of Turkish 20 Cypriot properties— No contravention of the above Articles, Necessity—"Law of necessity"'—Requisition of Turkish Cypriot properties—Even if in conflict with any one oj the Articles of the Constitution or not in strict compliance with the Requisition of Property Law, 1962 {Law 21/62), their validity is saved by virtue 25 of the "Law of necessity" which coincides with tlic doctrine of "permissible deviation from legality in the strict sense on the ground of paramount public interest^, the Court having taken judicial notice of the exceptional and tragic circumstancesfor our country in the context of which such orders were made. 30 The first five applicants in case 184/75 were Turkish Cypriots who after the Turkish invasion, moved to areas occupied by the Turkish troups. The remaining applicants were Greek Cypriots to whom the aforementioned Turkish Cypriots had leased their properties on various dates in the summer of 1975. 35 The applicant in Cases 166/75 and 183/75 was in possession of Turkish Cypriot properties as a custodian and attorney of its owners. 1508 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 Aristldes v. Republic By means of requisition Orders, made under section 4 of the Requisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law 21/62 as amended by Law 50/66)there were requisitioned allthe movable and immovable properties, wherever they were to be found, which belonged to Turkish Cypriots and were not being personally used by them, and which had been abandoned by them when they had moved to areas of Cyprus which were then, and stilt are, under Turkish military occupation. Hencethese recourses. Intherequisitionordersitwasstated,interalia,thatthepublic benefit purposes for which they were made werethe protection of public order, the better utilization of property in the public benefit and theprovisionor maintenance of supplieswhichwere essential to life orwhichpromoted thewell-being ofthepeople. All such purposes were expressly referred to in section3

(2)of Law 21/62. Asitappearedfromtheorderstherequisition oftheproperties concerned was deemed imperative for their protection and for their more effective administration including the collection of the crops produced by such properties; and, also, in order to satisfy the needs of displaced population through the achievement of the public benefit purposes mentioned in the orders. Counsel for the applicants mainly contended: 25

1. fa)That the requisition orders were invalid because they were vague and too general, and, therefore, they have not properly been made under section 4 of Law21/62. (
2. b)That no notices were given in connection with the requisitions under section 5 of Law 21/62. (
3. c)That no due inquiry has preceded the making of the requisition orders in question. 30 35 (
4. d)That it was not lawfully possible to make a provision inthe saidorders for the managment of the properties affected by them by the "Central Committee for Protection of Abandoned Properties of Turkish Cypriots" because the said Central Committee was not a body set up under a Law. (
5. e)That the reasons for which the orders of requisition in question weremade arenot within thepublic benefit purposes enumerated in section 3

(2)of Law 21/62. 1509 Aristides v. Republic (1W3) <

1. f)That the said ordersviolated the right ofproperty which is safeguarded by Article 23 of the Constitution in that they interfered with the proprietary rights of those of the' applicants who were allegedly tenants of the properties which have been requisitioned. '5 (
2. g)That applicants have not been offered promptly compensation, either simultaneously with the making of the orders of requisition or soon afterwards, and that such an· offer was a prerequisite of the validity of the orders. 10 (
3. h)That the requisition orders violated the rights of ihe applicants under their alleged tenancies, contrary to Article 26 of the Constitution. (
4. i)That by means of the sub judice requisition orders there has been contravened the right of applicants under Article 25 of the Constitution to use the affected properties for the purposes of their occupations as farmers. (
5. j)That the effect of the requisition orders complained of was discriminatory against the applicants in a manner contrary to Article 6 of ;he Constitution. 15 20 Held,

(1)that the said orders, because of the very special situation which had to be faced, had to be of general application and they could not be more specific at the time when they were made; that their generality and the fact that they do not refer 25 separately to individual properties affected by them, as well as the lack of certain other formal particulars, does not prevent them, in the very special circumstances in which they were made, from being orders validly made under section 4 of Law 21/62 (see, also. Vasiadou v. Republic

(1973)3 C.L.R. 241 at pp. 250. 30 251).

(2)That section 5 of Law 21/62 is not a mandatory provision, but an enabling provision making possible a preliminary investigation prior to the making of an order of requisition under section 4 of the same Law; and that the failure, therefore, 35 to publish on these particular iwo occasions notices under section 5 does not invalidate the administrative processes which led to the making of the complained of requisition orders. 1510 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Aristides v. Republic

(3)That it is to be derived with certainty from the various relevant documents, which were produced by counsel for the respondents that a sufficient inquiry and study of the matter was made by the Government before it proceeded to resort to the making of the said two orders; that what constituies a proper inquiry prior to reaching an administrative decision is a matter depending on the circumstances of each case; and that in the circumstances of the present cases the requisition orders have been made after due inquiry.

(4)That what matters, for the legality of the orders concerned, is that they were made by the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Interior and Defence, respectively, who were duly empowered to make them under the relevant legislative provisions and it was not essential, too, that the organ to which the management of the properties was entrusted should have been an organ which was the creature of a statutory provision; that it was sufficient that the said Central Committee was set ' up by the Council of Ministers by its decision No. 14202 of 18th August 1975 (see No. 51 in the Fourth Supplement to the Official Gazette of 29th August 1975); and, that the said decision of the Council of Ministers setting up the Central Committee, was within the ambit of the very wide executive powers which have been vested in the Council of Ministers by means of Article 54 of the Constitution, and which include the general direction and control of the Government of the Republic and the direction of general policy and extend to all matters other than those specifically exempted from the competence of the Council of Ministers under the said Article 54.

(5)That, even assuming, without so deciding, that such reasons do not fully coincide with all the public benefit purposes which were referred to in the orders, definitely all the reasons for which they were made come within the clearly referred to in the said orders purpose of the better utilization and development of property in the public benefit and, therefore, both such orders were made for at least one ofthe public benefit purposes expressly enumerated in section 3

(2)of Law 21/62.

(6)That as it appears from Article 23. when it is read as a whole, requisition is one of the constitutionally permissible ways of interfering with proprietary rights and this is expressly 1511 Aristides v. Republic

(1983)provided for by means of paragraph 8 of Article 23; and that, therefore, it cannot be accepted that there exists, in the present instance, a violation of the right safeguarded by such Article.

(7)That since under Article23.8(

1. d)of the Constitution compensation has tohe paid promptly, and not in advance as under 5 Article 23.4(
2. c)of the Constitution, the failure to offer any compensation to the applicants during the length of timewhich has intervened between the dates when the requisition orders in question were made and the date when judgment was reserved in the present cases, does not amount to such an un- 10 reasonable delay (bearing particularly in mind the very exceptional circumstances in which the requisition orders were made) as to betreated as a contravention bythe respondents ofArticle 23.8(
3. d)of the Constitution (see, in this respect, inter alia, Injeyianniv. TheRepublic

(1968)3C.L.R. 482, 487; observations 15 inHadjiKyriakou (No. 1)v. CouncilofMinisters

(1968)3 C.L.R. at p. 9 repeated).

(8)That Article 26 of the Constitution safeguards only the right to enter into a contract and not the rights under a contract too. (See the judgment of the majority of the Full Bench of 20 the Court in Chimonides v. Manglis

(1967)1C.L.R. 125). Held, further, that evenifthe minorityview inthe Chimonides case, asregards the interpretation ofArticle26,above, is,eventually, found to be the correct one and it could, therefore, be held that rights acquired under a contract are also protected 25 by Article 26 again this Court would not be inclined, in the presentcase,tofindthat therequisition ordersinquestionviolate the said Article, because the right to contract, which is safeguarded by such Article has, in the light of, inter alia, Article 33.1 of the Constitution, to be construed as being subject to 30 limitations or restrictions by means of the effect of an order of requisition envisaged by paragraph 8 of Article 23 of the Constitution.

(9)That no right of the applicants under Article25is directly infringed and the said Article does not exclude interference with thingswhichmay benecessary for theexerciseof therights safeguarded by it.

(10)That the safeguard against discrimination, which is contained in Article 6, is an aspect of the protection against 1512 35 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 Aristides v. Republic discrimination or unequal treatment which is afforded, also, by Article 28 of the Constitution; that it is well established thai reasonable distinctions which are consistent with the esseniial nature of things do not amount to discrimination and, therefore, different persons or things may betreated differently in essentially different circumstances which justify such a course. Held, further, that had this Court found that the requisition orders in question were in conflict with any one of the Articles of the Constitution which were relied on by the applicants, or that they were not made in strict compliance with any one of the provisions of Law 21/62, it would not have any hesitation, having takenjudicial notice of the exceptional and tragic circumstances for our country in the context of which such orders were made, to find that their validity is saved by virtue of the "law of necessity", as expounded in The Attorney-General v. Ibrahim, 1964 C.L.R. 195, which coincides with the doctrine of "peimissible deviation from legality in the strict sense on the ground of paramount public interest", as such dortrine is explained in Tahos on Modern Trends of the Principle of Legality in Administrative Law. Applications dismissed. Cases referred t o : 25 30 35 Vasiadouv. Republic

(1973)3 C.L.R. 241 at pp. 250, 251; Nicolaou v. Minister of Interior

(1974)3 C.L.R. 189 at p. 192; HadjiKyriacou (No. I) v. Council of Ministers

(1968)3 C.L.R. I at p. 9; Injeyianni v. Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 482 at p. 487; Georghiou v. Municipality of Nicosia

(1973)3 C.L.R. 53 at p. 57; Ffangou v. Greek Communal Chamber

(1966)3 C.L.R. 201 at pp. 209, 210; Chimonides v. Manglis

(1967)1 C.L.R. 125; Psoras v. Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 353 at p. 364; Saba, Kypris & Co. v. Republic

(1980)3 C.L.R. 149 at p. 160; Aloupas \. National Bank of Greece

(1983)1C.L.R. 55; Impatex Agencies v. Republic

(1970)3 C.L.R. 361 at pp. 372, 373: 1513 Aristides v. Republic

(1983)Kontos v. Republic

(1974)3 C.L.R. 112at pp. 123, 124; Voyias v. Republic

(1974)3C.L.R. 390at p. 413; Papadopoullos v. Republic

(1965)3C.L.R. 401at pp.413, 414; Constantinou v. Republic

(1966)3 C.L.R. 572at pp. 581, 582; Papaleontiou v. Republic

(1967)3 C.L.R. I at p. 6; 5 Skyfrost Co.Ltd. v. Republic

(1979)3 C.L.R. I at pp. 7, 8; Attorney-General of the Republic v. Ibrahim,1964C.L.R. 195; Lepouse

(1958)Recueildes Decisions duConseild" Etat p. 596; and Revue du Droit Publique et de la Science Politique

(1959)pp. 306-314; 10 Mornet

(1971)Recueil desDecisions du Conseil d' Etat p. 289; and Revue du Droit Publique et de la Science Politique

(1972)p. 256; Siret v. Constantinou

(1981)1J.S.C. II. Recourses. Recourses against an order of compulsory acquisition affecting applicants' properties. N. Pelides, for applicants in Cases Nos. 166/75and 183/

1. E. Lemonaris with C. HadjiPieras, for applicants in Case No. 184/
2. Cur. adv. vult. 15 20 TRIANTAFYLLIDES P. read the following judgment. These three cases were heard together on common legal issues regarding the validity of two orders by means of which there were requisitioned movable andimmovable properties belonging 25 to Turkish Cypriots. Both thesaid orders weremadeunder section 4ofthe Requisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law 21/62), as amended by the Requisition of Property (Amendment) Law, 1966 (Law 50/66). Law 21/62 is the general Law in respect of requisitioning which isenvisaged byparagraph 8ofArticle 23ofthe Constitution. As it appears from the material before me, the applicant in 1514 30 3 C.L.R. Aristides v. Republic TriantafyUldes P. cases 166/75and 183/75allegesthat at thetime whenthe aforesaid requisition orders were made he was in possession of immovable properties belonging to the deceased Hussein Zihni Ibrahim and his family, who were living at Peristerona village, 5 andwho,after theTurkishinvasionof Cyprusinthesummerof 1974,moved to areas which had been occupied by the Turkish troops. This applicant alleges, also, that he was, initially, the lessee of such properties under a contract of tenancy which had expired and which wasnot renewed dueto theintervening, 10 inthemeantime,deathofthesaidIbrahim,andthatheremained in possession of the properties as a custodian and attorney authorized for this purpose by the heirs of lbiahim. Thefirstfiveapplicants in case 184/75 are Turkish Cypriots —(four of whom were residing at Ayios Sozomenos and the 15 other at Peristerona)—who, after the Tuikish invasion, moved to areas occupied by the Turkish troops. The remaining applicants are Greek Cypriots to whom the aforementioned Turkish Cypriots had leased their properties on various dates in the summer of
3. 20 The first of the aforementioned two requisition orders was made by the Council of Ministers on 11th September 1975 (see No. 671 in the Third Supplement, Part II, to the Official Gazette of the said date); and this order will be referred to hereinafter as order 671/
4. 25 The second requisition order, which was, obviously, intended to supplement and extend that which was made on 11th September 1975 as aforesaid, was made on 13th November 1975 by the Minister of Interior and Defence in the exercise of powers delegated to him by the Council of Ministers (see 30 No. 820, Third Supplement, Part II to the Official Gazette of 14th November 1975); and this order will be referred to hereinafter as order 820/
5. By virtue of order 671/75 there were requisitioned all the movable properties, wherever they were to be found, which 35 belonged to Turkish Cypriots and which had been abandoned by them when they had moved to areas of Cyprus which were then, and still are, under Tuikish military occupation. 1515 Triaotafyllides P. Aristides v. Republic

(1983)Bymeansoforder 820/75therewererequisitioned allmovable andimmovableproperties wherevertheyweretobefound which belonged to Turkish Cypriots and were not being personally used by them. Order 671/75 was made pursuant to decision No. 14273 which wastaken bythe Councilof Ministers on 11th September 1975 and order 820/75 was made by the Minister of Interior and Defence pursuant to decision No. 14423 of the Council of Ministers on 13th November 1975. 5 In the first of the above orders it is stated that the public 10 benefit purposes for which it was made were the protection of public order, the better utilization of property in the public benefit and the provision or maintenance of supplies which are essential to life or which promote the well-being of the people. All the above purposes are expressly referred to in section 3

(2)15 of Law 21/62. Inthesecond order itisstated that thepublic benefit purposes for which it was made were the provision or maintenance or development of supplies and services which are essential to life or which promote the well-being or amenities of thepeople 20 and the better utilization in the public benefit of properties; again, allthesepurposes areexpressly referred to in section 3

(2)of Law 21/

1. As it appears from the contents of the first order, that is order 671/75, the requisition of the properties concerned was 25 deemed imperativefor their protection and for their more effectiveadministration includingthecollection ofthecropsproduced bysuchproperties;and inorder 820/75,which,asalready stated in this judgment, is to be regarded as supplementary to order 671/75, it is stated that the requisition was imperative in order 30 to satisfy theneedsofdisplacedpopulation through theachievement of the public benefit purposes mentioned in the order. In this judgment I shall deal with themain arguments which were advanced against the validity of thetwo lequisition orders in question; and if I do not refer expressly to any particular 35 1516 3 C.L.R. Aristides v. Republic Triantafyllides P. argument which has been put forward in this respect this is not because 1 havedisregarded it,but because, having considered it, Ifound that it was obviously not well-founded and, therefore, it was not necessary to deal specifically with it. 5 It has been submitted by counsel for the applicants that the requisition oiders are invalid because they are vague and too general, and, therefore, that they have not properly been made under section 4 of Law 21/
2. In my view, the said orders, because of the very special 10 situation whichhad to befaced, had to be of general application and they could not be more specific at the time when they were made. Their generality and the fact that they do not refer separately to individual properties affected by them, as well as the lack of certain other formal particulars, does not prevent 15 them, in the very special circumstances in which they were made, m from being orders validly made under section 4 of Law 21/
3. As was said by A. Loizou J. in Vasiadou v. The Republic,

(1973)3 C.L.R. 241 (at pp. 250, 251) "Whether the reasons 20 given" in respect of an order of requisition "are clear enough to satisfy the aforesaid constitutional and statutory requirements, as well as those of the general principles of Administrative Law, is a matter depending on the nature of the reasons and the circumstances under which the order is made 25 It is the very nature of the purposes of public benefit for which the property is required that it did not make it essential to give more detailed reasons in support thereof. The order of requisition, aspublished, served itspurpose of giving sufficient notice to a person whose rights are adversely affected thereby 30 for the purpose of exercising his rights under the law and under Article 146 of the Constitution". Another contention of counsel for the applicants is that no notices weie given in connection with the requisitions under section 5of Law 21/62. In my opinion, the said section 5isnot a 35 mandatoiy provision, but an enabling provision making possible a preliminary investigation prior to the making of an order of requisition under section 4 of the same Law, and the failure, 1517 Triantafyllides P. Aristides v. Republic

(1983)therefore, to publish on these particular two occasions notices under section5does not inmyviewinvalidate the administrative processes which led to the making of the complained of requisition orders. It has, also, been contended by counsel for the applicants 5 that no due inquiry has preceded the making of the requisition ordersinquestion. Inmyviewitisto bederivedwithcertainty from the various relevant documents, which were produced by counsel for the respondents and to which I need not refer in detail, that a sufficient inquiry and study of the matter was 10 made by the Government before it proceeded to resort to the making of the said two orders. As was pointed out by A. Loizou J. in Nt'colaou v. The Minister of Interior,

(1974)3 C.L.R. 189, 192, what constitutes a proper inquiry prior to reaching an administrative decision is a matter depending on 15 the circumstances of each case;and I am quite satisfied that in the circumstances of the present cases the requisition orders have been made after due inquiry. In both the said orders it is stated that what is described as the "Central Committee for Protection ofAbandoned Properties 20 of Turkish Cypriots" is empowered to do all things necessary for the management of the properties affected by the orders; and it has been argued by counsel for the applicants that it was not lawfully possible to make such provision because the said Central Committee is not a body set up under a Law. In 25 my opinion, what matters, for the legality of the orders concerned, is that they were made by the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Interior and Defence, respectively, who weredulyempowered tomakethem undertherelevant legislative provisions and it was not essential, too, that the organ to which 30 the management of the properties was entrusted should have been an organ which was the creature of a statutory provision. It is sufficient that the said Central Committee was set up by theCouncilofMinistersbyitsdecision No. 14202of 18thAugust 1975 (see No. 51 in the Fourth Supplement to the Official 35 Gazette of 29th August 1975); and, in my opinion, the said decision of the Council of Ministers, setting up the Central Committee, was within the ambit of the very wide executive 1518 3 C.L.R. Aristides v. Republic Triantafyllides I*. powers which ha\f been vested in the Council of Ministers by means of Article 54 of the Constitution, and which include the general direction and control of the Government of the Republic and the direction of general policy and extend to all 5 matters other than those specifically exempted from the competence of the Council of Ministers under the said Article 54. It has been, furthermore, propounded by counsel for the applicants that the reasons for which the orders of requisition li) in question were made are not within the public benefit purposes enumerated in section 3

(2)of Law 21/62. I am quite satisfied that, even assuming, without so deciding, that such reasons do not fully coincide with all the public benefit purposes which are referred to in the orders, definitely all the reasons for which 15 they were made come within the clearly referred to in the said orders purpose of the better utilization and development of property in the public benefit and, therefore, both such orders were made for at least one of the public benefit purposes expressly enumerated in section 3

(2)of Law 21/62. 20 I shall deal next with the issues,relating to the alleged unconstitutionality of the sub judice requisition orders: it has been submitted that they violate the right of properly which is safeguarded by Article 23 of the Constitution in thatthey interfere with the proprietary rights of those of the 25 applicants who are allegedly tenants of the properties which have been requisitioned. As it appears from Article 23, when it is read as a whole, requisition is one of the constitutionally permissible ways of interfering with proprietary rights and this is expressly provided 30 for by means of paragraph 8 of Article 23. So, I cannot accept that there exists, in the present instance, a violation of the right safeguarded by such Article. Of course, as fairly conceded by counsel for the respondents, there might arise, to the extent that any legitimate proprietary rights of the applicants may 35 have been actually interfered with, the question of payment to them ofjust and equitablecompensation under sub-paragraph (

1. d)of paragraph 8, above. 1519 TriantafjHides P. Aristides \. Republic (I9S3J In this connection it has been complained of, on behalf cf the applicants, that they have not been offered promptly compensation, either simultaneously with the making of the orders of requisition or soon afteiwards, and that such an offer is a prerequisite of the validity of the orders. Ido not want to minimize at all the importance of the directive inArticle 23.8(
2. d)that compensation should be paid promptly; and. actually, in order to ensure this, provisions such as sections 10 and II of Law 21/62 have been enacted. It is, therefore, appropriate to repeat the following observation which has been made, in this connection, in HadjiKyriakou (No. 1) v. The Council of Ministers,

(1968)3 C.L.R. I (at p. 9): 5 10 "My understanding of the obligation foi prompt payment of compensation is that when the exceptional measure of requisition is resorted to the authority concerned should 15 bethen in a position to make an offer, at once,to the person affected, and if such offer is not accepted then a reference to Court should be made without delay. Procrastination in the matter on the part of the person affected is no excuse for the authority concerned; the duty to pay compensation 20 is cast upon such authority and it has to be discharged by it promptly". On the other hand, 1 would like to observe, in any event, that since under Article 23.8(

1. d)of the Constitution compensation has to be paid promptly, and not in advance as imdei 25 Article 23.4(
2. c)of the Constitution, the failure to offer any compensation to the applicants, during the length of time which has intervened between the dates when the requisition orders in question weremade and the date whenjudgment was reserved in the present cases, does not amount to such an unreasonable 30 delay (bearing particularly in mind the very exceptional circumstances in which the requisition orders were made) as to be treated as a contravention by the respondents of Article 23.8(
3. d)of the Constitution (see, in this respect, inter alia, Injeyianni v. The Republic,

(1968)3 C.L.R. 482, 487). Furthermore, there 35 should be pointed out that it was always open to the applicants, 1520 J C.I.,K. Aristides \. Republic Triantafyllides P. who claimed that they were entitled to be compensated because of the requisition orders concerned, to apply themselves, under section 11of Law21/62,for the assessment of such compensation (see,also, interalia, inthis respect. Georghiouv. The Municipality 5 oj Nicosia,

(1973)3 C.L.R. 53. 57). It has been contended, also, by the applicants that the requisition orders violate their rights under their alleged tenancies. contrary to Article 26 of the Constitution: In Fratigou v. The Greek Communal Chamber,

(1966)3 C.L.R. 10 201.209,1 had expressed the viewthat Article26of the Constitution safeguards only the right to enter into a contract and not the rights under a contract too. This view seems to have been adopted by the majority of the Full Bench of the Court in Chimonides v. Manglis,

(1967)1 C.L.R. 125,and was subsequent15 ly followed and applied in, inter alia. Psoras v. The Republic, (196S) 3 C.L.R. 353, 364. and in Saba, Kypris & Co. v. The Republic,

(1980)3 C.L.R." 149, 160. At the time when this judgment is being prepared I am well aware that the aforesaid majority view in the Chimonidescase. 20 supra, ischallenged as erroneous in the cases of Aloupas v. The National Bank of Greece (Case Stated 182) and Ambrosia Oils and Margarine Industry v. Bank of Cyprus Ltd. (Case Stated 183*. which are being heard by the Full Bench of this Court, but as 1 am delivering this judgment in the exercise of the first 25 instance jurisdiction of this Court I consider myself, on the strength of the principle of judicial precedent, bound by the majority view in the Chimonidescase and I have to adhere to it. Even if, however, the minority view in the Chimonidescase, as regards the interpretation of Article 26, above, is, eventually, 30 found to be the correct one and it could, therefore, be held that rights acquired under a contract are also protected by Article 26, again 1would not be inclined, in the present case, to find that the requisition orders in question violate the said Article, * Reported in

(1983)I C.L.R. 55. 1521 Triantafyllides P. Aristides >. Republic

(1983)because the right to contract, which is safeguarded by such Article has, in the light of, inter alia, Article 33.1 of the Constitution, to be construed as being subject to limitations or restrictions by means of the effect of an order of requisition envisaged by paragraph 8 of Article 23 of the Constitution. 5 It has been, also, contended by counsel for the applicants that by means of the sub judice requisition orders there has been contravened their right undei Article25of the Constitution to use the affected properties for the purposes of their occupations as farmers. 1 cannot accept as correct this 10 contention as by means of the requisition oiders no right of the applicants under Article 25 is directly infringed and the said Article does not exclude interference with things which may be necessary for the exercise of the rights safeguarded by it (see, in this respect inter alia, Impalex Agencies Ltd. v. The Republic, 15

(1970)3 C.L.R. 361, 372, 373, Kontos v. The Republic,

(1974)3 C.L.R. 112, 123, 124 and Voyias v. The Republic,

(1974)3 C.L.R. 390, 413). It has, further, been argued by counsel for the applicants that the effect of the requisition orders complained of is dis- 20 criminatory against the applicants in a manner contrary to Article 6 of the Constitution. The safeguard against discrimination, which is contained in Article 6, is an aspect of the protection against discrimination or unequal treatment which is afforded, also, by Article 28 of the Constitution; and 25 it is well established that reasonable distinctions which are consistent with the essential nature of things do not amount to discrimination and, therefore, different persons or things may be treated differently in essentially different circumstances whichjustify such a course (see, in this respect, inter alia, Papa- 30 dopoullosv. The Republic,

(1965)3C.L.R. 401,413,414,Frangou v. The Greek Communal Chamber,

(1966)3 C.L.R. 201, 209, 210, Constantinou v. The Republic,

(1966)3 C.L.R. 572, 581, 582, Papaleonliou v. The Republic,

(1967)3 C.L.R. 1,6, Skyfrost Co. Ltd. v. The Republic,

(1979)3 C.L.R. 1, 7, 8). 35 Anyhow, I should state, too, that had I found that the requisition orders in question were in conflict with any one of the 1522 3 C.1..R. Aristides v. Republic Triantafyllides P. Articles of the Constitution which were relied on by the applicants, or that they were not made in strict compliance with any one of the provisions of Law 21/62, I would not have any hesitation, having taken judicial notice of the exceptional and 5 tragic circumstances for our country in the context of which such orders were made, to find that their validity is saved by virtue of the "law of necessity", as expounded in 77M· AttorneyGeneralv. Ibrahim, 1964 C.L.R. 195, which coincides with the doctrine of "permissible deviation from legality in the strict 10 sense on the ground of paramount public interest", as such doctrineis explained inTahos on ModernTrends of the Principle of Legality in Administrative Law (Τάχου "Σύγχρονοι Τάσεις τη$ 'Αρχής της Νομιμότητος είς το Διοικητικόν Δίκαιου") —

(1973), pp. 144-146, and, in particular, at pp. 146. 147, 15 and at pp. 150-152; and, useful reference may. also, be made to the decisions, which are referred to by Tahos, of the Council of State in France in the cases of Lepouse,

(1958)Recueil des Decisions du Conseil d'Etat, p. 596, and Revue du Droit Publique et de la Science Politique

(1959)pp. 306-314, and of 20 Momet,

(1971)Recueil des Decisions du Conseil d'Etat, p. 289, and Revue du Droit Publique et de la Science Politique

(1972)p. 256. 25 30 Before concluding, I should observe that 1 have proceeded to give this judgment on the assumption, which 1 think that it isjustified by the material at present before me,that the afore­ said requisition orders do apply to the properties of the applicants; and, also, that the circumstances of these cases render them distinguishable from that of Siret v. Constantinou, which was decided by my brother Judge Pikis J. when he was President of the District Court of Larnaca (

(1981)! J.S.C.I I). I might add that had the orders not applied to the properties of the applicants then they would not be affected by them and they would not have a legitimate interest in the sense of Article 146.2 entitling them to file the present recourses. 35 In the light of all the foregoing 1have reached the conclusion that the sub judice requisition orders are not invalid and, conse­ quently, these recourses have to be dismissed, unless counsel for any of the applicants applies that any one of these recourses -1523 Triantafyllides P. Aristides v. Republic

(1983)fhould be fixed for further hearing in relation to any specific issue arising therein which has not yet been argued and determined. In view of the novelty of the matters raised there will be no order as to the costs of these cases. Recourses dismissed with no order as to costs. 1524 5